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#### IV. IMPLICATION FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY


The preceding sections have attempted to address the unique considerations relevant to dealing with China as a nuclear adversary in the 1985-95 time frame. The 'strategic culture' of the PRC was addressd, as were varius scenarios which illustrate potential nuclear confrontation between the two states. We also have postulated varius generic kinds of nuclear responses which the U.S. may want to consider, along with illustrative examples of generic target categories and examples of specific target sets. In this section, we examine the operational constraints on targeting China and the implications of our findings for U.S. national security policy, with special reference to acquisition and modernization, employment, deployment and arms control.

## 1. OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON TARGETING


In considering targeting options, planners cannot assume a totally free hand in determining the appropriate matching of weapons with targets. There are, in other words, constraints of limitations on the use of certain

weapon systems which must be taken into account when planning a nuclear weapons targeting strategy.

This section of the report describes some possible constraints in the case of targeting China. The list is not to be considered exhaustive but it probably does represent the most important of the considerations facing the planning community. A determined effort is needed by those directly reponsible for designing nuclear war plans to examine in much greater detail the seriousness of the constraints listed below for the period 1985-95 and how the United States may be able in that period to devise ways to overcome or minimize their potential impact.



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


# (4) Hard Target Kill Requirements

The hard target kill requirements for 1985-95 should not be particularly difficult to meet. However, there may be in the time period of interest more than a few score targets in China which might require weapons with very low CEPs and, in some cases, earth penetrating warheads may be the most appropriate kind of weapons to employ.

# (5) Soviet Preparedness to Intervene in China

Any U.S. nuclear operation against China will take place against the background of latent or overt Soviet hostility toward the Chinese.



In fact, under most circumstances it may be advisable to purposefully leave un-targeted those PRC weapons systems considered to be dedicated to the destruction or engagement of Soviet forces for the purpose of deterring aggressive Soviet behavior.

### 2. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

So far the research has focused on targeting. But ...
targeting is not the only dimension of U.S. nuclear weapon
policy. Other dimensions of U.S. nuclear policy, all of
which are related in some degree to targeting policy,
include the following:

- . Research and development and acquisition programs
- . Weapons deployment
- . Weapons employment doctrine
- . Arms control approaches and objectives.

Each of these policy issues are closely related and decisions in one area could have decisive impact on considerations and decisions in other areas. The following analysis considers each issue in-turn without prejudicing the cause-effect relationship or the prioritization of the issues. Throughout the presentation of the analysis the relationships among the issues are discussed.

## (1) Weapon Modernization and Acquisition Issues

Modernization and acquisition policy refers to those decisions concerned with the qualitative and quantitative aspect of nuclear force posturing.

Technical modifications which would, for example, improve the system survivability, reliability, or damage expectancy would be modernization decisions which enhance overall nuclear force effectiveness. At the same time, however, decisions to proceed with such improvement areas would affect employment doctrine and perhaps arms control opportunities.

Similarly,


quantitative expansion of the nuclear force could be at variance with existing arms control agreements or

Concurrently there are no modernization or acquisition programs dedicated to satisfying the requirements of the relevant Chinese target categories.

opportunities for new arms control initiative.




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### (2) Weapons Deployment

Weapons deployment policy decisions are primarily concerned with the location of weapons systems (CONUS-based or forward-based) and the mode of deployment -- land, sea or air delivery systems. Many factors are based on the deployment location decisions. Chief among these factors are the relationship of the China target package to the U.S. strategic nuclear forces,



Associated with the deployment policy decision are implications and considerations pertaining to employment doctrine and arms control policy. If


regional delivery systems, especially sea-based platforms, are allocated to the China target package, they could be routed to other trouble spots in times of crisis. Fixed regional assets could be extended range Pershings or GLCMs stationed in Korea. There could be arms control implication with any decision pertaining to launch platform and delivery mode. For strategic systems, the aggregate limitations could affect system availability for dedication to a China package. Also, range limitations imposed on cruise missiles under SALT or LRTNF could preclude the regional deployment of nuclear forces for a China target package.

## (3) Weapons Employment Doctrine

Employment policy decisions pertain to questions of how and under what circumstances nuclear weapons are to be used. Doctrinal issues are fundmental to this decision and target sets and weapon allocation plans represent the implementing factors. For example, assured destruction doctrine with its policy of deterrence and retaliation requires that the U.S. weapons be capable of targeting and destroying the adversary's population and industrial capacity. Such a doctrine may not be suitable with regard to China

because of its large population and the dispersion of industrial and agricultural capacity at least through the mid 1990s.

The U.S. commitment to a policy of deterrence has been steadfast since it was espoused in the early 1960s. Although the doctrine continues to be stated in terms of inflicting "unacceptable" levels of damage upon the Soviet Union's population and industry an added dimension was introduced by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in 1974. The Schlesinger doctrine of flexible response provides for limited strategic responses below the level of a total retaliatory attack on population and industry. This doctrine provides the flexibility needed to deter or to respond to limited first strikes. This doctrinal concept is vital in formulating U.S. policy with regard to China because of the spectrum of inimicable Chinese activity that could require a nuclear response by the United States.



To accomplish these goals,

according to Secretary of Defense Brown, the U.S. forces must be capable of imposing "... an unacceptably high cost in terms of what the Soviet leadership values most -- political and military control, military power, both nuclear and conventional, and the industrial capacity to sustain military operations."

In contrast to the voluminous literature and detailed description of doctrinal issue regarding the Soviet Union, there is little, if any, unclassified writings on U.S. nuclear doctrine regarding China.

l Air Force Magazine, October 1980, p. 21.

However, the analysis and matching of relevant Chinese target sets with specific U.S. objectives reveals similarity and parallelism between the U.S. doctrinal issues vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the doctrinal issues related to China. Flexible responses and escalation control over a wide range of Chinese activity inimicable to the United States is essential. Significant with respect to China is the nuclear force contribution to deterrence of Chinese conventional aggression. This significance stems from the Chinese military doctrine which for the foreseeable future does not focus on nuclear weapons. Rather, in keeping with the basic doctrine of the PLA, its Chinese rely on their manpower advantage and the infusion of modern weapons into the military forces over the next 10-15 years.

Thus for escalation control primary targets would include Chinese nuclear delivery systems (e.g., ICBMs, IRBMs, and bombers) as well as those targets which serve to sustain military aggression (e.g., depots, transportation facilities and command and control). In response to Chinese coercion of U.S. allies or Chinese interference with U.S. vital interests, real-time targeting decision could be made based on existing conditions. Nuclear weapon test and

production facilities, energy sources, minerals and processing plants illustrate the flexible response option. Target selection would, of course, be driven in large measure by the opportunity for collateral damage within and beyond the Chinese borders.

## (4) Arms Control

Arms control policy decisions pertain to the approaches of governments to individually or collectively regulate the levels and kinds of armaments already existing or possible in the future. As a nation, the United States is committed to equitable, verifiable arms control measures which contribute to stability and reduce the potential for the outbreak of nuclear war. While the U.S. is committed to this course of action, China is not ready to participate in strategic and/or tactical nuclear arms control negotiations. The Chinese nuclear weapon inventory is too small and China has been critical of the SALT process. Also, China's view of the Soviet pursuit of hegemony and China's concern over Soviet aggression would not be conducive to regional nuclear arms control negotiations.

There are two distinct areas of concern for the U.S. with regard to arms control and China. The primary area of concern is the effect of the U.S.-Soviet arms control measures on our ability to develop and deploy nuclear delivery system for engaging relevant Chinese targets. The second area of concern is to identify the opportunities for dialogue with China in order to encourage their participation in meaningful ways to control and safeguard inventory of Chinese nulcear weapons.

The qualitative and quantitative constraints of the SALT II agreement could impact the U.S. targeting capability against China. Significant among the qualitative restrictions would be the 600km range limitations on ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles. Such constraints are included in the Protocol to the SALT II Agreement. Although the Protocol would only last through December 1981, the precedent is established for range limitations or tactical or theater based systems.

Under the SALT II Agreement the maximum range for air launched cruise missiles (ALCM) is 2500km and all ALCMs with ranges over 600km could only be deployed on heavy bombers which would count under the aggregate

limit. Thus, SALT II would impose significant constraints on cruise missiles, perhaps the most appropriate system for targeting China. Because of the location of targets within China and because of their orientation with respect to the Soviet Union and other countries, SLCMs would be an effective weapon system. Such systems deployed under CINCPAC would avoid overflight of the Soviet Union, would not pose a discrimination problem for the Soviet Union, and could be of sufficient range (without arms control constraints) to put at risk all critical targets identified early in this report.

In addition to the precedents being established in the SALT negotiation, there is underway a multilateral arms control negotiation on the long range threater nuclear forces (LRTNF). This forum includes the United States, its NATO allies, and the Soviet Union. Subject to negotiation and limitation are the same tactical or regional systems that would be available for U.S. deployment in Asia for employment against targets in China.

These are the U.S. arms control initiatives that need to be weighed against potential weapon employment requirements of the future. Additionally, we need to

Chinese into arms control negotiation. While quantitative and qualitative arms control measures may be premature for China to accept, other issues provide opportunities for dialogue. These include approaches for safeguarding nuclear weapons, restricting proliferation, and promoting underground testing. These initiatives can be pursued in the context of existing agreements or treaties. For example, the Non-proliferation Treaty, the Accidents Agreement, and the Hotline Agreement offer opportunities for Chinese initiatives in arms control. Collectively, such arms control initiatives could shape the requirements and the developments of U.S. nuclear weapons policy.

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