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3. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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The way in which a country views the role of weapons, and especially nuclear weapons, is perhaps the most explicit indicator of strategic culture. Views on usable and unusable force, the nature of warfare in general and the role of nuclear weapons in particular, the requirements of nuclear deterrence, etc., are all indicators of how a country thinks about, plans for, and

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expects to fight a nuclear war. An understanding of this doctrine provides insight into the nuclear logic of the potential adversary.

[REDACTED] China's present-day military doctrine is largely traceable to the programs and perspectives originated by Mao and his followers during the Chinese civil war. Then, as now, the concept of "people's warfare," provided the means for supplementing a technically backward army with the one resource China possessed in abundance: her people. This approach to war, with its minimal dependence on technology, required little training for its rural population scattered in self-reliant villages. Capable of sustaining themselves even when isolated, the Chinese combatants could wage a protracted war of attrition. The political will of the masses, rather than technology, was considered to be determinant of success.<sup>1</sup> Until China's first nuclear detonation in 1964, the principal deterrent factor in Chinese military doctrine was the willingness to trade the resources China commanded in abundance: space, time, and people.

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[REDACTED] "The notion that the masses will prevail applies not only for the political and military defenses of China, but also in the sense that the masses will prevail against their enemies in the world as a whole; to doubt this proposition is to doubt the entire interpretation of history and the role of man from which the present Chinese political system draws much of its moral force." Gelber (1975:18)

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[REDACTED] Having entered the nuclear fraternity, the Chinese added a concept known to the West as "minimum deterrence." Mao is reported to have stated to Andre Malraux, in 1965 "All I want are six atom bombs. ✓ With these bombs I know that neither side will attack me." China's nuclear doctrine can be inferred from public statements regarding the role of nuclear weapons and the characteristics associated with weapon deployment. China has publicly subscribed to a "no-first-use" policy, has urged the same posture on the other superpowers at various times, and claims to maintain nuclear forces solely to prevent a superpower monopoly. The deployed force is designed with survivability in mind, even from a "bolt from the blue" attack. In addition, China has no allies whose protection is dependent upon an extended deterrent and hence nuclear doctrine need not be constructed to provide such a deterrent.

[REDACTED] Mao's dictum "store grain, dig tunnels deep and do not seek hegemony" explains a great deal with how the Chinese view nuclear war and deterrence. ✓ Officials of the PRC have stressed that any nuclear attack on China would have to be followed by the invasion and occupation of Chinese territory. Nuclear weapons are thus viewed as one element of the strategic situation. Consonant with Mao's "people's war" concepts, it is people and not weapons that

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decide the outcome of conflicts. The Chinese attempt to "devalue"<sup>1</sup> nuclear weapons in order to maximize their advantage where it is strongest: in conventional defensive battle.

[REDACTED] At the same time that nuclear weapons are down played in the overall correlation of forces, the utility of nuclear weapons as a deterrent remains part of Chinese doctrine. The importance of psychological factors plays a central role in Chinese strategic culture. Emphasis on 'peoples' war is an attempt to "psych out" any potential aggressor as is emphasis on the nuclear retaliatory deterrent. The "swaggering" type deterrence philosophy of the Chinese distinguishes it from the U.S. or Soviet Union.

"Whereas U.S. and Soviet writing on nuclear strategy stress that no rational leader would deliberately chose to start a war knowing that victory would not be achieved or that unacceptable damage or national suicide would result, the Chinese emphasize the psychological factors that either lead to or prevent war. In the Chinese view, it is not the larger army but the feelings the aggressor has about the potential victim that either invites or deters war... The concept of an emotionally based deterrent to war dates back to the earliest Chinese strategic writings."<sup>2</sup>

1 [REDACTED] Gelber, (1975:19) Pollack notes that the "dig tunnels deep" doctrine represent(s) the ultimate form of strategically despising but tactically respecting nuclear weapons and its destructional power." Pollack, (1979:27).

2 [REDACTED] Pillsbury, (1980:53).

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[REDACTED] Recent accounts suggest that the Chinese do recognize that they are in a "new historical condition" with the advent of nuclear weaponry, although not as much importance is attached to the decisive role of such weapons as in the West. The recognition on the part of Mao that the PRC would need nuclear weapons in order not to be "bullied in the present day world" indicates that the threat of nuclear weapons is taken seriously. Were the nuclear threat not taken seriously, the Chinese could not be bullied by them, and would have no use for the acquisition of nuclear weaponry. The PRC "minimum deterrent" is based on a recognition of the coercive power nuclear capability represents. A relatively small and survivable nuclear force represents a significant deterrent and provides prestige to the Chinese regime. The importance of conventional forces and "people's war" is continually stressed, as is China's peaceful intent in acquiring nuclear weapons, as evidenced in her "no first use" stance promulgated since the 1964 detonation.

[REDACTED] The importance placed by the Chinese on a secure retaliatory deterrent, coupled with a doctrinal and pragmatic inability to engage in sophisticated 'limited strategic' warfare planning, suggests that the most threatening targeting option would be [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. CHINA'S MILITARY POSTURE

The military posture of a state reveals a great deal about the kind of war it envisages, its resources and its commitments. An examination of the military posture of the PRC provides insight into its strategic culture, and reflects earlier discussion of the Chinese economic plan, leadership, and nuclear doctrine.

The foundation of China's strategic forces derives from Soviet technology during the 1950's. Under a series of military assistance agreements with China in that decade, the Soviets supplied a GOLF-class submarine, and several Tu-16 medium bombers, in addition to aiding in the development of China's nuclear weapons facilities at Lop Nor and Lanchou. Since the Soviet schism, the Chinese

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have moderately extended these technologies and modernized their own facilities for the production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.<sup>1</sup>

[REDACTED] The strategic weapon systems are limited in range capability and thus do not currently present a threat to CONUS or the western Soviet Union. These strategic systems do, however, possess significant strike capability against regional targets and could be used to coerce U.S. allies or challenge U.S. security interests.<sup>2</sup>

[REDACTED] Today, the missile force consists of some 50 CSS-1, 65-85 CSS-2, 4 CSS-3, and, in its final development stages, the CSS-X-4 ICBM. There are no reported SLBMs in the diverse strategic inventory, but development of such a capability has been underway for some years. In addition, China has approximately 100 Tu-16 (Badger) medium bombers, 200 IL-28 (Beagles) and 100 Tu-2 (Bat) light bombers.<sup>3</sup> The Badgers, and perhaps the Bat aircraft, could be capable of nuclear delivery.

1 [REDACTED] See Table 2-1 for a display of Chinese nuclear weapons development 1970-1980, and illustrative extrapolations.

2 [REDACTED] United States Military Posture for FY81, an overview by General David C. Jones, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 76.

3 [REDACTED] The Military Balance, 1980-1981, IISS, p. 62

**TABLE 2-1**  
**CHINA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY: 1970 TO 1995**

	1970.1	1971.2	1972.1	1973.4	1974.5	1975.6	1976.7	1977.8	1978.9	1979.80	1985	1990	1995
Submarine	1 G class submarine launched but no missiles												
ICBM/IRBM/CRBM	approx 120	approx 120	approx 150	approx 200	200-300	200-300	200-300	several hundred			approx 500	2 with missiles	4 with missiles
MRBM	none deployed	approx 20 deployed (range up to 1,809 km)	approx 20-30	about 50 deployed	about 50 deployed	about 50 deployed (range 1,127 km)	30-50 may be phased out	30-40 CSS-1 1.3 MT deployed	30-40 CSS-1	40-50 CSS	50-85	85-80	80-150
IRBM	—	—	developed 15-20 (range 2,414-4,023 km)	produced 15-20 (range 5,633 km)	20-30	20-30 (range 2,414-2,818 km)	20-30 now operational	30-40 CSS-2 1.3 MT	30-40 CSS-2	60-70 CSS	80-80	80-100	100-210
CRBM	—	—	—	being developed	being developed	ready for deployment (range 5,633 km); ICBM with 12,875 km range being deployed; 12,875 km range not operational	ICBM with 5,633 km range now operational; ICBM with 12,875 km range in development	ICBM with 5,633 km range may now be deployed; 12,875 km range in development	limited ICBM (range 6,437 km)	2 CSS-3 (limited range of 6,437 km)	5-15	10-40	40-60
Tu 16	some	at least 30 (range 2,375 km)	100	100	100 (radius of action 3,275 km)	80	65	80	80	80-90	80-120	120-180	160-210

Source: The Future of Strategic Deterrence Part I, Adelphi Paper #616, NS, 1980, p. 39

[REDACTED]

The surface-to-surface missiles are in essence the only operational leg of the Chinese strategic force. Although modest in size, it is growing slowly and probably does fulfill its minimum deterrence role vis-a-vis the USSR. The force is deployed in fixed and mobile configurations. Conscious efforts to assure survivability of the force are evident, through hardening, dispersal, and deception. The force has also demonstrated a road-transportability, implying that, upon notification, firing units would move to unidentified locations away from normal base areas to execute their firing missions. Alternatively, some rapid-reaction capability may have been built into the force by allowing launch from immediately based areas.

[REDACTED] Given the level of technology believed to be exhibited by these systems, they are generally assessed to have an area strike role. Because of the deployment characteristics they could be slow in responding and because of poor accuracy they would not be reliable for targeting hard point targets. From an overall force vantage point, the Chinese SSM inventory today probably represents a credible deterrent to the USSR, China's principal avowed adversary. Indeed, the deployment of China's nuclear forces--near the border with Korea, south and west of Peking and south and west of Outer Mongolia, suggests they are intended to deter the Soviet Union.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The MRBMs, of which these were some 40-50 operationally deployed in 1979, are estimated to have a range of 600-700 miles, but may well be phased out and replaced by IRBMs with ranges of 1,500-1,750 miles. The number of operational IRBMs has been slowly increasing--in 1979 these were some 50-70 as compared to 65-85 in 1980. The number of MRBMs have not increased. The IRBMs are deployed in locations which put Soviet cities east of the Urals and regions of Central and Eastern Asia within range. The MRBMs are capable of striking at targets only in the eastern-most regions of Soviet territory.<sup>1</sup> Some MRBMs are deployed so far into the interior they could only be used against targets on Chinese soil. The range of the MRBM and IRBM systems, could enable China to apply strong pressure against all peripheral countries including Korea, Japan, Thailand, and India.

[REDACTED] A multi-stage ICBM (Inter-continental ballistic missile) with a range of 3,000-3,700 miles and a concomitant capability for reaching European Russia, was first tested in 1976 and some have been deployed. Recently, two CSS-C-4 ICBMs successfully completed their first maximum range tests. In May, 1980, CSS-X-4 reentry vehicles were landed in the Pacific about 6,400 miles from

[REDACTED] The Military Balance, 1980-1981, IISS, p. 61.

[REDACTED]

the missiles' launch site. China's operational missiles are liquid-fueled, a circumstance which could complicate handling and storage. To overcome these difficulties, a solid-fueled ICBM is reputedly under intensive development.

[REDACTED] Supplied by the Russians before the schism, a Chinese submarine with missile tubes is in operation (a GOLF-Class SSB, but lacking the SS-N-4 missiles associated with that class). No SLBMs (Submarine-launched ballistic missile) appear to have been yet developed for it, though such a program has been underway for several years.

[REDACTED] The Chinese apparently have no analogue to the manned bomber element of SAC or to the Long Range Aviation (LRA) of the Soviet Union. Although the Tu-16 force is capable of ranges which carry it into important peripheral areas (including Japan) there are no reports to indicate that the Chinese envision a manned penetrating role for this or follow-on aircraft in time of war. More likely, the aircraft would be used in support of conventional warfighting objectives possibly with nuclear weapons to stem the invasion of Chinese territory.

[REDACTED] In summary, the complement of China's operational strategic forces over the 1979-1980 period could be enumerated as follows:

[REDACTED]

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Designation</u>	<u>Range (nm)</u>
2	ICBM	CSS-3	3,000-6,000
50-70	IRBM	CSS-2	1,500-1,750
40-50	MRBM	CSS-1	600-700
90	Aircraft	Tu-16 (medium bombers)	2,000

[REDACTED] Prospects for Chinese strategic forces through the year 1995 are for steady improvement in capability and in number of systems deployed. Improved system capability and performance could be achieved as a result of training and experience as well as the introduction of advanced technology. Illustrative of system enhancements are improved guidance, solid fuel propellants, improved mobility, and payload fractionation (MRVs or MIRVs). Indeed, the mode of testing in the 1970s suggests that the Chinese are attempting to enhance the yield/payload ratio. The pace of modernization is expected to be slow for it will be constrained by the competition for scarce technology resources and skills. The strategic systems will be competing for the slowly developing capabilities for research and development, testing and production.

[REDACTED] In addition to scarce technical skills and resources, there is a shortage of foreign exchange and an internal objective to avoid dependency on the West. This scarcity

[REDACTED]

will require difficult policy decisions regarding size and composition of the strategic forces. These decisions would include the mix of IRBMs and ICBMs as well as the mix between bombers, SLBMs and surface-to-surface missiles. Based on the research and production capacity, Chinese military doctrine and their national modernization goals, an expansion in strategic missile quantities by a factor 2 to 3 can be envisioned for an inventory of 200 to 300 surface-to-surface missiles by 1995. Concurrently, improved basing schemes, mobile and fixed site, with the attendant command and control should be expected. Because of competition for scarce technology resources, and in view of the Chinese doctrine and defense posture, it is unlikely that a very large bomber, ICBM or SLBM force will be deployed in 1995. However it can be expected that for perception and survivability of regionally oriented forces SLBM development and deployment will receive priority over the CSS-3 and CSS-4 ICBM programs. Thus the SLBM force could go from zero today to some significant level by 1995 while the ICBM would probably increase from 2 in 1980 to perhaps 40 by 1990. The emphasis with regard to bombers will continue to be on their development and the expansion and modernization of the production base for aircraft of all types. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Since the late 1960s, trends in Chinese nuclear deployment suggest a continuation, perhaps for the duration of the period under consideration (1985-1995), of a restrained nuclear program, one intended almost solely for the most exigent of circumstances. This projection is based on the recognition that up to now the settled nuclear wisdom among the client elite has emphasized minimum deterrence. To be sure, there are persistent institutional pressures to undertake a more comprehensive and intensive nuclear program. However these pressures are resolved, the highest probability through the mid-1990s is that the notion of minimum deterrence will prevail in view of the needs for maintenance and modernization of Chinese forces, in addition to competing claims in the other areas of the "four modernizations."

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[REDACTED]

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### III. SCENARIOS AND TARGETING

[REDACTED] The development of a target selection strategy requires some appreciation of the kind of future situations in which the United States could use nuclear weapons against the Chinese. In what follows there is first presented a relatively brief set of scenarios relevant to the 1985-95 time period in which the attempt is made to project some hypothetical conflict situations serious enough to warrant the use of nuclear weapons.

1. [REDACTED] The first scenario considers a possible replay of the Chinese decision to intervene in the Korean War. The fact that Korea remains divided and that the long-range prospects for reunification do not appear particularly high suggests the possibility of U.S. Chinese conflict in the future patterned after events which took place 30 years ago, including the possible use of U.S. nuclear weapons against installations on mainland China.
  
2. [REDACTED] The second scenario concerns the possible development of a client or proxy state of the PRC in the third world or perhaps even in a more developed region analogous to

[REDACTED]

the client/proxy status of Albania with respect to China after the Sino-Soviet rupture in the early 1960s. Proxy wars are not an unusual feature of contemporary international relations and there is no reason to believe they will not continue to be a prominent aspect of world politics in the next 20 years.

3. [REDACTED] The third scenario considers the phenomenon of catalytic war. The premise here is that, under certain circumstances the Chinese may be convinced that their single best option in a deteriorating political or military situation would be to incur the risks attendant to trying to precipitate a U.S./Soviet nuclear exchange.

[REDACTED] The scenarios are treated briefly because it was not considered productive to expend a great deal of effort describing the development of the scenarios and how the particular crisis might or might not be resolved through the use of nuclear weapons. The uncertainty of the 1985-95 period did not seem to justify a very detailed elaboration of the specific chronologies and decision points.

[REDACTED] The decision was therefore made to develop a bounded set of targeting missions (some of which were generated as a result of working through the scenarios) and then to proceed with consideration of which target categories were

[REDACTED]

most consistent with the execution of the missions. As was to be expected, it was found that some target categories could serve more than one mission. In the respective descriptions of the target categories, there is not a uniform level of detail due primarily to lack of available information.

[REDACTED] 1. ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIOS

[REDACTED] This section of the report describes a selected number of hypothetical scenarios in which the United States might be forced to use nuclear weapons against the PRC in the 1985-95 time period.

[REDACTED] It should be noted at the outset that these scenarios are primarily methodological devices for trying to establish the kind of international incidents or crises that could lead to the use of U.S. nuclear weapons against the Chinese. The scenarios are not the analysts' predictions of what is likely to happen in 1985-95. Some of the scenarios may seem unlikely and to some may lack credibility, but crises by definition are typically unexpected occurrences--few, if any, would have believed in the early 1960s that within one or two years the world would be faced with the prospect of a nuclear war as a result of the deployment of Soviet missiles on the island of Cuba.

[REDACTED]

(1) Korean War Re-visited

[REDACTED] One can postulate a "Korean War re-visited" scenario for the timeframe of interest. To examine this scenario one recalls that Chinese entry into the Korean War was prompted by concern that the war would spill over into China, as well as by a strong commitment--both personal and ideological--to Kim Il Sung. Additionally, China shares a long border with North Korea along the Yalu River, and remains sensitive to the impact that events on the Korean peninsula have on Chinese security. Fear that the South Korean and U.N. (U.S.) forces would attain victory in Korea, coupled with the potential of that conflict extending to China and undermining the embryonic revolution, provided the impetus for Chinese involvement.

[REDACTED] Twenty-seven years after the Korean armistice, tensions remain high on the peninsula. Latent political instability in South Korea and uncertain North Korean intentions to exploit any major outbreak of social and political turmoil in the South to militarily effect unification in one of the most heavily armed areas of the world suggests that the potential for renewed Korean hostilities exists.

[REDACTED]

While initiation of a possible conflict would almost certainly originate in Korea itself, the interests of the Chinese, Soviets, Japanese and the United States would be involved in the execution and termination of another Korean war.

[REDACTED] The current and foreseeable Sino-Soviet rift introduces a new factor in the Northeast Asian security equation. Kim Il Sung has mutual defense treaties with both Moscow and Peking. Neither wants to upset the current balance on the peninsula but neither can really control Kim who plays one off against the other. Moscow has traditionally provided more military equipment and assistance to North Korea than has the PRC; the PRC supports Kim Il Sung's cause of national unification, while the Soviets are on record as favoring a "German type" divided country status in Korea. Trends over the past five years have moved Kim Il Sung closer to the Chinese.

[REDACTED] Should an inter-Korean conflict erupt, the U.S. would find itself involved immediately, and it is unlikely (though possible) that this would change by 1995. Both, the PRC and USSR would feel constrained to offer aid to North Korea, if only to preserve a position of influence in Pyongyang. The implications

[REDACTED]

of escalation to strategic nuclear war have provided a strong incentive in the past to avoid direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Presumably, this would apply to another Korean war. But would the Chinese be so restrained? The existence of strategic and theater nuclear options with which the U.S. could respond to a confrontation with the PRC would (to an uncertain degree) deter direct Chinese involvement in a renewed Korean conflict; and should Chinese forces enter the conflict, the existence of U.S. nuclear options in the Asian theater would enable the U.S. to convey to the Chinese that the PRC might not remain a sanctuary as it did in 1950-1953.

[REDACTED] (2) Chinese Client/Proxy State

[REDACTED] In the 1960s western analysts were concerned about the Chinese potential for exporting revolution throughout the third world. That potential was seriously deflated during the turmoil of the cultural revolution and immediate prospects for China making significant diplomatic headway in places like Africa and Latin America appear at this junction to be rather remote.

[REDACTED] Should the regime in China sufficiently stabilize itself in the near future, however, it could begin to

[REDACTED]

look increasingly beyond its borders for the purpose of strengthening its international position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the United States. The motivation behind this behavior may not be so much ideological in the sense of trying to develop Communist regimes modeled after the regime in Peking but rather of a more pragmatic nature aimed at strengthening the Chinese economic situation or denying the superpowers an unchallenged monopoly in various geographical regions around the globe.

[REDACTED] Regimes in unstable areas like Africa or Latin America could become in other words client or proxy states of the PRC. They would either become dependent on China for military arms yet retain their political independence or they would become "puppet" regimes of the PRC with little or no political identity of their own. In either case, such regimes could become crisis areas for U.S. military policy, particularly if those regimes were already anti-American in their political orientation.

[REDACTED] Chinese behavior under such circumstances could conceivably be patterned after the Soviet role in Cuba in the early 1960s. The Soviets deployed missiles in Cuba even though they were no strategic match for the

[REDACTED]

United States in terms of strategic weapon systems. In the Cuban missile crisis, there was an apparent U.S. readiness to consider escalating the conflict, if necessary, to the targeting of assets of Soviet territory. Installation of Chinese weapons in some Latin American country in the 1985-95 period could be responded to by the targeting of PRC assets in China. ✓

[REDACTED] In this connection one can keep in mind the control the Chinese exercised over a submarine base in Albania during the period of the Sino-Soviet rift in the 1960s. Virtually in the backyard of the Soviet Union the Chinese were involved in maintaining a military base of operations miles away from their national territory and with no nuclear weapons capability to deter Soviet actions.

[REDACTED] (3) Catalytic War

[REDACTED] The Chinese could under certain conditions in the 1985-95 time period decide that the appropriate option for them would be to try to precipitate a nuclear war between the superpowers. One set of circumstances leading the Chinese to contemplate such behavior might be a U.S./Soviet partnership of some kind which the Chinese perceived as directed against China. Another

[REDACTED]

set of circumstances might be the result of a deteriorating Chinese relationship with either the Soviet Union or the United States, one in which the Chinese were expecting intervention or armed conflict.

■ For the Chinese the assumption behind initiating a superpower war would be that the war would take place "over the heads" of the Chinese or that damage would be limited to tolerable levels. How prepared the superpowers would be to allow the Chinese to remain outside a superpower nuclear exchange would be a key judgement for the Chinese leadership.

■ A further risk to the Chinese would be that their attempt would be discovered and punitive actions would be taken by the superpowers, either independently or collectively.

■ The ability of the Chinese to initiate a catalytic war will depend heavily on such technical factors as the capacity of the United States and the Soviet Union to discriminate between and among different launching platforms and weapon systems. Later in this report there will be a discussion of some of the operational problems planners might

[REDACTED]

encounter when conducting nuclear strikes against the PRC and in that section the problem of SLBM discrimination will be discussed.

2. MISSIONS AND TARGET CATEGORIES

From the foregoing discussion of the kind of circumstances which could lead to military confrontations, we can deduce that Chinese behavior could be influenced by the possibility of a number of nuclear missions. Though in some circumstances the boundaries between them may become blurred, we can generally delineate them as follows:

- . Deterrence of inimical Chinese actions
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

- . Massive retaliation
- . Disarming retaliation
- . Tit-for-tat response
- . Nuclear operations in a protracted war.

Our task in this section is to identify and characterize categories of Chinese targets appropriate for the fulfillment of these missions and to deduce those implications likely to affect our nuclear policies. In accomplishing this task we will discuss each mission in

[REDACTED]

turn, considering those generic types of targets likely to provide the greatest leverage in achieving the effects sought in its undertaking and then we will identify specific Chinese target categories that fit the bill. Although there is overlap in the Chinese target categories selected for the missions listed above each mission will be discussed since policy implications are also derived from the requirements for mission execution.

[REDACTED] (1) Deterrence of Inimical Chinese Actions

[REDACTED] 1. Concept Definition

[REDACTED] The purpose of deterrence is to dissuade an opponent from unacceptable actions by threatening him with costs so great as to overwhelm any benefits he may expect in undertaking such actions. It follows that nuclear deterrence requires putting at risk those things the opponent's leadership values most. Determining just what these things are apt to be is more difficult in the case of China than it is elsewhere.

[REDACTED] There is indeed an argument that China is prepared to sacrifice material things--even her population--in pursuit of less tangible values to

[REDACTED]

a degree unmatched by the West and, in consequence, that deterrence in the usual sense is not an effective ploy. Mao's willingness to sacrifice China's economy, industrial capacity, educational system, party apparatus, and government structure to the cultural revolution in an effort to preserve the spirit of the revolution seems to support such a view. On the other hand, one can argue that Mao acted precisely so as to give up the pursuit of apparent benefits (higher economic growth rates, better institutionalized instruments of control, etc.) to avoid an unbearable associated cost (Chinese bureaucracies and loss of revolutionary élan as exemplified in the USSR). If the things that are truly most important to the leadership can be credibly put at risk, they will be dissuaded by the prospect of their loss.

[REDACTED] Moreover, the eclipse of the gang of four has marked a return to more "pragmatic" policies which are more easily understood in the West. While the twist and turn of China's internal political development cannot give us much confidence in projecting the long-term endurance of these policies, its likelihood grows the

[REDACTED]

longer they remain in effect and the greater their success. The emergence of a new leader as ferocious and stalwart in protecting the revolution as Mao would be surprising in the next 15 years.

[REDACTED] Nuclear deterrence simply must constitute a foreign policy tool if our relations with China reach a state where no consonance of views remains and military confrontation characterize our relations. Some degree of deterrent effect automatically flows from our possession of the means to deliver nuclear weapons to the Chinese mainland. A credible, perceptive targeting and declaratory policy will strengthen this effect, and reduce the likelihood of misperceptions which could lead to the actual use of nuclear weapons.

[REDACTED] 2. Generic Target Categories

[REDACTED] The following classes of things will almost certainly be valued highly by any Chinese leadership likely to emerge in the next 15 years:

- [REDACTED]
- . Objects of leadership responsibility, e.g. revolutionary continuity, Chinese great-power status, and protection of population
  
  - . Significant accomplishments achieved through major investments of the leadership
  
  - . Military capabilities for self protection and the maintenance of internal order, and
  
  - . Leadership continuity.

[REDACTED] No leader could sacrifice such things as these without abandoning his sense of responsibility to his people and to history. The leader that can face such choices--Hitler in his last days, perhaps--is committed to destruction for its own sake and is beyond the reach of rational interaction with the outside world.

[REDACTED] 3. Relevant Chinese Target Categories

[REDACTED] The leadership of the People's Republic of China has been characterized by a deep sense of

[REDACTED]

responsibility toward the Chinese people and toward preserving the traditions and achievements of the revolution. Key among the latter is the return of China to a position of world power compatible with earlier periods of greatness. The purely cultural aspects of the Chinese historical legacy, such as confucianism, have been regarded coolly by Maoists and, in the excess of the cultural revolution, actually repudiated. There is a clear perception on the part of the current leadership that it has a responsibility not to allow the masses to slip back into "old ways" at the expense of the revolution. What targetable Chinese treasures are the most highly valued in the eyes of the current leadership? The best answer seems to be those material products of the revolution that have served, even if only symbolically, to restore China to its historical position of power and esteem and which have given promise of enhancing and ensuring that position in the future. A list of such things might include the following:

- . Nuclear weapons production capabilities: plutonium production reactors and associated chemical

[REDACTED]

separation plants, uranium enrichment facilities, and weapons assembly facilities.

- . ICBM (CSS-3 and CSS-4), production, test and launch facilities including deployed launchers.
- . Major military installations supporting Chinese deployments along Soviet border; whether or not these and MR/IRBMs would be targeted would depend on the triangular relationship between the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union.
- . Advanced R&D facilities involving defense technology.
- . Major seaports.
- . Major heavy industrial centers.
- . Population in 20 most populated cities; though the percentage of total population is low, this represents a particularly valuable element since it

[REDACTED]

comprises a very large portion of the higher technological skills within China which are assuming growing importance to the leadership. As current policies continue, this population is likely to become the focus of the revolutionary movement. This population is likely to be included in other military and industrial targeting but should be identifiable on its own right as a potential cost and deterrent to unacceptable acts by the PRC.

. NCA Relocation Facilities - Though the identification of these would be difficult, the importance of threatening continuity of PRC leadership argues strongly for developing the basis for targeting facilities expected to house and protect key leaders whose loss would disrupt party, government, and military functioning in the aftermath of a U.S. attack.