U. S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY TOWARD CHINA: 1985-1995

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**Abstract:**

This report addresses the need to examine U.S. policy guidelines towards the Peoples Republic of China. China's continuing growth in nuclear weapons capabilities requires an investigation of the potential role China could play in the international arena in this period 1985-1995.
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The concern of this report is with the nuclear weapons policy of the United States toward the People's Republic of China. The period of interest is 1985-95. Its primary focus is on nuclear doctrine, specifically the kind of nuclear weapons employment policy that might be required by the United States in that period. The report therefore is particularly concerned with the need to develop an appropriate target selection strategy.

The report does not itself develop such a strategy—that responsibility properly lies with planners in the Pentagon and at the Strategic Air Command. What the report does is to identify various kinds of circumstances in which the United States might be faced with the need to employ nuclear weapons against Chinese assets, to identify a range of specific nuclear missions associated with those circumstances, and to 'map' the various missions with generic target sets and target categories.
Targeting has in recent years become a subject of keen interest to policy planners. Adoption of the so-called Schlesinger Doctrine in 1974 and Presidential Directive 59 in 1980 were significant turning points in the evaluation of U.S. targeting policy in the post-war period. The shift is away from countervalue targeting and retaliatory strikes aimed at punishing the adversary toward an emphasis on counterforce attacks and damage derived. Without access to SIOP and other classified targeting documents it is not possible to know how the PRC is "built into" U.S. nuclear war plans.

This is clearly not to argue that China will inevitably become a nuclear adversary of the United States. Current trends suggest a degree of stability in U.S.-Sino relations unprecedented in the post-1949 period. However, power alignments change in international politics and one cannot ignore the possibility of China becoming once again antagonistic toward the United States. China's continuing commitment to the development

of nuclear weapons makes it even more necessary for the United States to consider the prospects for nuclear weapons.

Some time ago, in the section of his book entitled "China as a 'Strategic Warfare' Adversary," Thomas Schelling wrote that:

...hardly anyone seems to have thought about what kind of war it would be or ought to be if the U.S. became directly engaged with China... We need to recognize that China as a 'strategic' adversary, could not be taken care of by 'strategic-war' planning that was developed during two decades of preoccupation with the Soviet Union. China is a different strategic problem altogether.*

This report has the objective of trying to help rectify whatever neglect there has been in the target planning community with respect to Schelling's observation. It should be viewed as a potential contribution to laying the groundwork for an appropriate U.S. targeting strategy toward China.

While the immediate concern of the report is with targeting, other dimensions of U.S. nuclear weapons policy are also considered: weapons acquisition and modernization of the specific programs required to support

targeting doctrine; deployment decisions which concern primarily the basing of weapons; and national arms control policy, i.e., efforts to regulate arms through various formal or informal understandings. Whatever U.S. targeting doctrine is decided upon regarding China, these other dimensions of policy will need to be addressed as part of the decision process due to the interrelatedness of the various dimensions of policy. The policy challenge is to strive for the highest degree of consistency between and among the different dimensions.

1. SUMMARY OF BASIC FINDINGS

The basic findings of this study are as follows:

PD/NCS-59, "Nuclear Weapons Employment," (and associated documents) The targeting options expected to be of greatest interest in the 1985-1995 period are those consequently, the initial data base remains to be developed.
Data on Chinese target sets of the kind interest in the study was not

The 'strategic culture' of China is clearly distinctive in terms of fundamental beliefs concerning: the nature of international politics and conflict; the extent to which history can be shaped by rational action; and the kind of strategy and tactics required for dealing with friends and enemies. Identifying the values the Chinese leadership attaches to specific kinds of targets, however,
Chinese declaratory doctrine on nuclear weapons employment is limited basically to statements about 'first use' (they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict outside their own territory) and about the significance of nuclear weapons in international politics (nuclear weapons are 'paper tigers'). The study suggests that the most reliable source for identifying Chinese operational doctrine may be the deployment mode and configuration of the weapon systems.

Arms control arrangements between the United States and the PRC are not considered likely in the sense of formal negotiations and agreements. However, the study identifies certain initiatives that might be undertaken by the U.S. side. For example, the Chinese have more strategic leverage over Pakistan than does the United States and use of this leverage could be encouraged for purposes of keeping Pakistan a non-nuclear nation. The United States could also assist the Chinese in such areas as nuclear weapons security.
2. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

The results of this study indicate that further research is needed in the following areas:

. Analytical work is needed in developing a target data inventory for China relevant to the 1985-1995 period. The current inventory appears to be in need of updating in terms of quality of information on

. The Soviet factor in working out a U.S. nuclear weapons policy toward the PRC is critical and needs further study.
Options for developing an arms control dialogue with the Chinese in the years ahead might be designed in the near term, particularly in the area of nuclear proliferation.
II. CHINESE STRATEGIC CULTURE

The concepts current in U.S. strategic targeting doctrine are almost exclusively the product of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The relevance to the Chinese case of such concepts is not evident, and requires careful analysis in developing guidelines for U.S. nuclear policy vis-a-vis the PRC in 1985-95. In developing such policy guidelines it is essential to keep in mind the notion that the objective of defense and warfighting is to force an adversary to do one's will. It follows that it is not what we think will deter an opponent, but what he is, in fact, deterred (or coerced) by that is essential. This suggests that importance of understanding the "strategic culture" of an adversary as it is in this context that views on the role and utility of various forms of military force take on meaning. ¹

Strategic culture is a term which refers to the value system of a particular polity or political leadership. It also refers to the particular way a country and its leadership approach strategic issues. Behind the notion of strategic culture is the thought that not all countries share the same values nor approach questions of strategy in the same way. To deal effectively with foreign powers it is necessary to understand the values of each of them individually, how these values affect behavior, and how they differ from one another and from our own value system.

The importance of strategic culture to targeting was implicitly recognized in Presidential Directive 59. Secretary of Defense Brown stated that the targeting guidance contained in PD-59 attempts to maximize U.S. ability to impose "an unacceptably high cost in terms of what Soviet leadership values most." Coercive strikes involve 'signaling' and other forms of communication where it is vitally important to know what the adversary values most and what kind of targets are most appropriate for accomplishing U.S. strategic objectives.
This chapter will attempt to cast some light on the 'strategic culture' of the PRC as it relates to nuclear targets in China. In order to accomplish this task, four interrelated areas will be examined in turn: 1) priorities in national policy; 2) leadership and authority within the PRC; 3) views on the role of nuclear weapons in national defense; and 4) the nature of the PRC's nuclear weapons capability.

1. PRIORITIES IN CHINESE NATIONAL POLICY

Priorities in national policy reflect the relative values current leadership places on competing claims for governmental attention. In the case of China, identification of emphases in national policy provides a rough guide to what the leadership most values, and, accordingly, what targeting options would most threaten them.

The leadership which assumed power after Mao Zedong's death perceived that its predecessors had brought the economy to near collapse, with production remaining constant in some sectors and actually declining in others. An ambitious program was advanced to reverse this stagnation and bring China into the ranks of the world's modernized states by the year 2000. Known as the 'Four Modernizations,' it introduced sweeping changes in
agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense. As a relatively immediate program for the achievement of these goals by the turn of end of the century, a plan for radical improvements by 1985—the beginning of the ten-year period considered by this study—in the four fields ("modernizations") of agriculture, industry science and technology, and defense was outlined by Chairman Hua Guofend in a speech to the Fifth National People's Congress in February 1978.

The 'four modernization' place emphasis on economic efficiency in the form of previously taboo practices, such as economic centralization, incentives to increase productivity, etc. The rationale for economic reform is based on an awareness of the importance of economic strength to national power and the desired goal of becoming a great and modern state. Hua's 1985 plan is an extraordinarily ambitious one, especially in its ramifications for the industrial sector. Steel production, for instance, was projected to double to a level of 60 million tons annually by 1985. As well, coal production was to double to more than 1 billion tons a year, and oil production was planned to rise throughout by an annual average of 13 percent. Moreover, in that speech Hua announced plans for 120 large-scale modernization or construction projects, among which are:
. 10 Steel production facilities
. 9 Non-Ferrous metal complexes
. 8 Coal mines
. 10 Oil and gas fields
. 30 Power stations
. 6 New trunk railways
. 5 Key harbors.

Although full realization of the ambitious plan for national modernization will inevitably require some assistance from the West, the current Chinese leadership has publicly stated that in the pursuit of modernization, China shall remain independent. Indeed, the leadership of the PRC seems intent of playing out its hand as a superpower,1 however pretentious such claims may be. Economic modernization has emerged as a primary element of China's claim to great power status, as has its nuclear weapons program.2

1 Chen Yi, in a 1963 interview, stated China's claim to superpower status. Speaking of the U.S., Yi said "they must recognize that China too is a big country, and one day we're going to catch up with them in strength... China requires a hundred years to become a modern state... In the past, we thought we could do it in ten, but that was wrong. However, our direction is right and our country is united." Huck (1970) p. 66-67.

2 Premier Hua Guofend stated on May 29, 1980 that China has reasserted its commitment to the development of strategic nuclear weapons in order to break the nuclear monopoly of the U.S. and Soviet Union.
The "steel vs. electronics" debate of 1971 reflected some of the differences within the Chinese leadership which may result in time in a different view of the role of nuclear weapons and the relationship of the defense sector to the overall structure of the economy. The debate centered on the relative merits of building up the steel industry, associated with more conventional means of defense, as opposed to the electronics industry, associated with high technology defense items. A 1975 article criticizing Lin Piao's "one-sided" view of nuclear weapons is illustrative of the doctrinal dimension of this economic debate:

"Lin Piao negated the decisive role played by the masses of the people in a war and denied that the foundation of an army lies in the rank and file... When the imperialists raised a hue and cry about the horrors of nuclear war and engaged in nuclear blackmail, Lin Piao prostrated himself before nuclear weapons... As he saw it, a modern war is fought by pushing buttons and it is new-type weapons, atom bombs and missiles, not infantry, that count."

While China has placed relatively greater emphasis on steel in the 'four modernizations,' the sophisticated technology base for the military will certainly continue to enjoy the support of the national leadership, and will remain a source of considerable prestige for the Chinese as they modernize.
The great store placed in modernization by the Chinese leadership suggests that the relevance of symbols of economic modernization, such as modern metallurgical facilities, as potential target categories. The threat of undoing many years of progress towards the goal of joining the ranks of modern superpowers would likely strike a responsive chord in Peking, and enable any nuclear antagonist of China to extract maximum coercive leverage from such a targeting strategy. It is indeed ironic that in its drive to attain superpower status, the PRC is making itself "vulnerable" to strategic attack by doing away with the inefficient decentralized economic planning mode.¹

2. LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY

Of paramount importance in warfare is the cohesiveness and leadership of the polity. The degree to which a particular state is united fundamentally affects the basis of the state as a strategic entity. Among the important elements comprising leadership and authority of a particular society are the degree of homogeneity in its

¹ "Everybody knows that under the conditions when both sides have nuclear weapons such weapons pose a much greater threat to the imperialist and social-imperialist countries whose industries and population are highly concentrated." Su Yu, "Great Victory for Chn. Mao's Guideline on War" quoted in Marweb and Pollack, P. 72
population, the nature and tradition of authority patterns, and criteria for the legitimacy of authority. Targeting strategy must take into account such factors in order to assess the way the morale of the populace may be affected by strategic bombing, or the extent to which 'decapitation' or 'regionalization' options may be worthy of consideration. Historically, China has exhibited a great degree of deference to authority, rooted in the Confucian tradition. This respect for authority has not, however, been historically complemented with a high degree of centralized authority; rather, regional 'warlords' formed the focal point of community allegiance.

The institutionalization of modernization in China will likely lead to a reduction in the old "warlordism" tendencies of the past. More and more, it is unlikely that anyone will be able to accrue to his own personal control the myriad levels of power which formed the basis for the "warlords" of the past--the competing influences will be too great for one man or small group.

What may occur in its place, however, is a form of geographic warlordism, in which sectors or areas dominate other regions. The development of the export sector, for example, will create perspectives for coastal regions of China which could well be divergent from the attitudes of the interior. Similar sorts of dominance can be
envisioned for functional reasons. Divergence of perspective and development of competitive goals could lead to schisms within China. Indeed, there is evidence of some regional chauvinism in the competition for industrial expansion even today.

(C) But, for all that, China remains a homogenous ethnic group. Some 95 percent of the population is ethnically Han, while the remaining 5 percent is a diffuse mixture of a variety of ethnic tribes and minorities with no cohesiveness except for the fact they are non-Han. The Han majority is conscious of Chinese history and community, controls the vast majority of the eastern third of China (where nearly all the economic value resides) and supports the Chinese government. This is not to argue against the possibility of internal frictions, but simply to avoid casting them as analogous to the Soviet case.¹

¹ The traditional invasion corridors across the Sino-Soviet border are both well known and difficult to control. Many, like the Ili Pass in the west, pass through largely undefended minority group areas which have always been antithetical to the central leadership in Beijing. However, since they constitute only a very small proportion of the total population and economic value of China, the loss of these regions would be more of political impact than national survival. Yet, the sensitive nature of the border regions may suggest a significant coercive potential in targeting such areas. The roots of the sensitivity stem more from proximity to the Soviet Union than from a fear of loss of empire.
During the first 30 years of the PRC's history, the country was ruled for the most part by leaders whose legitimacy derived from their status as heroes of the revolution. This generation of charismatic leaders is rapidly passing from the scene. For all practical purposes, it will have completely disappeared by the 1985-1995 period covered by this study.

The legitimacy of the rule of their successors will derive not from revolutionary charisma but from the authority of the offices they held. Changes made in the PRC's leadership selection process during the past year would seem to reinforce the concept of loyalty to the office holder rather than personality. These include shorter terms of office, with consequently greater turnover of incumbents; greater stress on abstract managerial qualifications for office; downgrading of the cult of personality; and the separation of the work of party and government thus diffusing the concentration of authority.

It is likely that new leaders would take the place of the deceased fairly quickly. Given the unifying effect of external attack, it is probable that these new leaders would command the loyalty of most Chinese citizens. The widespread protest movements in China in late 1978 and
through 1979, in which several hundred thousand petitioners flocked to Beijing to present their grievances indicate that the central government is indeed regarded as the final source of authority, and as the center of allegiance in a symbolic as well as an administrative sense. The overwhelming majority of protesters sought redress within the existing governmental system rather than the overthrow of the system itself.

Situations may arise in which provincial or lower level leaders could pursue essentially local interests at the expense of a unified national war effort, with consequent weakening of the PRC's capabilities. Recent economic reforms, which have given individual provinces greater autonomy in the management of their finances and greater flexibility in adapting central government directives to local needs, will reinforce existing centrifugal forces within the PRC.

The above statements are necessarily speculative. Much of the reaction of the Chinese population to a large-scale removal of the country's leadership will depend on highly situation-specific variables.