NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** November 11, 1997 The following is a summary of the Seventh Meeting of the International Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, which was held October 30-31, 1997 in Fukushima, Japan. The summary was prepared by Ralph A. Cossa, Co-Chair, CSBM Working Group. The summary represents the Chair's impressions and is not meant to be a consensus statement. Comments and feedback are welcome. Ralph Cossa is Executive Director of Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, Hawaii, a policy-oriented research institute with programs on security, political, economic, and environmental issues that operates as the Asia- Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. He sits on the steering committee of the Multinational Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, serves as executive director of the U.S. Committee of CSCAP, and is a board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies. -------------------- Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Seventh Meeting of the International Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures October 30-31, 1997 Fukushima, Japan Summary of Discussions ******************** The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) International Working Group (IWG) on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) met for the seventh time on 30-31 Oct, 1997 in Fukushima, Japan. Ralph Cossa (USCSCAP) chaired the session, which was co-hosted by CSCAP-Japan. The meeting focused on nuclear energy-related issues and concerns as part of the IWG's investigation of the PACATOM concept. Representatives from nine CSCAP Member/Associate Member Committees attended, along with a scholar from Taiwan and several government officials, all in their private capacities. There was a good mix of policy and technical energy expertise with most (but by no means all) participants possessing some working knowledge of nuclear energy- related issues. The meeting began with a comprehensive briefing and tour of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Participants were provided extensive details on the plant's operations, capabilities, and safety standards/record, along with a brief overview on Japan's overall nuclear energy program and TEPCO/Fukushima's contribution to this effort. The tour of the reactor facility, which began in the control room for reactors five and six, allowed us to stand atop one of the reactor cores and visually inspect IAEA seals (under the watchful eye of ever- present IAEA surveillance cameras). We also inspected a reactor cooling pond where spent fuel rods are initially stored, plus the common spent fuel storage pond and the spent fuel dry storage cask facility which both provide interim or longer term storage. TEPCO personnel were open and direct in answering our questions on current and future planned operations and allowed pictures to be taken throughout the tour. We also experienced, first hand, TEPCO's security and safety procedures and IAEA monitoring efforts. All agreed that the tour was a useful confidence building transparency effort and we are all extremely grateful to TEPCO for their gracious hospitality and support. The IWG meeting itself was described in advance as a "working session" without fixed agenda, aimed at taking stock of where the PACATOM project has been and is (or should be) going. In the Chair's opening comments, it was stressed that the intent of the IWG's PACATOM project was neither to promote nor to rally efforts against nuclear energy but merely to highlight the regional concerns associated with its use and to investigate if multilateral confidence building efforts could help alleviate or reduce these concerns. At a minimum, the IWG's efforts can (and already have) contributed to a greater awareness among both the policy-making and nuclear energy communities of regional concerns related to nuclear energy research and production. The IWG's efforts in this field may range from simple information gathering and dissemination on one end of the spectrum to the possibility of defining and promoting an international PACATOM organization to address identified problems in a more institutionalized fashion. In between these two extremes are a variety of interim steps or measures that can help identify, articulate, and hopefully address or alleviate nuclear energy-related regional concerns. Even if a formalized PACATOM organization proves unattainable or ill-advised, a series of confidence building measures aimed at reducing current concerns and perhaps setting the stage for future more institutionalized cooperation could prove helpful. Given the venue and availability of Japanese nuclear specialists and officials, this meeting also provided an opportunity to gain insights into some of the highly-publicized troubles experienced by Japanese nuclear power operations in recent years. In support of this effort, the group received a very candid, comprehensive assessment of Japan's nuclear power production and research programs and problems from an official assigned to the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC). He provided details on the various accidents and incidents of mismanagement that have shaken public confidence in PNC and in Japan's nuclear energy program in general and its nuclear fuel cycle (reprocessing) plan in particular. He noted, however, that there was also concern in Japan about future energy shortages and greenhouse gasses caused by burning fossil fuels, concluding that Japan had no option but to pursue nuclear energy as a critical component in its overall energy program. While others may use to term "energy security" to describe proliferation or other military-related concerns, in the Japanese context it deals with ensuring a stable, reliable supply of energy in a nation which (in the energy sector) is resource poor and thus increasingly dependent on outside sources to satisfy its growing energy needs. Japanese reprocessing efforts (at home and abroad) and research in plutonium- fueled fast breeder reactor technology should be seen in this light. Nonetheless, there is great and growing awareness in Japan regarding regional concerns over such activities--concerns which were reinforced and amplified during this meeting (see below). Japanese analysts also recognized the consequent need both for greater transparency and for careful and continuing analysis of their efforts in this (internationally and domestically) politically sensitive area. IWG participants began their PACATOM deliberations with a renewed look at the nuclear energy-related problems or areas of concern that we hoped to address through this multilateral effort. The following categories of concern were identified: - the safety of nuclear energy production and research operations, including dangers to the environment, operational mishaps, safety standards and training, emergency response capabilities, and growing public apprehension (including, among other issues, growing public perceptions/misperceptions about nuclear power safety and the not-in-my backyard or NIMBY factor); - the potential downsides and dangers associated with reprocessing, including added safety and environmental concerns, transportation and storage difficulties, fears about proliferation or diversion for military use, and precedents and implications for programs of neighboring states; - spent fuel and other nuclear waste storage and disposal challenges-- both interim and long term and involving both high and low-level radioactive waste--which have both safety and security/proliferation aspects and which also have political, psychological, and emotional dimensions that should not be underestimated or ignored; - questions regarding the physical security of nuclear facilities and materials (i.e., susceptibility to terrorism, espionage or external attack); the general adequacy of safeguards; the inadequacy of current transparency efforts; the unavailability, inaccessibility, or inadequacy of public information; and problems just over the horizon associated with eventual decommissioning of aging nuclear power production and research facilities. IWG participants recognized that many of these problems and challenges were, first and foremost, domestic issues that needed to be dealt with on an individual basis, but noted that many also had broad-reaching international implications. Specialists within the group also pointed out that many bilateral and multilateral efforts (including those of the IAEA and the World Association of Nuclear Operators) were also addressing many of these problems. Obviously, CSCAP's PACATOM efforts must recognize, complement, and build upon (while being careful not to undermine or detract from) existing efforts. It was also recognized that the current Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime distinguishes between the declared nuclear weapons states and non- weapons states when it comes to applying IAEA safeguards. It was generally agreed, however, that efforts aimed at enhancing nuclear safety should not be discriminatory, but should to the maximum extent possible apply to all participants equally. The value of greater transparency regarding most aspects of nuclear energy production and research was highlighted, along with the recognition that, in the area of physical security (i.e., facility protection), too much transparency regarding details as to how security procedures were designed or implemented could prove counterproductive. A step-by-step incremental approach toward the development and implementation of confidence building measures was also endorsed as the most practical approach. A brainstorming session was also held, in order to develop a broad (and largely unevaluated) list of transparency and other confidence building measures that could be subject to further examination at future meetings. This shopping list included joint training of plant operators, operator and technician exchange programs, greater sharing of information (especially in such areas as training, security standards and techniques, accident response procedures, etc.), the sharing of radiation and other technical data, the exchange of intelligence information (especially regarding potential physical threats to nuclear energy facilities), the possible creation of nuclear energy "white papers," and promoting greater awareness of existing information (including an inventory of items available through the world wide web or elsewhere). Other initiatives worth considering included the establishment of a regional information center, greater sharing of in-house or limited access information (including voluntary disclosure of data collected by the IAEA), cooperative efforts aimed at guaranteeing future fuel supplies (especially as an alternative to reprocessing), the creation of a regional joint reprocessing facility and/or a common regional waste storage or disposal facility, identifying (or in their absence establishing) regional norms relating to nuclear safety, promoting and tabulating bilateral agreements and investigating which ones may lend themselves to broader participation, promoting "open skies" agreements, giving consideration to a "non-targeting of nuclear facilities" agreement, and undertaking efforts to achieve greater awareness of available technologies and cooperative monitoring capabilities. Participants also recognized the importance of unilateral confidence building and transparency efforts which can also serve as models for other states to emulate. Efforts (such as those undertaken at this meeting) to better define problems and candidly discuss suspicions and concerns and approaches to dealing with them represent confidence building efforts in their own right. There was no attempt at this meeting to further evaluate these suggestions and they do not, at this point, reflect IWG recommended actions. They will likely be the subject of further examination and debate at subsequent IWG meetings. A consensus did appear to emerge, however, over the need for a comprehensive inventory of current unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral safety and transparency efforts already underway in the region. Among these is a Republic of Korea proposal for the establishment of The Asia Nuclear Safety Consultation Organization (ANSCO). A copy of the draft ANSCO was distributed at the IWG meeting. It was also widely recognized that the use of plutonium as a fuel source (either by itself or as a component in so-called MOX fuel) both raises the need for, and the challenge to, regional confidence building efforts. Further examination of nuclear energy safety and security-related issues, to include the development of near-term transparency and other confidence building efforts, appears advisable and potentially fruitful. This includes, but is neither limited to nor contingent upon, examination of the prospects for (and nature of) future more institutionalized approaches toward multilateral cooperation in this field. Given the breadth of topics to be discussed and the level of expertise desired among the participants, it appears useful to separate the PACATOM project from other CSBM Working Group efforts at this time. A follow-on CSBM Working Group meeting dedicated to this effort is proposed for the spring of 1998 in Washington, DC. Consideration is also being given to arranging a side trip for interested participants to the Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Laboratories (Albuquerque, New Mexico) to learn more about various technologies available to assist in promoting confidence and transparency in the nuclear energy field. Among the topics to be discussed at the spring 1998 meting will be the various potential confidence building measures emanating from this meeting's brainstorming session. We also would like to further investigate the subject of just how safe or unsafe nuclear energy is, to include examination of differences in safety records for power production vice research and reprocessing or storage facilities. An effort will be made to create an inventory of current organizations, programs, and initiatives that already address nuclear energy-related challenges and concerns. The IWG will also continue its examination of efforts in other regions (such as EURATOM and ABACC) to identify lessons learned. The next meeting will begin with a "nuclear energy 101"-type lecture to provide the audience with a common basic level of understanding of the nuclear energy process and its related issues and concerns, based on the recognition that representatives bring varying levels of expertise to the table. (A failure to provide such a primer was acknowledged to be a shortcoming of the May 1997 IWG meeting.) In the interest of promoting greater awareness as to major nuclear energy research and production efforts, we would also like to request CSCAP-Japan and CSCAP-China to give presentations on the nature and extent of the nuclear power programs of their respective nations. (Similar presentations by other nuclear energy users may be included in future meetings.) We also intend to expand upon our earlier survey of various ASIATOM, PACATOM, and other multilateral nuclear energy-related cooperation proposals in order to evaluate their feasibility and see what can realistically be incorporated into our own future efforts. *************** End of Summary