NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** March 13, 1998 The following is the complete transcript of the press briefing given by a senior US official on Wednesday March 11, regarding the upcoming four-party Korean peace talks in Geneva. The official was speaking on "background" and therefore was not identified. The US State Department transcript was provided by the United States Information Agency (USIA) on March 12. Citations to this briefing, as well as other media reports and officials' statements concerning the preliminary meetings, were included in the March 12 Daily Report. -------------------- BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ON FOUR- PARTY TALKS March 11, 1998 Washington, D.C. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon, everybody. I have recently come back from a rather routine round of preparatory consultations in Seoul and Beijing, getting ready to go off to Geneva. Before we get to Geneva, however, we are going to meet with the North Koreans for a bilateral meeting in Berlin. After that, we will have a preliminary Four-Party meeting in Geneva, following which, on Monday the 16th, a U.S. delegation, inter-agency delegation, led by Stanley Roth will commence the plenary session, which is expected to last through Friday. We have, in addition, been discussing with the Japanese the possibility of having a trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK meeting somewhere on the margins of all of this. When we have something to tell you about that, we'll let you know. If I could just give you a couple of thoughts about this round of the Four-Party Talks, and then ask you to take this wherever you feel you would like to go in questions. You will recall that the last plenary was chiefly notable in that it occurred, but it did not itself accomplish a great deal since the North Koreans, in particular, were unable to agree with us on issues related to the organization of work under the agreed agenda. And I will remind you, the agreed agenda was to replace the Armistice with a permanent peace structure and to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula. To us, the United States, and to the ROK, although they will speak for themselves, we felt that that agreed agenda, quite naturally, divided itself into everything before the "and" and everything after the "and"; that is, replacing the Armistice would be one topic, and tension reduction would be the other. And that since there were two quite obvious topics there, then we could quite easily form up some subcommittees to begin to work on them. Subcommittees, of course, would then refer the product of their work up to the plenary for further discussion and any agreement. The North Koreans felt that they really needed to have a much more extended discussion on the subject of the root causes of the problem. This is a discussion we invited them to begin, but they apparently weren't ready because there never was any such discussion. So we're ready for them to commence such a discussion this time, if they wish to; that is, we will listen with the utmost concentration to whatever they have to say and will give them an appropriate answer. But, having said that, we still think that we ought to divide our work into the two topics that I mentioned, and we are going to go back and continue to try to obtain from them their agreement that we can organize our work in that way. If we did organize our work in that way, then let me just give you what I think is a realistic sense of what that would mean. First, as you have heard me say before, replacing the Armistice with a peace treaty is the simplest of things in terms of simply putting words on paper and then signing the piece of paper. But it would be a meaningless step if there were not also substantial measures for reducing tensions that went along with it. And, therefore, although we are quite prepared to begin that drafting of a piece of paper any time the North Koreans wish to, we don't see that coming to a conclusion until the other subcommittee has really made substantial progress of its own -- in fact, has come towards the end of its work. And its work would have to be the tangible reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. And we have very specific views that there is a nearly universally accepted method for the reduction of tensions in a difficult environment. That is through the adoption of confidence-building measures -- ordinarily on an ascending track from simple, easy ones onwards to more difficult ones. So that is the nature of the approach we will offer in Geneva. Now, it is our hope that in this bilateral meeting in Berlin, when we are discussing bilateral subjects, that we will be able to take up that normal full range of concerns that each side has on bilateral subjects and, in so doing, make some contribution to the overall atmosphere that will affect North Korean behavior in Geneva -- just in the same way that we have hoped that our humanitarian response to North Korean food aid would also have some positive effect on the approach that the North Koreans take in these talks. Not linked, but still we have to be realistic and recognize that there may be some effect. I can't tell you what I think the North Koreans will do. We have not had any real substantive meetings with the North Koreans now for some time. We had expected to have an intersessional meeting with them. They canceled that. So our next encounter with them in Berlin is simply one day before we go on to the preliminary meeting in Geneva. And believe me, you would not want to have my schedule over the next few days. I'm going to stop there and let you pursue any topics that would be useful to you. Q: Could you elaborate a little more on the bilateral talk? Is this going to take place on the 13th; is that correct? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We picked that for good luck. Yes, Friday the 13th will be for bilateral topics. And there is a very familiar list. Those of you who have been watching these talks know that there aren't any really new subjects, but we cover a full range -- missiles, terrorism, MIAs, opening of liaison offices, et cetera. Q: Speaking of missile talks, what is the prospect -- because August (inaudible) you guys ready to have the talks; it was reported U.S. was prepared for the concrete package to North Korea. Can you tell us about this package, if possible? When it's possible to resume talks? Other question is really simple -- why in Berlin this time, not Geneva? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't intend to tell you any prediction about what kind of arrangement might be made in order to obtain changes in North Korean behavior with respect to either missile exports or their indigenous development program. But suffice it to say that we have put a very serious proposal before them, and we would like to hear a serious reply. As for why we haven't heard that reply yet, you'll have to put that question to them. But there has been speculation that the delay was related in some way to the defection of the Chang brothers. So it may be that now that they may be ready to come back to this, but there is no schedule yet agreed to for a resumption of the specific missile talks. Why Berlin? We asked that very question of the North Korean side and, I'll tell you, their answer didn't leave me deeply satisfied. But I'm happy to share it with you, and that is that their delegation was flying from Pyongyang to Europe via Berlin. They've got a large mission there. They intended to stop there, so this is where it would be easiest to support their delegation. Q: Do you have any intention to encourage South and North Korea to develop direct talk or dialogue? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's one of those things where you have to always ask yourself, could we do more harm than good? But, yes, we do have such an intention. We have, in fact, at every opportunity encouraged North Korea to meet with the South Koreans, either inside or outside of the Four-Party structure, and we'll continue to do that. But when the North Koreans decide to come forward and have such contacts, it won't be because of the United States making the suggestion; it will be because they themselves have decided that it's time for them to do that. Q: South Korea has a new government. How do you see that affecting the plenary talks? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first a commercial. Five years ago, the North Koreans said that they were deeply wounded by various purported activities by the new South Korean government then of Kim Young-sam and that these activities and, in one case, lack of an activity -- the lack of condolences for the death of Kim Il-sung -- made it impossible for them to have dialogue with the Kim Young-sam government. That was not an acceptable reason for not holding dialogue then, and it's still not acceptable. That said, since that is their public position, I think they are going to have to live with their own words now, and they'll have to come up with a different approach to the new government in Seoul. And so I think they are being very careful. If you look and see what is happening, they are being very cautious about avoiding creating an overly negative atmosphere with respect to the new government. I think most of you know me as being much too much the optimist, but, again, I'm going to say that I'm rather optimistic. I think that there will be over the next six months a number of opportunities for new progress in inter-Korean dialogue. The new government under Kim Dae-jung has lobbed out some initiatives, particularly with respect to the exchange of special envoys to implement the Basic Agreement of 1991-92. And I think that these are now getting some very careful attention in North Korea. Q: The KEDO agreement. The Secretary has, on more than one occasion, expressed assurance that South Korea, despite its financial problems, would go through with the deal. But there has been some talk that South Korea might try to delay its payment for some time. What have the South Koreans told you about their intentions? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The South Korean Government has officially reconfirmed its commitment to the KEDO project as originally stated to us, and there has been no change. Now, KEDO itself -- as opposed to the U.S. Government or the Korean Government -- KEDO itself has to continue working on a construction schedule, has to come up with plans for the payment of whatever work is to be done. Now, I'm not really the proper spokesman to tell you what that schedule is or what it's going to cost, but think in terms of a ballpark of a couple of hundred million dollars over the next 12 months. Now, when you think of that ballpark, you understand that it's not -- we're really not talking in the realm of this being an impossibility for a wealthy country to finance, even a country that has just gone through a serious economic problem. And there are many different ways to finance something. But also, KEDO is made up of a number of countries which are making their own contributions. And so if you were to say is it going to be that the ROK is going to fund X percentage of this, I don't have an answer to that. I don't even think that's necessarily a very important question. Q: So the bottom line is, at least in the short term, whatever obligation they may have -- first of all, their obligation is not set at this moment? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Their obligation is for the project. It is not for the year 1998. Q: All right. So KEDO may make a decision that it doesn't need money from South Korea at this moment which, just by happenstance, might help Seoul. Is that one possibility? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it certainly is a very valid option for the KEDO board. Q: Is there any change in the theory that South Korea will bear most of the financial burden and not the United States? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No change. No change at all. And that's been reconfirmed to us. Q: How about the North Korean perception of implementation of the Agreed Framework? Will they raise this issue in the bilateral meeting in Berlin, do you expect? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You asked would the North Koreans raise this with us bilaterally in Berlin? Q: Yes. Have they already shown some kind of frustration about not only light water reactor, but also toward the heavy fuel supply and other things? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the North Koreans might very well raise their questions about the pace of the construction project. And I don't mind telling you now that the answer that I would give them will be to refer them to KEDO. Q: What will be the U.S.' position if North Korea again insists to include the food aid programs and the withdrawal of U.S. troops? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's not an if, that's a when. The North Koreans always raise their food problem at every single encounter. And I don't even mind, to be truthful, because I also regard this as a very important issue. And I think it's important for the United States to be willing to sit down and give them not only a sympathetic hearing to this, but also then to take a leadership role in trying to react to it, since we have evaluated on the basis of trustworthy analysis that there is a genuine need. However, we have already made public what our response is, and so I don't have anything new to tell them. Q: Question on the inter-Korean dialogue and four-way talks. New Kim Dae-jung government wishes to push into Korean dialogue in parallel with the four-way talks, or sometimes they say separate from that. And I myself am a little bit confused. What is your understanding of new Korean Government's position on inter-Korean dialogue and Four-Party Talks? That is the first one. And the second one is -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Why don't I answer that, and then we'll come back to you, I promise. There really is absolutely no confusion on the subject of the relationship between the Four-Party Talks and inter-Korean dialogue. The Four-Party Talks were proposed at a time when inter-Korean dialogue had been frozen. After the accomplishments of '91-'92, then it had fallen into a trough, and there was no inter-Korean dialogue. And, in fact, the North Koreans were involved in a very aggressive campaign to dismantle the Armistice in a manner that was very destabilizing along the DMZ. You may recall the stories about armed incursions of North Korean troops into the DMZ. So the proposal for Four-Party Talks was made in that context of no dialogue and a situation that was becoming unstable. It was not intended to be a substitute for inter-Korean dialogue, but rather to provide an opportunity to restore inter-Korean dialogue by changing the political atmosphere. And I think, if nothing else, those of you who are skeptics about the Four-Party process, you have to at least grant that things have smoothed out a bit. And, in fact, the opportunity for inter-Korean dialogue was created. There were many contacts between South Korean and North Korean diplomats during the course of preparations for the Four-Party Talks and then, ultimately, at the Four-Party Talks themselves. Now, when you get down to the substance of the talks, the subject of inter-Korean dialogue is something for the Korean Government to speak to itself, but I understand that there is a rather broad agenda of political tension reduction steps that are already on the table. They haven't been finally agreed nor implemented, but, nonetheless, there is a fairly well-established agenda of work to be done. Whereas the agenda for the Four-Party Talks is separate from that, and has already been stated as the replacement of the Armistice and the reduction of tensions there. Of course, in this context -- that is, the replacement of the Armistice -- we're really talking about military confidence-building measures, as opposed to the kinds of confidence-building measures that might be addressed in the inter-Korean dialogue. To give you an example -- although I'm not trying to be the spokesman for inter- Korean dialogue here -- in the Four-Party Talks, a very easy military confidence-building measure would be the implementation of a previously agreed military hotline between North and South Korea. However, in the political realm of the inter-Korean dialogue, the cessation of slander would be a very easy first step to take. So if you can see the distinction between those two types of things, that might reveal how we would see the difference of work between the two things. Q: Does the U.S. support (inaudible)? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Q: Do you expect it to happen, or did you just pull these out of the air? I don't suppose you pulled them out of the air. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I pulled them out of the air, is the answer, because I think they're both quite easy to do. And if the North Korean side is ready to proceed down either of these tracks, those are among the first things I would expect to see as results. Q: Wouldn't you expect that they -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, I promised -- Q: I'm sorry. Q: Yes. I appreciate you reminding me of the situation, the U.S., Korea initiated four-way talks. But what is the change, what is the difference between now and that time of initiation? North Korea is still not eager to come to the table with a dialogue (inaudible), and probably they stopped this destabilizing the situation. But what made the difference? And my second question previously was, when you setting aside some agenda of four-way talks into the realm of U.S.-DPRK talks, and hopefully setting agenda for inter-Korean dialogue setting, what agenda is left for four-way talks? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that I risk repeating myself here, but the agenda for the four-way talks is what it has been agreed to be, which is very similar to what was stated when it was first proposed -- that is, replacing the Armistice with a permanent peace structure and the reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Now, I think from the way you phrased your questions, you're asking me to erect very thick walls between each of these things -- the bilateral U.S.-North Korean talks; the Four-Party Talks; the inter-Korean dialogue. And in fact, these thick walls don't exist, because in Geneva at Four-Party Talks, it's very possible for the U.S. and North Korea to meet; it's very possible for the two Korean sides to meet. In fact, when this is really working, I expect those sorts of things to happen. And when we meet, we, bilaterally, have a bilateral agenda. But if you're saying would I never, ever raise the subject of the Four-Party Talks, no I think particularly I'd have to be prepared to respond to the North Koreans if they chose to come at me with something. Q: What are the first two or three items on your bilateral agenda? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, -- Q: Should you happen to run into North Koreans. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a very familiar list to most of you. We are concerned about their missile exports and their indigenous development program. We're very concerned about the recovery of remains and getting at any unresolved questions about Americans from the Korean War. We are still discussing with them whether or not they can be removed from the terrorism list. They have a very insistent approach to us about the lifting of American sanctions on them. And then we have a prior agreement to open liaison offices in each other's capitals. Q: Those are the bilaterals? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Q: Has there been a reduction in political slander since the -- ? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think -- That isn't really something that we are the keepers of the score on. But I understand that there has been a softening of tone from North Korea in an effort to -- I'm not quite sure what the right phrase would be here, but -- to keep its options open with respect to the new administration in Seoul. Q: Who will be leading the North Korean delegation? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me tell you about the delegations. First, in the bilateral meeting, Charles Kartman will lead a small inter-agency delegation to meet with Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan and his delegation. Then we will go to Geneva, where Charles Kartman will lead a small inter- agency delegation for the preliminary meeting of the Four-Party Talks, and his counterparts will be Ambassador Li Gun from North Korea, who's their Deputy Perm Rep in New York to the UN; and it will be Director General Wang Yi, from the People's Republic of China -- he's the Director General for Asian affairs; and from the ROK, I don't believe there's been an announcement yet. At the plenary meeting, the American delegation will be led by Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth, and our delegation will approximately double in size. The North Korean delegation will revert back up to Kim Gye Gwan. The Chinese delegation will be led by Assistant Minister Chen Jian. And the ROK delegation, I'm not sure that it's been announced yet, but I am reliably informed it will be Deputy Foreign Minister Song Young-shik. Q: This is somewhat unrelated subject. In the past, one of the bones of contention in the relationship between the United States and South Korea has been the issue of the National Security Law. The United States has been demanding, asking for South Korea to repeal the National Security Law because of its potential for abuse. Yet, the newly-elected South Korean president, Kim Dae- Jung, also vowed that it would not -- he would not repeal the National Security Law because he just said that he would make sure, he would see to it that it not be abused. What is -- Is the United States ready to condone that, or is it just going to wash its hands of this matter once and for all? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's an interesting question. First of all, the United States has not demanded the repeal of any ROK law. The United States, in its annual human rights report, has every year pointed to what you have referred to as the potential for abuse of the National Security Law. Now that there is a new government in Korea, this may be a subject that others will be looking for as something that the new government might have some special interest in. But that isn't our business. At the end of it all, either it will be changed or it won't be, and we will make our judgment in our annual human rights report. But we do not have a demand on the Korean Government to change any of its laws. Q: There was a rumor last week that a coup attempt happened in North Korea. Could you tell us information you have on this matter? And how do you assess political situation there? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's easy to answer. I have no information, and so I don't -- I'll do you the favor and not then say, therefore, I don't have anything new to say about the political situation. I think that the political situation remains as it has been -- that is, that there are leadership dynamics in North Korea that we don't really understand. Therefore, we have a question about why there is still no one in the position of president, and we wonder whether the General Secretary of the party, Kim Jong-il, will take on that position or not. I don't think that any of this is related to the rumors that were swirling around last week, none of which have been substantiated. But I think that from our point of view, since we can't really see what's going on inside North Korea in the political realm that you're asking about, we really are confined to evaluating whether or not we are dealing with a government that seems to be responsive and in charge. And thus far, we feel that we are dealing with such an entity. When we pose questions, we get answers, and there is a negotiation that has been going on in which there seems to be an opposite side that has a consistent view. So we have no other information about the political dynamics within Pyongyang. Q: At the plenary session, what will be the carrot for North Korea to persuade them to accept them any confidence-building measures? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The carrot is that they can reduce tensions. Q: It is a very philosophical carrot or a tangible carrot? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, certainly there are many people who are willing to speculate that North Korea has as its policy the maintaining of a high level of tension. So if that theory were correct, then this is sort of a dysfunctional negotiation, isn't it, since what we're trying to do is take away something that they want. But our operating assumption is that they recognize that reduction of tensions is in their interest as well as everyone else's. And, more to the point, their interaction with the outside world depends upon their ability to convince the rest of the world -- especially us -- that they're ready to be good members of the international community. Q: At the bilateral talks, are you ready to offer the easing of economic sanctions maybe in exchange for certain kinds of measures taken by North Korea? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The North Koreans are going to raise their desire to see sanctions lifted; they always do. And we have in the past always tried to point them towards the way to get that done. Our sanctions are there because of certain aspects of North Korean behavior that we judge, and others in the international community, judge to be unacceptable -- missile exports, terrorism, the state of hostility on the Korean Peninsula. So over time, we've tried to spell out for them what we mean when we say changing that behavior and what we mean when we say that our sanctions are affected by this. So this is a conversation that we've had in the past, and I expect that we will continue to have it. Q: I believe the delegation from China is one ranking lower than the first time. Does that mean anything about their expectations? The second question is, several years ago, there was a kind of sense of urgency in the U.S. about North Korea -- that means that North Korea may collapse soon. Do you think this kind of sense of urgency still remains in the Administration, or it's gone? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not aware of any change in Chinese thinking; but you'll have to ask them for an explanation of why they've changed their delegation head. But their delegation was, in the last plenary, headed by Vice Minister Tang, who is an extraordinarily senior Chinese foreign ministry diplomat. I suspect that his schedule just couldn't be arranged for him to be there. And it was with that in mind that we originally set this whole thing up so that there would be not only a senior representative, but also an alternate so that schedules could be accommodated with either of these people. So we see them as being pretty interchangeable. And as for your second about an urgency about a North Korean collapse, I don't recall ever having tried to convince any of you that I saw that as being very urgent or imminent. In fact, just the opposite. It's the kind of thing that I have a very hard time discussing or predicting, because we don't really know very much. But certainly one of the things that would have added some measure of calm to the situation on the Korean Peninsula is the international community's willingness to provide emergency food relief after the floods and then the drought of the last couple of years. Had there not been any emergency food aid, then I think we would be faced with a much more dramatic situation. But there seems to have been an adequate response so far. Q: On the sanctions, is easing sanctions an all or nothing proposition? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a good question. Q: For example, once they sit down to talk, can't you ease some sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act, for example? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. The answer is yes. That's a good question. Q: Well, can you elaborate? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not really. But -- Let me be blunt. We would not lift sanctions because the North Koreans have sat down to talk. There's no reward for talk. But what we have told them is that as there is tangible progress in tension reduction, there would be sanctions lifting. And then the next question should be, well, how do you know it's tangible? That's what CBMs can do for you. When you reach agreement on specific CBMs and you implement them, then you've made some tangible progress. Q: What could you assume the accomplishment is in the upcoming meeting? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a bad question. I hate that question. (Laughter) Q: And what is your goal -- minimal goal? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right, all right. I'm going to try to deal with that seriously, but I hate that question. What I'd like to see and what I expect to see are two very different things. What I'd like to see is some immediate progress on confidence building measures. I'd like to see some immediate progress in reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. I'd like to be assured that the North Koreans are talking about the same thing that we're talking about. What do I expect to see? Something a bit short of all that. What I think is still perhaps too optimistic -- but at least it's a little more realistic -- is that they might be willing to begin to discuss with us what we mean by confidence- building measures, something that their diplomats could carry back to Pyongyang, report, and engage some of their people on so that a future round could reach some agreements. Q: You haven't had any discussions, any detailed discussions on CBMs so far? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You may recall that there was to have been an intersessional meeting. Q: Right. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was then that would have happened. Q: Agreeing on creating a subcommittee is a long shot? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The North Koreans have not agreed to what should have been easy. So I think it would be foolish to make any assumptions about their changing their position right away. Q: You mentioned that there's going to be consultation between Japan and ROK during the meeting, the period meeting? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, what I said was that we are discussing the possibility of a trilateral meeting among Japan, the ROK and the U.S. Q: Is that during the meeting? I mean -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't yet finalized the arrangements, but -- Q: What are you expecting from that? Are you -- Do you want Japan to be a cheerleader on the bench -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hardly. Q: Or are you foreseeing some financial support might be the issue among this talk? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. We're not looking for any particular support from Japan. But Japan has a legitimate and an important interest in these talks. And we have -- both the U.S. and the ROK have worked hard to keep them informed and to consult closely. So this is just a very standard way of doing that. Q: I'm sorry if I'm repeating something, but can you go through the exact schedule for the bilateral and for the plenary? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Q: Thank you. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will meet in Berlin bilaterally with the North Koreans on Friday the 13th. We haven't announced the venue. We will then meet in Geneva for the preliminary meeting on Saturday, the 14th. Q: (Inaudible) SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's Saturday, so if it turns out we need more time and we have to slip over to Sunday, I'm sure no one will object. Then the plenary talks begin on Monday and are scheduled to last through Friday, Monday though Friday. Q: That's a long time. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's a long time. Q: Please let me know your comment on the six-party declaration. And why at this moment, the South Korean Government propose in Beijing initially such an idea? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I understand it -- and all I'm trying to do now is give you our reaction to this. An explanation of this really should come from the Korean Government. But what the United States understands is that this was simply a reiteration of a view that has been held by President Kim for quite a long time. In fact, it's nothing new - - that is, recognizing that both Russia and Japan have legitimate interests and a legitimate stake in the outcome of all of this and, in fact, can play a role in making the outcome of these Geneva talks that much more assured that they might very well be brought in in a much later phase to play some role of guarantor or something of that sort. And I think that there was a specific reference in one of the explanations that I read that this would be something like a Helsinki conference. Now, that is entirely consistent with everything that we have always been told about the expectations from the ROK side. So I didn't find it either surprising or alarming to have the news about this idea coming out of the first few public comments of the new administration. Q: Just checking technicalities for planning purpose. Is there a Swiss official statement just like the last time, this time again? And another thing, is there going to be a briefing afterwards, just one time only, after everything gets finished? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't predict, sorry. Q: Okay. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would be delighted to be in a position to do both those things, but I -- At this point, it's too far ahead to know. Q: Why is it going for so long? What do you anticipate that's going to be new from last time? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, this is actually kind of a funny thing. We did not have any particular need for a specific duration and felt two, three days would probably suffice. But the North Korean side said that, well, if you're really serious about all this, you have to be willing to commit to a longer period of time and not have your officials rush off when there's still further business to discuss because of some previous schedule. So what this represents is a commitment of schedule, rather than a prediction of the agenda. Q: Yes, I'd like to follow up on the issue of the National Security Law. In the past, I remember the high-ranking State Department officials, including the Secretaries of State, saying that they would prefer, or at least they would like to encourage the abolition of the National Security Law in South Korea for the reason I cite earlier -- because of the potential for abuse. Now you seem to be saying that State Department will let go of the law once and for all. You said the United States does not consider the National Security Law issue as the business of the United States. So can I interpret it as kind of you are washing your hands completely of the matter? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, what I said was please refer to our human rights report, and that's where you'll find our statements about the National Security Law. But in terms of our providing further advice to the Kim Dae-jung government, I think that they will quite independently of us set their own agenda, and they'll have their own things to say. Q: Thank you. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. -------------------------------------------------- End of transcript