

By: Colonel Rhoades

Working Group: #5

(U) MEETING SPECIFICS: 1600-1800, 23 Feb 94, 1E-775

(U) ATTENDEES: Dr Carter, Maj Gen Admire, Dr Wallerstein, Mr Stephens, Mr Thomas, Ms Woolf, Mr Kayhart, Col Rhoades, CAPT Peters, Ms Bunn.

(U) MEETING AGENDA/OBJECTIVES:

- (U) Review drafting group's work to date and receive new guidance if needed. NOTE: Only the nuclear and chemical slides were available for STRATCOM review (not chop) prior to presentation. The working group as a whole did not see the slides.

(U) MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS:

- (U) Ms Woolf presented slides at Tab 1.
- (U) Dr Carter's comments:

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b1, USSEC

- (U) Asked Mr Stephens/Mr Kayhart what's the difference between bio/chem weapons in context of threat (bio/chem slides at Tabs 2 and 3).

-- (U) Probably only lethality in big picture, but both possess capacity for massive casualties.

-- (U) Only in the most severe cases would nuclear retaliation likely be an option.

- (U) Dr Carter asked if no nuclear response to bio, what can you do.

-- (U) Probably only plus up defensive programs for forces; however, offense/defense race in this case favors offense. New bio strains can be developed quicker than antitoxins or detectors can be prepared.

-- (U) Conventional preemption possible but risky business depending on location/toxin.

-- (U) Real problem if used against cities.

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- (U) On nuclear terrorism (Tab 4) Dr Carter wanted to know what DOD's role in terrorism is and what do we do to better assist FBI/DOE. It's obvious from his questions that he does not understand the NEST concept. Believe right answer to Question 19 is:

-- (U) Deterrence in this context can only apply to state-sponsored terrorism. Nonstate actors not deterred by our nuclear posture.

(U) SIGNIFICANT OUTCOMES:

- (U) Tasked working group chair to work response options menu.

- (U) Tasked chair to prepare pros/cons of different alternatives for declaratory policy; must be to SECDEF/Chairman in at least three weeks.

- (U) Requested terrorism drafting chair to fleshout options for DOD support to FBI/DOE. Also suggested other chair to do same for chem/bio.

(U) WHAT'S NEXT:

- (U) Next meeting: 1400-1600, 28 Feb, 1E-775.

- (U) Review new work plan (Tab 6).

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(U) OTHER: None.

6 Tabs

1. Deterring Deployment/Use of Nuclear Wpn by Proliferant Nations (S)
2. Deterring/Responding Chemical Use (S/NF/FRD)
3. Deterring/Responding to Bio Use (S/NF)
4. Deterring to WMD Terrorism (S)
5. WG 5 Key Questions (S)
6. WG 5 New Work Plan (U)

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