

By: Col Rhoades

Working Group 5

MEETING SPECIFICS: 18 Nov 93, 0900-1200, 4C-762
Meeting chaired by Mr Stephens

ATTENDEES: normal group

MEETING AGENDA/OBJECTIVES:

Obtained Under the
Freedom of Information Act
by Hans M. Kristensen

- Discuss extended deterrence and how it did or did not apply to Europe, Japan, Korea, Israel, others (Tab 1).
- Discuss tools available to address proliferation (Tab 2).
- Two attached matrices were used to focus discussion to preclude ramblings of previous meeting.

MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS:

- Ms Woolf provided a summary of the paper on extended deterrence:
 - Extended deterrence is a valuable tool, but only one in kit bag. May be losing some impact because of threat changes. Russian focus vs proliferant/other nuclear countries.
 - Provided to Germany/Japan because allies did not want them to go down that path; international opinions and economic instability. Great Britain/France were winners in WW2, so they chose own route to minimize US influence.
 - Israel special case because of complex threat environment. Could find no other way to meet security needs.
 - Extended deterrence works when coupled with other things. Future nuclear proliferators must look at what they may lose if punished by the international community, i.e., Japan--international "economic" integration.
- Dr Altfeld: US extended deterrence restricts countries' options/freedom to act especially if their interests are in direct conflict with US.
- Country-by-country review:
 - Europe: Traditional NATO
 - Old threat gone, new instability rising "out of region." Extended deterrence still viable.
 - Col Smith, ATSD/RE - If US withdraws nuclear weapons from Europe, credibility is at issue. Europeans will act uniformly among themselves to fill void. Nuclear weapons serve as baseline for defenses and continues risk/burden sharing process.
 - Mr Stephens, OSD/NS&CP, asked if group agreed that in NATO context, nuclear weapons/extended deterrence still credible. All agreed.

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-- Other:

--- Dr Altfeld brought up Carter doctrine to use whatever means were necessary to keep oil flow from middle east. Group not sure doctrine still applied to today's world, especially the use of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence context. Russian/Iranian invasion gone.

--- Col Shannahan posited that US should not provided hard/formal security guarantees to Gulf friend. Unnecessarily risks US flexibility; don't know who friends will be in the future.

--- Eastern Europe: Extended deterrence by NATO into this region is good.

- Tools review:

-- Col Shannahan discussed positive/negative security assurance and relationship to NPT.

--- Positive security assurances do not mean security guarantees nor extended deterrence.

---- Only aid those countries attacked with nuclear weapons or threatened. UN resolution 255--assistance.

--- NPT - 160 members, effective 1970, due 25-year review.

--- Issues:

---- Nonnuclear states want extended deterrence, more specific guarantees on aid.

---- Some want to add chem/bio.

---- Don't trust UN to act since veto right in Security Council.

---- Some want CTBT and commitment to lower nuclear weapons number to extend treaty indefinitely.

--- US position: Do not change treaty; extend indefinitely; possibly expand PSAs, but not sure how. CTBT will not be in place by 95 review, but can still show progress.

--- Very concerned with Japan if extension is limited to 5 years. May give Japan an opportunity to back away from NPT if Korean threat transcends their interests.

SIGNIFICANT OUTCOMES:

- Began to fill in data on two matrices.
- Should complete the discussions on extended deterrence on Monday, 22 Nov.

WHAT'S NEXT:

- Next meeting: 22 Nov, 1300-1600, 4C-7
- *** Weinstein will not be in town.

OTHER: None

2 Tabs

1. Extended Deterrence Matrix (U)
2. Counter proliferation Matrix (U)

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