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NPR REPORT # 8

4 NOV 93

4: COL RHOADES

Working Group: 5

MEETING SPECIFICS: 3 NOV 93, 1300-1600, J-8 RED ROOM

ATTENDEES: GUESTS

- ① MR DAVID KAYE, FORMER CHIEF JAEA INSPECTION TEAM LEAD IN IRAQ, NOW ASSOCIATED WITH SASC.
- ② DR STEVE FETTER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO DR CARTER, FORMER PROFESSOR AT UNIV MD.

MEETING AGENDA/OBJECTIVES:

- ① Receive MR KAYE & DR FETTER DISCUSSIONS ON PROLIFERATION
- ② REVIEW NEW TOR QUESTIONS
- ③ ASSIGN FURTHER DRAFTING ASSIGNMENTS

MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS: MR STEVENS CHAIRED MEETING IN DR WALKER'S ABSENCE. IN KOREA, WILL NOT RETURN UNTIL 9 NOV.

- DR FETTER ATTEMPTED TO SUMMARIZE THE DIFFERENT POLICY VIEWS OF HOW/IF NUCLEAR WEAPON PLAYED IN THE DEFENSE EQUATION. PRESENTED MODEL BELOW AS TOOL TO DEFINE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DETERRENCE/WAR FIGHTING & NUCLEAR/CHEM/BIO WEAPNS THREATS

Obtained Under the Freedom of Information Act by Miss M. Kristensen

↑ Threat Increase

REGULAR Powers that Possess	Deterrence		WAR FIGHTING	
	ACQUISITION	USE	Retention	Perception
NUCLEAR				
BIO/CHEM				
ADDITIONAL CONW WEAPNS	X	X	X	X

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- STRIEST
- De Reter Federation that policy community # 8 falls into two basic groups
 - ① nuclear weapon could only deter nuclear use or acquisition, although acquisition is hotly debated; Represented by Cieshel DASHCO AREA.
 - ② Other group is non-limiting except for ADV CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. Here also the case against chemical is weak, but not discounted. Larger HASHEO area represented. Existential deterrence may work both chemical as well as ADV CONVENTIONAL WPN is limited case.

Appeal
BS, USSC

- Fident: had 3 possible scenarios where [nuclear weapons may be used to preempt adversary.]
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- DR KAYE
 - Proliferation is NOT ON/OFF SWITCH. Persistent proliferation creep. Its very easy for countries, especially for chemical/Bio wps, to come to a point where militarization is only a few months away, yet appears to be legitimate programs. He calls it "virtual proliferation". To do Biological, you only need a good Brewery.
 - Doesn't believe the world could identify third world nuclear weapons, EVEN IF they saw them. minor fringe problem. booting

For weapons that look like ours/Russians.

- To counter proliferation in third world countries, one clearly must understand their motivations, social order, culture, political structure, use strategy, doctrine, etc.
- Presented 9 ideas why countries desire to obtain/hold nuclear weapons & to a lesser degree Chem/Bio.

Appeal
b5, USSC

① Security against ~~the~~ THREAT THAT IS compelling

② Dominance

③ TO AVOID Dominance by another superpower, to negate force power projection.

b5, USSC

④ Prestige - UK, Ukraine

⑤ VIEW that neighbor has them so I must
- competitor states or culture, social order drive
- North Korea does so Japan must, not just for defense, but force, culture hatred.

⑥ TRADE goods

b5, USSC

⑦ Pull superpower into conflict.

b5, USSC

⑧ FUSION on uncertain future

b5, USSC

⑨ Fulfilled, but may be politically/domestically complex to get rid of them

- Real problem with counter proliferation is to find and fix proliferation, not kill it. Especially for Chem/Bio WPNS.

- would define WMDs as those weapons:
 - ① IF used would change political balance
 - ② " " have major social impact
 - ③ that are difficult to defend against

- Does not see declaratory policy as threat, if CRAFTED NOT to constrain. May provide some political leverage for upcoming NPT.

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- ultimately believes that WOLFOWITZ scenario (400 Base Alt weapons) will become new "Gold Standard".

SIGNIFICANT OUTCOMES:

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What's Next:

- 10 NOV MEETING at 1300-1600, RED ROOM
- NEW TOR QUESTION SET AT TAB 1 WITH 1ST DRAFTING ASSIGNMENT. WE may provide PAPER AS DESIRED.

OTHER: NONE

VR
Dusty



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