NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK 
***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** 

September 16, 2002

This piece below is by Dr. Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI.  Mansourov writes that Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi is set to make history when he will hold a landmark summit with the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il on September 17, 2002.  Mansourov expects the unprecedented talks, despite their potential risks, to bring considerable geostrategic, political, and economic gains for both sides. Kim Jong Il is likely to give some presents to the Japanese guest on the abduction issue and on his strategic concerns, whereas Koizumi is certain to orally apologize before the North Korean people for Japan's past colonial abuses and to present his host with a gift of agreement in principle to provide generous compensation in the form of "economic cooperation funds" in future. This summit is likely to clear the debris of the century-long animosity and alienation between Japan and the DPRK and launch a speedy process of inter-governmental negotiations leading up to full normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries in early 2003. 

"A Breakthrough: Reform-minded Kim and Koizumi Open a New Chapter in DPRK-Japan Relations." 
by Dr. Alexandre Y. Mansourov

The news of the day is an upcoming trip by the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to North Korea on September 17, 2002.  If it succeeds, this visit may open the door for the full normalization of diplomatic relations between the DPRK and Japan by the end of 2002.  By inviting Koizumi to Pyongyang and normalizing state-to-state relations with Japan, Kim Jong Il is apparently intent to kill two birds with one stone: namely, to stall George W. Bush's anti-DPRK diplomatic offensive and use Tokyo as a gateway to Washington, as well as to obtain Japanese financing for deepening economic reforms in the north.

As for the Japanese calculations, Koizumi is said to have agreed to go to Pyongyang because of his strong expectation of success and serious results, which could positively affect his domestic popularity (his job approval rating went up by ten points after the initial announcement of the visit). Furthermore, Tokyo is concerned about the rapidly deteriorating U.S-NK relations and does not want to see the second Afghanistan, in its own neighborhood.  Moreover, Tokyo believes that normalization must be done prior to the ROK President Kim Dae-jung's departure from office, because DJ is very supportive of the improvement in the Japanese-DPRK relations, whereas Tokyo is not certain about the next ROK President's attitude in this regard.  Finally, as the North-South relations quickly improve, Japan does not want to be left out the process of the inter-Korean reconciliation, and, further, it wants to preserve its seat at the table, by being part of an international effort to shape the North Korean domestic reforms from inside.

What do we expect to see happen at the Kim-Koizumi summit?  Kim is sure to roll out a red carpet for the Japanese Prime Minister, with millions of cheering and flower-wavering Pyongyangites lining up the roads along the way of his motorcade.  Koizumi is likely to formally apologize for the crimes committed and sufferings inflicted upon Korea by Japan during its colonial rule (expect the same language as PM Murayama used in his apology a few years ago).  In a Joint Declaration, Kim Jong Il is likely to present Koizumi with a "gift," namely his agreement to extend a moratorium on missile tests, so worrisome for the Japanese, for a few more years.  On the abductions issue, Kim is likely to plead ignorance and promise to "find and punish those responsible." On the spy boat issue, Kim is likely to call it a misunderstanding and to vow to stop similar incidents in the future, since they cause so much anxiety to the Japanese people.  As for the strategic issues of WMD proliferation and regional stability, these are likely to be left intact for the U.S.-DPRK talks in the future.  I do not expect Koizumi to bring home anyone of the eleven alleged abductees along with him.  But, he is likely to get Kim's promise to resolve all these issues in the short run at the bilateral inter-agency level.

The big question, of course, will be the Japanese monetary compensation to NK for its colonial rule.  I believe Koizumi will agree in principle to settle this account, without committing himself to any concrete figure, which will be negotiated later on during bilateral financial talks.  Both sides are likely to end up with a present day equivalent of 0.5 billion U.S. dollars, discounted by the factor of two (difference in population size between the north and the south), plus almost 40-year interest accrued, which would make this compensation comparable to the amount paid by Japan to the ROK at normalization in 1965.  The Japanese government is likely to provide this money to Pyongyang in the form of grants, structural adjustment loans, infrastructure rehabilitation loans, in-kind and tied loans, private loan guarantees, all linked to the North Korean domestic economic restructuring efforts.

I would expect the two sides to agree on some kind of a roadmap, i.e., a series of bilateral steps that would lead them to the establishment of formal diplomatic and consular relations in the next few months, including a possible exchange of visits by Foreign Ministers later in the fall of 2002 and Koizumi's invitation for Kim Jong Il to visit Japan in early 2003.

The bottom line is that although the risks appear to be great for North Korea and Japan, too much is at stake for both Kim Jong Il and Koizumi personally, so that they cannot afford a failure.  In some sense, they are doomed to success.

Of course, a prompt successful normalization of relations between North Korea and the U.S. key strategic ally in the APR, Japan, will put the United States in a jam.  Washington will be left alone in the entire Northeast Asia with adamant pursuit of its hard-line "axis of evil" kind of policy toward North Korea.  And, although some conservative voices in Asia give credit to the Bush administration's hard-line rhetoric, by suggesting that "the more Washington pushes, the more Pyongyang bends in the current international climate of global war against terror," it is obvious that they themselves clearly prefer more conciliatory and constructive approaches for their own sake.  It is hard to avoid the impression that Tokyo is exploiting the U.S. hard-line policy towards the North in order to obtain more concessions from Pyongyang for itself, even at the expense of the broader strategic interests of the United States.  In general, the United States is widely advised to adopt a more conciliatory and pragmatic stance toward the DPRK.  Many wonder, "How many times can you reinvent the wheel?" They advise the United States to re-package the Perry process under some Bush labels and start selling it again as a brand new wine, in order to make it acceptable both in Washington and Pyongyang.

As for the "significant others," relations between North Korea and Russia are "on the upswing," with President Putin personally encouraging Kim Jong Il to continue his "Gorbachev-style reforms," and North Korean-Chinese relations are back to normal, despite Kim Jong Il's personal resentment at the way the Chinese leadership "mishandled" in the North Korean defectors' issue.  The most important point about these two sets of relationships is that both Russia and China support any economic policy changes in North Korea (big or small), whatever Pyongyang does, because any change is better than the existing status-quo in their estimates.  Regarding the strategic balance of power and threats in the region, some Chinese officials draw the attention of the United States to the fact that the PRC and DPRK are still bound by mutual defense obligations in accordance with the 1961 Mutual Defense Alliance Treaty between Beijing and Pyongyang.  They state bluntly that those hawks in Washington who talk about pre-emptive strikes against targets in North Korea, following Iraq's expected defeat, must learn history first and read the mutual defense provisions of the above-mentioned treaty, which is still in full force.  In other words, if the United States attacks North Korea, it'd better be prepared to fight China, too: the 1950 deja-vu!  In some quarters, the Cold War mentality is still live and well!