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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



AD393010

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M)(27 Sep 68

FOR OT RD 682338

4 October 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7th Infantry
Division Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.
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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96251

EABDDA-CO

15 June 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

THRU: Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, APO 96207
Commanding General, I Corps (Group), APO 96358
Commanding General, Eighth US Army, APO 96301
Commanding General, CINCUSARPAC

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

(U) The following report is submitted in accordance with USARIAC Reg 525-15, 22 Mar 68.

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. (U) The Division Artillery and its five battalions are organized under TOE 6-100E, 6-302E, 6-155E and 6-175E.
2. (U) The Division Artillery and all its battalions were assigned as an organic part of the 7th Infantry Division during the entire reporting period, a total of 121 days.
3. (U) The following changes in command and key personnel occurred during the reporting period:
 - a. LTC Russel H. Beaumont assumed command of the 1st Battalion, 31st Artillery from LTC John H. Dowling on 25 Mar 68.
 - b. MAJ Thomas E. Kinney assumed command of the 1st Battalion, 79th Artillery from LTC Calvin L. Colley on 27 Mar 68.
 - c. LTC Calvin L. Colley assumed command of the 6th Battalion, 80th Artillery from LTC Cleo M. Howard on 27 Mar 68.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

d. LTC Robert A. Garber assumed command of the 1st Battalion 79th Artillery from MAJ Thomas E. Kinney on 1 Apr 68.

e. MAJ John M. Spicer assumed duties as Div Arty S-3 from CPT Earl A. Greeno on 19 Jan 68.

f. MAJ Thomas E. Kinney assumed duties as AFSE on 19 Jan 68.

4. (C) The primary mission of the 7th Division Artillery, that of maintaining a constantly high state of readiness through training and readiness exercises was successfully accomplished during the reporting period.

5. (C) During the period of 15 Jan 68 to 19 Jan 68 the unit participated in I Corps CPX CAPITOL HILL. Upon alert all the headquarters and all battalion operations centers established field positions adjacent to their respective compounds. The initial mission of reinforcing the 2d Division was accomplished from 15 Jan to 17 Jan when counterattack planning went into effect. The battalions were released from the 2d Division on 17 Jan and fire support plans to include nuclear fires were completed. Fire Support of 12 battalions was coordinated and a 20 minute preparation was fired in support of the attack. The purpose of the exercise was to evaluate the effectiveness of the new I Corps contingency plan. In this relationship the objectives of the exercise were accomplished successfully.

6. (C) During the period of 3 Mar to 9 Mar the unit participated in 7th Division FTX OPPORTUNITY PLUS. This Divisional Field Exercise was an outstanding training vehicle for all units of the Division Artillery. All howitzer battalions made a minimum of five tactical moves and were afforded the opportunity to function in three different missions. The entire problem was played realistically with units occupying those tactical positions indicated in contingency plans and following plans in reinforcing the 2d Division Artillery. On the 3rd day of the exercise the Division Artillery joined the rest of the Division and participated in the counter-attack plans. The movement to join the division covered a distance of approximately 40 miles for all units of the Division Artillery and proved that the unit is capable of moving a reasonable distance within a realistic time frame to accomplish its mission. One major problem area discovered was the critical shortage of FLL parts for vehicles and proved to be a detrimental factor in the ability of the Artillery to move and maintain maximum fire power. Communications were emphasized and it was found that the new series of radios are extremely reliable.

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With the Division Artillery acting as the Division Alternate it was determined that distance between CPs which require travel time in excess of 15-20 minutes travel time by road are not tactically functional. It was determined that nuclear weapons can be assigned as low as the brigade level; however, more training was necessary in the Division to adequately utilize the full nuclear resources.

7. (U) During the entire reporting period the Division Artillery has taken on the task of training the Division in the function and proper utilization of Fire Planning Channels. The program began at the conclusion of CPX CAPITOL HILL when it was determined that officers at all levels lacked sufficient knowledge concerning fire planning. The training took the form of a combined lecture and demonstration period covering approximately two hours. During the lecture communications channels were emphasized as were the actions of the personnel at respective headquarters. During the reporting period each major headquarters was visited by Division Artillery personnel and were given the training.

8. (C) Another major mission undertaken by the Division Artillery was extensive planning and training in the employment of nuclear weapons. At its conception, discussion concerned the feasibility of assigning nuclear weapons to the Brigade Commander as opposed to the weapons assigned no lower than the Division. It was first determined that assigning weapons to this level would facilitate the timely utilization of this type of fire. This determination pointed out several problem areas to include the communications facilities available for such missions or requests and also the proper command and staff channels to be used. Further it was determined that the personnel within the Division needed extensive training in the area of nuclear weapons due to the critical shortage of prefix five qualified personnel within the command. This was undertaken in three phases. First, classroom lectures were given showing the communications channels available for requests and missions, the responsibilities of all members of the maneuver unit command and staff and the responsibilities of the Artillery commanders and staffs. The second phase was also in a classroom environment however, requests and missions were processed. The final phase was in a controlled field environment where the major commands provided operations personnel and equipment and used organic communications facilities to process requests and missions. The training was expanded and kept current by a Divisional requirement that each Brigade process a nuclear request and fire mission through appropriate headquarters to the firing unit. The results of the training showed that the Division and its organic units are presently capable of delivering effective nuclear fires upon any target.

training for assignment of NWS.

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9. (U) Throughout the reporting period this headquarters and all the battalions have taken part in readiness alerts designed to increase the deployability of the unit and to increase the ability of the unit to cope with any contingency. Throughout each of these alerts reporting procedures have been stressed as well as the processing of nuclear fire requests and fire missions. On each exercise emphasis had been placed on communications. It was found that the AN/GRC 46 is somewhat unreliable due to the age of the sets and the lack of necessary PLL repair parts. The AN/GRC 46 radios within the unit have not been fully modified for on line cryptographic transmissions and thus the full capability of the radio sets cannot be realized.

10. (U) During the months of March and April the Division Artillery gave 24 hour NO NOTICE Exercises to all the firing battalions in the Division Artillery. The primary purposes for these tests were to improve the units readiness posture and to insure that each unit was capable of performing its mission under contingency plans. The units within the Division Artillery were alerted at 0400 and ordered to tactical positions. Each was required to operate from the field for a period of 24 hours. Each battalion successfully completed all requirements and met the high standards required.

11. (U) Throughout the reporting period the Division Artillery has conducted intensive training for all officers to increase the technical proficiency of all officers within the unit. Instruction on basic Artillery procedures and a variety of associated subjects. A series of written tests have been administered to determine the proficiency of each officer.

SECTION II

COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I

OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

12. (U) Personnel: none

13. (C) Operations: Liaison with ROK Forces.

Item: Liaison responsibilities involving Republic of Korea.

Discussion: Liaison requirements with forces of the Republic of Korea are continual. The only plausible method for effecting such liaison is the assignment of a ROK Liaison Officer to allow the unit to successfully complete its assignment. Further, because of its mission, one of the battalions also requires a liaison officer from the ROKA.

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Observation: The assignment of necessary liaison officers will allow the unit to fulfill all its required missions.

COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES

Item: Whenever involved with a corps headquarters additional communications facilities are necessary.

Discussion: The present communications system calls for communications facilities with Corps Artillery through a system of six VHF sets and the results are circuits of very poor quality. Further in the initial segments of the contingency plans the 7th Div Arty is required to maintain close coordination with the 2d Div Arty in the areas of operations and intelligence. Again the VHF system proves inadequate since the circuitry travels through eight terminals and again the circuits are of very poor quality.

Observation: If there was a VHF system from each of the Div Artys to the Corps Arty the number of intermediate terminals would be reduced to two between the 7th Div Arty and Corps Arty and to four between 7th Div Arty and 2d Div Arty.

USE OF RADIO SET AN/GRC 46

Item: Application of appropriate MWO's and establishment of an adequate PLL for Radio Set AN/GRC 46.

Discussion: The Radio Set AN/GRC 46 is an integral part of the overall communications system. At the present time the GRC 46s within the Div Arty have not had the modification applied providing on-line cryptographic operation. This situation has become critical in that the full capabilities of the set has never been realized. Further the PLL for this set is inadequate and thus when the equipment fails the repair personnel have no parts to successfully repair the equipment. The transmitter T-195 has proven to be the least reliable piece of equipment. The major problem involved is a combination of the age of the equipment and the lack of adequately trained operators.

Observation: With proper application of the required cryptographic the capabilities of the AN/GRC 46 could be brought up to required operational status. If the necessary PLL were available the faulty equipment could be specifically repaired by the assigned personnel. The problem of T-195 failure can be solved partially by conducting adequate training for radio personnel; however, the age of the equipment poses a problem greater in magnitude.

REPAIR PARTS FOR VEHICLES

Item: Requirement for an adequate supply of vehicular repair parts.

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Discussion: During field exercises it was determined that the full fire capability of the Div Arty was severely hampered by the lack of necessary repair parts. One battalion had ten vehicles deadlined during the FTX OPPORTUNITY PLUS seven of which could have been immediately repaired in the field if the parts authorized by the FLL had been available. It has been estimated that during FTX OPPORTUNITY PLUS the Division Artillery fire power was reduced by approximately 1/3 primarily because of deadlined vehicles.

Observations: Commanders at all levels need to greatly emphasize the need for a thorough maintenance program. Further the supply channels for repair parts needs to be monitored closely to insure units are receiving the necessary authorized FLL parts to successfully complete their mission.

FIRE PLANNING TRAINING

Item: Adequate training in the function and use of fire planning channels.

Discussion: After a CPX it was noted that personnel within the Division were not adequately trained in the concept of fire planning. The major problem areas included the communications facilities available and the actual responsibilities of personnel at various levels of command. First it was found that Artillery Liaison Officers were not fully aware of their responsibilities to the maneuver unit commanders and that the commanders were unaware of the fire support the liaison officer could provide for tactical operations. There was a general breakdown in the rapport between the two segments within the Division. It was immediately apparent that extensive training in fire planning would provide the appropriate personnel with the basic knowledge to adequately perform their assigned missions.

Observations: The institution of a reliable training program within the Division produced the desired results. Fire planning and the understanding of fire support was greatly improved after the training sessions were conducted by the Division Artillery. All phases of fire planning were touched upon from the communications available for fire planning to the ultimate Division Fire Support Plan.

EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Item: Should nuclear weapons be assigned down to Brigade level and how to best prepare the Division personnel to adequately use nuclear weapons?

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Discussion: It was found that during field exercises nuclear fire planning was in effect however, the mechanics of nuclear fire requesting and the actual firing of the weapon were unrealistic. The fire missions concerned were not transmitted to the delivery unit on a timely manner and there was a general breakdown in the use of nuclear weapons on a training basis. If the nuclear weapon was to be assigned to the Brigade Commander then the personnel at that command level would require intensive training into the concepts of this type of weapon. One of the major problem areas was the lack of qualified prefix five personnel throughout the Division. Authorizations for prefix five personnel include Brigade S-3, S-2 and all Artillery Liaison Officers. Division Artillery is authorized 55 prefix five personnel however, when the training began there were only 9 qualified personnel within the Division Artillery. During planning conferences major problem areas that arose were appropriately solved. After the draft plans had been formulated the plan was examined and evaluated until workable procedures for request and firing of the weapons were developed. Of primary concern was the plausibility of assigning weapons to a Brigade Commander as opposed to allocating these weapons.

1968
P breakdown

Observations: Workable plans and procedures could be developed for the effective delivery of special weapons on a target. The assignment of small yield weapons to the Brigade Commander was far more effective than the allocation of such a weapon primarily because of the timely completion of the mission. Through adequate training the Division has become proficient in the timely transmission of nuclear requests and missions. The Division can adequately deliver a nuclear weapon on a target in a timely manner consistent with the assigned mission.

TRAINING OF OFFICERS

Item: Is enough attention being given to the continual training of the Officer Corps?

Discussion: There was evidence that there were deficiencies in the knowledge of officers in the basic branch related skills. The officers in a unit whose assigned mission is a state of preparedness often are required to spend a great deal of time on areas other than those MOS related. This was found to be the case within the Div Arty and the result was a breakdown in basic knowledge due to the lack of daily contact. A training and testing program was begun within the unit to improve the technical proficiency of the members of the Officer Corps. Initially the results were alarming in that many officers had lost proficiency in the basic skills of their branch. The training was continued and marked improvements were realized.

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Observations: A continual program of training of officers is necessary especially if the officers are not actively involved in MOS related duties on a daily basis. After completion of the Officers Basic Course or Officer Candidate School many officers have been assigned to training units and then TOE Artillery units. The better solution would be to send these officers to the TOE units and then to the training installations.

SECTION II

PART II

RECOMMENDATIONS

14. (U) Personnel: It is recommended that:

a. More prefix five qualified personnel be assigned to the Division and be utilized in those positions requiring the prefix five qualification.

b. Qualified ROA officers be assigned to those battalions requiring direct liaison with ROA Forces.

c. Few officers be assigned to TOE Artillery units prior to assignment to training installations to insure the maximum technical proficiency of these officers.

15. (U) Operations: It is recommended that:

a. Additional VHF be provided Division Artillery to provide jump capability and necessary communications with Corps Artillery.

16. (U) Training: It is recommended that:

a. Radio personnel receive continual effective MOS training to insure the proper operation of Radio Set AN/GRC 46 and Radio Set AN/GRC 19.

b. Fire planning training be conducted on a biannual basis to insure the proficiency of personnel within the Division and continued continuity in procedures.

c. Nuclear weapon requesting and employment training be conducted on a biannual basis to insure the proficiency of personnel within the Division and continued continuity in procedures.

d. Emphasis be placed on the continual training of officers in MOS related skills to insure maximum proficiency.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

17. (U) Intelligence: None.
18. (U) Logistics: It is recommended that:
 - a. The appropriate MWO be applied to the Radio Set AN/GRC 46 to provide on-line cryptographic capability.
 - b. An adequate PLL be established for Radio Set AN/GRC 46.
 - c. Authorized PLL repair parts be made available for expeditious repair of vehicles.
19. (U) Organization: None.
20. (U) Other: None.

James M. Bates
JAMES M. BATES
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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MEMO (15 June 1968) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

TO: HEADQUARTERS 7th INFANTRY DIVISION, Office of the Commanding General,
PO San Francisco 96207

8 JUL 1968

TO: Commanding General, I Corps (Group), ATTN: SAC/CT-401, PO 96358

1. Concur in the recommendation contained in paragraphs 14a, 14c, and 16c, of the basic report.

2. Reference paragraph 14b of the basic report. The Division is authorized 17 Div Artillery liaison officers and has 12 assigned. Div Artillery is authorized two and has one assigned. The full complement of liaison officers would permit the Division to discharge its liaison requirements. Efforts to obtain the assignment of authorized officers are continuous.

3. Reference paragraph 15 of the basic report. The Division is authorized 33 M/ANOC-69 and has 30 on hand. Of the on hand sets, seven are red and/or immobile for the lack of shelters. Separate action has been initiated to overcome these deficiencies. Two M/ANOC-69's are currently assigned to Div Artillery thereby providing it with a jump capability. Division resources are inadequate to permit providing additional terminals for operation in a unit with Corps artillery as recommended in the basic report; a separate action is underway with Corps which, if successful, will provide the terminals from Corps resources.

4. Reference paragraph 16 of the basic report.

a. The training recommended in subparagraphs a and d are within Div Artillery's capability and the training recommended is required by current Division policy and directives.

b. Further with respect to 16d, it is quite evident that many field grade officers and captains, who have been on branch material or staff assignment do not maintain their branch proficiency either through lack of opportunity or time. Personnel at all levels who have such individuals assigned as well as the individuals themselves should be encouraged to insure that branch proficiency is maintained. Command information programs, Infantry magazines and other "trade publications", Army magazine, and service schools are all suitable media for keeping this requirement constantly in the minds of all officers. It applies for noncommissioned officers too but to a lesser degree.

c. The training recommended in subparagraphs b and c has been approved and appropriate revisions to the Division basic training directive are being published. In order to preserve the proficiency in nuclear fire request procedures it is Division policy to require appropriate units to submit nuclear fire requests during each monthly Division Readiness exercise.

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5. Reference paragraph 18 of the basic report.

a. Reference para 18a. Every effort is being made to obtain and apply the kit for the radio set M/C C-4b to provide on-line cryptographic capability. Considerable progress has been made since the reporting period covered. At this date, all 37 of the Division's M/C C-4b models have kits and only 10 are yet to be applied. The kits for the 15 M/C C-4b models are not on hand. Requisitions were cancelled and kits were re-requisitioned in April 1968.

b. Reference para 18b. The establishment of adequate and correct IITs on all items of equipment has been an area of command emphasis in the Division for over six months. All IITs are being reviewed for correctness and considerable progress had been achieved by the completion of the last IIT as of 20 June 1968.

Atc [unclear]

J. L. SMITH
Major General, USA
Commanding

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EACICT-M (16 July 68) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

LTC Clark/rdr/3062/3302

Headquarters I Corps (Gp)
APO San Francisco 96358 22 JUL 1968

THRU: Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, EAGO-T
APO San Francisco 96301
Commanding General, USARPAC, ATTN: GPCF-DT
APO San Francisco 96558

TO: ACSFCR, Department of the Army, Washington D. C.
20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period 1 January thru 30 April 1968 for the 7th Infantry Division Artillery.
2. All observations and recommendations will be considered and appropriate action taken.
3. A Copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

D. K. Ledwith
D. K. LEDWITH
2 LT, AGC
ASST. AG

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EAGO-MH (15 Jun 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, APO 96301 7 AUG 68

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATIN: SPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed subject report. The following comments supplement the report.

2. (C) Reference item concerning use of Radio Set AN/SRC-46, page 5, para 13, and page 9, para 18a and b. Concur. The following is a summary of actions taken or being taken by this headquarters to improve the status of Radio Set AN/SRC-46:

a. Division requisition was submitted in April 68, and all division AN/SRC-46A models have been modified. MCO kits for the AN/SRC-46B sets were ordered with O2 priority. Follow-up is being made to determine the availability of MCO kits to provide the remaining 15 AN/SRC-46B's with on-line crypto-graphic capability. The division was advised of the correct FSM's for the MCO kits applicable to the "B" model.

b. A maintenance rebuild program has been established for the T-195 transmitter whereby all T-195's currently in the AN/SRC-46's will be directly exchanged with serviceable transmitters from the rebuild program. This will greatly improve the operational reliability and use of the AN/SRC-46.

c. Eighth Army requirements have been submitted for the new AN/SRC-462 which replaces the AN/SRC-46. However, distribution is pending approval by the DA Distribution/Allocation Committee (DADAC).

d. Assistance has been given to the 4th division regarding the establishment of adequate LL's to support on-hand equipment and periodic review for correctness.

3. (C) Reference item concerning repair parts for vehicles, page 5, para 13. Concur. The following actions have been or are being taken to improve this situation: Increased command emphasis is being given in training supply personnel as well as PM clerks. Further, more extensive use is being made of AUC Mechanical Assistance personnel to assist in maintenance and supply activities at unit level. Additionally, a system has been set up in APO where in major subordinate commands report, on a quarterly basis, their ten most critical items. Supply action on these items is proactively followed through to determine status and availability. Expedited supply action to fill shortages that follows.

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EAGO-MH (15 Jun 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

4. (S) Reference item concerning employment of nuclear weapons, page 6, para 13.

a. Nuclear weapons are allocated to CG, Eighth Army, and are sub-allocated to major subordinate commands. For training purposes, the assignment of nuclear weapons can be simulated. Allocations of nuclear rounds are made for planning purposes. It is beyond the purview of CG, Eighth Army to assign nuclear weapons at this time.

*has been before?
(and) be in future?*

b. This headquarters has been conducting bi-weekly all-erro code exercises to assist subordinate commands in training their personnel in nuclear weapons messages. All units which have a nuclear capability participate in this training program.

5. (C) Reference item concerning training of officers, page 7, para 13; page 8, para 16d; and 1st Indorsement, para 4b. Concur.

a. Each officer has a responsibility to himself to keep as branch proficient as possible, consistent with his other duties.

b. In addition to the various trade publications mentioned in 1st Indorsement, para 4b, service schools offer extension courses by correspondence designed to assist the officer and NCO to remain proficient in his basic branch.

c. Eighth Army conducted Nuclear Weapons Employment Refresher Training Courses in June-July 1968 so that prefix 5 qualified officers could receive training necessary to retain their proficiency MOS prefix.

6. (C) Reference item concerning assignment of ROKA liaison officers, page 3, para 11b. Concur. Liaison officers are provided by us, ROKA and that 19 states that replacements are not available for all Eighth Army vacancies, which now number 27. The next group of nominees will be interviewed at this headquarters in August, and it is planned that at least two officers will be assigned to the 7th Infantry Division. More personnel may be assigned, depending on the total number available and found acceptable.

7. (U) Reference item concerning assignment of prefix five qualified personnel, page 4, para 11a. Concur. Headquarters, Eighth Army, routinely requisitions prefix five qualified personnel to fill all prefix five positions in Eighth Army. Prefix five qualified personnel assigned to

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EA70-74 (15 Jun 68) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational report for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1968 (U)

Eighth Army by JA are equitably applied against major subordinate command positions. Based on findings of current review of prefix five officer requirements, assistance from JA will be requested.

d. (U) Reference item concerning assignment of Artillery officers with experience in TOB artillery units, page 3, para 1hc. Concur. The 7th Division may annotate its remissions to indicate that previous TOB artillery unit experience is desired for positions requiring such experience. A message has been prepared for dispatch to requirements branch, OPC, JA, requesting that combat arms officers, particularly artillery officers, have prior TOB unit experience before assignment to this command. Currently, a vast majority of division training and line officers are lieutenants who were assigned to Korea directly from basic branch courses.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. N. Hunter

R. N. HUNTER
1LT. AGC
ASST AG

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GPOP-DT (15 Jun 68) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Inf Div Arty for Period Ending
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 SEP 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding; indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



FRED E. HANSARD
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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