



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
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



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


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
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ENCL 4

22 Sept 1987

the .
SUBJECT: Weapons Support Detachment - Korea Nuclear Operations Standard Operation Procedures (WSD-K NUC OPS SOP).

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. REFERENCES: See Annex A.

2. PURPOSE: This SOP establishes WSD-K policies and responsibilities applicable to the safety, security, custody, and reliability of nuclear weapons assigned to this unit. It defines procedures which unit personnel will follow during all phases of operations involving those nuclear weapons in the custody of WSD-K.

3. This SOP applies to all organic or attached elements under the operational control of WSD-K. This SOP is applicable under combat conditions. These same procedures will apply under simulated combat conditions and nuclear operations training.

4. SCOPE: This SOP incorporates the requirements of EUSA NUC OPS SOP and EUSA NST SOP that apply to this unit and delineates responsibilities within the detachment.

5. GENERAL:


a. This SOP supersedes WSD-K NUC OPS SOP, dated 1 Oct 86 of which all copies will be destroyed.

b. The Detachment Surety Officer will publish any additions, deletions or corrections needed to this SOP. Any recommendations or corrections should be submitted to CMDR, WSD-K, ATTN Surety Officer, APO SF 96208.

c. This SOP compliments current regulations of higher headquarters. It is intended to provide guidance for the conduct of nuclear operations. If any conflict with higher headquarter regulations or SOP exists the more stringent requirement will apply. Any person discovering conflicts should inform the Detachment Surety Officer immediately. This SOP is not authority to violate any DOD, DA, or EUSA policy regarding tactical nuclear operations.

d. Before conducting any operations on a war reserve item, the personnel will be familiar with the requirements of this SOP and the applicable portions of the referenced publications. The supervisor will insure a copy of this SOP is available at all locations where an operation on a war reserve item is to be done.

e. IMPLEMENTATION: This SOP is effective immediately. It will be reviewed at least quarterly and updated as required.


ALBERT H. VOEGELI JR
LTC, FA
Commanding

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- ANNEX A - References
- B - Responsibilities
- C - Nuclear Support Team Operations
- D - Field Storage Location
- E - Firefighting
- F - NAIRA
- G - Convoy
- H - Emergency Destruction
- I - Technical Operations
- J - Custody
- K - Tie Down Diagrams

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The following is a list of publications which were used as primary references for this SOP.

AR 50-5
AR 50-115
AR 700-65

FM 5-25
FM 55-204
FM 55-218
FM 55-220
FM 100-50

SC 1375-95-CL-A03 and A03 HR
SC 1375-95-CL-A08 and A08 HR
SC 1375-95-CL-A04 AND A04 HR

TB 9-1100-803-15
TB 9-1100-811-40
TB 8-1100-815-14
TB 385-2

TM 9-1100-204-10
TM 9-1100-204-20&P
TM 9-1100-204-20&P-1
TM 9-1100-204-20-2
TM 9-1110-204-14
TM 9-1100-218-10
TM 9-1100-218-20
TM 9-1100-218-20P
TM 9-1100-218-20/1
TM 9-1100-218-20-2
TM 9-1110-218-14
TM 9-1110-220-10
TM 9-1110-220-20-1&P
TM 9-1110-220-20-2&P
TM 9-1300-206
TM 9-1375-213-12
TM 39-0-1A
TM 39-50-8

TP 1554-2

EUSA NUC OPS SOP
USFK/EUSA NST SOP (S-RELROK)
COMUSK TAC NUC SOP (SRD)

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1. All in command of or in charge of a site or an event will insure their personnel comply with the provisions of this SOP, current applicable regulations, and the directives of higher headquarters. Responsible personnel at all levels will:

- a. Insure the weapons are fired at the authorized time and place.
- b. Prevent unauthorized detonation, fuzing, firing or destruction of the nuclear weapons.
- c. Prevent the capture of weapons, components or classified reference material.
- d. Prevent and report by the most expedient means available any known or suspected dangerous conditions involving nuclear operations. This includes, but is not limited to, security violations, suspicious actions and any indicator of a personnel unreliability.
- e. Insure all members involved in an operation comply with the safety rules in AR 50-115.

2. Detachment Commander:

- a. Maintains responsibility for all nuclear activities, equipment, and munitions in the unit's custody.
- b. Plans, directs, and supervises the employment of the unit to implement nuclear weapon missions assigned by higher headquarters.
- c. Designates a Detachment Weapons Officer.
- d. Appoints nuclear weapons custodians and courier officers on orders for weapon shipments and custody.
- e. Coordinates physical security requirements with the 8th Military Police Brigade.
- f. Maintains sufficient NST's to accomplish unit missions.
- g. Exercise command and control of the NST.

3. Detachment S2/3:

- a. Advises the Commander on the employment of the unit's nuclear assets.
- b. Responsible for coordinating with external support assets.

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4. Detachment Weapons Officer:

- a. Serves as the Detachment Weapons Custodian at the Field Storage Location (FSL)
- b. Ensures nuclear weapon related directives are properly implemented within the weapons platoon.
- c. Provides technical assistance to the team leaders and coordinates actions which are specified by directives.
- d. Ensures all operations where practicable are standardized within the weapons platoon.
- e. Supervises and coordinates the NSTs.

5. Nuclear Support Team Leaders:

- a. Serve as custodians for all weapons in the possession of their team and are commanders of their team.
- b. Responsible for the receipt, custody, security, safety, and delivery of the weapons from pickup to the time they are expended.
- c. Ensure that upon receipt of a properly authenticated message and fire mission, the weapons are expended with accuracy and timeliness.
- d. Act as the courier officer during nuclear weapon convoys.
- e. Submit all required reports IAW applicable publications.

6. Nuclear Support Team Chief:

Responsible for the same requirements as the NST leader and will assume command of the NST when the team leader is not present or capable.

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ANNEX C (Nuclear Support Team Operations) to WSD-K Nuc Ops SOP

1. PURPOSE: This annex lists the requirements of the EUSA Nuc Ops SOP and the EUSA NST SOP for WSD-K.
2. GENERAL: The EUSA NST SOP prescribes procedures for nuclear support team operations. All personnel involved in NST operations will become familiar with the EUSA NST SOP.
3. ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES: The following are additional procedures which apply to the WSD-K.
 - a. If the NST occupies a hide position, the NST leader will establish a perimeter around the mission vehicle and position two entry control guards at the specified entry point. Listening/observation posts will be posted if necessary.
 - b. Prefire operations may be performed in any of the team vehicles, an aircraft, a tent provided by the ROKA or in the case of the 155mm or the new 8", at the howitzer.
 - c. A guard will be posted at the back of the primary and alternate howitzer after the team chief has completed his inspection.
 - d. The primers will be controlled by the team chief once technical operations are started on the weapon.
 - e. The team leader/team chief will supervise ramming the weapon and will insure the proper propellant charge is placed in the powder chamber.
 - f. The team leader/team chief will insure the howitzer is laid on the proper firing data.
 - g. The detachment will be notified as soon as possible after the weapon has been fired using the format in EUSA NUC OPS SOP APPENDIX I.
 - h. The NST will secure all remaining packages and components and repackage as necessary to transport safely and evacuate the firing position.
 - i. The Detachment will establish a duress code for all teams. It will also be given to air crew members prior to weapon loading if movement is by air. If the duress code is passed to a member of the team security force, the guard will aim his weapon at the individual(s) with the team member and order him to move away from the other individuals. All personnel will then be ordered to spread eagle on the ground and the team leader will be notified. Under no circumstances will the individuals be allowed to enter the exclusion area. This includes the use of deadly force, if necessary.
 - j. Any time the safety rules 1 through 4 in AR 50-115 are waived, it must be a conscious decision made on the part of the custodian. As soon as the emergency is over the rules will be enforced. This applies throughout all phases of operations.

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1. PURPOSE: The establishment of the Field Storage Location (FSL) is a consolidated effort of every element of the unit. The security of the WHA is of the utmost importance and will be accomplished as the defensive perimeter is established. This annex provides guidance on the set up and security of the WHA.

- a. The OIC of the FSL will normally be the Detachment Weapons Officer. The NCOIC will normally be the Weapons Platoon Sergeant.
- b. All weapons and nuclear components will be stored in the FSL.
- c. The OIC will establish a duress code for the FSL.
- d. The FSL OIC will determine who is authorized access to the FSL and may prevouch those personnel. All others must be vouched on a case by case basis.
- e. Personal recognition by the ECP guards is sufficient to allow entry of authorized personnel to the FSL.
- f. Personnel responding to a fire or accident in the FSL will be granted rapid entry.
- g. The Commander, Executive Officer, S2/3, and the team leaders are also authorized vouching authority.

2. PLACEMENT:

- a. The size of the FSL will be determined by the terrain, number of weapons stored, and the required security area. The size will be kept to the minimum operationally necessary.
- b. The FSL will normally be established within the unit perimeter. Any signature layout must be avoided to the maximum extent possible.
- c. The mission vehicles will be arranged, when possible, within the FSL so loading from one vehicle to another can be done "tailgate to tailgate".
- d. The weapons will remain tied down on the mission vehicles when stored in the FSL.

3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:

- a. Two entry control guards:
 - (1) Control entry into and out of the FSL. The entry control point will be the only entry or exit point in the FSL.
 - (2) Must know the number and identification of all personnel in the FSL at all times.

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(3) Prevent unauthorized access to the weapons.

(4) Will know their prescribed duties (WSD-K Guard Book) including rapid entry, escort, and entry control requirements.

b. Perimeter Guards.

Responsibilities for the perimeter guards are in the WSD-K Guard Book.

c. Reaction Force (RF).

(1) When WSD-K is deployed as a FSL in a Field Army Area the respective Liaison Officer and NCO will coordinate for a minimum of 1 platoon of ROK infantry to secure the area and perform the duties of a reaction force.

NOTE: If Military Police are opcon to WSD-K, the police force can be used as the Reaction Force while the ROK infantry provide perimeter defense.

(2) When individual teams are deployed to ROK Army firing sites, the respective ROK firing battery will provide the reaction force. This reaction force normally consists of 10 personnel and usually is the ROK Army crew from the alternate howitzer.

(3) The senior WSD-K Officer or NCO on the FSL or firing site is responsible to perform on site coordination with the ROK Officer in charge to insure smooth Reaction Force operations. The Nuclear Weapons Logistics Element and/or the Respective Field Army Liaison Teams are responsible to insure ROK personnel are present.

4. FSL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS:

a. Lay a landline to the detachment tactical operations center (TOC) and the emergency action facility (EAF).

b. Lay a landline to the weapon custodian's tent.

c. Maintain firefighting equipment. This will be as a minimum two fire extinguishers, two 5 gallon water cans and two entrenching tools.

5. OCCUPATION OF THE FSL.

a. Advance Party:

(1) The advance party will consist of the FSL NCOIC and at least one person from each section assigned to the FSL at the time of the occupation.

(2) The advance party will conduct a security sweep and then secure the area. As the mainbody arrives, ground guides will direct the mission vehicles into position in the FSL. The advance party will also establish the ECP.

b. Main body (Sections assigned to the FSL).

As the vehicles enter the FSL the drivers will park their vehicles and then act as guards until the mainbody is in position and the security is established.

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c. Priorities during the occupation of the FSL.

- (1) Establishment of the defensive perimeter.
- (2) Establishment of the FSL.
- (3) Position improvements.

6. FSL RECORDS:

a. The weapons custodian will maintain a record by type and serial number of weapons received by the WSD-K. This includes all weapons and components, whether in the FSL or deployed with the teams.

b. Monitor and record temperature and exposure times IAW
TM 9-1100-204-20&P-1

7. EMERGENCY/RAPID ENTRY PROCEDURES:

a. Under emergency conditions the custodian or the senior man present may authorize rapid entry into the FSL.

b. Personnel reacting to the emergency may enter the exclusion area at any point.

c. Entry control guards will maintain security of the weapons during emergency procedures. After the emergency is over the DIC and NCOIC will reenstate the two person rule and Entry Control Procedures.

8. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT:

a. Nuclear weapons and components are designated as "Vital to the National Security". Security guards and escorts must use the force necessary to prevent the unauthorized access to these materials. They also must use the force necessary to apprehend or prevent the escape of individuals whose unauthorized presence in the vicinity appears to present a threat to the security or safety of the weapons. These rules of engagement serve as guidelines for the use of deadly force to protect the nuclear weapons.

b. EXECUTION:

(1) All actions may be taken by the security forces to prevent access to or seizure of the weapons by intruders. This includes firing on those intruders, if necessary.

(2) The welfare of hostages taken or used will not be a deterrent to using the measures necessary to stop the hostile force. All actions will be used, to include firing on NST members held captive if necessary, to insure control of the weapons remains with the detachment.

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c. IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS: If possible, the guard personnel will warn intruders (voice, warning shot, etc) before firing on them. Guards will, when possible, shoot to wound and not kill. They will use all available fire power necessary in the following circumstances:

- (1) Unauthorized entry, theft, arson, or sabotage of any vehicle or aircraft containing nuclear weapons or material.
- (2) Forceful attempts to stop, impede, or obstruct the passage of any vehicle or aircraft containing nuclear weapons or material.
- (3) An escape or attempted escape of any person who appears to have committed any of the offenses indicated in (1) or (2) above.
- (4) To recapture a weapons holding area, weapons carrier, or recover any nuclear material taken by an unauthorized person(s).
- (5) To protect security force personnel and others from what they believe to be imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.
- (6) When directed by the guard/escort force commander, courier officer, or ground force commander.

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1. PURPOSE: This annex provides specific procedures for fighting fires involving nuclear weapons, components and associated high explosives by WSD-K personnel.

2. GENERAL:

a. The objective of fighting fires involving nuclear weapons and/or components is to minimize damage to the weapon and protect personnel, equipment, and property from fire, explosion, and contamination. The second objective is to prevent damage which might prevent mission accomplishment. Therefore, fires should be fought as long as there is a reasonable chance of extinguishing them before they can cause damage to the rounds.

b. A weapon/component fire will be reported IAW FM 100-50 and NAIRA procedures in this SOP.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. Custodians or senior US person present will be responsible for directing all fire fighting efforts and making all decisions regarding the weapons. The decision to continue to fight the fire or to evacuate rests with the custodian of the weapon. Adherence to AR 50-115 is mandatory except in cases of emergency. The decision to waive the appropriate rules will be a conscious decision made by the custodian or courier and as soon as possible the rules will be placed in effect. The custodian will insure the weapon is maintained in a secure environment at all times.

b. The NST team chief is responsible for insuring the serviceability of the firefighting equipment in the team's possession.

4. SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS:

The possibility of a nuclear detonation resulting from an accident or fire is negligible, but there is a potential hazard from the high explosive and radioactive components.

5. GENERAL FIREFIGHTING GUIDELINES:

a. All NST members must be familiar with TB 365-2 (NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIREFIGHTING PROCEDURES).

b. Approach the fire from upwind if it appears the weapon is on fire or has broken open.

c. If one of the following occurs the custodian should cease firefighting efforts and evacuate a minimum of 366 meters upwind or as far as the terrain and tactical situation allow:

(1) The weapon is too hot to touch.

(2) The paint starts to blister.

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(3) The HE component begins to melt.

(4) The HE is "torching".

(5) The custodian feels the possibility of an explosion is imminent.

d. All NST members are considered essential personnel to the firefighting effort.

e. A 360 degree security perimeter will be established around the weapon and maintained by the guard force, if possible.

f. Operation of all non-essential transmitters in the vicinity of the fire will be suspended.

6. MISSION VEHICLE FIRES:

a. The first person to notice a fire involving a mission vehicle will sound the alarm and immediately commence firefighting procedures.

b. The courier will stop all vehicles and establish an exclusion area. Other mission vehicles will immediately move a safe distance away from the vehicle on fire and a security perimeter will be established.

c. The closest personnel to the fire will fight it under the direction of the courier. The team chief will insure security is maintained around the mission vehicle(s).

d. An alternate mission vehicle will be made available to the fire fighting team for possible transload operations.

7. MISSION AIRCRAFT FIRES:

a. Follow the instructions of the air crew in evacuating the aircraft.

b. The courier will make the decision whether to fight the fire.

c. If necessary, transload the weapon to the alternate or the security aircraft.

8. AFTER ACTIONS:

a. Report the fire to the detachment or the controlling headquarters.

b. The area will be secured and if possible all personnel and equipment that may have been contaminated will be isolated until they can be decontaminated.

c. The courier or the senior man present will make an appraisal of the weapons condition and report it as a BROKEN ARROW IAW EUSA NUC OPS SOP Appendix J, TAB II.

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1. PURPOSE: This annex provides procedures for nuclear accident and incident response and assistance (NAIRA) for the WSD-K.

2. GENERAL:

a. The primary reasons for nuclear accident and incident control are to:

- (1) Minimize injury and loss of life.
- (2) Minimize interference with the FSL or NST operations.
- (3) Secure classified material and information.

b. Any accident or incident will be reported immediately thru S2/3 to CC Seoul or CP Tango or CP Main. Reports will be submitted in the format given in appendix 1.

c. Any weapon involved in an accident or incident may rupture or break apart. This could result in the spread of radioactive contamination and high explosives. Therefore, care should be exercised until the courier or custodian can make an appraisal of the condition of the weapon.

3. CONTROL MEASURES:

a. The custodian or courier will take immediate measures to accomplish the following:

- (1) Evacuate the injured and provide first aid.
- (2) Conduct fire fighting, rescue, or accident control procedures as necessary.
- (3) Establish required security around the accident site.
- (4) Make the required reports and, if needed, request assistance.
- (5) Mark the accident site and restrict movement through it as much as possible.
- (6) Determine the extent of damage and the condition (serviceable or unserviceable) of the weapon(s) involved, depending on the tactical situation.

b. The commander of WSD-K will provide the requested assistance to a deployed NST in order to allow the team to continue their mission, if possible.

4. Further guidance is contained in EUSA NUC OPS SOP Appendix J, TAB I.

5. Reports will be submitted IAW EUSA NUC OPS SOP Appendix J, TAB II.

Appendix 1- Definitions of reports.

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1. (U) To facilitate the prompt reporting of nuclear operational expenditure and accident/incidents involving nuclear weapons, the reports listed in this Annex will be used. Each report will be submitted by the unit in custody of the weapons at the time of the event through command channels to COMUSKOREA. Voice transmission will be the primary means for submission of the reports followed by a record copy follow-up.

REPORT	DESCRIPTION
a. STRIKE REPORT	Mission confirmation that nuclear mission has been accomplished, identifying any deviation that may have occurred IAW 5(d)4 and 6(c)2
b. BROKEN ARROW	Nuclear weapon incident involving: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon. - Radioactive contamination. - Seizure, theft, or loss of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component, including jettisoning.
c. BENT SPEAR	Nuclear weapon significant incident involving: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evident damage to the extent that major rework, complete replacement or examination or recertification is required. - Suspected or actual strike by lightning of a weapon has degraded safety or reliability of that weapon. - Suspected that a weapon has been partially or fully armed prior to authorization. - Possible adverse public reaction or release of information which is deemed to be of such importance as to warrant the attention of COMUSKOREA. - Attempted/ actual penetration or other degradation of security of nuclear weapon sites, activities, and /or tactical movement of weapons.
d. DULL SWORD	Nuclear weapon minor incident involving: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Damage to warhead section or weapon in which in country organizations are authorized to repair, or malfunctions of associated equipment which could result in damaged to the warhead section or warhead. - Damage, loss, or destruction of nuclear training weapons.

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- Unauthorized acts which degrade the safety or security of a nuclear weapon or trainer unless reportable as an accident or significant incident.
- Any other conditions which are considered reportable by the commander or custodian of a weapon.

e. EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION Self Explanatory.
 DISABLEMENT
 DISENABLEMENT

2. (U) All of the above messages will be transmitted using "FLASH" precedence

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1. PURPOSE: This annex establishes procedures for the tactical air and ground movement of nuclear weapons.

2. GENERAL:

- a. US custody of all weapons assigned to the WSD-K will always be maintained.
- b. Prior to movement of nuclear weapons all members of the convoy will receive a detailed courier's briefing.
- c. The capability to conduct emergency destruction will be maintained at all times.
- d. Loading should be tailgate to tailgate whenever possible, and will be executed as quickly as possible.
- e. Tiedown requirements are specified in the appropriate -20 system manuals for ground moves and the FM 55 series manuals for air moves. Some of the tiedowns most often used by WSD-K are listed in Annex K.
- f. Adherence to AR 50-115 is mandatory except in cases of emergency. The decision to waive the appropriate rules will be a conscious decision made by the custodian or courier and as soon as possible the rules will again be placed in effect.
- g. All load carrying vehicles will be inspected for normal maintenance requirements and meet applicable Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) or Periodic Maintenance Services (PMS).
- h. An exclusion area will be established around the load vehicle or aircraft at all halts, stops, loadings and unloadings. Entry control will be established at the rear of the load vehicle and the CH-47 or the side of the UH-1 and the UH-60. See Annex K.
- i. In the event of an accident or incident the following measures will be taken:
 - (1) Stop the operation.
 - (2) Implement the necessary NAIRA procedures in Annex F.
 - (3) Make a decision on the continued movement based on the guidance in the appropriate -20 manual.
- j. Each load vehicle will have a minimum of two entry control guards whose primary duty is to safeguard the nuclear weapon(s) and control access to the vehicle or aircraft. Each NST member will also be armed and available to guard the weapon(s) in the convoy.

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3. COURIER OFFICER RESPONSIBILITIES: The courier officer will:

- a. Insure all associated components and related items, i.e. ED material, propellant charges, CDS card, etc, are present when receipting for a weapon.
- b. Insure the transportation for the mission is adequate and appropriate.
- c. Insure the team members and air crew have the appropriate security clearances. The air mission commander must vouch for his personnel.
- d. Implement Annex J as applicable.
- e. Brief NST and air crews

Appendix 1 - Ground Convoy Courier Officer's Briefing.

Appendix 2 - Ground Convoy Load List

Appendix 3 - Air Convoy Procedures.

NOTE: Some of the diagrams used most frequently by WSD-K are listed in Annex K.

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1. SITUATION:

- a. Enemy forces, known and estimated.
- b. Friendly forces and supporting headquarters (FROKA, ROKA, CFA).

2. MISSION:

- a. NST #_____.
- b. ROKA firing battery_____.
- c. Rendezvous point at grid _____ NLT _____ hours.
- d. Firing point at grid _____.
- e. TOT _____ hours.

3. EXECUTION:

- a. Be prepared to leave NLT _____ hours.
- b. Basic load of ammunition will be issued.
- c. Individual and crew served weapons will be carried.
- d. _____ weapons are to be carried. There is a radiation and a high explosive hazard .
- e. Order of movement is _____.
- f. Convoy discipline:

(1) On the open road maintain a 50 meter interval with a maximum speed of 35 MPH.

(2) In built up areas maintain a 20-30 meter interval with a maximum speed of 25 MPH.

(3) At all rest stops and halts maintain a 5 meter interval.

(4) On unimproved roads maintain 30 meter interval with a maximum speed of 15-25 MPH.

(5) Trail vehicles will maintain sight of the vehicles in front of them.

(6) An exclusion area will be established at all stops. Entry control will be established by positioning entry control personnel at the rear of the mission vehicle(s).

(7) Strip maps will be issued.

(8) In case of a nuclear accident or incident, report IAW Annex F.

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g. Actions for emergency situations:

(1) Air attack/warning actions:

(a) Verbal - "Air Attack".

(b) Pull vehicles off the road and under cover if available.

(c) The mission load vehicle(s) driver and assistant driver will maintain two-man control of the material.

(2) Ambush or ground attack.

(a) Blocked near ambush.

(1) Return fire to ambush site.

(2) Attempt to drive out of kill zone.

(3) Provide security for load item.

(4) Roll up ambush.

(5) Custodian will insure weapon(s) do not fall into enemy hands.

(6) Continue the mission.

(b) Unblocked (far ambush).

(1) Speed up and drive out of the kill zone. Do not engage.

(2) If blocked, follow instructions above.

(c) Additional actions in the event of a ground attack or ambush.

(1) All available personnel will immediately return fire.

(2) Do not become decisively engaged. Suppress threat and pass through the area. If passage is impossible then back out of the area.

(3) Do not stop to engage targets. Avoid conflict.

(3) NBC attack warnings and actions.

(a) Stop breathing.

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(b) Mask.

(c) Signals:

- (1) Verbal - gas and metal against metal.
- (2) Vehicle horn - three short horn blasts.
- (3) Flag - yellow.

(d) Drive through area.

(4) Hijacking warning and actions.

- (a) Notify rest of the convoy by radio, if possible.
- (b) Flag - white.
- (c) Involving NST members, overpower and apprehend hijackers.
- (d) During movement the driver will attempt to immobilize the mission vehicle if hijacked. Personnel in the trail vehicle may shoot out the tires of the mission vehicle if necessary.

(5) Fire warnings and actions.

- (a) Vehicle horn - two long horn blasts.
- (b) Flag - red.
- (c) Fires will be fought by anyone on the NST.

(6) All clear - verbal command "all clear" given by senior man present.

(7) Emergency destruction will be accomplished IAW Annex H of this SOP.

- (a) Verbal alarm- "E.D." repeated several times.

h. Brief the Entry Control Personnel.

i. Brief all security force personnel.

j. Additional instructions for convoy personnel:

- (1) Two-man rule will be in effect for the mission.
- (2) Two entry control people will be posted at the back of the mission vehicle(s) at all stops.
- (3) The team chief will insure all tie-downs on the mission vehicle(s) are inspected at all stops.
- (4) Vehicle canvas, if available, will be in place and tied down on the mission and alternate vehicles.
- (5) Vehicles will have all bumper markings covered. During daylight headlights will be covered to prevent reflection.

k. Give the radiation and explosive hazard for each applicable system.

1. The duress code is _____.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT: Brief the NST on availability and location of rations, extra fuel, water, ammunition, maintenance support, etc. as required for each mission.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Signal:

(1) Current CEDI.

(2) Frequencies and callsigns.

(a) NST freq _____.

(b) NST callsign _____.

(c) Controlling HQs _____.

(d) ROKA freq _____.

(e) ROKA callsign _____.

(f) ROK/US callsign _____.

(g) WSD-K Ops callsign _____.

(h) Vanderbilt freq _____.

(i) Vanderbilt callsign _____.

(m) WSD-K FM retrans freq A _____.

(n) WSD-K FM retrans freq A callsign _____.

(o) WSD-K FM retrans freq B _____.

(p) WSD-K FM retrans freq B callsign _____.


b. Command:

(1). WSD-K located in the vicinity of _____.

(2). Controlling Hqs is (if other than WSD-K) _____.

(3). Chain of Command is _____.

c. Time is now _____ hours. Are there any questions?



APPENDIX 2 (Ground Convoy Load List) to ANNEX G (Convoy).

The following equipment will, as a minimum accompany all ground convoys.

1. CUCV, M1009.
2. 2-1/2 ton cargo or 2-1/2 ton M109 van.
3. Signal flags.
4. AN/VRC-46 with HPY57/TSEC in the CUCV and an AN/GRC-160 in either 2-1/2 ton.
5. CEOI and extract for each operator.
6. Smoke grenades.
7. Extra fuel.
8. Six or more filled sand bags.
9. Thermite grenades.
10. Aiming circles (2) with tripods and night lighting devices.
11. Individual and crew served weapons with the basic load of ammunition.
12. OE-254 antenna.
13. Strip maps for each driver.
14. Two-person safe.
15. Tools and required expendables.
16. Extra water.
17. Complete round, necessary demolition material and issued PLL.

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APPENDIX 3 (Air Convoy Procedures) to ANNEX G (Convoy) to WSD-K Nuc Ops SOP.

1. The custodian/courier will:

- a. Report to WSD-K Operations for a mission briefing and prepare to convoy to a SASP, designated location, or ROKA firing position.
- b. Prepare the weapon(s) and all associated material for air movement if leaving from the FSL.
- c. Receipt for and inspect all material accompanying an incoming shipment.
- d. Insure current CEOIs and key lists are prepared for the movement.
- e. Conduct the shippers briefing if originating the shipment.
- f. Provide a ground guide to direct the aircraft in to the specified landing zone.
- g. Verify with the AMC the aircraft is prepared to carry the weapon.
- h. Conduct the NST and aircrew mission briefing and answer all questions of the team members and aircrews.
- j. Review emergency actions for contingencies with the aircrews and exchange the duress code.
- k. Insure adequate security is provided for the weapon at all times.
- l. Direct loading and tie down of the weapon and all items needed for the mission. After the items are loaded, he will inspect all tie downs.
- m. Ensure requirements of Annex J are complied with as applicable.

2. The Air Mission Commander will:

- a. Brief the custodian on all matters relating to aircraft/crew participation in the mission and will give a safety briefing to all NST members.
- b. Verify an alternate aircraft is available for use as a backup. It may be on ground alert.
- c. Plan/coordinate the flight route.
- d. Ensure the load aircraft takes off before and lands after the security aircraft at all locations.
- e. Maintain constant communications between all aircraft and the controlling headquarters.
- f. Notify the custodian of all decisions made by the AMC concerning safety.
- g. Avoid overflight of the firing point until the designated time of arrival.

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3. Landing procedures:

- a. The NST Chief will fly in the security aircraft and will verify the security of the firing point before the load aircraft is called in.
- b. The custodian (NST Leader) will make the final decision whether or not to land the load aircraft.
- c. The NST Chief will ensure the load aircraft is directed into an established security perimeter.

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1. The courier will brief the the Air Mission Commander and aircrews. The briefing will include as a minimum the following:

- a. Identification of the team personnel.
- b. Custodial chain of command.
- c. Mission.
- d. Grid coordinates of destination.
- e. Authorized consignees for the cargo.
- f. Radiation and high explosive hazard.
- g. Two man rule, access, and entry control procedures.
- h. Communication procedures and requirements.
- i. The threat.
- j. Emergency or contingency actions.
- k. Applicable safety rules.

2. The AMC will brief the mission personnel on:

- a. Identification.
- b. Aircrew chain of command.
- c. Applicable flight rules.
- d. Aircraft circle X conditions.
- e. Flight safety.
- f. Emergency and contingency conditions.

3. This is a sample courier officer's briefing to the NST and aircrew.

- a. I am _____ and the
custodian/courier for
this mission. The air mission commander is _____.
- b. This briefing is classified SECRET - FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA.
- c. Situation:

(1) Enemy Forces:

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(2) Friendly Forces:

(a) Controlling Headquarters is _____.

(b) We will be operating in (FRDKA) (TROKA) (CFA) areas and they will be responsible for the reaction forces.

d. Mission: We will conduct an air convoy to grid

coordinates _____ and rendezvous with

the _____ ROKA artillery unit and execute a fire mission.

The TOT is _____ hours.

e. EXECUTION:

(1) The item being transported is classified vital to the U.S. National Security and must remain under two person control at all times. Does everyone understand the two person rule? All applicable Safety Rules will be enforced.

(2) The load items will be transported to the area at _____ hours and loading will start. The NST has primary responsibility for load and tie-down and the AMC will check the operation. The mission aircraft will lift off at _____ hours and the security aircraft will follow. The security aircraft will land at the FP at _____ hours. If the security is adequate, the mission aircraft will be called in to land. The NST will complete all ground operations and execute the fire mission. After the TOT, all NST personnel and equipment will be loaded in the aircraft and returned to _____.

(3) Nuclear Support Teams:

(a) The NST will establish and maintain an exclusion area around the load item at all times. The two-man rule applies at all times inside the exclusion area and will be enforced by armed guards. Use of deadly force applies. I or the team chief will be the vouching authority for those who are not already authorized access to the area.

(b) I will ride in the mission aircraft along with _____ additional NST members. The team chief will ride in the security aircraft along with the remaining team members. No additional passengers will be allowed on the mission aircraft.

(c) In case of an accident or incident I will need to send the required report to the controlling headquarters. In the event of an accident there is a possibility of high radiation levels. If a fire results from the accident there is an additional hazard of high explosives. In either case I will direct you to evacuate to a safe distance until the situation is under control and we can continue our mission.

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(d) I will make all decisions concerning the mission except for flight safety procedures. Those will be made by the AMC. I will be notified of any changes or problems with the air movement.

(e) Are there any questions concerning the hazards involved with the weapon(s)?

4. AMC and Air Crews:

a. The AMC will select a change over point approximately 10 minutes flight time from the landing zone. The security aircraft will take the lead and proceed directly to the LZ.

b. An orbit point for the mission aircraft will be selected about two to four km from the LZ and the mission aircraft will orbit while the security aircraft goes to the fire point LZ. The team chief will verify the security of the fire point and the identity of the ROK unit. The pilot of the security aircraft will maintain enough RPMs to make a rapid takeoff, if necessary. After verifying everything is in order, the team chief will tell the pilot the LZ is clear and the pilot will call in the mission aircraft. The mission aircraft pilot will transmit the challenge, which is

_____ and the security aircraft pilot will reply with

_____. Upon receipt of the proper reply and my decision to proceed, the mission aircraft will go in to the LZ. The security aircraft may be repositioned to clear the LZ for the mission aircraft. The NST may require the use of the aircraft radio to call the ROK battery or the team chief. If any problems occur which will cause the mission to abort, the mission aircraft will

immediately go to _____.

c. After landing, I may require the air crews to act as security guards.

d. The mission aircraft will take off before and land after the security aircraft in all but emergency conditions.


e. The team chief and I should have use of a headset.

5. Coordinating instructions:

a. The security force will, if possible, land first and secure the LZ if flight emergencies occur which require the mission aircraft to make a forced landing. The security aircraft will act as the aerial reconnaissance and radio relay between me and the controlling headquarters if the tactical situation allows. The AMC will make all decisions concerning aircraft serviceability and advise me of the status.

b. The mission aircraft will orbit the area and request the back up when inflight emergencies occur which require the security aircraft to make a forced landing.

c. The NST may receive a message that requires decrypting. If this occurs the AMC will land and the two action personnel will perform the required procedure. The aircraft will maintain sufficient RPMs to make an emergency takeoff, if necessary. I will deploy the ground security forces.



d. Under no circumstances will any weapon be jettisoned from any aircraft. Every attempt possible will be made to minimize damage to the weapon, US custody of the weapon will never be lost.

e. An emergency destruction requirement takes precedence over all other considerations. I will give evacuation instructions to the aircrew members.

f. Pilots in command (PIC) of the aircraft will make all decisions concerning aircraft safety and operation during flight. In case of conflicts between the PIC and the AMC, the PIC will insure continued safe operation until the conflict is resolved.

g. The weapon is classified as vital to the US national security and the security force is authorized to use deadly force.

h. Authorized consignees for the cargo are: (read current DF listing courier officer/custodian appointments).

6. Service Support:

a. Basic load of ammunition will be carried by all personnel.

b. Custodian will cover all other aspects as required.

7. Command and Signal:

a. Signals:

(1). Communication between all aircraft will be maintained during the mission.

(2). FM radio relay sites are:

(a) _____

(b) _____

3. The NST chief must be notified 15 minutes prior to landing so he can contact the ROKA battery by radio. The security will not land until authorized by the team chief.

4. Secure nets will be used, if possible.

5. Callsigns and frequencies are:

(a) NST freq _____ alternate _____

(b) NST leader callsign _____

(c) NST chief callsign _____

(d) AMC callsign _____

(e) Controlling Hqs callsign _____

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- (f) Retrans team callsign _____
- (g) Retrans team callsign _____
- (h) ROKA callsign _____
- (i) ROKA freq _____
- (j) US callsign on ROKA freq _____


b. Command:

(1). Controlling headquarters is _____

(2). Custodial chain of command is:

- (a) Courier officer _____
- (b) NST chief _____
- (c) Entry control/assemblers _____

F. The threat. (Explain what current threat received from MI is.)



1. This annex defines procedures for emergency destruction (ED) of nuclear weapons and associated components in the possession of WSD-K.
2. Custodians are responsible for maintaining the capability to destroy all war reserve (WR) weapons, Training nuclear weapons, test and handling equipment, PAL material, Sealed Auth System (SAS) and associated classified material.
3. The primary objective of destroying the weapon(s) will be to render them tactically useless. Accomplishment of this objective is paramount and should not be jeopardized by attempting to accomplish other objectives concurrently.
 - a. The secondary objective of destroying the weapons will be, when possible, to destroy them to the extent that classified design information cannot be obtained by examination of their remains. Accomplishment of this objective is a bonus effect and should not delay the accomplishment of the primary objective.
4. Destruction Authority. Emergency destruction may be directed by the controlling headquarters, the custodian, or the senior surviving U.S. person. Any order from outside the unit must be authenticated IAW COMUSKOREA EAP.
5. E.D. is mandatory when:
 - a. Unit, position or the activity is about to be overrun.
 - b. Unit or activity is unable to evacuate part or all of its nuclear stocks during withdrawal.
 - c. The Field Storage Location (FSL) or convoy are threatened by a major penetration, or major attack by guerrilla or underground forces.
 - d. When directed by higher Headquarters
6. E.D. of the war reserve weapons will be accomplished by members of each NST when deployed. Weapons within the WHA will be destroyed by all other U.S. personnel present who are trained in Emergency Destruction procedures. In the event we are ordered to destroy our classified Trainers and Test equipment prior to evacuating, the Weapons Platoon will be responsible for destruction.
7. Methods of destruction.
 - a. Demolition is the preferred method for destroying nuclear weapons, nuclear components, nuclear weapon trainers and associated classified equipment.
 - (1) Only dual non-electric initiating systems will be used.
 - (2) Classified components, nuclear weapon trainers and test equipment will be destroyed with separate explosive charges.
 - (3) The 2 of 2 container of M422 nuclear projectile will be destroyed by placing it adjacent to the shape charge used to destroy the 1 of 2 container.

b. Burning by hydrocarbon fuels is a last resort measure used to prevent use of a nuclear weapon until some degree of overhaul or refurbishment has been accomplished.

(1) Training in destruction by burning will not be conducted.

(2) Table C-1 of TM 39-50-8 will be adhered to prior to burning.

c. Army weapons will not be jettisoned.

d. Disablement:

(1) Command Disablement System (CDS) will be performed IAW TM's and EUSA NUC OPS SOP. NST Team Leaders will sign for CDS cards when receiving weapon(s). All members of NST's must know the location and use of the CDS cards.

(2) Disablement will be conducted IAW classified system TM's and EUSA NUC OPS SOP.

E. Disenablement will be conducted IAW classified system TM's and EUSA NUC OPS SOP.

8. Equipment and Materials:

a. Demolition material will be issued by the Nuclear Ammunition Supply Point (NASP) when the weapon is received by the unit. The material must accompany the weapon at all times until expended.

b. The ED package issued with the M454 and M753 will consist of the following:

(1) 4 ea Cap, Blasting, non-electric, M7

(2) 2 ea Charge, Demolition, shaped, M2A4

(3) 50 ft. Cord, Detonation, Reinforced

(4) 50 ft Fuse, Blasting, Time, M700

(5) 4 ea Igniter, Time Blasting Fuse, M60

c. The ED package issued with the M422 will consist of all items above plus 2 more charge, demolition shaped M2A4 and 4 more cap, Blasting non-electric M7

d. Demolition material used to destroy the trainers and test equipment is stored at the ASP 521. Pre-cut and pre-capped charge lines will be constructed and stored at the ASP in sufficient quantity to destroy all trainer weapons and test equipment.

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e. All NST's will maintain a demolition set as prescribed in SC 1375-95-CL A04-HR. NST's are responsible for ordering expendables required for demolition as needed. Authorized expendables are listed in TM 39-50-8 Table 3-2.

f. Each NST is responsible for maintaining a set of Binoculars for use by the re-entry teams. Each member will use his own NBC suit and M17 protective mask as needed. Sufficient water for decontaminating the re-entry teams will be transported with each NST when they deploy.

9. Transportation of ED Material:

a. When movement of weapons is by ground, the ED materials will be transported on a separate vehicle from the weapon. If separation is not possible, the ED material may be transported on the Mission Vehicle. The blasting caps should be tied down and transported separate from the weapon and other ED material whenever possible, IAW applicable TM's. See diagram in Annex K.

b. When movement of weapons is by air, all ED material will be transported in the same aircraft as the weapon. See Annex K.

10. Demolition Process:

a. NST's will conduct sufficient training to ensure all members are well trained and familiar with ED procedures.

b. More than one task can be performed at a time as long as the igniters are under two person control prior to tying in the initiating system to the ring main, branch line or charge line.

c. Tasks required for ED are as follows:

NOTE- Test burn must be done at least 25 feet away from other explosives and weapon.

(1) Determine Burn Rate: Inspect time fuse IAW Appendix 1. Cut and discard the first 6 inches of time fuse. Cut a 3 foot section and connect an igniter to it. Initiate the igniter and note the time. When the 3 foot section is completely burned, a small flame will shoot from the end of the fuse. When this occurs, note the time again. Compute the burn rate by dividing the time it took to burn 3 feet by (3); this will give you the amount of seconds per foot it takes the fuse to burn. Next, determine the time required to evacuate. This should be determined by the slowest person doing the initiating. Next, convert the time required to evacuate into seconds, by multiplying the minutes needed to evacuate by 60 (seconds) i.e. 10 min x 60 sec = 600 sec. The next step is to divide the time needed to evacuate, in seconds, by the burn rate, this will give you the number of feet of fuse needed to allow you the time you need to evacuate. If your answer has a fraction, round it up to the next whole number. If there is not enough time to do a test burn use 30 seconds as a burn rate.

(2) Build An Initiating System:

Inspect blasting caps IAW Appendix 3. After you have determined the number of feet you need to evacuate, cut two pieces of fuse the same length from the same roll of fuse you tested. If a new roll of fuse is used, re-compute your burn rate. Obtain a blasting cap, check to make sure the end of the time fuse is cut square. Slip the cap down on the time fuse keeping a three point grip on cap and fuse.

NOTE: Make sure you use the forward hole in crimpers and not the cutting hole. Place crimpers 1/8 to 1/4 inch from the bottom of the cap. Do not point the cap at other people or explosives. Squeeze the crimpers firmly enough to make a tight seal. Tug on the fuse lightly to ensure you have a tight crimp. Place the crimped cap with fuse attached under a sand bag a construct another one. Place the second cap and fuse under the sand bag until needed.

(3) Construct a Charge Line:

Inspect detonating cord and blasting cap IAW Appendix 1.

NOTE: Cut and discard the first six inches of det cord if the charge line is the first component made from the roll.

Obtain a blasting cap and as many feet of detonating cord as required to reach from the shape charge to the ring main, or branch line. Crimp a blasting cap onto the detonating cord in the same manner as for constructing the initiating system. If a single weapon is being destroyed there will be no branch line or ring main, so cut the detonating cord long enough to reach the ground if on a truck or aircraft.

CAUTION: make sure a distance of at least 12 inches is maintained between charge lines.

(4) Construct a Branch Line:

Inspect Det Cord IAW Appendix 1.

If more than one weapon is being destroyed it is necessary to use a branch line to tie all of the charge lines together. A branch line is nothing more than a piece of detonating cord routed throughout the WHA (weapon holding area), truck or aircraft close enough to the weapons so that the charge lines may be connected and brought back to the initiating point where the (2) initiating systems will be tied in. Be sure to cut and discard the first 6 inches of Det Cord if the branch line is the first component constructed during the ED.

(5) Construct a Ring Main:

Inspect Det Cord IAW Appendix 1

Cut and discard the first 6 inches of det cord if the ring main is the first component constructed. When vehicles within the WHA have more than one weapon on them, it will be necessary to construct a ring main to connect all of the branch lines together. A ring main is a long piece of detonating cord routed throughout the WHA near the back of the vehicles so that the branch lines will reach and then routed to the initiating point.

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NOTE: If a single weapon is being destroyed, make sure the igniters are under two person control prior to placing the charge line into the shape charge.

(6) Inspect Shape Charge IAW Appendix 1

Place shape charge on destruct dot of WR (War Reserve) weapons and secure with nylon pile or sand bags. Obtain a charge line and put a fuse well adapter on the line. Then place the blasting cap in the fuse well and secure it with the fuse well adapter. Route the charge line out of the vehicle and out toward the branch line or ring main if used. If multiple weapons are being destroyed do not attach the charge line at this time. Repeat the above procedure until all weapons have a shape charge emplaced.

NOTE: Bring the igniters under two person control before connecting charge lines to branch line or branch lines to ring main. Once all weapons have a shape charge and charge line emplaced, tie in to the branch line or ring main. Use M-1 clips or a girth hitch to accomplish this. Make sure the charge line is routed underneath the branch line/ring main, and there is at least a 6 inch over lap.

e. After all of the branch lines or charge lines are tied in to the ring main, or charge lines are tied into the branch line; evacuate all non-essential personnel to 300 meters.

f. Two persons, normally the DIC and NCOIC, will do the final tie-in of the initiating system. A final check of all charges and connections will be made prior to hooking up the initiating system. The initiating system will be tied in using an approved method from TM 39-50-8 or Appendix 2.

g. Obtain two igniters. To connect igniter to the fuse, first unscrew the fuse holder cap two or three times but Do Not Remove. Press the shipping plug into the igniter to release the split collet, rotate the plug top and remove it from the igniter. Insert the free end of the time fuse as far as possible in the space left by removing the shipping plug. Then tighten the cap sufficiently to hold the fuse in place and weather proof the joint.

To fire, hold the barrel in your free hand and remove the safety pin. Grasp the pull ring, push it in, and rotate to insure that the igniter is set, and pull forceably. In the event of a misfire the M60 can be reset quickly with out disassembly by pushing the plunger all the way in and attempting to fire as before.

If both initiating systems fire, evacuate immediately. If only one fires and time permits; cut the fuse ahead of the burn and construct another initiating system and change the igniter on the other. If time does not permit and one is burning; evacuate.

h. In the event of a misfire if time permits, the two persons who connected the initiating system to the charges will re-enter the area after 30 minutes and re-construct the initiating system, ring main or branch line as required, and repeat the steps above to reinitiate the system.

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i. Evacuation should be to a point 300 meters upwind.

j. After detonation, a re-entry team will approach the area from upwind, and using binoculars verify that the primary objective has been fulfilled. Don't get any closer than is necessary to the destruct area. There will be high levels of radiation in the immediate area. If it is necessary to re-enter the area to destroy a weapon, wear protective NBC suit and M17 protective mask.

k. After destruction, disablement or disenablement report IAW DPREP 3 Pinnacle/Emergency Destruction Report and Appendix 4. to COMUSKOREA. Voice transmission will be the primary means for submission of the reports followed by a record copy follow-up. NST's will send reports to HQ WSD-K.

Appendix 1- Inspection of Shape Charges, Time Fuse, Det Cord and Igniters

Appendix 2- Approved Tie-In's

Appendix 3- Inspection of Blasting Caps

Appendix 4- E.D. Report

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

Appendix I- (Inspection of Shape Charge, Time Fuse, Det Cord and Ignitors)
to Annex H. (Emergency Destruction) to WSD-K NUC OPS SOP.

Inspect demolition materials as follows:
Inspect outer package visually for evidence of damage, moisture, and vermin infestation. If any of the above is found, open package and examine and dispose of contents in accordance with table 3-3.

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Type of item	Condition	Quantity	Disposition
Explosive charges (general)	1. Exuding	*	1. Destroy—handle carefully
	2. Badly crushed and crumbled	*	2. Destroy
	3. Slightly crushed, dented (no crumbling)	*	3. OK to issue
	4. Water soaked	*	4. Allow to dry. If not crumbled, give priority of issue.
	5. Rusty cap wells	*	5. Give priority of issue
15-lb shaped charges M2A3 and M2A4	1. Explosive powder leakage	*	1. Clean w/damp rag and give priority of issue for local use. DO NOT SHIP.
	2. Explosive powder leakage plus cracked or broken glass	*	2. Destroy
Time blasting fuse	1. Water soaked (long exposure)	*	1. Destroy
	2. Water dampened	*	2. Cut five feet off each end and destroy. Test remaining fuse and, if it burns properly, give it priority of issue.
	3. Gashed or cut	*	3. If a quantity of usable lengths of good fuse remain, cut off and destroy damaged portions. If not, destroy entire quantity.
Detonating cord	Water soaked, gashed or cut	*	If a quantity of usable lengths of good cord remains, cut off and destroy only the damaged portions. If not, destroy entire quantity.
Others (except M1) <i>FIRING DEVICES</i>	1. Corroded bodies	a. Under 25	a. Destroy
		b. 25 or more	b. If slightly corroded, ship to DS for test. If extremely corroded, destroy.
	2. Bad primers	a. Under 25	a. Destroy
		b. 25 or more	b. Replace coupling bases or return to DS for same.

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WARNING

Foreign matter in a blasting cap may cause a misfire. If foreign matter is to be removed from a nonelectric blasting cap, do not tap cap with a hard object or against a hard object. Never blow into cap. Do not insert anything into cap to remove any dirt or foreign material.


Inspect nonelectric blasting cap by looking into the open end. If any foreign matter or dirt is present, follow procedure below:

- (1) Hold cap, near open end, between thumb and middle finger, of one hand.
- (2) Aim open end of cap at palm of second hand.
- (3) Gently bump wrist of one hand against wrist of other hand.
- (4) If foreign matter does not come out, dispose of cap in accordance with local regulations.

WARNING

Forcing a time fuse into a blasting cap by twisting or other means may cause cap to explode. Do not force time fuse into blasting cap.

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SUBJECT: UNIT/OPREP-3/PINNACLE/EMERGENCY ACTION TAKEN/001

1. Date-Time group of destruction/disablement/disenablement.
2. Location (i.e., unit and coordinates).
3. EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION:
 - a. number and type of weapons destroyed.
 - b. Authority ordering destruction.
4. Remarks (e.g., xx/number of weapons survived the destruction.
Additional attempt to destroy will commence 234567 Z Dec 87).

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1. GENERAL. This annex prescribes conditions that must be met when engaged in nuclear weapon technical operations.

2. Requirements:

a. An operational assembly team will consist of the following personnel:

- (1) Team Leader (Officer).
- (2) Team Chief (NCO).
- (3) Two Assemblers.
- (4) Radio Operator.
- (5) Two Guards.

b. The custodian must:

- (1) Provide adequate safeguards and protection for weapons under his control and for the men in his team.
- (2) Complete all records and reports in a timely manner.

c. All team members must be proficient in all phases of the team's operations. This includes all technical operations on the three weapon systems and operations needed to prepare the gun for firing.

d. The following will apply when a weapon seal is broken or missing and the cause is unknown:

- (1) If receiving from ordnance support, the NASP personnel will be told and they will either account for it to the satisfaction of the courier, replace it or the weapon will not be accepted.
- (2) If the seals are accidentally broken while in the custody of a WSD-K courier/custodian and it is known the container has not been opened the seal will be replaced.
- (3) If the seals are missing and can not be accounted for, a visual inspection of the container and contents will be performed to determine if any tampering with the weapon has occurred. If no evidence of damage or tampering is found, the seals will be replaced. If damage or tampering is found and the extent is unknown or can not be determined, the weapon will be rejected and reported IAW procedures in Annex F.
- (4) Only maintenance which affects the safety or reliability of the weapon will be performed in the field.

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e. The custodian/courier will notify the controlling headquarters as soon as possible when any of the following conditions exist:

- (1) Rejection of a weapon IAW the system technical manual and repair is beyond the maintenance level of the unit.
- (2) Loss, damage, or destruction (accidental or intentional) of a weapon or nuclear components.
- (3) If unable to unlock the nuclear weapon reject it to the Ordnance support unit and submit a minor nuclear weapon incident (flag word DULL SWORD) report IAW EUSA NUC OPS SOP Appendix J, TAB II.

(a) Should a US Army unit find a mechanical or electromechanical PAL device unlock, the following will be accomplished.

- (1) Continue prefire assembly procedures and only reject the weapon as specified IAW Appropriate TM.
- (2) Report the unlocked weapon as a possible compromise IAW JCS PUB 13, Vol II and EUSA NUC OPS SOP.
- (3) Continue to maintain custody of the PAL device until, EUSA, EACJ-TD-NS, provides disposition instructions.

3. RESIDUE for -204

a. When the -204 weapon system is expended, the locking device will be packaged in the empty M727 fuse container. This container is then to be placed in the fuse well of the M467 container. If the weapon is expended, the container and PAL will be tagged "Contains Residual Material" CRD, and be returned to the issuing ordnance unit.

b. After expenditure of the -204 series projectile, all EML's except those for the locking device, will be destroyed by the custodian/courier or the senior man present. The EML for the locking device will be turned in to the issuing ordnance unit.

c. Upon return to the FSL, the container will be remarked and prepared IAW TM 9-1100-204-20&P prior to being turned in to the issuing ordnance unit.

d DD Form 1150, (turn-in of nuclear residue/components after expenditure), will be prepared IAW Annex J.

*204
= M727
fuse container.
put into an
M467
container.*

*M467
container is
the W48/M454
(SS) mpr*

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4. RESIDUE FOR -218

A. When the -218 series projectile is assembled, the EML's will be annotated as follows:

- (1) The 1 of 2 container will be tagged "Contains Residual Material"CRD (See Para 4 c).
- (2) The 2 of 2 container will be tagged "INCOMPLETE ACCESSORIES FOR PROJECTILE, SN XXXX".
- (3) The TZ container will be tagged IAW Para 8-6.2.2, TM 9-1100-218-20.
- (4) The PZ/PW container will be tagged IAW Para 8-6.2.2, TM 9-1100-218-20

b. During a change of yield operation for an immediate fire mission, the cover of the TZ active material container (AMC), will be secured as directed in TM 9-1100-218-20; however, due to time restraints, the desiccant will not be immediately replaced nor will the (AMC) be repressurized.

c. When the -218 series projectile is pending expenditure, the locking device will be packaged and secured in the 1 of 2 container using the sleeve, spacer, and a plywood disc to protect the rod. If the weapon is expended, the 1 of 2 container will be tagged, "Contains Residual Material"CRD, and returned to the issuing ordnance unit.

d. After expenditure, all EML's except those for the locking device will be destroyed by the custodian/courier or senior man present. The EML for the locking device will be turned in with the locking device.

5. Residue for -220:

a. The -220 series weapon system uses the IRC to record the operations of its electronic PAL.

b. After expenditure, the EML's for the projectile and fuse will be destroyed. The IRC will be destroyed. The M613 container will be turned in to the issuing ordnance unit. The container will be tagged "EMPTY, CONTAINS SRD".

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M422/W33 has 2 containers (P. 30). 218 series.

refers to case 992 TZ = container 1 - PZ/PW = container 2.

P. 48. Cochran. refers to W33 914.

mech. PAL "rod".

220 series has electronic PAL. M613 container.

this is the ER W29 version.

1. Purpose: This annex outlines the procedures used to complete change of Custody, certificates of expenditure of destruction, Turn-in of residue, DA Form 581, and DD Form 1150. All complete DD Form 1150's, and DA Form 581's are unclassified.

2. Custodial Standards:

a. Minimum requirements for retaining possession of U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear components are to prevent unauthorized access, use or employment of nuclear weapons and ensure their safety, security, reliability and survivability.

b. U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear components are to be under continual surveillance of Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) qualified guards or stored in storage structures secured by prescribed double high security locks and equipped with an operational intrusion detection system (IDS).

c. Custody of nuclear weapons or nuclear components can be maintained during convoys, at nuclear ammunition supply points (NASP) or at Field Storage Location (FSL) by positioning two qualified guards at the rear of each load vehicle and/or two qualified guards as entry controllers.

d. NST's having custody of nuclear weapons will maintain custody and control at all times.

e. Enlisted personnel may receipt for nuclear weapons only during wartime tactical movements and only if in paygrade of E6 or above.

f. Weapons custodians are responsible for various degrees of custodial control including storage, safety, evacuation and destruction. Weapons custodians will:

(1) Control transfer, movement and access to nuclear weapons and nuclear components in their custody.

(2) Promptly report any losses, damage or other irregularities.

(3) Maintain custodial records.

(4) Ensure adequate safeguards and protection are provided.

(5) Complete records timely and accurately.

g. Courier officers are weapons custodians during movements and are responsible for custodial control, safety, security and destruction.

h. Should weapons custodians become incapacitated or unavailable, the senior U.S. military person in the custodial chain of command will assume those responsibilities.

3. Transfer of custody. DD Form 1150 (Request for issue or turn-in) will be used for transfer of custody between NASP's or FSL's and using units, between using units, certificate of expenditure, certificate of destruction or transfer of reportable nuclear residue or components to include locking devices.

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4 DD Form 1150 Preparation and Distribution:

a. Transfer between accountable NASP and detachment/NST. Examples are at Appendix 1 (Issue), Appendix 2 (Turn-in of complete round), Appendix 3 (Turn-in of residue).

b. Distribution of DD Forms 1150:

(1) Transfer between an accountable officer and a custodian.

- (a) Original-accountable officer of DODAAC WT4RT1
- (b) Copy 1-individual signing block 11
- (c) All other copies destroyed

c. Transfer between Detachments FSL and NST. Examples are at Appendix 4 (Issue), Appendix 5 (Turn-in of complete round), and Appendix 6 (Turn-in of residue).

(1) Transfer between custodians.

- (a) Original-accountable officer of DODAAC WT4RT1
- (b) Copy 1-individual signing block 10
- (c) Copy 2-individual signing block 11

5. DA Form 581's (request for issue and turn-in of ammunition). DA Forms 581 are required for issue of conventional components of complete rounds. See Appendix 7.

- Appendix
1. Transfer of Custody (weapon issue) between NASP and NST FSL.
 2. Transfer of Custody (weapon turn-in) between NST/FSL and NASP.
 3. Transfer of Custody (residue turn-in) between NST/FSL and NASP.
 4. Transfer of custody between NST and FSL (weapon Turn-In).
 5. Transfer of custody (weapon issue) between FSL and NST.
 6. Transfer of custody (residue turn-in).
 7. Sample DA Form 581.

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Appendix 1-Transfer of Custody (Weapon Issue) between NASP and NST WHA to Annex J (Custody) to WSD-K NUC OPS SOP

REQUEST FOR ISSUE OR TURN-IN		X	ISSUE	SHEET NO	NO. OF SHEETS	5. REQUEST NUMBER		
			TURN-IN	1	1	1-87		
1 FROM: Joe E. Brown, CW4		6. DATE MATERIEL REQUIRED			7. PRIORITY			
2. TO John J. Doe, 1LT		8. VOUCHER NUMBER 8001-0001			9. POSTED		BY	
3 ACCOUNTING AND FUNDING DATA								
4. ENG ITEM IDENTIFICATION	5. NAME AND MANUFACTURER		6. MODEL	7. SERIAL NUMBER		8. PUBLICATION		
ITEM NO	STOCK NUMBER, DESCRIPTION, AND CODING OF MATERIEL AND/OR SERVICES		A C CODE	B UNIT DO	C TEST	D QUANTITY	E SUPPLY ACTION	
1	1111-00-111-1111, CLASSIFIED ITEM		I	EA		1	1	
	SERIAL NUMBER 12345							
*ISSUE--Initial; R--Replacement							TURN-IN--U-Unserviceable; S-Serviceable	GRAND TOTAL
10. ISSUE OR TURN-IN OF QUANTITIES IN "QUANTITY" COL. WHEN REQUESTED		DATE		11. RECEIVED QUANTITIES IN "SUPPLY ACTION" COLUMN		DATE		
1 Sep 87		Signature, Printed name and rank		1 Sep 87		Signature, printed name and rank		

DD FORM 1150, OCT 57


REPLACES EDITION OF 1 JUL 58 WHICH MAY BE USED

NOTE 1: (U) Request number (block 5) will be the number of the supply mission directive (SMD) directing movement of items.

NOTE 2: (U) National stock number (NSN) will be used (block 4b) if one is assigned, if not; part number will be used.

NOTE 3: (U) If item has been destroyed or the command disablement system (CDS) has been used, a statement will be added to reverse of DD Form 1150 stating: "Item SN: 12345 destroyed (or command disabled) on (Date) at (Time)." Statement will be followed by signature, printed name and rank of individual making the statement. This form is then to be returned to the accountable officer.

NOTE 4: (U) Accountable officer will assign voucher numbers from DA forms 272 to DD Forms 1150 he initiates. This voucher number will be recorded on DA Forms 272 and will be perpetuated to all subsequent DD Forms 1150 reflecting the same nuclear weapon or nuclear component serial number initially recorded by the accountable officer.




Appendix 2-Transfer of Custody (Weapon Turn-In) between NST/WHA and NASP to
Annex J (Custody) to WSD-K NUC OPS SOP

REQUEST FOR ISSUE OR TURN-IN		ISSUE	SHEET NO	NO. OF SHEETS	5. REQUEST NUMBER	
1. FROM: John J. Doe 1LT		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TURN-IN	1	1	1-87	
2. TO: Joe E. Brown, CW4		6. DATE MATERIEL REQUIRED		7. PRIORITY		
3. ACCOUNTING AND FUNDING DATA		8. VOUCHER NUMBER 8001-0001		9. POSTED		DATE BY
4. ENG ITEM IDENTIFICATION	3. NAME AND MANUFACTURER	D. MODEL	C. SERIAL NUMBER		G. PUBLICATION	
1 2 3	a STOCK NUMBER, DESCRIPTION, AND CODING OF MATERIEL AND/OR SERVICES b	* C CODE D UNIT	QUANTITY e	SUPPLY ACTION f	UNIT PRICE g	TOTAL COST h
1	1111-00-1111-1111, CLASSIFIED ITEM	S EA	1	1		
	SERIAL NUMBER 12345					
					SHEET TOTAL	
* ISSUE—Initial; R—Replacement					GRAND TOTAL	
TURN-IN—U—Unserviceable; S—Serviceable						
10. ISSUE OR TURN-IN OF QUANTITIES IN "QUANTITY" COLUMN AS REQUESTED	DATE	*Signature, printed name and rank		11. RECEIVED QUANTITIES IN "SUPPLY ACTION" COLUMN	DATE	BY Signature, printed name and rank
	9 Sep 87				9 Sep 87	

DD FORM 1 OCT 57 1150

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 JUL 54 WHICH MAY BE USED

NOTE: (U) In code column enter "S" for serviceable item or "U" for unserviceable item (i.e., item that has been rammmed would be unserviceable).



Appendix 3-Transfer of Custody (Residue Turn-in) between NST/WHA and NASP to Annex J (Custody) to WSD-K NUC OPS SOP

REQUEST FOR ISSUE OR TURN-IN			ISSUE	SHEET NO.	NO. OF SHEETS	3. REQUEST NUMBER	
1 FROM: John J. Doe, 1LT			X TURN-IN	1	1	1-87	
2 TO: Joe E. Brown, CW4			8. DATE MATERIEL REQUIRED		7. PRIORITY		
3 ACCOUNTING AND FUNDING DATA			B. VOUCHER NUMBER 8001-0001		9. POSTED		DATE BY
4. NAME AND MANUFACTURER			D. MODEL	C. SERIAL NUMBER		E. PUBLICATION	
ITEM NO.	STOCK NUMBER, DESCRIPTION, AND CODING OF MATERIEL AND/OR SERVICES	C. CODE	UNIT	QUANTITY	SUPPLY ACTION	UNIT PRICE	TOTAL COST
1	111-00-111-1111, CLASSIFIED ITEM	S	EA	1	1		
	SERIAL NUMBER XYZ-XYZ AND RESIDUE FROM						
	EXPENDED ITEM 1111-00-111-1111, SERIAL						
	NUMBER 12345						
						SHEET TOTAL	
* ISSUE—Initial: R—Replacement			TURN-IN—U—Unserviceable; S—Serviceable			GRAND TOTAL	
10. ISSUE OR TURN-IN OF QUANTITIES IN "QUANTITY" COL. UNM IS REQUESTED		DATE		11. RECEIVED QUANTITIES IN "SUPPLY ACTION" COLUMN		DATE	
9 Sep 87		Signature, printed name and rank		9 Sep 87		Signature, printed name and rank	

DD FORM 1150, OCT 57


NOTE 1: (U) NSN and SN are that of the locking device.

NOTE 2: (U) Classification of M454 or M422 residue is "Confidential NOFORN." Classification of M753 residue is "Secret Restricted Data." DA Form 2402, tag or piece of tape affixed to outside of container will state: "Empty-contains Confidential NOFORN (or secret restricted data) residue."

NOTE 3: (U) Container markings will be changed upon receipt at NASP's or WHA's by ordnance units.

NOTE 4: (U) Statement will be added to reverse side of DD Forms 1150 stating: "Item SN: 12345 expended on (Date) at (Time)." Statement will be followed by signature, printed name and rank of individual making statement. This form is then to be forwarded to the accountable officer.

NOTE 5: (U) In code column enter either "S" for serviceable item or "U" for unserviceable item (i.e., item that has been rammed would be unserviceable).



Appendix 4-Transfer of Custody between NST and WHA (Weapon Turn-In) to Annex J (Custody) to WSD-K NUC OPS SOP

REQUEST FOR ISSUE OR TURN-IN			ISSUE	SHEET NO	NO OF SHEETS	5. REQUEST NUMBER	
			X TURN-IN	1	1	1-87	
1 FROM: Jay C. Jones, 1LT			6. DATE MATERIEL REQUIRED		7. PRIORITY		
2 TO: John J. Doe, 1LT			8. VOUCHER NUMBER 8001-0001		9. POSTED		BY
3 ACCOUNTING AND FUNDING DATA					DATE		BY
					DATE		BY
4	END ITEM IDENTIFICATION	3. NAME AND MANUFACTURER	D. MODEL	C. SERIAL NUMBER		C. PUBLICATION	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
						SHEET TOTAL	
* ISSUE—i-Initial; R—Replacement						GRAND TOTAL	
TURN-IN—J-Unserviceable; S-Serviceable							
10. ISSUE OR TURN-IN OF QUANTITIES IN "QUANTITY" COLUMN IS REQUESTED		DATE		11. RECEIVED QUANTITIES IN "SUPPLY ACTION" COLUMN		DATE	
9 Sep 87		9 Sep 87		9 Sep 87		9 Sep 87	
**Signature, printed name and rank				BY Signature, printed name and rank			

DD FORM 1150 OCT 57

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 JUL 56 WHICH MAY BE USED

NOTE: (U) In code column enter either "S" for serviceable item or "U" for unserviceable item (i.e., item that has been rammed would be unserviceable).

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Appendix 5-Transfer of Custody (Weapon Issue) between WHA and NST to
Annex J (Custody) to WSD-K NUC OPS SOP

REQUEST FOR ISSUE OR TURN-IN				X	ISSUE	SHEET NO.	NO. OF SHEETS	5. REQUEST NUMBER	
					TURN-IN	1	1	1-87	
1 FROM:			6. DATE MATERIEL REQUIRED			7. PRIORITY			
John J. Doe, 1LT									
2 TO:			8. VOUCHER NUMBER			9. POSTED		DATE	BY
Jay C. Jones, 1LT			8001-0001						
3 ACCOUNTING AND FUNDING DATA									
4. ENC ITEM IDENTIFICATION		5. NAME AND MANUFACTURER		6. MODEL		7. SERIAL NUMBER		8. PUBLICATION	
ITEM NO.	2. STOCK NUMBER, DESCRIPTION, AND CODING OF MATERIEL AND/OR SERVICES			3. CODE	4. UNIT OF MEASUREMENT	5. QUANTITY	6. SUPPLY ACTION	7. UNIT PRICE	8. TOTAL COST
1	1111-00-111-1111, CLASSIFIED ITEM			I	EA	1	1		
	SERIAL NUMBER 12345								
							SHEET TOTAL		
							GRAND TOTAL		
* ISSUE—Initial: R—Replacement TURN-IN—U—Unserviceable; S—Serviceable									
10. ISSUE OR TURN-IN OF QUANTITIES IN "QUANTITY" COL. WHEN REQUESTED		DATE	BY		11. RECEIVED QUANTITIES IN "SUPPLY ACTION" COLUMN		DATE	BY	
		9 SEP 87	Signature, printed name and rank				9 SEP 87	Signature, printed name and rank	

DD FORM 1150 1 OCT 57

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 JUL 54 WHICH MAY BE USED

NOTE: (U) If item has been destroyed or the command disablement system (CDS) has been used, a statement will be added to reverse of DD Forms 1150 stating: "Item SN: 12345 destroyed (or command disabled) on (Date) at (Time)." Statement will be followed by signature, printed name and rank of individual making the statement. This form is then to be forwarded to accountable officer.

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Appendix 6-Transfer of Custody (Residue Turn-In) between NST and WHA to Annex J (custody) to WSD-K NUC OPS SOP

REQUEST FOR ISSUE OR TURN-IN		ISSUE	SHEET NO	NO. OF SHEETS	5. REQUEST NUMBER	
		X TURN-IN	1	1	1-87	
1. FROM Jay C. Jones, 1LT		6. DATE MATERIEL REQUIRED		7. PRIORITY		
2. TO John J. Doe, 1LT		8. VOUCHER NUMBER 8001-0001		9. POSTED	DATE	BY
3. ACCOUNTING AND FUNDING DATA						
4. END ITEM IDENTIFICATION	5. NAME AND MANUFACTURER	6. MODEL	7. SERIAL NUMBER		8. PUBLICATION	
1	STOCK NUMBER, DESCRIPTION, AND CODING OF MATERIEL AND/OR SERVICES b	* CODE UNIT D ISSUE	QUANTITY e	SUPPLY ACTION f	UNIT PRICE g	TOTAL COST h
1	1111-00-111-1111, CLASSIFIED ITEM	S EA	1	1		
	SERIAL NUMBER XYZ-XYZ AND RESIDUE FROM					
	EXPENDED ITEM 1111-00-111-1111, SERIAL					
	NUMBER 12345					
					SHEET TOTAL	
* ISSUE--A--Annual; R--Replacement					TURN-IN--U--Unserviceable; S--Serviceable	
10. ISSUE OR TURN-IN DATE					11. RECEIVED QUANTITIES IN "SUPPLY ACTION" COLUMN	
BY Signature, printed name and grade 9 Sep 87					DATE 9 Sep 87	
					BY Signature, printed name and grade	

DD FORM 1 OCT 57 1150

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 JUL 56 WHICH MAY BE USED

NOTE 1: (U) NSN and serial number (SN) are that of the locking device.

NOTE 2: (U) Classification of M454 or M422 residue is "Confidential NOFORN." Classification of M753 residue is "Secret Restricted Data.: DA Form 2402, tag or piece of tape affixed to outside of container will state: "Empty-contains-confidential NOFORN.(or secret restricted data) residue."

NOTE 3: (U) Container markings will be changed upon receipt at NASP's or WHA's by ordnance units.

NOTE 4: (U) Statement will be added to reverse side of DD Forms 1150 stating: "Item 12345 expended on (Date) at (Time)." Statement will be followed by signature, printed name and rank of individual making statement. This form is then to be forwarded to the accountable officer.

NOTE 5: (U) In code column enter either "S" for serviceable item or "U" for unserviceable item (i.e., item that has been rammed would be unserviceable).

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REQUEST FOR ISSUE AND TURN-IN OF AMMUNITION For use of this form, see AR 710-2: the proponent agency is AMC.		1. DOCUMENT NUMBER (FROM SUPPLY)	2. CONTROL NUMBER 8102-0001
3. FROM: WHOMEVER	4. a. INITIATED BY	b. DATE	5. ACCOUNTING & FUNDING DATA
6. TO: WDSK CAMP PAGE APO SF 96208	7. a. APPROVED BY John J. Jones Cpt. OD	b. DATE	8. AUTHENTICATING OFFICE NO.
9. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TRANSPORTATION ORDER (Request) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ALLOCATION <input type="checkbox"/> TURN-IN <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)			

10. ITEM NO. a	NATIONAL STOCK NUMBER b	LOT NUMBER c	QUANTITY REQUESTED d	QUANTITY ISSUED e	UNIT PRICE f	TOTAL COST g
1	1320-D662 CHARGE, PROPELLING 8INCH M188A1 WB		1EA			
2	1320-D674 CHARGE, PROPELLING 8INCH M80		1EA			
3	1390-N523 PRIMER, PERCUSSION M82		3EA			
4	1390-N525 PRIMER, PERCUSSION MK2A4		3EA			
5	1375-M131 CAP, BLASTING NONELECTRIC M7		5EA			
6	1375-M420 CHARGE, DEMOLITION SHAPEDM2A4		2EA			
7	1375-M456 CORD DETONATING REINFORCED		50FT			
////////////////////// LAST ITEM //////////////////////////////////////						
DATE OF PICK UP: 12 Mar 87 DATE OF FIRING: UNKNOWN						

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11. REMARKS (Authority, Location of Ammunition, Instructions, etc.) 1. Non-nuclear items for whole round concept. 2. Required for immediate expenditure. Ammunition not expended will be returned.			
12. ISSUE OR TURN-IN OF QUANTITIES IN "QUANTITY REQUESTED" COLUMN IS REQUESTED		13. RECEIVED QUANTITIES IN "QUANTITY ISSUED" COLUMN	
BY: John J. Jones CPT. OD.	DATE 12 MAR 87	BY: <i>[Signature]</i>	DATE 12 MAR 87

EACJ-TDD-WSD-K-CO

ANNEX K (TIEDOWN DIAGRAMS) TO WSD-K NUC OPS SOP

The diagrams in this annex should be used by all NST teams when possible. However, the weapons may be repositioned for operational reasons or for the loading of additional nuclear weapons, other cargo, or personnel.


If the configuration other than those listed in this annex is used; the requirements of AR 50-115, the systems TMs, and the applicable FM 55 series manuals must be adhered to.

NOTE: On all aircraft diagrams the Aiming Circle, BUCS, Firing Tables, and the Radio will be carried on the security ship at all times when possible.

Appendix 1	M35 2 1/2 T.	155mm	Primary & Alternate
Appendix 2	M35 2 1/2 T.	New 8"	Primary & Alternate
Appendix 3	M35 2 1/2 T.	Old 8"	Primary & Alternate
Appendix 4	M109 Van	155mm	Primary & Alternate
Appendix 5	M109 Van	New 8"	Primary & Alternate
Appendix 6	M109 Van	Old 8"	Primary & Alternate
Appendix 7	UH-60A Helicopter	155mm	Primary & Alternate
Appendix 8	UH-60A Helicopter	New 8"	Primary & Alternate
Appendix 9	UH-60A Helicopter	Old 8"	Primary & Alternate


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M35 2 1/2 T 155mm Primary




- 1. 155 mm Projectile
- 2. Extractor
- 3. Tools
- 4. Powder Charges 3 ea
- 5. Safe

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
- 1. Shape Charges (2 Ea)
- 2. Time Fuze & Det Cord Boxes

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
1. Blasting Caps (4 Ea)

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- | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. 155 mm Projectile | 6. Safe |
| 2. Shape Charges (2 Ea) | 7. Extractor |
| 3. Time Fuze & Det Cord Boxes | 8. Blasting Caps (4 ea) |
| 4. Powder Charges 3 ea | 9. Igniters |
| 5. Tools | |


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- 1. New 8" Round
- 2. Extractor
- 3. Generators
- 4. Powder Charges 3 ea
- 5. Tools


- 6. Safe
- 7. Fuze Setters
- 8. Decoders

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- 1. Shape Charges (2 Ea)
- 2. Time Fuze & Det Cord Boxes


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1. Blasting Caps (4 ea)

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
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- | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|
| 1. New 8" Round | 6. Safe | 11. Decoders |
| 2. Shape Charges (2 Ea) | 7. Extractor | 12. Igniters |
| 3. Det Cord & Time Fuze Boxes | 8. Blasting Caps (4 Ea) | |
| 4. Powder Charges 3 ea | 9. Generators | |
| 5. Tools | 10. Fuze Setters | |

M35 2 1/2 T Old 8" Primary

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1. PZ & TZ

2. 1 of 2

3. 2 of 2


4. Powder Charges (2ea)

5. Tools

6. Expendables


7. Extractor & Maint Fixture

8. Safe



- 1. Shape Charges (2 Ea)
- 2. Time Fuze & Det Cord Boxes

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


1. Blasting Caps 8 ea

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
M35 2 1/2 T. Old 8" Alternate

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- | | | |
|------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. TZ & PZ | 6. Shape Charges 4 ea | 11. Time Fuze & Det Cor |
| 2. 1 of 2 | 7. Extractor & Maint Fixture | 12. Igniters |
| 3. 2 of 2 | 8. Safe | |
| 4. Powder Charges 2 ea | 9. Blasting Caps 8 ea | |
| 5. Tools | 10. Expendables | |


M109 Van 155 Primary



1. 155 mm Round
2. Safe
3. Tools
4. Powder Charges 3ea
5. Extractor


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M33 2/2 T.




- 1. Shape Charges (2 Ea)
- 2. Time Fuze & Det Cord Boxes

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
1. Blasting Caps

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- 1. 155 mm Round
- 2. Shape Charges (2 Ea)
- 3. Time Fuze & Det Cord Boxes
- 4. Powder 3 ea
- 5. Tool Box
- 6. Igniters
- 7. Extractor
- 8. Safe
- 9. Blasting Caps

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1. New 8" Projectile

2. Safe

3. Tools

4. Powder Charges 3 ea


5. Fuze Setters

6. Decoders

7. Generators


8. Extractor & Maint Fixture

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


1. Shape Charges (2 Ea)
2. Time Fuze & Det Cord Boxes.

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
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|-------------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| 1. New 8" Round | 6. Safe | 11. Generators |
| 2. Shape Charges (2 EA) | 7. Extractor | 12. Igniters |
| 3. Det Cord & Time Fuze Boxes | 8. Blasting Caps | |
| 4. Powder Charges 3 ea | 9. Fuze Setters | |
| 5. Tools | 10. Decoders | |

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M109 Van Old 8" Primary



1. RZ&TZ

2. 1 of 2

3. 2 of 2

4. Powder Charges 2 Ea

5. Tools


6. Expendables

7. Extractor & Maint. Fixture

8. Safe


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M35 2 1/2 T



1. Shape Charges (2 Ea)
2. Time Fuze & Det Cord Boxes.

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


1. Blasting Caps 8 ea

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
M109 Van Old 8" Alternate

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|------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. TZ & PZ | 6. Shape Charges (2 per box) | 11. Igniters |
| 2. 1 of 2 | 7. Extractor & Maint Fixture | |
| 3. 2 of 2 | 8. Safe | |
| 4. Powder Charges 2 Ea | 9. Blasting Caps | |
| 5. Tools | 10. Det Cord & Time Fuse Boxes | |

UH-60A Helicopter 155 mm Primary




- 1. 155 mm Round
- 2. Shape Charges 2 ea
- 3. Time Fuze & Det Cord Boxes
- 4. Powder Charges 3 ea
- 5. Tools

- 6. Safe
- 7. Extractor
- 8. Blasting Caps 4 Ea
- 9. Igniters
- *See Note

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UH-60A Helicopter 155mm (Alternate)



1. 155mm Projectile

2. Shape Charges (2 Ea)

3. Time Fuze & Det Cord Boxes

4. Powder Charges 3 ea

5. Tools

6. Igniters

7. Extractor


8. Safe

9. Blasting Caps 4 ea

* See Note

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
UH-60A Helicopter New 8" Primary



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- | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------|
| 1. New 8" Round | 6. Igniters | 11. Decoders |
| 2. Shape Charges (2 Ea) | 7. Extractor | 12. Generators |
| 3. Time & Det Cord Boxes | 8. Safe | |
| 4. Powder 3 Ea | 9. Blasting Caps 4 Ea * See Note | |
| 5. Tools | 10. Fuze Setters | |


UH-60A Helicopter Old 8" Primary



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- | | | |
|------------------------|---|-------------------------|
| 1. PZ & TZ | 6. Shape Charges 4 Ea. | 11. Blasting Caps 8 Ea. |
| 2. 1 of 2 | 7. Extractor & Maint Fixture | |
| 3. 2 of 2 | 8. Time Fuze & Det Cord Boxes *See Note | |
| 4. Powder Charges 2 ea | 9. Igniters | |
| 5. Tools | 10. Safe | |

UH-60A Helicopter Old 8" Alternate



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- | | |
|----------------|------------------------------|
| 1. TZ & PZ | 6. Igniters |
| 2. 1 of 2 | 7. Extractor & Maint Fixture |
| 3. 2 of 2 | 8. Safe |
| 4. Powders 2ea | 9. Blasting Caps 8ea |
| 5. Tools | 10. Shape Charges 4ea |

11. Time Fuse & Det Cord Box

* See Note