1. The Japan Times of April 15, 1957 reported that the National Defense Council is "reviewing Japan's comparative defense ability with and without American atomic weapons and guided missiles," but pointed out that this was a theoretical exercise as the government has ruled out the introduction of nuclear weapons.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of Intelligence Research
Weapons as conventional, and presumably Japan would object to the
distribution of such weapons among non-nuclear powers in Asia, though
in varying degrees. The Philippines would be least objecting, as being
cosmopolitan towards Japan and without live issues of a warlike nature with its

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Abstract

Contrary to the impression conveyed by the overwhelming popular
sentiment in Japan against any association with nuclear weapons, there
is mounting evidence that the conservative government in Tokyo secretly
considered the eventual manufacture of such weapons, unless interna-
tional agreements intervene. The Defense Agency evidently views
nuclear weapons as indispensable in modern war, and some conservative
leaders strongly believe that an effective counterbalance to the 

Human Sea tactics of the three Communist military powers adjacent to Japan. Prime Minister
Kishi seems to share these views, though his public statements for politi-
cal reasons have fluctuated between affirming the defensive value of
nuclear weapons and reassuring public opinion opposed to their use in
any form.

The government evidently feels that little is to be gained by
openly combating this explosive political issue at the present time,
although as the emphasis which Japan is now giving to the training of
nuclear scientists and technicians, application for uranium ore, rea-
search, and development of industrial capacity for producing nuclear
Reactor equipment constitute useful preliminaries for nuclear weapons
production. These preparations have both public approval and economic
justification under the banner of peaceful uses for nuclear energy.

The high cost of fuel and the shortage of electric power provide
powerful incentives for originating a nuclear power program in Japan,
which also possesses the requisite scientific manpower and capital.
The current budget contains a three-fold increase in subsidies for such
a program, and the newly appointed Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
is one of its most energetic champions. Although Japan's first reactors
and nuclear fuels have been imported, and therefore subject to the re-
strictions against military use imposed on such exports by the US and the
UK, Tokyo has made no secret of its active program to become self-
sufficient in this field. If successful in developing its own fuel
sources and reactors, as seems probable, Japan could soon accumulate its
first uncontrollable supplies of plutonium or other fissile or fertile
materials
of weapons grade, as a by-product of nuclear power generation. From this
stage, which may be reached in as little as five years, to the production
of the first nuclear weapons of the Hiroshima type would be a relatively
brief step.

Public opinion over the advisability of nuclear weapons production
may therefore be postponed to about 1960 without seriously delaying the
nuclear armament of Japan, even if a defense secret law is not enacted
by that time. Meanwhile the government is employing some success
to accustom the public to the notion that Japan should have the most
modern weapons. There has been no discernible objection, for example, to
the recent announcement of a contract let by the Defense Agency for the
construction of a nuclear submarine, or to tests of guided missiles by the
armed forces.
An earlier version of this paper was the CNO contribution for Japan to KE 110-A-27, Nuclear Energy Production in Fourth Countries: likelihood and consequences, 1974.
This report is based on information available through July 31, 1974.

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I. Background
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The circumstances of the Prevention by IAEA of Nuclear Weapons
believed that non-enrolment in nuclear defense — an objective sought by all Japanese — can best be attained in this manner. Japanese officials hold a group meeting to discuss the situation, and on May 15 of this year Japan's leading newspaper (including the Nikkei, Yomiuri Shimbun, Asahi) announced that they would not take part in the manufacture of, or shipment to, any country or government of, nuclear weapons. This statement was issued shortly after a statement by Prime Minister Murayama declaring that the government had no intention of acquiring or possessing nuclear weapons. The statement was widely interpreted as a clear indication that Japan would not support or encourage any such action. However, it is important to note that the Japanese government continues to support international efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and to work towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East.

The Constituency does not mean weapons of any type, although Article 9 states, "...our potential shall never be used..." The clause has not prevented the use of nuclear weapons, except in self-defense, during times of crisis. The 1978 edition of the Constitution has been revised to include a declaration that the government will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. This revision reflects the government's commitment to non-nuclear weapons and its dedication to peaceful coexistence with other nations.

The United Nations has also played a significant role in promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. The UN General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions calling for the complete, irreversible, and verifiable dismantlement of all nuclear weapons. The UN Security Council has also issued a number of resolutions condemning the use of nuclear weapons and calling for a complete and verifiable nuclear test ban.

The United States has been a significant player in the non-nuclear weapons movement. The Nixon administration took a leading role in initiating the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as the "Star Wars" program, which sought to develop a space-based missile defense system. This initiative was seen as a way to reduce the threat of nuclear war and to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, the program was eventually abandoned due to its cost and technical difficulties.

The current administration has taken a different approach, focusing on diplomatic efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. The United States has been instrumental in negotiating agreements such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). These agreements have been praised for their potential to reduce the risk of nuclear war and to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
content
The defense establishment, itself, and its influence in the Diet and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, is central to achieving Japan's objectives in regional and international affairs. The key positions in the defense establishment have been held by figures with significant experience in defense-related fields, and the Diet has been instrumental in shaping Japan's defense policies. The Diet has also been a source of support for the government's defense policies, particularly in the context of regional and international security challenges.

In conclusion, the defense establishment plays a crucial role in the implementation of Japan's security policies and has a significant influence in the Diet. The government must continue to focus on building the capabilities necessary to meet the challenges posed by regional and international security threats, while also ensuring that these efforts are supported by broad-based public and political support. Continued efforts to enhance Japan's defense capabilities and influence in the region will be necessary to achieve these objectives.

For the present, the conservative elites, the business community, and the defense establishment believe that nuclear weapons are necessary for the future security of Japan, and they support the government's efforts to achieve these objectives. They argue that nuclear weapons are essential for Japan's self-defense and that they are necessary to maintain regional and international stability. The government has been able to secure the support of the Diet and other key stakeholders in the implementation of these policies.

The difficulty of altering the current balance of power in the region is acknowledged, and the government is aware of the challenges involved in achieving its objectives. However, the government remains committed to the objectives set forth in the security guidelines and is working to achieve these objectives through a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military efforts. The government must continue to work towards these objectives while also ensuring that the interests of Japan, and the region, are protected.

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I believe, however, that this is the time to recognize one of the specific problems of the present trend. This trend requires an overall study of its implications if we are to prevent the emergence of a single superpower and the decline of the smaller nations. This trend, if allowed to continue, would lead to a world in which all nations would be in a constant state of tension, a world in which the larger nations would be in a constant state of arms build-up. It is evident that this trend must be reversed. This can be done by a series of steps, each of which would have to be carefully planned and executed.

One of the first steps would be to initiate a general international agreement, preferably under the aegis of the United Nations, to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would have to be carefully planned and executed, but it is essential if we are to prevent the emergence of a single superpower and the decline of the smaller nations. If this agreement is not reached, the world will be in a constant state of arms build-up, with all nations in a constant state of tension. This trend must be reversed, and the agreement must be reached, if we are to prevent the emergence of a single superpower and the decline of the smaller nations.