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A MONOGRAPH

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this brief monograph is to examine some of the issues and reasons that are driving Japan toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Historical research and analysis of current events were used to develop the conclusions. The paper compares Japan's military, political and economic problems with the known incentives for a nation to become a nuclear power. Specifically, an assessment is made of Japan's security issues as they relate to the current world environment; the resurgence of nationalism and concern for world prestige; and the benefits of nuclear technology. It is concluded that Japan will become a nuclear power in the decade of the 70's.

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JAPAN TODAY

The phenomenal rise of Japan's economy has rightly been called the "economic miracle" of Asia. This new industrial giant in the world economy is Asia's first modern society with Western ideas and is now the world's third largest economy [1] Japanese production more than doubled in the 1950's; and in the following decade, it almost trebled.[2] In 20 years, a once poor defeated people have modernized their agriculture, manufacturing, and many other productive activities; employed, transferred, and trained their workers; and managed the nation's domestic and international finances with such skill and success that some observers are using the word "superstate" to describe Japan.[3]

The future of this dynamic and prosperous country is a matter of the greatest importance not only to the United States and Asia but indeed to the whole world. The natural momentum of her economic growth, the industry of her people and the advanced state of her society is propelling Japan into a key position of world leadership in the decade of the 70's. Japan can contribute greatly to the economic growth of other countries, the expansion of international trade and to world peace and security. The Japanese have traditionally felt that they must find "their proper place" and they are searching for the proper role to play in the world political arena.[4]

The question now arises whether this new industrial giant will rearm, especially with nuclear weapons that are clearly within its technical and economic capacity, and become one of the world's

military superpowers. This is probably the most crucial issue confronting the Japanese people as well as the world in the decade of the 70's.

It is recognized that no one should try to answer categorically whether Japan will match her economic strength with military might because of the complexities involved in such a momentous decision. However, it is the considered opinion of the author that Japan will become a military superpower during the *decade* of the 70's. The purpose of this brief monograph is to examine some of the issues and reasons that are driving Japan toward nuclearization.

REASONS JAPAN WILL OPT FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS

While economic, environmental, and social change issues are asserting their primacy in the rich world, security problems are likely to continue to dominate the perspectives of many Asian governments. Japan's curious status as rich but Asian lies at the heart of its political problems. It has a sense of vulnerability about access to raw materials, about the future of international trade, about the danger of strategic pressure from its mainland neighbors and a certain sense of disappointment that its vast economic power has not yet been translated in terms of greater political influence or prestige in the world. A comparison of these problem areas with the incentives for a nation to become a nuclear power would show that Japan is ripe to assume a superpower role in world affairs. The incentives to become a nuclear power are legitimate security needs, the prestige of possessing nuclear

arms, *and* the economic and scientific benefits which can be derived from a developed military nuclear technology.[5]

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

What are the security needs of Japan as they relate to its national power and circumstance? With respect to world power relations, Japan's current posture could be defined as being in a state of transition caused by new forces--redefinition of US security interests, uncertainty of Japanese relationships with China and the Soviet Union, nationalistic fervor marked by increasing demands for political and strategic status, and concern for development in areas to which its own power and prosperity are linked. Thus, outward rather than inward looking may be said to characterize Japan's strategic thinking and this attitude can be expected to continue because "the Japanese have always been unusually conscious of the status structure of nations."[6]

At the beginning of the decade of the 1970's, Japanese-American relations were characterized on both sides by expectations that might not be fulfilled and by attitudes of diminished confidence and trust. A number of tensions and misunderstandings had begun to develop between the two countries primarily as a result of the United States' failure to acknowledge Japan's new strength and importance. Although the United States has been inextricably involved in the dual problems of Japanese security and economic development since the end of World War II (WW II), it appears that a new period of coolness has begun. It is this coolness and

uncertainty in the Japanese-American relationship that produced the key that will unlock the door to Japan becoming a nuclear power.

Prior to the decade of the 70's United States-Japanese relations were excellent. In the late 1940's both countries recognized the need for an American military commitment and military presence in Japan and East Asia for mutual security. In 1951, at the height of the Korean War, the United States entered into a security agreement with Japan for the purpose of building a regional alliance system to counter possible aggression against Japan. This security arrangement was in reality a base-lending agreement to the United States. Both sides were unhappy with the treaty because the Japanese thought there should be explicit provisions for their defense while the United States believed that the Japanese should consider the provision for their own defense and that the Japanese did not appreciate the extent of communist aggression and the gravity of the situation in East Asia.[7] Later, in 1960, a relationship referred to as "equal" by the Japanese was developed between Japan and the United States with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.[8] By this treaty the United States explicitly guaranteed Japan's defense and further agreed to consult and cooperate with the Japanese in that defense. In return, Japan would continue to lease bases to the United States. These bases could be used for logistic support for operations throughout East and Southeast Asia but their use for combat operations outside Japan or the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan required prior approval of the Japanese government.[9]

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is not a major political issue in Japan but the treaty is not popular because the Japanese do not like the idea that their security is almost completely dependent on the United States. The underlying cause for this unpopularity is the rising spirit of Japanese nationalism. The Japanese government is aware of this feeling and recognizes the fact that Japan could not even begin to defend itself against aggression by a major power without large conventional forces and, of course, its own nuclear weapons.

Article 10 of the treaty provides that after the agreement has been in force for 10 years, it can be abrogated by one year's notice from either country.[10] In November 1969, prior to the expiration of the initial 10 year term (June 22, 1970), President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato dispatched a Joint Communique announcing agreement to maintain the 1960 treaty in its present form after 1970.[11] Since that time, however, the United States has taken a number of unilateral actions that have caused widespread concern in Japan and would indicate that the United States is actually pushing Japan to assume a superpower role.

The first of these actions occurred in 1970 when President Nixon announced his new foreign policy for Asia commonly known as the Nixon Doctrine. The basic tenent of that doctrine is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot and will not undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. This policy which calls on foreign governments to increase their own capabilities

and responsibilities to sustain themselves did not overly concern the Japanese but it did cause a great shift in Japan's defense policy. Prime Minister Sato outlined his basic approach to Japan's defense in the decade of the 70's in an address to the Japanese Diet on February 14, 1970 when he stated: ". . . there is a wide national consensus for the policy of augmenting our self-defense capabilities in accordance with our national power and circumstances. . . ."12

This statement that Japan would complement its own self-defense efforts with the US-Japan Security Treaty is of great importance. In the past, Japan's defense policy was based upon exclusive dependence upon the US-Japan security system. To put it another way, collective self-defense had been the principal tenet of Japan's security policy, and individual self-defense played a supplementary role. Now, the new defense posture is one in which self-defense is the primary element and the Security Treaty relationship with the US is supplementary. This new change [illegible] Treaty by Japan fits in with the Nixon Doct[illegible] on a road towards more autonomous defen[illegible]

The next two significant [illegible] occurred in 1971 and were know[illegible] have had a more profound impa[illegible] than any comparable change since t[illegible] period, President Nixon announced [illegible] China (Japan's first Nixon shock) and the US revealed a new economic policy designed to defend the dollar (Japan's second Nixon shock).

On July 16, 1971, President Nixon announced his intention to visit China, and that Henry Kissenger had secretly visited Peking

to make initial arrangements. In Japan, the news hit the streets like an electric shock. The manner of this announcement seriously undermined Japan's Prime Minister Sato's confidence because his foreign policy was based on support for Washington's leadership. This policy required opposition to the People's Republic of China (PRC), especially in denying formal diplomatic recognition and opposing a seat for the Peking regime in the United Nations. Now Sato was embarrassed to find that Japan had not been consulted on a major shift in policy by Washington.[13] Even today, many months since President Nixon completed his visit to Peking in February 1972, the Japanese are still vainly trying to justify the lack of prior consultation by Washington. Finding no obvious US interest involved, the Japanese tend to interpret this failure as a deliberate slight in favor of China.

Exactly one month later on August 16, 1971, the second wave of "Nixon Shock" hit Japan, when President Nixon announced a reversal of economic policy, including measures that appeared to hit Japan harder than any other country. The President imposed a ten percent import surcharge which affected more of Japan's exports than those of any other nation and the end of dollar convertibility into gold brought a huge rush of dollars to Japan resulting in Japan being forced to allow the yen to float to a higher value in relation to the dollar.[14] Thus, Japan's exports to the United States became more expensive by both the surcharge and the higher yen value.

Relations between Japan and the US in 1971 were troubled by tensions and uncertainties without precedent during the previous 25 years. This new look in diplomacy and economic policy forged by Washington, together with Japan's future to adequately respond to new US priorities, has contributed greatly to heightening discord between Japan and the United States. President Nixon acknowledged this fact in a 1972 Report to the Congress on Foreign Policy for the 70's when he said:

> Our China and economic initiatives were a shock to the US-Japanese relationship. Both grew out of the new realities of a changed world situation. For precisely that reason, they had an unsettling effect upon Japan, which had become accustomed to a US-Japanese relationship rooted in the postwar period and based on a bipolar concept of world power. That relationship, however, had already been overtaken by time and Japan's phenomenal economic growth. The shocks of 1971, therefore, only accelerated an evolution in US-Japanese relations that was in any event, overdue, unavoidable, and in the long run, desirable.[15]

This accelerated evolution in US-Japanese relations was very "desirable" from the United States' point of view because America has become generally exhausted from its effort to maintain world peace through military might. The impact of maintaining military forces in excess of three million men coupled with its involvement in two wars since WW II and the unpopularity of the Vietnam conflict are responsible for the change in foreign policy of the United States. That policy provides that the United States will keep all its treaty commitments and provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of an allied nation whose survival is considered vital to the United States' own security. In cases involving other types of aggression, the United States will furnish military

and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But the nation involved must assume primary responsibility for its own defense.

This new formula cannot disguise the fact that United States' policy is undergoing a change not merely of means but of ends. It now appears that the United States is withdrawing from Asia and is prepared to allow aggression to succeed, and communism to expand in Indochina and possibly in other areas of Asia and the Pacific, rather than intervene directly to prevent it. Treaty commitments may be kept but how will they now be interpreted? A nuclear shield will be available; but, how credible will its use be after China has developed an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability? What if, in cases of conventional aggression, the country directly threatened is not able to meet the challenge? These then are the questions being posed by the Japanese leadership. The answer can be but one: more autonomous defense that will include nuclear weapons.

The security problem of Japan is further complicated by the fact that it is inseparable from the wider problem of Asian security. A more autonomous self-defense of Japan, less reliant on US protection, raises broader strategic problems for the region as a whole which must include the threat posed by the PRC and Russia.

Japanese attitudes toward China and the Chinese are complex and contradictory. The Chinese and Japanese can claim similar cultures, religions, customs, and traditions; however, cooperation between the two countries is lacking because of conflicting national

interests. These conflicting interests have often been called the "two Chinas" problem because Japan has attempted to maintain good relations with mainland China while continuing to recognize and support Taiwan. The genesis of this problem dates to the San Francisco peace conference of September 1951. The Japanese Government was led to believe that a peace treaty and an end to the occupation of Japan by the United States was dependent upon Japanese recognition of Nationalist China. Japan had always had a feeling of racial and cultural affinity with China and desired to establish peace and trade with mainland China. But Japan succumbed to pressure from the United States and subsequently negotiated and signed a peace treaty with Nationalist China.[16]

Japan has pursued its two China policy by trying to maintain a delicate balance between the two countries. On the one hand, the Japanese have followed the United States' hard line of non-recognition, establishing formal diplomatic ties solely with the Nationalist government and cultivating extensive economic ties with Taiwan. On the other hand, Japan has established more varied and extensive contact with Communist China than any other non-communist nation through various cultural, political, and economic missions.[17]

Japan's relations with the PRC will undoubtedly take on a different character because of United States' attempts at rapprochement with the PRC and the fact that Peking has assumed the Chinese seat in the United Nations. In addition, Communist China is on the verge of becoming a superpower. The latter fact is of

great concern to Japan. Communist China is a military power with three million men under arms and is fast approaching the status of a superpower because of its advances in weapons technology.[18] The PRC's nuclear weapon capabilities represents a genuine threat to Japan's security. Now that China has a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) capability, it could deploy an MRBM within striking distance of Japan and thus pose a direct military threat or indulge in some form of nuclear blackmail. The attainment of superpower status by development and deployment of an ICBM system would indicate that China will be able to threaten the American homeland with nuclear weapons in the near future and by so doing will weaken the credibility of the deterrent power of American strategic forces.

The PRC will be forced to make political capital of any ICBMs she produces at such great cost to its own economy. The most obvious action would be to direct the momentum gained in her national prestige toward nations surrounding it and attempt to pry them loose from the orbit of the United States. Seemingly, the United States could deter Peking by means of its own ICBMs but there the credibility factor may work in favor of the Chinese because of the uncertainties of Russia's reaction to an attack by the United States on Communist China. It simply does not make sense to assume that the United States would place its own cities in jeopardy in order that Tokyo or Osaka may be sheltered from nuclear attacks by either the Soviet Union or Communist China. Thus, nuclear weapons in the Chinese arsenal represent political, military, and psychological problems for Japan and provide

additional credence to the assertion that Japan will develop its own nuclear weapons in the decade of the 70's.

Another area of concern in Sino-Japanese relations is Southeast Asia. The two countries seem to be on a collision course with individual activities in that area of the world. Japan has expanded its economic influence to the point where Peking's political hegemony in Asia is being threatened. Japan's trade with developing Asia is likely to grow rapidly during the 1970's and it is estimated that by 1980 nearly half of the total imports of developing Asian countries are likely to come from Japan. Japanese investments and aid are pouring into the industries of Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Cambodia. To the Asian people, Japan's economic assistance is much more attractive than the revolutionary doctrine exported by Peking. The rapid expansion of the Japanese economy and diplomacy in Southeast Asia has increased Chinese concern because increased Japanese presence could damage the prestige of the PRC in that part of the world.[19]

Korea and Taiwan also pose potential points of collision between Japan and Red China. Historically Japan has considered it important to prevent Taiwan and Korea from falling into unfriendly hands. One of the reasons for the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 was to prevent any part of the Taiwan-Korean region from falling into hostile hands. If Taiwan fell to Red China, Peking would gain a strategic base from which it could interdict Japan's shipping lines to Southeast Asian markets and raw materials. These trade routes are vital to Japan's future. As a example, in

1965 Japan imported two-thirds of its total consumption of energy (mostly in the form of petroleum) and it is predicted that this ratio will increase to 80 percent in 1975 and to 90 percent in 1980. Japan will continue to import most of the iron ore and nonferrous metal ore it requires and according to an unofficial Foreign Ministry paper, 80 percent of the shipping bringing these products to Japan passes through the sea routes of Southeast Asia.[20]

The close proximity of Korea has always caused the Japanese to fear an invasion from that peninsula. Japan took no part in and had no responsibility for the Korean War but should war erupt a second time, Japan's security would be affected and appropriate action would be expected now that the United States is withdrawing its forces from that area. Although the Japanese public is still relatively unconcerned about a possible second Korean war, the danger is real and, like it or not, Japan will have to become involved.[21]

Russia is Japan's traditional enemy and its nuclear weapons and submarines around the Japanese islands are a source of daily concern to all Japanese. Japan's relationship with the Soviet Union has been shaped primarily by considerations of national security and only to a limited degree by economics.

Since the end of WW II, Japan has viewed the Soviet Union as its principal military threat. With the collapse of Japan in 1945, the Russians took over Manchuria and also claimed the northern islands off the coast of Hokkaido. The Soviet Union entered into a state of war with Japan in a unilateral abrogation of a Neutrality Pact between

Japan and the USSR signed in 1941. In October 1956, Japan and the Soviet Union signed a Joint Declaration terminating the state of war between the two countries and reestablished diplomatic relations. Nearly a decade and a half have passed since then, and while there has been a remarkable improvement in Russo-Japanese relations, no peace treaty has yet been concluded between the two countries. This situation stems from the question of the so-called "Northern Territorial Issue" which involves the restoration to Japan of certain islands (part of the Kurile Islands) occupied by the Soviet Union. Japan has consistently maintained that these northern islands are part of its inherent territory and has demanded that the Soviet Union restore them to their rightful owner.

The Soviet Government has assumed the attitude that the territorial problem has already been settled by a series of international agreements and recently put forth the argument that national boundaries formulated after WW II can no longer be changed since even a change in part would adversely affect other territorial issues.

Japanese fishing boats are frequently being harassed or seized by Soviet authorities in the seas around the Northern Territories, thus giving rise to a constant series of difficulties between the two countries. In addition, the Soviets growing naval power in the western Pacific represent a major problem for Japan. The presence of the Russian submarine flotilla in Vladivastok has virtually neutralized the Sea of Japan. Their ships allegedly have taken to traffic through the Strait of Tsugaru between Honshu and Hokkaido, which the Japanese claim as part of their territorial waters. The

question of how to keep the sea-lanes along the coast of China from being overrun by Soviet submarines is a major concern of the Japanese Defense Agency.

Even more formidable will be the task of patrolling the Indian Ocean. Japan imports over 90 percent of her oil from the Middle East and transports it across the Indian Ocean and through the Straits of Malacca. This vital supply line could be greatly threatened by Soviet naval harassment.[22]

Japan, as an island nation with expanding areas of responsibility, such as the reversion of Okinawa, recognizes that her prosperity and survival vitally depend on foreign trade and free navigation. The outcome of any confrontation between the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and the nuclear armed Soviet Navy would favor the Russians; however, if both forces had nuclear weapons, a stand-off could be the result.

Japan's limited military forces are oriented toward the north with four of 13 divisions located in Hokkaido. This is an indication of where the Japanese Defense Agency believes the primary threat to their security is located. In fact, Japanese public opinion polls have consistently shown that the Japanese public regard Russia as the primary threat to Japan's security.[23] The Japanese believe that the Soviet Union is not trustworthy and that their unpredictable military policy and expansionist aims have contributed to world instability in recent times. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan would definitely impede further expansion into Japanese territory by Russia, improve the

defensive posture of areas of vital interest to the Japanese Government, and also reduce the psychological threat of foreign domination.

JAPAN'S WORLD PRESTIGE

The resurgence of nationalism is probably the most powerful undercurrent in Japan today. It exists in unusually strong form with respect to geographical, racial, linquistic and religious elements. Japan's new feeling of nationalism is represented in the actions and attitudes of most all Japanese people to include political leaders, intellectuals, businessmen, diplomats, the press, leftist groups and the average citizen from all walks of life. An appropriate question at this point might be: "Is there tangible evidence of nationalism in Japan?" The answer is an unqualified "Yes!" Some of the manifestations of Japanese nationalism are:

1. Gradual return of the emperor to his historical role as father of the family nation.

2. Revival of interest in Shinto shrines and traditional national holidays.

3. A new series of high school textbooks which imply that blame for WW II could be traced to both Japanese aggression and economic pressure exerted by the "ABCD" ring (America, Britain, China, and the Dutch).

4. Resentment at any hint of being placed into what is considered as an inferior diplomatic position.

5. Changing attitude toward military affairs.

This latter manifestation is by far the strongest indicator of increasing Japanese nationalism. "Autonomous defense" is a popular phrase in Japan. That phrase is difficult to define but an explanation of the term is outlined in the 1970-71 White Paper on Japan's Defense Power which states:

> To defend its independence by itself and to seek peace is a matter of course for an independent nation. All nations are making efforts toward this end. Our country is also making autonomous defense efforts, corresponding to the strengthening of its economic power and the rise in its international position. In other words, our country has established the basic policy of coping with aggression primarily by its own resources and is continuing its efforts with the target of achieving a setup which will enable Japan to carry out measures exclusively for effective defense.[24]

Japan's own military resources are quite formidable and have grown rapidly in both quantity and quality in recent years. The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have grown from a relatively small, poorly trained organization of only 135,000 men in 1952 to over 260,000 highly trained men in 1973. The SDF is slowly but surely becoming the best combined arms force in Asia behind only the United States and Russia. Its all volunteer force has been designed for rapid expansion and is backed by industry and know-how capable for making it one of the most powerful military establishments in the world.

The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) currently has an authorized strength of 180,000 uniformed personnel and 35,250 reserves. It is divided into five armies with 13 divisions. The GSDF has 345 aircraft including 220 helicopters, and three SAM groups with HAWK (90 launchers). The Maritime Self-Defense Force is composed of one Self-Defense Fleet, five Regional Districts, one air training

command, one training squadron and one minesweeping squadron. It has 39,000 uniformed personnel and 172 vessels consisting of destroyers, escort vessels, submarines, torpedo vessels and minesweepers. Two hundred combat aircraft and about 60 helicopters are on active duty either independently or in cooperation with the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). The Air Self-Defense Force has Northern, Middle, and Western Air Defense commands organized with seven fighter-bomber squadrons of 230 F-86F aircraft, seven interceptor squadrons of 160 F-104J aircraft, and one reconnaissance squadron with 16 RF-86F aircraft. The latter aircraft are scheduled to be replaced with the RF-4EJ. In addition, the ASDF has four SAM battalions with Nike Hercules (100 launchers).[25]

It is readily apparent that Japan is embarked on an accelerating program to build up its military forces. The current defense budget is $1.86 billion (it has increased tenfold, compared with $206 million in 1954) and military expenditure is expected to double by 1975 if the economy keeps booming.[26] In the first week of October 1972, Premier Tanaka's (Japan's new premier) Cabinet approved a defense plan to spend $15-billion over the next five years.[27] The rationale for the Japanese build up as espoused by the National Defense Agency is: "Realistically, we must recognize that the basis of peace in the world is still military strength."[28] This is the agency's fourth five year plan to improve and expand its armed forces. The draft plan calls for an increase of almost 300 tanks, 70 armored personnel carriers and 230 combat helicopters to the GSDF. The Maritime Self-Defense Force is scheduled to obtain

two 8,000 ton destroyers carrying helicopters, nine submarines, 14 high-speed missile carriers and 61 other warships. The draft plan also allowed for the strengthening and expansion of the ASDF with an increase of 76 F4-EJ Phantom jets. This would bring the war plane inventory of the ASDF to 1,750 aircraft.[29]

Prestige, influence, and power come to a nation because other nations concede that one is entitled to them. Yet despite its remarkable and impressive record as a technological and economic giant, its rising mood of national assertiveness, and its willingness to play a wider international role, Japan is still considered to be a military and political pygmy. As an example, Japan has consistently requested and been denied a seat in the United Nations Security Council. The permanent member nations of that council are all nuclear powers. A nuclear armed Japan would give it great power status which in turn would improve its chances for admittance to the UN Security Council and greatly improve its international prestige and influence.

BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

The relationship between Japan's military nuclear technology and scientific, technological, and economic progress deserves closer examination. The fact is that military programs promote scientific and technological progress. The "spin off" of new technology for civilian industry from an expanded military production of advanced weaponry can greatly augment the growth rate of an economy. It is impossible to stop or slow the spread of

nuclear technology in the present world and the Japanese, like it or not, are in the nuclear age.

Great advances are being made by Japan in missile technology, space research, and nuclear energy.. It should be noted that Japan may be reversing the usual order of nuclear weapons development by its advanced rocket research, and thus have a potentially operational delivery system prior to a developed nuclear capability. Today, Japan is already considered by some sources to be the third most advanced nation in the world in space technology.[30] It has developed and successfully fired a one and one-half ton rocket to a range of 1,300 miles. Japan also has a missile named the MU-4 that has the thrust, range, and paylood capability similar to the Minuteman missile. After four earlier unsuccessful attempts, Japan became the fourth country in the world to place a satellite in orbit, following the lead of the United States, the Soviet Union and France. This accomplishment, considered one of the primary research activities of the Japanese Government occurred in February 1971 when a test satellite dubbed "Tansei" was successfully launched into orbit by an M rocket.[31] These space and rocket activities provide the basis for experts who estimate that Japan could test its own ICBM within a few years after the political decision has been made by the Japanese leadership.[32]

Fundamental research in atomic energy has been going on in Japan well before WW II and Japanese scientists have made significant contributions in the field of nuclear research since that time. In 1970 there were 23 power reactors, 10 research critical assemblies

and a total governmental budget of $39.2 million dollars applied to nuclear energy development. The country is also building a large number of breeder reactors for electric power, one by-product of which is the basic raw material for atomic weapons.[33] Japan is now so advanced in the field of nuclear energy that most experts believe it can build a nuclear weapon within six months. In fact, a Japanese nuclear physicist recently announced that along with Japan's missile program they were now ". . . in the nice position of being able to almost have the nuclear deterrent without having to build it."[34]

In addition, Japanese industry is developing nuclear power plants for ships and submarines. William Beecher points out that the Mitsubishi Company is prime contractor on development of a very fast, very large nuclear-powered submersible tanker designed to carry oil and other cargo under water. It also could serve as an ideal survivable vessel for Polaris type missiles.[35] It should also be pointed out that a primary research project of the Japanese government at this time is the development of a remote-controlled submarine.[36] A Polaris type submarine would provide an ideal nuclear deterrent for the island nation of Japan and provide ultimately the prestige they are seeking. Herman Kahn has said that ". . . any country with a Polaris submarine is a 'superpower.'"[37]

Because of the extreme sensitivity of most Japanese toward the idea of developing nuclear power, all activities in this field are carefully described as being "for peaceful purposes." Be that as it may, Japan is so far advanced in missile development and nuclear technology that one would have to agree with Leonard Beaton that

"it is difficult to see what reasons there could be for embarking on such an ambitious programme if the decision to develop nuclear weapons has not been taken."[38]

FOR JAPAN THE FUTURE IS NOW

Leading writers of the day have offered numerous reasons why Japan will not go nuclear. A sampling of these reasons are: (1) development of a sufficient nuclear capability could represent a substantial diversion of resources; (2) a nuclear force lacks a feasible nuclear strategy in that credibility depends upon the belief that it will be used; (3) domestic public opinion is against nuclear armament; (4) protection is available from an external power at an acceptable diplomatic cost; (5) a nuclear force is not cost-effective in terms either of military security or diplomatic status; and (6) nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles would actively offend the superpowers and bring into play forces inhibiting the transfer of nuclear technology or materials. However, the majority of these Japan watchers also agree that Japan will go nuclear with a major change in the international climate. The storm clouds are growing and Japan is preparing to put up its own nuclear umbrella.

President Nixon started that umbrella to unfold in July 1971, when he stated in a speech in Kansas City that the United States was entering a period of declining vitality and predicted that within five to ten years, five great powers--the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, China and Japan--would control

the world. Again in an interview published by Time Magazine on January 3, 1972, he expressed the opinion that if the United States, Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan could maintain a balance of power among themselves, it would be a better and more stable world.[39] In President Nixon's image of the world, there seems to be an implicit expectation that Japan will be able to take up a position as one of the poles in the pentagonal political structure by becoming strong enough to maintain a partnership of equality with the United States. One must logically conclude then, that the United States expects Japan to take the road toward becoming a political and military superpower.

Japan's current power rests solidly on her economic achievement as the third industrial power in the world with a Gross National Product almost two and a half times that of China and a good chance of overtaking the Soviet Union during the next decade. In economic terms Japan is clearly a superpower but in political terms it has not been considered a country capable of major influence in world affairs. This attitude by other countries would change once Japan becomes a nuclear power.

It should be noted that of the four major powers which stand out most conspicuously in Asia today, it is only Japan which has yet to develop its own nuclear armament, while nuclear armament is one essential ingredient for any power claiming a major share in world affairs today.

China presents a formidable threat to Japan and Asia. It seems probable that the inherent contradictions in the relations

of a backward China and an industrially striving Japan are almost certain to lead to rivalry for hegemonic primacy in the Far East--a revalry that would pit the magnetic pull of China's vast population against Japan's increasing economic leverage over the whole of Asia. Two such proud and regionally dominant nations cannot avoid competition.

The Soviet Union has been making friendly approaches to Japan and some Japanese political strategists are attracted by the potential of improved Soviet relations as a counterbalance to China. Yet it seems improbable that any close Soviet-Japanese relationship will develop. The Russo-Japanese war at the turn of the century left a bitter memory of diplomatic frustration and then forty years later, the Russians stabbed them in the back by tearing up their treaty of neutrality and grabbing the Kurile Islands as their share of the spoils.

Perhaps more than any other people in the world, the Japanese dread nuclear weapons. Atomic warfare has been waged only against Japan and the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 has produced what is described in Japan as a "nuclear allergy." Gradually, nevertheless, Japan is showing positive signs of losing some of her nuclear allergies and accepting the fact that it is part of the nuclear age. The Japanese people might like to believe that politics need not follow the yen. They cannot, however, because Japanese industrialists and businessmen are worried that Japan may lose out commercially if it does not become a nuclear power and between Japanese business and Japanese government there

is an intimacy that would make congressional investigative committees spring into immediate action in the United States. Another positive sign that Japan is losing its nuclear allergy was its three month delay in signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) and its failure thus far to ratify the treaty after signature on February 4, 1970. The Japanese believe that the NPT is an "unequal treaty" because it is unfavorable to nations that currently use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the resurgence of nationalism in Japan today makes unacceptable any international agreement in which the Japanese think they are put in an inferior status. This action or inaction with regard to the NPT also serves as another indicator that Japan is keeping open their option to make nuclear weapons.

The Japanese are extremely proud of their accomplishments and are walking a little tall instead of in a carefully humble shuffle. They always used to talk of "someday"--someday when we achieve a Western standard of economic progress, someday when we stand equal, someday when we are really confident of our abilities. A little reluctantly but definitely, the Japanese are conceding that the future has become the present and that their country is on the brink of becoming a political and military superpower. Someday is today!

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FOOTNOTES

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