THE USES AND LIMITATIONS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN ASIA

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TWO CONTRASTING VIEWS

It may be useful at the outset to contrast two polar positions that are tacitly or explicitly held on this subject. If my opening suggests something about the position that will be taken in this paper, I should hasten to say that there are many points between two extremes besides the median.

At one pole is a position that used to be held more actively in some quarters, particularly in the United States, than it currently is, although it may again assume prominence during the forthcoming American election campaign. According to this view, which I shall call the "broad-deterrent" view, the primary military threat in the Far East is posed by Communist China, acting alone or through its proxies in North Vietnam and North Korea. This threat can be effectively deterred by a declaratory policy that focuses on the controlled use of nuclear weapons against targets in China or in the proxy countries at the upper limits of an escalation process that would first employ conventional weapons inside or outside the tactical objective area, but would move rapidly to nuclear weapons if the precipitating aggression did not cease. The broad-deterrent view recognizes that the basic threat can, indeed is likely to, take many forms besides large-scale overt aggression. But the presumption is that the underlying stimulus, support, and control of these different manifestations remains the responsibility

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of Communist China, or its proxies. This presumption makes credible the use of nuclear weapons against the responsible parties themselves, thereby providing an effective deterrent against many of the lesser forms of provocation, as well.

At the opposite extreme is the "narrow-deterrent" view, according to which the threat of nuclear weapons use is neither effective nor relevant in Asia, nor is it applicable to the kinds of contingencies that may arise there. (I will pass over the question of whether the "irrelevance" of nuclear deterrence to the kinds of threats that are likely to arise is itself an indication of the effectiveness of deterrence in eliminating from consideration those contingencies that are presumed unlikely to arise!) According to this view, which has been held in many American and British quarters and is frequently expressed in France, the threat of nuclear weapons in Asia is ineffective because it is incredible, and it is incredible because of the constraints imposed by the political environment and by the type of conflicts which the ferment of social, political, and economic change in this area generates.

For reasons that include, but are not confined to, the World War II use of atomic weapons against Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the Asian political environment will, it is argued, inevitably make the use of nuclear weapons inappropriate, because the political costs that would be associated with their use would exceed whatever military gains might be obtained. The types of conflicts that are bound to arise in this area are too small, too ambiguous, and too deeply embedded in complex processes of social change, to give the use of nuclear weapons any plausibility. Other options will always be more attractive than using nuclear weapons, so the threat of use is academic. Finally, according to this view, the major national interests of the nuclear powers are not as directly involved in Asia as they are in the defense of the homelands of these powers. Hence, it must be assumed that the nuclear powers could not "wish to assume the enormous risk of a general war," as de Gaulle recently put it, which a first use of nuclear weapons would entail in Asia, as well as in Europe. (The reasoning here is, of
course, analogous to and, in one sense, stronger than the argument about the ineffectuality of the American deterrent in the European context, where major American interests are more deeply involved than in Asia. However, the essential difference between the two contexts, which the quotation ignores, is the different adversary and the differing power that it possesses -- a point I will return to later.)

The essential difference between the broad-deterrent and the narrow-deterrent views can be reduced to the basic question of the threshold of stimulus, provocation, or violence, at which a U.S. nuclear response becomes sufficiently credible to be an effective deterrent. Clearly, the threshold question conceals a number of complex issues, in Asia no less than in Europe. Would the use of nuclear weapons be militarily effective? (Are there tactical targets within the objective area that can be more effectively destroyed with nuclear weapons than with other means, without inflicting more significant damage on friend than foe? If not, then is geographic escalation with nuclear weapons against targets outside the tactical area likely to be more effective than conventional weapons in relieving the military threat? Is there a risk that use of nuclear weapons will involve the Soviet Union in further escalation moves?, etc.) Are the political costs of using nuclear weapons likely to be too great in relation to military effectiveness to make their use credible? Can these political costs be reduced, or are they likely to be offset by the political costs of failing to make a stand?

Implicitly, or explicitly, these questions are answered in sharply different ways by the two contrasting views of deterrence. As a result, each would establish the provocation threshold at grossly different points. The broad-deterrent view sets the provocation threshold at a relatively low level, while reserving flexibility for the type and targeting of the nuclear response that might be invoked. A wide range of contingencies can then be effectively deterred by nuclear means. The narrow-deterrent view sets the provocation threshold at a relatively high point, thereby implying that a wide range of contingencies, varying with respect to geography, level of violence,
duration, and the Asian countries that may be involved, will remain irrelevant to the use of nuclear weapons, and therefore undeterred.

THE EFFECT OF A CHINESE CAPABILITY

Without attempting to be unrealistically precise about this fundamental question of provocation threshold, I want to comment briefly on how the threshold might be affected by Chinese acquisition of a nuclear capability and, in somewhat greater detail, on some of the contingencies in Asia that, wherever the threshold lies, are likely to be below it. I will wait until a later point in the paper to make a comment about the intriguing, if perhaps academic, question of whether this threshold is likely to be higher or lower in Asia than in Europe.

On the matter of a Chinese nuclear capability, it is obvious that the answer is sensitive to the type of capability under consideration. Let us assume that for the next ten years a Chinese nuclear capability is, at worst, likely to be quite limited in numbers of weapons, delivery characteristics and its protection against attack, say, as limited as the current French capability. Clearly, the impact of such a Chinese capability is an extremely complex question, depending on many factors, including the status of Sino-Soviet relations, the conditions that prevail in the rest of the world in and outside Asia, the preferences and pressures of allies and, to some extent (although it is perhaps a more limited extent than is frequently believed to be the case), the occupant of the White House. But if, in order to focus on the effect of a Chinese capability, one makes the possibly heroic assumption that these "other" things are fixed, what can be said about the change, if any, in the provocation threshold? One can, I think, adduce speculative arguments in support of each of the three logically possible effects that such a Chinese nuclear capability might have on the provocation threshold.

First, it can be plausibly argued that a limited Chinese capability might have the paradoxical effect of lowering the threshold of provocation at which use of nuclear weapons against China would be
credible. The reasons for the paradox are both political and military. Chinese acquisition of a limited capability may complete the erosion of whatever residual protection remains from the Soviet "umbrella," thereby reducing the risk of Soviet involvement, and removing one major source of military, as well as political cost. Furthermore, Chinese acquisition may lessen the antagonism felt inside and outside Asia at the possibility of a second use of nuclear weapons against Asian targets. Clearly, the extent of this reaction would depend on China's own doctrine, declaratory policy, and behavior. But if these are truculent, the political costs associated with use or threatened use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear-armed China may recede markedly. Indeed, if, in seeking to exercise political leverage, a truculent China were to threaten to use its limited supply of weapons against population targets in countries supporting the United States and its allies, a U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons in a controlled manner against Chinese military targets could acquire the political accreditations of moderation and humaneness. Finally, the military gains from a first use of nuclear weapons against China might rise, because of the incentive to pre-empt against a small and vulnerable force that might otherwise be employed with damaging local military effects.

On the other hand, the complex reasoning and calculation that might lead to the threshold-lowering effect may apply more to the world of academic strategymaking than to crisis-conditioned decision-making. Recognizing that the outcome would be sensitive to particular actors in particular circumstances, it may well be that the extra complexity and unfathomability that a Chinese nuclear capability would add to an already-complex crisis, impinging on an already-uncertain and extended decisionmaker, would make him a little more cautious and reluctant than he would otherwise be. There might, of course, be the specific danger of a bomb detonated in a U.S. harbor, or on a U.S. Pacific base, or on an allied country; or the healing of the Sino-Soviet rupture; or the fearful clamor of exposed allies; etc. But the greatest impact might simply be the added uncertainty and unfathomability that even the token nuclear capability would provide.
If one were to judge normatively how decisionmakers ought to act, probably a stronger analytic case can be made for the threshold lowering effect. But if one were to judge, instead, how decisionmakers are likely to act, the threshold-raising effect is perhaps more likely to ensue. Not that the latter effect would be large, since there are obviously incentives for avoiding nuclear weapons use even in the absence of a Chinese capability; but if there is an effect, in practice, it is perhaps likely to be to add an extra touch of restraint and reluctance to the use of threatened use of nuclear weapons in Asia.

Finally, there is the position that a Chinese capability would have a negligible effect on nuclear deterrence. The case in support of this position can be readily inferred from the foregoing discussion. To the extent that decisionmakers seek to reduce their uncertainties, they may be more reluctant to employ nuclear weapons lest this expose them to a situation made more uncertain by Chinese possession of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the possibly lowered political costs and increased military advantages from destroying a limited Chinese capability may create incentives to pre-empt. A balance among these forces may, plausibly, leave the provocation threshold unaffected by Chinese acquisition.

THE DETERRED AND THE UNDETERRED

Let me now consider some of the specific contingencies in Asia in which nuclear deterrence seems very likely to work effectively, and some in which it does not. In addition to giving some empirical content to what has been a broad and general discussion so far, the conclusion I want to leave in this part of the discussion is that nuclear deterrence in Asia is by no means inapplicable or obsolete, that it has its uses and functions, as well as its limitations, and that if we are sometimes keenly aware of its limitations in situations like those in Vietnam and Laos, we should nevertheless retain a lively sense of the relevance and utility which deterrence continues to play, generally. Failure to do so may mean that, in our
efforts to escape from those limitations, we may become uncritically receptive to political solutions and arrangements that not only do not surmount the limitations of nuclear deterrence, but compromise and vitiate its uses as well.

Three situations in which it seems plain that nuclear deterrence is powerfully operative are the cases of large-scale conventional aggression against Korea, Taiwan, or Japan. The two U.S. divisions in Korea, still the largest U.S. force commitment outside of Western Europe, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Straits of Formosa, provide the trip-wire and the powder keg that make a U.S. nuclear response an effective deterrent against such aggressions. In case this simple assertion may be misunderstood, let me add two clarifying points. First, I am not saying that large-scale conventional aggression in either Korea or Taiwan would necessarily occur in the absence of nuclear deterrence. Surely, communist China has many other reasons, as well, for wanting to avoid or at least to postpone such confrontations. Not the least of these other reasons is that the conventional military forces in both areas are large and impressive; China's willingness and ability to incur the severe costs that even a conventional response to aggression against Korea and Taiwan would entail must certainly be limited. What I am saying, however, is that, in both cases, the risk of escalation to a point at which U.S. nuclear response, against military and high-value economic targets outside or inside China, would be likely to occur is sufficiently high to make these contingencies unlikely.

Second, I am not implying that Korean ground forces, and Chinese Nationalist ground and air forces in Taiwan, are unnecessary or of little value as long as the U.S. commitment, and the residual danger of a first use of nuclear weapons, remains evident. Although it is neither possible nor relevant to discuss particular force levels in this paper, in both Korea and Taiwan the existence of substantial conventional military capabilities retains considerable value. One reason is that such forces signify that the conventional option remains open and, under some circumstances, use of this option may be
valuable. In addition, of course, such forces do provide an asset that should be of use in deterring or meeting various forms of conventional and "unconventional" (in the sense of large-scale insurgencies) contingencies elsewhere in the Asian area, although admittedly we have not yet been too successful, or perhaps not sufficiently imaginative, in finding ways to make these assets useable outside of their respective home bases, a point I will return to later in the discussion.

Although the situation is quite different in Japan, nevertheless the U.S.-Japanese treaty of 1960 and the U.S. air forces remaining in Japan certify a U.S. commitment that makes nuclear deterrence against conventional attack on the Japanese islands operative and, I would say, eminently effective. Again, I am not saying that this contingency would be likely to occur in the absence of the U.S. commitment. In fact, it is neither militarily nor politically plausible under present circumstances, quite apart from the U.S. guarantee. My point is simply that there remains a residual nuclear threat, and it is a sufficiently powerful one to provide an effective deterrent in the foreseeable future, barring drastic changes within or outside Japan.

While it is thus clear that there are a number of cases in which nuclear deterrence works effectively, it is equally clear -- and in the nature of the case, inevitable -- that the situations that preoccupy us these days are the ones in which deterrence does not work, and may not be relied upon to work in the future. Laos and Vietnam are the two most critical examples, Indonesia's "konfrontasi" with Malaysia a third. Still other examples of the ineffectuality, if not irrelevance, of nuclear deterrence, arise in the Indian subcontinent in relation to potential conflicts between India and Pakistan, and the aggression two years ago by China against India. In possible future conflicts between India and China, however, the role of deterrence could become more credible, especially if India were to alter its previous opposition to having such protection invoked in its behalf.
One of the principal reasons that there has been a growth in the likelihood and intensity of insurgency conflicts in Asia is precisely the effectiveness of a possible nuclear response in deterring higher-threshold provocations. Another reason, of course, is that insurgency conflicts may simply be a more efficient technique for achieving communist objectives in the vulnerable, loosely-integrated societies of most of Asia, as well as in many of the other less-developed countries of the world. In these conflicts, nuclear deterrence loses its credibility and relevance for many reasons, including the "smallness" of the provocation and the ambiguity of the aggressive act, springing from the tangle of internal as well as external political and social motivations and support, previously alluded to. It is true that the more we study these conflicts, the more important does the command and control function of the external stimulus (e.g., the control of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam over the Vietcong and the Pathet Lao) appear to be. Nevertheless, there unquestionably remains an important element of internal volition, motivation, and organization in both South Vietnam and Laos, which nurtures ambiguity and blurs the clear and present nature of the threat on which a justifiable use of nuclear weapons depends.

From a military point of view, the result is that there is not a well-defined battle-line for locating appropriate tactical targets in the area of immediate operations. But the decisive limitation on nuclear deterrence in these situations is not military but political. In general, the political constraints are associated with a sharp disproportionality between the magnitude of such a response, and the level of violence in insurgent conflicts, as well as with the deep Asian animosity against any second use of nuclear weapons on Asian targets. Moreover, in all of these conflicts, a substantial component of the political costs is the impact on Sino-Soviet relations, in terms of possibly activating the somewhat blurred Soviet commitments to respond in kind to such pressure on communist China, and also of possibly mending the deep split within the communist camp in
the face of a common threat. Finally, the net political costs that would accrue from the reactions of our allies outside of Asia, as well as from reactions within the United States, combine to further discount the nuclear instrument in these circumstances. As a consequence, the military benefits from nuclear weapons use are likely to be minimized, and the political costs maximized, in insurgency situations such as Vietnam and Laos.

In the other situations in which nuclear deterrence is largely inoperative (e.g., the Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia, Indian-Pakistani frictions, etc.) there are many differences, but most of the same basic constraints apply. In these cases, too, expected political costs dominate limited military gains, not so much because the source of the threat is ambiguous, as it is in Vietnam and Laos, as because of the manifest disproportionality, the particular Asian sensitivity in this matter (whether on the side of the attacker or the attacked), and the possibly large and negative side-effects in the rest of the world, and in particular in connection with relations between the Soviet Union and China.

Illustrations of the types of situations in which nuclear deterrence is or is not likely to function effectively are useful in clarifying both its uses and limitations. However, we should avoid accepting an arbitrary distinction between what is likely to be below and what is likely to be above the provocation threshold. For example, it is not too difficult to imagine circumstances — although they seem relatively unlikely at the present time — in which the credibility of nuclear deterrence in Korea or Taiwan could be severely degraded by internal disruption and disorder, leading to opportunities for external communist-fomenting of insurgency. The accompanying ambiguity of the threat, and its progress through gradually rising levels of violence, could tend to blur the emergence of clear decision points, thereby rendering a nuclear threat disproportionate and irrelevant.

On the other hand, it is also well to remember, as the events of early August in the Tonkin Gulf have suggested, that a revolutionary
warfare situation, such as that in Vietnam, may be escalated toward a conflict in which nuclear deterrence of further escalation could be credibly invoked -- credibly enough to force not only an avoidance of further escalation, but perhaps some diminution of the original conflict as well. Situations on one side or the other of the provocation threshold can, by accident or intention, shift.

**SOME PARALLELS TO THE EUROPEAN SITUATION**

It is worth noting that many of the situations we have been describing have counterparts in the European context. For example, in a rough and limited sense, Korea can be considered the West Germany of Asia. The substantial U.S. commitment of forces and weapons performs a roughly analogous symbolic and trip-wire role. The substantial Korean forces also give considerable latitude for use of the conventional option, if this is desirable. Also, in a very rough sense, Taiwan is the Berlin of Asia -- or perhaps the analogy would be somewhat better between the offshore islands and Berlin. In both cases, it is the quality of the U.S. political commitment that undergirds the deterrent role, rather than the presence of U.S. forces.

In the European context, contingencies that are below the provocation threshold are perhaps more likely to arise in the southern flank than in the central front. (If in the central front, they are more likely to arise on the Soviet side than in the West.) It is no doubt true that the number and likelihood of military contingencies that are below the provocation threshold in Asia are much greater than in Europe. The reasons for this difference are fairly obvious: the greater probability in the Asian context of insurgent situations, because of the particular political, economic, and social environment; the negative political effects from invoking nuclear weapons, with particular respect to Sino-Soviet relations and Asian sensitivities; etc.

But the case is by no means conclusive. There is surely one impressive factor tending to lower the threshold at which nuclear deterrence becomes operative in the Asian context, and this is the
markedly inferior and vulnerable Chinese military posture compared with that of the Soviet Union. Nor is this likely to be seriously altered by Chinese acquisition of a nuclear capability. Failure to recognize this important point is one of the major anomalies in the view that is sometimes expressed in some European quarters, and was reflected, for example, in President deGaulle's July 23rd press conference, concerning the inapplicability of deterrence in the Asian context. In the European context, this view asserts that the U.S. deterrent is inoperative because the balance of deterrence between the Soviet Union and the United States "covers them directly but does not cover the other countries of the world." The proposed remedy to this situation in Western Europe is a national nuclear force. In Asia, essentially the same argument is made about the ineffectuality of both nuclear deterrence and of other forms of U.S. military power, because of "the enormous risk of a general war," which the use of such power, e.g., through conventional military measures against North Vietnam, would entail. However, in the Asian context, the proposal for political "neutralization" is advanced as the best prescription given the failure of U.S. deterrent power, just as the formula of national nuclear forces is advanced as the best prescription, given the same alleged failure in Western Europe. An exception to the Asian formula is sometimes made in behalf of Japan and India for which, on technological and economic, as well as military grounds, the European prescription -- national nuclear forces -- is advocated. *

While this argument has serious flaws in its European version, which I will not attempt to deal with, what is perhaps most curious is the stress that it places on the "enormous risk of a general war" as a barrier to applying military power effectively in Asia. Actually, the likelihood of general war arising from escalation of Asian conflicts is very much less, and the situation very much more stable with respect to this end of the spectrum, than the cited view implies.

*See, for example, General Gallois' interview with a Japanese correspondent in Paris, Mainichi Shimbun, January 30, 1964.
This is not to deny that there remains an acute problem of finding better means for coping with the large number and variety of undeterred conflicts that may arise and indeed have already arisen in Asia. It is simply to suggest that the heightened risk of general war is not one of the serious barriers to finding such improvements within the Asian context. Indeed, one might very well argue that this risk is so much less in Asia that the provocation threshold at which nuclear response might be credible would be even lower in Asia than in Europe. This is, of course, not an easy comparison to speculate about; there are, for example, differences in the nature and depth of the U.S. commitment in NATO that would tend to reverse this judgment. My own feeling, however, is that the provocation threshold is very likely to be lower in Asia than in Europe.

CONCLUSION: SOME MEASURES FOR SURMOUNTING THE LIMITATIONS OF DETERRENCE

In any event, the question of relative provocation thresholds is perhaps academic and impractical. In Asia, we are left with a wide range of current and potential undeterred conflicts. Although nuclear deterrence is more operative and effective than is often believed, its limitations are manifest not only in the Vietnamese and Laos cases, but in the unambiguous Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia, and in the case of various forms of possible Chinese aggression against India or Burma. It is in this area of undeterred conflicts where our greatest need for improvements in programs and policies lies. The "neutralization" formula does not seem attractive, to put it mildly, because its laudable objectives (independence, security, non-intervention, etc.) lack the necessary means of assuring enforcement and maintaining stability. But the neutralization slogan at least underscores the necessity for finding measures and approaches that hold greater promise for arriving at acceptable and durable political-military solutions. In the few remaining pages of this paper, I want to suggest very briefly what seem to me some of the promising lines of inquiry and innovation toward which we must look to develop better means for dealing with undeterred conflicts in Asia.
One of the subjects on which it seems important to concentrate is the matter of developing wider and more effective means of military collaboration among the Asian countries themselves. I am well aware of the numerous political and ethnic obstacles to this objective, but the nature and importance of the problem warrants devoting more attention and imagination to making progress. We have usually thought that the large military forces built up in countries like Korea and Taiwan for historical reasons, and maintained for largely political reasons, would only have relevance in World War II or Korea-type conventional conflicts. These, as we have seen, tend to be the conflicts which are very likely to be effectively deterred in the Asian context. I would suggest that in a technical military sense the value and potential utility of these military assets have not even begun to be explored.

To take one example, the many studies of counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and "modern warfare," based on British experience in Malaya, French experiences in Indochina and Algeria, and recent U.S. experience in Vietnam, emphasize the importance of a high ratio between counterinsurgent and insurgent forces. Admittedly the numbers in this game are far from reliable, and one finds mention of critical saturation ratios that vary from, say, 10 to 1 to 20 to 1. Without placing any great weight on the accuracy of this range, it seems fairly evident that "clear-and-hold," "oil-stain," or "strategic hamlet" operations are very likely to be what economists would call "labor-intensive" activities. An Australian journalist, Denis Warner, indirectly made the same point in a recent comment on the current (August 1964) situation in Vietnam:

With tens of thousands of Vietnamese forces tied down in the Mekong Delta, there are not enough government troops to cope with the new threat in the mountainous north and center.*

I would suggest that part of the problem of meeting the increasing frequency and adroitness of insurgent movements in the Asian area may lie in measures for facilitating military collaboration

among countries of the region, so that force saturation ratios can be built up more rapidly and inexpensively without the need to create large, unwieldy, and costly military structures in all of the countries of the area. Some sharing of military forces and capabilities among the threatened countries would be mutually advantageous when critical situations such as those in Vietnam and Laos arise. This is by no means to advocate a purely "military solution" for "political" problems. It is simply to say that, although the problems are a mixture of political and military aspects requiring political and military solutions, these solutions may be approached more effectively if greater attention is given to ways of developing intraregional military collaboration.

While on this subject of insurgency conflicts, let me add another point which unfortunately must also be highly abbreviated. In our approach to this admittedly highly important and complex type of undeterred conflict, and in the emphasis that is rightfully given to the nonmilitary aspects of the problem, there is often a tendency to reason along the lines of the following simple, and I think erroneous, syllogism. The major premise of the syllogism is that counterinsurgent operations depend on winning "loyalty" and "the minds and the hearts of the people," rather than military battles. A minor premise is that winning loyalty and "minds and hearts" depends on providing benefits, meeting popular needs, and otherwise raising the consumption standards of the rural population. And the inference that is drawn from the two premises is that social and economic improvement programs are essential to the waging of successful counterinsurgency.

Surely, there is much that is attractive in this doctrine from a broad humanitarian standpoint. But it seems to me very likely that in many cases the operational effect of implementing this doctrine can be perverse with respect to the conduct of effective counter-insurgency operations. Without going into details, which I have recorded elsewhere, the main point is that placing more resources in the hands of rural areas (which is what social and economic improvement programs typically do) is very likely simply to increase
the disposable resources that are available to the insurgent forces themselves. The essential reason, of course, is that in areas where the insurgents exercise a considerable degree of control, in the form of tax collections of one form or another, the effect of a broad distribution of social and economic benefits may be to increase the resources available to the insurgents for the support of guerrilla operations. Unselective social and economic improvement programs may have an effect that is fundamentally perverse.

The problem is, instead, how to use the instrument of social and economic improvement programs to stimulate behavior on the part of the rural population that is cooperative toward and facilitative of the operations of the government forces, and that raises the costs of insurgent operations. This criterion may have substantial effects on the type and allocation of social and economic improvement programs, as a concomitant of counterinsurgency measures, that differ markedly from the patterns that have been followed in the past.

My last point is, in a sense, the European counterpart of the earlier point about the desirability of improving arrangements for regional collaboration among the Asian countries themselves. Present prospects do not appear particularly bright for attempting to move in the direction of what has sometimes been referred to as a "common foreign policy" for NATO, especially with respect to conflict and coexistence in Asia. Nevertheless, there may be more opportunities than have been so far exploited for a closer relationship between the United States and its European allies on matters relating to Asian problems, and between the European NATO members and the Asian countries themselves, as well. What I am referring to is not simply the "more-flags-in-Vietnam" type of approach, but a closer consultative and collaborative effort in general on these matters. I would argue that a sharing of views should be accompanied by some further sharing of the aid burden on the military aspects of the problem no less than the economic development aspects. Britain, of course, is already deeply involved in these problems through a sharing of the burdens and responsibilities in Malaysia and in India. President
deGaulle is certainly right in saying that now that the European countries have "rebuilt their economy and are in the process of rebuilding their military strength," they should be capable of assuming responsibilities which they have not been able to assume in the past two decades. It would, I think, be desirable to explore ways in which various NATO countries could assume a part of the military burden in Asia, and in the process contribute to a better mutual understanding between the United States and its NATO allies and to closer collaboration in the conduct of their policies and programs.