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PROJECT REPORT
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UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY
IN EAST ASIA: THE JAPANESE FACTOR

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UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY
IN EAST ASIA: THE JAPANESE FACTOR

A Trident Scholar Project Report

by

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ABSTRACT

United States security policy in East Asia is still in large measure based on President Ford's "New Pacific Doctrine" of 7 December 1975. The first point made by this doctrine is that American strength is based on any stable balance of power in the Pacific. Significantly, the doctrine's second point emphasizes the importance of relations with Japan in maintaining peace and stability in the area.

Recent elaborations on this policy have included Secretary of State Vance's speech before the Asia Society in June, 1977, Vice-President Mondale's trip to Japan in February 1977, and Secretary of Defense Brown's address in Los Angeles on 20 February 1978. All of these statements are consistent with Ford's New Pacific Doctrine regarding the relationship with Japan.

The main point of this paper is to show how United States security policy in East Asia is affected by Japan. The first step is to define United States security objectives in East Asia and the security-related aspects of Japanese-American relations. The Japanese view of security described in Chapters Three and Four will, hopefully, provide a different perspective on East Asian security. After looking at both the United States' and Japan's individual views of security, the two are brought together. Several options for United States security policy, while remembering Japanese attitudes, positions, and restrictions, are presented. Finally, greater cooperation and coordination between Japan and the United States in security matters is proposed and supported.
PREFACE

This paper was originally to have been the "...Chinese and Japanese Factors." My thanks go to the Trident Committee for encouraging me to realize these great expectations. Thanks are also due Captain James Baker, USN and Commander Hepier Smith, USN for their advice and assistance, especially in the early stages. Hopefully, this paper will provide some food for thought in their continually busy days.

Most importantly, I would like to express my appreciation to my adviser of the last three years, Dr. Robert L. Bau. His guidance throughout the project, from conception to final draft, has been fantastic. We had no formal schedule of meetings, but kept in touch approximately once a week. This lack of rigid deadlines was one of the greatest experiences of the Trident program. By leaving the scheduling up to me, I feel I learned more than just the subject material. There was also a feeling of responsibility and the desire to do a good job.
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CHAPTER I

UNITED STATES SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN EAST ASIA

Different authorities use different terminology and orders of importance. But, the spirit of U.S. security objectives in East Asia can be defined as follows: 1) Maintain Japan as a U.S. and Western ally; 2) Deter aggression through the maintenance of forward bases; 3) Limit nuclear proliferation; 4) Promotion of and assistance to friendly nations; and 5) Moderate Soviet expansion. Security objectives are attained through military, political and economic methods.¹

CONTINUING MAINTENANCE OF JAPAN AS A UNITED STATES AND WESTERN ALLY

Why should the United States care about Japan, a nation we defeated in World War II thirty-five years ago? Japan has traditionally been a victim of racial prejudice in the United States. More often than not the Japanese were characterized as a nation of copiers using western technology, unskilled labor to make cheaper versions of western products. The wide cultural gap only intensified these feelings of prejudice. How then has Japan become "A key to stability in the Asia-Pacific region..."²

Through an "economic miracle" and much hard work Japan has built the world's third largest economy since the devastation of World War II. "Today, Japan is our largest trading partner in Asia. Japan is the largest trading partner of every East Asian nation."³ Also, Japan has became the world's ninth largest military power in terms of absolute defense expenditures.⁴ "Keeping Japan a stable and economic part of the coalition that so much sustains what order and progress the world now offers is a very high priority in U.S. policy."⁵
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<th>People's Republic of China</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
<th>United States</th>
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<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
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<td>1,250,000 tons</td>
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How is the United States prepared to back this policy militarily? Since 1951 the U.S. and Japan have had a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Several ships of the Seventh Fleet, including the aircraft carrier USS MIDWAY, are homeported in Japan. Okinawa, once again a part of Japan, is the base for two-thirds of a Marine division. When the scheduled, if prolonged, withdrawal of the Second Infantry Division from Korea is completed in the nineteen eighties, those Marines will be our only ground forces west of Hawaii. Japan, along with our Philippine bases, are the major basing and staging areas for any U.S. operations in East Asia. (See Appendix 1)

Without Japan and the current U.S. bases located there our military posture in terms of troop units, squadrons and ships would have to be reduced to less than half its present level. It is doubtful that the government of the Philippines would allow the permanent stationing of Marine units. The nearest base for troops, outside the politically difficult Korean Peninsula, is the crowded and isolated Marianas Islands. Without the homeporting and repair facilities available in Yokosuka and Sasebo the Seventh Fleet would not be able to maintain its present size or state of readiness for any period of time. The support facilities for the Air Force are not as crucial in case of limited operations. But in the case of sustained operations the Japanese facilities are indispensable. Without Japan as an ally, the whole idea of deterrence and quick response through forward basing is jeopardized.

DETERRENS:3 OF AGGRESSION THROUGH MAINTENANCE OF FORWARD BASES

"The principal military task of the United States in the Asia-
Pacific area continues to be the deterrence of aggression or violence that would threaten its interests of those of its allies.... In the Pacific Command, this mission is carried out primarily by means of a forward basing strategy. Like any strategy, forward basing has supporters and detractors. The major points of view will be discussed briefly.

Ever since we have stationed troops in South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines those countries have not been attacked by any foreign power. But, who is to say they would have been attacked had we not stationed troops there? One of the major arguments against the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea is the loss of the deterrent those troops constitute. Why, the critics ask, would the U.S. go to war over a small country in northeast Asia if no American lives are involved? The credibility of the U.S. deterrent is the involvement of U.S. personnel. Supporters of the withdrawal counter this argument by highlighting the new flexibility this gives U.S. policy. We are no longer immediately involved in another Korean war. The arguments and counter-arguments go back and forth, but suffice it to say deterrence is enhanced when troops are forward-based at the point of the threat.

Another aspect of the forward basing and deterrence question deals with flexibility. Our forward deployed forces are maintained in a high state of combat readiness. This readiness and their location gives them more flexibility and mobility than comparable stateside units in making a quick response wherever they are needed. A case in point is the Mayaguez incident. The helicopters used in the assault were based in Thailand, the Marines came from the Philippines, and
the ships were units of the Seventh Fleet operating out of Subic Bay, in the Philippines. Whether or not the action taken was the proper course is still being debated. But, without those forward based units the United States would not have had the option it chose to exercise in recovering the ship and its crew.

Since the end of the Vietnam War the emphasis of U.S. security policy in East Asia has shifted to the north. The emphasis now appears balanced between North and Southeast Asia. If the United States is to continue to play a credible major role in East Asian security questions the maintenance of forward bases in Japan and the Philippines is mandatory. A potentially aggressive nation will seriously believe in U.S. promises and treaties only if we have forces on scene to demonstrate our resolve. We do not use "proxy armies" of Cubans or any other nationality when we maintain a deterrent position. And, because we don't, we can maintain our position only through the maintenance of forward bases.

Northeast Asia is the only area where the interests of all four major Asian-Pacific powers - the United States, Soviet Union, Japan, and China - intersect. The threat of major aggression involving the United States or its allies has diminished in the last five years, but relatively minor wars continue to plague East and Southeast Asia. Although the major threat has diminished, it is still present. To deter, and if deterrence fails, to meet that threat forward based U.S. forces must be maintained.

LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The United States has signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Through this and numerous unilateral declarations and statements the U.S. has made its position on nuclear proliferation clear. Nuclear power for peaceful purposes is fine but the spread of nuclear weapons technology is not. Proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to instability in that country's regional area. The difficulties in this policy arise when nuclear power-plant technology approaches nuclear weapons technology.

East Asia has been and continues to be an extremely unstable region. There has been one war or another going on almost continuously throughout this century. Governments can change overnight. What was once a fledgling democracy can become a "People's Democratic Republic" or a repressive military dictatorship. Either one of those are likely to use nuclear weapons much sooner than a more moderate government. With the spread of nuclear power and the closing of the technology gap between power-production and weapons production the possibility of weapons production is present and the probability of such production is increasing all the time. Although a fictional story, such a scenario is developed very clearly in Paul Erdman's The Crash of '79. For this reason the reluctance of the United States to share its power-production technology is understandable.

At this time there are three non-nuclear East Asia nations who have: (1) the technology to develop nuclear weapons; or (2) the perceived need to develop nuclear weapons. The nation which has the technology is Japan, and for reasons to be discussed later is not producing nuclear weapons by choice. The two which perceive a need for nuclear weapons are Taiwan and South Korea. There have been articles
in Far Eastern Economic Review, Asian newspapers, and other sources to indicate that these two countries are on the verge of developing nuclear weapons. These are the countries the United States should be most worried about in regard to nuclear proliferation. For the Taiwanese, nuclear weapons would make it virtually impossible for the People's Republic in the near future to mount a successful invasion of the island. For South Korea, under the Park regime, nuclear weapons would provide a greater guarantee of security should the U.S. Second Infantry Division be withdrawn. Such weapons would possibly give it enough confidence to try a "re-unification" from the South.

The United States position has been and continues to be that we will provide a "nuclear umbrella" for our allies. Thus, if an ally is attacked with nuclear weapons the aggressor can expect retaliation from the U.S. With this guarantee the United States sees no military reason for any allied country to develop nuclear weapons. The flaw in U.S. logic comes when the ally perceives he isn't such an important ally that Uncle Sam is ready to trade Chicago or Los Angeles for the ally's capitol. Twenty years ago it was taken for granted that the United States would look out for its allies to the point of committing its own forces. We did in Korea in 1950-53, in the Taiwan Strait, and on other occasions throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. With the adoption of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the retreat from Vietnam, the proposed withdrawal from Korea, the recognition of the PRC, and the general reduction in U.S. overseas commitments, these two countries have come to the conclusion, which I believe to be correct, that the United States' "nuclear umbrella" no longer covers them. Neither of
these countries has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This leaves United States policymakers with two choices. They can either devise a new way to provide a credible deterrent or assume that the Taiwanese and South Koreans will have their own nuclear capability in the near future. In view of the conflicting U.S. policy demands for (a) greater reliance on allies for their own defense and (b) nuclear non-proliferation, this problem will be extremely difficult for policymakers to resolve.

PROMOTION OF AND ASSISTANCE TO FRIENDLY NATIONS

Under the Nixon Doctrine, which U.S. foreign policy still generally follows, self-defense and military assistance to friendly nations is to be emphasized as a part of U.S. security policy. One of the basic tenets is that the U.S. will provide assistance when requested. However, short of a nuclear confrontation the nation involved will be expected to provide its own manpower for defense. The Nixon Doctrine also calls for reduced U.S. force levels, basing the reductions on two assumptions. First, because of negotiations with adversaries, the threat those forces face is reduced. Second, because of increased strength and stability of our allies, there is less need for U.S. troop support. There have been several other reasons to support these reductions, including a scarcity of funds.

A look at the fiscal year Department of Defense Annual Report shows just how much U.S. security policy in East Asia now depends on promotion of and assistance to friendly nations. It states that with our ally Japan, South Korean forces backed by the United States, and
our Philippine bases, we are still a major Pacific power. If we
remove the forces and base structure contributed by our friends and
allies from that total we are left with pitifully little. This should
indicate the continuing necessity of not only military support, but
also political and economic assistance, for our Asian allies. Without
them, their support, and their facilities we would be practically
incapable of influencing any major event in the region. With them,
we maintain freedom of action. That freedom allows us to intervene
or remain on the sidelines, whichever is the appropriate choice.

There is more to security assistance than military aid and sales.
In nations that are allies or independent we can help maintain their
status through economic and developmental aid. In these areas Japan
can play a key role. Japan can and should increase its "unattached"
foreign aid. Too often, Japanese aid is "tied" to purchases from
Japan or programs that in the end help Japan and not the receiving
country. This kind of aid is often termed "economic aggression"
or "economic imperialism." It usually leads to resentment and bitter-
ness, if not outright hostility, in the receiving country. Making
friends through a coordinated economic assistance policy is much
better for our security than sending in troops, aircraft, or ships.

No matter how much we hope that aid programs will succeed, the
military option must be available where vital United States and allied
interests are concerned. Military intervention, if it is to be utilized,
is greatly facilitated when friendly and helpful nations are nearby.

MODERATION OF SOVIET EXPANSION

The fiscal year 1980 Department of Defense Annual Report contends
that our overall position in East Asia is favorable to our interests. "But the current equilibrium is not necessarily permanent. Soviet military strength in Asia and the Pacific continues to grow, though at a moderate pace." It is important to note that while Soviet strength is steadily increasing our’s is steadily decreasing. Why should the Soviets continue to increase their military strength in Asia? The obvious reason is the current state of relations between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China. Another is to support the Soviet client state, Vietnam. And, a third is to gain influence in a resource rich region that has traditionally been a U.S. and Japanese preserve. All three objectives involve the necessity of increased Soviet influence and involvement in both the internal and external politics of East Asia nations. And, it has been the Soviet pattern to gain influence through the threat or use of military force.

It has been widely reported and accepted that the Soviet Union annually outspends the United States on military hardware, with a Gross National Product about half the size of ours. One wonders what the Soviets intend to do with such vast military potential. They have gone beyond the point of defensive armaments and have developed the ability to project considerable naval power. "While the Soviet Union probably continues to assign priority to Europe in its military planning, nevertheless an objective observer in the Pacific sees a relentless expansion in Soviet military programs in the Far East." Soviet Far East military strength is outlined in the Japanese Defense White Paper for 1977.
The main body of Soviet ground and air forces is positioned to deter and defend against the Chinese. However, Soviet naval forces have been operating more and more beyond Japan. In 1976 the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, acknowledged that the U.S. Navy could not operate in the Sea of Japan in the face of opposition from the enlarged Soviet Pacific Fleet. According to the Japan Defense Agency the Soviet Far East Fleet is more than double the tonnage of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. But, this comparison is strictly on gross tonnage, not combat capability. The Japanese report emphasizes the "sea traffic blockade capability" of the large Soviet submarine fleet.

In any confrontation with China this increased Soviet naval activity is another "front" which must be faced by the People's Republic of China. Increased Soviet fleet maneuvers and port visits in East and Southeast Asian waters strengthen and support Soviet influence in client states like Vietnam. Support of Vietnam is one more link encircling China. This increased Soviet activity can be viewed as affecting the United States in two additional ways: First is the direct threat to the Seventh Fleet and other military forces which have traditionally been the decisive military units in the region. Second is the effect on the perceptions of our Asian allies regarding our superiority and resolve. When that superiority and resolve becomes questionable, Soviet political and economic benefits will increase as U.S. and Japanese benefits correspondingly decrease.

How then does Japan and U.S. security policy relate to moderating Soviet expansion? It would be very easy to readopt the "containment"
theory of the 1950s, but in this complicated era such simplistic
solutions are not practical. The Japanese feel threatened by the
Soviet Union. That will be discussed later on. The U.S. is challenged
by the Soviet Union. In East Asia this challenge is in the form of
protecting trade and resource supplies through political, economic,
and if necessary, military means. If the United States is to remain
a Pacific power this threat cannot be ignored. We must make every
effort to promote and assist our allies. We must demonstrate our
resolve to both our allies and the Soviets by maintaining the deter-
rent of our forward basing structure. History shows that the Soviet
Union backs down only when the probable costs, political, military,
or economic, outweigh the probable gains. We must insure that the
probable cost of Soviet expansion is greater than the probable gains.
CHAPTER II

ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES-JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONS

THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY: THE U.S. VIEW

The official title, "The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America" is more commonly known as the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The original treaty was signed in San Francisco in 1951, immediately after the signing of the formal peace treaty ending WWII. The current revised version was signed in 1960. This paper is not specifically concerned with the 1951 Treaty. It is concerned with how the United States view the 1960 Treaty.

Article II of the treaty is important and should be remembered. The key sentence, "They "(both parties)" will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them." Just as important are Articles V and VI. The gist of Article V is that any attack on either party "in the territories under the administration of Japan" would be a danger to both nations' "peace and safety." Article VI is vital because it grants the United States use of "facilities and training areas in Japan." Details of these basing arrangements are in a separate status-of-forces agreement.

Ever since the treaty was signed, the United States has been much more concerned with Articles V and VI that it has been with Article II. Whenever the U.S. talks about defense in Asia the 'Mutual Security Treaty' is mentioned, not the 'Mutual Cooperation Treaty'. In economic
matters it is rare for the United States to even mention Article II. It is important to remember that the Japanese view the treaty as having both security and economic implications.

The United States view of the treaty is one of providing for "equilibrium in the Pacific" as well as Japanese security. This broad view necessarily takes in more than Japan. The U.S. has viewed the treaty in this light for the last nineteen years. The article of the treaty that allows the United States to maintain her position as a major power in the Pacific is necessarily emphasized to a greater degree than the others. Without Article VI the United States position in East Asia would be far weaker, certainly below the level necessary to be a 'major power'.

In Article V the United States has taken the position that an attack on Japan is almost, but not quite, the same as an attack on the United States. As always, any U.S. military involvement would be "in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." This diplomatic clause allows the United States not to become involved if it determines involvement is not in its own best interests. Because of the large United States military and civilian presence in Japan, a major attack on Japan would undoubtedly draw some form of United States response. A major question posed in the last chapter still remains. Would the United States use nuclear weapons, possibly precipitating a major nuclear exchange, if Japan was attacked and the United States and/or Western Europe wasn't? The probability of a major attack on Japan alone is so low that both parties have left that difficult question unanswered.
So what is the United States' view of the Security Treaty? When the treaty was signed it was seen as a hedge against the threat of communism gaining undue influence in the Japanese political system. Since then, that threat has diminished and United States views of the treaty have changed accordingly. When the treaty was written, Japan was a defeated and defenseless nation. The Security Treaty was designed to allow Japan to recover from the war without the added burden of defense. It also guaranteed that the Japanese would not deem it necessary to rearm, thus threatening the stability of East Asia. At that time the United States was the dominant power in East Asia. The fact that the treaty gave the United States practically unlimited base rights was considered a quid-pro-quo for the United States defensive umbrella. Now the United States is no longer the dominant power. It is one of the dominant powers. The Japanese are no longer defenseless. The Japanese Self Defense Forces have some of the world's most sophisticated weapons. The security reasons for the treaty have changed.

The United States increasingly sees the security treaty as one of alliance rather than one of total dependence. The treaty is still seen almost exclusively in the security context by the U.S. In the United States view, Article II, on trade, is just an appendage. The formal security ties and the base rights remain as valid to Washington now as in the nineteen fifties.

FORMAL SECURITY RELATIONS

Although security arrangements between Japan and the United States, in addition to the Mutual Security Treaty, exist. Since 1972 there has
been an annual meeting between the United States Secretary of Defense and the Japanese Defense Minister. Of first importance in the U.S.-Japanese government-to-government consultations is the Security Consultative Committee. The Security Consultative Committee was established to study subjects that relate to security and "that help promote understanding between the Japanese and United States governments and help strengthen cooperative relationships in the field of security." The Committee's basis for establishment is an exchange of letters dated 19 January 1960, between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Prime Minister of Japan. It has met annually since 1960. The members from Japan include the Foreign Minister, the Defense Agency Director General, and others. The U.S. side is represented by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, the Commander of U.S. Forces in Japan who represents the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific and others. The exact duties and responsibilities of the Security Consultative Committee are difficult to determine because much of its work is, by necessity, classified. After reading many Foreign Broadcast Information Service translations of the Japanese press on military matters, it is apparent that any major change in U.S.-Japan security relations goes through the Security Consultative Committee. My belief is that any combined exercises, plans, etc. must clear the Security Consultative Committee before the exercise or plan can be ordered. The Security Consultative Committee also acts as the overseer for several other joint planning groups.

The next committee of importance is the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation which was formed in July 1976, as a subcommittee to the
Security Consultative Committee. As a result of meetings between President Ford and Prime Minister Miki, and between Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Defense Agency Director General Sakata, 38 this subcommittee was agreed upon. The Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation determines means of Japanese-American cooperation within the bounds of the mutual security treaty. And, to effectively attain the purpose of the treaty, the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation provides guidelines for joint operations by United States forces and the Japan Self-Defense Forces. 39 The members of the subcommittee are one level below the members of the Security Consultative Committee. For Japan, there is the Director General of American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, the Director of the Defense Agency's Defense Policy Bureau, and the Director of the Self Defense Forces Joint Staff. On the United States side is the Minister of the American Embassy in Tokyo and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces in Japan. 40 As always, others from both sides participate as necessary. Also if necessary, the subcommittee can establish additional departments for specialization and assistance. 41

The Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation held four meetings in its first nine months of existence and established three departments — operations, intelligence, and logistical support. 42 The subcommittee recognized problems of prior consultation as an area for study and consultation, but specifically excluded Japan's three non-nuclear principles and constitutional limitations from those studies. 43 These specific exclusions highlight the sensitivity of these issues in Japan and will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter. The three main subjects of studies and consultation are: (1) What might happen
when Japan comes under the threat of or direct armed attack, (2) Asian political-military problems that affect Japan's security, and (3) Others, to include joint planning, maneuvers, exercises, etc. 44 The activities of the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation are expected to steadily promote studies and consultation on means of Japanese-American cooperation which are vital to the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. security system.45

Another formal group is the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee. It was originated by the Status of Forces Agreement to deal with problems of that agreement.46 Its bimonthly meetings are attended by the American Affairs Bureau Director General in the Foreign Ministry, the Director General of the Defense Facilities Agency, and others representing Japan. The United States is represented by the U.S. Embassy Counsellor, Chief of Staff of U.S. Forces in Japan, and others.47 This group deals with the day-to-day problems associated with U.S. servicemen and their families stationed in Japan.

There have been, and will probably continue to be, unofficial working-level consultations on security issues at the vice-minister or under-secretary level, as the need arises. One more formal organ, outside normal diplomatic channels, is the Security Consultative Group which is discussed in the Japanese Defense White Paper, 1977. It was established on January 19, 1973 and held twenty-three meetings as of November 8, 1976.49 Its purpose is "consultation and adjustment on the implications of the Security Treaty and its related arrangements."50 The civilian members are one level below the Security Consultative Committee, but the military and Japan Defense Agency personnel are at the same level and more numerous than on the Security Consultative
Committee. It is important to note that this is the first time a uniformed officer of the Japan Self Defense Forces has been listed as a member of a bi-lateral committee. This listing is an example of the persistent progress in influence and responsibility of uniformed officers in the Japanese Defense Agency. Both the frequency of meetings and positions of its members indicate that this is an important group, on a par with the Security Consultative Committee.

The final group is a new committee, the name of which is unavailable to me. It was formed as an outgrowth of the Security Consultative Committee meeting in November, 1978. At that meeting the Security Consultative Committee approved guidelines for emergency action, defining the roles to be played by U.S. Forces in Japan and the Japan Self Defense Forces. In planning the implementation of these new guidelines Japan will be represented by the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council (equivalent to U.S. Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff) and the U.S. will be represented by the Commander of U.S. Forces in Japan. This is a significant step toward defense cooperation because it is the first time direct military to military talks have been given "official recognition."

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Where nuclear weapons are involved, calm discussions often become emotional arguments. When discussing such weapons, a calm discussion is required. Such sobering power requires clear, rational, unemotional thinking. Japan and the United States have both established policies on nuclear weapons. Both have thought clearly, rationally, and for the
most part, unemotionally about their policies. The policies are not
direct opposites, but they are not very much alike either.

Ever since the United States first developed nuclear weapons it
has discouraged other nations from acquiring them. Instead, the United
States has provided a "nuclear umbrella" for its allies. The general
tone of most "nuclear umbrella" guarantees has been the promise of
nuclear retaliation by the United States against any aggressor who uses
nuclear weapons on a United States ally. In the case of Japan this
guarantee has been stated often. In April, 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, reiterated the
guarantee. In his speech before the Japan Society he said "Above all,
we shall sustain the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with
Japan. For Japan this treaty offers strategic protection...." This
guarantee is extremely important to the functioning of Japanese defense
policy.

is the statement "Against nuclear threat, Japan will rely on the nuclear
deterrent capability of the United States." This is a very straight-
forward statement of Japanese policy and the importance of United States
strategic protection to Japan. The other major Japanese position on
nuclear weapons was stated by Prime Minister Sato in 1971. "Japanese
policy on nuclear weapons stipulates that:

1. Japan shall not produce nuclear weapons.
2. Japan shall not possess nuclear weapons.
3. Japan shall not permit the importation of nuclear
   weapons."56

This statement is known as the "three non-nuclear principles." It has
been the guiding light of Japanese nuclear policy since its conception.
There are indications that the absolute adherence to these principles may be slipping. The statement in the 1970 Defense White Paper that defensive nuclear weapons may be constitutional, but not Japanese government policy, is one indication. Another is the recent lack of press outcry and public protest that used to accompany United States nuclear-powered ship visits. Testifying before a Congressional committee, retired Rear Admiral Gene LaRocque, USN, said that United States naval vessels did not off-load nuclear weapons before entering Japanese ports. An unidentified "Pentagon official said it was no secret: that such vessels called in foreign ports, including Japan, with the weapons on board." This, of course, drew loud protests from anti-nuclear groups in Japan. The Japanese government then denied any knowledge of the matter. Then, "American sources finally revealed that a secret agreement, made in 1960 and reconfirmed in 1972 during talks between United States President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, permitted the unquestioned transit of United States nuclear weapons through Japan, not only by ship, but by plane as well." As in all such cases the U.S. government neither confirmed nor denied the presence of nuclear weapons on U.S. ships or aircraft. The massive protests died out rather quickly and have not occurred since then. There has even been a vocal minority who suggest that the U.S. nuclear deterrent would be enhanced by allowing U.S. nuclear weapons to transit Japan.

The lack of emotional outcry in response to that last suggestion indicates that the Japanese are finally to the point where they can rationally discuss nuclear weapons. "When former Prime Minister
Risaku Sato was asked about LaRocque's testimony, he declared that the nation's abhorrence of nuclear weapons should be reconsidered since such weapons have become commonplace. Although now there is discussion about nuclear weapons, the Japanese are not likely to revise the three non-nuclear principles, or their reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the near future. One reason for this open discussion of nuclear weapons has been growing doubt about the credibility of the United States nuclear umbrella.

United States nuclear weapons policy is all classified. Anything written here is only the author's logical conclusions drawn from considerable research into unclassified sources. As stated in the first chapter, both the United States and Japan feel that the probability of a nuclear attack on Japan in the absence of a world-wide nuclear war is very low. It is extremely doubtful that the United States would use nuclear weapons first if Japan were attacked by conventional forces. Both countries should be able to maintain Japan's territorial integrity with their combined conventional forces as they are presently deployed. Therefore, the United States can say that Japan is under the United States "nuclear umbrella" with little fear of having to use nuclear weapons before she herself is attacked. The possibility still remains that Japan could be attacked with nuclear weapons and the U.S. is not. This puts the President of the United States in a difficult situation. Would he carry out the promise of nuclear retaliation and risk American cities for Tokyo or Osaka? No one, probably not even the President, knows for sure. And that has the Japanese worried. The United States will continue to officially espouse the "nuclear umbrella", but there
will always be uncertainty.

PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON SECURITY RELATIONS

One of the key elements in any relationship between two countries is perception. When two countries interact they are dealing in perception, which more often than not, may or may not be synonymous with fact. Stresses and strains in international relations often occur because either one or both sides are dealing with false perceptions. There are three major areas where perceptions and misperceptions affect U.S.-Japan security relations.

The first major area is Japanese perceptions of "dictation" from Washington regarding security policy. Like any major country, Japan likes to feel its policies are determined independently by its own government. Too often, in the past, the Japan Defense Agency has been in the position where its policies appeared to be conceived in the United States. United States and Japanese security policies in East Asia are closely related and "...as long as the armed services maintain close ties with their American counterparts, Japan's defense and weapons policies will continue to be well coordinated with those of the United States." But, that does not mean that the United States "dictates" security policy to Japan. It does mean that United States and Japanese security policies, determined and analyzed independently, are closely aligned. Each nation's policy is strengthened by the partnership of the mutual security treaty. The United States, as the major partner in the alliance, has the obligation to refrain from dictation and
consult with Japan just like it does with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The opposition parties in the Japanese political system have long made effective use of the perception that the United States dominates Japanese security policy. They used to be unanimous in their call for disarmament of Japan and abrogation of the mutual security treaty. Some have softened that position in the last several years. The Japan Communist Party is still opposed to any continuation of the treaty. The Japan Communist Party calls the new guidelines on United States-Japanese Defense cooperation "a 'blueprint' for automatic participation of the Self Defense Forces of Japan in a U.S. war of aggression."

The perception of "dictation", although decreasing, is still present. United States officials should be careful not to force issues that are politically difficult domestically on the Japanese. A misperception that also causes problems are assumptions that Japan is providing bases for United States imperialist aggression at no cost.

Japan's constitution is known as the peace constitution because in it Japan renounces the right to wage war. This idealistic philosophy has led several of the opposition parties to the conclusion that Japan is obviously not a target because she poses no one any threat. Therefore, all the United States bases do is involve Japan in confrontations between the U.S. and USSR and give the United States staging areas for aggression like Korea and Vietnam. The opposition parties then postulate that without United States bases, East Asia would notice reduced tension and greater security for all, especially
Japan. The advocates of this theory, for the most part, also believe
in balanced relations between Moscow, Beijing and Washington.

The major misperception made in the United States is that Japan
is getting a "free ride" in defense. The advocates of this belief
say that the only things the security treaty does are to: (1) require
the U.S. to protect Japan, and (2) pay for the bases that provide that
protection. It concludes that the United States is subsidizing Japan's
strong and growing economy and continued economic growth because the
Japanese don't spend even 1% of their Gross National Product for
defense. The United States, they argue, is picking up the entire bill.
As the U.S.-Japan trade deficit increases more people join in this
belief. Neither this perception nor the "free bases" perception are
entirely wrong.

It is true that the United States enjoys the use of facilities
in Japan for basing its western Pacific forces. It's not true that
this is without cost. The Japanese economy benefits from the large
numbers of American servicemen who spend their paychecks in Japan.
Those forces are also committed to Japan's defense, the fact that
some Japanese don't perceive a threat, notwithstanding. And finally,
the presence of those forces provides a balancing power to maintain
stability in that unbalanced corner of the world.

In response to the "free ride" theory it is true that Japan benefits
from the United States presence. But, it is not a "free ride". Japan
pays about 3% percent of the annual cost for United States bases there.
The United States does benefit substantially from its bases in Japan.
Several reasons were given in Chapter One. Additionally, a seldom mentioned reason is that because we are allied with and defending Japan, Japan does not feel the need to rearm on a large, pre-WWII scale. If that were to happen the result could only be fear, uncertainty, and instability throughout East and Southeast Asia. For this reason alone the price we pay in defending Japan and maintaining our bases is very low.

FUTURE COOPERATION BETWEEN UNITED STATES FORCES AND THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

Cooperation between United States forces and the Japan Self Defense Forces is increasing. Japan is starting to share the costs of maintaining American forces in Japan. The two countries are involved in more joint military exercises, planning talks, and staff talks than ever before. For the past several years there have been annual cabinet level meetings on security between the two countries. Japan has proposed establishing "a cabinet-level consultative organ separate from" the Security Consultative Committee. These different forms of cooperation can only end up strengthening the United States-Japan mutual security treaty.

There are several probable reasons why Japan would want to share the costs for United States forces in Japan. One is to help dissolve the perception discussed earlier that Japan is getting a "free ride" in national defense. Another is to help decrease the large balance of payments surplus Japan enjoys. And a third is to persuade a budget-minded United States government to keep the forces there rather
than send them home. Cost-sharing plans have received more attention in Japan than in the United States. Secretary of Defense Brown went to Japan at the end of November, 1978. On November 2, 1978 Prime Minister Fukuda said Japan was ready to increase its share of maintaining United States forces in Japan from 14.2 billion yen to 20.2 billion yen. 67 Back in May, 1978 Defense Agency Director General Kanemaru advised Prime Minister Fukuda that Japan "consider increasing its share of United States defense costs in Japan." 68

For some reason this cost-sharing has not received much attention in the American press. One possibility is that it might be classified information. A more probable one is doubt about the reaction of the American public. One connotation that can be drawn from cost-sharing is that United States forces in Japan have become "mercenaries" hired by Japan for her own defense. While this takes quite a stretch of imagination, it is possible. There is a lot of pride in the United States and the fact that the United States isn't completely supporting its overseas forces could hurt that pride. Nevertheless, the cost-sharing is not only continuing, but is increasing.

Another area of cooperation between United States forces and the Japan Self Defense Force is joint military exercises. Because exercises are plans for war, few details are available to the public. But often, general statements as to the nature of the exercises are made in press releases. Because the Japanese are expected to handle the manpower requirements for all but a massive invasion, 69 the U.S. Army and the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force will seldom conduct joint exercises. The U.S. Navy and the Maritime Self Defense Force are both working in
in the same area - anti-submarine warfare. The U.S. Air Force and the Air Self Defense Force also have common missions. One would expect these two services to conduct more extensive joint exercises than the Army. In the Japanese Defense White Paper 1977, the only exercises listed were the anti-submarine warfare exercises. The exercises involved several ships and aircraft flights from both nations' forces. The United States does not keep an unclassified listing of all its joint exercises with foreign countries. Such exercises strengthen the deterrent value of the mutual security treaty. They also prepare forces from both nations for operating together, as they may be doing, should the deterrent fail. Joint operations are an excellent way to increase total force capabilities and options without increasing either country's force totals.

As indicated earlier, there are several official channels of communication between Japan and the United States regarding defense relations. Until 1978, none of these channels were concerned with planning and coordinating joint operations between the uniformed services of each country. The establishment of a group of officers from each country in order to implement defense cooperation guidelines can, for all practical purposes, be called a joint staff for planning. Such a staff will be of great use in planning future joint exercises and planning coordinated intelligence, logistics and other support for emergency situations.
CHAPTER III

JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD SECURITY

DEFINITION OF PERCEIVED THREAT

Western analysts will usually agree that "Japan is in an enviable position in that it is difficult to picture direct military threats against her." 71 It is doubtful that China or the Soviet Union would attack Japan "except in the context of an all-out East-West war." 72 That analysis, no matter how correct it may be, does not completely account for Japanese attitudes. The Japanese perceive a threat, whether it is real or not. Japan considers the strengthening of the Soviet Pacific Fleet a threat to its security, according to Vice Defense Minister Ko Maruyama. 73 Another major security issue between the Japanese and the Soviets is the so-called 'Northern Territories' dispute.

The Northern Territories are four islands off the northeast tip of Hokkaido that Japan claims the Soviet Union illegally retained after the end of WWII (see Appendix 2). The Soviets claim that the islands are part of the Kuriles and because Japan gave up all claim to the Kuriles, the islands belong to them. Japan would like to establish better relations with the Soviet Union, "but believes that eradicable tension will remain unless the Northern Territories are returned." 74 The Soviet position is equally tough, but at the opposite end of the spectrum. The official Soviet position on the Northern Territory issue is, "such an issue is nonexistent." 75 Neither side has made any
indication of concession and it appears that this confrontation will go on indefinitely.

The Northern Territories are important to Japan in a psychological sense because they are the last 'Japanese' territory occupied after WWII that has not been returned. Many fishing families were moved to Hokkaido by the Soviets and have maintained continuous presence on the Japanese government to help them go home. Finally, it is a point of national pride that those islands which have been "Japanese" in the past are no longer. The Soviets do not feel they can negotiate this question because of the precedent it would set regarding all other territory it has annexed since WWII (along the Chinese border, Finland, Poland, Rumania, and Iran).

One month after Japan signed a Peace and Friendship Treaty with the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union moved twenty-five hundred troops onto one of the four islands claimed by Japan. Four months after the first buildup, Japan now charges the Soviet Union with increasing the garrison to about 5000 men, building bases on two of the islands, deploying surface-to-air missiles, improving port facilities, and lengthening runways. The Japanese feel "this deed on the Soviet side is a very unfriendly gesture to Japan." These actions and the increasing size of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, especially submarines, have the Japanese understandably wary.

The only other area that could be considered a threat to Japan is the Korean peninsula. The Japanese have historically called Korea a "dagger" at the heart of Japan. Peace and stability on the peninsula
are considered vital by Japan. A major change in the present situation on the Korean peninsula or a likelihood of a major conflict there could trigger "expansion and reinforcement of Japan's defense structure to conform to changes" in the international environment. A major war on the Korean peninsula would raise fears in Japan of Soviet or Chinese involvement and upset the delicate balance in the region. Japanese relations with both Koreas are somewhat less than warm, though better with the South than with the North. As long as the status quo is maintained, Japan will continue to work with both Koreas to reduce the threat of conflict.

Japan no longer feels threatened by the People's Republic of China. The opening of diplomatic relations in 1972 and the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978 have created what might be called a "China Syndrome" in Japan. Many Japanese companies are actively pursuing the limited profits to be made as China attempts to modernize its economy. The Japanese people, in general, feel a cultural affinity with China. There are some Japanese who feel that Taiwan should still be recognized, but they are a small minority. The only threatening area in Sino-Japanese relations is the realization that China is trying to obtain Japan's support against the Soviet Union. This is threatening because of the reaction of the Soviets toward Japan.

China would like to have Japan as an ally. Most observers can see the possibilities for a very effective anti-Soviet "alliance", virtually shutting the Soviets out of East Asia. One month after the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty, the Deputy Chief of the
General Staff of the People's Liberation Army made a five-day unofficial visit to Tokyo. He met with leaders of the Japan Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces and toured defense facilities and industrial plants. Such visits do not necessarily indicate an alliance, but they do indicate that neither country feels threatened by the other.

The only territorial problem between China and Japan is the Senkaku Islands. This area is complicated by the claim of the Nationalist Chinese as well. The Senkakus lie only 110 miles northeast of Taiwan. They are 250 miles east of Foochow on mainland China and 250 southwest of Okinawa. The main reason all three parties claim the islands is not for their fishing rights, but because of the oil that is thought to be under the continental shelf in that area. In a move probably designed to hasten Japanese signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty, China reportedly gave indirect recognition to Japan's claim. No one has yet made effective demonstrations of sovereignty, but Japan began to review possible methods in August 1978. The main possibility for trouble now is if the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan intend to force their claim against Japan. Such a move would undoubtedly bring the People's Republic of China back into the picture, either pursuing its own claim or supporting the Japanese.

JAPANESE SECURITY OBJECTIVES - STABILITY AND GOOD RELATIONS

Japanese security objectives emphasize peace and stability. The Japanese economy would collapse if Japan were involved in a war. International trade ties bring Japan almost all her raw materials and deliver most of her finished products. Peace for Japan is vital.
Stability in East Asia is very important. Any disruption of trade because of local, non-Japanese conflicts would not be a mortal blow to Japan's economy, but it would hurt. Several areas where this is possible are Korea, Taiwan, People's Republic of China, and to a lesser extent, Vietnam. One must also remember that Japan will not, in all probability, use military methods of enforcing stability anywhere outside the Japanese home islands.

In Korea, stability is important because Japan trades almost equally with both the North and the South. Any war there would disrupt that trade. Japan also trades with both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Instability or pressure from one China or the other to limit trade would not be welcomed there either. Japanese trade with Vietnam is not on the same scale as Korea or China. However, there is potential to participate in Vietnamese reconstruction programs. Problems such as the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict will retard any investment opportunities.

A major Japanese security objective is maintenance of friendly relations with the United States and the countries of East Asia and secondly the rest of the world. This is particularly true concerning countries that Japan is dependent upon for her economic security. These include Arab oil producers, those who control the shipping lanes, those who supply natural resources, and the United States. Japan rapidly shifted allegiance from Israel to the Arabs when the 1973 oil embargo was imposed and has since sold developmental technology and support to the oil producing countries. Because Japan can not escort
its ships everywhere they go, particularly to the Persian Gulf, the
states that control strategic straits are cultivated by non-military
methods to stay friendly with Japan. Non-military methods of cultiva-
tion include developmental aid, co-production schemes, grants and
loans, setting up labor intensive industries, and covert aid to govern-
mental leaders. The countries that supply most of the raw materials
for Japan's industries are cultivated in these ways also. Friendly
relations with the United States are vital because (1) the United
States supplies the militarily secure environment for Japan's economy,
(2) America is Japan's largest individual trading partner, and (3) Japan
receives many of its raw materials, timber, coal, etc., from the United
States.

It should, by now, be obvious that in Japan, security and the
good health of the economy are almost synonymous. The Japanese feel
if economic relations are under strain, "a further doubt must also
arise in relation to defense links where these exist."64 But, there
are some contradictions in the economic-security objectives. Why
should the Japanese, who are worried about the increasing size and
capabilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, sell the Soviet Union a
large floating dry-dock that reduces Soviet problems in deploying a
Kiev-class aircraft carrier to the Pacific?65 It was probably a politi-
cal concession in response to the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship
Treaty and it was a sale that could lead to future economic ties.
This incident is indicative of the general linkage between Japanese
security, political and economic policies and brings to mind several
conclusions. Japan will pursue economic and political ties with all nations in an effort to avoid military confrontation. Economic and political motives are more important than military-security motives in any international relationship. If the economic and political objectives do not suffer, then military-security objectives may be pursued. In summation, political and economic first, then military security.

THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

Because of its constitutional limitations, Japan does not have an Army, Navy or Air Force. But, Japan does have the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The distinction appears to be an exercise in semantics, but there is a difference. There is a basic premise underlying the name "Self-Defense Force" that is not present when Americans speak of "the military." The premise is made clear in the words Self-Defense. Unlike U.S. forces that operate all over the world, Japan's forces are restricted to defending only the home islands. And then, only after they have been attacked. Pre-emptive strikes are unconstitutional. This idea becomes clear in the mission of the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

Unlike United States forces, Japan does not state a broad mission for its forces in a single sentence or paragraph. Instead, the mission of the Japan Self-Defense Forces is outlined in a Standard Defense Program Outline. The outline is based on the premise that the domestic and international situation "will not undergo any major changes for some time to come" and the following three ideas:
(1) "Japan's defense structure should primarily possess the assorted functions required for national defense, while retaining balanced organization and deployment, including logistical support."

(2) "Such defense preparedness should enable Japan to maintain a full surveillance posture during peacetime, and cope effectively with conflict to the extent of limited and small scale aggression."

(3) "This defense posture should be capable of adapting smoothly to meet any serious changes in the situation around Japan which might require such adaptation."86

To accomplish this mission, the Self-Defense Forces must be capable of dealing with the immediate power projection capabilities of any potential adversary. Their surveillance arms must be capable of detecting changes in the immediate capability of any adversary. This change must be detected in time to allow for either a build-up of the Self-Defense Forces or arrival of assistance from the United States. Should an adversary increase his immediate projection capabilities, the Self-Defense Forces should be able to increase its defensive capabilities to an effective level within its existing organization. It's not necessary for the Self-Defense Forces to be ready to repel a major invasion that would be detected during preparation. The Self-Defense Forces should be able to repel, for example, a surprise Soviet landing on Hokkaido that originally appeared to be an amphibious exercise headed for the Kurile Islands. The force levels necessary under this Standard Defense Force Program are tabulated in Appendix 3.

The Self-Defense Forces have been described as one of the best equipped conventional forces in the world. The major types and quantities of equipment are tabulated in Appendix 4. In addition to
those listed, in December 1977, Japan decided to procure two new aircraft from the United States. The F-15 fighter plane and the P-3C maritime patrol/anti-submarine warfare airplane will soon be intro-
duced into the Self-Defense Forces. These planes are scheduled to
replace others in the Self-Defense Forces inventory that are becoming
obsolete.

Not only are some of Japan's planes becoming obsolete, some old
Japanese ideas about defense are changing also. When plans for pro-
curing the F-15 were being discussed in the government, some opposition
parties questioned the acquisition on legal grounds. By law, Japan
has limited herself to defensive armament only. The retention of
bomb-sight and mid-air refueling capability on the F-15 was called a
change in the government's definition of 'defensive capability'.
The Japanese Defense Agency said it was neither a significant change
nor unconstitutional. The Agency also stated that self-defense is
relative and changes over time. Whenever a weapon is capable of
being used outside the home islands it faces charges that it is uncon-
stitutional because it has offensive potential.

These restrictions make it difficult for a military force trying
to accomplish its mission. Another example of restriction is the Japan
Defense Agency statement to the Diet stating that Japan was not planning
to arm merchant ships for anti-submarine warfare defense. It is
illegal to do so now. Indicative of changing attitudes toward restric-
tions, in this case the director of the cabinet Legislation Bureau
added that changing the law for self-defense would not be unconstitu-
tional.
The Japan Self-Defense Forces are intended to serve strictly on Japanese soil in a defensive mode. This has precluded their involvement in United Nations peace-keeping duties. Reasons for this attitude include a fear of the revival of an expansionist military, a sincere belief that military forces overseas do more harm than good, and a belief that lack of offensive potential gives adversaries no reason to fear or attack Japan.

THE JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY AND JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY

The position of the Japan Defense Agency in the government of Japan is not as important or influential as is the position of the Department of Defense in the American government. In Japan, the Defense Agency is an agency headed by a Director-General appointed by the Prime Minister. It is not a cabinet-level agency. There is more emphasis on civilian control of the military establishment than in the United States. There are no civilian career positions in the Japan Defense Agency, so civilian employees are "borrowed" from different ministries. Naturally, those employees' loyalties usually remain with the parent ministry and not the Japan Defense Agency.

The Japan Defense Agency does not work alone in formulating Japanese security policy. Influence is exerted by the Japan Defense Agency, the bureaucracy, and most importantly by the political parties. Security policy in Japan is much more politicized than it is in the United States. Big business exerts some influence, but not as much as it does in the United States. Within the bureaucracy, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs has the greatest influence on security policy. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry exerts some influence. The Finance Ministry has a major input into security policy through the budget.

All of the above 'actors' will influence security policy to a greater or lesser degree. The Japan Defense Agency, being a part of the Office of the Prime Minister, will usually present its proposals through the Liberal Democratic Party to the Diet for approval. There has been an interesting example of policy formulation in action for the past year that illustrates this process rather well.

It all started with the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council's forced resignation. In July 1978, General Hiroshi Kurisu said that in the event of an attack, his commanders would have to take "supra-legal action" if they wanted an immediate response. Now the Self-Defense Forces can not take any action without the approval of the civilian chiefs. That statement caused some quick questioning in the Diet. On 28 July 1978, the Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency said studies of legislative requirements for Self-Defense Forces emergency action would be speeded up. He also welcomed "constructive opinions" from the frontline units, but warned them about speaking publicly. On 8 August 1978, it was reported that twenty Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces staff personnel began the study of how the Self-Defense Forces should react to national security emergencies. The study is expected to take two years to complete. In the middle of August 1978 there were several statements
made by Japan Defense Agency officials clarifying ambiguous definitions of currently authorized Self-Defense Forces actions. On August 17, 1978 the last opposition party made its position on the proposed emergency legislation known. Komeito joined the Democratic Socialist Party and the New Liberal Club in favoring legislation, while the Japan Socialist Party, Japan Communist Party, and the United Social Democrats are opposed. Komeito also made its qualification saying civilian control must be emphasized in both the legislation and the Self-Defense Forces. On 29 August 1978 the military chiefs of the Self-Defense Forces said they hoped the Diet would legislate some way for them to act in the event of a surprise attack. On 30 August 1978, one of the upper-level civilians in the Japan Defense Agency said in a television program that the study should authorize the Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency and not the Prime Minister to mobilize the Self-Defense Forces. On 7 September 1978 the first appearance of the "cooling off" of this issue came from a Liberal Democratic Party leader and former Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency, Mr. Nakasone went beyond the immediate question of whether or not there should be legislation and said because actions during national emergencies might violate private rights, the government should provide compensation to those whose rights were violated. The Japan Defense Agency also fell back to say its study was to see how to "make the Self-Defense Forces take smooth and effective action in case of a national emergency." It also said no bill would appear in the near future and reaffirmed the doctrines of civilian control.
and prime ministerial approval before the use of the Self-Defense Forces. The study is still going on.

This entire process of comments from many sources will undoubtedly intensify when the study is published. The Finance Ministry is sure to get involved if any expenditures are called for (new command, control, and communications equipment). The Foreign Ministry will be questioning its effects on relations with other countries, especially East Asia. Each of the opposition parties will be comparing it to their own doctrines concerning defense. What changes will come when this whole program is completed are unknown.

The Japan Defense Agency, just like the U. S. Department of Defense, must ask the legislature to approve its budget each year. Because the Japan Defense Agency does not have a cabinet minister representing it in the Diet, its "slice of pie" is often reduced by the other more powerful ministries. The Japan Defense Agency has annually increased the defense budget, but keeping it below 1% of the gross national product. That figure is the unofficial "ceiling" that is acceptable throughout the country. If it were to go above that, great turmoil in the Diet would ensue amid charges of militarism. The defense budget has increased in real terms but stayed below 1% of gross national product because the gross national product has increased greatly each year.

In November 1978, the Japan Defense Agency said the Finance Ministry was likely to cut its budget. The 1979 budget calls for a 12.3% increase over 1978, while gross national product grows about
The Japan-U.S. Mutual Security System - The Japanese View

The Japan-U.S. Mutual Security System is the mutual security treaty, status of forces agreements, and the various defense related diplomatic notes, protocols, etc., that the two governments have exchanged. The United States and Japanese views of this system have reached a point where the major differences have all but disappeared. The only ones that remain are relatively minor definitions of spheres of action or degrees of cooperation. There are several major provisions and responsibilities that both sides agree on.

Both sides agree on Article V in the Mutual Security Treaty, which is the responsibility for responding to an attack on Japan. During the Vietnam War, there was public protest against United States forces using Japan as a local base because they were being used in a war not related to Japanese security. Both sides generally agree that in the event of an attack on Japan, Japanese forces would provide defense for Japan while American forces would support them as required and conduct the offensive actions against the aggressor. Washington would probably
Since the early 1970s, Japan has pursued a course in foreign

shaped by economic and political ties. It

said, that the military aspect of the relationship should be over-

Treaty contributes to stability throughout East Asia. III

ally, the Treaty contributes to Japan's security, and (3) the

(1) Japan is one of the Western-type nation politically and economically.

important and of great significance for the following reasons:

this subject. The role and importance of the Security Treaty are "extremely

Japan's contact on National Security Problems had several times on mutual security system, and particularly the Treaty. The Chairman of the

the Government of Japan strongly supports the continuation of the

the United States does.

the propositions and responsibilities of the mutual security system. Like

worse, and Japan views, however, Japan views

like the one depicted earlier involving the transport of nuclear

secure nuclear weapon a "major change." It is not a question of

equal, The United States has never specifically said it can-

the Japanese consider nuclear weapon a "major change" of

use of United States bases in Japan for some operations outside

insecurity in American forces in Japan, their capabilities, and the

consult and with this, Tokyo is concerned that Washington might make

The Japanese feel very strongly about Washington's obligations to

ment, but the Japanese are entirely committed to defensive operations

The United States has increased its military force in Japan -
policy that is not easily parallel to U.S. policy, but security policy has paralleled U.S. policy. Explanations for this vary. Some see it as a revival of true Japanese international independence, others as just looking out for Japan's national interests (continuity of imports). One Japanese writer implies some resentment of the United States dominance of Japan's security policy when he says, "One of the covert functions of the Treaty, not directly implied by our claims, is to guarantee in effect that Japan's economic power will not be used for military purposes." But, as that writer and many others have concluded, "the disappearance of the treaty would only heighten security policy to maintain the security system and the Security Treaty as they are now. An independent security policy will not, in all probability, be pursued as long as the Liberal Democratic Party is in power. The Liberal Democratic Party does not appear threatened by any single party or coalition of opposition parties. The opposition parties in Japan debate the necessity for the United States security relationship. Those of the conservative, right-wing advocate amending Article II of the constitution to legitimize the Self-Defense Forces as an Army, Navy, and Air Force. Very few advocate nuclear weapons, but all say that option should remain open. At the opposite end of the spectrum are the left-wing liberals. They all used to advocate abolition of the Self-Defense Forces, abrogation of the Mutual Security Treaty, and unarmaged neutrality for Japan.
observed to the conclusion the newality "in Japan to no

Treaty," the congress of opinion has led some knowledgeable
adopted approval of the self-defense forces and the national security
cultural. 119 middle-of-the-road opposition parties have recently
down the procedure which sound self-defense forces was organized.
that revealed the disassociation plan, the Japan Socialist Party came
In Japan, we support the self-defense forces. In the same article
opposition parties, has revealed that the large majority of the popul-
the Japan Socialist Party. Just as the other
party advocated "emergency plan for disassociation of the self-defense
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Seves-Japan Mutual Security Treaty can not protect Japan against a
forces in many asset nations of a coming attack Japan. The United
would also hasten the
production. Not only would a nuclear deterrent force not protect a
defensive role from attack is possible, but the cost could be
be effective in destroying the economic infrastructure. To build a
small forces, only few weapons need to penetrate any defenses to
population and industry concentrated in a nuclear strike of the already
indispensable agent of a nuclear attack. With the majority of Japan's
nuclear weapons capability and a world that can see that Japan is
logical defense for Japan. Anyone with a basic understanding of
Number Security Treaty on the premise that it is the only economical.
The government of Japan base is agreement for contribution of the
THE JAPANESE PUBLIC AND SECURITY

Very little is published outside of Japan on the attitudes of the Japanese public toward security issues. The two major sources of opinion polls inside Japan are the major national daily newspapers and the Secretariat of the Cabinet. There is no appreciable difference in results of these two sources. Cabinet polls were taken in 1969, 1972, and 1975. Approximately 2,500 persons were interviewed individually. The results indicate quite clearly that the Japanese public is satisfied with the Self-Defense Force as it is constituted today. Any major changes, either increasing or decreasing, would likely create political problems for the government. Public demonstrations led by the opposition from the left or right (depending upon the change) would be expected. Reliance on diplomacy in the preferred method of avoiding conflict, with a gradually increasing Self-Defense Force, was favored by the vast majority favored either maintaining it at its present level or decreasing it. The budget has hovered between six and seven percent of the national budget and 0.5 to 0.9 percent of gross national product. This budget opinion is a clear indication that to go over the unwritten limit of 1% of gross national product for defense spend-

ing would cause political trouble for the government. It is highly
unlikely that Japan will make any dramatic increases in its share of the United States-Japan defense relationship budget. For this domestic reason, Japan would resist the pressure to go above 1% of gross national product even American advocates applying.
once, and would be an excellent tool which Japan could use to help the present reversible threat international economic situation.

123 force potential/friday/competition with different forms of old, should not be used to particularly replace the influence Japan can take.

later, exert any military influence or tension secret.
The possibility of Japan exporting arms as a method of contributing to regional security is remote to non-existent. Japan does not export arms now. Considering domestic attitudes regarding arms sales and defense expressed in Japanese newspapers, public opinion polls, opposition party statements, and government statements, any arms sales to other states are out of the question. Arms sales or transfers in East Asia will continue to be from the big three, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China.

In the context of technological transfer, the Soviet Union, as of the U.S. in the case of a dry dock, will transfer technology that would otherwise contribute to regional insecurity. In another military-related technology transfer, current examples of arms sales suggest that although Japan is not ready to put its security at risk, the Soviet Union on line for the People's Republic of China, 125 a low-key supply effort at China's request has been acceptable. 126

In non-military related technology transfers, Japan can contribute to the modernization of developing East Asian countries. Along the lines of aid, technology can be used to support those peaceful countries because these countries are more favorably disposed toward Japan. Once again, the Japanese contribution to regional security is economic power used to stabilize possible unstable political and security situations.
naction still have come of a military action against Japan. Such of the
other East Asian actions are very important. Post-Southwest action
contradiction to security or political stability, the exercise of
East Asian security, either of establishing a Japanese military
As Japan stands, there are several lines to Japanese contradictions

LIMITS TO JAPANESE CONTRACTIONS

exchange or use of force to maintain their oil supplies.
the Japanese will probably pursue many other methods short of the
circumstances. Under these circumstances, non-converted methods,

even in the direction enough that such action is possible under those
not in the pacific, non-imperialism contradiction of Japan, the Soviet
nation's and complex operations for the oil tankers. Although the is
and small submarine operations with the United States and other powers
sealing the exits from the sea of Japan to Soviet submarine, front
are to defend the oil interests, options for response could include
Union made these emergency sea route 250 miles from the Soviet.
example, given the context of a UNO-bounded fact was where the Soviet
to operate national self-defense, given the proper scenario, Japan might be capable
regional defense. Given the proper scenario, Japan might be capable
current legal restrictions and force capabilities prevent any further
127
Japan claims it can defend its merchant shipping 250 miles from the
self-defense force operate safely from the Japanese home islands.
The maritime security role in the only situation in which Japan

situation.
The overpowerted influence Japan has on their economy. The author, therefore, testifies that their trade partner of every non-communist country, the large industrialized countries, as well as Australia, where Japan is the largest industrialized country, still respects and respects. This is especially true in the year of Japanese "economic aggression." It is a very persuasive fear, the author asserts, that Japan's economic strategies could be a threat to the world. This fear is especially strong in the years after World War II, and though it's thirty-five years old, it is still a very persuasive fear. The author argues that Japan's economic strategies could be a threat to the world.
not only economically, but socially and culturally as well.\textsuperscript{131} This extended Japanese influence cannot help but lead toward a rise in nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment among the populations of these countries. Such a development will not be good for either Japan or the other countries involved. Japan is dependent on them for the raw materials that sustain her industries and because of their strategic position astride Japan's oil lifeline. The Southeast Asians are dependent on Japan to keep their economies alive. Without Japanese investments, factories, and aid, most of those countries would economically wither away. This leaves a classic dichotomy. Japan cannot do too much without causing trouble for herself, yet if she doesn't do enough there will be trouble also. One possible solution lies in changing the forms of economic ties. Instead of being so highly visible and overbearing, Japanese firms could operate through local companies, hire more managerial-level personnel from the local population, and contribute forms of aid that are not tied to projects that benefit Japanese businesses as much as they benefit the local population.

When considering limits on Japanese contributions toward regional security, probably the most important are Japan's self-imposed limits. Article IX of Japan's constitution is highly regarded at all levels of Japanese society. This article is the foundation of Japan's "peace constitution" and the rallying point for the many pacifist groups through the past thirty years. The 1% of gross national product limit on defense spending, limits on the employment of the Self-Defense Forces, and a reliance on diplomacy and economics to achieve objectives in foreign relations all seem to be deep-seated feelings of the
Japan and bilateral security

Security role in the foreseeable future.

That the Japan self-defense forces will participate in any regional role. Other than those two situations, it is hard to believe that Japan would enter into a full-scale war where the North appears to be capable of sending military forces outside the territorial waters. A nuclear attack may however be the catalyst for the Japanese government to respond. Without an external threat, it is highly unlikely that Japan would recognize the right of collective self-defense under the 1947 peace treaty.

Proud and fond of Article IX, which does not permit the nation to wage war. The Japanese people have grown externally The one great lesson of the war for Japan was that economic growth can

After World War II, there was a deep revolution toward war in Japan.

Thus, majority of the Japanese people, Article IX is the symbol of their
to the peace and security of the region. "196

Ereatly and cooperative relations between them can contribute greatly

towards cooperation in international affairs and good-neighborship.

After the talks said both sides "recognized the necessity of each

between the Republic of Korea and Japan. The joint communiqué issued
drawn from Korea in 1977 there was a multilateral conference in Tokyo

pentagon. Following the announcement of United States troop with-

reason, Japan has always had a very keen interest in the Korean

been detached as the "paper pocketed at the heart of Japan." For this

regional security in Korea than elsewhere. Historically, Korea has

Japan to more likely to work on further the home defense to maintain

 treating their combined power on Japan or any other East Asian nation.

common interest nation are involved with each other, they are not concerned

remain unchanged without a strong coalition. As long as the two major

advantage in a security concept, for the sovereignty and the Chinese to

in particular true in the Korean situation. Also, it is to Japan's

in both the strategic, the better off East Asian stability will be. The

particular, the bilateral views, in general, the less secure involvement

Japanese views on the security of the Korean situation a regional level clearly

security.

security. Japan's views on the security of the Korean situation a regional level clearly

armament are not anywhere near cooperative to maintain regional

could restrict increased tensions. It is apparent that Japan and the

supreme, the Roosevelt Territorial Issue, or even an invasion threat,

more easily. Any heightened security threat rejected by Japan, be it

invasion in tension would cause insecurity and the stress and to become

relation or tension would cause insecurity, and, consequently, an
area in the foreseeable future.
more than likely not have any kind of security relationship in the
future of the South Pacific nations and because of this, Japan will
It is clear that Japan’s domestic constraints are in accord with the
in order to build up its home defense forces. 137
pose a threat to any nation. This was in response to "apprehensions
after nations that Japan was never going to be a military power or
October, 1976 the Japanese ambassador to the Philippines told other
the situation not to become involved militarily in the region. In
space. Japan’s constraints of these feelings and its refusal to show
1945 and proceed integration into the Greater East Asia-Co-Prosperity
is still a major restraint of the military occupation from 1942 to
security in the area would probably be counter-productive. There
area of concern to Japan’s relationships with the Southern
An area of concern to Japan’s relationships with the Souths
overcome them.
many overlapping domestic constraints, and no dominating threat to
the probability of such an arrangement is rather small. There are too
than the United States, it could probably be South Korea. 135
kind of bilateral or regional security arrangement with a country either
maintaining regional security. If Japan were to cooperate in any
Japan might feel compelled to assist, outside her own borders, in
It should be remembered that Korea was one of the two areas where
because Japan has said that it has a role to play in regional security.

Japan and China will continue their economic relationship as long as the trade opportunities and China, for the foreseeable future.

The Chinese are for now. They each have their own reasons. Japan for the Chinese are interests in maintaining the regional status quo. At least, harmonious, especially where it concerns their territory. Both countries are both interested in limiting the expanding Soviet influence or being advanced. In addition to needing each other's business, they and Japan have sufficient common interest to keep them from although there are those three major differences between China and Japan.

It seems to be so different that any close alliance is impossible.

between Japan and China, These two economic, social, and political exceedingly encourage the Soviet. The second is the still large gap keep building their ties with China so long as the Chinese does not

First is the fear Japan has for the Soviet Union. The Japanese will protection that such an alliance is not probable for several reasons.

an anti-Soviet alliance in the near future. It is this observer's observation of the situation have said that Japan and China will form a rapidity. The Chinese are hungry for Japanese technology and the

in the summer of 1976. Trade between the two countries, is increasing
dramatic jump with the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty increasing closeness between Japan and China. These relations took

Republic of China. In the past eight years, there has been a substantial another area of Japanese regional security concern is the people's
Japan does not overtly recognize the Soviet Union, but, any security relationship to promote regional stability is highly unlikely.

The Japanese relationship with Taiwan has become, for all intents and purposes, entirely economic. Based on observations of Japan's attitude, Japan would probably do nothing should the People's Republic of China try to take over Taiwan by force. As long as Taiwan remains independent Japan will continue her profitable relationship. The only area of tension between these two parties is the Senkaku Islands, described earlier in some detail. There is almost no possibility of renewed government-to-government relations, especially in a security context, given the present relationship between Japan and the People's Republic on the mainland.
there are indications that Japan wants to be even closer to the United States. This, in fact, is also apparent that because of her strategic location, Japan is dependent on Japan. In Appendix 6, we list the United States wants to have the use of Japanese facilities. It would lose above half of the military Japan can be shown in Appendix 6, if the United States were to lose the necessity to the maintenance of their influence. The importance of alliances to the maintenance of their influence also apparent that because of her strategic location, Japan is dependent on Japan. In Appendix 6, we list the United States needs to maintain a military influence in the area. It is the objections discussed in Chapter One, it is apparent that the United States importance or other elements of our position. At 26 49 to negotiate these dubious and fears have included attempts by high-ranking officials to negotiate the United States will live up to the treaty obligations. A third portion military officials, do you blame us for wondering if a third portion military officials, do you blame us for wondering if we have been the negative ones, say allies do not appear satisfied with these arrangements, and why Good will continue to be an agenda feature. However, our friends and security officials, the United States continues to stress that it is Japan Self-Defense Forces, Japan has been a critical factor in the United States security policy in East Asia.

CHAPTER A

PROSPECTS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN EAST ASIA
option is, that it would help cut the percentage of the United States defense capabilities. The only advantage to the United States is that a reduction in the combined United States-Japan defense force level to a more non-existant level, therefore, that it would
probably result in a reduction in the combined United States-Japan alliance, which would
also cut the United States government's concern over the presence of the
Japanese capabilities to take up the slack in defense capabilities.
In the context of a regional context, if the United States and Japan
were to maintain their combined position under the auspices of the
Mutual Security Treaty, this option would necessitate increased
military deployments. In the event of a regional crisis, if the United States and Japan
would have an already international United States capability to respond
United States forces that have worked well as a deterrent. If also
this is in conflict with the establishment of a policy of forward basing of
and maintaining emergency deployment and joint use capabilities. If
does, pressentiably has advocated our other option of reducing presence
options.

Of course, very by degree, but to a general within one of the three
security policies in that area has three major options. Each can of
security, or where should United States policy be handled, United States
security enterprises have been discussed, that should be handled
how the different components of the United States/Japan
Japanese enterprises in the direction of weaknesses. 14
will be to the extent which is imminent in shifting the United States
of the other accounts, it is probably more to assume, therefore, that it
derese cooperation and coordination with the United States. Because
success as discussed in Chapter Three, Japan is pressentiably for greater
The defense budget spent in Japan, from a security point of view, would be 'penny-wise and pound-foolish.' The unilateral reduction of defense capabilities has never deterred, what in the end turned out to be, a costly war. And, there is no good reason to believe it would in this case either.

The second option available to the United States is to decrease our own force levels to maintain both a credible deterrent and a widely flexible response capability. This option is obviously the most attractive. There are, however, inherent flaws in such a program. The first is that force increases in United States foreign policy is peace and good will. An increase in United States presence would weaken United States presence as an open invitation to start a result that would occur in East Asia. It would be easy to see an increase in United States presence as an open invitation to start a regional arms race, automatically creating instability and insecurity.

Finally, and most importantly, such a position is politically impossible in the United States. First, the general feeling apparatus in the country that non-involvement and reduced force levels in East Asia is not in their interest. Second, the undesirable expense such a force level increase would entail.

The third and final option for United States security policy in East Asia splits the difference between the first two. It takes some advantage from neither reducing nor increasing, but maintaining the current force levels in East Asia. Maintaining is
Three, for maintenance of the Mutual Security Treaty, the United States, Japan, could help promote the current state of trade balance. Increased cooperation between the United States and Japan and coordination between the United States and other major powers would help ensure alternative increased capability of the United States forces. There are several advantages to this option. In addition to the
been proceeding slowly.

For some reason, possibly fear of rapid implementation, the process has
also been delayed. This should also appear to the United States, but
and coordination have been accelerated. The United States and Japan
seen to increase defensive capability is through increased cooperation
increased capabilities. With these two factors, the only way Japan
also sees United States' defensive capabilities as being unchangeable to
have politically unchangeable on the domestic (Japan) level. Japan
should be prepared that an increased defense capability is desired.

desire the Japanese 'feel' on security in Chapter Three, it
In military capability, especially in areas already having
Given the present political climate in the United States, any increase
been quietly active in pursuing this goal, and with good reason.
development of this cooperation and coordination. The Japanese have
seen cooperating the apparent effort to slow down or inhibit the
between the two countries' forces. For the United States, this would
done in conjunction with increased cooperation and coordination
Streets, and Japan's security position would be improved if this were
United States security policy has been widely perceived as a means to deter Japan from pursuing military power and to maintain its own security. However, from the perspective of Japan, the United States security policy is seen as a threat to its national security.

The United States' security-related aspects of Japan-U.S. relations, by necessity, need to be perceived as united states security objectives, and then the United States policy in that view is extended by Japan. The United States has shown how united states security decisions must be made with new expenditure.

Greater cooperation and coordination can be achieved without any change to the United States' stance, the increased security, and of course, the United States policy from Washington. And finally, the United States can cooperate with Japan without appearing as an accessional to the part.

Increased cooperation and a greater role in defense without drastic changes.
FOOTNOTES

1. These objectives were derived from the author's analysis of the following major policy statements: President Gerald Ford, speech declaring a new Pacific Doctrine, Honolulu, 7 December 1975; Vice-President Walter Mondale, news conference opening statement, Tokyo, 1 February 1977; Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, speech before the Asia Society, New York, 28 June 1977; Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, 30 February 1978.


5. Hinson, p. 43.

6. ibid.

7. ibid.

8. There are several reasons, other than the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, why Japan is not producing nuclear weapons. One is doubt concerning their cost effectiveness. Joining the nuclear club would cost vast sums of money and would sharply increase the nuclear threat to Japan. Another is the likelihood that Japan would not be accepted as a nuclear power by the world, which would result in the end of the nuclear era.

9. Ibid.

10. Because of recent United States troop withdrawals and diplomatic actions, both of these countries seriously doubt the effectiveness of the United States' nuclear umbrella in their defense.

11. Hinson, p. 43.


13. Ibid.
110 Handbook on Japanese Foreign Policy and Security, pp. 33, 34.
111 Tadakuro Kurumi, "Japan and Her National Defence," Pacific
Community, April 1973, p. 422.
112 Tidib.
113 Ichiti Suga, "Japan's National and Foreign Policy, Pacific
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115 Masaki Kozak, Options for Japan's Foreign Policy (London:
116 Yoshiyuki Akahira, "Japan's Foreign Policy and the
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117 Asanuma's Plan to Dissolve Defense Forces, by Public
Information Section, His Excellency of the Cabinet, 1971.
118 Public Opinion Poll on Japan's Defense Policy and the
119 Socialist party draft plan to dissolve defense forces and
the number of the cabinet, 1978.
121 Takehara, "Security Debate in Japan, a paper prepared
for the 1976 Conference of the Section on Military Studies of
the International Studies Association, Charleston, South Carolina,
8-10 November 1976, P. 2.
122 Henry S. Rosan, "Japan and the Future Balance in Asia," Orbis 21
123 Tidib.
124 This incident was described in Chapter Three.
126 Tidib, pp. 127-128.


132 Japan, The Constitution of Japan, Article IX.

133 Ibid.


137 Ibid.


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## Appendix 3

**Comparison of Standard Defense Force & Present Strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Deployed Regionally in Peace</th>
<th>12 Divisions</th>
<th>4 Air Divisions</th>
<th>2 Combined Brigades</th>
<th>11 Mobile Operation Units</th>
<th>6.600 Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Unit</td>
<td>12 Divisions</td>
<td>4 Air Divisions</td>
<td>2 Combined Brigades</td>
<td>11 Mobile Operation Units</td>
<td>6.600 Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major equipment</td>
<td>25 Groups</td>
<td>10 Squadrions</td>
<td>5 Groups</td>
<td>5 Groups和1 more planned</td>
<td>4,400 Aircraft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Units deployed regionally in peace include:
  - 12 Divisions
  - 4 Air Divisions
  - 2 Combined Brigades
  - 11 Mobile Operation Units
- Basic Unit includes:
  - 12 Divisions
  - 4 Air Divisions
  - 2 Combined Brigades
  - 11 Mobile Operation Units
- Major equipment consists of:
  - 25 Groups
  - 10 Squadrions
  - 5 Groups
  - 5 Groups and 1 more planned

**Source:** Japan Defense Agency, "Defense of Japan 1977"
### Inventory Figures (As of Mar. 31, 1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifles, etc.</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine guns</td>
<td>67,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoiless rifles</td>
<td>6,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field guns</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-aircraft guns</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored personal carriers</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Specifications (Part 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type 89 10.7cm rifle</th>
<th>magazines</th>
<th>4.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 88 10.6cm machine gun</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 89 8.7cm mortar</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 88 81mm mortars</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 90 81mm mortars</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Specifications (Part 2)

| Type 89 10cm howitzer | 105 | 4.5 |
| Type 89 75mm howitzer | 155 | 4.5 |
| Type 89 47mm howitzer | 205 | 4.5 |
| Type 89 47mm howitzer | 255 | 4.5 |

### Notes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ship Type</th>
<th>Special Equipment</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support ship</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-speed rescue ship</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank landing ship</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol ship</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine sweeper</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1,000 ton)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2,000 ton)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4,000 ton)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6,000 ton)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4,000 ton)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6,000 ton)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Number of ships in service (As of May 3, 1977)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 2: What do you think is the best way to prevent possible invasion from invading Japan?

- 27% Don't know
- 24% No danger
- 22% Cannot deny such a possibility

Answer: Yes, there is the danger

1969, 1972, 1975
The Secretary of the Cabinet
Public Information Section

POLICY AND JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON THE JAPAN DEFENSE

Appendix
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 3: Which do you think is the best policy for Japan's national security at present and in the near future?</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To abolish the existing United States-Japan Security Treaty and build up the Japan Self-Defense Force, namely to secure national defense for Japan itself.</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As it has been, to secure national defense by both the Treaty and gradual buildup of Japan Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other choice</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 4: How do you behave if Japan would be invaded by any foreign country?</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To support Japan Self-Defense Force to resist in combat way</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To resist in guerrilla warfare</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To resist in non-combat way</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't resist at all</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other choice</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Question 3:** What do you think is the major role of Japan's Self-Defense Forces?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 6:** Do you support the establishment and existence of Japan's national defense budget?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.18</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 7:** Do you think the national defense budget (¥) should be increased, decreased, or kept the same?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>1972</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 8:** Do you think the national defense budget (¥ billion) should be increased, decreased, or kept the same?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>