

US vs China vs UN Positions on NWFZs
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US Position on NWFZs	Chinese Position on NWFZs	The Common Characteristics Of NWFZs 1999 UN Disarmament Commission Report
We have also long supported properly crafted nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs), which when rigorously implemented under appropriate conditions can contribute to regional and international peace, security and stability. The key conditions for establishment of a NWFZ , in accordance with UN Disarmament Commission guidelines, include that:	The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is of great importance to the advancement of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the promotion of international and regional peace and security. To this end, we believe that the following principles regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones should be observed: "	contribute to the international nonproliferation regime, world peace and security;
The initiative for the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone comes from the states in the region concerned;	Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established by relevant countries in light of the realities of their region on the basis of voluntary agreement through consultations among themselves.	are based on arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region;
All states whose participation is deemed important participate in the zone;	Treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones should be consistent with the purposes and principles of the <i>Charter of the United Nations</i> and should not be used to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries outside of the relevant nuclear-weapon-free zone.	originate from the region itself;
The zone arrangement provides for adequate verification of compliance with the zone's provisions;	The nuclear-weapon-free status of nuclear-weapon-free zones should not be subject to influence of any other security mechanism. Countries in nuclear-weapon-free zones should not refuse to fulfill their obligations under any excuses, including that of a military alliance.	should be supported by the international community;
The establishment of the zone does not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security;	A nuclear-weapon-free zone should have a clear geographical border. It should not include continental shelves and EEZs, nor the areas where there exist disputes over sovereignty of territory or maritime rights and interests between the contracting parties to the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty and their neighboring countries.	should include all the states of the region concerned in the negotiations on the establishment of such a zone;
The zone arrangement effectively prohibits the parties from developing or otherwise processing any nuclear explosive devices for whatever purpose;	Effective verification mechanisms, including IAEA safeguards, should be put in place in nuclear-weapon-free zones so as to effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.	should be respected by all states parties to the treaty as well as by states outside the region, including the nuclear-weapon-states;

<p>The zone arrangement does not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise of rights recognized under international law, particularly the high seas freedom of navigation and overflight, the right of innocent passage of territorial and archipelagic seas, the right of transit passage of international straits, and the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage of archipelagic waters; and</p>	<p>The arrangements of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be conducive to the international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy among member states so as to promote the development of their economy and science and technology.</p>	<p>should involve the nuclear-weapons-states (NWS) in the negotiations of the treaty and protocols to facilitate their support;</p>
<p>The establishment of the zone does not affect the existing rights of its parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and overflights to other states.</p>	<p>The nuclear-weapon states should respect the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones, undertake corresponding obligations and commit themselves to unconditional non-use and threat of use of nuclear weapons against nuclear-weapon-free zones.</p>	<p>should involve states with territory or that are internationally responsible for territories within the zone in the negotiations of the treaties and protocols;</p>
<p>“Ambassador Kennedy on Negative Security Assurances,” CD Plenary Discussion of Negative Security Assurances February 10, 2011, http://geneva.usmission.gov/2011/02/10/conference-on-disarmament/</p>	<p>"Speech by Head of the Chinese Delegation to the International Conference 'Central Asia--Nuclear Weapons Free Zone'," Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 15 September 1997.</p>	<p>should take into account all the relevant characteristics of the region;</p>
		<p>should reaffirm the commitment of the states to such zones to respect relevant international treaties;</p>
		<p>are legally binding;</p>
		<p>should be consistent with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;</p>
		<p>should provide for states parties to freely decide whether to allow foreign ships and aircraft to visit their ports and airfield, and transit their airspace and their territorial waters;</p>
		<p>should be implemented by the states parties in accordance with their individual constitutional requirements;</p>
		<p>should prohibit the development, manufacturing, control, possession, testing, stationing, or transporting by states parties of any type of nuclear explosive device. They should also</p>

		prohibit the stationing of any nuclear explosive devices within the zone;
<p>Note: A similar set of attributes could be developed for the 1992 Denuclearization Declaration between North and South Korea; and Japan's domestic Non-Nuclear Principles, to compare for consistency with the US, Chinese, and UN criteria. We were unable to find a set of Russian criteria although such may exist Colors indicate common element or degree of consistency between US, Chinese, and UN desirable criteria</p>		

KCNA: DPRK Vice FM States DPRK's Stance on Denuclearization at UN Session

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[Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Station (KCBS) in Korean carried a gist of Pak Kil-yo'n's speech in its 1200 GMT newscast on 29 September; The official daily of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly Presidium and Cabinet, Minju Joson, carried a substantively similar article which OSC plans to process as the first referent item; KCNA headline: "DPRK's Principled Stand on Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula Clarified"]

Pyongyang, September 30 (KCNA) -- It is the consistent stand of the DPRK government to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and push forward its denuclearization through dialogue and negotiations. DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Pak Kil-yo'n who is heading the DPRK delegation said this in a speech at the 66th UNGA session on Sept. 28.

What the DPRK and the Korean people most urgently require is a stable and peaceful environment as they are channeling all efforts into economic construction, he said, and went on: It is to be regretted that a solid and durable peace mechanism has not yet been built on the Korean Peninsula.

The national division imposed upon the Koreans by outside forces and the state of ceasefire, neither war nor peace, have lasted for over half a century. This is the reality of the peninsula.

There continue arms buildup and nuclear war exercises against the DPRK on the peninsula and in its vicinity despite the unanimous aspiration and wishes of the people at home and abroad aspiring after peace and stability. Therefore, the situation on the eve of war is being created in the peninsula periodically.

But for the songun [military-first] politics pursued by leader Kim Jong Il [Kim Cho'ng-il] and the powerful war deterrent of the

DPRK, a war would have broken out on the peninsula several times and peaceful economic construction would not have been imaginable there.

The present situation on the peninsula requires the parties concerned to take an opportunity of dialogue and make a bold decision to settle fundamental issues.

Underlying the continued tensions on the peninsula is the hostile relations between the DPRK and the U.S., the root cause of distrust and confrontation.

It is impossible to defuse mutual distrust and confrontation nor is it possible to find a smooth solution to the issue of the denuclearization of the peninsula as long as there remain the hostile relations between the DPRK and the U.S., the signatories of the Armistice Agreement, in which they level guns at each other.

That was why the DPRK proposed again to have talks to replace the AA with a peace treaty last year.

The conclusion of the peace treaty would be a process for implementing the resolution adopted at the 30th UNGA Session in 1975. This will serve as the most effective step for building confidence to wipe distrust between the DPRK and the U.S. and, furthermore, a motive force guaranteeing the denuclearization of the peninsula.

The denuclearization of the peninsula stipulated in the September 19, 2005, joint statement calls for turning the whole Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone on the basis of completely defusing in a verifiable manner the potential nuclear threat to the peninsula from outside.

The nuclear issue of the peninsula was a product of the U.S. hostile policy and nuclear war threat to the DPRK from A to Z. It is, therefore, the U.S. which has the responsibility and capacity to remove its root cause. Had the U.S. not threatened the DPRK with nuclear weapons after introducing them to the peninsula, the nuclear issue would not have surfaced.

The peninsula is standing at the crossroads of detente and vicious cycle of increasing tension. Under this situation the U.S. would be well advised to boldly roll back its hostile policy toward the DPRK and opt for comprehensive dialogue with a long-term and strategic judgment.

The DPRK will in the future, too, make painstaking efforts to build a solid and durable peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula and continue cooperating with the parties concerned to resume the six-party talks without preconditions.