

CRC 322 — Vol. I

**U.S. NAVY RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL
INCIDENTS AND CRISES, 1955 - 1975**
Survey of Navy Crisis Operations

[8F5]

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

1401 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Institute of Naval Studies

no App C?

annual
Command History
Annual Report
Command History
CINCPACFLT

By: Robert B. Mahoney, Jr.

July 1977

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Prepared for:

OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH

Department of the Navy

Arlington, Virginia 22217

Q. p. 25. 80V

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (Op96)

Department of the Navy

Washington, D.C. 20350

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER CRC 322 - Vol. I	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) U.S. Navy Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1955-1975 Vol. I - Survey of Navy Crisis Operations (2 vol.)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
7. AUTHOR(s) Robert B. Mahoney, Jr.		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Center for Naval Analyses 1401 Wilson Boulevard Arlington, Virginia 22209		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) N00014-76-C-0001
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Office of Naval Research Department of the Navy Arlington, Virginia 22217		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Op96) Department of the Navy Washington, D.C. 20350		12. REPORT DATE July 1977
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 46
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES This Research Contribution does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy.		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) aircraft carriers, amphibious operations, crisis, crisis management, conflict, emergencies, foreign policy, international incidents, international relations, marine corps, military strategy, naval operations, politico-military affairs		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Over the period 1955-1975, the Navy and Marine Corps played an active role in U.S. crisis management diplomacy, responding to 99 international incidents and crises, exclusive of the Vietnam War. This paper provides a summary history of these operations, focusing upon major trends in the Navy's operations over the 21-year period. Particular emphasis is given to the employment of major projection forces (aircraft carriers and amphibious units) in these responses. Brief descriptions of the 99 incidents and responses are also presented.		

⁷Contributors: Jill M. Hill, Judith C. Erdheim

²⁰Volume II is a classified volume containing the following:

Appendix C - Summaries of incidents and responses, 1955-1975

Appendix D - Additional events which are not included in the main
list of responses

Appendix E - Projection operations

Appendix F - USN and USMC responses to international events, 1919-1939

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ENCLOSURE REMOVED

1401 Wilson Boulevard

Arlington, Virginia 22209

703/524-9400

An Equal Opportunity Employer

**Center
for
Naval
Analyses**

*an affiliate of the
University of Rochester*


30 Sep 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST

Subj: Center for Naval Analyses Research Contribution 322

Encl: (1) CRC 322, "U.S. Navy Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1955-1975 (U)," Volume I: "Survey of Navy Crisis Operations," Unclassified and Volume II: "Summaries of Incidents and Responses (U)," Confidential by Robert B. Mahoney July 1977

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest.
2. Research Contributions are distributed for their potential value in other studies and analyses. They do not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy.
3. When no longer desired for retention, the enclosure should be destroyed in accordance with current security regulations.


CHRISTOPHER JEHN
Director
Institute of Naval Studies

CONFIDENTIAL

Subj: Center for Naval Analyses Research Contribution 322

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Department of the NavySNDL Part I:

21A1	CINCLANTFLT	42X1	FAIRECONRON 2
21A2	CINCPACFLT	42X1	FAIRECONRON 4
21A3	CINCUSNAVEUR	42X2	FAIRECONRON 1
22A1	COMSECONDFLT	42X2	FAIRECONRON 3
22A2	COMTHIRDFLT	45A2	CG I MAF
22A2	COMSEVENTHFLT	45A2	CG III MAF
22A3	COMSIXTHFLT	45B	CG FIRST MARDIV
23A1	COMNAVFORCARIB	45B	CG SECOND MARDIV
23A2	COMNAVFORJAPAN	45B	CG THIRD MARDIV
23B1	USCOMSOLANT	45B	CG FOURTH MARDIV
23B1	USCOMSEASTLANT	45V	CG FIRST MAR BDE
23B2	COMCARSTRIKEFORSEVENTHFLT	45V	CG FOURTH MAB
23B2	COMPATRECONFORSEVENTHFLT	45V	CG NINTH MAB
23B3	COMIDEASTFOR	45V	COM THREE ONE MAU
23B3	COMCARSTRIKEFORSIXTHFLT	45V	COM THREE TWO MAU
24A1	COMNAVAILANT	45V	COM THREE FOUR MAU
24A2	COMNAVAIRPAC	45EE	CG FORTRPS SECOND FSSG LANT
24D1	COMNAVSURFLANT	45EE	CG FORTRPS PAC
24D2	COMNAVSURFPAC	50A	USCINCEUR
24J1	CG FMFLANT	50A	USCINCSO
24J2	CG FMFPAC	50A	CINCPAC
26F1	COMOPTEVFOR	50A	CINCLANT
26F2	DEPCOMOPTEVFORPAC	50A	USCINCREC
26V1	CG LFTCLANT		
26V2	CG LFTCPAC		
26QQ1	COMNAVSPECWARGRU TWO		
26QQ1	COMNAVSEPCWARGRU TWO, DET CARIB		
26QQ2	COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE		
26QQ2	COMNAVSPECWARGRU ONE, DET WPAC		
26YY2	FOSIF WESTPAC		
26YY3	FOSIF ROTA		
28A1	COMCARGRU 2		
28A1	COMCARGRU 4		
28A1	COMCARGRU 6		
28A1	COMCARGRU 8		
28A2	COMCARGRU 1		
28A2	COMCARGRU 3		
28A2	COMCARGRU 5		
28A2	COMCARGRU 7		
28B1	COMCRUDESGRU 2		
28B1	COMCRUDESGRU 8		
28B1	COMCRUDESGRU 12		
28B2	COMCRUDESGRU 1		
28B2	COMCRUDESGRU 3		
28B2	COMCRUDESGRU 5		
28L1	COMPHIBRON 2		
28L1	COMPHIBRON 4		
28L1	COMPHIBRON 6		
28L1	COMPHIBRON 8		
28L2	COMPHIBRON 1		
28L2	COMPHIBRON 3		
28L2	COMPHIBRON 5		
28L2	COMPHIBRON 7		
41A	COMSC		
42A1	COMFAIRCARI		
42A1	COMFAIRKEFLAVIK		
42A2	COMFAIRWESTPAC		
42A2	COMFAIRWESTPAC, DET CUBI POINT		
42A3	COMFAIRMED		
42P1	COMPATWING 5		
42P1	COMPATWING 11		
42P2	COMPATWING 1		
42P2	COMPATWING 2		

SNDL Part II:

A1	SECNAV
A1	UNSECNAV
A1	ASST SECNAV (RE&S)
A2A	OPA
A2A	ONR
C4J	NAVTACSUPPACT
C4J	NOSIC
FA2	FICEURLANT
FB1	FICPAC
FB38	COMOCEANSYSPAC
FE1	COMNAVSECGRU
FF38	USNA, Nimitz Library
FKA1A	NAVAIRSYS COMHQ
FKA1G	NAVSEASYS COMHQ
FS1	NAVINTCOMHQ
FS3	NISC
FS5	NFOIO
FT35	NAVPHIBSCOL, Little Creek
FT35	NAVPHIBSCOL, Coronado
FT43	SWOSCOLCOM
FT73	NAVPGSCOL
FT75	NAVWARCOL
V12	CG MCDEC

UNCLASSIFIED

Subj: Center for Naval Analyses Research Contribution 322

DISTRIBUTION LIST (Continued)

Department of the Navy (cont'd)

OpNav: Op-00	Op-965	Op-60
Op-00K	Op-955	Op-60N
Op-009	Op-986	Op-601
Op-009F	Op-03	Op-605
Op-09	Op-32	Op-605C
Op-09BH (6)	Op-05	Op-605D
Op-090	Op-50	Op-61
Op-96	Op-55	Op-611
Op-96N	Op-06	Op-64
		Op-007

Headquarters, Marine Corps:

- Commandant, Marine Corps
- Chief of Staff, USMC
- Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Policies
- Deputy Chief of Staff, Research, Development and Studies
- Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Training
- Director of Information
- Director of History and Museums
- Director of Intelligence

Department of the Army

- Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
- Adjutant General (6)
- U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency
- U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
- Commandant, Army War College

Department of the Air Force

- Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
- Department of the Air Force (AFXOD)
- Air University Library

Other Defense Department

- Secretary of Defense
- Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (2)
- Ass't SecDef, ISA (Policy Plans and NSC Affairs)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense, Intelligence
- Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation (2)
- Ass't SecDef, PA&E (General Purpose Force, Naval Forces)
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (C³ & I)
- Director, Defense Research and Engineering
- Director, Net Assessment
- Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- National Military Command Center
- Advanced Research Projects Agency, Cybernetics Technology Office (2)
- National Defense University
- Armed Forces Staff College
- Intelligence Center, Pacific
- Defense Documentation Center (2)

Defense Intelligence Agency:

- Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- Defense Intelligence Agency (Attn: DIN-2D3)
- Deputy Director for Estimates: Soviet/East European Division
- Deputy Director, Intelligence (Research Center):
 - Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division
 - Western Division
- Defense Intelligence School

UNCLASSIFIED

Subj: Center for Naval Analyses Research Contribution 322

DISTRIBUTION LIST (Continued)

Central Intelligence Agency

Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Strategic Research
Office of Regional and Political Analysis
Office of Economic Research

Department of State

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Agency for International Development
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs:
 Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
 Director, Office of International Security Policy
Bureau of Intelligence and Research:
 Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
 Office of Political-Military Affairs and Theater Forces (2)

Other

Director, National Security Agency
U.S. Information Agency
Aerospace Corporation
Bendix Corporation, Southfield, Michigan
CACI, Inc.
Decisions and Designs, Inc.
Institute for Defense Analyses
Human Resource Research Organization
Mathematica, Inc.
The Mitre Corporation
The Rand Corporation
Stanford Research Institute

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	1
Focus	1
Limits of the analysis	1
Identifying the Navy's responses to international incidents and crises	3
Definitions and sources	3
Comparison with other lists of responses	6
Comparison with RC 144	6
Comparison with Brookings Institution Project	7
Responses by year and region	12
Geographic distribution of the responses	12
Temporal distribution of the responses	12
Comparison of geographic and temporal distributions	13
The role played by aircraft carriers in the Navy's responses	19
Reasons for focusing on carrier operations	19
Distribution of carrier responses	20
The number of carriers participating in responses	23
The role played by amphibious forces in the Navy's responses	26
Forces employed in recent responses	29
Navy projection forces in recent responses	29
Force mixes employed in recent responses	32
References	36
Appendix A - Employment of carriers in Navy crisis responses	A-1 - A-4
Appendix B - Employment of amphibious forces in Navy crisis responses ...	B-1 - B-4

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the President's message to the Congress, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

2. The second part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the President, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the Secretary's report to the President, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

3. The third part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Congress, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the Secretary's report to the Congress, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

4. The fourth part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the President, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the Secretary's report to the President, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

5. The fifth part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Congress, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the Secretary's report to the Congress, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

6. The sixth part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the President, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the Secretary's report to the President, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

7. The seventh part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Congress, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the Secretary's report to the Congress, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

8. The eighth part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the President, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the Secretary's report to the President, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

9. The ninth part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Congress, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the Secretary's report to the Congress, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

10. The tenth part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the President, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the Secretary's report to the President, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

11. The eleventh part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Congress, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the Secretary's report to the Congress, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

12. The twelfth part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the President, dated January 3, 1862. It is a very important document, as it contains the Secretary's report to the President, and is one of the most important documents in the history of the United States.

INTRODUCTION

FOCUS

Crisis management is one of the Navy's principal missions. Over the period 1955-1975 the Navy and Marine Corps played a major role in 99 U.S. responses to international incidents and crises, exclusive of the Vietnam War.

This paper provides a summary of these Navy crisis management operations. It has been produced as part of CNA's International Incidents project, undertaken at the request of Op-60. The paper meets the Navy's requirements for information concerning its role in crisis management by:

- Using authoritative sources to provide an up-to-date summary of the Navy's major responses to international incidents and crises, replacing out-of-date studies which have been used for this purpose in the past;
- Presenting the composition of the major Navy and Marine forces involved in these operations and detailing their principal actions during the responses;
- Identifying patterns in the employment of Navy forces in crisis responses (e.g., the geographic and temporal distributions of the operations);
- Analyzing the contributions made by naval projection forces (carriers and amphibious units) in the responses; and
- Identifying trends and broad patterns which can be employed as guides for planning, with a particular emphasis upon recent (1966-1975) operations.

LIMITS OF THE ANALYSIS

This paper focuses upon the actions of the Navy and Marine Corps immediately prior to and during American responses to international incidents and crises. This will be referred to as the 'crisis management' role of the fleet.

This focus has some important limitations. The first is that it includes only a fraction of the total range of actions which the Navy undertakes in support of national crisis management efforts. The paper does not deal with the fleet's actions during the crucial pre-crisis periods (before incidents occur) when the presence and deterrent capabilities of naval forces can have far reaching impact. Peacetime presence can be a far from 'routine' activity. It can have considerable effect on the ways in which events ashore transpire. Clearly, the optimal solution for many crisis management problems is to prevent the crisis from developing by taking timely action during the pre-crisis period to achieve national goals.

By the same token, this paper's focus on the fleet's activities should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the other services and other types of policy instruments (military and non-military) play major roles in the crisis management activities of the National Command Authorities.

Another point that needs to be noted is that the Navy's crisis operations are 'responses' in two senses. The first is that they are reactions to foreign events (e.g., the October War of 1973). At the same time, however, they are also reactions to the directives of the National Command Authorities. Both meanings are intended when the terms 'Navy responses', and 'crisis responses' are employed in this paper.

The final point that needs to be considered is the way in which the data and analyses presented in this paper can be employed in planning, particularly contingency planning and forecasting. While the value of historical experience (particularly recent experience) for planning is readily apparent, it is important to bear in mind that the past is only a potential precursor of the future. The way in which the Navy has been employed as an instrument of crisis diplomacy in the past has been the result of choices made by the National Command Authorities in conjunction with certain types of foreign events. Different choices may be made in the future in response to changing circumstances.

Because of these limitations, the inferences that can be drawn from the analysis to be presented are also limited. The analysis deals with only one aspect (albeit a very important one) of American crisis management policy. It is limited by being based on past experience, which may or may not be repeated. Even with these limitations, however, there remains the need to address the points set out previously by determining how the Navy's role in U.S. responses to crises has evolved since 1955.

IDENTIFYING THE NAVY'S RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS AND CRISES

DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES

Modern crisis diplomacy began in the middle 1950's when the U.S. and USSR acquired the capacity to present credible nuclear threats to one another's territory. This mutual nuclear vulnerability has set off the period since the mid-1950's from earlier eras of crisis diplomacy.

Many definitions of "crisis" and "crisis management" have been proposed.* The present analysis focuses upon American military responses to international incidents and crises, instances in which the U.S. employed military forces in response to events abroad, short of war. These events were "critical" precisely insofar as they were singled out for attention in documents which were part of (or significant commentaries upon) the U.S. political-military policy process.**

More formally, U.S. military responses to incidents and crises consist of:

- (a) any actions taken by the National Command Authorities involving the U.S. armed forces (only the Navy and Marine Corps for immediate purposes),
- (b) in conjunction with events (of any type) occurring outside of the United States,
- (c) other than in the course of general or limited war,
- (d) and with the exception of a few categories of responses (to be shown below) such as humanitarian relief efforts,
- (e) that were reported at a given level in the political-military policy process.

The first and last points are interrelated. The "conjunction" of U.S. military actions and international events is determined by examining documents which are part of, or report

*For a review, consult Charles F. Hermann, International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research, New York: Free Press, 1972.

**For convenience, in the body of this paper the crisis management contributions of the USMC will be subsumed under references to the Navy and its role in support of national policy. The specific contributions made by each of the naval services are detailed in the descriptions of individual responses provided in Appendix A.

on, the defense policy process. If a positive statement associating a set of U.S. military operations and some set of foreign events is found, the "case" is considered a U.S. military response. The mere presence of U.S. forces within a region does not constitute a response. The forces must be associated with the events in the documents reviewed.

Crisis management is a "peacetime" activity (defining peacetime negatively as the absence of war). The lower threshold of limited war is defined in terms of U.S. casualties. Any engagement in which American forces suffer at least 1,000 casualties (KIA, WIA, and MIA) is at least a limited war. In the period reviewed (1955-1975), only the Vietnam-Indochina War falls into this category. It is excluded from the analysis.

The beginning of the Vietnam-Indochina War is set at August 1964 with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The end of the war is defined in April 1975, with the final evacuation of U.S. personnel from Saigon. While it is true that many forms of direct U.S. involvement in Indochina terminated before this date, it is also the case that a U.S. military presence (directed specifically at events taking place in Indochina) continued to exist. This presence was perceived at high policy levels within the U.S. and in the commentaries produced by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.*

The exemption clause in the definition (d) covers several categories of responses:

- Humanitarian operations (e.g., the provision of medical assistance following natural disasters abroad);
- Intelligence and other special operations (these are not systematically covered in the project's sources, which do not include compartmentalized intelligence information);
- Operations which are routinely undertaken to support U.S. diplomacy (e.g., Navy units are customarily alerted during some Presidential visits to third world nations);
- Incidents at sea which are not specifically related to events taking place ashore (e.g., hijackings, rammings, overflights of Navy ships by Soviet aircraft);
- Extra-regional alerts of Navy forces (during some responses the Navy was placed on global alert; while this is noted (where relevant), the principal emphasis in the analysis is upon forces within the region where the crisis or incident transpired (e.g., the Mediterranean basin).

*For U.S. perceptions, consult the NMCC Operational Summary from January 1973 through April 1975. For the perceptions of the DRV, see The Thieu Regime Put to the Test 1973-1975, Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975.

Some of the events which fall into these exempted categories are presented in appendix D.

The final term in the definition (e) refers to the sources employed to identify responses. These fall into two sets. The first consists of documents which are a direct part of the military policy process in that they are used in the course of decision making or serve as the formal reports of the actions taken by major military commands. The sources in this category are:

- The Operational Summary of the National Military Command Center,
- The yearly Command History produced by each Unified Command (e.g., CINCPAC),
- The yearly Annual Reports and Command Histories produced by the numbered fleets and by the senior Navy commands within each Unified Command (e.g., CINCPACFLT).

The second set of sources consists of documents which were produced within the Navy (or for it) to provide systematic information concerning the Navy's crisis management responses. These make up the "institutional memory" of the Navy:

- Bendix Corporation, "The Navy and Sub-Limited Conflict (U)," September 1966, Secret;
- Center for Naval Analyses, "Conventional Force Deployments: Appendix A, USN/USMC Force Levels and Deployments 1958 - 1972 (U)," 29 May 1973, Confidential;
- Chief of Naval Operations, "Summary of Wars/Near Wars Since 1946," Joint Hearings, Senate-House Armed Services Subcommittees, CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier, April 1970, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 163-165;
- Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps, "Selected Analysis of Marine Corps and Navy Amphibious Force Requirements and Capabilities (U)," (Project Ides) April 1972, Secret/NoForN;
- Barbara A. Gilmore, "Chronology of U.S. Naval Events, 1960-1975," Operational Archives, U.S. Navy History Division;
- Operational Archives, U.S. Navy History Division, "Attack Aircraft Carrier Utilization," August 1969.

These two sets of sources were the only documents utilized to identify the Navy's responses. Additional sources were employed to obtain information concerning the operations.*

*Both sets of source materials are on file in the Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division, of the Naval Historical Center. This paper would not have been possible without the assistance of Dr. Dean C. Allard (Branch Chief), Bernard F. Cavalcante, and Barbara A. Gilmore of the Operational Archives Branch.

COMPARISON WITH OTHER LISTS OF RESPONSES

Employing the criteria set forth in the previous section, 99 Navy responses to international incidents and crises were identified over the period 1955-1975. A list of these operations and brief descriptions of each incident and response are presented in appendix C. The 99 operations are plotted over time in table 3 and figure 1, below.

The comprehensiveness of this list can be evaluated by comparing the aggregate profile of responses produced by the Incidents project with the profiles produced by other projects.

The two best comparison bases for this purpose are the data sets gathered by CNA's RC 144* and the Blechman-Kaplan Brookings Institution project.** Other major compilations of Navy responses (e.g., Ides, Selected Analysis, Bendix) have been incorporated into the Incidents data base, making comparison less useful.

Comparison with RC 144

RC 144 relied upon a single unclassified source (Keessing's Contemporary Archives) to identify U.S. involvement in conflicts from 1 January 1946 to 31 December 1964.

Unfortunately, while the study states that there were 49 instances (out of a total of 380 conflicts reviewed) in which the United States made some kind of military response, it does not identify the specific cases in which USN/USMC operations took place. Instead it provides the summary information presented in table 1. (p. 69):

TABLE 1

SUMMARY INFORMATION FROM RC 144

<u>Type of operation involving the USN</u>	<u>Number of instances</u>
threat/show of force	2
unofficial/covert combatant roles	2
limited combat forces	1
limited strategic support	5
full range of operations	4
(total)	14

*CNA RC 144, "An Analysis of Recent Conflicts (U)," January 1966, Unclassified.

**Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976 (report prepared for the Advanced Research Projects Agency).

Even without more detailed information, the aggregate findings of RC 144 can be compared to those of the Incidents project over the period of comparability (1955-1964), as is shown in table 2.

TABLE 2

AGGREGATE COMPARISON OF INCIDENTS PROJECT AND RC 144 LISTS

	Incidents project 1955-1964	RC 144, NAVY RESPONSES, 1946-1964	RC 144, ALL U.S. MILITARY RESPONSES 1946-1964
Number of responses	68	14	49

Even including the years from 1946 through 1954 in the RC 144 data base, the Incidents project identifies significantly more instances of Navy operations. It presents a more comprehensive picture of the Navy's crisis activity.

Comparison With Brookings Institution Project*

The Brookings project provides a broad examination of the political-military roles played by the American armed forces since World War II, with a special emphasis on the assessment (where possible) of the extent to which U.S. decision makers achieved their goals when they employed the armed forces as policy instruments.

In its coverage of the activities of the armed forces since 1946, the Brookings project resembles the Incidents project in its exclusion of humanitarian relief efforts and events which were part of the Indochina War.** While it includes U.S. military responses to international incidents and crises (in fact, such operations make up a majority of the 'cases' it reports), it differs from the Incidents project in a number of key respects.

*Comparison of the two projects has a value beyond providing validation evidence for the Incidents project. It appears likely that the Brookings study (relying as it does upon open sources) will become the standard work on this subject in the academic community. The Navy has a vital interest in this research because it will greatly affect the informed public's consideration of the roles played by the Navy in support of national policy.

**The Brookings project uses a definition of the Indochina War that differs from that found in this paper. Their definition of the war begins and ends with the large scale involvement of U.S. ground forces in the conflict.

(1) In contrast to the CNA project, the Brookings study relies solely upon open sources. As a result, the Brookings list includes some minor responses that were not focused upon at the policy levels represented in the Incidents project's sources. An example is the U.S. reaction (of little more than two day's duration) to the Haitian Coast Guard disturbance of April 1970.

(2) The use of open sources leads the Brookings project to subdivide responses which are carried as one unit in the Incidents data file. Examples include:

BROOKINGS

Cyprus 1/1964
Cyprus 6/1964
Cyprus 8/1964

Laos 4/1963
Laos 5/1963

Panama 1/1964
Panama 4/1964

INCIDENTS PROJECT

Cyprus 1-11/1964

Laos 4-6/1963

Panama 1-4/1964

Open sources tend to be oriented towards the political and military events to which the U.S. responds. Within a crisis of any duration the media are likely to present a number of such critical events and to 'divide' the American response in terms of them. While this ebb and flow of action is captured by CNA's sources, there is also a strong tendency for policy documents to 'count' a single continuous response as a single unit for reporting purposes.

(3) Brookings includes a number of intelligence operations that were discovered by the media; for example, reconnaissance flights in the Middle East undertaken in conjunction with the Rogers Peace Plan initiative of 1970. As noted previously, such operations are not covered systematically in the sources available to the Incidents project.

(4) Brookings includes a number of military events which were not responses to specific incidents and crises; e.g., the clearing of the Suez Canal (4/1974). By definition, no counterpart operations exist in the Incidents data base.

(5) The Brookings list includes responses which did not involve the USN or USMC. Perhaps the best known example of this sort is the series of small scale operations conducted by the Army in the Congo (Zaire) in the early and middle 1960's.

The net effect of these five differences between the two projects is that the Brookings effort identifies more 'cases' of U.S. military action (see below).

Given the differences between the two in focus and content, what ends are served by a comparison? Three replies can be given.

First, there is a common core to the two. The modal case in the Brookings study is a U.S. military response as defined in the Incidents project. Given the flexible nature of seapower (and the extensive employment of the Navy in crisis operations) there should be common patterns in the two data sets. Moreover, since it employs a wider variety of (open) sources than any other crisis project, the Brookings study provides the best comparison base for the validation of the Incidents list.

Secondly, the differences make for a tougher test. Confidence in the findings of both will be increased if the same general patterns emerge, despite the differences in focus and content.

Finally, the Navy needs to know what picture of military operations is being painted by the Brookings project. The best way in which to do this is by comparison with the Incidents work.

Both projects cover the period 1955-1975. Over this span Brookings identifies 169 actions involving the four services while CNA finds 99 responses to international incidents and crises involving the Navy and Marine Corps.

This finding was expected, given the five key differences between the two projects outlined previously. The important point is the pattern taken by the two sets, as given in table 3 and figure 1.

Both data sets trace out quite similar patterns over time. The correlation* between the two is a quite respectable .89 . The fit between the two data sets is particularly strong since the middle 1960's--the period of greatest interest for policy purposes. The two data bases provide support for one another.

*Note that this comparison includes Indochinese operations (e.g., the evacuation of Saigon) that are included in the Brookings file but not found in the CNA data base due to the differing definitions of the duration of the Vietnam War used in the two projects. This provides that much more 'noise' against which the communality of the patterns emerges.

TABLE 3
PATTERNS OF RESPONSES IN THE TWO PROJECTS*

<u>Year</u>	<u>International incidents</u>	<u>Brookings</u>
1955	2	2
1956	7	6
1957	5	9
1958	5	9
1959	5	11
1960	3	10
1961	9	12
1962	9	11
1963	10	18
1964	13	21
1965	9	13
1966	0	3
1967	4	6
1968	1	4
1969	2	3
1970	4	6
1971	3	6
1972	0	3
1973	3	7
1974	1	5
1975	4	4

*Units are the number of responses initiated in each year.




FIG. 1: COMPARISON OF CNA AND BROOKINGS STUDIES

RESPONSES BY YEAR AND REGION

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE RESPONSES

Since 1955, 82% of the Navy's crisis operations have occurred in three regions:

- the Mediterranean,
- the Americas (Central and South America plus the Caribbean),
- East Asia (Korea through Southeast Asia).

Table 4 gives the distribution of the responses by region and, where appropriate, sub-region. (The operations are listed by region in table 7.)

TABLE 4

DISTRIBUTION OF NAVY RESPONSES BY REGION AND SUB-REGION

<u>Region</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Sub-region</u>	<u>Number</u>
Mediterranean	25	(none)	25
Americas	34	Central America/Caribbean	33
		South America	1
East Asia	(23)	China/Taiwan Strait	6
		Korea	2
		Southeast Asia	15
Other Regions	17	Indian Ocean	13
		Atlantic	4
(Total)	(99)		(99)

$$23/99 \approx 1/4, + 10 = 17$$

$$40/99 = 27\%$$

TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE RESPONSES

Table 5 shows the distribution of Navy's crisis management operations over time in terms of the year in which each response initiated.

A great deal of importance cannot be attached to these numbers. There are significant differences between the responses. Nevertheless, they do provide one partial index of the frequency with which the Navy was called upon to support national policy and hence shed some light on the way in which one dimension of the Navy's role in crisis management has evolved over time.

TABLE 5

NUMBER OF NAVY RESPONSES INITIATED, BY YEAR

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>
1955	2	1966	0
1956	7	1967	4
1957	5	1968	1
1958	5	1969	2
1959	5	1970	4
1960	3	1971	3
1961	9	1972	0
1962	9	1973	3
1963	10	1974	1
1964	13	1975	4
1965	9		

Over the 21-year span an average of 4.7 responses were initiated in any given year. As an examination of figure 2 quickly shows, this value in isolation is misleading due to the variability of the time series. Most of the years prior to 1966 exceed the mean value; all years following 1966 are below that figure.

It is more meaningful to consider the time series in terms of three phases or sub-periods:

- 1955 - 1960,
- 1961 - 1965,
- 1966 - 1975.

These phases (represented by vertical lines) and the mean values for the subperiods (shown as horizontal lines) are plotted in figure 2.

COMPARISON OF GEOGRAPHIC AND TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTIONS

Tables 6 and 7 present the distribution of the Navy's responses in terms of the regions (Mediterranean, the Americas, East Asia, and other regions) and phases (1955-1960, 1961-1965, 1966-1975) employed previously.




FIG. 2: AVERAGE NUMBER OF RESPONSES PER YEAR, BY PERIOD

TABLE 6

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES BY PERIOD AND REGION

<u>Region</u>	<u>1955-1960</u>	<u>1961-1965</u>	<u>1966-1975</u>	<u>Total</u>
Mediterranean	10	3	12	25
Americas	6	24	4	34
East Asia	8	12	3	23
Other Regions	3	11	3	17
(Average, by period)	(4.5)	(10.0)	(2.2)	
Total	27	50	22	99

During the first period there was a relatively even distribution of responses over the three primary regions. Operations became more frequent in the second period and tended to occur with a greater relative frequency in the Americas. In contrast, during the most recent period (1966-1975) operations have been less frequent and the majority of responses have taken place in the Mediterranean.

TABLE 7
LISTING OF RESPONSES BY REGION AND PERIOD

<u>MEDITERRANEAN</u>	(N = 25)
<u>1955-1960</u>	(N = 10)
Jordan 3-5/1956	
Pre-Suez 7-10/1956	
Suez War 10-11/1956	
Post-Suez 11-12/1956	
Jordan 4-5/1957	
Syria 8-12/1957	
Lebanon 5/1958	
Lebanon 6-10/1958	
Jordan-Iraq 7-12/1958 *	
Berlin Crisis 5-9/1959 *	
<u>1961-1965</u>	(N = 3)
Jordan 4/1963	
Cyprus 1-10/1964	
Cyprus 8/1965	
<u>1966-1975</u>	(N = 12)
Greek Coup 4/1967	
Middle East War 5-6/1967	
Eilat 10/1967	
Cyprus 11-12/1967	
Lebanon-Libya Contingency Operation 9-11/1969	
Jordan 6/1970	
Jordan 9-10/1970	
Lebanon 4-6/1973	
Middle East War 10-11/1973	
Cyprus 7-8/1974	
Cyprus 1/1975	
Lebanon 8-12/1975	
<u>AMERICAS</u>	(N = 34)
<u>1955-1960</u>	(N = 6)
Cuban Civil War 12/1956-1/1959	
Haiti 6/1957	
Venezuela 1-5/1958	
Panama 3-5/1958	
Panama 8-11/1958	
Guatemala-Nicaragua 11-12/1960	

1961-1965

(N = 24)

Bay of Pigs 4-6/1961
Dominican Republic 6/1961
Dominican Republic 11-12/1961
Dominican Republic 1/1962
Guantanamo 1-8/1962
Guatemala 3/1962
Haiti 8/1962
Cuban Missile Crisis 10-11/1962
Haiti 4-6/1963
Haiti 8/1963
Dominican Republic 9-12/1963
Venezuela-Colombia 11/1963
Caribbean Surveillance/Cuba 1-4/1964
Panama 1-4/1964
Venezuela 1-10/1964
Brazil 3-4/1964
Guantanamo 4-7/1964
Panama 5/1964
Dominican Republic 7/1964
Haiti 8/1964
Panama 1/1965

EAST ASIA

(N = 23)

1955-1960

(N = 8)

Vietnam Evacuation 1-6/1955
Tachen Islands 2/1955
PRC-ROC 7-9/1957
Indonesia 12/1957-6/1958
Quemoy 6-12/1958
PRC-ROC 7/1959
Laos 7-10/1959
Laos 12/1960-1/1961

1961-1965

(N = 12)

Laos 3-6/1961
South Vietnam 12/1961-8/1962
South Vietnam 4/1962-8/1964
Thailand 5-8/1962
PRC-ROC 6/1962
Laos 4-5/1963
Vietnam Civil Disorders 8-11/1963
PRC-ROC 9/1963
Indonesia-Malaysia 9-12/1963
Laos 4-6/1964
Gulf of Tonkin 8/1964
Indonesia 9/1965-7/1966

1966-1975

(N = 3)

Pueblo 1-3/1968
EC-121 4/1969
Mayaguez 5/1975

4B3.

table 7.
navy
responses
by
report
period.

-17-

Indo Pak War
Indian Ocean
Ethiopia

12/1971 - 1/1972
10/1973 - 4/1974
2-4/1975

Source.
Maloney K. 1977.
p. 17.

f. 18.

British Guiana 4/1965
Venezuela-Colombia 1-4/1965
Dominican Republic 4/1965-9/1966

1966-1975

(N = 4)

Trinidad 4/1970
Cienfuegos 9/1970-6/1971
Haiti 4-5/1971
Bahama Lines/Caribbean Surveillance 12/1971

OTHER REGIONS

(N = 17)

1955-1960

(N = 3)

Red Sea 2-8/1955
Morocco 10/1956-2/1957
Congo 7-11/1960

1961-1965

(N = 11)

Gulf of Guinea/Congo 2-3/1961
Zanzibar 6/1961
Kuwait 6/1961
Berlin Crisis 8/1961-5/1962 **
Sino-Indian War 10-11/1962
Yemen Civil War/Saudi Arabia 1-7/1963
Zanzibar 1/1964
Tanganyika 1/1964
Tanzania 1/1965
Yemen 7/1965-11/1967
Indo-Pak War 10-11/1965

1966-1975

(N = 3)

Indo-Pak War 12/1971-1/1972
Indian Ocean 10/1973-4/1974
Ethiopia 2-4/1975

* Response carried out by Sixth Fleet.

** Navy responses took place in the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic. This case is assigned to the Other Regions category because more activity appears to have taken place in the Atlantic theater of operations.

THE ROLE PLAYED BY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN THE NAVY'S RESPONSES

REASONS FOR FOCUSING ON CARRIER OPERATIONS

Carriers and amphibious units make up the Navy's principal projection forces. Projection forces play a key role in crisis management. They provide the National Command Authorities with the capacity to affect events ashore (either by direct action or by their presence) while retaining the inherent flexibility that is characteristic of all naval forces.

Since the goal of this section is to trace out the anatomy of the role played by carriers in crisis management operations, no attempt will be made to develop detailed measures of effectiveness that would reflect the inherent differences between the units that participated in the responses (e.g., the differing strike capabilities of Hancock and Enterprise). Instead the focus will be upon the number of CVA and CVS units participating in the missions as a partial indicator of the demand placed on carrier resources by these responses.

Other justifications can be offered for this decision: *Support Units*

- Particularly in the third world, the audiences for U.S. crisis management operations are unlikely to make the distinctions between the various carriers in the U.S. force that might be made by a professional naval officer.
- The review of sources indicates that the presence of a carrier in a response is the factor most commonly noted within the policy community. Differences between units are seldom focused upon in these comparisons.
- Some distinctions between carriers do not affect their crisis management roles. While the Congo (1960) operation was conducted by a CVS, a CVA could have performed the same functions. Even though CVS units are no longer in the active force, it is useful to see what roles they played that present-day CV units might have to fill.
- Some of the capabilities (and limitations) of carriers accrue irrespective of class. A unit can only be in one place at a time. Some operational constraints (e.g., COD range) affect units in a broadly similar manner.

DISTRIBUTION OF CARRIER RESPONSES

not attached Over the period 1955-1975, carriers participated in 59 of 99 Navy responses to international incidents and crises.* A list showing the number and type of carriers which participated in each of the operations is presented in Appendix A. Accounts of the specific roles played by these forces in each operation can be found in Appendix C.

Figure 3 shows the number of responses involving carrier forces which were initiated in each year since 1955. To some extent the three periods identified for the entire set of 99 responses also serve to classify the sub-set of responses in which carriers participated, though the phases are not as sharply delineated.

In considering the distribution of carrier responses over the three periods, there is a contrast between the average number of operations involving carriers and the percentage of responses which included carrier units, as is shown in table 8.

TABLE 8

COMPARISON OF THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF CARRIER OPERATIONS AND THE PERCENTAGE OF CARRIER OPERATIONS, BY PERIOD

	<u>1955-1960</u>	<u>1961-1965</u>	<u>1966-1975</u>	<u>1955-1975</u>
Average Number of CV operations in each period (CV Ops/Years in Period)	3.3	4.4	1.7	2.8
Percentage of CV operations in each period (CV Ops/All Ops)	74%	44%	77%	59%

Carrier operations were most frequent, on the average, in the middle period (1961-1965). During the same period, however, the smallest percentage of responses involving carrier units occurred, because of the large number of non-carrier responses during these years. Correspondingly, while a lower average number of carrier operations took place in the final period (1966+), over three-quarters of the responses which were conducted in this period included carrier forces.

*This number has been computed using fairly restrictive assumptions. Only units within the crisis theater which played an active role in the response are included in the calculations. Units with LPH hull designations are excluded (these are covered in the next section).




FIG. 3: COMPARISON OF RESPONSES INVOLVING CARRIERS AND ALL RESPONSES

Table 9 presents the distribution of the Navy's 99 responses by region, period, and the employment of carrier forces in the operations.

TABLE 9

DISTRIBUTION OF CARRIER AND NON-CARRIER RESPONSES BY PERIOD AND REGION

<u>Region</u>	<u>1955-1960</u>		<u>1961-1965</u>		<u>1966-1975</u>		<u>1955-1975</u>	
	<u>CV</u>	<u>NonCV</u>	<u>CV</u>	<u>NonCV</u>	<u>CV</u>	<u>NonCV</u>	<u>CV</u>	<u>NonCV</u>
ψ Mediterranean	9	1	3	0	12	0	24	1
Americas	3	3	9	15	0	4	12	22
ψ East Asia	7	1	8	4	3	0	18	5
Other	1	2	2	9	2	1	5	12
(Sub-Total)	20	7	22	28	17	5	59	40
(Total)	27		50		22		99	

Two regions stand out: the Americas and the Mediterranean. The former is the only one of the three principal regions in which the majority of responses did not involve carriers. During the period when crisis management operations were most frequent (1961-1965) there were a total of 15 non-carrier responses, the largest entry for any of the three periods. These operations made a substantial contribution to the peak in the response curve observed in the early 1960's. In the most recent period, 4 of 5 non-carrier responses took place in this region.

The Mediterranean is the area where responses were most likely to involve at least one CV unit. This is not a surprising finding, given that two attack carriers were customarily deployed with the Sixth Fleet over most of the 21-year period.

Of more significance is the number of carriers involved in these Mediterranean responses. Of the 12 operations in the most recent (1966+) period, only five involved the "standard" number of two. Two involved three units (the second Jordanian Crisis

of 1970 and the Middle East War of 1973) and five saw the use of only one unit: the Greek Coup of 1967, Cyprus 1967, the first Jordanian Crisis of 1970, and the Cyprus and Lebanon Crises of 1975.*

THE NUMBER OF CARRIERS PARTICIPATING IN RESPONSES

The number of carriers units involved in responses provides a crude index of the demands placed on the carrier force by crisis management operations. These calculations are of particular interest due to the decline in the size of the carrier force since the early 1960's.

Table 10 provides, for each period:

- (a) the number of responses involving carriers,
- (b) the total number of carriers active in these operations,
- (c) the ratio of carriers to the number of operations involving at least one carrier (b/a).

The last figure provides a rough index of the level of effort made in each period. Declines indicate that fewer units, on the average, were involved in the carrier responses in a given period. Correspondingly, higher numbers index an increase in the average number of carriers participating in those responses which involved at least one CV or CVA unit.

TABLE 10

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CARRIERS IN CARRIER RESPONSES, BY PERIOD

<u>Period</u>	<u>Attack Carriers</u>			<u>All Carriers</u>		
	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>	<u>(a)</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>(c)</u>
1955-1960	18	38	<u>2.1</u>	20	52	<u>2.6</u>
1961-1965	22	33	<u>1.5</u>	22	43	<u>1.9</u>
1966-1975	17	29	<u>1.7</u>	17	31	<u>1.8</u>
(1955-1975)	(57)	(100)	(<u>1.7</u>)	(59)	(126)	(<u>2.1</u>)

*The way in which carriers and other major projection forces have been employed in recent responses will be considered at greater length in a later section.

The major point is contained in the 'c' columns. Despite the drawdown in the carrier force since the early 1960's, the number of CVs and CVAs involved in the responses since 1966 is quite close to the figure for the 1961-1965 period. In the last decade a smaller force has been employed more intensively in those responses that involved at least one carrier.

It would be reasonable to expect that the U.S. would make a relatively greater commitment of resources when the direct target for its actions was a communist nation. Table 11 shows this to be the case.

TABLE 11

CARRIERS IN RESPONSES INVOLVING COMMUNIST NATIONS*

Principal target	Response	N CVA	N CV
USSR	Post-Suez 11-12/1956	2	3
	Berlin 5-9/1959	2	2
	Berlin 8/1961-5/1962	2	3
	Cuban Missile Crisis 10-11/1962	3	8
	Middle East War 5-6/1967	2	2
	Eilat 10/1967	2	2
	Jordan 9-10/1970	3	3
	Indo-Pak War 12/1971-1/1972	1	1
	Middle East War 10-11/1973	3	3
PRC	Tachen Islands 2/1955	5	6
	PRC-ROC 7-9/1957	3	3
	Quemoy 6-12/1958	5	6
	PRC-ROC 7/1959	2	2
	Sino-Indian War 10-11/1962	1	1
	PRC-ROC 9/1963	1	1
DPRK	Pueblo 1-3/1969	2	3
	EC-121 4/1969	3	4
DRV	Gulf of Tonkin 8/1964	2	2
RGNUC**	Mayaguez 5/1975	1	1
	(Mean)	2.3	2.9
	(Mean, excluding Cuban Missile Crisis)	2.3	2.6
	(Mean, 59 responses involving CVs)	(1.7)	(2.1)

4B3.

Mahoney R.
1977.

*Obviously the Soviet Union and other Marxist-Leninist states have been at least indirect targets during most of the U.S. responses. Conservative criteria were employed in the construction of this list. Only carrier responses are included (hence the exclusion of Cienfuegos, 9/1970-6/1971). The last five entries in the Soviet section are cases in which the USSR made a military response in conjunction with (though not necessarily directed at) a response carried out by the USN or USMC; the source for these entries is (CNA) 76-1177, "Soviet Employment of Naval Power for Political Purposes, 1967-1975," Bradford Dismukes, 18 July 1976. All of the other entries are cases in which a Marxist-Leninist state was the obvious primary target for U.S. military actions. The Pathet Lao regime is excluded from the list because it was not a national government until 1975. Cuba is excluded for two reasons. First, while it was often perceived by U.S. planners as being involved in Caribbean incidents (and hence was a target for U.S. operations), this linkage was often more indirect and less substantial than was the case for incidents involving other Communist states. Secondly, its status in the socialist commonwealth of nations during portions of the 1960's is uncertain.

**Presently Democratic Cambodia.

THE ROLE PLAYED BY AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN THE NAVY'S RESPONSES

Amphibious units make up one of the Naval Service's two principal projection forces.* Like aircraft carriers, amphibious forces play a central role in crisis management operations because of their ability to affect events ashore, either by taking direct action or by establishing a naval presence that must be taken into account by other actors concerned with the incident or crisis.

Amphibious forces played a role in 61 of the Navy's 99 responses over the period 1955-1975. Appendix B lists these operations.** Accounts of the specific roles played by these forces in each operation can be found in Appendix C.

Figure 4 shows how the responses involving amphibious forces were distributed over the 21 year period.

As was the case with carrier operations, the three periods can be used to classify the Navy's responses which involved the employment of amphibious forces. Table 12 shows the average number of operations involving amphibious forces in each period and the percentage of responses involving amphibious units.

In the middle period (1961-1965) operations involving the use of amphibious forces were most frequent. In contrast, this period saw a lower percentage of operations involving these forces than was the case in the earlier and later phases. The percentages for the amphibious operations are more evenly distributed over the three periods than was the case with carrier operations.

*Other components of the Navy besides carriers and amphibious units also have a role in the projection of power ashore. Surface combatants can affect events on land by naval gunfire support, by interdicting seaborne traffic, and by serving as advanced staging platforms for Marine forces (as seen most recently in the Mayaguez operation). However, the broadest projection capabilities reside in the amphibious and carrier forces.

**As with the earlier set of carrier operations, restrictive assumptions were used in the identification of the responses in which amphibious forces participated, e.g., only forces within a theater were included as part of the response, and then only if the sources cited them as part of the operation.




FIG. 4: DISTRIBUTION OF AMPHIBIOUS RESPONSES OVER TIME

TABLE 12

COMPARISON OF THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS*
AND THE PERCENTAGE OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, BY PERIOD

	<u>1955-1960</u>	<u>1961-1965</u>	<u>1966-1975</u>	<u>1955-1975</u>
Average Number of Amphibious Operations (Amphib. Ops./Years in Period)	3.0	5.6	1.5	2.9
Percentage of Amphibious Operations in each Period (Amphib. Ops./All Ops.)	66%	56%	68%	61%

*In this section the phrase 'amphibious operations' refers to Navy responses which included amphibious forces. Amphibious operations do not necessarily entail the projection of power ashore. Projection operations are discussed in appendix E.

Table 13 presents the distribution of the Navy's 99 responses by region, period, and the utilization of amphibious forces in the operations.

TABLE 13

DISTRIBUTION OF AMPHIBIOUS AND NON-AMPHIBIOUS RESPONSES BY PERIOD
AND REGION

	<u>1955-1960</u>		<u>1961-1965</u>		<u>1966-1975</u>		<u>1955-1975</u>	
<u>Region</u>	<u>Amphib.</u>	<u>Non</u>	<u>Amphib.</u>	<u>Non</u>	<u>Amphib.</u>	<u>Non</u>	<u>Amphib.</u>	<u>Non</u>
Mediterranean	8	2	3	0	11	1	22	3
Americas	3	3	16	8	2	2	21	13
East Asia	6	2	6	6	1	2	13	10
Other Regions	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>
Sub-total	18	9	28	22	15	7	61	38
Total	<u>27</u>		<u>50</u>		<u>22</u>		<u>99</u>	

Amphibious forces participated in the majority of responses in each of the three periods and within each of the three primary regions.

FORCES EMPLOYED IN RECENT RESPONSES

NAVY PROJECTION FORCES IN RECENT RESPONSES

Naval projection forces play a leading role in American crisis responses. The two preceding sections have provided a survey of the ways in which the Navy's major projection forces (carriers and amphibious units) have been deployed in responses over a 21-year period. This section provides a more focused examination of the employment of these forces in recent operations (1966-1975).*

Table 14 provides an aggregate summary of the employment of major projection forces in responses which allows us to see how the most recent period both differs from and resembles earlier periods of operations.

Comparing operations in the 1966-1975 period with those in earlier years, a number of points of similarity and contrast can be observed. Since 1966, Navy crisis responses have been less frequent, particularly in comparison to the 1961-1965 period. At the same time, however, the intensity of the operations has increased. Since 1966 amphibious units and carriers have been more likely to participate in crisis operations than was the case in the immediately preceding period. Similarly, despite the reduction in size of the active carrier force since the early 1960s, since 1966 the number of CVs (or CVAs) deployed in those operations in which carrier forces were used has remained at a level similar to that found in earlier years.

A more detailed picture of the role played by projection forces in recent responses is presented in table 15, which provides a profile of the major units involved in each operation.

A number of significant points can be made on the basis of the information presented in table 15. The first (and most obvious) is the frequency with which one or both of the major projection forces have been employed in recent responses. Such units participated in 87% (19/22) of the post-1965 operations.

The second noteworthy point is the existence of a special weapons/logistics evacuation contingency mission for the amphibious force. While this role is cited by the sources in only two cases (the Greek Coup of 1967 and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974), it is possible that its incidence has been understated due to the sensitivity of the subject. This is a role which is not customarily discussed even in high-level routine reporting.

*This section deals with the employment of projection forces in crisis operations and not with projection operations per se. A summary of projection operations over the period 1955-1975 is provided in appendix E.

TABLE 14

EMPLOYMENT OF MAJOR PROJECTION FORCES IN RESPONSES,
BY PERIOD

<u>Period</u>	<u>N Responses</u>	<u>Amphib. %</u>	<u>CV %</u>	<u>N CV</u>	<u>N CVA</u>
1955-1960	27	66%	74%	2.6	2.1
1961-1965	50	56%	44%	1.9	1.5
1966-1975	22	68%	77%	1.8	1.7
(1955-1975)	(99)	(61%)	(59%)	(2.1)	(1.7)

KEY

N Responses	Number of operations conducted in each period.
Amphib. %	Percentage of operations in each period involving amphibious forces.
CV %	Percentage of operations in each period involving carrier forces (CVA and CVS).
N CV	Average number of CVs employed in those operations involving at least one CV, by period.
N CVA	Average number of CVAs employed in those operations involving at least one CVA, by period.

The third point of significance is the presence of LPH units during all of the Mediterranean responses since the 1973 October War. Prior to the regular deployment of LPHs in the Mediterranean, shortages of helicopters limited the roles that the Marine forces on station in that theater could play during responses. For example, the Marines were not assigned a contingency mission during the first phase of the Jordan 6/1970 operation, probably due to the absence of adequate helicopter lift.

The fourth point is the variation in the size of the projection forces marshalled in the responses. For example, a majority of the Mediterranean operations did not involve 2 CVAs (the number of attack carriers customarily deployed in that theater). Five responses involved only 1 CVA and two involved 3. Significantly, the amphibious force was also augmented (by one battalion landing team) during the two Mediterranean responses in which the carrier force was increased to 3 CVAs (Jordan 9-10/1970 and the Middle East War of 1973).

TABLE 15

MAJOR PROJECTION FORCES PARTICIPATING IN RECENT RESPONSES (1966-1975)

<u>Response</u>	<u>Projection Force *</u>	<u>Response</u>	<u>Projection Force *</u>
Greek Coup 4/1967	CVA America Two BLTs**	Middle East War 10-11/1973	CVAs Independence, Roosevelt, Kennedy Two BLTs, LPHs Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima
Middle East War 5-6/1967	One BLT	Indian Ocean 10/1973-4/1974	CVA Hancock (replaced on station by Oriskany which was in turn succeeded by Kitty Hawk)
Elilat 10/1967	CVAs Saratoga, America		CVAs Forrestal, America One BLT and LPH Inchon**
Cyprus 11-12/1967	CVAs Roosevelt, Saratoga	Cyprus 7-8/1974	
	CVA Roosevelt One BLT	Cyprus 1/1975	CVA Saratoga One BLT, LPH Guam
Pueblo 1-3/1968	CVAN Enterprise; CVA Ranger; CVS Yorktown (later: CVA Coral Sea and CVS Keatinge)	Ethiopia 2-4/1975	No major projection units Gulf of Thailand 4/1975 (Eagle Pull Execution) LPH Okinawa One BLT
EC-121	CVAN Enterprise; CVAs Ticonderoga, Ranger; CVS Hornet		South China Sea 4/1975 (Frequent wind Execution) CVA Hancock LPH Okinawa One RLT
Lebanon-Libyan Contingency Operation 9-11/1969	CVAs Kennedy, Saratoga One BLT.		
Trinidad 4/1970	One BLT, LPH Guam	Mayaguez 5/1975	CVA Coral Sea Elements of Third Marine Division.
Jordan 6/1970	CVA Forrestal One BLT	Lebanon 8-12/1975	CVA Kennedy (replaced by Independence) One BLT, LPH Iwo Jima (replaced by Inchon)
Jordan 9-10/1970	CVAs Independence, Saratoga, Kennedy Two BLTs and LPH Guam		
Cienfuegos 9/1970-6/1971	No major projection units		
Haiti 5/1971	One BLT		
Bahama Lines 12/1971	No major projection units		
Indo-Pak War 12/1971-1/1972	CVAN Enterprise One BLT (-), LPH Tripoli		
Lebanon 4-6/1973	CVAs Forrestal, Kennedy One BLT (additional BLT held in readiness in LANTCOM as contingency force) Gulf of Thailand 6-7/197 "Eagle Pull Alert" LPH Inchon One BLT		

* This list includes carriers, battalion landing teams, and Landing Platforms-Helicopter; other types of amphibious ships are not listed.

** One of the amphibious force's missions was to be prepared to assist in the evacuation of special weapons.

*** Following the initial evacuation phase of the operation, the Inchon (with a BLT (-) embarked) served as a special logistics evacuation force; British amphibious forces also participated in the initial (evacuation) phase of the response.

4B3.

R. Mahoney
1977 p.31

This variation in the number of major projection units mustered during the operations suggests that naval forces have been tailored to the crisis situations with some selectivity. Responses have involved more than simply the utilization of those naval forces which were readily available in a given theater; some operations have involved only part of the in-theater forces, others have required redeployments from other theaters.

FORCE MIXES EMPLOYED IN RECENT RESPONSES

In employing naval forces in crisis responses it appears that the National Command Authorities have utilized four "packages" of naval forces in crisis management operations. These sets of responses (presented in table 16) can be differentiated on the basis of the number and type of major projection units employed. Furthermore, it appears that the force packages correspond (in at least a general sense) to certain types of crisis situations, or sets of similar policy problems.

TABLE 16

CLASSIFICATION OF NAVY RESPONSES SINCE 1966

<u>Type of Major Projection Forces</u>	<u>Responses in Category</u>
No major projection forces	Cienfuegos 9/1970-6/1971 Bahama Lines 12/1971 Ethiopia 2-4/1975
Only amphibious units	Trinidad 4/1970 Haiti 5/1971
One-two carriers, usually accompanied by amphibious units*	Greek Coup 4/1967 Middle East War 5-6/1967 Eilat 10/1967* Cyprus 11-12/1967 Lebanon-Libya 9-11/1969 Jordan 6/1970 Indo-Pak 12/1971-1/1972 Lebanon 4-6/1973 Indian Ocean 10/1973-4/1974* Cyprus 7-8/1974 Cyprus 1/1975 Mayaguez 5/1975 Lebanon 8-12/1975
More than two carriers*	Pueblo 1-3/1968* EC-121 4/1969* Jordan 9-10/1970 Middle East War 10-11/1973

*Amphibious units did not participate in four of the responses in the last two categories: Eilat 1967, Indian Ocean 1973-1974, Pueblo 1968, and EC-121 1969.

Three operations fall into the first category (No Major Projection Forces). Two were surveillance operations (Cienfuegos and Bahama Lines); one (Ethiopia 1975) was a low-level response that appears to have primarily entailed surveillance operations conducted by the destroyer Lawrence.^{*} Projection forces are not required for this type of operation.

Moreover, in two of the cases (Bahama Lines and Ethiopia) there was no significant in-theater Soviet presence that would have required the kind of tactical deterrence that carrier-based aviation can provide. In the case of Cienfuegos it is plausible to assume that the level of force in the operation was deliberately underplayed since the primary U.S. reaction to the Soviet deployments appears to have taken place on the diplomatic level.^{**}

Only two cases fall into the second package (Only Amphibious units); Trinidad and Haiti. Both responses took place in the Caribbean, an area of traditional interest to the U.S., one in which the Soviets do not maintain standing surface naval forces, and in which shore-based tactical air assets, had they been required, were potentially available during crisis responses (using airbases in CONUS, Guantanamo, and Puerto Rico). As a result, there was less of a need for carrier forces. Amphibious units, on the other hand, had a major role to play in the responses as contingency evacuation forces to rescue American citizens who might have been endangered by civil unrest on both islands.

The third package of responses (One to Two Carriers, Usually Accompanied by Amphibious Units) makes up the largest category of crisis operations. The majority of these operations were Mediterranean responses.

^{*}The interpretation that the Lawrence was on station to gather information rather than to serve as an advanced staging platform for evacuation operations is buttressed by the fact that a carrier task force formed around the Enterprise had been in the Indian Ocean for some time prior to the operation but was not deployed to the vicinity; on the day after the evacuation of American personnel from the conflict area within Ethiopia (an evacuation conducted by civilian airliners) the Enterprise group conducted a port visit in Mombasa.

^{**}American political and military responses are covered in Barry M. Blechman and Stephanie E. Levinson, "Soviet Submarine Visits to Cuba," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1975, pp. 30-39.

The major projection forces participating in these operations* possessed the capability to project power ashore to:

- evacuate special weapons and associated personnel,
- rescue endangered Western nationals,
- conduct short term, moderate scale landing and airstrike operations directed at third world nations, and
- serve as a medium for sending signals of U.S. intentions and concerns during the course of a crisis (e.g., the movement of two carrier groups towards the Syrian coast during the final phase of the 1967 June War**).

Unlike the responses in the previous two categories, carrier aviation had a more direct role to play in these operations. This is particularly true in light of recent experience during Mediterranean crises in which allied nations have placed restrictions on the utilization of airfields and refused to grant overflight rights to U.S. aircraft.

The fourth and final force package contains four operations. These are the most serious crisis responses in terms of both the nature of the incidents responded to and the level of naval force deployed in the operations. The four cases are most profitably examined in two subsets.

The first consists of the Pueblo and EC-121 incidents. Both involved unprovoked direct attacks on American military units by North Korean forces. As direct attacks, they constituted more direct challenges to the U.S. than did the incidents responded to in the preceding three categories. Had the U.S. resorted to power projection in retaliation for the attacks, it almost certainly would have taken the form of air strikes rather than amphibious landings. As a consequence, carriers rather than amphibious units, were the appropriate projection forces for the operations.

*Marine/amphibious forces did not participate in two of the operations in this category. The first case was the 10/1967 Eilat response which took place at sea. The second case was the 1973/1974 deployment of carrier units into the Indian Ocean. The missions assigned to this force appear to have been to demonstrate American determination to navigate in international waters despite restrictions that littoral nations might attempt to apply and to express (through the language of action) U.S. concern with the oil embargo and American capabilities to project power ashore in the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. The absence of an amphibious force helped to tailor the symbolic message. The carrier's presence showed that the U.S. could move projection-capable units to the area. The absence of an LPH (and other amphibious types) showed that there was no substance to prevalent speculations concerning possible U.S. intervention to seize oil fields. In this respect the absence of an amphibious force spoke as loudly as the carrier's presence.

**For a discussion of this phase of the 1967 response, see Appendix C.

The second subset consists of the two Mediterranean crisis responses. The grave seriousness of the September-October Jordanian crisis is attested to by the view of one prominent Soviet student of American crisis behavior that: "the crisis threatened to become the most critical confrontation since the time of the Caribbean crisis in 1962" and by the observations of American commentators that U.S. intervention would have been a genuine possibility had the Jordanians not been able to halt the Syrian advance.* The extremely critical nature of the response to the 1973 October war is indicated by the world-wide increase in DEFCON alert status during the course of that operation.

Judging on the basis of the congruence between the four force packages and the types of crisis management situations included in each of the four categories, it is apparent that the National Command Authorities have marshalled naval forces with considerable selectivity. The Navy has been used as a flexible instrument of crisis diplomacy.

*The Soviet view quoted is that of V.V. Zhurkin, The U.S. A. and International Political Crises, Moscow: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1975, p. 50; Zhurkin is the Deputy Director of the Soviet Institute of the United States of America and Canada. G. Matthew Bonham and Michael J. Shapiro, "Explanation of the Unexpected: The Syrian Intervention in Jordan in 1970," 113-141 in Robert Axelrod (ed.) Structure of Decision, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, cover possible American responses.

REFERENCES

1. Annual Reports and Command Histories produced by the numbered fleets and by the senior Navy commands within each Unified Command (e.g., CINCPACFLT)
2. Azar, Edward E., Probe for Peace: Exploring Small State Hostilities, Minneapolis: Burgess, 1973
3. Azar, Edward E. and Thomas J. Sloan, Dimensions of Interaction: A Source Book for the Study of the Behavior of 31 National from 1948 through 1973, Pittsburgh: International Studies Association, 1975
4. Bendix Corporation, "The Navy and Sub-Limited Conflict (U)," Secret, Sept 1966
5. Blechman, Barry M. and Stephen S. Kaplan, "The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument," Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976
6. Bonham, G. Matthew and Michael J. Shapiro, "Explanation of the Unexpected: The Syrian Intervention in Jordan in 1970," 113-141 in Robert Axelrod (ed.), Structure of Decision, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976
7. Cable, James, Gunboat Diplomacy, New York Praeger, 1971
8. Center for Naval Analyses, "Conventional Force Deployments: Appendix A, USN/USMC Forces Levels and Deployments 1958 - 1972 (U)," Confidential, 29 May 1973
9. Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps, "Selected Analysis of Marine Corps and Navy Amphibious Force Requirements and Capabilities (U)," Secret/NoForn, Apr 1972
10. Chief of Naval Operations, "Summary of Wars/Near Wars Since 1946," Joint Hearings, Senate-House Armed Services Subcommittees, CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 163-165, Unclassified, Apr 1970
11. Command History produced by each Unified Command (e.g., CINCPAC)
12. Democratic Republic of Vietnam, The Thieu Regime Put to the Test 1973-1975, Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975
13. Dirksen, Senator Everett, "Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Foreign Countries. II. Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1945," Congressional Record, Senate, S6955-S6958, 23 Jun 1969
14. Center for Naval Analyses Memorandum (CNA)76-1177, Dismukes, Bradford, "Soviet Employment of Naval Power for Political Purposes, 1967-1975 (U)," Unclassified, 18 Jul 1976
15. Ellsworth, Henry Allanson, One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines, Washington: GPO. 1974 (reprint of 1934 edition)

16. Gilmore, Barbara A., "Chronology of U.S. Naval Events, 1960-1975," Operational Archives, U.S. Navy History Division
17. Goldmann, Kjell, Tension and Detente in Bipolar Europe, Stockholm: Esselte Studium/Scandinavian University Books, 1974
18. Hermann, Charles F., International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research, New York: Free Press, 1972
19. National Military Command Center, Operational Summary
20. Operational Archives, U.S. Navy History Division, "Attack Aircraft Carrier Utilization," Aug 1969
21. Operational Summary of the National Military Command Center
22. Richardson, R.P., Jr., et. al., "An Analysis of Recent Conflicts (U)," CNA Research Contribution 144, Unclassified, Jan 1966
23. Tillema, Herbert K., Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the ERA of Containment, New York: Crowell, 1973
24. Zhurkin, V.V., The U.S.A. and International Political Crises, Moscow: Izdateli' stvo Nauka, 1975; excerpts translated in Joint Publications Research Service, Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs, 27-108, 29 Jul 1975

APPENDIX A

EMPLOYMENT OF CARRIERS IN NAVY CRISIS RESPONSES

APPENDIX A

EMPLOYMENT OF CARRIERS IN NAVY CRISIS RESPONSES

Table A-1 presents a summary of the types and numbers of aircraft carriers employed in the Navy's responses to international incidents and crises over the period 1955-1975.

TABLE A-1
LIST OF CARRIER RESPONSES

<u>Incident</u>	<u>CVA</u>	<u>CVS₁</u>	<u>CVS₂</u>	<u>CV</u>
Vietnam Evacuations 1-6/1955.....	0	0	0	0
Tachen Islands 2/1955.....	5	1	0	6
Red Sea 2-8/1955.....	0	0	0	0
Jordan 3-5/1956.....	2	0	0	2
Pre-Suez 7-10/1956.....	2	0	0	2
Morocco 10/1956-2/1957.....	0	0	0	0
Suez War 10-11/1956.....	2	1	0	3
Post-Suez 11-12/1956.....	2	1	0	3
Cuban Civil War 12/1956-1/1959.....	1	0	0	1
Jordan 4-5/1957.....	1	1	0	2
Haiti 6/1957.....	0	0	0	0
PRC-ROC 7-9/1957.....	3	0	0	3
Syria 8-12/1957.....	2	1	1	4
Indonesia 12/1957-6/1958.....	1	0	1	2
Venezuela 1-5/1958.....	0	0	1	1
Lebanon 5/1958.....	2	1	0	3
Lebanon 6-10/1958.....	2	1	0	3
Quemoy 6-12/1958.....	5	1	0	6
Jordan-Iraq 7-12/1958.....	0	0	0	0
Panama 3-5/1959.....	0	0	0	0
Berlin Crisis 5-9/1959.....	2	0	0	2
PRC-ROC 7/1959.....	2	0	0	2
Laos 7-10/1959.....	1	0	0	1
Panama 8-11/1959.....	0	0	0	0
Congo 7-11/1960.....	0	0	1	1
Guatemala-Nicaragua 11-12/1960.....	1	1	0	2
Laos 12/1960-1/1961.....	2	1	0	3
Gulf of Guinea/Congo 2-3/1961.....	0	0	0	0
Laos 3-6/1961.....	2	0	1	3
Bay of Pigs 4-6/1961.....	2	0	0	2
Dominican Republic 6/1961.....	2	1	0	3
Zanzibar 6/1961.....	0	0	0	0
Kuwait 6/1961.....	0	0	0	0
Berlin Crisis 8/1961-5/1962.....	2	1	0	3
Dominican Republic 11-12/1961.....	1	0	0	1
South Vietnam 12/1961-8/1962.....	0	0	0	0
Dominican Republic 1/1962.....	0	0	0	0
Guantanamo 1-8/1962.....	0	0	0	0
Guatemala 3/1962.....	1	0	0	1
South Vietnam 4/1962-8/1964.....	0	0	0	0
Thailand 5-8/1962.....	1	1	0	2
PRC-ROC 6/1962.....	X	X	X	X
Haiti 8/1962.....	1	0	0	1
Cuban Missile Crisis 10-11/1962.....	3	5	0	8
Sino-Indian War 10-11/1962.....	1	0	0	1
Yemen Civil War/Saudi Arabia 1-7/1963.....	0	0	0	0
Jordan 4/1963.....	2	0	0	2
Laos 4-5/1963.....	2	0	0	2
Haiti 4-6/1963.....	1	0	0	1
Haiti 8/1963.....	0	0	0	0
Vietnam Civil Disorders 8-11/1963.....	2	0	0	2
PRC-ROC 9/1963.....	1	0	0	1

TABLE A-1 (Cont'd)

<u>Incident</u>	<u>CVA</u>	<u>CVS₁</u>	<u>CVS₂</u>	<u>CV</u>
Dominican Republic 9-12/1963.....	0	0	0	0
Indonesia-Malaysia 9-12/1963.....	1	0	0	1
Venezuela-Colombia 11/1963.....	0	0	0	0
Zanzibar 1/1964.....	0	0	0	0
Tanganyika 1/1964.....	0	0	0	0
Caribbean Surveillance/Cuba 1-4/1964.....	0	0	0	0
Panama 1-4/1964.....	0	0	0	0
Venezuela 1-10/1964.....	0	0	0	0
Cyprus 1-10/1964.....	1	0	0	1
Brazil 3-4/1964.....	1	0	0	1
Laos 4-6/1964.....	2	0	0	2
Guantanamo 4-7/1964.....	0	0	0	0
Panama 5/1964.....	0	0	0	0
Dominican Republic 7/1964.....	0	0	0	0
Gulf of Tonkin 8/1964.....	2	0	0	2
Haiti 8/1964.....	0	0	0	0
Panama 1/1965.....	0	0	0	0
Tanzania 1/1965.....	0	0	0	0
British Guiana 4/1965.....	0	0	0	0
Venezuela-Colombia 1-4/1965.....	0	0	0	0
Dominican Republic 4/1965-9/1966.....	1	1	0	2
Yemen 7/1965-11/1967.....	0	0	0	0
Cyprus 8/1965.....	1	0	0	1
Indonesia 9/1965-7/1966.....	0	0	0	0
Indo-Pak War 10-11/1965.....	0	0	0	0
Greek Coup 4/1967.....	1	0	0	1
Middle East War 5-6/1967.....	2	0	0	2
Eilat 10/1967.....	2	0	0	2
Cyprus 11-12/1967.....	1	0	0	1
Pueblo 1-3/1968.....	2	1	0	3
EC-121 4/1969.....	3	1	0	4
Lebanon-Libyan Contingency 9-11/1969.....	2	0	0	2
Trinidad 4/1970.....	0	0	0	0
Jordan 6/1970.....	1	0	0	1
Jordan 9-10/1970.....	3	0	0	3
Cienfuegos 9/1970-6/1971.....	0	0	0	0
Haiti 4-5/1971.....	0	0	0	0
Bahama Lines/Caribbean 12/1971.....	0	0	0	0
Indo-Pak War 12/1971-1/1972.....	1	0	0	1
Lebanon 4-6/1973.....	2	0	0	2
Middle East War 10-11/1973.....	3	0	0	3
Indian Ocean 10/1973-4/1974.....	1	0	0	1
Cyprus 7-8/1974.....	2	0	0	2
Cyprus 1/1975.....	1	0	0	1
Ethiopia 2-4/1975.....	0	0	0	0
Mayaguez 5/1975.....	1	0	0	1
Lebanon 8-12/1975.....	1	0	0	1

KEY

- CVA Number of attack aircraft carriers in the response.
- CVS₁ Number of CVS (support) units in the response, with the exception of units which fall into the CVS₂ category.
- CVS₂ Number of CVS (support) units in the response that appear to have primarily operated as LPH (helicopter assault) ships during a crisis operation. It is assumed that a CVS falls into the CVS₁ category unless the source materials place primary emphasis upon its role as a platform for Marine and/or helicopter operations.
- CV Total number of carriers in the response (sum of previous columns).
- X Sources do not permit the determination of the number of carriers involved in the operation.

APPENDIX B

EMPLOYMENT OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN NAVY CRISIS RESPONSES

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the
theoretical aspects of the problem. It is shown that the
problem is equivalent to a problem of the theory of
differential equations.

APPENDIX B

EMPLOYMENT OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN NAVY CRISIS RESPONSES

Table B-1 identifies the instances in which amphibious forces participated in the Navy's responses to international incidents and crises over the period 1955-1975.

TABLE B-1
RESPONSES INVOLVING AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

<u>Incident</u>	<u>Amphib.</u>
Vietnam Evacuations 1-6/1955.....	1
Tachen Islands 2/1955.....	1
Red Sea 2-8/1955.....	0
Jordan 3-5/1956.....	1
Pre-Suez 7-10/1956.....	1
Morocco 10/1956-2/1957.....	0
Suez War 10-11/1956.....	1
Post-Suez 11-12/1956.....	1
Cuban Civil War 12/1956-1/1959.....	1
Jordan 4-5/1957.....	1
Haiti 6/1957.....	1
PRC-ROC 7-9/1957.....	X
Syria 8-12/1957.....	1
Indonesia 12/1957-6/1958.....	1
Venezuela 1-5/1958.....	1
Lebanon 5/1958.....	1
Lebanon 6-10/1958.....	1
Quemoy 6-12/1958.....	1
Jordon-Iraq 7-12/1958.....	0
Panama 3-5/1959.....	0
Berlin Crisis 5-9/1959.....	0
PRC-ROC 7/1959.....	X
Laos 7-10/1959.....	1
Panama 8-11/1959.....	0
Congo 7-11/1960.....	1
Guatemala-Nicaragua 11-12/1960.....	0
Laos 12/1960-1/1961.....	1
Gulf of Guinea/Congo 2-3/1961.....	1
Laos 3-6/1961.....	1
Bay of Pigs 4-6/1961.....	1
Dominican Republic 6/1961.....	1
Zanzibar 6/1961.....	1
Kuwait 6/1961.....	1
Berlin Crisis 8/1961-5/1962.....	0
Dominican Republic 11-12/1961.....	1
South Vietnam 12/1961-8/1962.....	0
Dominican Republic 1/1962.....	1
Guantanamo 1-8/1962.....	1
Guatemala 3/1962.....	1
South Vietnam 4/1962-8/1964.....	1
Thailand 5-8/1962.....	1

IncidentAmphib.

PRC-ROC 6/1962.....	X
Haiti 8/1962.....	1
Cuban Missile Crisis 10-11/1962.....	1
Sino-Indian War 10-11/1962.....	0
Yemen Civil War/Saudi Arabia 1-7/1963.....	0
Jordan 4/1963.....	1
Laos 4-5/1963.....	1
Haiti 4-6/1963.....	1
Haiti 8/1963.....	1
Vietnam Civil Disorders 8-11/1963.....	1
PRC-ROC 9/1963.....	X
Dominican Republic 9-12/1963.....	1
Indonesia-Malaysia 9-12/1963.....	0
Venezuela-Colombia 11/1963.....	0
Zanzibar 1/1964.....	0
Tanganyika 1/1964.....	0
Caribbean Surveillance/Cuba 1-4/1964.....	0
Panama 1-4/1964.....	1
Venezuela 1-10/1964.....	0
Cyprus 1-10/1964.....	1
Brazil 3-4/1964.....	0
Laos 4-6/1964.....	0
Guantanamo 4-7/1964.....	1
Panama 5/1964.....	1
Dominican Republic 7/1964.....	0
Gulf of Tonkin 8/1964.....	0
Haiti 8/1964.....	0
Panama 1/1965.....	1
Tanzania 1/1965.....	0
British Guiana 4/1965.....	0
Venezuela-Colombia 1-4/1965.....	0
Dominican Republic 4/1965-9/1966.....	1
Yemen 7/1965-11/1967.....	0
Cyprus 8/1965.....	1
Indonesia 9/1965-7/1966.....	1
Indo-Pak War 10-11/1965.....	0
Greek Coup 4/1967.....	1
Middle East War 5-6/1967.....	1
Eilat 10/1967.....	0
Cyprus 11-12/1967.....	1
Pueblo 1-3/1968.....	0
EC-121 4/1969.....	0
Lebanon-Libyan Contingency 9-11/1969.....	1
Trinidad 4/1970.....	1
Jordan 6/1970.....	1
Jordan 9-10/1970.....	1

<u>Incident</u>	<u>Amphib.</u>
Cienfuegos 9/1970-6/1971.....	0
Haiti 4-5/1971.....	1
Bahama Lines/Caribbean 12/1971.....	0
Indo-Pak War 12/1971-1/1972.....	1
Lebanon 4-6/1973.....	1
Middle East War 10-11/1973.....	1
Indian Ocean 10/1973-4/1974.....	0
Cyprus 7-8/1974.....	1
Cyprus 1/1975.....	1
Ethiopia 2-4/1975.....	0
Mayaguez 5/1975.....	1
Lebanon 8-12/1975.....	1

NOTE:

This list includes only amphibious operations. Responses involving the USMC which did not include amphibious shipping (e.g., Morocco 10/1956-2/1957) are not included. A "1" indicates that amphibious units are cited by the sources as part of the Navy's response to the incident or crisis; a "0" that amphibious forces were not cited; an "X" that source materials were incomplete and did not allow the determination of the presence or absence of amphibious units.