


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THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE  
PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION,  
1899-1902



A thesis presented to the Command and General Staff College of the U.S. Army in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the

MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE

by

GERALD H. EARLY, MAJ, USA  
B.S., Arizona State University, 1965  
M.A., Shippensburg State College, 1970

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back. Then Young's command made a forced march to Tired Pass in yet another attempt to intercept Aguinaldo. An insurgent force gallantly delayed Young while their leader escaped into the mountains. Although Young did not find Aguinaldo, he did manage to capture the revolutionary president's mother, young son, and others of the party.<sup>41</sup>

The grand design, while missing Aguinaldo, had succeeded in most of its mission. The Americans had captured or destroyed the organs of the insurgent government, and most of north-central Luzon was under American control. MacArthur then recommended that Otis issue a proclamation announcing the end of the revolutionary government and declaring that further insurgent military activity would be treated as outlawry. Otis demurred. He was afraid the remaining insurgents would be encouraged to fight to the bitter end if they knew they would be treated as criminals if captured, and he feared rebel retaliation against their American and Spanish prisoners.<sup>42</sup>

#### Efforts to Win the People

As early as 7 December 1898, Admiral Dewey and General Otis agreed that arrangements should be made for the eventual transfer from military to civilian control of the American administration in the Philippines. They jointly suggested that the President appoint a commission to come to the islands, assess its needs, and make recommendations on the form and institutions of civil government.<sup>43</sup>

The Schurman Commission. Such a Commission was appointed by the President, and its members arrived in the Islands between January and March 1899. The chairman was Jacob Gould Schurman, president of Cornell University, and the other members were Charles Denby, former United States

minister to China, and Professor Dean C. Worcester of the University of Michigan, who had traveled in the Philippines and written a book about his experiences. Dewey and Otis also became members. The Commission did not interview Aguinaldo personally, but it met with his representatives as part of the inquiry. It also conferred with members of the American administration and conducted an extensive examination of existing plans for the governance of the Philippines. The Commission's report, dated 31 January 1900, in effect approved and recommended the extension of the forms of government for the Islands already developed by Otis and being implemented by the military establishment.<sup>44</sup>

The Illusion of Civil Success. The institutions of local government installed by the United States forces were so successful that the insurgent leadership became alarmed. The Americans appeared to be gaining the confidence and support of the people, which would inevitably mean an end to the revolutionary movement. In most areas, the impartial American governments, with few restrictions on the freedom of the people, no demands for food or money other than normal taxes, and no interest in drafting the young men, was in marked contrast to the previous insurgent administration. As in Manila, the prompt and purposeful establishment of schools and improvement in public services won adherents among the people.<sup>45</sup>

However, all was not as sanguine as it appeared on the surface in the occupied areas. The local revolutionary leadership was nowhere completely destroyed, but had only gone underground or joined insurgent bands operating in nearby areas. At the direction of Aguinaldo's headquarters, the revolutionaries steadily but quietly combated American efforts. The insurgents in these areas were no longer in much of a position to gain

adherents through attraction, for only those who were ideologically committed to the idea of an independent Philippines, or who could expect to profit from upsetting the existing administration, were likely to actively oppose the Americans. Therefore, the rebels turned more to the tactics of coercion. By threats, enforced when necessary by kidnapping, torture, and murder, they elicited cooperation and silence from the people. While many Filipinos submitted of necessity to this abuse, it alienated growing numbers of people from the Katipunan.<sup>46</sup>

In most American-controlled areas there were in fact two governments, usually comprised of the same members, who by day worked diligently and apparently willingly for the Americans while at night they served the insurgents. A village president, therefore, might hold office under both the Americans and the insurgent shadow government, and he often served both with equal zeal. As a result, the Americans often perceived a pacified and even pro-American population, while in actuality insurgent agents were everywhere and the revolutionary government could have resumed full and open control on a moment's notice.<sup>47</sup>

#### Aguinaldo Orders Guerrilla War

The series of stunning defeats the rebels suffered between February and November 1899 had reduced their army to scattered and largely uncoordinated bands. Yet while they had been steadily driven back by the American Army, the insurgents had never been decisively defeated.

Aguinaldo then did what he had preferred all along, and now he could do no other if his movement was to survive. On 17 October 1899, he directed guerrilla war against the Americans. Emphasizing the importance of continued resistance to the Americans, he said in an address to the country that:

The day for final judgment of our cause approaches. Over in the United States in the month of December next the great assembly will meet which is to judge this cruel contest which the Filipino people are maintaining against the imperialist party, presided over by McKinley.<sup>48</sup>

He then called on the people to rally and resist the enemy. He ordered the army to step up the action of "flying columns" and attack American outposts on its own initiative. He directed the establishment of guerrilla bands to promote disturbances, "to cut the railroad, destroy the bridges, and keep the enemy busy trying to locate . . . and run them down."<sup>49</sup> He also ordered the sandathan to conduct a terror campaign in Manila, "according to the instructions sent by me some time ago."<sup>50</sup>

On 1 November, Aguinaldo told some civilian municipal leaders that it would be necessary to:

. . . impress upon all residents the capture of enemies who wander in small numbers at distant points, going to the extent of killing them. Remember that if only a few are killed at each place, if there are many places where they are killed the total number gotten rid of will be large and we shall obtain victory and our desire.<sup>51</sup>

This latest insurgent decision would come as a surprise to the Americans, who by now considered the long-term task of pacification to be progressing nicely. Once again, the next move was up to the insurgents, and this time events would take an especially ugly turn.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> John R. M. Taylor, "The Philippine Insurrection," II, pp. 138-39.
- <sup>2</sup> Frederick Funston, Memories of Two Wars (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911), pp. 177-78.
- <sup>3</sup> Taylor, loc. cit.
- <sup>4</sup> Taylor, II, p. 151.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 50.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 130-31.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid., pp. 139-40.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., pp. 157-58.
- <sup>9</sup> William T. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1939), pp. 90-92; see also Taylor, II, pp. 139-40.
- <sup>10</sup> Henry A. Fant, "Arthur MacArthur and the Philippine Insurrection," (unpublished Master's thesis, Mississippi State University, 1963), pp. 30-31; see also Taylor, II, pp. 160-61.
- <sup>11</sup> Funston, op. cit., pp. 188-98; see also Fant, op. cit., p. 31.
- <sup>12</sup> Taylor, II, pp. 160-61.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 161-62.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 160, 168.
- <sup>17</sup> Fant, op. cit., pp. 31-32; see also Sexton, op. cit., p. 98; and Taylor, II, p. 168.
- <sup>18</sup> Taylor, II, pp. 168-71.
- <sup>19</sup> John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 77-78.
- <sup>20</sup> Fant, op. cit., p. 36; see also Sexton, op. cit., pp. 106-08.
- <sup>21</sup> James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines, Vol. II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), pp. 49-52.
- <sup>22</sup> Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 308.

- 24 Sexton, op. cit., pp. 122-24; see also Taylor, II, p. 172.
- 25 Taylor, II, pp. 179-81.
- 26 Ibid., p. 182.
- 27 Fant, op. cit., p. 38.
- 28 Taylor, II, p. 202.
- 29 Ibid., p. 188.
- 30 Ibid., pp. 182-88.
- 31 Ibid., pp. 195-98.
- 32 Ibid., pp. 188-92.
- 33 Ibid., pp. 192-94.
- 34 Ibid., p. 201.
- 35 Ibid., pp. 204-05.
- 36 Ibid., pp. 205-08.
- 37 Ibid., pp. 205-07.
- 38 Ibid., p. 203.
- 39 Fant, op. cit., pp. 43-49; see also Taylor, II, pp. 208-10.
- 40 Fant, op. cit., p. 45.
- 41 Ibid., pp. 49-51.
- 42 Sexton, op. cit., p. 198; see also Taylor, II, pp. 215-17.
- 43 Taylor, II, pp. 134-35.
- 44 Ibid., pp. 173-74, 185-86.
- 45 Ibid., pp. 173-76.
- 46 Ibid., pp. 228-29.
- 47 Ibid., pp. 229-30, 268.
- 48 Ibid., p. 211.
- 49 Ibid., p. 212.
- 50 Ibid.
- 51 Ibid.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE PERIOD OF GUERRILLA WAR, NOVEMBER 1899-JULY 1902

Defeating the regular insurgent formations in the field was a precondition to the pacification of the Philippines. But contrary to what some Americans believed in November 1899, there was still much more to be done. Somehow the mass of the people had to be converted from apathy or insurgent support to the pro-American attitude that would mean an end to popular cooperation with the revolutionary movement and its guerrilla bands. At the same time, the remaining insurgent forces had to be eliminated. The insurrection would not be over until the people were won over and the insurgents suppressed.

#### The Counter guerrilla War

With Aguinaldo driven into the mountains and out of contact with many of his subordinate leaders, sporadic battles continued between the American troops and small insurgent regular forces operating at the initiative of their own commanders. Most American attention thus far had been directed toward northern Luzon, leaving relatively unexplored the insurgents in the south. During the next several weeks the Americans moved against the remaining insurgent formations, successfully breaking up the enemy forces in many areas. On 19 December 1899, General Lawton was fatally wounded at one such engagement at San Mateo, near Manila.<sup>1</sup>

Although the insurgent emphasis had previously been on regular warfare, the use of guerrillas against the Americans was nothing new. Throughout the February-November 1899 period of conventional war, the



insurgents had guerrilla contingents acting in cooperation with their field army.<sup>2</sup> But now the primary insurgent military effort was devoted to guerrilla warfare, with their forces operating directly against vulnerable United States installations and forces and indirectly in undermining American efforts at organizing effective and popular local governments.

The Dictatorship of the Katipunan. After his cabinet was captured, Aguinaldo abandoned all pretense of republican government and his regime became a dictatorship. However, because of his isolation and the extreme difficulty of communication, his role during the period of guerrilla war was limited primarily to exhortation and inspiration. Local insurgent commanders, who in the past had displayed independent tendencies that had disrupted conventional military operations, were now declared by Aguinaldo to "have complete and absolute power in the government of the provinces."<sup>3</sup>

These local leaders may have had military forces and full freedom of action, but they were faced with a difficult situation nevertheless. The Americans now occupied the major population centers in most of central and northern Luzon and were steadily expanding this area and exporting their administration to the other islands. While not pro-American, most of the people were neither pro-insurgent. After three years of turmoil and warfare, most seemed willing to cooperate with any regime operating in the area. They simply wanted to be left alone to pursue their lives and private interests.<sup>4</sup>

The insurgents had two other problems which plagued them and restricted their activities during this period. One was the chronic shortage of arms and ammunition, which grew more acute with the northward displacement of Aguinaldo's headquarters. This caused situations

where--for lack of arms--the guerrillas had to bypass good opportunities for assailing American detachments. Sometimes they even had to pretend to the villagers that they were stronger and better armed than was actually the case.<sup>5</sup> The other problem was the increasing number of desertions and the general state of poor discipline among the rebel troops. This, too, had been troublesome before, but it now reached almost unmanageable proportions. The corrective was harsh discipline, including summary execution for captured deserters, but still the desertions went on.<sup>6</sup>

Insurgent Propaganda Efforts. The revolutionary government continued vigorous propaganda efforts for consumption abroad and at home. At the beginning of the period of guerrilla warfare, Aguinaldo was sustained by the prospect that the United States Congressional session beginning in December 1899 would mean independence for the Islands. When this failed to occur, his next hope was that the November 1900 United States Presidential election would result in the victory of the Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan, an anti-imperialist who had reportedly referred to Aguinaldo as "one of the heroes of the world."<sup>7</sup> The insurgent theme was that their movement was fighting against an imperialist party, not the people of the United States. Knowing that membership in the American Army was voluntary, Aguinaldo also hoped that the people of the United States would eventually so tire of the war that enlistments would stop, resulting in a weakening of American forces in the Philippines.<sup>8</sup>

Filipino morale was bolstered by reports of fictitious insurgent battlefield successes, false information on the recognition of the rebel government by European countries, stories that the German fleet had sunk the American Pacific Squadron and that a force of German troops was on the way to the insurgents' aid, and reports that troubles in China would cause

most of the American Army to be withdrawn from the Philippines for service in the Boxer Rebellion. The insurgent leadership also continued to tell the people lurid stories of American brutality.<sup>9</sup>

Progress of the American Attraction Program. The American policy of introducing local self-government, expanding government services, and not interfering in the personal affairs of the people, was enormously attractive. By continuing the practice begun in Manila of using Spanish colonial government forms and experienced Filipino administrators, but avoiding the abuses of which the natives accused the Spanish, the American position was doubly strengthened. The Americans also won adherents by operating aggressively against the roving bandits who had long been the bane of rural Philippine existence.<sup>10</sup>

But in spite of the American policies, the insurgents were still the countrymen of the villagers, and many of them were known to have made great sacrifices in the cause of national independence.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, the insurgent leaders were far better able than the Americans to capitalize on the predilection of lower class Filipinos to submit to the authority of their betters. The rebels also continued to take advantage of the language barrier and the dissembling that permitted local officials to concurrently serve both the American and the revolutionary regimes.<sup>12</sup>

However, Filipino opinion leaders in Manila and the provinces were becoming more and more convinced of the desirability of American rule. They considered the behavior of the revolutionary government as irresponsible in many of the areas where it had been in control, and few persons of property anticipated with favor the idea of such behavior on a country-wide basis.<sup>13</sup> This change in attitude, combined with the comparative success of the American-sponsored administrations, began to

undermine insurgent efforts to retain their shadow governments and continue the supply of resources and information on which they survived.

The Insurgent Terror Campaign. Since the insurgent capacity to practice a policy of attraction was impaired by the efforts of the American Army, Aguinaldo sanctioned a program of deliberate terror which was to be the source of much of the revolutionary success during the early guerrilla war period. Previously practiced intermittently and with some restraint, terror now became institutionalized and all-pervasive. Aguinaldo ordered the formation of special Katipunan enforcement groups whose function was to deal viciously with those who had showed pro-American attitudes. The result was a reign of terror, practiced largely in the vicinity but without the knowledge of American officials.<sup>14</sup>

The Katipunan terror campaign against the villagers, while doubtless necessary to intimidate those who were being attracted to the Americans in increasing numbers, can be viewed as the last violent spasm of a dying organisa. The wealthy and conservative Filipinos in the cities were at this time accomodating themselves to the American administration, which they considered more capable, orderly, and fair than the revolutionary regime. Moreover, these people were critical of what they considered as the cowardice and ineptitude of the rebel armed forces, which by now avoided open battle with the Americans and, when drawn into fighting, took disproportionate numbers of casualties.<sup>15</sup> Many of the mestizos, who thought of themselves as "white," found it easier to accept United States sovereignty when they considered the increasingly pure Malay membership of the insurgent movement. As Taylor notes, they feared "a dark deluge."<sup>16</sup> The people in the provinces, where previously lay the rebel strength and loyalty, were becoming alienated by a growing bill of indictment against the revolutionary

governments and the insurgent bands. Where the rebel government openly operated, its officers showed little respect for life and property and their administration was frequently corrupt, autocratic, and inefficient. There was scant democracy exhibited in the selection of civil officers, and when in office these leaders were frequently harsh and dictatorial.<sup>17</sup> The villagers increasingly opposed the levies of young men for the rebel army, as well as the extortion of money and property for its support. Also resented were the many insurgent restrictions on personal freedom, including the requirement for passports while traveling in rebel-controlled areas, the prohibition of private firearms possession, and jailings for suspicion of hostility to the regime. Bandit gangs ravaged the countryside, and the revolutionary governments were ill-equipped to prevent it. In many cases the villagers suspected, sometimes with good cause, that the raiders of one area were the insurgent garrisons of others. To protest these unsatisfactory conditions, some municipal officials in rebel governments attempted to resign, but this was forbidden by the Katipunan.<sup>18</sup>

The penalties for failing to support the Katipunan--which was declared by Aguinaldo in September 1900 to be the duty of all Filipinos--were so vicious as to repel even the stoic peasants. Kidnap and assassination were commonplace, and burial alive and torture by fire, beating, and mutilation were also used.<sup>19</sup>

Beyond the matter of rebel abuse and maladministration, there were many who opposed the Katipunan for other reasons. The Tagalog orientation of the movement offended some groups, and the short-lived effort to make Tagalog the official language of the Philippine Republic was much resented. In some areas the Macabebes, the Guards of Honor, and other groups were militantly anti-revolutionary. In others, Filipino priests who still

recognized the authority of the Archbishop in Manila aroused the people against the Katipunan and its rival Catholic Church.<sup>20</sup>

The combination of these forces created a large number of Filipinos who were moving toward disaffection and open hostility to the insurgent movement. The American administration, by contrast, was giving the people many of the things the Katipunan had originally been formed to achieve. More importantly, the Americans did not exploit the people or knowingly permit Filipino officials in their administration to do so. It increasingly appeared to the villagers that the vaguely-understood independence sought by the Katipunan was far outbalanced by immediately available justice under American sovereignty. It is for these reasons that the only option left to the insurgents was terror, which under the circumstances repelled the people and was ultimately self-defeating.

The American Military Effort. If the Americans did not see the insurgent terror campaign in operation, they well knew its effects. Once again the center of rebel activity was the Tagalog provinces of central Luzon, but there was no particular geographic plan of action. The pattern was the same throughout the islands.<sup>21</sup> Based on information provided by the villagers, the guerrillas would fall upon small American detachments, columns, or individual soldiers. This was not a war wherein cities fell or large forces were engaged, but rather a continual series of small but violent episodes. Captain Taylor estimated that between 5 May 1900 and 30 June 1901 alone, American forces engaged in more than 1,026 separate battles in the Philippines--most involving company sized or smaller units.<sup>22</sup>

Small groups of Americans were never safe. The villagers gave information on their plans and movements to the insurgents, who ambushed

than in the field or destroyed their headquarters when most of the troops were away. Local civilians sometimes attacked isolated Americans, and it was a foolish soldier who got drunk or went with a prostitute in a Filipino village. This situation was extremely frustrating to the small American garrisons, and this frustration bred brutality. American troops, fully aware by now that many friendly seeming natives were actively cooperating with the enemy, sometimes turned to abuse to get information and confessions from the Filipinos. The American command never officially condoned this practice, but its extent became the basis for considerable criticism of the quality of the Army's performance in the Philippine Insurrection.<sup>23</sup>

The near-monopoly of the insurgents on intelligence information seriously hindered the Americans through most of the early part of the insurrection. Operating in a country whose natives were largely hostile or indifferent, and who spoke a different language, restricted American efforts to gather information to primarily military reconnaissance, prisoner interrogation, and the analysis of captured documents. Even the fruits of these efforts were not at first efficiently handled, and it was not until September 1901 that orders were issued for all Army posts to have an intelligence office.<sup>24</sup>

American effectiveness against the guerrillas improved with the increasing use of loyal natives in the service of the United States. Filipinos of the Macabebe clan formed organized units within the American Army beginning in September 1899. Known as the Macabebe Scouts, and the forerunners of the later Philippine Scouts, these troops performed exceptionally well during the period of guerrilla war.<sup>25</sup> In July 1901, the para-military Philippine Constabulary was formed to deal with bandits. Its success contributed to the improved state of law and order which helped bring the people closer to the American administration.<sup>26</sup>

MacArthur as Military Governor

On 5 May 1900, Major General Arthur MacArthur succeeded Otis as Military Governor and Commanding General of the Philippine Division. Otis had asked to be relieved of his duties, ostensibly for reasons of pressing family business. However, the real cause was reportedly his discouragement at the lack of definitive progress against the revolutionary movement and his distaste for the nature of guerrilla war.<sup>27</sup> Since September 1899, MacArthur's new command had an average strength of 54,204 officers and men--the largest American field army since the Civil War.<sup>28</sup>

As Commanding General, MacArthur administered the Army and directed the archipelago-wide actions of the American forces in the field. But it was as Military Governor that he made the decisions that would eventually lead to the successful conclusion of American operations in the Islands. Shortly after becoming Military Governor, he recommended to the War Department the issuance of a proclamation of general and complete amnesty. This was approved by the President and the proclamation was issued on 21 June 1900. In it, the Americans announced:

. . . immunity for the past and absolute liberty for the future to all persons who were then or who had at any time since February 4, 1899, been in insurrection against the United States if they would within ninety days subscribe to a declaration acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty and authority of the United States in and over the Philippine Islands. . . .<sup>29</sup>

The results were disappointing. During the period of the proclamation's effect only 5,000 insurgents surrendered--merely a small fraction of the number suspected to be still at large.<sup>30</sup>

The issuance of this proclamation was, in effect, MacArthur's partial implementation of the recommendation he had made unsuccessfully to Otis six months before. Although he arranged with the War Department to issue a follow-up proclamation including provision for the treatment



as outlaws of rebels remaining under arms after the period of amnesty, this second proclamation was never announced.<sup>31</sup> This was probably due to MacArthur's increasing recognition that the insurgents were not bandits with a "pretended government," as he and Otis had believed, but rather were people determined to free their country from alien domination.<sup>32</sup> Once the Americans appreciated this vital fact, they understood the genuine attractiveness to the Filipinos of much of the revolutionary program and the corresponding necessity for firm and systematic methods for separating the insurgents from the people.

The Taft Commission. The President appointed a second Commission to the Philippines on 7 April 1900, in the belief that conditions in the Islands had progressed to the point where civil government could soon be installed. The Commission was comprised of Judge William Howard Taft as chairman, Professor Dean C. Worcester, the only member of the earlier Commission, General Luke E. Wright of Tennessee, Henry C. Ide of Vermont, and Professor Bernard Moses of California. The Commission's instructions were to "continue and perfect the work of organizing and establishing civil government already commenced by the military authorities, subject in all respects to any laws which Congress may hereafter enact."<sup>33</sup>

The President directed cooperation between the Commission and existing military authority. He further specified that the Commission would begin with the organization of municipal governments and proceed from there to larger divisions. Whenever it believed that conditions in the Islands permitted the overall transfer of government from military to civil control, it was to report that fact to the Secretary of War. In any case, it was to take over all legislative responsibilities and certain other functions in the pacified areas on 1 September 1900.<sup>34</sup> After

arriving in Manila on 3 June 1900, the Commission issued the following statement:

The military governor, General MacArthur, until we assume our own full authority, will continue to perform the duties and exercise the general powers heretofore discharged and wielded by General Otis; and even after we take full, active part in the government, he will continue to be its executive head, until on our recommendation it shall seem to the President that the time has arrived for the appointment of a civil executive and the making of the military forces of the United States merely auxiliary to the carrying on of the civil government, and available only in cases of emergency for the suppression of lawless violence too formidable to be overcome by the regularly organized police force. . . .<sup>35</sup>

The Commission vigorously and promptly undertook its work, although relations were strained from the start between the Military Governor and the Commission Chairman. Despite the attitude of his predecessors, MacArthur's assessment of the situation in the Philippines made him believe that a great deal of additional military effort would be required before large areas of the archipelago would be ready for government under civil control. Moreover, there were contradictions and overlaps in the charters given by the Secretary of War to the Military Governor and the Commission Chairman--contradictions that would have almost assured problems between even the best intentioned of men. MacArthur was therefore cool toward the Commission from the first, although with military correctness if not enthusiasm he cooperated with its efforts.<sup>36</sup> Taft complained frequently and at length to the Secretary of War about this matter. However, his complaints were related to MacArthur's attitude rather than his performance, and Taft later admitted that MacArthur had done "everything in his power" to assist the Commission in its responsibilities.<sup>37</sup> Although the split in military-civil responsibility for the pacified areas was mutually annoying, it appears not to have impeded the organization of civil governments throughout the archipelago.

The Americans Tighten the Screws. MacArthur eventually concluded that his policy of treating the insurgents with consideration was not having the desired effect. He could take satisfaction in the gradual improvement of the condition of the people under the American administration, with schools, sanitation, and public health coming to be even more emphasized by his office. However, the actual pacification of the Islands, his primary mission, was being blocked by the stubborn and bloody insurgent resistance. He was also aware that many of the American methods were interpreted by and to the Filipinos as evidences of weakness. Among these were the slow and deliberate judicial procedure which often resulted in known murders being freed because of an understandable absence of incriminating testimony, the unaccustomed freedom of the press in Manila, and the situation described by General Otis wherein the assets and families of rebel leaders in the field were comfortably ensconced in Manila. Moreover, until now rebels who were either captured or voluntarily surrendered were almost immediately freed upon taking the oath of allegiance to the United States. This had manifold benefits in quickly reintegrating these former enemies into useful society, but it provided no incentive for rebels to give up before they were cornered.<sup>38</sup>

The Military Governor decided to take a new and tougher line. In December 1900, MacArthur announced the imposition of General Orders 100, of 1863, originally promulgated by Abraham Lincoln to help control guerilla warfare in the border states during the Civil War. Again according to Captain Taylor, MacArthur:

. . . described the duties of noncombatants residing within territory occupied by organized combatant forces in consequence of regular military operations. He cited the laws of war which govern their relations with such forces and warned the people that the violation of them would meet exemplary punishment.

... all persons suspected of contraband traffic with insurgent organizations were ordered to be arrested and sent to Manila. Commanding officers were informed that in carrying out this injunction they would find it safe to assume that all prominent families which had not by some public action or declaration committed themselves to American interests were engaged in supplying the insurgents or at least knew who was doing it, and accordingly if they were not principals themselves they were accessories.

... all prisoners of war captured in the field or arrested in the towns should be held in custody until the cessation of hostilities; all men who surrendered were disarmed and released at once.<sup>39</sup>

American officers and soldiers in the field were delighted with this decision, the timing of which many interpreted as having been delayed until after McKinley's reelection victory over the anti-imperialist Bryan in the November 1900 Presidential election. They believed that United States domestic political considerations, especially the fear of fueling the anti-imperialist propaganda machine with reports of American repression of the Filipinos, no longer applied. The American military felt they now had the means to effectively combat the insurgents and were eager to begin putting it to the test.<sup>40</sup> The proclamation began to take effect after having been proved by the deportation to Guam of 26 insurgents on 7 January 1901. From that time forward, "secret resistance and apathy began to diminish, and kidnapping and assassination were much abated."<sup>41</sup>

#### The Formation of the Federal Party

The combination of the American policy of attraction and stepped-up military action against the insurgents in the field was having its effect. Nonetheless, most of the countryside could not yet be called pacified. However, by now most prominent Filipinos in Manila, including a number of important former insurgent leaders such as the ubiquitous Pedro A. Paterno, recognized the impossibility of realizing the aim of independence through violence and accepted the necessity of reaching

some accomodation with the Americans. This group, striking a balance between what they preferred in self-government and what the American authorities would permit, founded the Federal Party on 23 December 1900.<sup>42</sup>

Its platform was approved by MacArthur and the United States Civil Commission. Its main provisions were:

1. The recognition of the sovereignty of the United States, which shall be represented in the islands by a liberal, democratic, and representative government.

2. Individual rights, liberties, and the guaranty of personal rights, the rights of property and of the home, with liberty in the matters of religion and entire separation of church and state.

3. Without peace the enjoyment of individual rights, liberties, and the guaranty to which every educated citizen is entitled would be impossible, and consequently the founders of this party promise to cooperate with the established government, using all the means in their power to procure the pacification of the country, in order that the Filipinos in arms may acknowledge said government, as their resistance is bringing this country to ruin and desolation and gives rise to the commission of a multitude of crimes and abuses which discredit the Philippine people in the sight of civilized nations.

4. Municipal government, or self-government, substantially as it exists in the United States, and provincial or departmental government, subject only to the high inspection of the central government.

5. Primary elemental education shall be gratuitous . . . Furthermore, it shall be one of the aims of the party to obtain the passage of a law which will require children of both sexes to be educated in public or private schools. . . .

6. The creation of armed militia for the purpose of preserving the peace and insuring persons and property against criminals.

7. The awarding of public employment shall be on the basis of ability, loyalty to the established government, and strict morality according to the civil-service laws in force at present.<sup>43</sup>

Additional provisions pertained to the desired form of island-wide government and the representation of the Philippines in the United States Congress.<sup>44</sup> These were not matters within the jurisdiction of the existing American administration, but they were legitimate goals for the Federal Party within the framework of American sovereignty.

The objectives of the Federal Party were not substantially different from the type of government the American military and civil authorities were attempting to implement. However, the American program was now being promoted by influential Filipinos who were able to make their appeals to the insurgents on the basis of "surrender without dishonor" and who could effectively explain to the people the meaning and conditions of the American-sponsored form of government.<sup>45</sup>

The effectiveness of the Federal Party, as its agents traveled throughout the Islands and won adherents to its cause, could be measured in the viciousness of Aguinaldo's response. A succession of anti-Federalist decrees emanated from the insurgent mountain headquarters authorizing the summary execution of anyone proposing surrender to the Americans or association with the cause of the Party.<sup>46</sup> Notwithstanding Aguinaldo's efforts, by May 1901 the Party had 150,000 members.<sup>47</sup>

#### The Capture of Aguinaldo

The revolutionary movement was dealt another crippling blow in Brigadier General Frederick Funston's daring capture of Aguinaldo on 23 March 1901. Funston and several other Americans pretended to be captured by rebels, who were actually Macabebe Scouts in disguise. Through a series of ruses, the party arrived at Aguinaldo's small headquarters area, where they scattered or killed the small garrison and arrested the rebel leader.<sup>48</sup> Funston brought Aguinaldo to Manila, where MacArthur treated him with the dignity appropriate to the man who for four years had been symbolic of the Filipino fight for independence. After conferring with other ex-leaders of the insurgency, Aguinaldo on 19 April announced that "he believed that he was serving his beloved country in acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States."<sup>49</sup>

Since at the end Aguinaldo had been more the figurehead and propagandist of the revolutionary movement than its operating chief executive or commander, his capture and subsequent oath of allegiance did not mean the end of the insurrection. Yet it was a serious loss to the revolutionary movement, for now the Katipunan was comprised of individual chiefs operating without any leader of stature or semblance of genuine central direction.<sup>50</sup>

#### Beginning of the End

The combination of recent American programs now began to pay off. Having their effect were the obviously stable, orderly, and nonoppressive American administrations; the reduction in terrorism through the imposition of General Orders 100, with its consequent reduction in the insurgents' ability to enforce their will on the populace; the success in the field of American units against rebel guerrilla bands, made possible in part by the increase in United States Army stations in the archipelago from 53 in November 1899 to 502 in March 1901,<sup>51</sup> and the adoption and salesmanship of the American program by the Federal Party.

However, the cost of pacification to the opposing military forces had been high:

. . . from November 1, 1899, to September 1, 1900, 268 Americans were killed, 750 were wounded, and 55 were captured. According to the American reports, during the same period 3,227 Filipinos were killed, 694 wounded, and 2,864 were captured. From 5 May 1900 to 30 June 1901 . . . the Americans lost 245 killed, 490 wounded, 118 captured, and 20 missing. According to the American reports the Filipinos lost 3,854 killed, 1,193 wounded, 6,572 captured, while 23,095 surrendered. . . . Up to July 4, 1901, 23,000 firearms of various types had been reported as captured from the insurgents.<sup>52</sup>

Unreported in the statistics is the fact that the entire population of the archipelago had suffered from a war that in some areas had been going on for 6 years by 1902. Leon Wolff, whose Little Brown

Brother is extremely critical of the American effort in the Philippines, puts the number of Filipino deaths as a result of the insurrection at 250,000, for which he cites no authority.<sup>53</sup> Author Gore Vidal recently mentioned an astonishing but also unsubstantiated figure of 3 million Filipino deaths, in a total population of 7 million.<sup>54</sup> Whatever the true number, it is understandable that by 1902 most Filipinos were eager for an end to the conflict and an opportunity to return to a more orderly manner of life. This factor cannot be discounted in any assessment of the decline of the Katipunan movement.

#### Chaffee Replaces MacArthur as Commanding General

Taft's complaints about MacArthur to the Secretary of War, and the decision to elevate Taft to Governor General and end the office of Military Governor on 4 July 1901, led to MacArthur's reassignment effective the same day. His successor as Commanding General of the Philippine Division was Major General Adna R. Chaffee, who with the new governmental arrangements had a much restricted sphere of action.<sup>55</sup>

The highly regarded General Chaffee had served in the Civil War as private, sergeant, and lieutenant, followed by twenty years in the West as one of the Army's premier Indian fighters. His administrative experience included service as an inspector general and on the staff of the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth. Chaffee came to the Philippines fresh from triumphs in Cuba, where he was acclaimed as "The Hero of El Caney," and China, where he headed the American force in the Boxer Rebellion.<sup>56</sup> Mindful of the controversy between MacArthur and Taft, Secretary of War Root gave Chaffee specific instructions as to the primacy of the Civil Governor after 4 July 1901.<sup>57</sup>



The best summation of the status of the Islands and MacArthur's success in accomplishing his objectives in pacification by the time of his departure is in his own final report of 4 July 1901:

. . . the armed insurrection was almost entirely suppressed as a result of cooperation between the army and the people, who had accepted the invitation to combine for mutual protection and for the welfare of the country. At that time there was no organized insurgent force above the Pasig River. All of the islands in the Visayas were at peace, except Samar. In southern Luzon disorders still continued, but were diminishing so steadily as to encourage the belief that the provinces there would soon be pacified.<sup>58</sup>

#### The Last Year of the Insurgency

As mentioned in MacArthur's final report, the remaining major areas of insurgent resistance were in southern Luzon and on the island of Samar. The principal rebel leader in Luzon after the capture of Aguinaldo was General Miguel Malvar, who remained in the field in Batangas Province with a force of at least 4,000. His soldiers had always outnumbered the Americans in the area, and some of his revolutionary governments had been in operation since 1896.<sup>59</sup>

Positions had by now hardened all around. The insurgents acted with savagery against the Americans, or toward their own people when necessary to maintain cooperation. The American tendency was to reply in kind. Only through close supervision could Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, the American commander in Batangas, keep his forces under control and insure they applied only legal and appropriate force. The American troops were fired by reports of the massacre by villagers on Samar of 48 members of Company C, 9th Infantry. And the troops were still frustrated by their inability to tell friend from foe among the Filipinos.<sup>60</sup>

General Bell decided that the insurgents must be separated from the people quickly and completely. This concept was not new; indeed, it

had been the basis of MacArthur's successful tightening-down policy of a year earlier. However, previous separation methods were inadequate for the job at hand, so Bell resolved on a new approach that he believed would both eliminate popular support for the guerrillas and protect the people from insurgent pressures. He announced a program of "zones of concentration" whereby the Filipinos were moved into fortified and controllable areas beyond which they could not travel without American knowledge and supervision. Nothing was to be left outside these zones that could be of use to the insurgents. Bell practiced a strict application of General Orders 100. Captain Taylor reports that he "announced his intention to retaliate by the execution of prisoners of war in case any more persons were assassinated by the insurgents for political reasons. It was not found necessary to do this. Assassinations stopped at once."<sup>61</sup>

The American forces confiscated or destroyed stores of food found outside the zones, and the houses of those cooperating with the insurgents were burned. Meanwhile, Bell's troops relentlessly pursued the guerrillas in the field, scattering and defeating them in dozens of small combats.<sup>62</sup>

Bell's policy worked. Malvar's forces, already short of ammunition and troubled by desertions, now had difficulty locating adequate food. Cut off from its sources of information, the insurgents were frequently found and engaged by the pursuing Americans. The people, now securely under United States protection, cooperated with the American administration to such an extent that thousands of them joined in the search for Malvar and his guerrillas,<sup>63</sup> and now the Americans were benefiting from the work of spies among the insurgents.<sup>64</sup> Once again, agents of the Federal Party were effective in urging the revolutionary forces to surrender without abandoning their ideals. On 16 April 1902,

Malvar and his followers gave up. Throughout Bell's campaign, 8,000 to 10,000 insurgents or sympathizers were captured or surrendered; by July all of them had taken the oath of allegiance and were released.<sup>65</sup>

The efforts of Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith on Samar, where he was attempting a mission similar to Bell's, were far less successful. Smith eschewed the notion of attracting the Filipinos, and he set an example of brutality toward innocent villagers and insurgents alike that was followed by many of his men. As a result, the Samar pacification took substantially longer and was far more difficult than in Batangas. It was not completed until Smith adopted Bell's methods and began to deal more even-handedly with the Filipinos that he began to make progress. The rebels finally surrendered in Samar in late April 1902.<sup>66</sup>

#### Summary of Insurgent and American Tactics

The tactics used by both the insurgents and the Americans were developed over a period of time, but both were in full operation during the period of guerrilla warfare. After November 1899, the Katipunan had only policy guidance from Aguinaldo's headquarters, with local rebel leaders dealing almost independently with matters in their areas. Where possible, the revolutionary government set up local regimes, the success and representative nature of which depended upon the talent, attentiveness, and attitude of the insurgent commanders in the area, as well as the degree of their freedom from American intervention. The people--either voluntarily or under duress--supplied the resources to these governments and the Katipunan. Meanwhile, the guerrillas acted as a military force against small and vulnerable American detachments and encouraged the people to kill individual Americans in the hope that the

cumulative effect would be the declination of the United States force or, more likely, the disheartening of the American public and military for perseverance in the Philippine policies of the United States Government.

The American policy toward the Filipinos was announced by Merritt, structured by Otis, and refined and carried into effect by MacArthur and later Chaffee. Merritt proclaimed United States intentions and told the people they would not be interfered with unless they opposed the American regime. While defeating the insurgent regular army, Otis created the basis for the introduction of a civil government appropriate to the experience and political development of the people. During the period of guerrilla war, MacArthur recognized that he could only defeat the insurgents by separating them from the people. He did this by continuing and improving local government, while increasing the penalties for cooperation with the insurgents. At the same time, his troops continued to pursue and defeat the guerrillas in the field. Chaffee, left with small but stubborn areas to pacify, adopted even stricter policies to cut off rebel support, while his troops operated aggressively against the remaining revolutionary guerrilla bands.

#### The End of the Insurgency and Later Political Developments

On 4 July 1902, at the recommendation of Governor Taft and General Chaffee, President Theodore Roosevelt issued a proclamation of amnesty which marked the official end of the Philippine Insurrection:

The amnesty proclamation gave full pardon to all Filipinos who had participated in the revolt. The only exception was for those who had committed crimes subsequent to May 1, 1902 or had been convicted at a prior time for crimes of murder, rape, arson, or robbery. Provision was made, however, for special pardon by the insular authorities of revolutionaries already under sentence. . . . 67

The United States Government started the Philippines toward self-government and eventual independence even before the end of the insurrection when the United States Civil Commission included Filipino membership in 1901. In the following year, an elected Philippine Assembly began to share legislative power in the Islands, and two non-voting commissioners represented the Philippines in the United States House of Representatives. The Filipinos got full control of both houses of the Assembly in 1913. The Governor General, who continued to be appointed by the President with Senate approval, exercised the executive powers until November 1937. Meanwhile, general legislative authority with a few specified exceptions, "mainly designed to ensure the constitutional rights of the people and the sovereignty of the United States," went to the Assembly. The Islands were granted Commonwealth status in 1935, and on 4 July 1946 the President of the United States declared an independent Republic of the Philippines.<sup>68</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines, Vol. II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), pp. 157-60; see also John R. M. Taylor, "The Philippine Insurrection," II, pp. 219-20.

<sup>2</sup> Taylor, II, pp. 153-54, 290.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 255, 260-62, 277, 304.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 288

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., pp. 307-08.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 296, 304-05.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 292.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., pp. 257-58, 283.

<sup>9</sup> John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 225-27; see also Taylor, II, pp. 154, 258, 276, 307-308.

<sup>10</sup> Gates, op. cit., pp. 85-86, 94-95.

<sup>11</sup> Taylor, II, p. 230.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., pp. 231, 252.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 114-15.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 261-67.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp. 114-15.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 112-13.

<sup>17</sup> LeRoy, op. cit., pp. 302-06.

<sup>18</sup> Gates, op. cit., p. 227; see also Taylor, II, pp. 84-92, 199-200.

<sup>19</sup> Taylor, II, pp. 228-29.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp. 91-92.

<sup>21</sup> Gates, op. cit., pp. 157-58; see also LeRoy, op. cit., p. 161.

<sup>22</sup> Taylor, II, p. 238.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 250.

- 24 Gates, op. cit., p. 249.
- 25 Taylor, II, p. 208.
- 26 Gates, op. cit., pp. 239-40.
- 27 Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 309-10.
- 28 Taylor, II, p. 222.
- 29 Ibid., p. 224.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 U.S., War Department, Adjutant-General's Office. Correspondence, Vol. II, pp. 1175-78.
- 32 Taylor, II, p. 236.
- 33 Ibid., p. 227.
- 34 Ibid., pp. 227-29.
- 35 Ibid., p. 228.
- 36 D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. I, 1880-1941 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1970), pp. 36-40.
- 37 Gates, op. cit., p. 238.
- 38 Taylor, II, pp. 122, 231-32.
- 39 Ibid., p. 232.
- 40 Charles J. Crane, The Experiences of a Colonel of Infantry (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1923), pp. 360-61.
- 41 Taylor, loc. cit.
- 42 Ibid., p. 223.
- 43 Ibid., pp. 233-34.
- 44 Ibid., pp. 234-35.
- 45 Ibid., pp. 236-37.
- 46 Ibid., pp. 259-60.
- 47 Ibid., p. 237.
- 48 Frederick Funston, Memories of Two Wars (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911), pp. 384-426.

- <sup>49</sup> Taylor, II, pp. 260-61.
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 261.
- <sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 238.
- <sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>53</sup> Wolff, *op. cit.*, from dust jacket, not repeated in volume.
- <sup>54</sup> Wolff and Vidal are doubtless including in their totals the 200,000 people who died in the cholera epidemic of 1902. See "Philippines, Republic of the," The Encyclopedia Americana (1964), XXI, p. 759.
- <sup>55</sup> Taylor, II, pp. 239-40.
- <sup>56</sup> Adna B. Chaffee, "The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography (1943), XIX, 6-7.
- <sup>57</sup> James, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
- <sup>58</sup> Taylor, II, p. 238.
- <sup>59</sup> Gates, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-62.
- <sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 248-49; see also Taylor, II, p. 239.
- <sup>61</sup> Taylor, II, p. 246.
- <sup>62</sup> Gates, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-62; see also Taylor, II, pp. 240-48.
- <sup>63</sup> Taylor, II, pp. 240-48.
- <sup>64</sup> Gates, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
- <sup>65</sup> Taylor, *loc. cit.*
- <sup>66</sup> Gates, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-56.
- <sup>67</sup> Taylor, II, pp. 248-49.
- <sup>68</sup> "Philippines, Republic of the," The Encyclopedia Americana (1964), XXI, pp. 759h-759i.



## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSIONS

In a peculiar way both sides won in the Philippine Insurrection: the United States established its sovereignty throughout the archipelago, and the Katipunan got most of the reforms for which it had fought--less that of immediate independence. However, these results were achieved only after a long, costly, and bitter conflict. Several matters need to be considered in any overall assessment of the United States effort in the Philippines. The first is the issue of how the American administration developed its counterinsurgency response. Then, to test the validity of present-day United States Army counterinsurgency doctrine, next is an evaluation of the American counterinsurgency methods in light of today's internal defense and development guidelines, and a determination of the strengths and weaknesses in their application. Finally, there is need for final conclusions on the quality of the total United States effort in the Philippine Insurrection.

#### The Development of the American Counterinsurgency Response

Throughout the insurgency both sides recognized the importance of popular support to the success of their respective efforts. The United States never envisioned a permanent garrison and occupation of the Islands. The rebels had to have popular support to survive American actions against their movement, since their manpower and supplies depended on the cooperation of the people. Matters were less than clear-cut during the May-November 1899 period of regular warfare, when at first it appeared to the

Americans that whichever side controlled an area as a result of military action could install an administration favorable to its interests. The issue then seemed to be primarily one of defeating the insurgents in the field, scattering the revolutionary government, and then consolidating the gains by setting up loyal municipal governments. This, of course, proved to be inadequate. Contributing to the American lack of appreciation for the complexity of the problem was a tendency to think of the insurgents as motivated principally by greed. This attitude caused the Americans to underrate the commitment and tenacity of the rebels, many of whom were patriots and nationalists. Moreover, it failed to recognize the genuine attractiveness of the notion of national independence to the Filipino people, who had spent more than three centuries under Spanish rule.

All of this changed with the advent of full-fledged guerrilla war as a matter of official insurgent policy after November 1899. From then on the United States Army could no longer find and fix large insurgent military units in the field. Additionally, rebel intimidation of the villagers in areas under ostensible American control was permitting the Katipunan to get intelligence on American activities and the money, manpower, and supplies without which any revolutionary movement cannot long survive.

Once the United States command realized that the independence movement was genuine and widespread, its strategy changed from an effort to primarily defeat the insurgent army in the field or chase it down as bandits to a more realistic combination of engaging small guerrilla units in combat while concurrently removing the sources of insurgent sympathy and support: in contemporary terms, an internal defense and development campaign.

### Counterinsurgency Guidelines Applied in the Insurrection

The efforts of the United States Army, later supplemented by those of the United States Civil Commission, finally succeeded in pacifying the Philippines. The story of the elimination of the insurgency has been told in narrative, and it is now appropriate to evaluate this effort in terms of today's counterinsurgency guidelines:

1. It is preferable to prevent an insurgent war rather than fight one.

Since the United States inherited an ongoing insurgency when it assumed sovereignty over the Philippines from Spain, this guideline is not precisely applicable to the Philippine Insurrection. President McKinley said that "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operative upon the political condition of the inhabitants,"<sup>1</sup> and he ordered the Army to extend the United States administration throughout the archipelago. Given this policy of the United States Government to retain the Islands, and the determination of the Filipinos to fight if necessary for independence, it appears that the United States Army could not have prevented an insurgent war.

Regardless of misunderstandings between Aguinaldo and American officials in Asia, the Philippine Insurrection was foreordained when the President issued and never altered Merritt's orders to occupy and govern the Islands. It may have been that American ability or willingness to announce a specific date for Philippine independence would have placated the rebels, but this is conjectural and it remains that most authoritative American observers of conditions in the Philippines, military and civilian, felt the Islands would not be ready for complete self-government and independence for an indeterminate period of time.

2. The government must show the people that it is the better choice.

This was the key element in the eventual American victory in the Philippines. Had the United States administration not been demonstrably more efficient and less repressive than that of the revolutionary regime, and had not the people been persuaded of this fact, the insurrection could not have been ended when it was. The positive effects of the American policy of attraction, with its programs of education, government services, and personal freedom, greatly contributed to winning the Filipinos to the United States cause. Conversely, the negative effects of the few and increasingly harsh options left to the revolutionaries, combined with Filipino observation of abuses, maladministration, and disorder in areas under rebel control, caused the revolutionary movement to become unpopular. When the threat of insurgent reprisal was removed by other American programs, and the people became free to indicate their preference, the United States administration profited from these positive and negative impressions on the Filipinos. Eventually, native opinion leaders decided that an American government would be preferable to a nation-wide revolutionary regime, and they were able to successfully convey this notion to a country that was both accustomed to following authority figures and exhausted by war.

3. Internal defense and development should be characterized by the integration of all functions--security, sociopolitical development, and economic development--at all levels.

Here the American administration had an advantage, in that until 4 July 1901, by which time the worst of the insurgency was over, the Military Governor combined within himself both military and civil authority. Even when the Civil Governor became paramount in the pacified areas, his program represented no departure from that which had preceded it--rather

only its extension, refinement, and codification. The United States was fortunate to have had four successive supreme military commanders in the Philippines--Merritt, Otis, MacArthur, and Chaffee--who from the start and throughout recognized the necessity for civil-military program integration.

Merritt's proclamation after the fall of Manila set the theme and tone of American policy as it would affect the populace: ". . . as long as they preserved the peace and performed their duties toward the representatives of the United States they would not be disturbed in their persons or property."<sup>2</sup> Otis' preparation for battle while improving the administration of the city of Manila, and his systematic introduction of civil government and the benefits of orderly administration in the captured areas, provided a workable framework for the introduction of American internal defense and development programs. During the period of guerrilla war, MacArthur arrived at the formula for victory when he found the means to separate the people from the insurgents and was able to convince the Filipinos, who were by then becoming increasingly affected by the benefits of American programs, to rid themselves of what by 1901 had become an unpopular revolutionary movement.

4. Planning, organization, and control of internal defense and development functions should follow the established political organization of the nation.

In that the existing political organization in the Philippines before the fall of Manila had been the Spanish colonial administration, this guideline is not applicable in the usual sense. The government of the Islands at the beginning of the insurrection was, in effect, the United States Army; therefore, the planning, organization, and control

of internal defense and development operations was done in Army channels, and later shared with the United States Civil Commission.

In the civil government of the Islands, the Army deliberately sought to use the forms that had existed under the Spanish and to which the people were accustomed. Also, competent Filipino civil servants from the Spanish regime continued in their positions under the Americans. These policies made the American-sponsored administration more congenial to the Filipinos and reduced the trauma that might otherwise have been associated with the changeover in administration from the Spanish to the Americans.

5. Internal defense and development must include the creation or strengthening of a spirit of nationhood among the people.

The American administration, as a colonial power, was on the wrong side of this guideline and the insurgents had all the advantages. The appeal of the revolutionaries was directly to Filipino nationalism, while the United States administration represented its antithesis. It can even be argued that to the extent the Americans were successful, the spirit of Filipino nationalism would be diffused. However, as the United States administration gained credibility when its programs proved to be for the well-being of the Filipinos, and as insurgent programs broke down, the prospect of eventual self-government may have somehow fostered a spirit of delayed nationhood. If so, this was at best a corollary and unsought effect.

6. Internal defense and development must seek to create in the people both a desire and an ability for self-government.

The desire for self-government was plainly extant throughout the American experience in the Philippines; it was with the issue of ability

that there was a question. American officials in the Philippines were agreed that the Filipinos were not ready for independence and national self-government, but that to the extent possible local self-government should be introduced, encouraged, and expanded upward to successively higher levels. Their attitudes became national policy through recommendations made to and accepted by the Secretary of War and the President. This was the program adopted, and it was successful.

7. Internal defense actions must be structured to promote the achievement of specific, constructive internal defense goals.

The United States Army's internal defense actions efficiently met this criterion during the period of guerrilla war. Earlier, when the rebels fought in regular military formations, the American response was primarily in the conventional military mode. The plan at that time was simply to defeat and clear the insurgents and install American-sponsored governments in the pacified areas.

Not until it became apparent that the insurgents were continuing to elicit popular support and operate clandestinely in these occupied areas did the Americans formulate and implement a comprehensive and systematic program for internal defense. This took the form of establishing American garrisons throughout the country to provide security for the people, while Army units continued to seek out and destroy rebel bands in the outlying areas. Thus there was the increase in American garrisons from 53 in November 1899 to 502 in March 1901. This by itself proved inadequate in the face of the coercive tactics employed by the insurgents against the Filipino villagers. It was not until the American Army tightened military control and effectively separated the people from the insurgents--by punishing those who cooperated with the rebels and later by physically

isolating the people and resources--that the United States administration achieved the conditions under which the insurgency could be demoralized and defeated.

American internal defense goals by the end of the period of guerrilla war were related to area security, with the objective of providing the basis for a normal and orderly life by the villagers and an environment in which they could come to trust and cooperate with the American administration. This was appropriate and ultimately successful.

8. A nationwide, population-oriented intelligence network is a prerequisite for internal defense success.

American failure to develop and capitalize on the possibilities of more thorough and systematic intelligence gathering and analysis may have impeded the pacification effort. This is another area in which, through most of the insurrection, the advantage lay almost completely with the rebels. There is no evidence of a systematic American-directed national intelligence network until September 1901, when the United States administration organized military intelligence offices down to the post level. At Philippine Division headquarters, the analysis of captured documents and reports was hindered by the volume of material processed and the fact that at the beginning virtually no Americans spoke or read Tagalog or the other Filipino languages.

Throughout the insurrection the revolutionaries had multilingual agents in the American administration who were most successful in both distorting translations to insurgent advantage and spying and reporting on United States plans and activities. This led to the situation wherein the insurgent shadow governments could operate in areas under ostensible American control. The intelligence reported by spies in Manila to



Aguinaldo's headquarters, and in the provinces to local rebel leaders, had a debilitating effect on the American effort. Only in 1901, when the Americans were able to provide security for the villagers while winning them over through successful local government programs, did sufficient loyal Filipinos become available to assist in the collection of intelligence. At this point the intelligence balance shifted in favor of the United States.

The closest the United States administration came to a nationwide, population-oriented intelligence network was the efforts of the Federal Party. With its establishment and spread, beginning in early 1901, the Americans could work with sophisticated and capable Filipinos who were alert to local and country-wide developments and willing to transmit useful information to the United States administration. However, even this was not the high-level intelligence apparatus visualized in current-day internal defense and development operations, the use of which might have substantially benefitted the American cause.

Related to the intelligence effort was the matter of propaganda. Here again, the insurgents had the advantage until the almost simultaneous imposition of the highly effective General Orders 100 and the birth of the Federal Party. The revolutionary propaganda themes were ready-made and highly appealing, both in the Philippines and the United States. For home consumption, there were exhortations on the basis of patriotism, religion, and race, as well as spurious reports of expected friendly foreign intervention, battlefield defeats turned into victories, and representative government where none in fact existed. For overseas effect, the rebels emphasized the ideas of an independence movement betrayed and legitimate self-government and democratic aspirations denied.

The American propaganda effort tended to take the form of performance rather than protestation. The United States administration proclaimed policies of benevolence toward and noninterference with the people from the beginning, but it was not until these attitudes were proved, and the number of loyal Filipinos grew in consequence, that the Americans achieved success in the area of Filipino public opinion.

9. The philosophy for neutralization or regaining of control over individual insurgents must consider their potential usefulness to the nation.

In this the American administration was wise and far-seeing. The policy throughout was that insurgents who voluntarily surrendered would be disarmed and released after taking an oath of allegiance to the United States. Until December 1900, even those captured in battle were permitted to return to their homes after taking the oath. The rules were changed in late 1900, so that captured insurgents--as opposed to those who voluntarily surrendered--would be held prisoner until the cessation of hostilities. However, the official policy still permitted those who voluntarily gave themselves up to return immediately to private life. In that many of the returning insurgents were intelligent and able men, their return to productive civil pursuits had an overall beneficial impact on the United States effort.

The fair and moderate treatment afforded to former leaders of the insurrection persuaded many of them to support the United States in the later stages of the insurrection. This, in turn, helped make possible the development and wide popularity of the Federal Party, which was instrumental in ending the insurrection. It is doubtful whether the Federal Party would have been formed, or if its success could have been

as great, had it not been for the American practice of promptly reintegrating former insurgents into Filipino society at all levels.

10. Regulations for suppressing insurgent violence should be formulated before violence occurs, be based on law, be publicized, and be enforceable.

Here again, the United States administration was deficient. Due to a lack of recent experience with insurgent war, and in consequence of originally thinking of the rebels as mere bandits than true revolutionaries, the American administration at first adopted an insufficiently comprehensive policy. Once it became obvious that the combination of rigorous military action and local self-government could not defeat the highly successful insurgent policy mix of patriotic attraction and ruthless intimidation, more stringent methods were employed to cause the necessary separation of the insurgents from the people. In December 1900, MacArthur announced the application of General Orders 100, which he implemented only partially but with great success through most of the Islands. Chaffee's even more stringent application of General Orders 100, in early 1902, provided the basis for American pacification of the remaining pockets of stubborn insurgent resistance.

There is the question of whether MacArthur was constrained by United States domestic political considerations from earlier taking a harder line against the insurgents. The official reports do not comment on this matter, but American officers in the Philippines believed that the timing of the crackdown was caused by the necessity of avoiding any appearance of American repression of the Filipinos before the Presidential election of 1900. They viewed MacArthur's announcement of General Orders 100 in December 1900, a month after McKinley's victory over the anti-imperialist Bryan, as proof that previous political restraints were removed.

It may have been that the announcement and imposition of General Orders 100 at the beginning would not have brought earlier success to American efforts in the Philippines. This cannot be answered definitely, because it took time for the Americans to prove to the Filipinos that their administration was preferable to that of the revolutionaries, and to continue to wear down the insurgent military establishment. However, it cannot be denied that only when General Orders 100 was introduced did the United States begin to make clear and continuing gains against the insurgents.

11. The ultimate goal of internal defense operations must be the breaking down of an insurgent organization, not the infliction of the maximum number of insurgent casualties.

The American leadership recognized this principle from the first, but this knowledge was applied in different ways in different periods. During the May-November 1899 period of regular warfare, the United States command believed that the defeat of the insurgent army and the capture of the revolutionary government would end the insurrection. The rebels were never decisively defeated during this time, and the capture of the organs of formal government had little but a demoralizing effect on the Katipunan movement. This initial American attitude was too narrow and showed a lack of appreciation for the complexity of the issues involved and the dedication and tenacity of the insurgents.

This guideline was later adopted by the American administration in its contemporary sense. The United States military and civil governors preferred to eliminate the insurgent movement to killing its adherents in battle which, given the size of the archipelago and the potential for protracted small unit combat, was a near-impossible task. Thus American amnesty proclamations and appeals to the insurgents to lay down their arms

were unsuccessful until the adoption of the American line by the Federal Party, which could credibly induce the insurgents to surrender with honor.

12. The primary responsibility for the internal defense of a nation rests with that nation.

Because of the colonial nature of the American effort in the Philippines, this guideline is inapplicable in the usual sense. However, it should not be forgotten that the American administration formed the Macabebes Scouts, which later became the Philippine Scouts and a regular part of the United States Army. The para-military Philippine Constabulary, formed to combat the bandits who plagued the islands from time immemorial, was also enormously successful. In addition, the Federal Party platform, which was approved by the American military and civil governors, included recognition of the necessity for local police and militia for self-protection.

#### American Strengths and Weaknesses in Applying the Guidelines

The mix of internal defense and development options applied in a particular insurgency are obviously influenced by the nature and objectives of the revolution, the history and condition of the area, and the infinitely variable combinations of social, economic, political, and military factors that may apply. The situation in the Philippines was especially complicated by the fact that the United States was in the position of an outsider attempting to impose a colonial administration on people of a different race, culture, and language. This limited the American adoption of some of today's counterinsurgency guidelines.

The United States ended the Philippine Insurrection by using many of the broad internal defense and development concepts that are present

day Army counterinsurgency doctrine. The strength of the American effort was in demonstrating that the United States-sponsored administration was efficient and benevolent, and in convincing the people that it was preferable to a revolutionary regime which, in the areas under its control, had often showed itself to be brutal, corrupt, and incapable of protecting the people. The American command was wise in directing its actions against the insurgent organization rather than the Filipino people, and in returning surrendered insurgents to useful society as quickly as possible. After the Filipinos became convinced that the American administration was preferable to that of the revolutionaries, United States forces were able to provide the degree of security required to enable the villagers to confidentially show their preference for the American cause-- both by cooperating in local government and in refusing to support the rebel shadow governments and guerrilla bands.

The major American weaknesses were in not more vigorously working to establish a nation-wide intelligence network and slowness in strictly applying General Orders 100. However, language and cultural limitations hindered the American ability to develop an effective intelligence network until the United States administration proved itself through the success of its internal defense and development campaign. And, as American officers in the Philippines suspected, it may well have been that domestic political concerns explicitly or implicitly limited the freedom of the Military Governor to impose General Orders 100 until after the election of 1900.

#### Final Conclusions

The experience of the United States Army in the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 confirms the validity of today's counterinsurgency

guidelines. Although the Katipunan movement was an anti-colonial effort rather than a true insurgency, the nature of the Filipino revolution was not much different from many recent insurgencies. The same principles applied then as now in the counterinsurgency effort. Every present-day counterinsurgency guideline that was thoroughly and carefully implemented at the turn of the century by the American administration in the Philippines was successful, while some of the slowness in the pacification effort may have been caused by failure to adequately and promptly adopt others.

A great advantage to the Americans in the Philippines was that the form of administration they sought to introduce was developed by knowledgeable and prescient men on the scene. These officials were not interested in personal profit or exploiting the people, but tried to insure their well-being--albeit within the policy decision of the United States Government to retain the Philippines for an indefinite period. Once the genuineness of this concern became apparent to the Filipinos, and the contrast between the character of the American administration and its Spanish predecessor and revolutionary competitor became clear, the way was open for the final pacification of the archipelago.

NOTES

<sup>1</sup>U.S., War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, Correspondence,  
Vol. 2, pp. 676-78.

<sup>2</sup>John R. M. Taylor, "The Philippine Insurrection," II, p. 72.