THE STUDENT MOVEMENT IN SOUTH KOREA

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INTRODUCTION

There have been dramatic and important changes in many aspects of the South Korean student movement since the end of the Yushin era in 1979: ideology, internal structure, tactics, relations with other sectors of society, and the capacity to conduct coordinated and disciplined operations have all evolved in various ways. Such changes are to a large extent the subject matter of this report. But in examining the student movement, it is essential to recognize and to keep in mind a crucial element of continuity with the long and influential Korean past. Student goals are moralistic and utopian, often to a passionate, even sometimes to a ludicrous degree. Korean governments have tried to counter student protest on the basis of conventional establishment ideology, comprising mainly anti-Communism and rapid economic development. Officials are concerned with concrete, practical goals — the uses and maintenance of power and the increase of tangible material goods — while students deal largely with ethical abstractions.

The struggle can be seen in Confucian terms as a moral one; are those in power virtuous enough to retain the 'mandate of heaven'? Indeed, that question is often the underlying basis for the way Koreans regard their leaders. Given this strongly moralistic component of popular political culture in South Korea, the authorities may win most of the battles, but they tend to lose the wars.

The purity of students' motives and their dedication to high ideals is an undisputed given of the situation, while it is also universally accepted that those in high office are more or less corrupt, seeking to advance their own interests. Thus students are always able to seize and hold the moral high ground, even when they challenge conventional thinking and the status quo in such areas as anti-Communism, the advantages of unrestrained economic growth, or the importance of the Olympics for national prestige. It is the purity of their motivation and their sincerity that carries weight in the ideological struggle for popular support.

But such altruism also separates students from the political opposition and the moderate middle class proponents of political change. In fact ordinary Koreans may strongly disapprove of student extremism, denouncing the actual content of the slogans chanted or written on banners during demonstrations. Nevertheless the students' untainted integrity has an almost mystical power. The Chun Doo Hwan regime has made a determined effort to contain the student movement in recent years, not just with tear gas but also on ideological grounds. Because of the persistent importance of traditional ethical ideas and the student monopoly of virtue, it had failed.

The worldly cynic may protest that all this is a sentimental interpretation in neo-Confucian terms of what is really just a disguised struggle for power and the rewards
that go with it. I would simply reply that anyone who wants to use such a coldly rational, universal conflict model is welcome to it. Certainly that is the direction today of student theorizing, which is increasingly based on the concepts of class warfare and imperialist aggrandizement. But it seems evident to me that more irrational and emotional elements are also involved in student discontents and motivations, and that the reaction of the Korean man-in-the-street is, at least on certain critical occasions, based as much on the stirring of deeply internalized, gut values as it is on rational calculations of self interest. Unfortunately the students' acknowledged role as conscience of the nation carries with it a built-in disadvantage, one that has been pointed out by many observers: students tend to be highly intransigent, ardently pursuing democracy without a clear idea of the self restraint that is necessary to make it function. Complete conviction regarding the 'truth' of their own ideologies and the purity of their own abstract goals leaves very little room for compromise.

What makes events in South Korea so hard to understand and to predict is the complexity and instability of the socio-psychological mix - the uneasy, tension-ridden,... malintegration of different belief systems and codes of behavior. In any given situation what are the dominant factors that govern actions and events? Is it the tendency towards elitist, top-down authoritarianism that is deeply rooted in Korean culture, or is it the perennial discontented rebelliousness that tries to tear down established structures of authority? Does the heroic risk-taking of radical students reflect a traditional collective discipline or a new spirit of non-conformist individualism? Similarly, does the embrace by students of an eclectic... amalgam of radical ideologies mean that youth in South Korea is on an open ended quest for new intellectual horizons; or are we seeing merely the substitution of one narrowly circumscribed orthodoxy for another? Such questions are hard to answer, and yet real understanding of the forces driving the student movement requires that one come to grips with these issues.

There is enormous ambivalence in the thinking of activist students between the acceptance of established hierarchies of status and merit on the one hand, and an insistence on across the board egalitarianism on the other. What should be the primary focus of individual loyalties: the family? high school classmates? the South Korean State? a pan-Korean nationalist vision uniting both North and South in some sort of mystically utopian recreation of Koguryo? And most ambivalent of all, there is the contrast between personal ambition and the emphasis on austerity, self-sacrifice, and the sharing of the discomforts of the poor. Student ideologues, and indeed the rank and file of activists as well, provide answers to these questions with uncompromising certainty, but in actuality loyalties are deeply divided. Some of the issues are out in the open,
debated fiercely by students themselves, while others are unacknowledged and remain out of sight, contributing to the mood of tragic anxiety that one often encounters in talking to student activists.

Any examination of the current political struggle and the role of students must also take into consideration the changing socio-economic context of South Korean society. Living standards continue to rise for nearly everyone. There is increasing self-confidence about the ability of Koreans to compete against other nations and growing optimism regarding the country's long term prospects. As the weight of traditional constraints declines, young people are more outspoken, more demanding, and less restrained in their behavior. Regardless of governmental efforts to keep the lid on, South Korea has become a much more open society, especially compared to the 1970s under President Park. In recent years a greater degree of repressive force has been required to maintain a less tightly disciplined and controlled state. In the mix of persuasion and coercion used by the Chun regime to maintain itself in power, persuasion has become almost completely ineffective in dealing with students.

In trying to understand the motivation and behavior of militant students, it is also helpful, I think, for foreigners to look at another aspect of the Korean cultural tradition - in this case an emotional orientation that is not derived from China or Japan or the West but is deeply rooted in the unique national experience of Koreans. People in any society will, of course, react negatively to extreme hardship, injustice, oppression, unfair treatment or shame. But in Korea there is a conscious, culturally determined, expression of individual and collective anger and helplessness in the face of a tragic fate. The term for this in Korean, han, has no good translation in English, but is best represented by a cluster of words and phrases such as grievance, rancor, resentment, chagrin, desire for revenge, and the aspiration to overcome all difficulties through heroic effort. Han is the obsessive emotional reaction to deep disappointment and a sense of unjust treatment, and the result can be uncontrollable fury.* A particularly thoughtful academic observer, Professor Kim Kyong Dong of Seoul National University, has written that this emotional force "can be an important source of motivation for action -- for either achievement or conflict".** Thus the concept of han can be used to help explain both the national determination (expressed in thirteen hour factory work days) to overtake Japan.

*It should be pointed out as an interesting example of the juxtaposition of opposites that Koreans have frequently been praised for their endurance, resiliency, and fatalistic acceptance of extreme misfortune.

**Kim Kyong Dong, Unpublished ms.
economically, or the self-immolation of university students in protest against government repression. Professor Kim writes, "it is a poignant psychological force with tremendous potentially destructive power."

Koreans have a strongly tragic sense of their national history -- of centuries of invasion, occupation, destruction, oppression, and exploitation. In the modern period there has been no let-up, with division of the country and a disastrous civil war forced on the nation as a result of the intervention of foreign powers. More recently there has been a widely shared and growing popular repugnance for the political repression practiced by two militaristic regimes; and the han that has been generated as a result appears increasingly to have outweighed in the perceptions of students the psychological rewards of increased material prosperity. Han is a diffuse and intangible concept that does not lend itself well to rigorous social science analysis, but it nevertheless makes sense to those of us who have observed Korean students in action.

Organized student protest against political authority has a very long tradition in Korea, reaching back at least as far as the 16th century. In the modern period the student movement can be said to have its direct roots in the Japanese colonial period, when dissent was an expression of national patriotic resistance to the illegitimate rule of hated foreigners. Attitudes and emotions generated at that time appear to have been carried over to the period of liberation and independence since 1945, in the sense that the government and police are regarded with total enmity; and issues are seen in absolute black and white terms. Student protest is an attack against authority itself, which becomes the embodiment of evil, rather than against the specific policies formulated by the authority.

In contemporary South Korea the role of dissenting students as the purest expression of the nation's ideology and moral traditions has become institutionalized. Although there may be criticism of extremist ideologies and violent tactics, the student movement generally has the respect, sympathy, and admiration of most of the population. Because of the importance in Korean society of close kinship ties and old boy networks based on high school and university association, student thinking easily and quickly penetrates all elite groups. The older generation and conservatives in general may be opposed to specific goals, but they are nevertheless constantly exposed, not only to the currents of student thought, but also to the considerable weight of student righteousness. In the long run this tends to be more influential than government propaganda.

No systematic attempt will be made here to trace the student movement's history since 1945, but a few remarks concerning the background of the current situation are in order. Although the actual student participants are completely replaced every four years, hierarchical and
collective aspects of Korean social structure ensure a substantial degree of continuity in the goals, tactics, and internal organization of the movement.

Leftist and anti-American elements of student thought were already important during the U.S. military occupation from 1945-1948, and this ideological orientation, while often submerged in the subsequent decades never disappeared entirely. More recently it was the intense crackdown on student dissent by Park Chung Hee's internal security forces during the Yushin period (1972-1979) that initiated a more radical political stance and more tightly disciplined clandestine organizations among students. Many student leaders were arrested and imprisoned during this period, and new kinds of organizational structures were adopted in the effort to resist infiltration by government agents, and to ensure continuity under new leaders. Disillusionment with the United States as the principal ally, and support for what was regarded as an oppressive militaristic dictatorship became more widespread. It was also possible to discern at this period the pattern that was to be characteristic of subsequent relations between the authorities and militant student groups. Students reacted to the more intensive efforts to disrupt their active dissent by adopting a more bitterly confrontational attitude. Increased repression bred increased hostility, accompanied by more radical political theories - at least among leaders. In other words, the effort by the ex-military rulers to root out subversive thought tended to be counter productive. Or, to rephrase the situation in terms of the concepts introduced earlier, the student movement was being shaped by the emotions of han and a heightened conviction of its own moral righteousness.

In the late 1970s a sharper distinction developed between the aspirations for gradual political reform through the adoption of democratic political institutions by ordinary rank and file student activists and sympathizers on the one hand, and the goals of a much smaller group of left leaning, ideologically committed leaders on the other. Close communication and mutual support developed among the more radical student leaders and progressive intellectuals, both in academia and in literary and artistic milieux, and contacts were also maintained with groups in Japan who supplied texts and sophisticated theoretical indoctrination. There was also increased recognition by students during this period that the version of Korean history they had learned in high school was often misleading and even false. The resistance activities of Korean Communists against Japanese colonial rule had been completely ignored by official textbooks, and the accounts of post-liberation political struggles were badly distorted; "As a result cynicism, distrust, and systematic ideological hostility towards the authorities became more widespread among students."

Following the assassination of President Park in October 1979, student groups shared the widespread popular
expectation that fundamental democratic reforms would soon be adopted. But then, after the military coup of December, 1979 frustration and apprehension among students rose as General Chun Doo Hwan and his associates pursued their timetable for the reassertion of authoritarian military rule.

Massive student demonstrations were organized in Seoul in mid-May 1980, accompanied by demands that General Chun relinquish some of his newly acquired powers, and that a definite timetable be announced for concrete measures of democratization. Estimates vary, but it is believed that as many as 80,000 students were in the streets of Seoul on May 15. Even larger demonstrations were scheduled for the 16th, but opposition politicians, church leaders, and moderate student opinion prevailed on the activists to cancel the show of popular force. It was an impressive display of organizational self-discipline and coordination. As a result of some unruly mob scenes during the previous demonstrations, there had been a widespread feeling that public order was threatened, accompanied by a drop in popular support for the students. Above all there was at that point a desire not to provoke a military take-over by Chun. It now appears evident, however, that Chun had already made his decision. In spite of the cancellation of the Seoul demonstrations, student leaders were arrested on the night of May 17th, and martial law was declared. Student demonstrations organized in Kwangju on the 18th were put down with bloody ferocity, and armed insurrection by the citizens of the city followed. The effect of these events was to discredit absolutely the voices of moderation within the student movement.
RECRUITMENT AND INDOCTRINATION

Korean high school students who hope to get into college, live an extremely constrained life, one that is focussed almost entirely on studying for university entrance examinations. School itself is tightly structured and authoritarian. Students are not encouraged to express their own thoughts; rather they must soak up knowledge passively, accepting everything they are taught as absolute truth. At home family life is geared to providing encouragement and support for the educational sweepstakes. Any slackening of effort or class standing is cause for great parental concern, and pressures on the child to do well are likely to be intensified.

Upon entrance to a university both the constant pressures for high academic performance and the tight social constraints are abruptly relaxed. The student enters a completely different world - an experience that can be both intoxicating and disorienting. The freshman knows that he has four years of relative freedom ahead, before society closes in on him again with long hours and close supervision in an office, and eventually family responsibilities.* This is the only time of life, at least until retirement, when he can be non-conformist, escaping from established authority. Today most Korean university students are taking advantage of this brief period, indulging themselves in more or less hedonistic activities, depending on the amounts of available spending money.

But the freshman who is caught up in the militant, activist student movement reacts quite differently to the challenges and opportunities of university life. He latches on eagerly to the traditional student's role of bearer of the unsullied moral conscience of the nation. For the first time he looks up from his text books and observes - under the guidance of new, radicalized peers - the actual society around him. He is no longer in a sheltered environment where there is always only one correct answer that is to be memorized and regurgitated on a test. Now he is plunged into controversy and must for the first time in his life make important choices, both intellectual and social: what and how should he study, and who should he associate with? What sort of moral stand will he take on political issues? It is an interesting fact that in most cases he enthusiastically adopts a whole new perspective on the world around him as unquestioningly as he accepted the "truths" of high school.

The only strong constraints that remain are a sense of gratitude and obligation to his parents, who are paying large sums for his education, and the requirement that he

*In spite of the exclusive use here of the pronoun, 'he', it should be remembered that women make up an important part of the student movement, both at women's colleges and at the large, co-ed universities.
face examinations again after four years in order to compete for job openings in commerce, industry, or the bureaucracy. The social world of the university is, of course, much larger, more varied, and more impersonal than that of high school, with more opportunities available to satisfy individual interests. Many students who are away from their strongly cohesive family environments for the first time, feel somewhat lost and insecure. A considerable percentage, possibly more than a third of all college and university students have barely enough (or less than enough) money to support themselves after paying tuition and as a result suffer constant material hardship.

The student movement does not wait for freshmen to come and join; it actively recruits. Upper classmen carefully examine the lists of incoming freshmen from their own high schools, focusing particularly on those with whom they have personal, family, or home town ties. Recruiters say that the ideal candidate is someone from a poor family who was an energetic trouble maker in high school. As much information as possible is gathered about the personality, ability, and record of each potential new recruit.

A warm welcome is extended to the new freshmen by radical student organizations that usually includes, not only substantial amounts of food and drink, but also fellowship - the sense of belonging to a tightly knit community. During March, the first month of the university year, the emphasis is on attracting new members. After the freshmen become candidates, indoctrination starts and continues more or less intensively throughout the freshman and sophomore years. Each college or university has a large number of student-run extra curricular activities that are usually referred to as circles. There are also clubs and departmental student associations. At one women's college, for example, there are some 44 "circles" to choose from, of which eight are regarded by students as "consciousness raising". The term circle is also used in a more specialized way to refer to a particular militant group or cell within the student movement. Some circles and clubs are sponsored or at least sanctioned by the university and have faculty advisors, but the radical circles operate on their own under the direction of upper classmen. The indoctrination is carried on initially by small group study.

Participants in these study circles tend to take the work more seriously than their regular courses. A senior at a large southwestern university commented on the study circles as follows:

Students all realize that our high school education is completely one-sided -- a form of brain washing in which a single correct answer is provided for everything, either to justify the domestic military dictatorship or American imperialist domination. When we go to the university, we find that we have to
counter this by teaching ourselves a whole new perspective on the social sciences, with a different content, different text books, and a different method of instruction. We teach ourselves, and we call this, membership training (MT).

Student activists may spend about two hours daily involved in such extra-curricular study. They call it "soft" but "serious" in contrast to the stiff, formal impersonality of regular lecture courses. Study groups usually comprise from 5 to 10 students and can be readily observed by any visitor to a university campus. Upper classmen lead the discussions, throwing out issues that are "relevant to the reality of the present Korean crisis"... and reading aloud key passages from various texts. Typical texts are likely to be Marxist or neo-Marxist writings on colonialism, dependency theory, or class structure. Sometimes the group will spend fifteen or twenty minutes reading selected passages to themselves. When the discussion is resumed, everyone is expected to participate, and peer pressure combined with the very considerable authority exercised by juniors and seniors makes sure that they do.

In spite of the contrast between this "soft" or progressive style of instruction and normal Korean education, it is important to note that differences of opinion are not left unresolved. The discussion continues until everyone gets it right. Thus while the method of study appears to be progressive, what actually happens is that a complete new alternative system of thought and way of looking at the world is substituted for the conventional one previously provided by the Ministry of Education.

Students are not encouraged to study on their own, except for the reading of selected passages from approved books. There is considerable concern among leaders with propagating a uniform, orthodox ideological perspective, and in fact a remarkable degree of coordination exists among militant student groups throughout the country in this regard. Student leaders claim that such careful supervision and control of membership training is necessary for two reasons: 1) to prevent the fragmentation and theoretical weakening of the movement in the hands of future generations of leaders; and 2) to protect students who might otherwise be carried away in their radical statements from indictment under various provisions of the National Security Law.

Membership training also includes drinking excursions on weekends combined with all night discussion and pep talks, living and working with poor farmers for a week or ten days during summer vacation, and the participation as shock troops in demonstrations, both on and off the campuses. Only about one third of the original recruits survives the first six months of intensive indoctrination, finally acquiring formal membership in activist circles.
Many of those who drop out, do so because of parental or academic pressures, or because they finally decide that it is not worth the risk to their future careers. Nevertheless, they are likely to remain sympathetic, even to some degree still committed to the cause, confessing to feelings of guilt at having abandoned their comrades.

By the time freshmen are admitted to formal membership, they are committed to the ideological goals of the radical circles, and their social world is almost entirely restricted to the company of fellow activists. Persistent rumors exist to the effect that women students who have joined circles at large universities, regularly provide sexual services to other members, under the pretext of reinforcing group solidarity. Most student informants laughed at such stories, attributing them to government efforts to discredit the student movement. It was also pointed out, however, that Korean students, particularly militants, are no longer puritanical about sex, and many sexual liaisons do in fact exist among activists.

Membership training also includes intensive indoctrination in a code of behaviour that stresses loyalty to the group and the rejection of selfish egoism. The mission, which is a sacred one, is to raise the consciousness of the Korean people without any concern for personal risk or sacrifice. As individuals they are expected to remake their personalities and change their values so as to escape the effects of bourgeois family upbringing. In this connection there is a conscious effort to reject Western individualism and materialism, and to revive a more truly Korean form of communalism. At student festivals, in particular, traditional farmers' music and dances are prominently featured, preceded by long hours of conscientious rehearsal. There has even been a return to the native rural drink, makkoli, as a symbol of pure nationalism. Students believe that North Korean society expresses such native traditions to a much greater degree than does the South.
RADICAL IDEOLOGY AND ITS PROSPECTS

Student ideologues explain that in the Korean context radicalization, particularly after 1980, has been natural and inevitable. They claim that once it was clearly understood as a result of the military coup in December 1979 and the events of May 1980 in both Seoul and Kwangju, that the United States fully supported Chun's military dictatorship, all hope of change through gradual and moderate reform had to be abandoned. This theme was emphasized by many older informants - the devastating sense of betrayal, when they had realized in 1980 that America was not a model to emulate but rather the enemy, itself. Students further assert that the intensity and speed of the subsequent radicalization should be regarded as a reflection of this realization as well as of the degree of polarization of Korean society brought on by Chun's radical repression. The claim often made by foreigners that because of cultural factors Koreans are unable to make concessions and are therefore unable to reach a compromise politically is rejected absolutely: what makes compromise in Korea difficult is not national character, but rather that upright human beings have been obliged to make a difficult moral choice.

Everyone involved in the student movement agrees that the period from 1980-1983 was one of ideological consolidation, during which intense efforts were made to think through the basic issues in the light of recent events and come up with a coherent satisfying set of explanations as well as new goals. There follows a general summary derived from conversations with many informants of how the three basic issues of unification/nationalism, democratization, and social and economic justice have been linked together in progressive thought:

The core problem confronting South Koreans is the continued existence of a fascist military dictatorship over a period of 26 years, despite the longings of the people for freedom, and constantly repeated statements on the part of both the United States and South Korean Governments that their goal for the ROK is democracy.* The chief obstacle to democracy, then, is the strength of the military, which has consistently been justified by the alleged threat from the North, and which is supported logistically and diplomatically by the United States. Ultimately this situation can be attributed to the division of the country and the doctrine of anti-communism that supports

*'Freedom' and 'democracy' have, of course, special meanings in radical rhetoric.
it, both of which are artifacts of American interests and policy. The United States, contrary to what was believed in the past, wants neither unification on the Korean peninsula nor democratization in the South.* For strategic, political, and economic reasons the U.S. prefers the status quo in which a puppet regime, subordinate to Washington confronts the North militarily, maintains strict public order at home, and makes sure that the South Korean economy serves the interest of American multinational corporations. From this perspective the policy of forced draft economic growth is simply a means of exploiting Korean workers and farmers to enrich a small Korean elite and their foreign masters. The United States therefore is the real enemy, not the DPRK.

Students are particularly contemptuous of the brand of nationalism espoused by Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan.

All ROK rulers have been puppets of the U.S. The Korean war in particular was cleverly used as an instrument to perpetuate the division of the country, intensify anti-Communism, and prevent the truth from emerging regarding American imperialism and the exploitation of workers, farmers, and the poor. In Korea democracy and justice have been subordinated to anti-Communism and the enrichment of the ruling class.

They feel that they have no personal stake in Chun's patriotic propaganda, which they regard as having been devised simply to consolidate the power of the military and dupe the population. They are convinced that everything they have been taught in school about modern Korean history, the DPRK, and the role of the U.S. is lies -- as is the news that appears in newspapers and on TV. They say that the DPRK is more truly Korean and independent than the South with its enormous foreign debts, its importation and adoption of vulgar pop culture from America, and its dependence on the U.S. economy.

Actually this kind of talk probably reflects more a hatred of the Chun regime and frustration with the current repression of student activism than it does positive attitudes towards the DPRK and Kim Il Sung. Nevertheless it often seems that the hostility towards Chun, his fellow generals, and the economic "profiteers" is so great that

*A paper written by Bruce Cumings that has been translated and widely circulated in South Korea, is often mentioned in this regard. A copy is attached.
student militants would be pleased to see the Inmingun (North Korean Army) come South and kill them off.

Concern among radical students with the operation of other political systems throughout the world appears to be minimal. Presumably this constitutes the subject matter of conventional political science courses and is therefore suspect. Also, it is not regarded as having any direct bearing on Korea's unique "crisis". If I asked why there was no interest in the Scandinavian social democracies or in Japan as possible political models with a good track record for solving the problems of industrial society, there was little response beyond the reiteration of the claim that Korea was part of the third world. Students have derived considerable satisfaction since 1983 from violating taboos, simply as a way of expressing their resistance to established authority. The issue of unification, as it is treated by students, has been one such taboo. But at the same time unification is also a cornerstone of radical student thought:

Theoretically it must take precedence over everything else, and no sacrifice is too great to achieve it. Korea has no future without unification, since everything worthwhile in national life will continue to be sacrificed to this insane military confrontation with the DPRK. Unification has not even been seriously considered during the past thirty years because of American imperialist influence. The struggle for unification and socialism should be the natural outcome of industrialization in Korea, just as it has been everywhere else in the world. Why shouldn't we have a Communist party in South Korea too, if France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Japan all have one? The government has warned the upper classes in the ROK that if the students prevail, they will lose their property. Why not, if that is necessary in order to achieve democracy and social justice? The access to power of Kim Young Sam or Kim Dae Jung will not bring about the kind of fundamental, revolutionary change that is necessary. The role of Korean students is to raise the national consciousness to the point where true revolution becomes inevitable.

As a result of these causal linkages among 'democracy', unification, and social justice, which are always cited as absolute facts, none of the immediate problems facing Korea is regarded as solvable without dealing also with all the others. In other words, "gradual reform is useless; only
revolution can tackle the structural causes of Korea's current crisis."

Remarkably similar versions of this general line were presented by students, both male and female, attending or expelled from universities in Seoul, Taegon, Inchon and Kwangju. Evidently education under the student movement is nearly as centralized as under the Ministry of Education. Students speak with great conviction - with a zeal that resembles religious faith. They do not react positively to arguments that question these cause and effect relationships or that point out logical inconsistencies or errors of fact. More experienced student leaders and especially older intellectual advisors have thought through the issues in much greater depth than the rank and file activists, and can present sophisticated counter-arguments, if their assertions are questioned. But invariably when this happens, the mood of the interview becomes cold and formal, and the informant soon finds an excuse to leave. Militant students and their mentors live in a world where people are divided between friends and enemies. If the interviewer hopes to succeed, he must qualify at least as a strong sympathizer.

As students recited this litany, their discouragement and frustration - their feelings of han - would become more evident. But in response to the question, "Do you therefore regard the situation as hopeless for the next few years?" they would invariably shift mental and emotional gears, insisting that their willingness to persevere in spite of fascist repression and the inevitable increase in the consciousness of the Korean people would overcome all enemies.

One aspect of student thought that is shared with many older intellectuals is the conviction that nothing good whatsoever has come of 26 years of authoritarian rule. Moderates and outside observers often speak of the imbalance between economic and political development, but for activists the emphasis in discussing economic issues is invariably on a "distorted" economy, on economic and social "mal-integration", dependence on foreign capital, heavy debts, the abuses of the chaebol (conglomerates), and the impoverishment of workers under intolerable conditions. They look selectively at the world around them with ideological blinders, totally ignoring the energetic prosperity and optimistic dynamism that exist in most sectors of Korean society. There is a peculiar refusal to accept the fact of rapid industrialization and the increasing prosperity and national strength that accompanies it. Ideologically students cling tenaciously to their vision of South Korea as a deprived third world country under colonial domination. According to this perspective, industry comprises richest sweatshops where goods are produced with foreign capital and foreign technology to serve the needs of the military in confrontation with the North, to enrich America, and to seduce Koreans with an
imported materialism that undermines the national soul. By focusing entirely on the plight of the poor farmer, on workers in the low wage sector of industry, on inadequate coverage of the poor by the nascent welfare system, and on examples of corrupt collusion between big business and high government officials, militant ideologues are somehow able to convince themselves that the South Korean economy is a disgraceful shambles of speculative greed and exploitation of the masses under the ultimate control of the United States.

This message is so closely associated with vigorous political dissent, that it has become widely diffused in diluted form among the middle classes, who in any case strongly sympathize with the students' desire to get rid of the regime in power. Thus, the attitude of many ordinary Koreans has become somewhat ambivalent regarding the nation's industrial achievement and the role of the United States.

One issue that arises in connection with radical student thought is how radical is it? Is there a militant form of Communism among hard core student leaders as the government has maintained? Chun's propagandists and his prosecutors at student trials have proclaimed that subversive pro-Communist cells exist among some students and former students who are loyal followers of Kim Il Sung.... Lawyers who defend students being prosecuted under the.... National Security Law insist that their clients are just progressive reformers, who are occasionally driven to make extreme statements by their rage and frustration. For example, some student leaders adopt a posture of total defiance to the "fascist puppets" and proclaim openly in court that they are Socialists. It seems to be true that some militant students and former students do listen to North Korean broadcasts, occasionally using DPRK propaganda verbatim in their slogans and proclamations. This trend reached a peak towards the end of 1986, resulting in strong repressive measures by the authorities including a large number of arrests. It also appears to have antagonized Korean public opinion. Subsequently opposition politicians, church leaders, and more moderate elements among student groups all exerted pressure against the pro-P'yongyang stance, and during the first half of 1987, although active militancy has increased, the ideological emphasis has shifted back somewhat to the issues of human rights, democratization, anti-Americanism and the promotion of social and economic justice. This should probably be regarded more as temporary tactical retreat, however, than as a permanent change of any significance.

The line voiced by students with regard to international political and economic relations as well as internal domestic contradictions in South Korea sounds like it and resembles North Korean propaganda in many respects. It is also true that most students make a point of disbelieving everything derogatory that the Chun
government has to say about the DPRK. In any case, every informant, even those who felt a Communist party should be tolerated in the South, denied that organized student groups were Communist. There were vague references, however, to older, influential former students who might have contacts with North Korean agents in Japan, and who possibly favored a take-over by the North. In general, however, there was strong criticism of the government for constantly trying to use the Communist bogey man as an excuse to destroy the student movement and wipe out dissent.

In spite of the fact that all activists seem to be ready and eager to recite the leftist rhetoric described in the foregoing pages, there is some question regarding the depth of belief and radical commitment among rank and file demonstrators. In discussing this issue, most graduate students and sympathetic younger faculty tended to adopt a somewhat superior and doctrinaire attitude, asserting that since most students come from middle class backgrounds, their main concern has to be the achievement of liberal democracy with an emphasis on human rights and constitutional government. They argued that only a small portion of the student movement is deeply concerned with "class emancipation" and "class struggle", and that therefore the "objective conditions of Korean society are not yet mature enough to allow true democratic development... towards socialism." They seemed to be eager to show that there was a large gap between militant students' enthusiastic repetition of slogans they had memorized, and their own deeper ideological understanding.

Certainly graduate students who were formerly activists should be in a a better position than the foreign observer to understand the actual situation. Nevertheless the degree of radical commitment of rank and file student activists was impressive. Not only do they speak out confidently, violating the taboos against pro-Communist doctrine and unification-at-any-cost, but they have also adopted a critical attitude toward liberal democracy. What follows is a typical statement:

It is time to move on beyond the issues of human rights, freedom of the press and fair elections. These matters are of much less concern now than the division of the country, the plight of the poor, and our national submission to American imperialism.

Of course, it remains to be seen whether a significant degree of change in the direction of political democratization will undermine their convictions and, more importantly, influence the indoctrination of incoming freshmen in the future. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to expect, at least in the short run before dramatic political changes have occurred, that students will make every effort to maintain the integrity of their hard line
ideological position and their cohesive unity as an organization. There appears to be no particular reason why the internal structural and psychological forces that have driven the movement towards increased radicalization should lose their momentum.

On the other hand massive popular support for a new constitution followed by a fair election at the end of this year (1987), free of any hint of military interference, might have some effect in moderating the views of rank and file activists. Certainly such a chain of events would have considerable influence on the thinking of ordinary students, and militants could not help but be sensitive to the loss of sympathy for their cause on campuses.

In recent months another taboo - against criticism of the Olympics -- has been challenged by students, who frequently complain about what has been labeled Chun's policy of the three Ss: sex, screen, and sports. It is alleged that the government has fostered interest in these activities in recent years as a means of diverting students from their campaign of political and social activism. Students who are not involved in the movement may ruefully admit that to some extent the policy has been effective, but they also tend to be cynically critical along with the activists of what they refer to as "Olympic hysteria".

Having described some of the dimensions of radicalization, it is appropriate to ask why and how it occurred. There has already been mention earlier of the standard explanation: disillusionment and frustration as a result of the events of 1980 combined with the bitter reaction to Chun's offensive against ideological dissent. But other factors have undoubtedly also been important, although they are harder to pin down. Since 1980 the covert organization within the student movement has been enlarged and established on a more effective basis. All students know that it exists, but they don't know who is involved or just how it works. In addition a less controlled and less purposeful process also seems to have been at work. Since 1980 debate - often extremely controversial debate - among covert leaders regarding the interpretation of events and tactics has been more or less continuous. Except for the pull-back from a pro-North Korean line last winter, these debates have invariably been won by those with the more radical arguments. Students laughingly comment that there is only a six month period between different generations of student leaders, with an intensification of tension and commitment each time a new ideological controversy is settled. At smaller universities, particularly some of those in the provinces, where students had not previously participated fully in the activist movement, radicalization took place after 1982 in a slightly different way. Often when there were protests or demonstrations on purely campus matters, more radical students who had been picked for leadership roles by a higher echelon of the student organization, were able to take over meetings and raise...
political issues. The mood on Korean campuses is such that no one ever opposes this kind of intervention by engaging in ideological argument, even though the prevailing opinion of students might in fact have been moderate, favoring liberal democratic goals.

Some sort of inner dynamic associated perhaps with the special conspiratorial mood within which debates take place, and the competitive desire of individuals to prove themselves before their peers, seems also to have been at work. Contrary to what we might think, in Korea collective and hierarchical institutional structures do not prevent forceful and ambitious individuals from competing for power and status.
ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

Former student activists who were expelled, imprisoned, or who went underground during the Yushin period (1972-79), became influential heroes -- the first generation of professional, full-time, covert leaders of the student movement.* This was the group that first established a relatively simple, multi-layered, cell-like organization in the late 1970s to try and resist penetration and elimination by Park Chung Hee's police. This generation of leaders, which started out interested mainly in political reform, gradually shifted its perspective, becoming more concerned with the distribution of wealth and associated socio-economic problems. A radicalization of thought occurred forshading the "doctrine" of the three mins (sammin): minju (aspirations for democracy as opposed to fascist military dictatorship); minjok (nationalism/independence/unification); minjung (the masses/egalitarianism).

Following the establishment of martial law in 1980 large numbers of student activists were expelled, and many were imprisoned. Then there was another wave of arrests and expulsions in 1982 and 1983, as the student movement resumed its campaign to attract and indoctrinate new members, and the number of protest demonstrations increased. In 1984 the Chun government changed its policy to that of "campus autonomy" accompanied by a relatively lenient policy towards students. Almost 400 students were released from prison, and large numbers of expelled students and professors were reinstated. As a result an older generation of experienced and more radical student leaders re-entered the movement, providing additional reinforcement for its growing militancy and complexity of organization.

The "spot" form of organizational structure (chom chojik), which had existed in rudimentary form as early as the late 1970s, was subsequently expanded and refined. In the spot system all contacts between overt and covert student groups, as well as between different echelons, are carried out by single, designated individuals, who are in turn able to name a back-up if their position is in any way endangered. Coordination among student groups at different universities throughout the country is organized similarly, as are the links between different covert levels and groups. The designated person knows only his or her contact and one else in the other group(s). Usually, the person who receives instructions from a higher level will not be the

*Actually, some of this group were rehabilitated after serving prison terms, eventually becoming opposition politicians, company officials, and even bureaucrats. Consequently intimate personal networks based on university class membership and shared experience still exist, extending across political, class, and ideological boundaries and facilitating the flow of information and sometimes material assistance.
same person who reports to that level on lower echelon thinking and activity. Students say that no one knows the whole structure. At all levels the names of leaders are kept secret, except for the obvious orators and exhorters who inspire demonstrations. It was not even possible to discover how many organizational levels there are between the top decision makers and those who march in the streets. According to lower level leaders, the structure permits a healthy flow of information and opinion from the bottom up through the system, so that higher leaders are always in touch with the ideas and feelings of ordinary students. Nevertheless, there is no question about where authority lies, and the rank and file do as they are told.

The participation of large numbers of students in demonstrations depends on the administrative ability and charismatic skills of overt student leaders, but real power and direction is in the hands of students and former students who stay out of sight. Most of these have been expelled, and many are wanted by the police.* Since 1980 and the failure of what might be termed "optimistic moderates" within the student movement, this hidden leadership has become more influential, forging a more cohesive, radical, and militant student organization designed to be the "vanguard" of social and political change. During the Park years arrests of student leaders and the dismantling of student organizations were effective in disrupting activities, but since 1980 it has been possible to carry on almost without interruption under new leaders and new organizational labels, in spite of continuing repression.

At the overt level a National Federation of Student Associations (Chonhakryon) was established in 1984 along with regional federations, and these organizations helped greatly to integrate student thought and activity throughout the country. The factional ideological division between Minmintu and Chamintu surfaced in 1985, eventually spreading throughout the student movement.**

*As of June 1st, 1987.

**In very broad and general terms Minmintu (also known as CA, constitutional assembly) adherents adopt a hard line: Marxist position, in which the emphasis is on internal contradictions in South Korea - most notably the class struggle between workers and the bourgeoisie. The current fascist government now presides over a system of monopolistic state capitalism, according to Minmintu theorists, and the nation is ripe for revolution. Chamintu members see Korea as a marginal part of the world capitalist system, and for them the most critical problem is American imperialist domination and the need to promote national independence and unification. Most student activists are in the chamintu faction.
Current student leaders at the covert level are in contact with a fairly wide variety of older progressives and intellectuals from the church, academia (including high school teachers), the political opposition, the labor movement, the legal profession, and the arts. Such people, who have diverse ideological beliefs, share a bitter opposition to the Chun regime. They provide counsel, refuge, financial aid, and moral support, as well as links with sympathetic groups overseas. In spite of the influence of this older support group, many members of which have high social status, it appears that actual student leaders (including expellees and drop outs) remain in control of the movement. For this reason older sympathizers, many of whom are moderates at heart, have had to undergo a radicalization process in order to try and hold on to the trust and respect of increasingly radical student leaders. They are often unsuccessful, with young radicals inclined to dismiss them as part of the system that must be eliminated. There are, of course, all sorts of strong personal ties and obligations that cut across sharp age, occupational, and organizational boundaries, linking, for example, a lawyer with his client, a professor with his student, or the recipient of financial aid with his benefactor.

The greater integration and cohesiveness of the student movement in recent years has overcome a good deal of the traditional elitism and Seoul-centeredness of the past, according to which students from Seoul National, Yonsei, Korea, Sungkyungkwan, and Sogang universities dominated both as leaders and as participants in protest demonstrations. Provincial universities, particularly Chonnam in Kwangju and Pusan National, have been in the forefront of militant activism during the last five years or so. There is indeed some evidence that Kwangju now rivals Seoul as a place where important decisions are made and new initiatives undertaken. Formerly Korea university used to hold the first demonstrations in the spring, and then the other universities followed according to their own separate organizational time tables. While Sungkungkwan was often influential in establishing the particular line adopted for the season, other universities differed to a greater or lesser degree. But more recently most universities demonstrate at about the same time, adopting the same attitude on particular issues, and this has been one element in the successful crescendo of pressure built up in May and June, 1987.

Student activists are ordinary rock-throwing soldiers during their first two years at the university, carrying out the brunt of confrontations with the police. Upper classmen are more concerned with planning and organization, and they expose themselves much less to the actual struggle. As mentioned earlier, those in the most responsible leadership roles do not appear at all. When police arrest the apparent leaders, they rarely get hold of anyone really important; the reason for torture has been to try and uncover the
secret organizational structure. Leaders are chosen secretly from among third year students on the basis of dedication and performance, and while their fellow students may guess who they are, there is a taboo against speculation about their identity.

In the spring of 1987 a decision was made to utilize hit-and-run tactics by smaller, highly mobile groups of student demonstrators in downtown areas. This was an effort to break out of the stalemate that had developed between police and students at the university gates, in which tear gas always won the day. Student leaders were determined that their battles after June 10th would be carried out under the noses of the urban population, most of whom, while vaguely sympathetic, had managed to avoid openly choosing sides.

The new tactics were extensively rehearsed in Kwangju and other provincial cities. The problem, of course, was that by leaving their campus refuges, students were raising the confrontational stakes and making themselves more vulnerable to arrest. But they realized also that police forces were stretched thin in the cities, and that if the demonstrators split up into numerous groups, forming in one place and then quickly dispersing to reform somewhere else, there was no way the police could keep up. Through superior communications and transportation facilities the police had nearly always in the past been able to mobilize overwhelming forces quickly wherever the students gathered to demonstrate. The new tactics severely tested their capacity to do this, and in many cases police detachments were outnumbered by the sudden unexpected concentrations of students. These tactics required that overt leaders at the rank and file level have more responsibility and authority, so that the small groups of students could adapt flexibly to the changing situation as it developed in the city streets.

Until quite recently it has always been assumed by students that their closest personal bonds were with high school classmates and after that with classmates at college. But activists claim that now the ties with fellow members of the same circle within the student movement are much stronger, because "they are all imbued with a deep sense of common purpose and have studied, acted, and suffered together in the common cause."

The sub-culture of the student movement is strongly collective. Both membership training and demonstrations are entirely collective activities, while the songs, the drinking bouts, the celebration of folk art, and labor in the countryside all serve to reinforce this aspect of the student ethos. The collective mood is fostered consciously as a return to national traditions and a rejection of imperialist, selfish individualism. The ideology itself is characterized by students as collective. It was reported that very few members drop out after their freshman year, and that when they do, it is almost always because of
parental pressure, not because students find that activism is too arduous or time consuming.

Students often claim that participation in the movement is the most satisfying experience of their lives. They speak of the sense of personal mission as if it had a sacred quality, often bringing up the traditional stance of the Confucian scholar in dynastic times, who was prepared to risk his life for moral integrity. Students seem to believe that they are in the forefront of a national revival - a return to the most worthwhile elements of their cultural heritage. One comment was: "The major task of this generation is to create a new set of national beliefs and values founded in our common past and rejecting foreign materialism and individualism." It is this theme that reinforces the desire for unification and the sense of comradeship with Koreans in the DPRK.
STUDENT ACTIVISTS AND OTHER STUDENTS

The percentage of students who are militant activists varies from one campus to another, with a far smaller membership at women's colleges and universities. Most estimates, which are all quite vague, put the total at from 3% to 5% of all college and university students, of whom perhaps as many as 15,000 are in the Seoul area. The term activist or militant applies to committed radicals who belong to organized groups or circles, and who have adopted a revolutionary ideology. Their thinking, or at least their expressed views, are not as a rule less radical than those of the core leaders, but their knowledge of the classic ideological texts and of governmental systems in other countries - particularly of Communist states - is quite thin. Opinions differ as to how deeply they have internalized their radicalism. Sympathetic faculty and other moderate intellectuals tend to believe that most students are really liberal democrats at heart (or at least by cultural conditioning) and can be expected to throw off their extremism after graduation, particularly if a substantial degree of democratization takes place in South Korea. Curiously enough militant leaders with a strongly Marxist perspective have a similar opinion, saying that given the students' class base their political beliefs have to be fundamentally bourgeois-democrat and do not match their rhetoric. Students themselves seem more certain of their permanent commitment, with most insisting that they will devote their lives to "raising the consciousness of the Korean people" in order to promote "liberation of the oppressed classes". What is at issue here is a certain tension between students' whole-hearted dedication to their cause on the one hand, and the worldly wise recognition by older Koreans that their extremism is really a reflection of their status as students and the influence of their colleagues in a collective context. When their ideas change after graduation, it is not regarded as a logical inconsistency or the result of a lack of individual integrity, but rather as a natural and understandable shift to accompany changes in their social situation.

It is generally assumed by activists that all other students are sympathetic to their cause, and that failure to participate in the movement is caused by lack of courage and dedication, the influence of parents, or concern about careers. Militants recognize, however, that the sympathy of ordinary students often extends only to the common desire to get rid of Chun's "military dictatorship", and that there are many moderates who are opposed to revolution, even though no one speaks out on campus against radical ideas.

Activists say that they do not have hostile feelings towards moderate and apathetic students; they merely give up on them. Nevertheless, some degree of antagonism does exist, and this may surface in other aspects of student life that have no apparent connection with the movement. There has
been a good deal of tension and animosity on campuses in recent years with a lack of mutual trust and communication between administrators and faculty and students. Radicals by creating their own ideological curriculum and subculture, have isolated themselves to a considerable degree from ordinary university life.

It is true that some students who are failing academically, others who are having trouble at home, and still others with psychological difficulties do join the movement as a way of coping with their problems; and in many cases such students do, in fact, become committed radicals, although they are only a small proportion of the total. Actually, surveys have shown that there are proportionately just as many well adjusted students who get good grades and come from stable, tightly knit families among activists, as there are in the student population as a whole. Indeed their intellectual level is reported to be somewhat higher than the average.*

Most observers in Seoul agreed that the number of organized, committed activists had probably peaked in 1985 or early 1986 and had not increased significantly since then. It was pointed out that the extremist doctrines, the risks of physical danger as well as to future careers, and the potential for family alienation all placed absolute limits on the numbers of students willing to commit themselves to militant activism. Many students commented that they felt guilty watching the activists take all the punishment, even though they believed that the struggle was on everyone's behalf; others envied the evidently satisfying communal togetherness of men and women participants in the movement.

It is extremely hard to evaluate the degree of radicalization experienced by students who are not circle members. Four different professors (all teaching sociology at elite universities) were willing to make estimates about the status of students in small classes (40 - 60 students)/ where they had reasonably good information about each individual. With some minor exceptions these estimates were in fairly close agreement.** A rough summary table follows:

- Radical activists 4% - 6%
- Students who were informed on the issues, considered themselves to be somewhat involved in the movement, and who would participate in demonstrations

*A Study of Student Activism in Korea, Korean Social Science Research Council, Seoul, 1987. (in Korean)

**Sociology classes have more radical students than courses in the natural sciences or the humanities.
and other activities if specifically asked to do so.* 4% - 8%

- Students who did not participate but who generally understood the issues, kept track of political events, and felt sympathy for activists. 15% - 20%

- Students who really did not understand the issues, or follow events but sympathized out of a sense of brotherhood with fellow students, and because the movement is fashionable. 30% - 40%

- Students who were oblivious, interested only in their own studies, relationships, and careers. 30% - 40%

A group of highly sympathetic graduate students came up with a somewhat different but not contradictory formulation after considerable discussion:

- Committed activists
  - Sympathizers
    - Strong sympathizers 3% - 5%
    - Weak sympathizers 35%
  - Opponents 50% - 10%

There are always passive student spectators standing around quietly when demonstrations take place, usually because they are on their way home and find the university gates blocked. Most spectators appear completely disinterested much of the time; demonstrations occur so frequently that they have become just an annoying part of the daily routine. On some occasions, however, demonstrations turn into highly dramatic events, generating violence and a great deal of excitement and emotion. When this happens, the silent spectators often become partisan, joining in the orchestrated chants and applauding the warriors who return from the gate drenched in tear gas.

Many informants emphasized the fluctuating nature of the degree of student sympathy. Whenever the police reaction to demonstrations is particularly violent, involving brutality and arrests, particularly inside the campus, then the indignation and sympathy of non-participants increases perceptibly. *Feathers try to make use

*Members of this group were likely to feel guilty about not doing more but worried more about damaging their careers (or chances for marriage).
of this phenomenon by staging demonstrations when students are out of class but still at their campuses.
RADICAL STUDENTS AND THE MIDDLE CLASS

Although obvious it is worth emphasizing that most radical students are from the middle class and expect to lead middle class lives after graduation.* Poor students with rural or small town backgrounds constituted a much higher percentage of activists in the 1970s than they do today. Many militants are sons and daughters of bureaucrats and corporation executives. Of 1219 students arrested at the time of the Konkuk University incident in October 1986, over 60% were classified by the police as of middle class background, while almost 10% were children of government officials. It is also noteworthy that 465 were women students.

Among students in late 1986 and the first half of 1987 there was a widespread belief that middle class support for their cause was increasing, but it seemed to be difficult for student ideologues to sort out the selective and limited nature of this growing popular sympathy. There was some tendency to believe that if certain aspects of middle class consciousness were being raised, such as, for example, that Chun Doo Hwan's "fascist dictatorship" had to go, or that the nation was "subservient" to American influence, then everything else would slip into place. There would then be a massive shift towards a more progressive ideological consensus as the rest of the population finally perceived the obvious "truths". The general idea was to get the more sympathetic (younger) middle class elements to abandon their moderate, in-between position and force them to make an unequivocal choice. Students asserted optimistically that they were winning the struggle for the hearts and minds of ordinary people, who increasinely realized that justice and unification were more important than anti-Communism and economic growth.

In actuality, of course middle class perspectives tend to be quite different. Most peoples' lives are deeply rooted in the status quo. And there has been no lessening of the desire for continued order and prosperity. What did happen was that the credibility of the government was destroyed, students successfully pointed out that political taboos need no longer be observed, and it became obvious to everyone that Chun's mandate was seriously eroded. The only perfect point of congruence of radical student thought and middle class beliefs was the idea that the military should

*The term middle class, like intellectuals is a slippery one. For the sake of simplicity here it will include persons who have at least a minimally decent living standard, a high school education, and who do not engage in manual labor, or menial service jobs... A taxi driver who owns his own dab of a well-to-do farmer are anomalous, border line cases. Both can send some if not all of their children to a university and occasionally even go to Cheju Do on vacation.
get out of politics. Ideas about the meaning of democratization are quite different, and for most of the middle class unification is an almost hopelessly distant prospect.

The most characteristic feature of middle class attitudes towards student radicalism before June 29th, 1967 was that while dangerously extreme and not to be trusted, it was nevertheless the only "game in town" - the only credible force capable of bringing about political change, and that therefore the student movement should be encouraged. This was perhaps more generally true of persons under forty-five and those who might be classified as "intellectuals", than it was of older persons in business and the bureaucracy who tended to be more conservative.

Many younger member of the middle class who were students themselves not so many years ago, and who have made the transition from relative freedom at the university to a life of confined upward striving, retain a certain nostalgic sympathy for activist ideals. Even while asserting that the present crop of militants will eventually have to toe the line and learn how to adapt to corporate organizational structure, there are those who express considerable ambivalence about the distribution of power, status, and wealth in contemporary society. There is, in other words, the hope that radical ideals can somehow challenge what are regarded as the excessive authoritarian and hierarchical characteristics of most Korean institutions. Those who were part of the student movement in the past look back on their exploits in battling the police with a mixture of pride and wonder at their own naivete.

Students who are now involved in radical activity, say that they are very much concerned with continuing to make a contribution after graduation, and that this is a frequent topic at self criticism sessions. Recognizing that family responsibilities can often take priority over ideological commitment, they maintain that the best solution is to marry a fellow militant. Women activists in particular say that they will only marry someone whose consciousness is at the same level as their own.

There seems to be a fairly sharp division between those students who realize that inevitably they are going to have to make a sharp transition, becoming part of the world they detest, and those who insist that they will continue the good fight. The latter point out that a fairly large and influential progressive society exists in South Korea comprising all those who were expelled, forced to drop out, or were imprisoned for political reasons over the past twenty-five years or so, along with other enlightened intellectuals. The members of this group are for the most part intelligent and talented, although they have not been permitted to succeed or to live well, and they are bound together by strong bonds of ideological allegiance.

In any case students fully realize that the nature of their participation in the movement will change drastically
after leaving the university, even though their attitudes
may remain constant. A few former activists find jobs with
Christian youth movements, where they will be actively
assisting student demonstrators who get into trouble with
the authorities. Other organizations, both church related
and secular, provide legal aid or support for students
involved in labor agitation. In addition some opposition
politicians have former student leaders on their staffs.
But the sum total of all such jobs is not great compared to
the number of graduating activists each year.

Becoming a blue collar worker in order to promote union
organization is probably the most conspicuous and highly
regarded way for students to continue their radical efforts.
Mass communications, the theatre, literature, and art were
also often mentioned as fields of activity where talented
graduates could exert influence to raise popular
consciousness. Many former activists become primary and
secondary school teachers, but as government employees they
have until now been subject to strict supervision and
control. Under a more democratic regime progressive
teachers associations would probably organize openly and
play a more significant political role.

Students predicted that under a bourgeois democracy led
by someone like Kim Young Sam, progressive groups, although
still excluded from power, would thrive and be able to
organize relatively freely for the ultimate transition to
Socialism. They contrasted their own solidarity and firm
convictions with the selfish individualism and disunity of
the middle classes and opposition politicians, predicting
a certain eventual victory.

Most radicals insisted that even if it was only in a
minor way, they would continue to pursue their goals after
graduation, seeking jobs where they could exert a positive
influence on national life and help "raise consciousness".
Taking a blue collar job with the idea of educating workers
and helping them organize labor militancy was frequently
mentioned as the most praiseworthy course of action.

*The frequency with which the phrase "raise consciousness"
appears in this paper reflects the fact that it is a
constant cliche of radical student discourse.
STUDENT ACTIVISTS AND THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

The role of the church in political dissent and more specifically in support of students is extremely complex because of doctrinal differences in the positions of Catholics and Protestants, the fragmentation of the Protestant Church, and variations attributable both to generational differences and the workings of individual conscience among church leaders.

In South Korea Christians are everywhere. They are extremely well organized, often well funded, and they have high social prestige. Most congregations have strong internal cohesion, and the government has been reluctant to interfere in church activities, providing some degree of refuge from surveillance and control. The church symbolizes moral respectability, particularly within the new middle class. Traditionally church leaders, both Catholic and Protestant have been among the most outspoken middle class opponents of governmental authoritarianism. Various church groups were deeply involved in efforts to promote gradual reform in the late 1970s. Church-sponsored organizations such as the Urban Industrial Mission and the Farmers Catholic Organization were firmly repressed as a result of their efforts to educate and mobilize industrial workers and farmers.

The profound ideological disillusionment that followed Chun's seizure of power in 1980 forced youth movement leaders within the church to undertake the same kind of internal debate and re-examination of first principles that was taking place in the student movement as a whole.

Radical students after 1982 adopted a hard line, showing contempt for the church and its efforts at reform, which they regarded as having been discredited by the events of 1980. Clergymen might be men of personal uprightness and good will, but institutionally the church was regarded as an integral part of the bourgeois (enemy) society, and therefore it could play no useful role in revolutionary reform. As long as the church preferred anti-Communism as part of its creed, it could, according to the radical view, make no contribution to solving the nation's more immediate problems.

Younger more progressive elements associated with both Catholic and Protestant youth organizations were also troubled by these issues. Some of these men were former student leaders who sympathized deeply with student goals. Accordingly, a radicalization process took place within some church groups after 1982 and considerable interest in Liberation Theology developed. As a result, although there was considerable formal hostility expressed by militant student leaders towards organized religion, in fact Christian and non-Christian groups, within the student movement worked together without serious difficulty.

In general church groups have avoided direct involvement in student action, but they have provided
support in many ways including the use of church buildings as sanctuaries. Financial help and legal services have been provided for many arrested and imprisoned students, as well as for the victims and the families of victims at Kwangju. The movement by students to infiltrate factories and to assist farmers has received extensive support from Christian organizations in recent years. Some, such as the Korean Christian Action Organization, have adopted a confrontational stance, and as a result most of their work has been blocked or undone by police action, but other groups working quietly behind the scenes have been quite effective.

The church has also been active in promoting and helping to finance the popular culture movement, through which radical intellectuals, most of whom were fairly recent university graduates, published a great deal of "subversive" literature and sponsored art exhibitions and dramatic presentations with progressive political content.

It is perhaps too soon to evaluate the role of Christians and the church in unifying dissent in June 1987 and getting members of the middle class to join students in opposing repression in downtown Seoul, but it appears to have been substantial. The formation at the end of May, 1987, of the National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution was accomplished largely as a result of Christian initiatives. This was the broadest coalition of opposition groups ever organized and according to some (Christian) observers it permitted a much better degree of coordination between student protest and the efforts of other dissenting groups after June 10th.
THE STUDENT EFFORT TO INFILTRATE LABOR

The point has already been made earlier that formal student ideology is fundamentally revolutionary in character. Students have convinced themselves, theoretically at least, that the contradictions facing the nation are so deep-rooted that only a basic change in social, political, and economic structure can lead to a solution. But there is an agonizing problem: who will carry out the revolution? The full weight of ideological authority provides only one answer: the oppressed working class. In continuing study and self-criticism sessions, students have been led to recognize that their role is limited to that of raising the consciousness of the oppressed laboring classes, and that as intellectuals with middle class backgrounds they themselves, however militant their tactics, cannot be the instruments of true revolution. And, given the fact that the rural population is still relatively conservative politically, student ideologues have determined that the main long term effort must therefore be directed at educating labor and helping workers mobilize for action. As a result the most ideologically advanced and most dedicated students - those who intend to remain in the movement after their university years - have tended to focus on this highest priority task of encouraging industrial labor to perform its proper revolutionary role. In addition, they often see themselves as abandoning their own class background and transforming themselves permanently into labor activists.

But they have encountered frustrating problems, and in spite of the strenuous efforts that got underway in 1985 and some initial successes (1985), the program to infiltrate labor was not going well as of early June, 1987. The problems can be grouped under three headings: 1) the lack of receptivity of labor to the students' message; 2) the preoccupation of students with utopian and political goals; 3) severe government repression.

The students' ideological model, in which South Korea is in a state of semi-colonial dependency on exploitative U.S. capitalism, makes it impossible for them to recognize the true dimensions of economic progress and its effect on industrial labor. It is true, of course, that there are many low-paying sectors in Korean industry, where workers are dissatisfied. In addition there is anger and resentment because of tight governmental restrictions on the right to organize, to strike, and even to present grievances. Paternalistic employers have worked closely with the police and officials of the Ministry of Labor to keep labor docile and obedient. When these constraints are lifted, and as workers sense the waning of President Chun's power, student agitators will have fertile ground for their efforts. In the short term redundancies are likely to be inevitable. But it is also true that with industrial expansion and the disappearance of a "stagnant labor pool", employers have had
to compete for workers in recent years by offering better pay and improved conditions. Korean labor has, in fact, done relatively better than workers in the other NICs, and this applies particularly to such low paying sectors as female labor in the textile, shoe, and electronics industries. As a result of industrial expansion and export growth jobs are abundantly available, and living standards continue to improve. Workers may be resentful and combative, but they are not by and large in a revolutionary mood. Rather, they are likely to share with most other Koreans an optimistic view of the nation's economic future under a free enterprise system, expecting that their children will live much better than they do.

So there is a sharp and continuing contradiction between the students' desire to revolutionize the working man - and labor's objectives, which are better pay and improved working conditions. This, too, has been the subject of much debate and self-criticism, with students forced to conclude on repeated occasions that in order to gain their confidence, they must promote workers' immediate, practical interests, abandoning at least for the short term their own preoccupation with ideological goals. But such tactical compromises with moral principle have not been easy. The conflict over how students can best serve workers' interests has been going on more or less continuously ever since the turn towards radicalization began in the 1970s. It is still far from resolved.

One problem is that most students are not really interested in the messy complexities that characterize actual social problems. What fascinates them and enlists their emotional support are the broad moralistic abstractions, in terms of which there is a clear enemy to blame and hate, and an equally clear "truth" to believe in. The realization of how the Korean case fits into prestigious international theories of colonialism, dependency, class warfare, and revolution comes as a revelation, a true enlightenment, revealing the "hypocrisy and lies propagated by the military dictatorship and its American masters."

There were reportedly (in early June, 1987) over forty different student groups that were primarily concerned with raising the consciousness of workers. Many of these organizations had established secret branches in the various industrial enclaves of South Korea. The Chun government has demonstrated on many occasions that it is determined to eradicate attempts by students to radicalize labor, and as a result many of the organizations have disbanded and reformed under new names in accordance with the rhythms of police repression. The more militant groups can claim responsibility for a certain amount of labor unrest since 1985, but many of their members have ended up in prison.

Other, more gradualist, often church-sponsored organizations have tried to pursue less confrontational goals, usually under the direction of older founders and advisors. This older generation is not interested in
braving about revolution but rather wants to train leaders who can create and direct a strong labor union movement under a hoped-for, liberal democratic, successor regime. Their thinking is often at variance, however, with that of the Christian students working under their sponsorship.

Both radical and moderate organizations are using the same instrument to try and achieve their goals - namely, students, both men and women, who take blue collar jobs, and try to gain the friendship and respect of their fellow workers. Estimates of the number of students who have deliberately taken factory jobs in order to "raise workers' consciousness" varies greatly from a low of about 1500 to a high of over 5000. It is a crime in the Republic of Korea to disguise one's educational qualifications in order to obtain a blue collar job. The dividing line between a dedicated activist who has been expelled from a university, and who obtains employment in industry for ideological reasons on the one hand, and the drop-out or graduate who takes a factory job because no other work is available on the other, is not always absolutely clear. With less than 50% of all college and university graduates obtaining jobs in 1986, it is obvious that many former students have to become workers in industry, at least temporarily. It also seems probable that most are discontented and ready to join in, if not actually help organize, labor disputes.

Employers are likely to fire a former student, if his or her higher educational background is discovered, regardless of whether he or she has actually been involved in labor agitation. If, however, the student is accused of playing an active role in promoting labor unrest, the police are usually called in, leading to questioning, threats, and sometimes arrest and imprisonment. One long-time observer of the labor scene noted that, "in Korea all labor disputes are illegal, and they are invariably settled illegally through the informal intervention of the police and other officials." As a result of frequent police crackdowns and employer resistance it is now believed that the number of student activists working in industry has declined during the last year or so, in spite of the fact that new, dedicated recruits are constantly trying to penetrate the field. Employers, who for the most part strongly resist any threat of unionization, have adopted certain practices to avoid hiring militant ex-students. For example, a textile manufacturer may hire only girls under 19 or married women.

The ex-student activist working in a factory has a difficult and dangerous job. The work may be physically demanding or excruciatingly boring, and living conditions are likely to be lower, often much lower then he or she is used to. He must carefully and gradually cultivate the friendship of fellow workers, with whom he has almost nothing in common. And if his activities are uncovered, he faces possible arrest and imprisonment. There is great admiration for such "people by other activists, who often refer to them as the true heroes of the movement. Apparently the most
frustrating aspect of their role is coping with what is referred to as "low worker consciousness." A number of interviews with former students who had been through the experience revealed a good deal of ambivalence. On the one hand they reported that gaining the confidence of fellow workers and helping them attain a better understanding of the facts regarding American imperialism and its exploitation of Korean labor was extremely satisfying. But on the other hand they sometimes longed for more intellectual stimulation and the material amenities of middle class life. Factory working hours are long, often 10 or more hours daily, and vacation time is minimal. In order to carry out their mission, the infiltrators must spend the only free time of the day - a couple of hours in the evening - in conversation with fellow workers, or leading informal study and discussion groups. Although no figures were available, the burn-out rate is apparently fairly high. There is, however, no shortage of new volunteers, eager to contribute to the cause.

According to informants, married couples are best able to withstand the strains of this kind of life. Usually both husband and wife are former activist students, and both have factory jobs. In other cases a former student will have married a working woman, converting her to his cause and enlisting her help in his conversion efforts.

It seems evident that if strict governmental control of union activity is relaxed, and former students are free to carry their message to workers, there will be a major surge of effort in this area. Past experience has shown that given time and the opportunity to operate without restraint, most student agitators have been able to organize and indoctrinate a core group of discontented workers.

The chaebol or conglomerates were described as representing the greatest opportunity but also the most difficult challenge for labor activists. Wages and working conditions are better than in smaller companies, and management exerts detailed control over every aspect of the workplace. But there is also a good deal of worker resentment against the enormous wealth and power of the chaebol and the tight authoritarian discipline that characterizes their labor policies. Former students with experience in such companies say that nearly all the workers are intelligent and have a high school education, so they can easily absorb the "truth" of the new ideology. It was asserted that the struggle to raise worker's consciousness must be won in the chaebol, since they constitute the front line of Korean industry.
DISCUSSION

The Korean student movement is possibly unique, not only because of its long historical tradition, but also because it has often been a major player in important national political events. Periodically students have wielded great power, although they have never controlled the government. During the past thirty-five years or so a large amount of governmental effort and resources have been devoted, not always successfully, to keeping students under control. There is a theory that South Korean student protest is a cyclical phenomenon, reaching peaks of activity every seven years; actually, the numbers don't quite work out.* In any case it is important to recognize that we are dealing with a permanent, continuing aspect of Korean political development.

In this discussion two major questions will be addressed: 1) What are the significant structural changes - those with implications for future developments - that have taken place in the student movement as a result of the period of increasingly intense activity from 1982 until July, 1987? 2) What sort of role are activist students likely to play in the current transition period that will hopefully lead to the establishment of a more legitimate regime under a democratically elected president? The first question will be dealt with briefly, since it is the topic of most of the preceding sections of this paper. The second question is more complex and more difficult; rather than answers, there will be speculation.

1) It is probably correct to assume that most activist students, particularly those from elite universities, will, as in the past, find jobs after graduation in business, the bureaucracy, and the professions, where they will gradually adopt a middle class lifestyle and worldview. Doubtless, these former militants will remember their campus radicalism with nostalgia, but it will have been largely replaced, at least in terms of their daily lives, by some more pragmatic set of beliefs focussed on advancing family interests and the prosperity of corporate enterprise. In spite of its ideological tensions and penchant for moralistic rhetoric, South Korea is still very much a materialistic, consumption and achievement-oriented society.

But having said this, it is nevertheless important to point out that the situation has changed since 1982 in some important respects, and that as a result the student movement is likely to continue to exert substantial leverage on domestic politics for the foreseeable future. The following changes, all of which have taken place in recent years, appear to be both significant and irreversible.

especially in light of the expected shift to a more open and democratic society:

a) Student radicals have put together an alternative, coherent, and comprehensive ideology that has completely transformed their perspectives on nationalism and national goals, as well as on the place of South Korea in the international system. As a result of new methods of indoctrination and the emotional stresses that have accompanied their struggles against authority, students now tend to believe in their new doctrines with an intensity that approaches religious fervor. Many elements of this ideology have, in more or less diluted and sometimes distorted form, seeped across sub-cultural and class boundaries and are now widely incorporated in popular thought and attitudes.

b) Student radicals have created a highly organized, well disciplined, and partially clandestine organization that has developed effective means for self perpetuation through recruitment and ideological indoctrination.

c) Compared to the past it seems probable that a significantly larger number of today's student radicals will not conform to the dominant middle class ideology and will occupy a somewhat marginal and alienated position in society.

d) Student radicals have developed plans and methodologies for the mobilization of labor, that in the absence of governmental repression are likely to be at least partially effective.

If we can assume that future governments in South Korea will be somewhat less intolerant of political dissent, then the changes cited above would all appear to contribute in the long run to the establishment of more firmly based leftist political institutions.

2) It seems useful to approach the second question, "what can we expect from the student movement during the next several months or so?", by way of an internal debate. First, there will be arguments supporting the idea that student activism will resume, interfering with efforts to establish and consolidate the new regime—what might be called the Chang Myon period (1960-1961) precedent. This will be followed by a contrasting summary of reasons for expecting militant students to be relatively calm and tolerant, if not supportive, of new political initiatives. It is assumed, of course, that during the period under consideration the South Korean military does not interfere, the DPRK does not make any particularly aggressive moves, and there is no economic catastrophe.

With the lessening of military intervention in politics and a weakening of bureaucratic authority and the coercive force of the police, the student movement remains in place as a well organized, cohesive, and highly motivated institution. There will probably be less severe constraints on student activism, so that radical leaders can be expected
to step in and try to influence events in what they perceive to be a temporary and partial power vacuum. In particular, the temptation to bring about more revolutionary change by encouraging labor agitation will be considerable.

We know that students are deeply suspicious of the leading opposition politicians, believing that they lack the moral qualifications to rule, and that the imitation, Western-style democracy they are expected to establish, will not fit the requirements of the Korean situation. Students will insist on taking the credit for Chun and Roh's unexpected willingness to compromise, and there will be considerable restiveness, as the older generation tries to take over, telling young activists to go back to school and study. For militants the student movement has been the central focus of their world, providing each individual participant with lofty goals, a satisfying identity within an emotionally supportive community, and an exaggerated sense of importance in shaping national events. The role of ordinary student will seem selfish, restricted, and dull by comparison.

There is no reason to expect that the myriad dissatisfactions of student existence will be solved in the near future. Overcrowding, the impersonality of instruction, and economic hardship will remain as major problems. Actually, more real autonomy for the universities will probably result in higher tuitions and still more restrictive enrollment policies. And it is highly unlikely that Korean professors are suddenly going to transform themselves into warm, caring counselors on personal and intellectual matters. In the longer run there will almost certainly be greater budget allocations for education, but it will be many years before the the disastrous consequences of doubling the college and university student body in the early 1980s can be corrected.

The traumatic nature of the shift from a sheltered and confined life in high school to relative freedom at the university will not be ameliorated, and as a result there will probably always be a certain percentage of freshmen who are susceptible to the attractions of a highly organized and collective movement. Student radicals have been conditioned to expect that the process of achieving some kind of unified Korean socialism will be a long, slow one, with many temporary set backs along the way. So they will continue to think far ahead, recruiting and indoctrinating freshmen and assigning them the task of raising the nation's consciousness regarding class exploitation, the dangers of anti-Communist ideology, and the importance of breaking free from American"imperialist hegemony."

The recalcitrant nature of the Korean unification problem, and the frustrations that build up in the absence of any realistic prospect of a solution, are both factors promoting extremism. The "alternative nationalism" advocated by student radicals will continue to make a strong appeal, as anti-American ideas become more firmly embedded
in South Korean popular culture. Probably the more
dedicated and militant students have gone too far to be able
to reverse course and come to terms with a liberal
democratic regime, closely allied to the United States and
an integral part of the international capitalist economic
system.

Currently in South Korean there is an uneasy
disequilibrium or tension among competing value systems,
without any single dominant trend around which a national
consensus might form. The student movement represents to
some extent an escape or retreat from the massive influx of
individualism and democratic, free enterprise ideology from
the West. Traditional Confucian concepts of justice,
morality, hierarchy, and communalism reinforce the
authoritarianism of the left. In other words, "radical" in
this context is not entirely innovative but rather finds
support in deeply conservative national traditions.

It is highly probable that there will be a good deal of
disillusionment with the inefficiency, delays in decision-
making, corruption, and general sloppiness of democratic
governmental institutions. The pluralist idea that the
common good is somehow advanced when different groups in
society organize to promote their own interests, does not
fit at all well into the Confucian scheme of things. Given
this special environment intransigent students may well
mobilize behind simpler and more extreme solutions to
current problems.

A number of older and moderate-but-sympathetic Korean
observers of student radicalism have brought up the point
that rapid upward mobility is more likely for certain able
and ambitious individuals during a period of political and
economic turmoil. Modern Korean history has demonstrated,
according to this view, that new opportunities and rapidly
growing living standards are often the result of fundamental
social change. But recently Korean society has been
settling down. Petty commerce, for example, is saturated,
and there are too many small entrepreneurs. The only avenue
to good jobs is that of slow, conscientious, expensive.
academic achievement. With the blue collar-white collar
boundary becoming increasingly sharp, working class mobility
is also blocked, adding to a general restlessness and desire
for revolutionary change.

As a result of the recent years of struggle on campuses
students now regard faculty members who are not openly
sympathetic to their cause with distrust and hostility.
Those with Ph.D.s from American universities are especially
marked for suspicion. Progressive faculty have become a
kind of elite, praised not only for their ideas but for
their personal courage in resisting authority. It can be
expected that this mood will continue, fostering the
prestige and acceptance of radical ideas.
Now, for the other side of the argument: that we can expect a significant weakening of student activism.

Student extremism, both ideological and tactical, was the result primarily of frustration at continued authoritarian rule under former generals. The whole paraphernalia of a radical and anti-American ideology combined with a semi-clandestine network of student cells has been directed primarily towards the goal of getting rid of Chun Doo Hwan. Behind (or underneath) the formal ideological mumbo-jumbo Korean students are still achievement-oriented, individualistic, middle class youths, interested in getting ahead and living the good life. While some embittered, alienated core leaders may continue to demand extreme solutions to current problems, there will be far fewer new recruits for the movement, and—of possibly greater importance—the mass of uncommitted students who are nevertheless interested in public issues will no longer be sympathetic supporters.

The militant theoreticians have gone too far, creating an extremist splinter group that will be completely isolated from mainstream political culture. Without a specific evil in the form of repressive riot police, newspaper censors, and goons breaking up labor union meetings, the dedicated militance of student warriors cannot be sustained. They need something more tangible than hypothesized American "imperialism" or "exploitation of the working class" to fight against. It is also probable that the public at large will no longer be tolerant of student extremism, once government authoritarianism is checked, and democratic reforms begin to be implemented.

The growing cosmopolitanism of South Korea, especially in the form of a greater understanding of actual conditions in the DPRK as well as the situation of other Communist countries is likely to show up the inadequacies of neo-Marxist interpretations of international relations. Similarly a less heated and polarized domestic environment will enable students to reach a more balanced evaluation of social and economic developments at home. The obvious and overwhelming material advantages of South Korea's growth and export policies will in the long run be convincing, both to intellectuals and to students.

Most older Koreans appear to believe that for the time being at least, the period of active militance is over. When asked what will happen if real progress towards democratization occurs, and human rights are guaranteed, an overwhelming majority of middle class moderates predicted that student activism would subside. But no one seems to want the students to disappear entirely from the national political arena. A typical remark was, "in the last analysis, they are our only certain guarantee against arbitrary rule." A more progressive view was that, "as democratic socialism becomes more respectable and an accepted part of the political scene, the student movement
will form its shock troops, demonstrating when necessary, working to support labor, and helping get out the vote*.

There is one final argument that is related to the cyclical theory mentioned earlier: After so much emotion, tear gas, anger and energy expended, the time has come for a period of relative calm. The nation is tired of student challenges to authority and is ready for a different, more constructive political phase.

These then, are the major arguments on both sides. The next question is, what actually are the students up to now? Probably another research trip is necessary in order to make really confident predictions, but there are some pretty good indications that student activism is far from dead. It is rather just biding its time during the summer and making plans for the fall and the election period in early winter. In other words the weight of evidence favors the first of the two arguments presented above - The "Chang Myon period precedent," although not all the contrary arguments can be discounted entirely.

Although morale was high in the student movement during May and June, 1987, and there was confidence in eventual victory, student leaders were not prepared for the Chun regime's unexpectedly total acceptance of opposition demands, and as yet no unified position, either ideological or in terms of tactics, has been agreed upon. There are reports that the government's willingness to compromise was a deep disappointment to many radicals. Student groups in the meantime have kept busy assisting flood victims and aiding strikers, particularly those in the Ulsan area.

Student leaders regard both Kim Yong Sam and Kim Dae Jung as much too conservative, but if forced to choose, they will throw their weight behind Kim Dae Jung. Students will be mobilized to participate energetically in the election campaign on behalf of the RDP, since "the primary task at present must be to destroy Chun Doo Hwan". They will fan out all over the country urging farmers and workers to vote. Major rallies will be organized by students in the fall on behalf of political prisoners who have not yet been released, and in support of striking workers. Christian groups are urging that every effort be made to avoid violence so as not to antagonize the public at large.

Many student leaders seem to be convinced that the U.S. called the shots in June, persuading Chun and Roh to give in. They now see American policy as catering to the desires of the Korean middle classes and therefore find themselves, alongside labor, confronting a formidable alliance. The consensus among activists seems to be that if by some mischance Roh were to be elected, the student movement would mobilize all its strength in combination with labor to declare the election invalid and bring the art of demonstrations to a new level of intensity.