THE ROLE OF ALLIANCES AND OTHER INTERSTATE ALIGNMENTS IN A DISARMING AND DISARMED WORLD

Report

A Study by a Panel of Research Associates
of the
Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research,
School of Advanced International Studies,
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THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE IMPACT OF DISARMAMENT ON ALLIANCES AND OTHER INTERSTATE ALIGNMENTS

by

Arnold Wolfers

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by

Arnold Wolfers

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE IMPACT OF DISARMAMENT ON ALLIANCES AND OTHER INTERSTATE ALIGNMENTS

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I. Introductory Comments

The Theoretical Approach of Part I

Part I differs in its subject matter from all of the essays that comprise Part II of this Report. Whereas the latter treat the alliances and alignments of specific geographical areas, the former deals with problems that transcend any one area except where general propositions are illustrated by concrete examples. As a result, the discussion in Part I is conducted on a higher level of abstraction at which the question of "where" and "among which existent nations" does not arise. However, even here the abstraction will not be carried to the point required in establishing purely theoretical models. While in their case not only spatial qualifications—location on the globe—but also time qualifications—location in the historical continuum—are omitted, the examination in Part I, no less than in Part II, will focus on alliances and alignments as they exist today or as they are assumed to develop in the foreseeable future. If the disarming world were not to set in for, say, half a century, much of what is said in Part I—in which references to facts familiar to the present world, such as Cold-War alliances, nuclear Superpowers and North-South conflicts abound—would be no less obsolete by the time of the disarming world than Part II. The disarmament measures considered in Part I are also taken exclusively from among those that have been introduced into the debates and the negotiations of our time.

Some Terminological Clarifications

The term disarmament will be employed broadly to cover all events—negotiations, agreements, and measures—pertaining to both quantitative arms reductions, or disarmament in the narrower sense of the term, and arms control measures.

The distinction between a "disarming world" and a "disarmed world" poses few semantic problems. It will be assumed here that the world will be disarmed once the major nations conform with provisions similar to those now proposed in treaties of general and complete disarmament, even though all instruments of organized violence may not have been entirely eliminated.

The disarming world, on which most of the Report will be focused, is conceived as differing from the traditional "armed world" by a process of consecutive disarmament steps or at least by enough such steps to warrant expectations of progress toward more disarmament. It is realized that some arms reductions and controls, particularly those based on tacit rather than on formal agreement, are rarely missing even in an armed world, so that it may be possible to observe much of the impact of disarmament on the role of alliances even prior to the dawn of a disarming world.

The terms alliance and alignment are widely used in the discourse of both practitioners and theoreticians in international relations, but the meaning given to them is not

uniform. In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is proposed, rather arbitrarily, to confine the term "alliance" to military pacts of assistance but to include bilateral and multilateral pacts as well as unilateral guaranties so long as the commitment is for military cooperation. In some places, the latter will be spoken of as guarantee pacts to emphasize their peculiarities and to conform with common usage.

Alliances will also be called military alignments, being a subcategory of the broader phenomenon of interstate alignments. Alignments merely signify reciprocal arrangements among nations which can be military or nonmilitary. In the latter case, nations are assumed to have established a relatively close and stable degree of collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, diplomatic, propaganda, or other nondefense fields.

A second distinction will be made that will prove useful in the discussion of some aspects of the subject, the distinction between outer-directed and inner-directed alignments. Alliances are always outer-directed, as they presuppose a common adversary outside the membership of the alliance against which mutual assistance is promised. However, an "alliance" may also be directed at one of its own members which threatens or commits an act of aggression against other members; but here it is customary to speak of a "collective security" agreement rather than of an alliance or collective defense pact.

Collective security pacts such as the League of Nations or the United Nations will not be treated in this Report because their elaborate international institutions and many unique features pose special problems that could not be covered within the framework of this study.

For brevity's sake, the terms "North" and "South" will be employed to comprise, respectively, the industrialized countries of the northern hemisphere and the less developed countries to the south of them, though many of the latter do not lie as far south as the southern hemisphere.

The Interaction Between Disarmament and Other Events Affecting the Role of Alliances

This report is addressed to the question of how the disarmament measures characteristic of a disarming world might induce changes in the form and functions of existing alliances. The subject is limited, therefore, to a cause and effect relationship in which disarmament measures can properly be considered to account for the changes in the alignment pattern. This limitation does not suggest, however, that events other than disarmament, some preceding, others accompanying it, may not have to be given some consideration, too. Thus, certain disarmament agreements may explain a loosening of bonds between some allies and deserve being treated as the cause thereof. But usually these disarmament agreements would not have come about if a relaxation of tension had not first taken place. This, in itself, would have tended to weaken the bonds between allies. Here, then, the change must be credited, or charged, to both a détente and an event in the field of disarmament. However, in order to keep the subject within manageable proportions and to be able to concentrate on the question of effects of disarmament proper, Part I as well as Part II will contain only brief and sporadic references to what conditions would have to be fulfilled to make disarmament and specific disarmament agreements possible and thereby to enable them to exert influence on alliances. It is not being overlooked that a measure such as denuclearization of the Near and Middle East, in which Israel and the Arab countries would have to concur, is unthinkable without a drastic reduction in the intensity of the conflict that causes their present mutual hostility and induces them to seek allies against each other. But denuclearization as a measure of disarmament might in itself bring about a further reduction of tension between the opponents.

In some instances, too, one would have to anticipate that disarmament negotiations would be coupled with de-alignment negotiations as was the case at the Washington Conference of 1922. Here disarmament and a change in the role of a specific alliance were

not related to each other as cause and effect as if it were a oneway road, but were mutually dependent on each other. A study of the impact of alliances on the disarmament process, which would reverse the pattern of this inquiry, might be fruitful; it has not, however, been undertaken in this Report.

II. The Chief Determinants of Alliance Policy

To discover what influence, if any, disarmament measures of a scope that would justify speaking of a disarming world would exert on the role of alliances the conditions that determine this role must be considered. Once they have been identified, one can inquire whether disarmament steps would tend to change one or more of these determinants and thereby indirectly induce a change in the role of alliances. If the new role turned out to be substantively different from what it is in an armed world, the difference could properly be attributed to the process of disarmament that typifies a disarming world.

These remarks may appear to suggest an unnecessarily involved approach to the problem that is under discussion in this Report. But the fact is that there exists no obvious or direct connection between disarmament and alliances except in the extreme case in which military alliances would disappear because nations had literally deprived themselves of all military means by which to give one another military assistance. In all other cases, even assuming there is a substantial reduction in armaments, there remains room, in principle, for military alliances, not to speak of other types of outer-directed and inner-directed alignments. The question is, therefore, through what intermediary events disarmament measures may lead to alterations in the role of alliances, which include their functions, their spread, and their intensity. The determinants of alliance policy are, logically, the connecting links. As an illustration of this nexus: alliances committed to their existing functions primarily by the existence of serious international conflict would tend to become a dead letter, other things remaining equal, if disarmament were to remove the threat or the conflict itself. Similarly, to take the case of another important determinant, if disarmament measures drove a wedge between allies, their willingness to cooperate with one another might sink to a level at which an effective alliance could not survive. In both of these cases, the cause and effect relationship between disarmament measures and the role of alliances would be unmistakable, indicating the possibility at least that in a disarming world—not to speak of a disarmed world—the forms and functions of alliances might show marked differences from those in the present armed world.

The determinants of alliance policy can be broken into an almost infinite number of co-determinants. Geographical distance no less than ideological preconceptions, port facilities no less than personal idiosyncrasies of leading statesmen, could be shown to be among the antecedents of decisions to form or dissolve, to strengthen or to lay on ice, the bonds between nations to which the name alliance is attached. Yet, the inquiry can be made manageable, without distorting the picture, if all of the significant determinants are fitted into a small number of comprehensive categories, which are then treated as the chief determinants.

In the following analysis, three such categories, each covering a wide and variegated but closely related set of circumstances, will be identified and discussed: the conflict pattern, the distribution of power, and alliance-mindedness. The first two are external to the actors whether these actors are conceived of as being states or as the individuals who act for the states. They can be called environmental or situational. The last of the three categories is internal in the sense that it relates to the psyches of the decision makers and their backers; it is psychological or predispositional.

Alliance Policy and the Conflict Pattern

"Conflicts are the primary determinants of alignments" writes George Liska. 1/ Putting it more specifically, nations enter into outer-directed military alignments, called alliances here, when, as a result of serious international conflict, they are or consider themselves to be threatened by a common adversary. In this sense, as Liska goes on to say, they "are against and only derivatively for someone or something."

Often the term security pact is used as a synonym for alliance. The term is unobjectionable so long as it is not taken to mean that all alliances are defensive, as a concern solely for security might suggest. Alliances are more frequently offensive in character than members of alliances would have the world believe. The threat against which a defensive alliance is directed is deemed a threat to the existing distribution of interests and values, which the allies seek to preserve. The threat against which members of an offensive alliance join forces consists in the resistance they expect from their adversary to changes in the existing order of things, changes they wish to bring about out of revisionist, revolutionary, or expansionist motives.

As long as incompatible demands for preservation and change abound in the world and create conflict and the expectation of hostile acts, they are bound to be reactions on the part of governments in the form of national armaments or alliances, most frequently in the form of both. This condition would no longer hold true if a central authority, capable of effectively suppressing all national self-help, were ever to be established as it presumably would have to be in a completely disarmed world. In a disarming world, however, in which nations, by definition, retain at least some of their armaments, there is no reason they should deviate from established practice and decide, universally, to forego alliances and rely solely on their own military means. What might happen, instead, is that alliances might come to occupy either a less prominent or a modified place among the instruments of policy. Conceivably, too, military alliances might tend to give way to other kinds of outer-directed alignments, while at the same time the climate for inner-directed alignments might improv .

Alliances reflect the character of the conflict from which they spring. The higher the tension among adversaries, and the more acute the threat of enemy military action, the more reason governments have to aim at stringent promises of military support and protection from other nations. In a more relaxed atmosphere, or where conflicts are unlikely to take on a military character, pacts of mutual diplomatic or economic assistance may be all that nations are concerned about.

Shifts within the wide spectrum of conflict from mere friction to all-out hostilities occur all the time and can also come about as a result of disarmament measures. The closer the conflict is brought to the point of mere friction, the less it will generate alliances or keep them alive. One cause for such a shift deserves particular mention. Conflicts have a way of receding into the background and losing intensity whenever a new conflict arises that is, or is believed to be, more menacing. Events following on World War II illustrate this point. Practically all present-day alliances that involve major powers are the result of the East-West conflict. This holds true for the alliance system of the United States in its world-wide ramifications 2/; it also accounts for the alliances of the Soviet Union and Red China. (French alliances with some of France's former African colonies may constitute an exception by not being clearly connected with the Cold War.) All of these Cold-War alliances followed on the World War II alliances that were directed against Germany and Japan.

1/ George Liska, Nations in Alliance: the Limits of Interdependence, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962) p. 12.

2/ It is true, however, that New Zealand, Australia, and the Philippines may have originally regarded their security pacts with the United States as guarantee pacts against Japanese resurgence.

The reversal of alliances that took place at the close of World War II and its early aftermath is not an exceptional event. Frequently, nations are involved in several conflicts simultaneously though the alliances to which they are genuinely committed be limited to the dominant conflict. But this place of dominance may change. If it does, either existing alliances will take on a new direction or new ones will take their place. Therefore, if certain disarmament measures should relax the tension between some opponents while at the same time provoking conflict among allies, disarmament might become a factor in reversing an existing alliance pattern.

It takes exceptionally serious events such as those that occurred at the outbreak of the Cold War to turn former allies into enemies and to lead them to join opposing military alliances. But even in the absence of such a grave break of continuity, conflict among allied or friendly nations—a widespread phenomenon—may affect the alliances to which these nations adhere. Conflicting and divisive interallied interests may divert attention from the common defense interest against a common foe and tend to erode the alliance. One need only think of NATO or the Sino-Soviet alliance today to recognize the opposite pulls toward collaboration and conflict to which allied nations are subjected. Disarmament negotiations, and even more disarmament agreements to which not all members of a multilateral alliance adhere, may exert such divisive effects and interfere with allied solidarity and collaboration.

While conflict and alliances are closely intertwined, the presence or spread of neutrality and nonalignment does not point to an absence of conflict. On the contrary, they represent the efforts of countries not to become involved in the conflicts of others or in some particular conflict in which other nations are engaged.

It may seem fanciful even to suggest that any of the present major powers might require or seek military alliances against countries militarily so weak compared with themselves, as are practically all of the countries of the South. No matter how fierce the conflict between such unequal opponents might become, is not the alliance an unlikely instrument for use in such confrontations? This is not necessarily true. One need only remember how the massive military efforts of France were defeated in Indochina and Algeria and to ask whether France might not have profited if it had enjoyed the active support of powerful allies. In certain types of hostilities, the means at the disposal of nonindustrialized countries do not compare unfavorably with those the so-called Great Powers can or can dare to bring into action. The peculiar characteristics of alliances effective against guerrilla forces, infiltration and insurgency, and in support of those defending themselves against them, deserve more attention than has been given to them in the literature so far.

As a rule, alliances are not a remedy for the conflicts from which they spring and are not intended as such. Rather, they shall be looked upon as instruments by which nations conduct conflict against adversaries whether with the aim of deterrence, defense, or offense. Yet, this does not preclude the possibility that alliances may themselves affect conflicts to which they stand in a kind of reciprocal relationship. In certain circumstances, they may exacerbate the conflict in the same way as national armaments do. They may provoke fear by being interpreted as a sign of hostile intention: they may even trigger preemptive action. They may also make the settlement of conflict more difficult by committing the allies to rigid positions that they dare not forsake for fear of undermining allied solidarity before a settlement of the conflict has been reached. But like armaments, alliances are also a means of counterbalancing hostile power and thus not only of creating a sense of security but of actually providing more security. Traditionally, they have been employed as one of the chief means of deterrence and thus of preventing an open resort to violence.

There is still another reason alliances can on occasion serve as valuable instruments of peace strategy. They do so whenever they give the more peace-minded or moderate members of a coalition influence over their more aggressive or revisionist allies. At times, too, as was recently seen in the Cyprus crisis, allies interested in the peace of an area may attempt to mediate between two or more members of the alli-

ance. The conflict between Turkey and Greece was clearly a threat to the strength and solidarity of NATO. Because such balancing, moderating, and mediating services contribute to the preservation of peace, a disarmament process that would lead to the erosion of alliances should be scrutinized carefully to see that the advantages it was expected to confer outweighed the possible disadvantages resulting from the removal of the stabilizing influences that alliances provide.

Alliance Policy and the Distribution of Power

How power is distributed among nations has almost as much to do with the role of alliances as the conflicts from which they emerge. Even a most intense conflict implying an acute danger of hostile action by the adversary will not produce alliances in the case of countries that have enough power—or believe they have enough—to meet the threat alone. After all, no matter how favorable the circumstances viewed from an alliance point of view, bonds with other countries and commitments to other countries, the very core of alliances, inevitably involve risks, costs, and frustrations that no country acting rationally will assume gratuituously. Conflict is also unlikely to lead to alliances with nations too weak or too vulnerable to stand up to an opponent even given all the assistance that potential allies would be prepared to offer. They would risk provoking the adversary rather than to protect against him. In these two extreme situations, conflict tends, therefore, to induce a policy of neutrality or isolation rather than of alignment. One question to be answered later is whether disarmament measures might produce or increase a preference for "going it alone." The role of alliances could decline either if certain disarmament measures made strong countries more confident that they could handle the situation without assistance from others, or if it made weak nations more fearful of the provocative consequences of alignment.

The relationship between alliances and the distribution of power comes out most clearly if one considers changes in an existing balance or imbalance of power, whether they be between adversaries or among allies. To start with the former, whenever the balance of power is tipped in favor of one of two opponents, the favored nation gains a higher degree of security—or new opportunies for offensive action—and thereby comes to have less need of allies unless it were to set itself more ambitious goals. In the opposite situation, in which the balance is tipped towards the adversary, the side experiencing a decline in its relative power and security may be expected to set a higher value than before on allied promises of assistance.

It might seem reasonable to assume that relatively weak countries would be most eager to find allies and, therefore, to initiate alliance policies. Yet, after World War I and World War II, the foremost alliance builders in the West—France after World War I, the United States after World War II—were stronger than the countries with which they sought to align themselves. In fact, in the American case, exceedingly weak countries, particularly in Asia, were induced to join the alliance system. It isn't particularly puzzling that very vulnerable countries should lack the courage, and in many instances the opportunity, to initiate alliances. But why should major countries, which become the coalition leaders, find it beneficial to enter into security pacts with nations that have relatively meager military assets with which to contribute to the common pursuit of alliance goals? The fact is that in many instances a minor country, or a country temporarily reduced in military power as most of the European countries were at the close of World War II, may be desirable allies even when unable or unwilling to offer strictly military assistance. In such cases, it is more correct to call the resulting alliance a unilateral guarantee pact, which is what most of the alliances or collective defense pacts of the United States were in the early period after the war. But whether guarantee pact or alliance, the major countries would obviously not be led to initiate them or to consent to them if they received nothing in return. What they hope to get, as a minimum, is the opportunity to prevent the adversary from taking over these countries and their resources; they may also get far from negligible military cooperation and may obtain access to territory and facilities that are valuable if not indispensable for operations against the adversary. A country becomes alliance worthy, therefore, if in the absence of military forces and weaponry, it possesses real estate

valuable to its prospective allies. It depends, however, on the particular circumstances whether the advantages of having access to or being able to project power into real estate controlled by minor countries compensates for the liability of becoming committed to their protection. 3/ At different periods during this century, France and the United States have been critized for their "pactomania" when it seemed as if they were collecting allies indiscriminately, and with an eye only on their assets rather than on the balance between their assets and their vulnerabilities.

From what has been said, it can be gathered that two different power ralationships affect alliance policy. One is the relative power of countries compared with that of their adversary, which determines both their vulnerability to attack and their ability to deter or defeat an attack. The second power relationship is that among allies or potential allies. It determines the alliance-worthiness of a country measured in terms of its relative contribution to the success of the alliance. The degree of dependence of one ally on another or the fitness for leadership within the alliance are also functions of this interallied power relationship and will tend to change as the relative power of the allies vis-a-vis one another changes.

If one seeks to anticipate the future role of alliances, and particularly their spread among nations and within areas, one is confronted with a serious difficulty: power or impotence in one contest may not be power or impotence in another. Nobody would deny that nuclear weapons represent destructive power such as man has never wielded. Yet nuclear power even of the tremendous megatonnage presently in the hands of the two Superpowers does not guarantee them decisive alliance-worthiness under all conditions in which nations seek allied protection; as a device by which to offer protection to others in terms of deterrence, the threat of using nuclear weapons may in certain circumstances lack sufficient credibility. If friend and foe should ever become convinced that these weapons would never be used for the sake of allies—assuming the adversary possessed them too—their subsequent elimination through disarmament would have little impact on alliances because their use for the protection of allies would already have been discounted. There is a second, and quite different, situation in which nuclear weapons do little to give a country increased alliance-worthiness. These weapons may appear so inappropriate for guerrilla or anti-guerrilla warfare that countries exposed to such warfare will be little inclined toward alliances with nations possessing them. In such cases, capacity to offer more appropriate types of assistance may weigh more heavily in attracting allies than the possession of weapons of unequaled destructiveness.

Inappropriateness of nuclear weapons for the kind of warfare that prevails in the South and among industrially underdeveloped countries, generally, does not account, however, for the unwillingness of many post-colonial states to enter into an alliance with the United States. The policy of nonalignment, which most of these countries profess, has nothing to do with fear of being insufficiently protected by the ally, but on the contrary with fear of being subjected to a dominance reminiscent of colonial rule. Taken literally, the term "nonalignment" is a misnomer. These countries do not seek to avoid alignments or even military alliances per se which they have joined in con-

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3/ See John W. Burton, "Escape from Power," Disarmament and Arms Control, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 187-203, in which the "new isolationism" of the nuclear powers, that is, their incipient attitude of nonalignment growing out of the feeling that the risks of escalation inherent in involvement in local conflicts outweigh the interests served by such involvement, is discussed.

siderable numbers; what they mean is nonentanglement in the struggles of the major powers and particularly in the Cold War. 3a/

The countries that make it a principle to forego all alliances, the neutrals in the traditional sense of the term—among which the United States was the most prominent in its isolationist days—are strongly determined in their choice of policy by the distribution of power prevailing among others. The more the opponents in conflicts in which the neutrals themselves take no part balance each other off, the more security, as the experience of Switzerland best illustrates, they can enjoy by remaining on the sidelines. Their interest in the balance between others makes them very sensitive to events, including disarmament measures, that might upset this balance.

Alliance Policy and Alliance-mindedness

As mentioned earlier, the term alliance-mindedness is being used here to cover the whole syndrome of psychological elements that enter into the making and shaping of alliance policies. It refers to the subjective interests of governments and nations in being or remaining allied whether generally or with specific countries. The intensity as well as the ups and downs in this interest are deeply affected by emotions as well as by intellectual judgments and estimates, some pertaining to the relationship with the adversary, some to expectations concerning the behavior and attitudes of one's allies. Even if the environmental factors, the conflict pattern, and the distribution of power remained unchanged, alliance-mindedness, as an independent variable, might fluctuate between the high level of a frantic search for allies, to the zero level at which it stands with neutral countries, which reject any idea of becoming partners to "entangling alliances."

The extraordinary sensitivity of alliance policy to psychological factors, manifested in its quick and often vehement reactions to changes in the psychological climate, is not difficult to explain. Because alliances tend to be costly and risky, it takes a deep conviction of their effectiveness as a means of countering external threats to bring them into being and to preserve them, a conviction that is responsive to many influences. In addition, alliances are based on the trust that the ally will live up to his promises of assistance in future contingencies and under conditions—the casus belli, to speak juridically—in which such assistance threatens to be most painful to him. The solidarity necessary for effective cooperation rests, therefore, on such psychological phenomena as conviction and confidence.

Such solidarity, and with it the stability of alliances, is extremely vulnerable to the impact of differences or disputes among the allies themselves. Allies may differ in their views about the adversary, especially about the nature and intensity of the conflict with him, or about the best ways of meeting what is assumed to be the common danger. One can speak, figuratively, of an existing conflict pattern or of the distribution of power "dictating" the course of alliance policy. But what if allies disagree, on

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3a/ The term nonalignment has come into wide use to describe a major aim of most of the states of the "South." By subscribing to a policy of nonalignment these states do not intend to turn their backs on all interstate alignments or even alliances, as will be shown in the essay on Africa below. Rather, as the term will be used in this Report, nonalignment indicates a refusal of a state to become the ally of either party to the Cold War while leaving room for the paradox of "alignments among the unaligned." As Francis O. Wilcox has stated it, "states are unaligned if they are not involved in regional or other alliances of the Western world or the Soviet bloc." (See "Nonaligned States and the UN" in Neutralism and Nonalignment, Laurence Martin, ed., New York: Praeger, 1962, p. 122.) The traditional neutrals in Europe do not, either in their own view, or as defined here, belong to the category of nonaligned states, although they are radically opposed to participating in any alliances.

the basis of subjective judgments and feelings, on whether the conflict warrants expectations of hostile action, and therefore justifies preparations for common counteraction? What if some allies believe that the threat can best be met by conciliation policies and others believe in creating or maintaining adequate counterpower and in a resolve to meet any challenge with force if necessary? Similarly, it is not enough, when seeking to understand alliance policies, to inquire into the military ability of countries to assist one another effectively against a common danger; what if they cease to believe that the aid will be forthcoming or if they question the wisdom of allied leaders in matters of preparedness, deployment, or strategy?

When the impact of disarmament measures on alliance policy is discussed below, the psychological determinant will call for much attention because, as will be seen, a process of disarmament may change the psychological climate between adversaries and between allies and thereby affect existing alliances even in the absence of changes in the environment. However, a word of warning is necessary here: No matter how important the psychological events as co-determinants of alliance policy, it would be a mistake to exaggerate their impact, as if they alone offered the key to the explanation of decisions in the alliance field. To give an example, it can hardly be doubted that unfriendly feelings of President de Gaulle toward the "Anglo-Saxons" have something to do with his coolness to the alliances with Britain and the United States. Yet such feelings might never have expressed themselves in policy decisions were it not for conflicts of national interest pertaining especially to nuclear strategy between continental France and its insular allies, the United States and the United Kingdom. Similarly, one may guess that the intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute can be explained not on the grounds of ideological convictions alone, but also of territorial, economic and power conflicts between the Soviet Union and Red China in their capacities, as national states. 4/ However, there is a reason the psychological factor may be particularly powerful in the shaping of alliances in our era. At a time when nationalist and revolutionary leaders are in power in many countries, one is no longer surprised to find that some of them prefer to have their countries cut their own throats rather than to permit them to be subjected to the "indignities" of dependence on overpowering allies suspected of imperialist or hegemonial ambitions. In such cases, psychological predilections and aversions may gain precedence over sober and objective calculations concerning the environmental factors.

Before moving on from this brief sketch of the psychological determinants of alliance policy, attention should be drawn to one particular feature that will be found to have considerable bearing on the relationship between disarmament measures and alliance policies. Decision makers cannot develop rational alliance policies except on the basis of their views or hunches about the nations with which or against which their country is to align itself. Yet their images of other peoples, not perfect even in the best of circumstances, may deviate more or less from portrait likeness and be much influenced by popular stereotypes. Nations may shy away from reliance on alliances with the United States if they are obsessed by the image of the United States as a basically isolationist or imperialistic country; alliances with Germany suffer from instability because Germany is seen in many countries as a potentially aggressive nation with which it is dangerous to be too intimately associated. It stands to reason that disarmament policies like many others may reinforce or correct the distortions inherent in such images.

III. Alliances Under the Conditions of a Disarming World

The last section dealt with the chief determinants of alliance policy that disarmament would have to effect if it is to change the role of alliances. This section will con-

4/ See the discussion of the stresses and strains, both environmental and psychological, within the U.S. alliance system in "Stresses and Strains in 'Going it with Others,'" Alliance Policy in the Cold War, Arnold Wolfers, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959) p. 1ff.

centrate on the disarmament measures themselves, as they modify these determinants and thus, indirectly, the alliance pattern. The problem is to discover what disarmament may do to existing and potential alliances to make the alliance pattern of a disarming world different from that of an armed world. It cannot be assumed that all disarmament measures would have repercussions in the alliance field; controls of military expenditures, for instance, applied proportionately to all nations, would not relieve any country from its need of allied assistance if such need existed, or was thought to exist, previously. However, so many different disarmament measures do have an impact on the alliance structure—whether on the membership of alliances, their stability, or their particular functions—that no attempt can be made to discuss all of them individually. Instead, the discussion will focus on specific types of disarmament measures, and only as they illustrate significant influences on alliance policy.

Disarmament, The Conflict Pattern, and Alliance Policy

It would be a mistake to visualize a disarming world as being different from the present world merely because disarmament agreements, presumably rising in scope and importance, were taking place. No substantial disarmament process seems conceivable, as was mentioned earlier, unless the world were moving from the present conditions of severe conflict among major powers in the direction of conditions of greater harmony among them. This being so, alliances in a disarming world would be exposed simultaneously to the effects of harmonization and of disarmament, making it impossible in many instances to sort out the respective determining effects of these two events. This is particularly true because both tend to push nations in the direction of downgrading and reducing their outer-directed military alliances: harmonization because it implies a reduction of the external threats that bring alliances into being, disarmament because it reduces the means by which nations can translate such threats into military attacks.

However, assuming a sufficient degree of harmonization, expressing itself in an atmosphere of détente which would permit the beginnings of a disarmament process, one can focus on the impact of this disarmament process itself on the conflict pattern. While the hopes, expressed in public debate on disarmament, that arms reductions and controls will by themselves eliminate dangerous conflict and the threat of open violence, may not be justified as a rule, disarmament agreements can alter the relationship between adversaries in a way that will in turn affect the relationship among allied countries. For instance, if the redeployment of military forces by two adversaries, usually discussed under the heading of disengagement, reduced the danger of incidents in a particular area, nations in that area might come to feel more secure and therefore less interested in alliances even though the conflict itself had remained unsettled. A similar effect might come from a removal of rocket installations (particularly those of the first-strike variety that invite preemption) from the territory of a country that felt threatened by enemy retaliation against such targets. However, allies who lost interest in promises of assistance from allies merely because some outer manifestations of the underlying conflict, such as friction on the border, were eliminated might do so at the expense of their national security. As long as the conflict remains unsettled, nations unable to provide for their own defense or for the deterrence of attack run grave risks if they allow de-alignment to precede conflict resolution. Conceivably, therefore, a disarming world that was characterized merely by a lessening of tension might tempt defensive countries to "go it alone" before conditions made such a policy rational.

Instead of making conflicts less acute, disarmament may change the intrinsic character of a conflict. Thus, if substantial arms reductions were to cut down the ability of some nations to conduct military operations outside their territory, the effect might be to shift the locus of their hostile confrontations from the military field to that of economic, diplomatic, or psychological warfare. In a disarmed world, threats to rearm

might become a particularly attractive tactic in the latter two fields. 5/ A disarming world might be characterized by a trend away at least from large-scale military operations, which would mean a reinforcement of the trend that has already been generated by the fear of nuclear escalation. Were this to happen, nations engaging in alliance policy would have an inducement to reorientate themselves away from formerly promising military allies and toward allies excelling in the conduct of psychological, economic, or diplomatic actions and capable of offering assistance to those engaged in such actions. If one adds the likelihood that the means of guerrilla warfare and insurgency would not be seriously affected by agreements directed at the reduction of armaments, one would be justified in expecting that in the wake of substantial arms reductions, nations with a high capacity for assisting others in guerrilla or anti-guerrilla combat would gain a particularly good chance of attracting and preserving allies or of becoming alliance leaders.

Finally, and perhaps with the most far-reaching consequences for the alliance pattern in a disarming world, disarmament agreements may generate conflict among allies or intensify existing interallied disputes that had remained subordinate to the chief conflict before it had abated and were therefore not able to exert influence on the existing alignments.

The difficulty of getting a group of allies to agree on disarmament proposals or to join in disarmament agreements is well known; it has greatly hampered disarmament negotiations. The chief reason for this difficulty arises from the discriminatory effects of a large proportion of all disarmament measures. Nuclear disarmament is a case in point. Here discrimination is inevitable because any agreement limited to nuclear weapons affects the nuclear "haves" quite differently than the nuclear "have nots." The weapons of only the first group are involved. Their reduction or control has an equalizing effect, though obviously of widely varying consequences depending on the specific nuclear disarmament measures.

Leaving aside for later discussion changes in the distribution of power that would be involved, allies that had relied for their protection against massive conventional attack on the "nuclear umbrella" provided by the coalition leader might lose all interest in the alliance if the umbrella were discarded without a simultaneous elimination of the threat to them of conventional aggression. Then, again, nuclear powers that had counted on fulfilling their commitments to others by means of nuclear deterrence might, if deprived of the means for such deterrence, prefer to terminate an alliance rather than to prepare for large-scale conventional intervention on behalf of their allies. In a disarming world, then, in which the emphasis were placed on nuclear disarmament, dissolution of alliances in some cases, realignment in others, would have to be anticipated.

In view of the rise of minor nuclear powers such as France and Red China—which may be followed by others if proliferation is not stopped—frictions might also arise between the Superpowers and those of their respective allies that had attained some nuclear striking power. If one can imagine the Superpowers agreeing to considerable reductions of their nuclear power, leaving themselves with only a minimum of retaliatory capability, the countries possessing barely a "minimum deterrent" might resist any cutbacks. Even if such a divergence between the two groups did not lead to a reversal of alliances by inducing the Superpowers to line up against the minor nuclear powers, the equalization between the major and minor nuclear powers that would come about if the Superpowers went ahead with their cutback might trigger a struggle for leadership in certain alliances.

There is one type of disarmament agreement that is so discriminatory as to make an actual reversal of some existing alliances a distinct possibility. The agreement in question falls under the heading of anti-proliferation measures, the purpose of which

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5/ See Robert E. Osgood's discussion of this possibility in his essay on Western Europe and the Atlantic area, below.

is to prevent the rise of new nuclear powers. Unless at the dawn of a disarming world proliferation had already gone so far that efforts to stem its further spread would have become futile, one might expect efforts to prevent a further dissemination or acquisition of nuclear weapons to become a significant characteristic of a disarming world. But while the existing nuclear powers, and many of the non-nuclear countries, might be interested in accords against proliferation, would-be members of the nuclear club would be likely to oppose them. The ensuing conflict between the two groups could have serious effects on the existing Cold-War alliances.

Denuclearization of some countries or areas as well as disengagement by the Superpowers from some areas whether nuclear, conventional or both, might have similar effects as still another form of discrimination. If the Superpowers agreed to disengage from an area, presumably in the wake of a considerable détente in their mutual relations, they might come to share an interest in keeping the nations of the specific area under common control. If the area were Central Europe, Germans might fear such a development because it would look to them like a return from the Cold-War alignment to the wartime East-West alliance against Germany. Conceivably, then, a disarming world in which denuclearization and demilitarization were carried out in several regions might see a rather widespread transformation of presently antagonistic alliances into new outer-directed alignments among countries that presently belong to opposing coalitions.

Disarmament, the Distribution of Power, and Alliance Policy

It would be surprising if the distribution of power were not strongly affected by arms reductions and arms control measures, considering the fact that one of the chief purposes of disarmament is to curb the military power of the nations involved. Alliances will inevitably be strengthened or weakened, as the case may be, by disarmament measures that change the power relationship between the adversaries or affect the relative power position of allies, compared with one another. One need only remind oneself that in the extreme case of general and complete disarmament nations would no longer have any reason to continue a military alliance against an opponent who had been deprived of all military means by which to threaten them. Moreover, any substantial disarmament of an ally would rob him of his alliance-worthiness if that worthiness rests on his ability to offer military assistance.

As far as the distribution of power between the chief adversaries is concerned, it is reasonable to assume that they will agree to no disarmament measures that, in their judgment, would alter this distribution. The U.S.—U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, which serves as a basis for discussions at the Geneva disarmament meetings, explicitly laid down the principle that arms reductions would have to be balanced, which is the same as saying that any cutback of military power would have to affect the opposing sides proportionately and thereby leave the existing distribution of power between them intact. 6/ The difficulties of assuring such a balance and its preservation throughout the duration of an agreement, known to be tremendous, need not be discussed here. But assuming that these difficulties were overcome as far as the general power position of the opposing sides was concerned, this achievement would not mean that the two adversaries would necessarily retain their old relative military power position in every area of the world and with respect to every type of military forces and weapons. A reasonable balance of military power between them might be maintained, for example, if one side gave up some of its striking power in the air while the other reduced its ground forces, or if one side gained superiority in one area, the other in another. Therefore, despite a continuing "balance" between the adversaries, relations

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6/ "All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations." UN DOC A/4879, 20 September 1961.

with some allies might come under a serious strain unless they were given adequate compensation. To give an example, no amount of overall proportionateness in the arms reductions of the United States and the Soviet Union would leave the protection of America's allies in Europe unaffected if a sweeping cutback of American long-range nuclear striking power were accompanied by a cut in Soviet conventional forces but not in Soviet medium-range nuclear power as well.

Aside from the repercussions on alliances resulting from such disarmament-induced changes in the composition of the military means of the two sides, the most far-reaching effects would follow from any actual, even though unintended, change in the existing balance or imbalance of the interadversary power relationship. If the adversary were favored by such a change, some allies might desert an alliance that no longer promised them adequate protection while a change in favor of their own power position, resulting from a decline in the adversary's ability to threaten them, might induce some to "go it alone." Allied countries entering into disarmament agreements have to take these effects into consideration if they themselves feel that the continuation of the alliance will remain important to them even after arms reductions or controls had been successfully negotiated with the opponent.

Changes in the relative power position of nuclear and non-nuclear allies vis-a-vis each other must be anticipated in cases in which disarmament measures are limited to nuclear weapons, whether applying to the quantity of such weapons or to the delivery vehicles, or to their use and deployment. Inevitably, the relative power of the nuclear nations would drop because only their weapons would be affected. The result may reveal itself in changes in the structure of existing alliances as, for instance, in the leadership of the alliance or in the stability of the alliance. Countries that had joined an alliance in reliance on the nuclear protection extended to them by a nuclear member of the alliance might lose interest in the alliance once disarmament had cut deeply into the ability for such nuclear deterrence. One cannot conclude that the two Superpowers would, therefore, necessarily lose most of their attractiveness as allies of weaker countries. America's European allies might remember that a non-nuclear North America was a mighty ally even in pre-nuclear days, and America's allies in Asia might rely more even today on America's conventional than on its nuclear assistance. But nuclear disarmament might, if substantial, change the existing non-Communist alliance pattern particularly if it induced the United States to return to an isolationist policy as a result of the high degree of invulnerability to direct attack that North America would enjoy in a non-nuclear world. In any event, disarmament of an exclusively nuclear character would produce some degree of equalization between the nuclear and the non-nuclear countries. As a result, the one-time nuclear Superpowers might enter into a process of retrenchment that might force countries formerly protected by them to take refuge in neutrality or in alliances with lesser countries, presumably of the area.

Nuclear arms reductions would have little effect on alliances linking nations of the North with nations of the South, of which the OAS is an example, because, as mentioned earlier, nuclear weapons play an insignificant role as far as the security of the South is concerned. The elimination of seaborne nuclear weapons in the South might tend to strengthen rather than to weaken such alliances. It would remove friction between the United States and those countries of the South that fear both the effect of nuclear war in general and the danger of serving as bases for American nuclear vessels, rockets, or bombers. As a result, a disarming world characterized by steps in the direction of a return to non-nuclear conditions might witness a relaxation of some North-South tensions.

Conventional arms reductions in the North would exert a much more direct effect on alliances in which the South played a part, though it is hard to imagine any agreements on arms reductions, other than the prohibition of shipments of arms from industrial countries, that would have any direct effect on the military and para-military forces of the nonindustrial countries themselves. The size of their forces rarely exceeds what they need for maintaining internal security and the arms they use, particularly in guerrilla and anti-guerrilla operations, are not of a kind susceptible to verified

arms limitations. As a result, conventional arms reductions will tend to discriminate in favor of the relative power of the nonindustrialized countries. While the effect would hardly be of a kind that would turn countries of the South into a military threat to nations of the North, it might greatly affect the ability of the latter either to protect vital interests that they may have in the South or to give assistance to countries of the South that are in need of allies whether for defensive or offensive purposes.

Generally the effect would be to raise the alliance-worthiness of the countries best able to provide subconventional assistance of the kind that guerrilla and anti-guerrilla forces require. Other things being equal, substantial conventional arms reductions would tend, therefore, to favor those Communist countries that excel in the support of guerrilla operations and insurgency—or what they call "wars of liberation"—in a manner that requires the dispatch of relatively few ground forces. Whether the non-Communist industrial countries could prevent such a shift in relative alliance-worthiness by enhancing their anti-guerrilla capabilities of a subconventional type remains an open question. The differential in favor of the Communist powers in this area would be further enhanced if the Communists proved more willing than their opponents to circumvent prohibitions of arms shipments and succeeded in doing so even in the face of the controls presumably provided in most disarmament agreements.

Disarmament, Alliance-mindedness, and Alliance Policy

Disarmament measures need not affect the distribution of power or the condition of conflict in order to affect alliance-mindedness or the solidarity among allies. It is enough for them to induce certain reactions in the minds or hearts of those responsible for alliance policy. Thus a mere suspicion on the part of one nation that another member of the coalition was preparing in disarmament negotiations to bargain away an element of security of its allies may suffice to weaken the alliance. To give another illustration, a change in the image other alliance members have of the alliance leader might result from a promotion of disarmament by the latter. Whether successful or not, such promotion might make those members more alliance-minded that had been reluctant to be tied to a country they regarded as excessively militant; but the same impression of strong disarmament inclinations on the part of the coalition leader might cool off the alliance-mindedness of countries fearful of softness or appeasement. Therefore, nations relying on alliances with both of these types of countries will, if engaging in disarmament talks, have trouble not to hurt the solidarity of one or the other of the two groups and will probably have to choose between them.

One peculiarity of the impact of disarmament on alliance-mindedness is that this impact tends to set in prior to the time at which an agreement with the adversary has been reached and frequently even prior to the start of negotiations. Strains on the solidarity of allies may result from disputes among them about the proposals they should put forward if they reach the conference table; they may also arise if, in the course of negotiations, allies are faced with the decision whether to accept or to turn down proposals of the other side. Once negotiated, an agreement will put an end to these strains if all the allies are satisfied that the particular agreement was proving profitable to them and thereby refuted their earlier suspicions. But solidarity may again be put to the test at a later date; inherent in every disarmament agreement is the possibility, after all, that the adversary might disregard or violate it at some future date. Even if the allies have agreed on the machinery for verification, inspection, and enforcement, which is designed to allay their apprehensions and to protect them against illegal action by the adversary, they may come to disagree on the nature and seriousness of the violation or on the sanctions to be applied. When, after World War I, France convinced itself that Germany was violating the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, it discovered to its dismay that the other great powers in the League of Nations refused even to hear its well-documented complaints for fear that an investigation would disturb the process of pacification and of the normalization of business that mattered more to them than any alleged German secret rearmament.

One may conclude that a disarming world in which new disarmament proposals were being put forth, negotiated, or agreed upon continuously or intermittently, will be hard on many existing alliances. This result will not militate against the disarmament process itself provided the arms reductions and arms controls that are put into effect reduce the objective need for alliances by eliminating causes of conflict and incentives to aggression. If they do not, the strains on allied solidarity will tend to increase the insecurity of many nations.

Such strains will be increased if the adversary deliberately engages in divisive tactics connected with the disarmament process. He can make proposals that are attractive to some but cause anxiety among other allies; he may be skillful in embroiling the allies in disputes with one another over matters of inspection or enforcement. The role that propaganda inevitably plays in connection with the disarmament process tends to widen the opportunity for an adversary to engage in divisive psychological maneuvers. Therefore, whatever the gains from the disarmament process as a whole, the efforts to get it going and keep it going will demand much care on the part of governments interested in the preservation and strength of alliances.

IV. Disarmament and Nonmilitary Alignments

This section will deal with all types of nonmilitary alignments, although a clear distinction will have to be drawn between those that are outer-directed and those that are inner-directed; they differ widely with respect to the effects that disarmament would exert on them. What they have in common is that the commitments of their members fall short of promises of military support.

While these alignments can be viewed as belonging to a single category, those among them that are outer-directed are closely related to alliances. They, too, are instruments with which to combat common adversaries though by economic, psychological, or diplomatic "warfare" only. The imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions against Cuba by the countries of the Western Hemisphere is an example of this sort of outer-directed alignment although, in this case, Cuba is still regarded by the members of the alignment more as an aberrant member of the Inter-American System than as an adversary. Because these outer-directed alignments provide for no use of arms—except, in some cases, of subconventional types of arms, which presumably elude disarmament agreements—they differ from alliances as far as the subject of this Report is concerned, in that disarmament does not affect them directly. If the peculiar conditions of a disarming world should have any impact on them, it must be the result of indirect repercussions.

Inner-directed nonmilitary alignments are much further removed from alliances and disarmament. They lie not only outside the range of disarmament as far as the means of cooperation are concerned, but they also have little, if anything, to do with conflict and the expectation of violence that generate alliances. Disarmament could change their role only if it created a psychological climate or environment that would make nations more or less inclined than they are in an armed world to coordinate or integrate their nonmilitary activities.

Disarmament and Nonmilitary Outer-Directed Alignments

Promises, mutual or unilateral, to assist other nations with means other than military power are frequently included in alliance treaties. They are kept separate when the intention is to steer clear of military entanglement. The determinants of policies of nonmilitary alignment and the impact of disarmament on them are not identical in every respect with what has been said in sections II and III concerning alliances. Yet they are sufficiently similar to require only brief comments on the ways in which they deviate.

As far as the conflict pattern is concerned, nonmilitary alignments against an adversary may come into play even if the conflict is sufficiently far down on the scale of intensity to preclude a resort to war. Therefore, if a disarming world should be characterized by a relaxation of tension between adversaries, whether as a result or as a precondition of the disarmament process, it would still leave room for nonmilitary, outer-directed alignments. It would, indeed, stimulate them if the diminished chance of military confrontations would channel more tensions into nonmilitary forms of combat, having a similar effect in this respect as that already produced by fear of nuclear escalation. Therefore, the value of alignments fitted to the needs of nonmilitary conflict would tend to increase as a result of substantial disarmament.

Another reason for such a reevaluation might arise from new types of conflict connected with the disarmament process itself. One might expect nations to be much concerned about avoiding isolation if they feared violations of disarmament agreements, or intervention by others, including that of international bodies, against what were alleged to be their own violations of such agreements. Such fears could generate a quest for diplomatic alignments and for what could be called voting alignments.

A particularly acute demand for nonmilitary alignments could come from nonindustrialized nations fearing either a prohibition of arms shipments or a breakdown of disarmament agreements and a subsequent race for rearmament. In the latter case the industrial nations would gain in alignment-worthiness in proportion to their ability to rearm and their willingness to protect others against the dangers of rearmament.

Here the discussion is already moving toward the second determinant, the distribution of power, which plays a role here, as it does in the case of alliances. There is one important difference, however: The power that comes into play in nonmilitary alignments is only marginally military power. Nations committing themselves to diplomatic or economic assistance against an adversary are primarily concerned about his power to resist diplomatic or economic pressure and to respond to it in kind. For this reason, disarmament, by affecting military power only—apart from the exceptional case of disarmament so radical as to include de-industrialization—can have only a slight direct bearing on the kind of distribution of power that matters here. However, the effect of the "military power in the background" should not be underestimated. In the absence of such power, threats to apply diplomatic or economic pressure might lose much of their credibility and sting.

The third determining factor, here to be called "alignment-mindedness," plays a role too. It cannot be taken for granted that the alliance-mindedness of nations will remain the same after the means of military assistance have been reduced or eliminated. Nations that feel called upon to take on global responsibilities as long as they are militarily powerful may enter on a general process of retrenchment as they cut back their armed forces and lose much of both their alliance and alignment-mindedness. Moreover, some may not possess the same degree of capability for diplomatic or economic assistance that they had for military assistance. In the case of others, the opposite may prove true; they might become far more willing to become partners to outer-directed alignments once the danger of military confrontations had receded. A disarmed world could, therefore, become the scene not so much of a quantitative change in alignment-mindedness as in a new distribution of alignment roles among nations. If the Western powers alone should turn more isolationist as the military threat in the world receded, nations seeking promises of assistance against economic pressures or guerrilla threats would have an incentive to turn to countries that retained high alignment-mindedness as well as high nonmilitary alignment capability.

Disarmament and Inner-directed Nonmilitary Alignments

The discussion here will be limited to inner-directed alignments of a nonmilitary nature. Military ones exist, too; they are known as "collective security" arrangements but have been omitted in this Report except in the case of the OAS, as mentioned and explained in section I above.

Despite their remoteness from the disarmament process, inner-directed nonmilitary alignments deserve attention here. The question arises whether outer-directed alignments or alliances might have a tendency to transform themselves into or perpetuate themselves as alignments for internal cooperation once disarmament had made military confrontations less likely. NATO, even today, contains provisions pertaining to internal economic cooperation. There is also in alliances, including NATO, a kind of implicit understanding that the allies will cooperate to restrain one another and to keep their foreign policies in line with the common interest. As the external threat receded, would, it is asked, the nonmilitary bonds weaken, or, as is sometimes hopefully suggested, would they take the place of what had been the primary military bonds?

The experience of the past offers little support for the latter hope. Not only have the nonmilitary provisions of NATO practically remained a dead letter despite efforts to put life into them, but the selection of partners for security purposes must necessarily differ from what it is when, for example, economic integration or political unification are at stake.

Another suggestion that is sometimes heard, is that if nations were relieved from much of the financial burdens of armaments, they would become more able and inclined to enter into economic agreements and alignments with poorer countries. But this view is highly controversial. The fact is that the recipients of foreign economic aid in the South have profited immensely from the East-West competition generated by the Cold War, and there is no way of predicting what would happen to it if the competitors became friends. Then there is the view that the more relaxed political climate of a disarming world would give new impetus to integrative regional or other processes. The possibility cannot be denied but one is hard put to discover any specific cause and effect relationship between the two phenomena. Even if disarmament produced a high degree of harmony among nations, it would remain an open question whether a sense of greater security would militate in favor of or against "going it with others."7/ Today, it seems clear that what integrative tendencies there are, whether operating in the Atlantic area, the Arab world, or Africa, are being greatly stimulated by common external dangers to which the countries of these areas believe themselves to be exposed.

Some types of disarmament measures may, however, draw countries of a region closer together and thereby stimulate both inner-directed and outer-directed alignments among them. The outstanding example is the demilitarization or denuclearization of an area whether voluntarily accepted by the countries of the area or imposed on them from the outside. In both cases, there might arise a common interest in preventing either excessive outside control or outside intervention to enforce the agreement. This interest would call at least for mutual diplomatic support and voting support. If strong regional sentiment were thereby generated, it might in time prepare the way for political unification, which in such a case could be credited to the disarming world. Some forms of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, another probable aspect of a disarmament process, might have similar effects, as will be shown in the next section.

V. Peacekeeping and its Effects on Alliances and Other Interstate Alignments

So far the discussion has been limited to arms reductions and arms controls as if they alone would distinguish a disarming world from an armed world. But if a future disarmament process should develop along lines even remotely resembling those en-

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7/ In Latin America, for example, some feel that the reduction, through disarmament, of the overwhelming power of the United States would weaken the alignment of the Latin Americans, insofar as that alignment stems from a common fear of U.S. domination. See John Dreier's essay on the Western Hemisphere, below.

visaged in U.S. proposals for general and complete disarmament 8/, international peacekeeping operations and peacekeeping forces would play an increasingly important role as disarmament progressed in the direction of a disarmed world.

Aside from any final stage of complete disarmament, substantial cutbacks of their armed forces by the major powers would tend to increase their inclination to shift the burden of peacekeeping, at least in the more remote areas, to the United Nations and other international bodies. Some such shift has already been occurring, as in the Congo and the Near East.

The question to be posed here is not whether a substitution of international for national forces is an effective or desirable way of handling the problem, but whether, if such substitution occurred, it would have repercussions on the pattern of alliances and other alignments. Two effects, one leading in the opposite direction from the other, deserve consideration.

In the first place, if international forces succeeded in preserving the peace between hostile countries, for instance, by separating their forces from each other or by inducing one side to withdraw its troops, alliances negotiated in support of one or both parties to the dispute might become superfluous and break up. Moreover, for those nations that had consented to the international peacekeeping operation or had participated in it, the continuation of allied bonds with the party against which action was taken might prove impossible, as France experienced in the days of the Ethiopian war, when its participation in sanctions against Italy ended its alliance with Italy against Nazi Germany. Therefore, any spread of international peacekeeping in a disarming world would rob some alliances of their raison d'etre, provided other things remained equal.

But other things may change and trigger a second and contrary effect. International police forces, in contrast to noncoercive peacekeeping devices such as Observations Commissions, can arouse hostility. Rebel separatist groups and movements, as the Congo has demonstrated, are likely to react to the interposition of the United Nations on the side of the established government no less vehemently than if other nations were intervening against them. They may, therefore, seek and obtain outside assistance and thereby enter, in fact, into a new type of outer-directed alignment, namely one directed against the international authority and its armed forces. Only exceptionally would such an alignment take the form of a military alliance because the kind of political bodies calling for the support would usually be in need not of regular allied armed assistance but of supplies of trained men, small weapons, and ammunition and of logistic support or political backing within the international authority.

One may conclude, in the light of these opposing pulls on alignment policy, that some existing outer-directed alignments might fade away under the impact of a disarmament process while "anti-peacekeeping alignments," in extreme cases even of an alliance type, might make their appearance especially in areas of revolutionary conflict.

VI. Alliances and Other Interstate Alignments in a Disarmed World

Only incidental references have been made so far to a disarmed world in contrast to a disarming world, although the two would differ in fundamental ways that could hardly leave alignment policy untouched. There are several reasons the subject of total disarmament has been accorded little attention, one being the extreme unlikeliness that it could become a reality in the foreseeable future. Another is that, in trying to imagine the conditions that would prevail in a disarmed world, one is confined to the abstract models

8/ The United States Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, April 18, 1962, Documents on Disarmament, Washington, D.C., (1962), pp 351-82.

developed by advocates of complete disarmament which may deviate as widely from the actual outcome as Marx's fantasies about the future classless society, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the withering away of the state differ from the realities of the Soviet Union and Red China. Finally, outer-directed alignments, which are the chief topic of this Report, cannot be made compatible with the assumptions one has to make in imagining a disarmed world.

The incompatibility between alliances, as institutionalized promises of military assistance, and a disarmed world, which would deprive nations of the means with which to offer military assistance, is obvious. It might be argued that they could still promise such assistance on condition that disarmament were to collapse. But unless such promises were clandestine, they would run into legal obstacles. A stimulus to protect oneself against an eventual failure of the authority entrusted with enforcing the disarmament clauses would not be lacking and might indeed lead to clandestine promises of rearmament assistance and eventual protection against the effects of rearmament by an adversary. Yet, one could hardly speak here of an alliance policy compatible with complete disarmament, which presupposes effectively enforced disarmament. Moreover, if the fear of violations is in itself a divisive factor in any disarmament agreements, the emergence of outer-directed alignments against specific potential violators would surely destroy the system. One need only compare the situation with conditions within states of a federal structure such as the United States, which is probably the most useful analogy one can make if one wishes to speculate realistically about a disarmed world. One need think, then, in terms of the effects that would arise from outer-directed and, therefore, adversary alignments among some states of the union against others, to realize how close the situation would be to a break-up of the political system, if not to civil war.

There remains, however, one form of outer-directed alignment that might become even more attractive in a disarmed than in a disarming world. Complete disarmament is inconceivable without international machinery to detect violations of the rules and to enforce them against violators. Such detection and enforcement becomes more important and exacting the further down the scale arms reductions are extended with the climax reached at the point of complete disarmament. Yet, obviously, both detection and enforcement can become the source of serious disputes among the participants to the agreements and place grave strains on their cooperation. It seems logical to expect, therefore, that nations with common views on the steps to be taken would be drawn together in a way that could lead to their alignment for common political action within or outside the body responsible for the disarmament system. Such alignments might even become—or degenerate into—cooperation to gain control over the international machinery on which the fate of nations would after all have come to hinge.

Inner-directed nonmilitary alignments are a different matter. There is no reason to assume that a world of disarmed nations would necessarily possess adequate universal institutions to cope with all of the economic, financial, cultural and other nondefense matters transcending national boundaries. With a view to managing these matters, nations with particular affinities or common interests might, therefore, align themselves with one another as they do in an armed world. Moreover, if relieved from the burdens and responsibilities of national self-help in matters of security, more of their efforts and ambitions might be channeled into nonmilitary activities and, as a result, into inner-directed nonmilitary alignments with others.

One may conclude, then, that a disarmed world would not only be as free of military alliances as of national armaments, but would depend for its continuation as a political system on the prohibition and prevention of all outer-directed alignments, with the exception of political alignments for cooperation in representing common interests of groups of members within the international bodies controlling the system. Inner-directed alignments need not be adversely affected by total disarmament; they might, on the contrary, be enhanced in value and spread more widely.

Part II

Area Studies

1. Western Europe and the Atlantic Area
2. Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact
3. The Near and Middle East
4. Asia and the Pacific Area
5. Africa
6. The Western Hemisphere

1. Western Europe and the Atlantic Area

by

Robert E. Osgood

I. The Functions of Military Alliances

II. Political and Military Characteristics of the Area

III. Background of the Present Alliance

The Relationship of the United States to Europe.
The Ownership and Control of Nuclear Weapons.
The German Problem.

IV. The Implications of Disarmament for Alliances

Regional Disarmament.
General Arms Control.
General Limited Disarmament.
General and Complete Disarmament.

1. WESTERN EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC AREA

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I. The Functions of Military Alliances

This analysis assesses the implications of various kinds of disarmament for present and future security alliances and alignments in the Western European and Atlantic area. It examines the military and political consequences of disarmament in so far as they are related to the functions and the efficacy of military alliances. It is not, however, primarily concerned with assessing the advantages and disadvantages of disarmament apart from its effects upon alliances.

In the area with which this paper is concerned, the principal constructive functions of military alliances are (1) to improve the security of member states by making collective military responses to common threats credible and effective and (2) to enhance the basic harmony of member states by establishing a framework of interdependence. These functions can be referred to as external and internal. The internal function, in that it concerns the cohesion of the alliance, is an instrument of the external function; but it is also an end in itself. It is doubtful, however, that the internal function will be served if there is no felt need for the external function or if the alliance fails to fulfill that need.

Historically, of course, military alliances in this area have also served offensive objectives, such as the acquisition of territory. But these objectives are contrary to U.S. and Western interests and will therefore be excluded from the analysis that follows, which deals only with defensive military-security alliances.

In their external function, military-security alliances are intended to enhance the power of single states by concerting their power with the power of other states. In serving this function, they are one of three principal military instruments that states use to support their vital interests. The other two instruments are armaments (more specifically, military establishments and their weapons) and warfare. These three instruments are closely related to each other. In the dynamic field of international politics, they both supplement and supplant each other in adjusting national power to changing patterns of conflict and interest.

Restrictions on one instrument are likely to place an additional burden on another. Thus alliances and armaments, hopefully, will supplant war as instruments of security; but this puts a premium on the skillful political management of these two nonviolent instruments of power. By the same token, formal arms restrictions may throw an additional burden on bilateral or multilateral military commitments in maintaining security short of war. Generally, changes of either military alignments or armaments will affect the requirements and the efficacy of each other as instruments of the continual adjustment of national power to changing and conflicting interests.

In the Cold War, a stable pattern of military alignment has been built on a stable pattern of conflict and interests in the Atlantic-Western European area, while the arms race has served as the dynamic instrument of countervailing power. A mutually satisfactory formal restriction on the armaments of the Cold War protagonists, like the mutual acceptance of the existing dynamic equilibrium, would be contingent on a certain pattern of interests and alignments. If either the interests or alignments should change, the arms agreement might cease to satisfy the security aims of the signatories. For the

same reason, a substantial restriction of armaments is unlikely to be mutually acceptable without a basic change of interests or alignments. But, of course, even within a fixed pattern of alignments and interests, international politics and conflicts of interest will continue. Since armaments are in this case the only instrument for adjusting military power to cope with such conflicts, even limited disarmament will have repercussions on the external and internal functions of a multilateral alliance like NATO.

Neither military alliances nor armaments are infinitely flexible in adjusting power to changing patterns of interest and conflict. But since at least the last quarter of the nineteenth century, armaments have played an increasingly large and dynamic role in international politics; whereas the very magnitude of the requirements of organizing peacetime military potential and forces-in-being, together with the political effects of public opinion and ideology and the increased importance of advance military commitments for deterrence, have tended to make alliances more stable and less flexible in peacetime. Given these inherent restrictions on alliances, formal restrictions on armaments will often accentuate allied divergencies of interest by raising doubts whether the alliance can support the vital interests of its members. Indeed, these divergencies could become so marked as to dissolve the alliance in realignments or nonalignments, at the risk of undermining deterrence and inducing war. But even in the absence of disarmament, military—especially nuclear—policies have become a primary medium of interallied politics in NATO. They thereby act as a dynamic element in the substance of alignments within the formally unchanged structure. Consequently, restrictions on armaments are bound to put an added strain on the internal function of a multilateral military alliance.

The analysis that follows occasionally suggests ways in which alliances may adjust to the effects of disarmament and ways in which changes of alignment may be the precondition of disarmament. Nevertheless, most of the analysis concerns the problems for alliances that result from the interaction of armaments and alliances when armaments are formally restricted. This emphasis, however, results from the definition of the study. It does not necessarily argue the utility or disutility of disarmament. That is another question, even though it should not be answered without weighing the implications of disarmament for alliances.

II. Political and Military Characteristics of the Area

There are some distinctive characteristics of the Western European-Atlantic area that make alliances there both peculiarly useful and peculiarly feasible:

The area contains a number of highly advanced industrial-technological states with the governmental capacity, the resources, and the historic experience to project great military power beyond their borders and to form military alliances.

None of the states in Europe is militarily self-sufficient against threats from either outside or inside the area. In the twentieth century, the outcome of wars in Western Europe has been crucially affected by states outside the area, notably the United States and Russia. Since World War II, European states have been subordinate participants in a larger political contest between external powers. Therefore, their security has come to depend on alliances with states outside Europe.

As demonstrated by the two world wars and the Cold War, U.S. security is vitally affected by the security and by the discord or harmony of Western European states. Consequently, in the absence of self-sufficient European alliances, the United States will be inclined to continue its role, institutionalized in NATO, as the principal alliance force in Western Europe.

One must also take into account some distinctive characteristics of the pattern of conflict and alignment—the configurations of power, interest, and commitment—that would affect the impact of disarmament on alliances in this area.

In modern history, the conflict pattern in Western Europe, despite strong cultural and political affinities among regional states, has been marked by intense clashes of national interests, active military competition, numerous crises, and warfare. Since World War II, however, militant nationalism has been suppressed by the sobering experience of devastating warfare, the polarization of international politics accompanying the ascendance of Soviet and U.S. power, the threat of Soviet power and ambition, the organization of the major states into an alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union, the inhibitions against military ambitions imposed by the nuclear age, the growth of economic integration, and the popular preoccupation with domestic welfare.

Despite the general harmony in Western Europe, the European states are impeded from acting as a unit in military and political affairs by important divergencies of national interest, continuing European dependence on U.S. protection (which is partly a consequence of these divergencies), and the inherent political obstacles to concerting foreign and defense policies among a number of roughly equal states.

Supplementing the military guarantees of the North Atlantic alliance is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a partially integrated peacetime military organization extending U.S. power to the protection of Europe, with the United States playing the dominant role.

Within NATO the relations among the allies are sensitive to changes in the terms of military collaboration (including force-levels, weapons systems, strategy, and the control of nuclear weapons), since these terms strongly affect their security, status, relative power, and foreign policies.

Among a number of states in Western Europe there are important nonmilitary alignments, which tend to reinforce special political ties. The European Economic Community (comprised of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) is significant because it was formed with the expectation that it would lead to a political union or at least a special European coalition.

The area contains some states that are nonaligned (Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, Spain, and Eire) and a number of states, both neutral and allied, that lack the resources and political will to play a significant military role. Some of the allied states—notably Italy and Norway—contain important neutralist and anti-military elements. On the other hand, some of the nonaligned states (Spain and Sweden) might become significant collaborators against Soviet aggression impinging on their security.

With most of the allies, the United States has made bilateral agreements to implement military collaboration within the obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty. With the United Kingdom, the United States has made special agreements for nuclear collaboration outside the treaty. Similarly, with Canada, the United States has special continental defense agreements outside the NATO which have been articulated in the Ogdensburg Agreement (1940), NORAD (1957) and numerous military arrangements and bilateral agreements. With Spain, the United States has base agreements.

Certain general conclusions about the relationship of disarmament to alliances follow from these characteristics of the area.

At almost any level of arms resulting from an arms agreement (possibly even under general and complete disarmament), some states would feel the need for military alliances for the sake of external security and for ordering peaceful relations among themselves. They would also retain the internal political and material prerequisites for engaging in alliances. Arms reductions, however, might encourage nonalignment in states with strong neutralist elements.

Arms reductions and resulting changes in relative power, especially reductions in the power of the United States and the Soviet Union, would tend to produce changes in U.S.-European relations and intra-European relations. Western European states would

have to depend more on themselves and less on the United States in proportion to the reduction of arms. Consequently, new configurations of interest and power and new patterns of military and political collaboration could be expected to arise among them. Disarmament resulting in the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe would be especially consequential.

Limited arms agreements imposing only slight restrictions on the level, types, deployment, production, ownership, observation, or use of weapons and forces are likely to exert significant effects on allied cohesion and patterns of interest and, therefore, indirectly on allied security.

If there ceased to be a significant military threat to or in Western Europe, a modified form of NATO or some new alliance or alliances in the area, reinforced by nonmilitary alignments, might continue to serve as a framework of national accommodation and cooperation.

To complete these generalizations about the military and political characteristics of the area and their implications for disarmament and alliances, certain assumptions about the general international political environment should be stated.

In the Western European-Atlantic area, the Cold War will be the most significant political conflict for the foreseeable future, and every other issue will be colored by it. The present détente, however, may well continue and expand over the long run, both as a strategy of East-West conflict and a reflection of a limited convergence of national interests across the Iron Curtain.

At the same time, the Cold War outside Europe—especially in Asia—may become hotter. In any case, there will probably be increasingly numerous and intense regional conflicts in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, which will command the attention of the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union. U.S. (and perhaps U.K.) military involvements in these areas, especially in Southeast Asia, could become a serious distraction from European commitments, although Europe will continue to be the primary U.S. and U.S.S.R. interest.

The principal current territorial-political issue in Europe—the division of Germany—seems likely to become increasingly significant and will continue to have a critical bearing on the implications of regional and other disarmament schemes for the alliance.

As long as the Cold War in Europe lasts, neither complete nuclear disarmament nor anything approaching general and complete disarmament will be practicable, since radical changes in the levels and kinds of armed forces are bound to affect the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union unequally and would probably jeopardize the European interests of both states.

If the Cold War should wither away, there would still be sufficiently serious conflicts of interest among the present European allies and between them and states to the East to involve the prospect of war and provide incentives for security alliances. This would be true even in the event of drastic disarmament.

The security and harmony of Western European states will continue to be a vital interest of the United States regardless of the Cold War or disarmament—and regardless of the existence of formal alliances with European states; for the material and political inter-dependence of the United States and Western Europe will persist, and the lessons of U.S. involvement in two world wars with European origins will be no less pertinent.

III. Background of the Present Alliance

NATO distinguishes the North Atlantic Alliance from all other peacetime alliances by the extensiveness of its standing forces and their integration. More than a traditional

guarantee pact, it is an institutionalized framework of continuing military and political collaboration.

The great unifying factor in NATO, however, has been the preponderance of one of its members, the United States. This preponderance is reflected in the command of European and Atlantic forces by an American, the semipermanent presence of U.S. forces on the continent, U.S. dominance of military planning and operations, U.S. ownership and decisive control of nuclear warheads on allied territory, and the overwhelming dependence of NATO on U.S. nuclear forces outside NATO.

The NATO superstructure and the dominant role of the United States in it resulted from the heightened fears of European military insecurity accompanying the Korean War. Before the Korean War, the North Atlantic Treaty was essentially a guarantee pact extended by the United States to Western Europe. The European allies were expected to take over their own defense in the natural course of their anticipated economic recovery and political unification.

NATO has been eminently successful in achieving its primary goal of containing the extension of Soviet control and influence in Western Europe. Despite the relative weakness of its conventional forces against a sustained Soviet attack, and despite the growing vulnerability of Western Europe and the United States to Soviet nuclear devastation, NATO has withstood two serious Berlin crises by confronting the Russians with united diplomatic resistance and the prospect of a united military response to aggression.

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear balance seems more stable than ever because both states have increasingly invulnerable second-strike capabilities to inflict terrible damage on each other. Contrary to some strategic speculations about the consequences of Soviet nuclear power, the deterrence of conventional conflicts in Europe seems no less stable, since the risks of "escalation" and the fearful uncertainties of nuclear warfare extend nuclear deterrence to the whole spectrum of overt military threats in this vital area. Furthermore, the contribution of twelve divisions of the Federal Republic of Germany has brought NATO's numerical strength on the forward line somewhat closer to the requirements of effective conventional resistance to Communist forces in Eastern Europe. The chief value of NATO's conventional capability, above a mere "trip-wire," is less deterrence than coping with limited conflicts if deterrence should fail and supporting diplomatic resistance if deterrence succeeds. The chief deficiences of conventional strength now lie less in numbers of forces than in their deployment, logistics, coordination, strategy, and tactics, and the numbers and types of weapons. Yet these deficiencies are probably not so serious as to jeopardize deterrence.

Nevertheless, several developments challenge the present organization of the alliance and its continued efficacy. Most immediately, they challenge the cohesion of the alliance; indirectly, they may threaten its military security. Regardless of this latter danger, the internal functions of the alliance have a value of their own.

From the beginning, the North Atlantic alliance has been not only a security treaty but also an instrument for ordering the relations among its members. Of particular importance, the alliance, like European economic integration, has served as a framework of cooperative relations that provides an alternative to the divisive national separatism of the past. Thus, from the outset, the alliance has been generally regarded as an instrument of European unity. Thus, too, Germany's membership in NATO was intended not only to strengthen the alliance militarily but also to give Germany a constructive but constrained position in Europe by tying it more closely to the West. As the European allies have become more politically self-conscious and active and the Soviet military threat has apparently declined, interallied relations have come to the forefront of NATO's concerns; and the terms of military collaboration, especially as they pertain to the control of nuclear weapons, have become as significant for interallied politics as for deterrence.

The principal developments affecting the organization and efficacy of the alliance

are the Soviet achievement of a devastating first- and second-strike capacity against the United States as well as Europe; the economic recovery and political resurgence of several of the European allies; the onset of détente in East-West relations; the Gaullist challenge to NATO's military integration, the virtual nuclear monopoly of the United States, and the general preponderance of the United States in European security affairs; the heightened German concern with reunification; and the prospect of Germany's seeking political and possibly nuclear equality with France and Great Britain. These developments have accentuated three related issues, which any disarmament agreement is bound to affect:

The relationship of the United States to Europe

From the military standpoint the need for integration and central control of armed forces is greater than ever; but the growth of Soviet nuclear power, by raising doubts in some allied countries about the willingness of the United States to use its nuclear deterrent in response to non-nuclear aggression, and the economic and political resurgence of proud allies, by creating dissatisfaction with U.S. preponderance, lead toward decentralization. Fundamentally, this contradiction results from the great disparity of power between the United States and any of its European allies individually, combined with the discrepancy between their sense of national autonomy and their power to control their external environment.

Possibly, the best solution to the political liabilities of U.S. preponderance would be the creation of a unified European defense community that could concert the great military potential of Europe and deal with the United States as an equal partner. But no such Europe exists. Despite the growing strength of a European sense of identity and despite real progress in European economic cooperation, the historic and contemporary divergencies of interest in Europe about the cardinal issues of military and foreign policies make a truly unified European defense and political community seem unlikely in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, if the atmosphere of détente deepens, there will be no security incentive to form such a community. On the other hand, the increase of East-West tensions would tend to drive the European allies into greater dependence on the United States.

In this situation, President de Gaulle has insisted that a European coalition of a traditional sort, built around a French nuclear force, must supplant U.S. preponderance in Europe; and he has opposed NATO's military integration (as distinguished from the alliance as such) as the instrument of U.S. preponderance. Despite the continued presence in France of NATO's central institutions and much of its infrastructure, he has steadily constricted French participation in NATO; for example, by refusing the placement of nuclear weapons on French soil unless under exclusive French control and by withdrawing naval units from assignment to allied command. In 1965, there were some indications that he might deny the allies use of certain NATO facilities in France, further reduce French participation in NATO, or eventually withdraw France from NATO altogether. In any case, de Gaulle's revisionist drive has made the issue of U.S.-European relations, which was previously a somewhat hypothetical concern, a critical practical problem in the alliance. It might well remain critical even if de Gaulle were not in office.

De Gaulle's conception of a stronger, more independent "Europe of States" seems to clash with the view of the United States and most of its European allies that European unity must develop within an Atlantic framework, supplementing, not supplanting, close ties to the United States. To proponents of European federation and opponents of national nuclear forces, the example of France espousing an independent nuclear force as the indispensable condition of political autonomy and self-respect is a dangerously divisive influence in Europe. To the United States, anxious to maintain an effective, safe nuclear force capable of a graduated response under political direction, the French example runs contrary to the crucial need for the integration and central control of nuclear weapons.

In the resulting clash of concepts concerning the military and political organization of the alliance, the United States has tried to protect its vital interests in European security and harmony by striking a balance between central control and allied autonomy. In general, the U.S. answer to this problem has been to extend to its European allies greater participation in the integrated, collective management of NATO's military and political affairs while leaving the door open to equal partnership with an hypothetical united Europe that might emerge within this Atlantic framework.

The ownership and control of nuclear weapons

The problem of accommodating disparate power and divergent interests within the alliance comes to a head in the issue of who shall own and control the use of nuclear weapons. It is not easy for proud and latently powerful states indefinitely to depend entirely on another state to make such fateful decisions as whether, when, and how to use nuclear weapons in their behalf. Therefore, continued dependence on U.S.-owned nuclear weapons could undermine allied confidence in U.S. ties. Yet if every state that could acquire its own nuclear weapons were to base its security on nuclear self-reliance, this could incite allied suspicions and fears of being triggered into a nuclear war and thereby undermine the credibility of a united response to aggression.

Moreover, nuclear proliferation might increase the risk of accidental and inadvertent war, while virtually precluding the opportunity of using nuclear weapons in a limited and controlled way. The only logical rationale of a small national nuclear force is the French concept of an automatic countercity force. The U.S. concept of holding open the option of a controlled nuclear war, on the other hand, depends on having a counterforce strategic nuclear capability in addition to a countercity force, so that the latter might be withheld to save both sides from unlimited devastation while bargaining for an end to hostilities. It follows that the United States, rather than be triggered into an unlimited countercity exchange, might qualify its commitment to defend an ally with a small nuclear force intended to strike independently. If so, the result would be to undermine the cohesion and, eventually, the security of the alliance.

Quite apart from this consideration, the prospect of a German nuclear force would be profoundly disturbing to all allies, because of Germany's history of militant nationalism, its forward geographical position, and its unfulfilled national goal of reunifying the two Germanies. Perhaps the prospect is a figment of morbid imaginations. After all, World War II was a terrible lesson for Germany. Germany is now devoid of military ambitions and acutely conscious of the adverse effect on its whole political position of even suggesting nuclear ambitions. In any case, the Federal Republic, on joining NATO, unilaterally renounced production (though not acquisition) of nuclear weapons on its soil. On the other hand, the trauma of World War II will not last forever. If France were to persist in building an independent force, and if the Gaullist rationale for such a force gained currency, Germany would have a good claim and might have a strong desire for nuclear equality. This prospect would be especially plausible if Germany were susceptible to de Gaulle's appeal—in the name of Franco-German rapprochement and European independence—to join France in forming the nucleus of a European military coalition; for in such a coalition Germany would not be likely to remain dependent indefinitely on France's nuclear force alone. Yet by 1965 it had become clear to most Germans that de Gaulle had no intention of allowing Germany to participate in the control of a "European" nuclear force and that his coalition would not promote European political integration or German reunification.

Possibly, German participation in a genuinely integrated, jointly controlled European nuclear force might be a safe and effective method of granting Germany nuclear equality short of an independent nuclear force. But the political feasibility of such a force is doubtful. It is difficult to imagine the European participants in a joint nuclear force permitting any one state to have exclusive control of the decision to use nuclear weapons, but it is just as difficult to envisage them sharing the decision equally, whether by unanimity (thereby giving each a veto over the rest) or by majority (thereby depriving each

of a veto). Therefore, an acceptable method of decision-sharing probably presupposes the existence of a European confederation or federation. Yet no such political union exists, and the attempt to foster it by trying to create a European nuclear force seems more likely to impede than to promote European unity. In any case, one must doubt that military and political independence from the United States constitutes a sufficient incentive for European allies to build a collective nuclear force, especially in an atmosphere of détente.

The U.S. plan for dealing with the problem of nuclear ownership and control—as opposed to the alternatives of the status quo, national nuclear forces, or a collective European nuclear force—has been to create a multilateral nuclear force, integrated with nuclear forces of the United States, in which the United States would share with its European allies ownership, control, and management of nuclear weapons under safeguards against any member using these weapons independently. The proponents of such a force, as originally envisaged in the MLF, regarded it not only as a counter to de Gaulle's nuclear designs but, more importantly, as a step toward giving Germany and other non-nuclear allies (and Great Britain and even France eventually) a larger role in nuclear strategic planning, operations, and related contingency planning, diplomacy, and decision-making. A greater role might satisfy European desires for greater nuclear autonomy without creating additional independent nuclear forces. Some also foresaw the possibility of the European participants acquiring a collective voice in the control of such a force—a voice that might even become independent of a U.S. veto if the European members should form a political union and devise a method of joint nuclear control—thereby achieving a more nearly equal U.S.-European partnership.

No one envisaged such a force as militarily essential, since its functions could be equally well performed by exclusively U.S.-controlled forces already programed. On the other hand, as a substitute for some of these programed forces, it would be a powerful, useful, integral part of the total nuclear forces of the West. Specifically, it would be a counter to the more than 700 Soviet MRBM's that could devastate Western Europe. Whether primarily a counterforce or countercity force, a multilateral nuclear force might give European allies an important voice in the control of nuclear weapons responsive to a threat of special interest to them.

The immediate effect of the MLF proposal, however, was to provoke de Gaulle to oppose vehemently any such plan as a device to perpetuate U.S. preponderance and tie Germany to an Atlantic rather than a European community. This accentuated the conflict between the French and U.S. conceptions of the alliance and put the Federal Republic of Germany in the middle of it. In the resulting tension, the United States, although not inclined to drop its support of a multilateral nuclear force because of French opposition, was not likely to establish such a force without British membership, lest the arrangement fragment the alliance by creating a bilateral German-U.S. nuclear coalition. It remains to be seen, however, whether any British plan for a joint nuclear force, with its probable inclusion of British nationally manned components, would be acceptable to the Germans, since purely German-manned components are politically unacceptable.

Whether the absence of a multilateral nuclear force would lead to nuclear proliferation or the erosion of allied cohesion or whether a multilateral nuclear force, if established, would fulfill its intended functions would depend on a number of imponderable factors. These would include the apparent stability of the nuclear balance, national views concerning the utility of independent nuclear forces and nuclear participation short of independent control, the convergence or divergence of allied strategic concepts, and the credibility of U.S. nuclear protection. Above all, it would depend on political developments: the trend of East-West relations, the convergence or divergence of foreign policies on German reunification and on relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the ability of the United States to concert policies with its allies and undertake advance consultation with them, and the strength and appeal of Atlantic and European international organizations that qualify traditional national autonomy. However, as important as any of these factors and related to most of them, would be the particular issue of Germany's role in Europe and the Atlantic alliance.

The German problem

Despite West Germany's great economic progress its active role in European economic cooperation, its firm support of military and political integration in NATO, and its major contribution to NATO's armed forces, it remains, almost twenty years after World War II, a nation bound by special legal and political constraints reflecting the lingering distrust of its allies and its own citizens. Spiritually, Germany's problem is to create a national role and identity that will channel its great inherent energy in constructive directions free of the reality or suspicion of militant nationalism. Militarily, its dominant concern is to maintain its security. Politically, its chief unfulfilled objective is reunification.

So far the Federal Republic has sought these ends through full acceptance of the special, self-imposed restrictions on nuclear production as well as the common restrictions embodied in Western European Union and by its full participation in, and advocacy of, international economic and military integration in both European and Atlantic institutions. This resolution, however, could be jeopardized by a number of possible developments: the breakdown of economic and military integration and a resurgence of traditional nationalism in Europe; German dissatisfaction with the privileged nuclear status of France and Great Britain; German loss of confidence in the efficacy of U.S. nuclear deterrence in behalf of German interests; or frustration with the continued division of Germany and the lack of allied interest in reunification.

Three developments, in particular, complicate Germany's military, political, and spiritual problems of foreign policy: (1) the conflict between de Gaulle's "Europeanism" and the United States' "Atlanticism," (2) the intensification of German reunification sentiment, and (3) the consolidation of détente. The first development, by making Germany the fulcrum of interallied nuclear politics, might aggravate German political schizophrenia and incite extreme solutions to the dilemma. The second development exacerbates a potential source of national frustration and ambition. The third development accentuates the heightened desire for reunification while intensifying German suspicions that its allies may foreclose the opportunity for reunification for the sake of disengagement or other measures to stabilize East-West relations. In combination, these developments could reactivate a militant nationalism that would erode the postwar German restraint and thereby undermine allied cohesion, while ruining the prospects of an orderly removal of the division of Europe.

IV. The Implications of Disarmament for Alliances

The effects of disarmament, in the form of various types of arms agreements, are discussed with regard to these issues. Three types of arms agreements are examined: (1) arms control, i.e., those measures which tend to stabilize the military confrontation by restricting the use, ownership, control or deployment of forces but which do not affect their number; (2) limited disarmament, i.e., partial reductions in the existing level of arms or restrictions on their manufacture, testing and type; (3) drastic reductions in arms levels. The application of each of these types of agreements can be either regional or non-regional in character.

In examining the implications of disarmament, two kinds of effects are taken into account: those due to changes in the distribution of power and those due to changes in the political atmosphere among allies and between potential adversaries. These effects, of course, may be closely related. Yet in a period in which the psychological and political impact of military power short of war plays such a prominent role in international politics, it is well to note that slight formal restrictions on armaments may cause disproportionately great repercussions on the cohesion and vigilance of an alliance like NATO that depends on a high level of peacetime military collaboration.

Fundamentally, the potential internal repercussions of disarmament in the alliance spring from the fact that, like all alliances, the North Atlantic Alliance is based on di-

vergent as well as identical and convergent interests. This includes divergent security interests; for despite identical security objectives, the allies have divergent views of specific security requirements—of military strategy, weapons and forces, and command and control arrangements. A major internal task of the alliance, and of the United States particularly, is to maintain through the changing terms of military and political collaboration a working compromise among these divergencies so that common interests will predominate.

A disarmament agreement is bound to complicate this problem of achieving and preserving an allied consensus because, in effect, it compels allies to commit themselves in a solemn treaty to particular security requirements and terms of collaboration that become difficult, if not impossible, to alter legally without renegotiating the agreement. Moreover, their commitment is not simply a contract with their allies; it is a contract with the potential adversary. In effect, this renders the most delicate matters of allied relations subject to agreement with the adversary and raises troublesome questions about the possibility of some members—particularly the United States—accommodating the adversary at the expense of allies. For this reason, any arms agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States and any of its allies is apt to be ripe with opportunities for the Soviet Union to play on the "contradictions" among allies. In some kinds of disarmament agreements, this difficulty might be mitigated by making the whole alliance rather than its individual members a party to the agreement, thereby leaving more room for interallied adjustments in the terms of collaboration. This expedient might be especially important in dealing with jointly owned weapons. Its success, however, depends on the capacity of the allies to reach a consensus on arms agreements, which in turn presupposes a consensus on military and foreign policies. Generally speaking, the difficulty of maintaining unity in the face of formal arms restrictions is one of the unavoidable prices of disarmament that must be weighed against prospective benefits. To the extent the alliance has achieved cohesive but flexible relations among its members, however, the difficulty may be surmounted. Otherwise, realignment might be preferable to a strained or impotent alliance.

Regional Arms Agreements

The minimum ostensible purposes of limited local arms control, restriction, or reduction in Europe are to reduce the risk of unintended war and provide assurance against deliberate war without changing the East-West military balance or the political-territorial status quo. More comprehensive schemes purport to pacify the most explosive political and military situation in the Cold War by withdrawing armed forces from the two Germanies or a wider zone of confrontation. The most comprehensive regional disarmament proposals would combine this disengagement with a political settlement of the division of Germany within a new, guaranteed military equilibrium.

The unavowed military and political repercussions of regional disarmament might be more significant than the avowed intentions. The repercussions on Germany's position in Europe and the alliance would be particularly significant for the internal and external functions of NATO.

First, consider the effects of agreements for zonal arms control, restriction, and reduction. Agreements that would prohibit nuclear weapons in the two Germanies or a wider European zone, as in various versions of the Rapacki Plan, would not prevent nuclear weapons from outside the disarmament zone being used against targets in the zone. Furthermore, the Soviet Union would have the advantage in quickly reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons. A denuclearized zone might reduce the danger of nuclear war only if the use of nuclear weapons might otherwise be decided by local commanders with access to nuclear weapons, contrary to the intention of central political authorities. But there are much easier and more reliable unilateral measures for achieving the same purpose while avoiding the problems of subordinating what should properly be a matter of allied collaboration to agreement with the adversary.

At the same time, a denuclearized zone would weaken the security of the alliance by affecting the local conventional-nuclear balance adversely. Considering the dependence of NATO's forces on tactical nuclear weapons placed in West Germany, the denuclearization of West Germany would deprive the forward forces of the most immediate nuclear deterrent to non-nuclear military adventures. But more than the denuclearization of Germany would be involved. The United States would probably have to withdraw its nuclear forces from the Continent altogether because of the material difficulties of deploying them in other European countries and because of France's refusal to have nuclear weapons on its soil that are not under exclusive French control. Rightly or wrongly, these weapons have come to be regarded as a visible guarantee that the nuclear deterrent will come into force before Western territory is overrun. The Federal Republic is especially sensitive to this guarantee. In a sense, tactical nuclear weapons on German soil are the condition of Germany's acceptance of a strategy of flexible response, including a substantial capacity for conventional resistance. Their removal would be unacceptable except, perhaps, in the context of a thorough revision of the overall distribution of military power in a general disarmament treaty.

Furthermore, a denuclearized zone would constitute, in effect, an agreement with the Soviet Union to deny the FRG nuclear weapons. Although the Federal Republic of Germany has accepted special constraints in contract with its allies, it would oppose any such constraints in contract with the U.S.S.R. as essentially a device of U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation to freeze the whole status of Germany. For in German eyes a denuclearized zone, like almost any East-West agreement with respect to German arms, would presuppose an agreement with the Soviet Union to guarantee and perpetuate the political status quo—in other words, the division of Germany—lest a change in the status quo undermine the political basis of the arms agreement.

Are there compensatory measures in the terms of allied collaboration that might make a denuclearized zone more acceptable? German participation in a multilateral nuclear force outside the Continent, combined with a convincing strategy of off-shore tactical nuclear deterrence, might make a denuclearized zone acceptable on security grounds, especially if coupled with a more favorable conventional balance and effective safeguards against local surprise attack. A more convincing compensation for local nuclear disarmament would be commensurate disarmament of Soviet MRBM's that hold Europe hostage. Still, none of these security compensations seems likely to overcome the FRG's political objections to local arms agreement without the reunification of Germany. Germany might under some conditions, accept local military "thinning out" and nuclear restrictions as part of the terms of collaboration with the United States and other allies, but to embody such measures in a formal agreement with the Soviet Union is quite a different proposition.

Zonal agreements of more limited scope have been proposed to provide warning and assurance against surprise attacks in the center of Europe—for example, observation posts, inspection zones, and exchanges of local military information. Against tactical surprise attacks dependent on preparations in the zone of inspection, such measures might provide a small margin of warning and assurance, although one would have to weigh this advantage against the possible disadvantage of subjecting zonal forces to the constraints of publicity while Soviet forces outside the zone remained unencumbered. Instant communicati · facilities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, combined with mutual obligations to announce major military maneuvers, could provide some reassurance against local surprise attack and miscalculation. Nevertheless, by making the stabilization of the political-territorial status quo and aspects of the control of the forward forces in Germany subject to an agreement with the Soviet Union—and, therefore, also subject to Soviet claims, protests, and possibly interventions—these measures would incur some political liabilities. The same consideration applies to a reduction or limitation of conventional forces in a central European zone, which some consider a necessary concomitant of agreements for observation and exchange of information. Moreover, even so limited a measure as establishing East-West communications facilities might raise interallied controversies, as, for example, over what national or allied units should serve as communicator (Saceur, France, the United States) with the other

side. Nevertheless, given a sufficiently firm consensus in the alliance, the advantages of such local arms control measures, in terms of security and general political objectives associated with détente, might outweigh their political risks.

On the other hand, any regional disarmament that restricted or eliminated the U.S. military presence—whether nuclear or conventional—would affect the military balance. It would have the most immediate military and political repercussions, since the convincing projection of U.S. power to this area is the essence of deterrence in behalf of the European allies, and since U.S. forces in Germany have come to be regarded as the necessary guarantee of U.S. protection. Consequently, the repeated Soviet proposal to prohibit foreign bases—in effect, all foreign forces—in Europe would obviously threaten the security and cohesion of the alliance unless there were a radical decline of the latent Soviet military threat. Any serious consideration of such a proposal, therefore, must include, at least, reciprocal and equivalent Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe coupled with a regional military balance and effective guarantees to deter a Soviet return. In other words, the proposal to prohibit foreign bases properly belongs to the category of disengagement arrangements.

The disengagement of U.S. and U.S.S.R. forces from any zone in Europe, although it might seem to promise to redress a troublesome imbalance in regional conventional capabilities, would exert an unequal effect on the capacity of the two states to project their power in Europe. For the withdrawal of U.S. forces even from West Germany would make it very difficult, if not completely impractical, for the United States to keep effective forces on the Continent. Once off the Continent, it would be far more difficult for them to return than for Soviet forces to return to Eastern Europe from Russia.

Furthermore, the removal of foreign forces from the two Germanies without resolving the problem of reunification, while appearing to sanction the freezing of the status quo, would create an unstable situation replete with the danger of revolution and war to which neither the Soviet Union nor the United States could remain indifferent. In the absence of a stable arrangement for the reunification of Germany, the essential guarantee of stability in the center of Europe is the engagement, not the disengagement of Soviet and U.S. forces capable of controlling local disturbances. Putting it another way: as long as the Cold War persists, disengagement will be compatible with the security of the alliance only if accompanied by the reunification of Germany in a revised military and political environment that includes effective guarantees of the settlement. To be effective, such guarantees would have to be part of a European security treaty establishing under formal arms restrictions a new pattern of military power and commitments among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Eastern and Western European states.

Under these conditions, the withdrawal of foreign forces from a European zone would have a drastic impact on NATO. For one thing, the Soviet Union would not under any foreseeable pressure agree to the reunification of Germany unless Germany were also formally prohibited from participating in NATO. Probably, in addition, Germany would have to accept prohibitions against nuclear ownership and sharing and special restrictions on its conventional forces. Presumably, Germany's new status would be guaranteed by an international agreement including the United States and the Soviet Union. This agreement, however, would almost surely have to rest on a revision of the whole alliance system in Europe and the end of the political conflicts that created it.

It is hard to see how the Soviet Union and the United States could agree on disengagement with reunification unless the Soviets had convincingly abandoned all ambitions to control the center of Europe and were confident that Eastern Europe would be a secure buffer despite Soviet withdrawal, and unless both sides were confident that neither would seek special military ties to a reunified Germany or to states on the other side of Germany. In other words, reunification of Germany presupposes the end of the Cold War in Europe. In this situation, the guarantee of the disengagement agreement would be much more likely to rest on a major realignment of European commitments, based on new centers of military power and diplomatic activity, than on truncated Atlantic and Warsaw

alliances no longer dominated by the military presence of their superpowers. But this realignment, in turn, would be much more likely to be the precondition than the consequence of such an agreement, since the present configurations of power and interest seem incompatible with mutually acceptable disengagement.

One can only speculate about the nature of such an hypothetical realignment. Probably it would resemble the Concert of Europe following the Napoleonic wars, in that it would rest on the agreement of a group of states to preserve a particular European order rather than on a balance between two or more opposing coalitions. Its nucleus might be a new Little Entente between France and certain Eastern European states, or it might be an entente between a European coalition or federation on one side and the Soviet Union or an Eastern European coalition on the other. In either case, the United States and the Soviet Union might continue to extend guarantees to the respective centers of power on their side of Germany, and they might even be engaged in a bilateral agreement of their own. It seems quite unlikely, however, that the nucleus of realignment would be a U.S.-U.S.S.R. concert of power, since it is hard to believe that these states would have been willing or able to agree on reunification and disengagement if they intended to remain the dominant elements in a European order.

Whatever the pattern of realignment might be, it would be directed toward the containment as well as the protection of Germany. Yet Germany might not long remain a passive element in this setting. Rather, it might capitalize on its position to play an active diplomatic game between its rival guarantors. If a reunited Germany became aligned with one set of guarantors or the other, European alignments would return to something more like the present opposing alliances and less like a new Concert of Europe. In this event, however, the disengagement agreement would have to be abrogated or renegotiated, since its political-military foundation would have been undermined. U.S.S.R. and U.S. re-engagement would probably follow.

No matter what form realignment within the terms of a disengagement and reunification treaty might take, military commitments would at first be less organized than in NATO. But if a pattern of conflict crystallized again, something like the present NATO institutions might be expected to develop, since the technical requirements of military coordination and the necessity of consolidating allied cohesion to reinforce deterrence seem now to dictate a more formal structure of collaboration than traditional guarantee pacts have provided. On the other hand, after a comprehensive disengagement treaty, alignments might become more fluid, and alliances might disintegrate under the strain of adjusting to a novel international environment, especially if there were no polarizing threat. (If there were such a threat, the agreement would probably not last.)

In any case, realignment should be regarded as a process both preceding and following disengagement, not as something that could be frozen in a disengagement treaty. It follows that a disengagement treaty should permit plenty of legal opportunity for states to adjust their military commitments and armaments to this dynamic process. The attempt to freeze armaments completely while the configurations of power were altered by alignment and realignment—by the consolidation or disintegration of alliances—would be futile and destabilizing.

Nonregional Arms Control

As in the case of regional arms agreements, nonregional arms control agreements—that is, agreements affecting the military establishments of states regardless of their geographical deployment—range from restrictions that would scarcely affect the U.S.-U.S.S.R. military balance to restrictions that would radically revise the configurations of military power. Yet even at the lower end of the spectrum of general disarmament, the psychological and political repercussions might substantially affect the external and internal functions of NATO.

The lower end of the spectrum includes a wide variety of what may be narrowly designated as arms control measures; that is, measures that are intended to restrict the use

and the transfer of or access to weapons without restricting the testing, production, types, and quantities, or deployment of weapons and armed forces directly. Among these are measures designed to reduce the risk of inadvertent and unauthorized war or war by miscalculation of intentions (for example, the "hot line" and a proposed exchange of military observers) and measures designed to discourage or prevent the spread of nuclear forces to additional states (for example, pledges not to acquire or disseminate nuclear weapons).

Although arms control measures like these are intended only to stabilize the existing nuclear balance, not to create a new balance based on altered levels of military power, they could affect U.S.-allied relations no less than direct arms restrictions and reductions. Thus formal U.S.-U.S.S.R. arrangements to engage in special communications with each other during crises may imply to allies that the cardinal choices of war and peace that could determine their fate will be decided to their disadvantage by the superpowers. To some extent, however, this implication can be countered by extending organized consultation with allies or, possibly, by establishing a Saceur-Soviet line of emergency communication.

On the other hand, it would not be so easy to allay suspicions and mitigate divergencies of interests resulting from arms control measures intended to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. For treaties impinging on the control of nuclear weapons and the distribution of nuclear power would make one of the most delicate issues in allied relations a matter of East-West cooperation.

France, which aspires to be a politically potent nuclear power, must oppose any non-proliferation agreement—for example, one prohibiting nuclear assistance to France—that might militate against its nuclear effort. To France, such an agreement could only seem like a device to perpetuate U.S. preponderance in Europe in collusion with the Soviet Union. Although the nuclear effort of France receives little assistance from other states, it will want to remain free to receive more assistance in the future as political opportunities for nuclear collaboration may arise. Its price for accepting restrictions on its own force would probably include at least a substantial reduction of U.S. and U.S.S.R. nuclear delivery vehicles and a cessation of nuclear production. On the other hand, like all nuclear powers, France would favor agreements, for example, pledges by non-nuclear powers not to acquire nuclear weapons or receive nuclear assistance, designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other states while legitimizing its own nuclear force.

The West German government will be no less sensitive to non-proliferation proposals. Although the FRG has undertaken special nuclear prohibitions in the alliance, it will not favor pledges not to acquire or disseminate nuclear weapons that impose these or additional prohibitions as the result of agreements to which the Soviet Union and other nonallied states are signatories, unless, perhaps, they are part of a larger agreement envisaging reunification, and unless they follow satisfactory German participation in a jointly-controlled nuclear force. Such pledges would constitute, in effect, agreements to restrain German internal policies by cooperation between the two primary states on which reunification must depend. They would also give the Soviet Union a basis for claiming the right of surveillance over and intervention in German affairs.

Furthermore, non-proliferation agreements are likely to conflict with interallied commitments intended, in part, to serve the same purpose. The Soviet Union condemns as proliferation a broad, unspecified range of measures of nuclear assistance to and cooperation with non-nuclear powers. In particular, it opposes arrangements for joint nuclear management and control, like the MLF, regardless of their technical safeguards against independent national use. Indeed, Soviet opposition would seem to be equally applicable to the present two-key control arrangements on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The United States, on the other hand, defines nuclear proliferation narrowly as the extension to a non-nuclear state of the independent ownership of nuclear weapons and the independent decision to use them. The difference of definition, of course, reflects differences of national interest. The Soviet Union opposes any measure that might miti-

gate the problems of nuclear control in NATO and sees tactical advantages in exploiting the opposition of other allies to particular schemes of joint control. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. genuinely fears any measures that might give the FRG more influence over the control of nuclear weapons and that might conceivably lead to an independent German force by subsequent modification of control arrangements. The United States, however, cannot afford to outlaw methods of nuclear collaboration on which the cohesion of proud and independent allies may depend, especially when they may be the only practical alternative to the spread of independent nuclear forces among several of these allies.

For what it is worth, a simple agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons to independent national control, in the spirit of the so-called Irish UN Resolution, would seem to be the only non-proliferation pledge compatible with both U.S. and Soviet views in the foreseeable future. The Soviet Union presently opposes even this much as inferentially legitimizing other forms of nuclear sharing. But things might look different to the U.S.S.R. after an agreement for joint nuclear control were accomplished, especially if it then finds that pressure from its allies in Eastern Europe should make some ostensible form of joint nuclear management prudent.

Nonregional Limited Disarmament

Like limited arms control, arms freezes and limited reductions are apt to exert an impact on allied relations that exceeds the significance of their direct effect on the military balance. Principally, this is because the effects of an agreement on the security interests of allies are not identical and because the nature, distribution, and deployment of armed forces impinge on many other kinds of interest—prestige, independence, and political associations with allies. In all respects, the military posture of the United States is of central importance, but U.S. satisfaction with the level and distribution of military power in agreement with the Soviet Union will not necessarily satisfy all the European allies.

The significance of such divergencies of interest is magnified when essentially conjectural military requirements have to be fixed in a formal treaty. The reluctance of states to fix their military posture in a formal commitment is reinforced not only by the rapid rate of technological innovation and obsolescence throughout a great variety of interdependent weapons systems (particularly, of course, those not included in the arms agreement) but also by the prospect of political changes that will make a given configura- of power obsolete. Thus if postwar bipolarity seems to be giving way to new centers of power and decision and new alignments of interests, statesmen will want to be free to make concomitant adjustments in their military posture. Only if the arms agreement is based on a political agreement establishing a stable configuration of interests may this difficulty be mitigated.

National sensitivity to formal arms reductions is heightened by the great difficulty of changing the quantities of different types of weapons without changing the relative military capacities of states to support their vital interests or the vital interests of allies. Clearly, equal reductions of the same weapons, either by percentages or numbers, will have unequal effects on the relative power of almost any two states—and certainly in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union—since between competing signatories neither the quantity and quality of the same weapons nor the national requirements for those weapons are identical. Yet either asymmetical reductions in the same weapons or compensatory reductions in different kinds of weapons will be difficult to make with seeming equity. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that the existing military balance in Europe is quite asymmetrical. Thus the Soviet Union's superiority in conventional forces is somewhat balanced by the West's tactical nuclear weapons. The great number of Soviet MRBM's capable of devastating Western Europe is somewhat balanced by superior numbers of U.S. nuclear bombers, ICBM's, and sea-borne Polarises and by projected MLF missiles. The resolution of these complex disparities of power to the mutual satisfaction of the United States and the Soviet Union is difficult enough. Their resolution to the mutual satisfaction of the United States and its allies is complicated almost in

proportion to the number of trade-offs and other compromises the two superpowers must make, since two-power accommodations will tend to multiply the chances of discrepancies between U.S. and allied military interests.

Thus the Soviet Union, with fewer numbers of ICBM's than the United States, might expect disproportionate reductions in U.S. ICBM's and Polarises as the price of agreement; but to the European allies this accommodation might look like the purchase of U.S.-U.S.S.R. stability at the expense of even more marked European vulnerability to Soviet MRBM's. Furthermore, reductions of nuclear striking power would tend to increase the importance of the local non-nuclear imbalance. Yet it is difficult to equate conventional with strategic nuclear weapons by a formula that would achieve a mutually satisfactory exchange of disproportionate reductions in these two categories, especially since tactical nuclear weapons are also integrally related to the conventional balance.

Beyond a certain point, reductions of U.S. and U.S.S.R. conventional forces would compel the United States to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe, especially if military involvements outside Europe seemed demanding. Any significant reduction, let alone withdrawal, of these forces would tend to increase European dependence on nuclear weapons, since greater reliance on conventional defense would seem no more feasible or attractive to the allies under disarmament than now. In their view, this would probably enhance the importance of either significant participation with the United States in jointly controlled nuclear forces or management of nuclear weapons independent of U.S. control and ownership. Consequently, reductions of conventional and nuclear forces would raise serious questions within the Western alliance.

In this context of interallied politics, it is apparent that the treatment of jointly controlled or owned nuclear weapons in a disarmament treaty would raise delicate issues, since allies may be less willing than the United States to exchange for Soviet reductions weapons over which they have special influence, unless they are exchanged for weapons like the Soviet MRBM's, which are of special concern to them. They would be less willing if the reduction of the U.S. nuclear striking forces were sufficient to restrict the United States to a minimum countercity force (that is, a force capable only of striking an "unacceptable" number of cities on a second strike). Regardless of whether such reductions would affect the credibility of autonomous U.S. nuclear weapons as a deterrent to aggression in Europe, the reduction of U.S.-U.S.S.R. forces to minimum countercity forces would emphasize, in allied eyes, the liabilities of depending exclusively on U.S.-controlled deterrents. For if nuclear forces were nothing but minimum countercity forces, European allies would be more suspicious that the U.S. force would not respond equally to attacks on their cities and to attacks on U.S. cities, and they tend to be more apprehensive that the United States would not consider attacks on their territory worth the obliteration of U.S. cities. At the same time, a small nuclear force in the alliance—whether jointly or independently controlled by allies—would acquire a greater value relative to the U.S. nuclear force, since the reduction of U.S. and U.S.S.R. forces would lower the cost of a nuclear aspirant acquiring a relatively impressive force and provide great-power sanction for the only strategic justification of small nuclear forces.

The problem of how to deal with anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's) would also be a sensitive issue in the alliance in the event of nuclear disarmament, unless ABM's were completely prohibited. The Soviet Union, being militarily defensive-minded and conscious of its inferiority in nuclear striking power, takes the position that ABM's ought to be unrestricted even though offensive missiles and bombers are restricted or reduced. Conceivably, in such a partial freeze, ABM's could reduce offensive missile capacities sufficiently to destroy the credibility of a U.S. nuclear response by relieving the Soviet Union of the fear of intolerable devastation.

On the other hand, it seems quite unlikely that either side would permit such quantities of ABM's to be deployed without resuming the competition in offensive missiles. For that reason, it is possible that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would build or deploy enough ABM's to upset the balance between them. In that case, the chief effect of ABM's might be to discourage or provide protection against small nuclear forces

by making the cost of gaining a convincing countercity force prohibitive to any single state, even if that state were not a signatory to the offensive freeze agreement. But another effect would be to increase the relative vulnerability of Western European cities as compared to U.S. cities, to make them physically the only accessible and politically the most profitable Soviet targets. To offset the political effects of this differential, the United States would be under great pressure to give its allies equal ABM protection. On the other hand, if U.S. and U.S.S.R. ABM's were restricted at a certain level, the question of deploying ABM's to protect allied cities would be even more crucial politically.

A simple nuclear freeze on all kinds of weapons would raise less complicated but nevertheless troublesome questions of divergent military interests in the alliance. A U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement to freeze nuclear arms at roughly existing quantities in various categories presupposes mutual acceptance of the existing level and distribution of military power—or at least mutual preference for the existing level and distribution of military power over the anticipated results of continuing unrestricted competition. But such acceptance can hardly rest on one state's clear superiority; it must rest on an overall approximate parity in the ability of one state to fight and punish the other.

This means that the Soviet Union is not going to accept a freeze that leaves the United States with an impressive numerical superiority or with a sufficient technical superiority in striking power to support a significant counterforce capability that the Soviet Union lacks. A freeze may be mutually acceptable, however, if both powers have only a countercity capability and a little to spare. Yet a formal agreement based on mutual acceptance of this situation would tend to undermine whatever credibility a first-strike deterrent strategy against conventional aggression in Europe might otherwise have, if only because the U.S. government, having long ago lost confidence in a simple massive-retaliation strategy, would view things that way, and its views would be known.

Of course, this may be a situation that the United States will have to accept sooner or later without an arms agreement. (Since U.S. defense spokesmen anticipate extraordinary devastation, including over 100 million American lives, in a U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear exchange, the United States' will to initiate nuclear blows in any circumstance must be questionable.) Furthermore, at the high numerical level of nuclear vehicles that will exist at the time of a hypothetical freeze, the difference between a counterforce capability and a superfluous (as opposed to a minimum) countercity capability may not mean much in terms of damage limitation. Possibly of much greater political significance would be the effects of a nuclear freeze on the issue of nuclear ownership in the alliance.

Arms agreements tending to freeze existing configurations of nuclear power, whether by restrictions on delivery vehicles, nuclear tests, or nuclear production, would foreclose the emergence of a collective European center of power with its own nuclear weapons in accordance with the French vision of the future. France would accept such restrictions only if its nuclear force were much more nearly equal to the Soviet and U.S. forces; but that would be the case only if these two forces were greatly reduced. On the other hand, France would probably welcome such restrictions if it were not bound by them, since this would improve its chances of gaining a relatively impressive force.

Quite apart from the French approach to a nuclear freeze, there are other European states that have no national nuclear ambitions at present but that might also be interested in holding open the option of a European nuclear force that would not be merely a French force. In the long run, they might accept a nuclear freeze only in return for substantial participation in joint nuclear control, including the decision to use nuclear weapons.

In addition to effects like those suggested above, which might result from changes in the composition and distribution of military power as they impinged on different national conceptions of vital interests and military requirements, limited disarmament would affect allied relations simply by virtue of the climate of opinion it fostered. It should be recognized that democratic leaders who mobilized public support for disarmament would have compelling reasons to depreciate the significance of international tensions that might upset the agreement. Popular expectations would tend to reinforce this outlook, es-

pecially if limited disarmament were undertaken as a first stage toward general and complete disarmament. At present, in the absence of a formal agreement, the preservation and adjustment of military power are made in an almost routine fashion with public acceptance or indifference; but similar measures, no less necessary, for preserving the military balance within an arms agreement would present quite a different internal political and psychological problem.

In the political atmosphere of a major disarmament agreement it seems likely that allies with only a small military role and strong neutralist elements would be inclined to cut back their participation in NATO below what they might be legally entitled to and to become only nominal allies. Norway and Italy might be under great domestic pressure to withdraw from NATO as an organized military force contrary to the spirit of disarmament. Canada might increasingly regard the United Nations as a more appropriate substitute for NATO. Initially, the major allies would be vigilant against violations of the letter and spirit of the agreement; but as their confidence in the agreement increased, they might be less vigilant in keeping up their military establishments, including their military potential and research and development programs, within the permitted limits.

With a continuation of détente, there would be a tendency to view the disarmament agreement as a substitute for military alliance. In this atmosphere, there would be little but the most routine functions for NATO's military institutions to perform. Given existing tendencies in the alliance, the present institutions of NATO might stay intact, if only from inertia; but it would probably atrophy as a military organization if international tensions were moderate. The alliance would return to something like its original form of a guarantee pact unless, perhaps NATO had become so thoroughly integrated and institutionalized as to be regarded as a permanent adjunct of its members' foreign offices. Possibly some more specialized form of military collaboration, like an organization for joint nuclear control, could remain an active core of alliance; but no organization that lacked an active military role could serve the military and political functions of a security alliance.

In the atmosphere of protracted disarmament the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance would tend to erode, but this would not in itself lead to realignments. More likely, it would lead to de facto nonalignments. It is unlikely that new military alliances would arise except in response to new military threats, since there would be insufficient incentive for new military efforts and alignments and since signatories would be unable legally to change the configurations of power without violating or seeming to violate the terms of disarmament. On the other hand, if there were military threats sufficient to lead to new military alignments, there would probably be rearmaments as well. If new alliances were formed, it is hard to imagine a disarmament agreement, based on a different alignment of power, remaining intact.

Disarmament can neither freeze nor transform international politics. Given changes in the pattern of conflicting interests, it is quite improbable that adjustments of military power would take place only by realignment, as they often did in the eighteenth century before states had much capacity to expand their power by internal means. Given the irrevocable capacity of advanced states to increase their military strength by internal means, rearmament will recommend itself as a more effective method of adjusting power to changing interests than realignment. In fact, realignment would probably compel rearmament, just as it repeatedly led to war when war was a more normal recourse.

The likelihood and extent of realignment and the resulting instability of a disarmament agreement would depend, in part, on the tentativeness or fluidity of allied relations at the time the agreement was negotiated and put into effect. To the extent an alliance had become consolidated, institutionalized, and integrated, it might have sufficient cohesion and inertia to retain its form into the disarmed world and to adjust the relations of its members in response to a radically changed and changing environment. A confederation or federation would have an even better chance of keeping its internal structure intact. One crucial test of an organization's cohesion would be its capacity to develop a united disarmament policy before the negotiation of an agreement. In the Atlantic-Western European area such a policy would presuppose a common resolution of at least

two central related issues: the military and political organization of Europe and of Europe's relationship to the United States and the method and terms of the reunification of Germany.

General and Complete Disarmament

If general and complete disarmament (GCD) included an effective international military force to perform the external functions of national forces, it would theoretically eliminate the need for alliances altogether. GCD without such a force would still have a drastic effect on existing alliances and their function, since it would transform the configurations of power on which military cooperation could be based. Furthermore, realistically one must assume that the incentives for any kind of military alliance would also have changed radically, since states would not have agreed to GCD unless the present political environment had become one of relative harmony and stability. Yet unless international society were organized like a well-ordered state with a central government and a preponderant police force, one must also assume that the prospect of serious conflicts of national interest and the felt need to prepare for war in order to support national interests would persist even in the environment of GCD. Consequently, there would still be need for alliances—all the more so, perhaps, because the other principal nonviolent instrument of accommodating power to changing patterns of conflicting interests, armaments, would be severely restricted.

This conjecture presumes, of course, that armed coercion, however severely restricted, would still be an indispensable instrument of international politics, since otherwise there would be no substance for military commitments. The reason for this presumption is that even GCD would not eliminate the capacity of states to coerce or threaten to coerce each other with armed force. This capacity would be composed of internal security forces not needed for domestic order, paramilitary forces, civilian technology with military uses, and rearmament potential. In the Atlantic-Western Europe area rearmament potential would probably be the most important element of military power, with the threat of rearmament serving a deterrent function analogous to the function of nuclear weapons in the armed world.

Clearly, if these were the principal instruments of military power, GCD would severely diminish the capacity of states to project their power openly and directly beyond their borders for either offensive or defensive purposes. Consequently, the distance between potential adversaries and their friends would acquire a new military significance. This would mean that the United States would regain its historic invulnerability to direct attack. Yet its global interests would be unlikely to contract proportionately, since the speed of communication, the far-flung material interests, the countless economic and diplomatic associations among nations, and the habit of looking at international relations as a world system of increasingly interdependent states would continue to govern the outlook of great nations; and since the United States, by virtue of its immense material wealth and military potential and its habitual concern with world order, would remain a central participant in this system.

Consequently, the maintenance of international order in a disarmed world would not rest on the isolation of the United States and other major states from each other but on their consciousness of a tentative, rather fragile new order dependent on mutual restraint—an order which, if violated by rearmament, aggression, or war, might suddenly become exceedingly volatile and dangerous. An indispensable instrument of this mutual restraint would continue to be the ability of potential adversaries to oppose each other with armed forces.

In the unfamiliar world of GCD, the security and harmony of Western Europe would remain a vital U.S. interest. Yet the conditions of securing that interest would be radically different. There would be no U.S. forces in Europe and no NATO military superstructure. The United States could do no more than extend a guarantee to European states, and this guarantee could not quickly be carried out. The security of Western

European states against threats from the East or threats within Western Europe itself would depend principally on their own resources. Yet the major states would be no more likely to feel militarily self-sufficient in the disarmed environment than at the present. Consequently, they would combine their security resources—principally, their rearmament potentials—through mutual defense commitments, in accordance with their historic traditions and demonstrated capacity to form alliances.

The commitments, however, would not take the form of an organized alliance resembling NATO, since there would be no external forces in-being to manage, coordinate, and integrate. At most, military commitments would entail the coordination of contingency plans for rearmament, for the military use of civilian transportation and other technology, and for emergency employment of internal security forces. If there were remnants of NATO, they would operate only as instruments of regular political consultation, perhaps the peaceful settlement of disputes, and common surveillance of disarmament. Only confederations and federations might continue to perform coordinated military functions like central contingency planning for rearmament and the maintenance and deployment of internal security forces.

In the absence of a Western European or an Atlantic federation, what would be the pattern of alliances in a disarmed world? Initially, perhaps, a number of European states, not excluding Eastern European states, would form something like the OAS (without its collective military functions), organized according to the principle of collective security. In other words, a group of states would be committed to combine against aggression by any one of them as well as against the possibility of a hostile power or combination of powers outside the group. The unifying interest at the core of this kind of alliance would be not only opposition to armed aggression, but preservation of the terms of the disarmament agreement.

Yet even within this generalized alliance one would expect special economic, political, and security interests to lead to special military guarantees and forms of cooperation between states capable of supporting each other. Within a decade after disarmament, further refinements of national interest would probably lead to a more fragmented system of military commitments. One may reasonably assume that the preservation of the disarmed world order would remain a compelling common interest. Nevertheless, autonomous states would have other and more immediate interests as well; and some of these interests would take precedence over an abstract interest in world order, just as they do now. In any case, nations would not be willing to entrust the protection of these interests to a general pledge of all for one and one for all. That presupposes a transformation of the prevailing international system of autonomous states.

It is highly implausible that the special security alignments arising in the international environment of GCD would so finely balance each other and that the inhibitions against arming or using arms would be so compelling that adjustments of power to changing configurations of interest would take place without rearmament. On the other hand, the very agreement of states to abolish their external forces presupposes such a radical alteration of motives and outlooks in international politics as to make a stable order of countervailing alignments among the advanced states conceivable. It is at least a logical fancy.

2. EASTERN EUROPE AND THE WARSAW PACT

by

Gene D. Overstreet

I. The Warsaw Treaty Organization

- Origins of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
- Formal Provisions of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
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2. EASTERN EUROPE AND THE WARSAW PACT

Gene D. Overstreet

I. The Warsaw Pact

Origins of the Warsaw Treaty Organization

Public mention of a multilateral alliance embracing the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was first made at the Moscow Conference called by the Soviet Union in November and December 1954. The conference was a response to the pending Paris Agreements which projected the inclusion of West Germany in a Western European Union with a joint military force, and to the refusal of the Atlantic allies to cooperate in Soviet schemes for an all-European Security arrangement. It was attended by the Eastern European allies of the Soviet Union with China represented as an observer. The Western European powers and the United States declined the invitation to attend. The participating countries issued a declaration warning that the Paris Agreements would jeopardize the peaceful settlement of the German question, result in the creation of rival military blocs in Europe, and precipitate a full-fledged arms race; and that should they be ratified, the communist countries would be forced to adopt appropriate measures to coordinate their armed forces and command.1/

The treaty itself, signed in Warsaw, May 14, 1955, was advertised as a necessary security measure, forced on the communist bloc by Western intransigence, which would be dissolved gladly if a "General European Treaty of Collective Security" could be agreed upon. Article 11 of the treaty incorporates this promise.

The treaty performed important functions in addition to this diplomatic tit for tat. First, it legitimized the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and East Germany. The Austrian State Treaty, signed May 13, 1955, nullified the legal basis for the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania. Similarly, recognition of East Germany as an independent sovereign state required that new legal justification be given for the presence of Soviet troops in the former occupation zone, and for the existence of the East German army. With the signing of the Warsaw Pact, East Germany was formally incorporated into the socialist camp.2/

The signing of the treaty was followed by a joint communique announcing the establishment of a unified command for the Joint Forces of the signatory powers. This joint command, which makes possible immediate and coordinated implementation of the assistance provisions of the treaty, is what distinguishes the Warsaw Treaty Organization from the bilateral treaties of "Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" which

1/ Declaration of the Governments of the USSR, the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the People's Republic of Albania, New Times, No. 49, Dec. 4, 1954, Supplement pp. 66-72.

2/ Kazimierz Grzybowski, The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations: Organizations and Institutions (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 176-78.

already bound the satellite countries to each other and to the Soviet Union. 3/ The provision for joint command is significant for two reasons. First, as will be discussed later, the practical consequence of the implementation of this provision is direct control by the Soviet Ministry of Defense over the Eastern European armies. Second, the Joint Command was established by a communiqué subsequent to and not a formal part of the Warsaw Treaty itself; thus, the Joint Command structure could outlive the treaty. This conclusion is interesting in light of a remark by Bulganin in a speech in Warsaw in May 1955, indicating that even if the Warsaw Pact should dissolve on ratification of a European Collective Security Treaty, the bilateral arrangements, presumably supplemented by the joint command, would remain in effect. 4/

Formal Provisions of the Warsaw Treaty Organization

The legal framework of the WTO consists of the treaty, the communiqué establishing the joint command and the Status of Forces agreements subsequently signed with Rumania, Poland, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic.

3/ The following bilateral treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance are in force between the Soviet Union and: Czechoslovakia, Dec. 12, 1943; Poland, April 21, 1945; Rumania, Feb. 4, 1948; Hungary, Feb. 18, 1948; Bulgaria, March 18, 1948; East Germany, June 12, 1964. The satellites are linked to each other by similar treaties: Czechoslovakia and Poland, March 10, 1947; Albania and Bulgaria, Dec. 16, 1947; Bulgaria and Rumania, Jan. 16, 1948; Hungary and Rumania, Jan. 24, 1948; Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, April 23, 1948; Bulgaria and Poland, May 29, 1948; Hungary and Poland, June 18, 1948; Bulgaria and Hungary, July 16, 1948; Czechoslovakia and Rumania, July 21, 1948, and Poland and Rumania, Jan. 26, 1948.

The treaties concluded with the northern countries have as a causus foedoris an attempt by Germany to renew its "aggressive policy" and resultant involvement of the Soviet Union or a satellite in "armed conflict." They call for the joint use of all means at the disposal of the parties to eliminate every possible "threat" of aggression by Germany or any country allied with it. (The treaties concluded before the end of the war refer to countries allied with Germany "in a war." The treaties concluded after the end of the war refer to countries allied with Germany in any way in an "aggressive policy.")

Justification for action under the treaties is article 53 of the U.S. Charter, which permits action against a former enemy without authorization by the Security Council.

The treaties concluded with the Balkan and Danubian states before the expulsion of Tito have as a causus foedoris an attack by any third power which threatens the independence of the victim state, or threatens to enslave it, or to sever part of its territory. These treaties were based on article 51 of the Charter.

The treaties are valid for twenty years and are automatically renewed for succeeding five-year periods unless one party indicates a desire to terminate.

The treaty with Finland signed April 6, 1948, calls for joint action against Germany and any third power allied with it. Finland is obliged only to exercise self-defense. The parties must consult to determine whether an attack that would invoke the treaty has in fact occurred or is likely to occur, and to determine whether Finland wants Soviet assistance. Finland is not obliged to come to the defense of the Soviet Union if its own territory is not violated. See: Aleksander Rudinski, "Two Types of Alliances inside the Soviet Bloc", MidEuropean Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, Inc., also: W. W. Kulski, "The Soviet System of Collective Security Compared with the Western System", Am. J. Intern. Law (July 1950), pp. 453-76.

4/ Martynas Brakas, "Legal Status of Soviet Troops in Central and Eastern Europe", East-Central European Papers, No. 3 (February 1960), p. 11.

The Treaty. That the Warsaw Pact was conceived mainly as a political tool is apparent from the text of the treaty. For purposes of interbloc politics, the signatories attest their willingness to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes and to work for disarmament and the conclusion of a treaty of European collective security. The signatories claim to have created a treaty corresponding to the requirements of article 51 of the UN Charter; that is (as distinct from NATO, a truly regional defense arrangement based on the exercise of individual or collective defense in Europe alone, and open to any state that desires to join and pledges to abide by its provisions.

For purposes of political cohesion in the communist bloc, the contracting parties foresake all other "coalitions, or alliances . . . (or) agreements whose objects conflict with the object of the treaty." (Art. 7) In addition, they agree to consult with one another "on all important issues affecting their common interests" and in case "a threat of armed attack on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty has arisen." (Art. 3) A Political Consultative Committee consisting of representatives from all contracting parties was created to provide a vehicle for these consultations.

The causus foederis of the treaty is an "armed attack in Europe" on one or more parties to the treaty by "any state or group of states." The contracting parties are obliged to come to the assistance of the victim with all means deemed necessary by them, including armed force.

The Joint Command. The Joint Command of the WTO consists of a Commander-in-Chief who is a high-ranking officer of the Soviet Union 5/ and Deputy Commanders-in-Chief who are the Defense Ministers, or other high-ranking officers from the Eastern European partners. The responsibility of the deputies is command over the armed forces assigned by their governments to the Joint Armed Forces. The staff of the Joint Armed Forces, under the Commander-in-Chief, includes members of the General Staffs of all the signatories, and is located in Moscow. 6/ General of the Soviet Army P.I. Batov has been Chief-of-Staff since October 1962.

The communiqué establishing the Joint Command mentions further agreements to be concluded by member states as to the "disposition of the Joint Armed Forces" on the territories of the member states in accordance with the requirements of mutual defense. As far as is known, no agreements of this kind have been made. Instead, bilateral Status of Forces agreements have been signed by the Soviet Union and the countries on whose territories its troops are stationed.

The Status of Forces Agreements. The Soviet Declaration of October 30, 1956 contained an offer to reexamine the hitherto unrestricted freedom of movement of Soviet troops on satellite territory. 7/ Agreements establishing the legal status of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of Warsaw Pact states were then concluded with Poland on December 17, 1956; with the German Democratic Republic on March 13, 1957; with Rumania on April 15, 1957; and with Hungary on May 27, 1957.

The Polish and Hungarian agreements place significant restrictions on the movement

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5/ Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev was the first Commander-in-Chief. He was replaced in July 1960 by Marshal A. A. Grechko.

6/ As of December 1960, Poland had no official mission responsible to Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow. (Otto Pick, "Armies in Eastern Europe", The World Today (December 1960), pp. 541-42.)

7/ "With a view to establishing the mutual security of the socialist countries, the Soviet Government is ready to examine, with other parties to the Warsaw Pact, the question of Soviet troops stationed in the territory of those countries. In this, the Soviet government proceeds from the principle that the stationing of troops of one state, which is a party to the Warsaw Pact, on the territory of another member state should take place on the basis of agreement among all the Pact's participants in addition to the agreement of the state on whose territory those troops are stationed or are planned to be stationed at its request." Pravda, Oct. 31, 1956.

of Soviet forces, on Soviet control and use of military and civilian facilities, and on the judicial accountability of Soviet personnel.

The agreement with the German Democratic Republic, on the other hand, does not contain provisions regulating the movement of Soviet troops, and does require the host government to guarantee the use of military installations and facilities and transportation and communication media. It also permits the Soviet General Command to take necessary measures (in consultation with the government of the German Democratic Republic and in accordance wit.. measures adopted by it) should a threat to the security of Soviet forces arise.

Implementation of the Warsaw Treaty

Over the years, the implementation of the Warsaw Treaty has been at most incomplete and unrealistic in view of its stated aim to provide joint regional defense. National troops, as far as is known, have not been effectively integrated so as to form "Joint Armed Forces." Joint training of officers from different Eastern European armies has been avoided, as had been, until 1961, joint employment of national forces except in certain combinations. 8/ The three existing agreements on stationing of troops are bilateral and apply only to Soviet troops, not those of the other participants, and it is unclear whether the placement of Soviet troops on allied territory was "on the basis of agreement among all the Pact's participants" as called for by the October 31, 1956 statement.

In the absence of integrated training and maneuvers, standardization of organization and equipment results in a certain degree of coordination. By 1954, the Eastern European armies had been reorganized on the Soviet model down to the platoon level. Uniform supplies, equipment, manuals, and publications were in use in all the armies. Parallel security organizations and political officer corps on the Soviet model had been assimilated into the forces.

A centralized command structure, controlled primarily by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, makes possible coordinated planning and training. The nucleus of the non-Soviet officer corps consists of soldiers who were trained in the Soviet Union as old Comintern fighters, or as defectors and prisoners during the war. The younger generation of officers trained specifically for Warsaw Pact leadership forms the largest, but least experienced, group. Professional Soviet military advisors are attached to the Eastern European forces, especially in countries where no Soviet troops are stationed. These Soviet officers are concentrated at the highest levels of responsibility. 9/ They frequently adopt the nationality of their host country. It was reported, for example, that after the announced withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania, unusually large numbers of people with Russian names became naturalized Rumanian citizens. 10/

The original command structure included a staff of Soviet officers located in Moscow who coordinated the advisors in the field. Now, presumably, orders are transferred by the permanent Eastern European representatives to the Joint Command and General Staff in Moscow.

The Political Consultative provision of the Warsaw Treaty has not been fully implemented either. The committee is supposed to have authority to discuss: (1) "all important issues affecting the common interest" of the signatories (Art. 3); (2) threat of armed attack on one or several signatories (Art. 3); (3) joint action in the defense of one or more members that have suffered armed attack (Art. 4). These provisions suggest that the committee should be formulating common policies or planning for joint defense measures when, in actuality, it has so far merely echoed Soviet foreign policy and accepted the defense policy sponsored and carried out by the Soviet Union.

8/ Hans Von Krannhals, "Command Integration in the Warsaw Pact", Military Review (May 1961), pp. 46-47.
9/ Ibid., pp. 48-49.
10/ Brakas, op.cit., p. 9.

The Consultative Committee has not met twice annually as originally specified. It has been suggested that Khrushchev was reluctant to make use of the committee lest it develop into a truly consultative body, or that Poland was opposed to the meetings. 11/ Two subsidiary organs provided for in the treaty, a Joint Secretariat and a Permanent Commission to discuss foreign policy questions, have not, as far as is known, been activated. 12/

The Role of The Warsaw Treaty Organization in Soviet Strategy

Since its creation as an essentially paper and political organization in 1955, the Warsaw Treaty Organization has gone through several stages of development and seems now to be a more valuable tool for Soviet military strategy and intrabloc political stability than was originally envisaged by its planners.

The timing and circumstances of its founding in 1955 clearly show that the original purposes of the pact were political. A socialist bloc alliance comparable to NATO was to give the bloc bargaining power at a time when the Western allies were building a strategy dependent on West German rearmament and close alignment with the West. The Warsaw Pact, in turn, linked East Germany to the security plans of the Eastern camp and gave the socialist allies, already bound together by bilateral defense arrangements, one voice with which to bargain with NATO. The arrangements of the pact also provided a legal framework for the presence on Eastern European territory of Soviet troops whose function would be to preserve communist regimes favorable to Moscow and the unity of the camp, in addition to providing front line—buffer zone defense for the Soviet Union.

A turning point occurred in bloc relations on many levels, not the least significant of which was the military. The brutal suppression by Soviet troops of the rebellion in Hungary, which has been the only, if disputable, invocation of the pact, dirtied the image of Soviet garrisons in Eastern Europe and led the Kremlin to reconsider their legal basis. The blatant control function of the Soviet armed forces was diminished, or shrouded, as were Soviet economic exploitation and political domination, in line with de-Stalinization of intrabloc affairs. Soviet military officers retained positions of influence in satellite military affairs—even in Poland, which received the greatest concessions in mass withdrawals of Soviet officers from the Polish Army and in its status of forces agreement—but withdrew from public prominence.

After the successful launching of the sputnik in 1957 and the succeeding clamor over the missile gap in the United States, Soviet strategy leaned increasingly toward a minimum deterrence posture with greater reliance placed on missile and rocket defenses. Modern technology and the prospect of intercontinental warfare seemed to make the value of an Eastern European buffer zone less important. The questionable reliability of Eastern European armed forces, dramatically illustrated by Hungarian troops in 1956 and large-scale defections from East German armed forces, seemed to point further toward the expendability of Eastern European forces. A series of large-scale troop reductions in the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, including the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Rumania, took place during the late 1950's. 13/

11/ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Organization of the Communist Camp", World Politics (January 1961), p. 177.

12/ Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 315.

13/ In 1958 the Soviet Union reduced its troops by 41,000 men in the GDR and by 17,000 men in Hungary (N.S. Khrushchev, "On Certain Questions of the International Situation", speech at a conference of Byelorussian agricultural personnel, Pravda, Jan. 26, 1958). Soviet troops were removed from Rumania in 1959. The Eastern European members of the Pact reduced their troops by a total of 337,000 between 1955 and 1957, (N.S. Khrushchev, speech at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, Pravda, May 27, 1958) and the GDR announced a further reduction of 90,000 in 1960 (Communiqué of a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, Pravda, Feb. 5, 1960).

Since the late 1950's, however, in the shadow of a debate within the Soviet Union over strategic planning and forces allocation (between a Khrushchev faction, which favored reliance on a minimum deterrence posture, and professional military officials, who preferred a traditional, balanced forces strategy) increased attention has been given to the coalition aspects of Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategy. The East European armies have been maintained at high levels of strength and considerable investment has been made in their modernization. Communist bloc mobilization in response to the Berlin crisis in 1961, and again during the Cuban crisis in 1962, was announced by the Joint Command and was said to include all the Joint Armed Forces. Large-scale maneuvers of all the pact's forces, except Bulgarian, took place in 1962. Public statements by Soviet and Eastern European officers about the unquestionable capability, preparedness, and unity of spirit of the Joint Armed Forces have become more frequent.

The role the Warsaw Pact forces play in military strategy is unclear, and may be under debate in the Soviet Ministry of Defense. The editors of Military Strategy 14/ have pointed out the need to develop an overall strategic plan for joint operations in event of war. This suggests that there has not been, until now, such a plan. The Sokolovskii volume emphasizes that to repel attack and destroy aggressive plans on the part of the imperialists:

> It is obviously essential to unify the political, economic and military forces of all the socialist countries, to organize mutual support and to mobilize all their economic, human and military resources, to establish a single military, political and strategic plan for the entire war and for its particular stages, and to achieve complete unity in the leadership of the combined armed forces 15/

The editors go on to present a possible command organization to be used under combat conditions. The highest agency for political coordination would be the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Pact. The highest military authority would be assigned to the Supreme High Command of the Soviet Armed Forces, with representation from the Supreme High Commands of the allies. In some theaters, operational units might be under the local high command, but their activities would be guided by an overall strategic plan.

The functions assigned to the Joint Armed Forces during wartime would presumably be those of mopping up after an initial Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe, or even fighting a war limited in objectives and weaponry, which the Soviets anticipate might be started by German aggression, or by accident. If the Soviet Union really expects 16/ that such a war could be limited in weaponry and area, combat ready Eastern European troops, equipped only to fight a conventional war, would be vital to stall a West German advance, at least until Soviet reinforcements arrived.

Increased attention to the conventional ground and armored forces of the Warsaw Pact may be related to the strategy debate. The "traditionalists" who favor a balanced forces posture may argue that Socialist bloc superiority lies here rather than in strategic delivery systems.

In peacetime, the structure of the alliance gives the Soviet Union access to areas for maneuver, logistics planning, transporation facilities, etc. Eastern European industry, especially in Czechoslovakia and Poland, and to a certain extent in East Germany and Rumania, contributes air power to the joint defense posture. Poland and Czechoslovakia produce much of their own arms including tanks, guns, antiaircraft weapons and ex-

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14/ Herbert Dinerstein, Leon Gouré, Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Military Strategy, ed. by Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii, the Rand Corporation Translation (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963).

15/ Ibid., p. 495.

16/ Ibid., p. 396. Wlodzimierz Onacewicz, "Soviet Military Strategy in Brief" in Soviet Materials on Military Strategy: Inventory and Analysis, ed. by W. Onacewicz and R.D. Crane (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, 1964), pp. 21-22.

plosives. 17/ Improved rail and road and water transportation under the direction of COMECON has military as well as economic significance.

Despite the apparent increase in attention to the military preparedness of the pact, its role as a cohesive agent in a time of turbulence in intrabloc affairs may still be its most important contribution. In the early years, the presence of Soviet garrisons on satellite territory had a strong repressive effect on the regimes and populations in East Europe. After 1956 and the new look in socialist interstate relations, it seems unlikely that policy differences and dissatisfactions will be either expressed, or settled by force as in Hungary. Yet the presence of Soviet troops is still a reminder of the Cold War and of an obligation to mutual allegiance and mutual defense. The control function of Soviet troops is illustrated by the reaction in Rumania to their withdrawal. Bucharest subsequently launched an extensive de-Russification campaign, stepped up its opposition to COMECON policies, increased its ties with the West, and proclaimed its neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. It is significant that Rumania could do this despite its proximity to the Soviet Union, but it is also significant that Rumania is not directly threatened by Germany, or by internal instability. The alliance commitment and Soviet military presence contribute to regional as well as domestic stability insofar as they help relieve bloc members of concern with potential intrabloc conflicts. Poland, for example, does not worry about East German "revanchism."

A discussion of the control function of armed forces in the communist camp would be incomplete without mention of the paramilitary organizations which supplement the regular armed forces. Militarized security police, and border guards are two elements; other components perform paramilitary training and civil defense functions. Depending on their special training, some paramilitary units constitute a ready reserve from which to draw replacements or additional forces for the regular military. 18/ Along with the regular military, they are a symbolic and practical representation of communist authority.

Joint maneuvers, joint planning, and public references to the collective might of the Warsaw Pact forces may have as much to do with a Soviet desire to exploit the psychological value of the Warsaw Pact as they have to do with improving its operational aspects. As a commitment to collective defense, the Warsaw Treaty may form the strongest remaining bond between the European socialist states at a time when the strength of ideological and economic ties is dissipating, and when the Soviet Union is being criticized by China for letting the bloc fall apart. If this is so, retention of the formal structure of the alliance may be considered vital by the Soviet Union at least until firm, interlocking interstate ties fill the gaps left by waning ideological convictions and economic commitments.

The distorted and officially encouraged fear of German aggression and general suspicion about the motives of imperialist states, bolster the strength of the alliance. Like

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17/ "The Military Establishments", East Europe (May 1958), pp. 6-7.

18/ Paramilitary forces are recruited from the labor force and party membership. Organized like the military, they are subordinate to either the Ministry of Interior or the Communist Party and are trained to perform domestic duties rather than to fight a war. The varieties of paramilitary police includes: (1) A part-time militia composed of trusted workers led by career officers. Their training included the study of communications, antiaircraft and infantry drills, engineering and auto repair, etc. Their primary duty is to quell internal rebellions. (2) Full-time militias composed primarily of regular police forces. They are trained in the use of machine guns and mortars and are also expected to oppose insurrections. (3) Frontier guards which halt the flow of people to and from the West. (4) Military security forces that are the only uniformed and the most disciplined and trustworthy shock forces to be used during emergencies. (5) The secret police which functions in all the military and paramilitary organizations as agents of the Ministry of Interior and the C.P. to counter espionage and to weed out undesirables. (see "The Military Establishments", East Europe (April and May 1958).

Although the military alliance is the strongest commitment to unity, it is only one bond joining the Eastern European states with one another and with the Soviet Union. The most obvious and pervasive link, the strength of which is becoming more difficult to assess, is the Communist party apparatus. In protecting its position of authority in each individual state, the Communist party has an interest in the domestic and foreign policies pursued by its neighbors.

The interaction between regimes, which was once thought to represent a chain of command descending from Moscow through the Eastern European capitals, has become more complex in recent years and does not always foster cohesion. The exercise of influence over the bloc by the Soviet Union does not maintain unity as it once did, but, in some cases, aggravates divisive tendencies. The less stable regimes, in need of support from the Kremlin, bind the Soviet Union closer to the region in the role of a conservative force. At the same time, more stable and dynamic regimes object to Soviet interference and present a threat to unstable regimes by setting a liberal example. The authority of party ties and ideological commitments does not any longer provide a sure guarantee of regional cohesion.

Instead, the most effective and promising instruments of regional cooperation seem to be functional organizations and technical commissions. The histories of regional organizations, like COMECON or the Danube Commission, have not been unblemished by unsolved problems and significant obstacles, but their development seems to indicate the emergence of new forms of interstate cooperation less encumbered by the demands of orthodoxy and political submission that characterized bloc relations in earlier years.

The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance

The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, like the Warsaw Pact, was founded in response to a Western initiative—the Marshall Plan. The original aim of COMECON was to isolate the young socialist economies from the West and "to coordinate their economic plans, establish a joint investment program, begin joint production programs. . . from the point of view of setting up a division of productive forces according to the requirements of each country and its historical conditions." 21/

Between 1949 and 1954, the council was essentially inactive, dealing only with the problem of increasing intrabloc trade. By 1954, the bloc looked to COMECON to relieve shortages of raw materials made acute by disproportionate autarkic development. At meetings between 1954 and 1956, the Council decided to coordinate the new five-year plans and to establish Permanent Technical Commissions that would coordinate specialized production. 22/

21/ "Integrating the Satellites—The Role of COMECON", East Europe (November 1959) p. 4.

22/ The Permanent Technical Commissions with representatives from each participant have their headquarters in the capitals of the member states. Founded in 1956 were the Commissions on Agriculture in Sophia; Electric Power, Geology, Timber and Wood Processing, Foreign Trade, and Ferrous Metals in Moscow; Coal and Transportation in Warsaw; Machinery in Prague; Petroleum and gas in Bucharest; Nonferrous metals in Budapest; and Construction in East Berlin. In 1958, Commissions were founded in Food and Consumer's Goods and General Economics in Prague; Coordination and Delivery of Plants in Moscow. In 1960, a Commission on Nuclear Power was founded in Moscow, and in 1962, a Commission on Currency and Financial Questions in Moscow.

After economic and political discontent erupted into violence in 1956, the Soviet Union must have looked to COMECON to solve several growing problems. Economic integration and interdependence could counter impending political and ideological disruption of the bloc. Serious economic reforms, making use of specialization and economies of scale, could help make Eastern Europe economically and politically content. Increases in the quantity and quali · of production in Eastern Europe could relieve the burden of aid to the area and even supplement the resources available for Soviet aid programs in less-developed free-world countries.

Subsequent COMECON sessions dealt with proposals for a 15-year plan for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for more efficient use of raw materials and power resources and for further specialization of production. Finally, in 1958, the members adopted a working charter and a "Convention on the Competence, Privileges and Immunities" of the council. The charter recorded the aims of COMECON: "To continue to develop economic, social, and technical cooperation on the basis of consistent implementation of the international socialist division of labor in the interests of building socialism and communism, and of maintaining a lasting world peace." The convention "provides all the necessary conditions to assure the representatives of the council's member states independence and maximum opportunities in performing their functions in the council and its agencies." 23/

The structure of the council has tended to frustrate Soviet attempts to guide the organization, but also to inhibit regional growth. The council operates on the unanimity principle and has authority only to make recommendations, which must be ratified by each member before they become binding. The Permanent Secretariat, whose chairman, a Soviet citizen, is the "leading person in the council" and the Conference of Deputy Representatives, which conducts the technical and administrative business of COMECON, both reside in Moscow, and both have limited authority to make executive decisions.

In 1962, Khrushchev, in an attempt to inject new strength into the organization, proposed a Joint Planning Authority that would plan coordinated industrial development, investment plans, and joint projects. The Eastern European members balked, offered to consider a more powerful executive body, but not a supranational planning authority.

The executive committee was formed in July 1962. It has the authority to take practical steps toward the implementation of measures accepted by the council or one of the Permanent Technical Commissions. The committee, which consists of the highest level representatives from the member countries, has decision-making power, so it promises to be a more effective and productive center of authority than the council has been. It met three times in the latter half of 1962 and considered recommendations made by the Permanent Commissions and questions of regional finance and development. The council, having lost some of its executive functions, will become increasingly important as an administrative and supervisory body, coordinating the activities of the Permanent Commissions and other regional bodies, not originally part of COMECON, for example, the Danube Commission and the International Railroad Administration.

Of the joint projects sponsored by COMECON, the two with the most far-reaching consequences for multilateral cooperation and interdependence—and for military preparations and operations—are the oil pipeline and joint power grid, which link several of the Eastern European countries to the Soviet Union. The oil pipeline, which was completed in 1961, extends from Byelorussia through Poland into the German Democratic Republic. The southern branch empties into Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Each participant was responsible for the construction of its own section of the pipeline and now retains full ownership.

The power grid plan calls for linking the power systems of the German Democratic Republic with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; the Rumanian system with Czecho-

23/ Ptichkin, N. "Twelfth Session of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance", Vneshnaya Torgovlya (February 1960). Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XII, No. 21, pp. 7-8.

slovakia; the Hungarian system with the Western Ukraine; and the Polish system with the Kaliningrad district of the Soviet Union. Bulgaria may eventually be incorporated in the system by a link with Rumania. By 1960, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania and the German Democratic Republic had embarked on several joint projects designed to create new power supplies by using their own resources.

Another significant regional project, inspired by Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, is Intermetal, which began functioning in January 1965. All the European members of the bloc, including the Soviet Union, except Rumania have joined the organization, which aims to increase regional production of steel and steel products by fostering specialization. Austria, whose steel industries have already helped supply the bloc with metallurgical installations, has expressed an interest in being included in Intermetal's plans.

Regional Organizations

In addition to COMECON, several specialized regional agencies form vehicles for limited, but significant regional collaboration on technical matters. The work of the Danube Commission is illustrative of cooperative regional efforts to cope with mutual problems—in this case, a shortage of transportation facilities.

The commission, created by a convention signed in Belgrade in August 1949 was used in its early years to ostracize Yugoslavia, to prevent countries not members of the bloc from using the river, and to protect the sovereign rights of the riparian states. Since 1953, however, cooperation between the member states in technical and economic matters has increased. Shipping organizations of the member states have concluded a variety of agreements setting general conditions for the transport of goods in international commerce, uniform tariffs, and use of port facilities.

Each of the riparian states is responsible for enforcing regulations and maintaining and improving navigation. Special bilateral administrations were set up at the Maritime section, and the Iron Gates section and a third is planned for the Upper Danube, where Hungary and Czechoslovakia have a common frontier. In 1964, the first major bilateral construction project in the Balkans was inaugurated by Tito and Gheorghiu-Dej at the Iron Gates section. By 1971, Yugoslavia and Rumania plan to complete a $400 million navigation channel, bridge, and hydroelectric station. Rumania has approached Austria to participate in the project by helping to finance that part which has to do with the modernization of river traffic. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have been asked to assist in the project by providing equipment and supplies.

In 1953, reconciliation with Yugoslavia was necessary because of its position on the river. Since then, a series of bilateral agreements opened the river to Austrian traffic. Both Austria and East Germany were admitted to the commission as observers in 1957 and as full members in 1960 and 1963 respectively. Cooperation with bloc and other members of the commission is of obvious economic benefit to all the riparian states. A communiqué issued by the Soviet Union and Austria in 1962 spoke of the Danube Commission as a precursor to a unified water transportation system for all of Europe.

The commission, even with its non-bloc members, is associated with the Permanent Transportation Commission of COMECON, so Danube Commission policies are determined somewhat by COMECON decisions.

A similar agency, The Organization for the Collaboration of Rail Roads has standardized tariffs and the other formalities of international rail transit. This organization grew out of a series of conventions on the international transport of passengers and goods signed in 1950 by the European socialist countries and adhered to by Communist China, North Korea, Mongolia, and North Vietnam. In cooperation with the Permanent Transport Commission of COMECON, the railroad organization has encouraged technical and scientific cooperation and the coordination of national transportation plans and international shipping arrangements.

Of all the cooperative socialist bloc enterprises, collaborative nuclear research and development are most firmly under Soviet control. Because the Soviet Union has the most plentiful uranium resources and the most sophisticated facilities for their processing and use, it is the natural leader in both military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Soviet Union has also managed to control Eastern European uranium deposits, first because it acquired monopoly rights, or formed joint stock companies after the war, and, second, because the Eastern European countries have, for lack of their own facilities, had to send their supplies to the Soviet Union to be processed. In some cases, the Soviet Union has concluded long-term leases for Eastern European mines. 24/

In 1955, the Soviet Union embarked on a limited sharing program with other bloc members, 25/ agreeing to supply an experimental stockpile, fissionable material, technical assistance, and, in some cases, 26/ atomic power plants for industrial use. In conjunction with the expanded program of assistance, the entire socialist camp agreed to establish a Joint Institute for Nuclear Research outside Moscow. Member and nonmember scientists study and conduct research there. The work of the institute centers largely on the study of high energy physics, a field that many of the participants consider of little practical value for developing atomic nergy programs for industrial use. In recent years, the institute has cooperated with the Permanent Commission on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of COMECON in coordinating research and disseminating information on the application of isotopes in the fields of medicine, agriculture, and industry.

Of the Eastern European members of the bloc, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have the largest supplies of uranium ore and the most advanced research facilities and techniques. The Soviet Union has encouraged bilateral collaboration between Eastern European countries in the development of nuclear energy. Hungary and the German Democratic Republic have signed such an agreement, and one may also exist between the latter and Czechoslovakia. Because the research programs and radioactive materials available to these countries are under close Soviet surveillance, it is difficult to determine whether they could convert their nuclear facilities to military use, individually or collectively. 27/

A further indication of the extent of regional interdependence—in addition to these instances of effective functional regional cooperation—is the overall increase in intraregional trade in recent years. Despite difficulties in executing COMECON plans and growing trade opportunities with the rest of the world, trade within the COMECON group has, since 1962, shown a greater percentage increase than trade with the rest of the world. Intraregional trade is encouraged by geographic proximity, by the unique trade and payments mechanism of socialist economies, and by their inability to earn sufficient foreign exchange to trade extensively with either the industrial or the raw material producing countries outside the bloc. The Soviet Union is still the most important trade partner of each Eastern European country.

Trade outside the bloc is conducted primarily with Western Europe, and is increasingly concentrated in the four most industrialized countries—West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy—which can provide up-to-date plants and technical knowledge. The growth of trade between Eastern and Western Europe will, however, be inhibited by the implementation of the Treaty of Rome, which threatens to curb Eastern European exports of foodstuffs, solid fuels, and oil. Several Eastern European countries, especially Poland and Hungary, have been trying to diversify their manufactures and con-

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24/ Leases on East German and Czechoslovakian mines extend up to the year 2000.
25/ Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, China, the GDR, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.
26/ Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
27/ Grzybowski, op. cit., pp. 143-50; Anna Jonas, "Peaceful Atomic Energy Programs in the Soviet Bloc Nations," Rand Corporation P-1741, July 1, 1959; Nikolai Kent, "Joint Atomic Research in the Eastern Bloc", Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR (August 1961).

sumer goods production in order to get under the EEC tariff wall. In the last months of 1964, several Eastern European countries approached Western firms with proposals to enter into joint ventures in East Europe. Their aim is to get around tariff walls and benefit from Western marketing techniques in order to maintain the flow of hard currencies.

The expansion of trade relations between East and West Europe might ironically have the effect, in the short run, of promoting integration of the Eastern bloc. Since the Western Europe of the Six will increasingly act as a collective, the Eastern nations might be required, to maintain an equal bargaining position, to act similarly. This would not necessarily mean the consolidation of the Soviet version of a division of labor among the Eastern states, but it would serve as a restraint on going it alone as Rumania seeks to do and on all-out pursuit of balanced economies within each state.

III. Regional Trends

Before exploring the potential effects of disarmament and arms control measures on the alliance system and alignments of the socialist camp, it is appropriate to investigate the already existing indications of significant change in the attitudes and actions of the Warsaw Treaty powers, and to assess the direction and extent of the evolution underway. The atmosphere in which this evolution is taking place will be either perpetuated or diluted by arms-control measures, depending on their nature.

A gradual disintegration has taken place within the communist camp during the 1960's. It has affected ideology by challenging both the universal validity of Marxism-Leninism and the authority of its hitherto chief interpreter, the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Political disintegration has followed a parallel course with a reassessment of standardized policies and a growth of nationalistic patterns of development and action. Political and ideological disintegration have been accompanied, somewhat paradoxically, by regular expressions, by most of the European members of the bloc, of multilateral agreement and approval, and the development of organizational manifestations of unity. Likewise, the pursuit of diverse planning and trade policies has been accompanied by attempts to organize and regularize economic intercourse under the auspices of COMECON.

Two important factors in the evolution of the bloc are the eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute, which presented an opportunity for the Eastern European socialist regimes to exercise the rights and authority attending their well-advertised sovereign independence, and the East-West détente, which has given impetus to Soviet and Eastern European programs for extending contacts and cooperation with the West; programs that need not result in a breakdown of bloc cohesion, but that reduce the interdependence once forced by political and economic isolation, Soviet dominance, and the requirements of public unity.

A relaxation of the fear of deliberate and devastating war has given the bloc a freedom of maneuver in the shadow of the Soviet "nuclear umbrella." Security arising from the existence of a Soviet deterrent shield has facilitated the assertion of independence by the Eastern European regimes.

This disintegration in the bloc has, so far, been partial. The prospect of complete disintegration is remote, so long as the Cold War balance-of-power and the possibility of war remain, and, more important, so long as bloc leaders are satisfied with selecting and adapting to domestic requirements the means available for communist construction and are not moved to challenge the fundamental goals and definitions, domestic and international, of their ideology and political alignment.

Limitation of Power

In the context of bloc politics, limitation of power means a diminution of the binding force of orthodox ideology and a decline in the importance of the Soviet Union Commu-

nist party as the embodiment of ideological and political authority. At the same time, it means a relative increase in the power and latitude of the other members of the bloc. In sum, bloc politics are becoming more flexible and responsive, with somewhat more voluntarism and compromise.

Stalin was able to establish and enforce monolithic unity by acting on his distrust of indigenous Communist movements. Political domination and manipulation could be achieved by exploiting the ideological leading role of the CPSU; the domestic unpopularity of the satellite governments; and Soviet ability to play the other bloc members off against one another.

These factors are no longer operative. The ideological authority of the CPSU, skillfully and successfully challenged by the Chinese, and deflated at least in part by the theory of many roads to socialism, has given way in Soviet propaganda to the notion that the extent to which the Soviet Union has succeeded in building communism is the basis for its role as vanguard of the socialist movement. Since all socialist states are now slated to reach communism "more or less simultaneously," the basis of Soviet supremacy is increasingly power and wealth.

That growing domestic stability and popularity of the Eastern European regimes makes the other tools of Soviet domination ineffective has been proven by Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary and most dramatically in recent months, by Rumania. The stronger the indigenous Communist party, the less able is the Soviet Union to use police tactics or economic dependence to exact cooperation. Similarly, the Soviet Union can be played off against China or the West by a secure Eastern European regime. The stronger regimes are in a position to demand that bloc programs satisfy their conception of their national interest—even to the extent of frustrating attempts to sever, or mend, bloc unity.

The importance of personalities in bloc politics has been indicated by some aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute and by the hesitant, if not hostile reaction of many Communist leaders to the Khrushchev ouster. Whether the personal ties and political favors that Khrushchev shared with some bloc leaders were significant elements of bloc cohesion should become clear as the new leadership tries to establish working relationships with other bloc regimes.

Limitation of power applies in a measure not only to relations between Communist powers but also to relations within them. Considering the U.S.S.R. itself, in place of total control and integration of the system, or a totalitarian dictatorship, there has arisen something resembling old-fashioned dictatorship of the limited variety. Whereas under the Stalinist model all decisions were political, there now seems to exist the possibility of a significant nonpolitical realm. Whereas all groups in the society were under party control, now there exists the possibility of autonomy for certain professional groups in nonpolitical decisions.

Illustrative of this tendency is the role of the arts in the Soviet Union. Formerly, they were called into service for the total mobilization of the society toward political goals; in form and content, they were wholly dedicated to this task. Now, however, the political leadership seems to accept something less than total politicization of the arts; it acknowledges that they may follow nonpolitical criteria, at least as to form. Putting it another way, the leadership grants that art may serve private satisfaction, in the artist and the audience, as well as public goals.

Illustrative also is the role of science, in the broadest sense of that term. Scientific and technical criteria, along with aesthetic criteria, are given increasing respect, and the professionals in these fields are given increasing autonomy. This has particular relevance in administration of the economy, where rational criteria increasingly force their way through certain ideological prejudices, such as the labor theory of value.

Similar tendencies have manifested themselves in politico-military relations. An important issue in Khrushchev's debate with the military was that of the competence of party leaders or professional officers to plan Soviet strategy and to determine the na-

tion's defense needs. It is too early to say whether professional military opinion will carry more weight with the new Soviet leadership. But a reorganization of the administration of Soviet defense industries has occurred, perhaps in deference to military. On the other hand, the reorganization may be just another cyclical shift back to centralization.

There has been, then, a certain retraction of the power of the political leadership. This power was never literally total, of course, since even under Stalin a certain residue of minor decisions was left to the individual in his private capacity; but it aspired toward the total, and in theory the political realm encompassed all. Now, at least in practice, the political realm has shrunk somewhat, and the sum of decisions left to citizens, in their private or their professional capacities, has increased. The political leadership observes certain effective restraints, and in this sense a limited dictatorship has taken the place of totalitarian dictatorship.

Dispersion of Power and Diversification of Policy

Similarly, in bloc affairs, the Soviet Union has come to recognize effective restraints on its once near total command over the composition and policies of allied regimes. The reaction in Eastern Europe to the recession of Soviet power is not unlike the reaction in Africa or Asia to the withdrawal of colonial powers, or in Western Europe to the lessening of U.S. influence. Much like the aid race in less developed countries, the emergence of an alternative source of authority and power in Peking has given the smaller members of the socialist bloc a bargaining tool. Similarly, the nuclear stalemate, the East-West détente and the attainment of a measure of economic maturity, have made it possible for both Eastern and Western Europe to assert some independence of their most powerful ally.

The extremely complex phenomenon of nationalism in the communist bloc has immediate repercussions on attempts to weld into a stable and unified, if not boundaryless, system the existing socialist states, and long-range implications for the achievement of the communist goal of a universal, stateless society. The foundations of present-day nationalistic communism were laid by Stalin, who thought that by superimposing the Soviet system on each individual Eastern European socialist state and by fostering its isolated development, he could maintain strict Soviet control. This was the case with the weaker regimes, which adopted the Soviet model, sometimes with adjustments to domestic conditions, and resigned themselves to Soviet domination. The Yugoslav and Chinese regimes, on the other hand, which enjoyed an indigenous power base, wanted membership in the socialist camp as equals, not underlings of the Soviet regimes. Post-Stalin reaction against Soviet abuse of economic, political, and cultural power has led to the growth of ethnocentric nationalism (as in Rumania and Slovakia, for example) and, in several states, to a desire to maintain independence in international dealings. These nationalistic feelings superimposed on the original formula of independent state socialism have reinforced a belief on the part of communist leaders in the lasting usefulness of the nation state as a vehicle for economic, social, and political growth. 28/

The fragmentation of the bloc into more or less autonomous national units is limited by potential repercussions on domestic politics, even in the regimes that were strong enough to assert their autonomy in the first place. Ulbricht and Zhivkov, for example, profess unfledging loyalty to Moscow, even the new leadership, because their unstable regimes need Soviet support. On the other end of the spectrum, Tito, faced with factionalism and the beginnings of a succession struggle, has been careful not to jeopardize the most recent cycle of good will in Moscow.

28/ Paul Shoup, "Communism, Nationalism and the Growth of the Communist Community of Nations After World War II", American Political Science Review (December 1962), pp. 886-98.

A persistent desire for autarky is the economic manifestation of nationalist communism. The Eastern European regimes organized their economies after the war according to the Stalinist model of autarkic and heavy industry oriented state socialism. Now, reluctance to give up the right to build independent state socialism and to convert or abandon established industries or to sacrifice control over national planning to an external authority that would probably be dominated by the Soviet Union helps to frustrate efforts toward specialization of an industry-wide rather than a technical nature. Rumania's defiant opposition to COMECON's recommendations has its roots in a persistent desire for rapid industrialization and autarky.

It also has to do with the issue of more or less simultaneous arrival at communism. Should the process of standardization of the levels of development of socialist countries proceed or follow COMECON integration? In a running battle with East Germany and Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, Rumania makes its position clear. It will not be satisfied with the role of a less-developed, raw material producing partner in the bloc while the more industrialized members enjoy favorable terms of trade at its expense. To expedite industrialization, Rumania has turned to the West for trade and aid.

Poland, the most vocal critic of COMECON's sluggishness, has also clung to autarky. Its behavior is illustrative of the vicious circle of COMECON failure. Specialization among socialist countries requires coordinated planning. But state planners are reluctant to draw national plans that are dependent on deliveries from abroad, or to commit themselves to rigid delivery schedules that cannot always be met. Without mass production and mass markets, the quality of goods produced in the bloc is frequently low, so earning hard currency in the West sometimes takes precedence over meeting COMECON obligations.

Preference for bilateral rather than multilateral agreements for trade and payments and for specialization is indicative of a continuing desire to maintain national control over economic growth. Bilateralism is a way to avoid central direction, or supranational control over regional planning and development. It is also a symptom of the irrationality of the socialist economic system, which has yet to devise satisfactory machinery for multilateral, or even trilateral clearing.

The pursuit of differing, even unorthodox, policies by nationalistic socialist states is made possible by the dispersion of power and legitimized by Soviet experimentation in political and economic liberalism, by the acceptance of renegade Yugoslavia into the fold, and by the theory of many roads to socialism.

The theory of many roads to socialism has long-range potential for providing a flexible and durable foundation for a commonwealth or regional subgroupings of socialist states. It offers a formal mechanism, within the context of regional alignment, for the articulation of national differences. In the meantime, gradually increasing autonomy for the smaller socialist states will probably continue to develop unless a crisis of major proportions results in a reunion between China and the Soviet Union, and requires overall bloc unity. There are limits to the degree of autonomy these states might choose to exercise, and these limits are maintained by powerful political imperatives. The requirements of national security in a divided Europe, living in the shadow of unsettled disputes from the war, sets one limit to bloc maneuverability. The vested interests of socialist regimes and the conservative force of their hierarchical network of apparatchiki also promise to sustain the alignment. Uniform political, economic, and legal structures provide a framework for regional collaboration. The continuing belief that socialism is the system of the future, even if it doesn't conform completely with orthodox precepts, contributes to a sense of mutual destiny.

Habits of Collective Action

If a process of disintegration seems to characterize relations between the major Communist powers and also between them and the lesser Communist states, the opposite

tendency is widest among those lesser states themselves, particularly in Eastern Europe. The moderation of Soviet control over the Eastern European "satellites" has resulted not so much in the fragmentation of that community as in its re-formation on a sounder basis.

With the reduction of Soviet power and the modification of Soviet methods of influence in the region, agencies for economic and social cooperation, which were originally a product of Soviet imposition, have taken on a different character. Whereas they were originally perceived by the Eastern European leaders as exploitative, they can now be seen and used as devices for genuinely mutual benefit. Autarkic impulses and national rivalries do of course persist, and may now be given more open expression. But these seem not to prevent acknowledgment of the advantages of cooperation and the further implementation of economic and social exchange. While this may not result in an ideally complete division of labor among the East European economies, it is producing closer interdependence. Expressions of this in the economic field—and these are now frequently undertaken at the initiative of the Eastern European governments rather than of the Soviet Union—include agreements on further industrial specialization, expanded intrabloc trade, establishment of joint enterprises, collaboration in transportation and electric-power projects, and pooling of technical resources. The bureaucrats and technical experts attached to COMECON's Permanent Commissions work effectively on a technical, nonpartisan level. The COMECON bureaucracy, unlike the characteristic Soviet administrative organs shows signs of developing into a permanent, self-sustaining bureaucracy--a kind of international civil service. 29/

It should be emphasized that this cooperation occurs not only—perhaps not even mainly—through the formal machinery of COMECON. It increasingly takes the form of bilateral, and to some extent multilateral, agreements among the Communist governments. An especially significant example is the recent creation of intergovernmental committees for economic and scientific-technical cooperation, of which some half dozen have been formed bilaterally between Eastern European countries or between them and the Soviet Union.

It should also be emphasized that some forms of cooperation extend to non-Communist states in the region. Illustrative of this tendency is the increasing inclusion of Austria in intraregion agencies and agreements. Now a full member of the Danube Commission, Austria has also entered into special agreements with Rumania and Yugoslavia for improvement of the waterway. It has recently negotiated settlement of long-standing property disputes with several of the Communist governments, and it has expanded greatly its trade and tourist exchanges with the Communist countries. Further agreement on economic and cultural cooperation can be expected.

While cooperation with West Germany is, for the Eastern European countries, a proposition of an altogether different order, it too appears to be growing. West Germany also has been admitted to the Danube Commission, and its trade with Eastern European countries is expanding. In recent trade agreements, several Eastern European countries have recognized that West Berlin is part of the Federal Republic, at least for commercial purposes—a significant development. Greece has improved its relations with the Communist countries; wartime claims between Greece and four Communist countries have recently been settled, and expanded economic and cultural exchange is expected.

This process of "normalization" in relations between Communist countries and the contiguous non-Communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe seems to signify, not the break-up of the Communist community, but rather its extension as an economic and cultural entity, to include non-Communist countries on a broader regional basis.

In sum, relations among the Communist Eastern European countries appear to show an increased and voluntary interdependence. The degree of cooperation achieved may seem a failure when compared with earlier Soviet demands or with current exhortations;

29/ Robert S. Jaster, "CEMA's Influence on Soviet Policies in Eastern Europe", World Politics (April 1962), pp. 517-18.

but when compared with prewar conditions or with any realistic evaluation of its prospects, it is impressive. This does not mean, of course, that the region is hermetically sealed against economic and cultural relations with the West. Integration of the Communist Eastern European community does not exclude discriminating expansion of contacts between its members and non-Communist states.

In conclusion, it is clear that since Stalin's death a disintegration of the traditional order has occurred. It is equally clear that this disintegration has been partial, and that complete disruption of the political, economic, ideological, and military cohesion of the socialist camp is unlikely.

The evolution of the bloc toward a polycentric system, or subsystems, of states is due most fundamentally to the incompatibility of proletarian internationalism and hegemonic order with a nation-state system based on absolute sovereignty. The organizational format is in flux, but the basic alignment has shown that it can endure. Once regulated by interparty loyalties and rigid internationalism, the system seems to be developing, partially due to Moscow's encouragement, into one in which regional, interstate collaboration will replace the hierarchical order, which has been challenged.

It should, nevertheless, be cautioned that traditional national and ethnic rivalries still frustrate the development of cordial relations between some of the Communist states and that in an environment characterized by limitations on Soviet authority and growing nationalism, disruptive forces could come to the fore in Eastern Europe, especially in the Balkans. Tensions exist, for example, between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria over Macedonia, and between Rumania and Hungary over Transylvania, and over the status of Hungarian minorities in Rumania. The ambiguous and vacillating relationship of Yugoslavia to the Communist camp and the future course of Rumania's quest for autonomy are further sources of potential regional instability.

IV. The Effects of Arms Control Measures on the Communist Systems of Alliances

In postulating the effects of specific kinds of arms measures on Communist alignments—political and economic as well as military—it is necessary to keep in mind some of the peculiar aspects of the Communist world view, how they affect attitudes toward and expectations from arms measures and how they might, in a "disarming" world affect the inner- and outer-directed alignment.

Ideology

As the Soviet Union has grown in power, become increasingly involved in world politics, assumed more numerous, yet sometimes contradictory commitments (some of which relate to arms control), its systematic ideological view of the world has become less of a practical guide to action. The Khrushchevian concepts of peaceful coexistence and the non-inevitability of war are illustrative of adjustments and compromises that the Soviet leadership has, in the face of international realities, had to make in its doctrine. The nature of modern war seems also to have inspired changes in attitudes that directly affect disarmament policy. Khrushchev, and probably the present leaders, seem to feel that the responsibilities of nuclear stature have made many capitalist statesmen "rational." At the same time, the Soviets have shown themselves willing to discuss and conclude partial, token, arms measures that were previously considered unacceptable imperialist tactics of deception and delay.

Yet, the hazards of the modern world do not seem to have convinced the Soviets that they must accept disarmament and arms control agreements. Moreover, even in con-

sidering arms control and disarmament agreements, the Soviets are especially keen on propoganda and political action. And international changes, including arms agreements, are not likely, in the foreseeable future, to eliminate distrust of capitalist countries, nor the socialist belief that the socialist countries are missionaries of historical progress, and that class conflicts will continue to develop as Marx predicted. Therefore, tension and competition can be expected to characterize relations between the capitalist and socialist camps also in a "disarming" and disarmed world.

From an ideological point of view, the Soviets probably anticipate that capitalist alignments would suffer more from disarmament because of the inherent "contradictions" between imperialist states and because they expect that capitalist states would be less able to adjust to a demilitarization of their economies.

The nature and relevance of alliances and alignments in the communist bloc in a "disarming" world will depend partially on whether the Soviet Union has decided (or will be forced to concede) that a future, geographically dispersed, communist world will not be dominated by and dependent for defense and economic aid on the Soviet Union, but rather will be a world of nation states pursuing different roads to socialism and communism according to local and regional conditions.

Sense of Security

Another pertinent question is whether the Soviet Union is prepared to alter the means of revolutionary change from violence to peaceful competition, revolution by example, and parliamentary transition even after arms measures limit the risks of armed or nuclear retaliation. The character of modern war may, in the Soviet view, have eliminated the possibility of real security and, therefore, of using a military strategy so long as the capitalist powers maintain the capacity to devastate the Soviet Union, albeit at the cost of ultimate defeat and destruction. In this context, Soviet arms proposals are in part a tactic for appeal to the bourgeoisie as well as the working class.

To mobilize the maximum array of allies against the imperialist United States, the Soviet Union appeals to nationalist and pacifist sentiment and encourages the formation of a third bloc, neutral between the capitalist and socialist blocs in other respects but supporting the U.S.S.R. in issues of peace and independence, the "peace camp." The struggle for peace is similar to the earlier struggle for collective security (now against the United States, then against the fascist alliance). Historically, this anti-imperialist strategy is adopted by the U.S.S.R. when it feels itself insecure, whereas the anti-capitalist strategy (excluding the bourgeoisie) is adopted in times of relative security. If, through arms measures, the Soviet Union could reduce or sufficiently inhibit United States capacity to wage devastating war, it might again feel relatively secure and therefore return to the militant strategy, as the Chinese now propose. So as not to abrogate the arms agreement, such a militant strategy would probably be conducted not through diplomacy but by encouraging local Communist parties to start guerrilla wars in developing countries, or to exert pressure through trade unions in developed countries, or to arouse nationalist sentiment among minority groups such as the Kurds or Nepalese.

The Eastern European states might react quite differently to a new sense of security. Their present preoccupation with domestic priorities could be expected to continue. Their bargaining power in the face of more vigorous Sino-Soviet competition could be expected to increase. And differences in foreign-policy orientation could widen the gulf between them and the Soviet Union, especially if Soviet policies seemed to threaten beneficial economic and cultural ties with the capitalist world. In such a contingency some or all of the Eastern European states might be seen by developing countries as a more suitable and more moderate model for economic development and international policies than either the militant communists or the "imperialist" West.

The effects of some arms measures might then be to aggravate differences within the Sino-Soviet bloc. The absence of China from arms negotiations already presents the Soviets with serious political and potential military problems that may inhibit Soviet attempts to limit the danger of war through agreements with the West.

It will be assumed in the discussion that China, for the foreseeable future, will not be a signatory of any arms agreement. There have been no indications that China is as yet seriously interested in arms control or disarmament. In the future, it may find it tactically advantageous to alter its belligerent image by favoring policies of peaceful coexistence and radical disarmament for their propaganda and political value, but this alone does not change the situation. Peking's policy has vacillated on the issue of a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific, but it seems unlikely now that China will be seriously interested in such a proposal until it has fully exploited the political value of its nuclear stature, even if it does so in an arms control context.

The Soviets will have to take into consideration that in response to arms agreements, and even the conduct of negotiations, China can be expected to voice criticism and attempt to make inroads into Soviet spheres of influence on grounds that the Soviet Union is neglecting the defenses of the bloc, discouraging revolutionary movements, cowering before a "paper tiger," and trying, with the United States, to form a world gendarmerie.

In more concrete terms, the Soviets face a potential two-front strategic problem. As a result, they might prefer to concentrate on regional agreements that would have less effect on overall military strength than on the disposition of forces. They might prefer, for example, that troops withdrawn from the European theater be restationed in the East rather than be demobilized. Greater integration and independence for the Eastern European armies in the Warsaw Pact would facilitate such a move. Or, since China might be little affected by a European or Atlantic nuclear war, and China's army would probably survive in greater proportion than the Soviet army and would be able to fight primitive and protracted war, the Soviets might find nuclear arms measures a way to avoid a two-front war.

From the Chinese point of view, it is possible that, having decided that military assistance from the Soviet Union is neither forthcoming nor desirable, it would consider it advantageous to have the present nuclear powers restrict or reduce their arsenals. Peking might be pleased to see the Soviets bargain away some of their ability to woo young nations and revolutionary parties with military might in return for a reduction of U.S. power, especially if it included the Pacific area. However, if a reduction of tension and withdrawal of troops and weapons in Europe would leave U.S. forces free to resist China in Asia and other areas and free Soviet resources for aid to revolutionary movements, China might then find itself in direct conflict with the United States and indirect conflict with the Soviet Union.

The Eastern European allies, who have thus far opposed aggravation of the Sino-Soviet dispute, would probably pursue the same policy in a "disarming" world, failing to cooperate directly with the Soviet Union in competition with China and opposing a severe restriction of Chinese influence in the bloc and in the world. Yet, if, as a result of arms control measures, relationships with Western Europe and the United States provided the Eastern European allies with an alternative source of bargaining power, they might eventually be able to stay aloof from the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Alliances and Alignments

While the analysis will deal primarily with the potential effects of arms control measures on alliances in the Communist camp, consideration is also given to the pos-

sible effects of arms control measures (and resulting changes in alliances) on overall political and economic alignment. It will be concluded that the development and decline of alignments need not correspond to, nor result from, the development and decline of alliances.

In the case of the Warsaw Treaty powers, the institutionalized alignment (consisting of COMECON, the Danube Commission, etc.) already, in some cases, transcends the alliance. The economic, political, and ideological interdependence of the states of Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union can be expected to outlive the necessity for military alignment, although there may be, in time, some shifts in the distribution of power and composition of the alignment. It will be suggested that these aspects of alignment—the inner-directed aspects—might, during and after disarmament, become even more important from the Soviet point of view as a way to solidify the bloc. In the view of the Eastern European leaders, economic and political alignment may provide a means for economic development and a shield against Western attempts to "build bridges" that might threaten to undermine their positions of power. If, through arms control measures, Eastern European dependence on the Soviet Union, and resultant fear of Soviet domination were diminished, greater regional integration might be facilitated. A recession of Soviet influence as overseer and stabilizer of intrabloc relations might, on the other hand, result in the short run in the eruption of interstate squabbles.

It is difficult to predict the effects of arms control measures on the outer-directed alignment—in the communist case, on messianic revolutionary zeal. It may be hazarded, however, that with increased security, the Eastern European members of the alignment will concentrate more on domestic and regional affairs than on spreading communism abroad. Instead of being missionaries of communism, the younger generation is likely to be susceptible to Western ideas, and the regimes, individually, or collectively, are likely to want to expand economic and cultural relations with Western Europe.

The Sino-Soviet alignment presents a different case. Both the alliance of 1950 and subsequent aid and trade agreements, although not formally nullified, are essentially inactive. All indications are that with or without arms control, the split will get worse before it gets better.

The following discussion of the potential effects of specific arms control measures on communist alliances treats separately limited arms control measures, regional arms control and disarmament measures, general arms reduction, and general and complete disarmament.

The primary changes to be analyzed are those within rather than between alliance systems. Nevertheless, occasional mention of secondary changes—responses to changes in the distribution of power or cohesion of the adversary alliance—will be included, especially since the socialist bloc is anxious to frustrate the development of Atlantic or European unity, and since much of socialist bloc policy, including the founding of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, has been motivated by developments within NATO.

In view of the fact that collaborative aspects of the WTO are relatively undeveloped, arms control measures are not likely to disrupt or obstruct any give and take on political and planning levels—indeed, they might even encourage it where it has not existed before. On the other hand, the command structure and strategy-making bodies of the alliance are so dominated by the Soviet Union that changes, due to disarmament measures, in the distribution of power or organization of the alliance are likely to require greater adjustments than would similar changes within NATO. It is also significant that the Warsaw Treaty Organization is a less developed military instrument than is NATO. Thus, the Warsaw Treaty powers would consider it to their advantage to institute arms control and disarmament measures, such as an all-European security arrangement or disengagement or a non-proliferation agreement, which could alter or disrupt the existing alliance structures because NATO would have much more to lose.

Limited Measures

The present East-West détente may, if it lasts, provide an opportunity for the successful negotiation of limited arms control measures designed in part to stabilize the military balance and to pave the way toward political settlements and further arms measures. Such limited measures based on a mutual desire to stabilize the peace and especially to avoid war by accident or miscalculation seem more feasible in the present environment than do more extensive measures requiring alteration of the level and deployment of forces.

Soviet interest in détente is based, in part, on a realization that military and political stability in Europe is necessary at a time when the problems of socialist bloc unity and economic reform take immediate priority. In this context, confidence-building measures could help to increase the importance of the inward-looking factions in the bloc and perpetuate the détente, which, as has been mentioned, encourages autonomy in Eastern Europe. However, the implementation of arms control measures might also seem to the Soviets to threaten the unity of the Atlantic community and present the Soviet leaders with new, less risky, opportunities to chip away at the Western alignment. A more militant policy on the part of the Soviet Union might not meet with the approval of its Eastern European allies who would not, presumably, want the beneficial economic and cultural aspects of the détente cut short and who might, in some circumstances, feel that the Soviets were risking war on their territories for the sake of political gains in Western Europe.

A limited measure that would apply specifically to Europe and would be negotiated by the alliances as wholes rather than by the two Superpowers would be the establishment of communication links between military commanders and the exchange of military information. Insofar as this would lessen the fear of surprise attack or miscalculation, it would be beneficial for both sides.

The political and economic impact of such an experiment in multilateral cooperation across the iron curtain would probably be significant for all members of the two alliances. It might contribute to a breakdown in political and psychological barriers and stimulate cooperation and exchange in other fields. The East German regime is likely to encounter domestic difficulties with even a slight reduction of tension in Europe, but internal adjustments could probably be made more smoothly in a situation in which the structure of the alliances were not altered. It should be added that West Germany would also suffer domestic tensions especially since at least tacit recognition of the East German regime would be inherent in the arms control arrangement.

Regional Measures

Regional arms control schemes have been given considerable attention in Soviet propaganda and draft proposals since the early 1950's. It is significant that Poland also has taken initiatives in proposing regional arms measures that could lessen the danger of war in Central Europe and could pave the way toward lessened dependence on the Soviet Union militarily and in foreign policy.

Nuclear Freeze and De-nuclearization in Central Europe. Two such proposals call for a freeze of nuclear warheads, or complete de-nuclearization of a zone in Central Europe comprised of at least, the whole of Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Both of these measures would prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the countries of the zone—most importantly, by West Germany. De-nuclearization would have the added effect of depriving West Germany of access to existing nuclear weapons on its soil. Both measures would also preclude a nuclear arms race in the zone and de-nuclearization would lessen the importance of the countries in question as targets for enemy counterforce nuclear strikes.

The de-nuclearization of Central Europe could result in an increase in the relative strategic value of local conventional forces by increasing the plausibility of a limited

conventional attack by such forces. Any reduction of Soviet military presence as a result of a withdrawal of forces manning nuclear weapons would also tend to increase the relative value of Eastern European conventional forces. An important consideration here would be whether de-nuclearization were coupled with reductions in conventional forces and partial disengagement. The Eastern European allies would remain dependent on the Soviet Union for nuclear defense and deterrence insofar as threats originating from and directed toward countries outside the zone would assume a relatively more important deterrent role in the absence of nuclear weapons "at the front."

A nuclear freeze, on the other hand, would result in a situation where the nuclear weapons and related delivery vehicles available in West Germany far exceeded those in the Warsaw Pact countries. This would depend on the freeze taking place early enough so the Soviet Union was not in a position to reduce the present imbalance by building up stocks of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in the WTO countries before the freeze took place.

Finally, de-nuclearization might have implications with regard to the possibility that WTO would become a vehicle for circumscribing the military activities of the Soviet Union inside the territories of the member states. The Status of Forces agreements were a step in this direction. De-nuclearization and non-proliferation—and more so, of course, disengagement—would further the process by imposing new constraints on Soviet military dispositions in those countries.

Other Agreements For Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A state without a nuclear weapons system, in general can achieve such a system only through nuclear testing or transfer of weapons from a nuclear "have." The existing limited test ban agreement for practical purposes reduced the possibility of the Central European states acquiring a nuclear capability through testing since underground testing is more suitable for perfecting existing sophisticated weapons systems than for establishing a new system. Therefore, the only additional non-proliferation agreement that is of concern in this study is an agreement on the part of the nuclear "haves" not to transfer nuclear weapons to the nuclear "have-nots" and an agreement by the latter not to acquire.

It is difficult to conceive of a system for verifying such an agreement through checking on the transferor states—the nuclear "haves." The verification system would unquestionably be directed toward the possible recipients of nuclear weapons—in this case, West Germany and the Warsaw Pact countries. Therefore, the implications of such an agreement would be roughly the same as those associated with a nuclear freeze and de-nuclearization in Central Europe.

Nevertheless, there might be certain additional implications in connection with a package of proposals including a test ban, an agreement on the part of the nuclear "haves" not to transfer weapons to the nuclear "have-nots" and either a nuclear freeze or de-nuclearization in Central Europe. Such a package which would foreclose the future options of all such states to acquire nuclear weapons would unquestionably generate greater political pressures inside NATO than among WTO members. Furthermore, the confirmation and perpetuation of Soviet predominance in the Warsaw Pact would give the Soviet Union the advantage in managing intra-alliance frustrations and resentments.

Exclusion of Germany from ownership of nuclear weapons through some form of non-proliferation agreement and/or non-acquisition pledge would reduce the fear of West German revanchism by placing the activation of nuclear weapons beyond German control. But reduction of this threat by means of a non-proliferation agreement would tend to dampen WTO military collaboration, could open the way for economic intercourse between COMECON and the EEC, and promote pluralism inside WTO in much the same fashion as other measures that reduced the assumed West German threat.

A non-proliferation agreement (or a de-nuclearized zone) applying to West Germany would represent, in effect, an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union

to deny nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic. It could be interpreted to imply the perpetuation of the division of Germany on the grounds that any subsequent alterations in the status quo would "undermine the political basis of the agreement." 30/ Participation by Moscow with the United States in a scheme to guarantee the division of Germany would further reduce the fears of German revanchism with the implications noted above.

The package of proposals to prevent proliferation in Central Europe could readily be extended to other areas of the world. The formula of no transfers of weapons and no tests, if applied in the Far East would prevent China as well as India and Japan from developing effective weapons systems although the latter two have adhered to the nuclear test ban. If China refused to agree to such a package, means of compelling it to do so would be extremely difficult. Both the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries in a period of détente might be willing to cooperate to meet such a problem if the formula for meeting the problem in its initial application had the effect of excluding West Germany, the chief target of Soviet propaganda, from nuclear weapons and only thereafter applied to a fellow socialist regime, Communist China, West Germany in turn might find its exclusion from a nuclear weapons system more palatable if the same formula prevented the development of significant nuclear weapons systems by all other states, including France and Communist China, except the three with present significant nuclear capabilities.

Disengagement. Disengagement from Central Europe on the part of the Superpowers would necessarily affect the status of Germany, and the status of Germany is and has been a determinant in the shaping of WTO. Disengagement could take place either in the face of a permanently divided Germany or of a reunified Germany. The socialist bloc opposes reunification except on terms unacceptable to the West. As long as the communist regime in East Germany has an unsteady hold on a population receptive to the example of prosperity and political freedom provided by West Berlin and the Federal Republic, the Soviet Union will be reluctant to disengage because once disengaged, Soviet troops could not return to quell a counterrevolutionary rebellion without violating the agreement with the West. Also, if left alone, there might be great temptation for the East German regime to start a crisis over Berlin. Greater economic and political collaboration with its Eastern European neighbors might be encouraged to compensate for the loss of Soviet military and police support.

A securely divided Germany, accompanied by reduced fears of German revanchism, would dampen tendencies toward military collaboration inside the Warsaw Pact and, indeed affect the military rationale of the alliance. Reduced fears of Germany would evoke divisive pressures inside the alliance as various forms of nationalism began to supplant the fear of Germany as a primary determinant in the relations between Moscow and other WTO members and as a device used by elites in Eastern Europe to consolidate their positions of power. These elites would necessarily be less receptive to domination by the Soviet Union, and domination would become increasingly difficult for the Soviets themselves to justify.

Poland might object to Soviet disengagement from Germany alone because it would bring Poland into the front line of defense. Existing restrictions on Soviet troop activities in Poland might have to be waived and its freedom of maneuver in the international arena restricted. Disengagement from Poland itself might bring a revival of anti-Russian feeling as it did in Rumania and encourage nationalistic politicians who could be expected to advocate greater independence from the Soviet Union. But economic dependence on the Soviet Union which is felt by Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, if the disengagement arrangement were extended to include it too, would tend to inhibit any reaction to those countries to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe.

30/ Dr. Osgood's essay on the Atlantic Area, p. 27.

The tendencies toward military collaboration inside WTO would also be influenced by disengagement. Indeed, the prerequisite for disengagement may turn out to be some sort of all-European security arrangement which would, in accordance with Article 11 of the Warsaw Treaty, call for the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. In such an instance, military relations among the European communist states would be conducted on the level of bilateral treaties, conceivably with provisions for joint command and most likely with greater responsibility falling to the Eastern European Ministries of Defense. Even if disengagement were achieved within the context of the present alliance structures, a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe would, in the first instance, open up the possibility that closer political collaboration might develop to compensate for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. On the military level, the removal of the network of Soviet officers from Eastern Europe would necessitate greater delegation of responsibility, coupled with more diffusion of command, to pact members in matters of logistics, planning, and maneuvers. In fact, greater integration of Eastern European armies might materialize in response to the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the concomitant reduction of Soviet military control over WTO.

The role of Yugoslavia in an Eastern Europe free of Soviet military presence might become more important. Tito's decision to establish a special relationship with COMECON and his apparent concern that Rumania may be pressing its autonomy too far, too quickly may be indications that Yugoslavia wants to be important in the Balkan-Danube area as a stabilizer, and perhaps, a guiding force in regional collaboration. Yugoslavia may present an example of voluntary cooperation, disciplined nationalism, and economic experimentalism.

General Arms Reductions

Reductions of Nuclear Delivery Systems. Reductions in delivery systems as well as nuclear freezes would be relevant to the WTO mainly insofar as they impinged on the tendencies toward military collaboration inside the alliance. Implications for those tendencies would arise chiefly from those changes in the strategic balance, induced by nuclear reductions and freezes, that affected the Soviet Union's ability to rely on its MRBM capacity to counter military threats emanating from Western Europe. To the extent that ability was diminished, the Soviet Union would tend to rely more on its own conventional forces, which to be sure would assume a greater strategic value in the absence of a Western nuclear deterrent, or it would tend to increase its dependence on WTO forces.

Conceivably, the Soviet Union might reduce its MRBM's for reciprocal reductions in the ICBM's of the United States and sea-based Polarises. The effect would be to reduce the threats of devastation inside the Soviet Union posed by the ICBM's and in return the threat to Western Europe exerted by Soviet MRBM's. However, it would be inevitable that, in the eyes of the Eastern Europeans, the primary beneficiaries of the ICBM-MRBM reductions would be the Soviet Union and Western Europe, while the Eastern Europeans themselves would in the process be rendered more vulnerable to conventional attacks. WTO collaboration therefore might take the form of closer integration attempts to reach an accommodation or détente with the West, having lost faith in Soviet deterrent capacity as far as they were concerned. In any event, the price of Eastern European collaboration with the Soviet Union, after an ICBM-MRBM reduction, would tend to go up, and the Soviets would be constrained, it would appear, to recognize the legitimacy of new Eastern European claims.

Conventional Reductions. Significant troop reductions by the members of NATO and the WTO are hard to imagine without some withdrawal from Europe by the Superpowers. A reduction of troops in Europe would be viewed favorably by the Warsaw allies insofar as it would limit the West German war machine and U.S. presence on the Continent. From the Eastern European point of view, a reduction of Soviet military presence could spur the process of reorientation from Soviet-dependent toward regional policies. Channels of communication between Eastern and Western Europe should be-

come more important with any reduction in the presence and mobilization capacity of the Superpowers.

Any reduction of conventional forces of the Soviet Union that would adversely affect its defensive position in Europe, or on its Eastern frontier, would inevitably affect the security of its Eastern European allies in much the same way as a reduction of U.S. power would affect the security of Western Europe. Such reduction of forces would therefore cause tension between the U.S.S.R. and other members of the Warsaw Pact.

As a result of effective general or regional measures, some Eastern European states might conclude that the benefits to be derived from the alliance were less valuable than those that might result from non-cooperation with the alliance (perhaps in the pattern of Albania, which has not attended Warsaw Pact meetings, nor participated in maneuvers since 1961). Rumania, for example, might decide that the economic benefits that could flow from the West if it limited its participation in Warsaw Pact activities would be of greater value than the security guarantee of the alliance. If the Soviet Union instituted a retalfatory boycott to encourage a maverick country to change its mind, there would be no guarantee that the other COMECON members would cooperate. (Most of the countries in Eastern Europe continued to trade with Albania after the Soviet Union severed relations.) The Central European countries, to whom the Warsaw Pact commitment is more important, could not, presumably, follow suit. They might, however, place more emphasis on their commitment to one another than on Soviet guarantees.

The longer-run effects of extensive arms reductions on the Warsaw Pact would depend to a great extent on how the regimes in Eastern Europe chose to cope with the new military and psychological situation in Europe. The policy preferences of the younger generation of leaders would be crucial to this period of adjustment. There appear to be two different, but not necessarily incompatible, factions critical of the present line within the new generation. There are the intellectuals and scientists, who are disaffected with the party line and want freedom to pursue with integrity their specialized fields, and the party functionaries who are intent on liberalization. This group seems to favor multilateral contacts, within and outside the bloc, for cultural exchange and technical cooperation and experimentation in economic planning and organization. The other group consists of ambitious, opportunistic, nationalist cadres who are willing to exploit nationalistic and ethnic feelings to gain positions of power. If in control, leaders of this kind might tend to accentuate the differences within and between states of the bloc and frustrate regional cooperation, if not foster real animosities. Intellectuals and technicians might at first find a nationalistic regime a permissive alternative to the present leadership but strong nationalism might degenerate into totalitarianism and separatism.

The development of national chauvinism could provide the foundation for new subalignments in the Balkans where traditional ethnic and territorial disputes that underlie present interstate relationships are, in part, kept in check by both the Cold War and by the hegemonic order imposed by Soviet authority. A reemergence of nationalism in the hands of opportunistic politicians could threaten the existence of multinational states like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; relations between Hungary and Rumania over Bucharest's treatment of Hungarian minorities might further deteriorate; Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece might clash over the fate of Macedonia and Albania.

The role arms control measures might play in the political development of Eastern Europe is unclear. It may be speculated, however, that arms control measures that bring into question the value of the defense commitment shared by the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union could create the conditions for an acceleration of nationalism in Eastern Europe.

In a disarmed world, existing institutionalized alliances would disappear, although skeletal alliances consisting of consultative bodies with contingency plans for rearmament would, presumably, endure. Even after complete disarmament, the socialist world would expect conflict with the capitalist world to continue and would remain interested, therefore, in strong alignments that would be viewed as potential alliances should the disarmament agreement break down, or should the opportunity arise to "bury" the capitalist world. The existence of paramilitary forces for the purpose of maintaining domestic security and the potential for rearmament on the basis of these forces would also tend to perpetuate "alliance-mindedness" on both sides of the Iron Curtain

Soviet theory now holds that it is the military might of the socialist bloc that enables the "peaceful and progressive" forces of the world to pursue revolutionary goals in defiance of imperialist resistance. At the same time, the communists say that it is only the threatening military power of the imperialists that obliges them to maintain armaments and armies. If the "imperialists" were disarmed, new opportunities for guerrilla and psychological warfare and subversion could open up to communist parties across the world. Primitive warfare, of the Chinese variety, would be at a premium in a disarmed world. The importance of "volunteers" sent without formal governmental endorsement from China or the Soviet Union to assist revolutionary movements would be increased as well. Partially in recognition of these possibilities the United States in its Outline of the Basic Provisions of a Treaty of General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World provided for a United Nations peace force, which by stage three of GCD would have "sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it." It is possible that in some parts of the world the interests of world communism would be pitted against the interests of this peacekeeping organization. Local communist parties might be encouraged to form alliances for the purpose of either opposing, or of controlling, these forces.

In a disarmed world, the socialist countries might hope to spread revolution by example more effectively than they have been able to do in a Cold-War environment in which the less-developed countries choose to avoid alignment with either camp. In order to be effective in its competitive bid for the presently nonaligned, the socialist bloc would have to surpass capitalist countries in economic growth and in the production of surpluses with which to give assistance to the developing world. In such a circumstance, competing economic alignments might assume some of the importance that alliances have in an armed world. The Eastern European allies of the Soviet Union would be important participants in any such socialist alignments since they are more dependent on foreign trade than is the Soviet Union and could work out a scheme for division of labor with developing countries.

3. THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

by

Charles Burton Marshall

I. The Area Broadly Considered

II. The Alliances and Alignments

The Arab Zone.
The Northern Tier.
Cyprus.

III. The Implications of Disarmament and Arms Control

The Arab Area.
The Northern Tier.
Cyprus.

IV. Implications for Arms Control and Disarmament

3. THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

Charles Burton Marshall

I. The Area Broadly Considered

The area assigned for this consideration of alliances and alignments under conditions presumably to prevail in a world assumed to be in a process of disarming or a state of having disarmed—and, short of these conditions, of the effects on alliances and alignments produced by arrangements of less sweeping scope for reducing or eliminating armaments—has been aptly described in a Senate report of a few years ago: "...the area remains obdurately a most disorderly part of the world; geographically, racially, culturally, economically, and above all, politically, there is a profound inconsistency about the area. For every rule there is an exception, for every premise a contradiction." 1/

Even the delimitations of the Near East or the Middle East—terms taken to be synonymous for all practical purposes—are disputable. By whichever term identified, the area represents a conceptual region with an elastic perimeter and a mobile center. The variability is illustrated by the definitions in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary of the Near East as "1 the Balkan States, 2 the region included in the former Ottoman Empire, 3 the countries of SE Europe, N Africa and SW Asia—often considered as including the area extending from Morocco, the Republic of Sudan and Somalia N&E to Pakistan and India" and of the Middle East as "the countries of SW Asia and N Africa—often considered as the countries extending from Libya on the W to Pakistan and India on the E."

The variability of the key terms is readily explainable. They are derived from history, rather than geography. In an areal scholar's words:

> ...these names...emphasize that the area they describe owes its regional character to something that lies beyond its borders. It is because these lands, with all their natural diversities, are "near to" or "in the middle of" other regions that they are included in a single term. This means that...unity is chiefly functional. It is a unity impressed from without, not an inherent unity arising from geographical or social conditions. 2/

Their geographic inconstancy aside, the terms as used in whatever context in whatever time reflect a conceptual consistency in describing an expanse lying south and east of the more modernized and resourceful portions of Europe, affecting accesses among waterways of the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Indian Ocean, and interposing between Europe and lands of greater Asia and remoter Africa while bearing on the maritime connections to the outer world of Russia and other Eastern European lands. The area is, in sum, of high importance to strategy and commerce. It is a meeting place between Christendom and the Islamic sectors and a place of confrontation between Israeli and Arab nationalisms—a zone, moreover, of interacting interests between Western powers and Russia.

1/ Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, United States Foreign Policy: Middle East, Staff Study, 86 Cong. 2 sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p.1.

2/ John Badeau, The Lands Between (New York: Friendship Press, 1958), p.3.

For purposes here relevant, the area is taken to embrace the countries beyond Europe and south of the Soviet Union touching on the Mediterranean Sea, the Aegean, the Black, and the Caspian, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and the Persian Gulf. At a minimum, it may be conceived to extend westward to the Arab lands of the Nile Valley and eastward to the eastern borders of Iran, and also as including the island of Cyprus. At a maximum, it may be conceived as engrossing the northern tier of North Africa and extending eastward to India's western borders to include landlocked Afghanistan and the western province of Pakistan. The minimal delineation encloses thirteen juridically independent countries—Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Turkey and Yemen—and, along the southeastern and northeastern coasts of the Arabian Peninsula, a Crown Colony and two protectorates of the United Kingdom and three dozen or so sultanates, emirates, and sheikdoms with special relations with the United Kingdom. Thus conceived, the area includes some three million square miles and populations of some ninety-five millions. The broader compass adds six countries—Afghanistan, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia—aggregating two million square miles and roughly doubles the population.

The history reflected in the terms Near East and Middle East is quite recent. Near East rose a century or so ago as a short term for a zone of political turbulence occasioned by, or occasioning, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The alternate phrase, Middle East, originated six decades ago by an American navalist, Admiral Mahan, to denote a conceptual strategic area centered on the Persian Gulf. It came into wide use only in World War II to denominate a zone of strategic concern interposing between the European Theater of Operations and the China-Burma-India Theater. Both terms "are relics of a world with Western Europe in the centre, and other regions around it." 3/ To more successful and resourceful states beyond it, the general area came to be regarded as a way station, a transit zone, important for accesses to what lay beyond. Motivations of exterior powers dealing with the area were ulterior to it. Imaginative policy makers from beyond its compass were wont to project unity and tidiness for it. Thus Lord Palmerston, detailing British policy a century ago, disavowed coveting any part of the area "... any more than any rational man with an estate in the north of England and a residence in the south would have wished to possess the inns on the North Road. All he could want would have been that the inns should be well kept, always accessible, and furnishing him, when he came, with mutton chops and post horses." 4/

For inhabitants, however diverse their frames of values and intense their mutual animosities, their environs were the center of significance. The great issues were suppressed ones close at hand, rooted in ancient rivalries and reflecting frustrations inherited from a scarcely remembered past.

In a scholar's description, the Middle East had been "throughout recorded history, the most frequently invaded region of the globe." 5/ Recorded history indeed began with that region as the scene and source of the significant actions. Migrations and marches and countermarches on conquest traversing it were paramount events of early epochs. History's protagonists then did not simply act on the area but were based within it. In multifarious succession, various groups wrested some portion of land as a base for further expansions or a foothold to be held against subsequent intruders. The area's present heterogeneity got an early start.

Notably in Rome's imperial centuries, initiative and primacy devolved westward and northward, but the eclipse did not endure. For the better part of a millenium preceding

3/ Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1963), p.9.

4/ Quoted by Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hoder & Stoughton, 1957), p. 375.

5/ Dankwart Rustow, in Sydney Nettleton Fisher (ed.), The Military in the Middle East (Columbia: Ohio State University Press, 1963), p.5.

the onset of what is called modern times, the area was partially restored to high significance. On the eve of that onset, two organized societies, based within the area, standing back to back, and exercising dominion over great scopes, blocked the other parts of the Old World. One—still potent as a source of myth and frustration to Arab peoples—was an Arabic Muslim society then ruling the Indian Ocean and exercising paramountcy to the western limits of the Mediterranean and thence southward to Senegal; the second, an Iranic Muslim society supreme around the Aegean, the Black, and the Caspian Seas, to the middle courses of the Volga, and to China and Bengal.

The modern era may properly be said to have begun with the envelopment of that double interdiction—first by development of Western European maritime capabilities to outflank the one roadblock, and second by Russian conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, thus opening a way through the Urals, securing a foothold on the Caspian, and contributing to eventual securing of access to the Black Sea. 6/

Encircled and divested of primacy, the countries of the area entered into a long decline and eclipse—increasingly subject to heterogeneous forces and particularist traditions within. A conglomeration of political societies asserted or resisted authority. Central institutions were weakened, and general life became marked by inertia and instability. Save for the phase of Ottoman imperial success, no states of the area could be said to stand in the first or even the second rank of significance in world affairs. Beginning with Napoleon's expeditions to the Nile and Palestine, much of the region passed under outsiders' dominion for roughly a century and a half.

It is standard practice to apply the modifier "changing" in discussing the Middle East. The progressive relinquishment of outside control and emergence, locality by locality, into juridic autonomy in recent decades and especially since World War II are among the principal circumstances reflected in this emphasis on change as a characteristic of the area. Change has manifold other aspects—for example, the widespread striving for modernity and the resulting conflict with tradition in the component countries, and alterations of strategic potential by developments related to nuclear weaponry and rocketry. Change, however, is only one trait. To a significant extent, the area is retentive of old characteristics under new conditions, so that shifting and continuing traits are subtly intertwined.

A few broad generalizations—some old, some new—about an area so diverse may be ventured, with due account for exceptions.

One concerns the nearly complete pervasiveness of Islam. In mentioning this, one must take note of the exceptions—insular Cyprus, where a heavy majority under an Orthodox ethnarch is devoted to removing restrictions protective of the autonomy of a minority of Turkish derivation and to overturning the effects of propinquity to mainland Turkey; Lebanon, singular as a nominally Arab society held together on a basis of an uncertain equilibrium between Christian and Muslim components; and, probably most significant of all, Israel, unique as a state with ethnic, linguistic, and religious bases not shared by any other state anywhere. 7/ Islam's effect is widely variant as between such examples as secularized Turkey and theocratic Saudi Arabia, but should not be dismissed. In an observer's words:

> ...Religion means different things to different people. In the West it means principally a system of belief and worship, distinct from, and in modern times usually subordinate to, national and political allegiances. For Muslims it

6/ Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, Abridgement of Vols. VII-X by D.C. Somervell (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 167ff; Bernard Pares, A History of Russia, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1949) pp. 102-5.

7/ These three—with a potential as sources of issues vastly in disproportion to size—aggregate from three tenths of one per cent to half of one per cent of the territory and from one half per cent to three per cent of the population of the area as a whole, depending on whether the minimal or the maximal scope is assumed.

conveys a great deal more than that. Islam is a civilization—a term that corresponds to Christendom as well as Christianity in the West. No doubt, many local, national, and regional traditions and characteristics have survived among Muslim peoples, and have gained greatly in modern times; but upon all the peoples that have accepted them, the faith and law of Islam have impressed a stamp of common identity, which remains even when the faith is lost and the law has been abandoned. In our own time that stamp is growing dim, but it is still by no means effaced. 8/

Another concerns the prevailing newness of governing structures. Two of the political entities concerned—Turkey and Iran—are describable as

> ...old sovereign states, with a habit of responsibility for their own survival and welfare. For them, national independence had been an accepted fact—an axiom of political life, in no need of assertion or demonstration. Though their independence has on occasion been threatened, it has never been lost, and their political thinking, with rare exceptions, has in consequence not been bedevilled by the problem of foreign rule and the struggle to end it. Their foreign policies, developed through practical experience over a long period, are directed toward the attainment of limited and definable national purposes, and are based on a normal mixture of tradition and calculation... 9/

The same can scarcely be said of any other constituent political entity of the area. The other states, even those operating under names of ancient historic memory, represent experiments in nationhood and independence of as yet brief duration. 10/

Virtually as a corollary, many—indeed most—of these states have not coalesced as political societies. In the general case, national identity is far from pervasive in the consciousness of person and groups. Links between regimes and peoples are in relatively low stages of development. Governments tend to be uncertain regarding general acknowledgement of their authority. A sense of contingency attends the existing state structures. The canons and institutions of public life are not at a high level. Apathy and turbulence, by turns, characterize the political climate within the respective states. In sum, the quality of rulership called legitimacy is not prevalent.

As one might expect, an accompanying trait is emphasis on ideology as a device to compensate for civic weakness and, as a corollary, on militancy in external relations. There are significant exceptions, but in the main regimes tend to direct their discourse toward great transformative goals. By the same token, the foreign policies prevailing in the area are revisionist—that is, guided in fact or at least in rhetoric and with variant intensities, toward the correction of alleged injustices, imperfections, or disadvantages in existing arrangements of jurisdiction. Thus, "the most important characteristic setting apart the Middle East as a subordinate international system is the ideological context of its politics, both domestic and external." 11/

A further germane characteristic—no novelty—concerns the role of military establishments in relation to internal rule. "Soldiers—in one observer's summation—have governed a majority of Middle Eastern countries almost continuously for at least a

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8/ Lewis, op. cit., p. 25.

9/ Ibid, p. 125. See also Badeau, op. cit., p. 50.

10/ Afghanistan's status in independence dates back to the Treaty of Rawalpindi of 1919. Saudi Arabia took form in 1926 and entered the nexus of diplomacy in 1927. Yemen's entry into international relations technically began at about the same time. Iraq's independence was formalized in 1930. Otherwise the countries of the area have all either come into existence as political entities or have succeeded to control of their external relations during or since World War II.

11/ Leonard Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East (New York: Wiley, 1964), p. 263.

millenium." 12/ The persistence of this characteristic into contemporary times is not surprising in an area generally, though not universally, marked by a deficiency of the attributes of civil culture. Among the reasons for military primacy, according to an observer of the area: "... Perhaps the most compelling one is that in an unformed society the army is often the only institution that provides discipline, a sense of mission, education, and training in administrative and technical skills..." 13/

Yet another characteristic, summing up the rest, is the one referred to at the outset—the obduracy of the area, particularly as it relates to preferences entertained by outsiders. As stated by one observer:

> ...the great power relationship has an important bearing on Middle Eastern affairs, but the latter may not be understood wholly or even primarily in terms of the major international system. If power were to be likened to rays of light, we might say that extra-area power is 'refracted' when projected into the Middle Eastern element. If we are ever successful in quantifying power for purposes of international political analysis, we shall have to give that power separate coefficients in each system. The concept of subordinate system complicates the problem of quantifying power, but it also complicates the problem of reducing the international system to a set of rules... 14/

That enduring trait of obduracy, however, has taken on new forms and complexities in the circumstances of recent and contemporary times. To understand these circumstances, one must look beneath clichés concerning Middle Eastern aspirations to move beyond the limitations of the imperial past. The issues active in the area are not simply as between past and future. Various aspiring groups, in trying to get rid of elements of the past, are usually intent on preserving, reviving, and vindicating other elements of the past. The divisions are over the question of whose past is to prevail as a pattern for the future. With these questions in the forefront, in the wake of imperial dominance, the area tends to lose the conceptual unity with which outsiders' policies tended to regard it in earlier times. Instead, the area divides into two separable zones. A basic misassumption in western powers' policy undertakings in the 1950's with respect to the Middle East, manifested in the project for a Middle East Defense Organization and then in the project initially known as the Baghdad Pact, lay in trying to disregard the cleavage and to fit two inherently diverse zones into one pattern of policy.

One main zone may conveniently be called the Arab Middle East, without prejudice to the fact that it also, and emphatically, includes Israel. This zone divides logically into four territorial components: first, the range of land bracketed by the easternmost limits of the Mediterranean and the head of the Persian Gulf and generally called the Fertile Crescent; second, the Arabian Peninsula; third, the Nile Valley countries; and fourth, the other lands west of Egypt along the Mediterranean coast of Africa within the limit assumed as the western reach of the Middle East.

The other of the two main zones is a northern tier of states extending from the line of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus to whatever is assumed as the easternmost reach

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12/ Manfred Halpern in John J. Johnson (ed.) The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1962, p. 277.

13/ John Campbell in Fisher, op. cit., p. 107. As "the one important explanation of the army's role in Middle Eastern politics" one authority cites Thomas Hobbes' aphorism to the effect "that in politics, when no other card is agreed upon, clubs are trumps." Rustow, loc. cit., p. 4. The point states a correlation rather than an explanation. One is left still to wonder about the failure to agree to some alternative to having clubs as trumps—about the sparseness and weakness of institutions of civil rule.

14/ Binder, op. cit., p. 262.

of the Middle East and including at the maximum Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It may also be described as consisting of the non-Arab range of the Middle East. 15/

II. The Alliances and Alignments

The Arab Zone

Arab pervasion of the Middle East through the expanses southward of Turkey and Iran is perhaps the most significant basic factor bearing on the pattern of alliances and alignments through that broad zone. Arab identity is not clearly based on ethnic considerations but, rather, is cultural. Approximately four-fifths of the population over that wide range share in the language, the traditions, the general attitude toward others, and, with less precision, the expectations about the future summed up as Arabdom.

Exceptions represented by differentiated groups adhering to other languages, habits, and outlooks may be found in great numbers over the entire range. Usually they are too small in numbers, too scattered, and vocationally too undiversified to be in position to assert political autonomy to match their cultural separateness. Four instances of a different order, presenting latent or active political significance, are noteworthy. One exception concerns the Berbers, a people clinging to Hamidic culture and found in North Africa west of Libya. In numbers and vocational diversity, they are sufficient to lay a claim to being a political society on their own, but they are relatively inert politically. In contrast, the Kurds, also a culturally separate group distributed over the northern parts of the Fertile Crescent and in the adjoining areas to the north, are in a significant degree politically conscious. Especially in Iraq, they constitute a challenge to Arab predominance. 16/ Still a third significant grouping concerns the Nilotic peoples forming the majority in the southern portions of the Sudan. These are culturally and religiously separate from the Arabs predominant in the northern portion and ascendant in the ruling structure generally. They present an active challenge to the unity and stability of the country. 17/ The fourth instance, most noteworthy of all, relates to Israel, where a culturally and religiously differentiated people have established and maintain an independent state in a land asserted by Arabs to be rightfully theirs. The position held effectively bisects the Arab zone on a line from the Mediterranean southwest of Gaza to Eliat on the Gulf of Aqaba.

The issue over the existence of an independent Israel, essentially a dispute over control of territory, is rooted in conflicting versions of historic right, with points of reference in differing epochs of the past. The Arab case asserts historic title to govern over the entire zone stretching from the Atlantic Coast of North Africa to the Persian Gulf and including all of the Fertile Crescent, as an inheritance from an Arab empire

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15/ The distinctiveness of the two zones in respect of patterns of alliance and alignment may be taken here as, for all practical purposes, complete. Only one relationship susceptible of being described as an official alignment bridges the division—and it is one of doubtful material importance. It is the Treaty of Saadabad of 1937, which on its face engages Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, in the northern tier, and Iraq, in the Fertile Crescent, to refrain from interference in each other's internal affairs, to respect mutual frontiers, and to consult over any threat to their common interests posed by an international conflict. See Donald N. Wilber, Iran, Past and Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955) p. 179. If not an alliance, the treaty was designed to present at least a framework for alliance in event of a contingency understood but not specifically expressed—to wit, a serious effort to bring about a Kurdish national state. Never having been denounced, the Saadabad pact remains at least technically in force, but its substantial significance is highly questionable. In illustrating the substantial separateness of the northern tier and the more southerly reaches of the Middle East, its latency is perhaps more significant than the fact of its technical existence.

of roughly a millenium ago. Israeli claims to statehood rest on an asserted antecedent in the Kingdom of Israel of 933 to 722 B.C., revived in 168 to 63 B.C. The nature of the challenge to Arab aspirations posed by Israeli independence, though largely psychological, is nonetheless real and important. The relation to Arab ambitions and frustrations is a subtle one to be understood only by taking account of tensions and contradictions within Arabdom itself.

The collectivity of Arab states is deeply affected by tension between a concept of unity and factors of diversity. The forces of unity are often summed up by observers and by Arabs themselves as constituting an Arab nationhood or nationalism. The phrase is probably too vague to qualify as national in any ordinary sense. 18/ On the other hand, the fact of having a common language is an important and basic circumstance over the Arab zone. In a full sense, the Arab states do share a universe of discourse. Their peoples read papers, listen to radio broadcasts, and respond to slogans from other Arab lands. Successful political personalities within one land wield influence directly on the populaces of other Arab lands. The dialogues between regimes and peoples tend to become interspersed to an unusual degree. Arabdom is thus to a significant extent a manifestation of a common state of mind. It responds to the rhetoric of Arab unity, rising from an array of common assumptions about the past projected into futurity.

By tradition, the Arab peoples were unified in the remote past, when Arabs' relative power was at its height, and are rightfully one people still. In unity, the argument goes, they would enjoy anew the scope and power in relation to other peoples and areas asserted to have been theirs in an earlier epoch. Against the abstraction of unity, the Arab range is divided into more than a dozen separate rulerships. The divisions into particular

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16/ For a summary of background of the Kurdish question, see U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, op. cit., pp. 53-55. Kurdish national self-determination was promised in the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Kurdish rebellions, aimed toward national independence, beset Turkey, Iraq, and Iran sporadically in the 1930s and 1940s. Kurdish aspirations continue to operate as an imponderable factor in Middle Eastern affairs. They are voiced ambiguously as between national independence and autonomy and equality within the frameworks of existing states. Kurdish sentiment is strongly opposed to Arab unification as a development bound to reduce the Kurds' standing as an ethnic minority with a cultural identity traced back to ancient Sumeria. Estimates of Kurdish numbers vary from three and a half million, with eight and a half million referred to as a probably firm figure, with some 45 per cent in Turkey, 30 per cent in Iran, 18 per cent in Iraq, and the balance in Syria and the Soviet Union. Much more conservative estimates of Kurdish strength, however, are given by some authorities, as for example The Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle East: a Political and Economic Survey (London: 1950), p. 436. Whatever the numbers, the Kurdish potential as a nation is enhanced by their variety—"a complete people in that they include farmers, city dwellers, and nomads and carry on a variety of occupations." Carleton S. Coon, Caravan: The Story of the Middle East (New York: Holt, 1951), p. 215.

17/ The Sudanese situation has been summed up as follows by an observer of the area: "The Sudan, though a member of the Arab League, is only partly Arab. The northern two-thirds of the country is inhabited by Arabic-speaking Muslims. The southern third is peopled by Nilotic negroes who are not Muslims and do not speak Arabic. The Sudan's connection with Egypt goes back for centuries, but it is too deeply embedded in Africa and too conscious of its borders with Ethiopia, Uganda, and the Congo to think or act solely as an Arab state. Independence was inspired and stimulated by the Arab nationalist movement and by Egyptian efforts to substitute union with Egypt for British control. But the Sudan has made clear its determination, first, to remain independent and, second, to serve its African as well as its Arab interest." Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 116-17.

18/ In one observer's apt words, "Politically, the problem is that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as 'Arab Nationalism'." Reinhold Niebuhr, The Disaster of U.S. Policy, The New Leader, Aug. 18, 1958, p. 9.

states are regarded as arising from conditions imposed by outside powers in a time of Arab subordination. They thus symbolize and bring actively into the present influences that represent factors which in the past succeeded in dividing Arabdom and depriving it of its control of the great sweep of land from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. The fact of resumption of independence by almost all Arab lands and peoples within recent memory is of small consolation to Arab emotions, so long as Arabdom remains divided into lesser parts by lingering imperial control. On the other hand, the ruling establishments in various Arab lands do have real concern in their own continuity. In practical considerations as opposed to abstract ones, the Arab lands reflect a diversity of interests related to differing economic resources and stakes, to divergent historic experiences, and to contrasting relationships to outside powers.

Particularities among the varied Arab lands stand in the way of giving substance to the rhetoric of Arab unity. On the other hand, the appeal of Arab unity is so strong that no Arab regime can flout it, and every Arab regime feels compelled to emphasize it in declaratory policy. Yet the whole idea of political unification as the only ultimately rightful form of political power over Arab lands tends to impinge on the legitimacy of existing Arab regimes. The result is a paradox bordering on contradiction. Arab regimes in general feel compelled to pay tribute to ideas tending to discredit their own rightful existence. But Arab regimes go on trying to maintain their separate existence counter to the ideal unity they vaunt.

The continued existence of Israel in defiance of the Arabs' repeatedly proclaimed intentions is the main focus of Arab ambivalence and frustration. In the Arab view, Israel is not merely the main flaw impinging on perfect realization of the aspiration to renew Arab control of Arabdom's asserted heritage but is also an obdurate manifestation of Western imperial power. Israel's existence is accounted for as an effect produced by Western designs and Western support.

The governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France are parties to an agreement of May 25, 1950, designed to promote military stabilization between Israel and the Arab states. By its terms, "The three Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation." The declaration also restricts arms shipments by the signatories to Israel and the Arab states contingent on assurances against using the arms for aggression. From the standpoint of the Arab states, the guarantee, instead of being a neutral proposition, aligns the guarantors on the side of Israel, although, ironically, on the sole occasion when the United States has acted under the guarantee, it acted in opposition to the other signatories. 19/

Opposition to Israel's existence and a proposition that Israel's presence is an aggressive one requiring ultimate elimination are the two ideas on which Arab unity has been able to manifest itself. Declaratory hostility to Israel's existence as an outpost of purported Western imperial power, moreover, provides an opportunity for some of the Arab states to vindicate their doctrinal regularity even while continuing to enjoy Western patronage. 20/

The Arab aspiration to reclaim all of an asserted homeland suffers other impingements in continued British tenure of positions and special relationships on the more remote coasts of the Arabian Peninsula. The Arab governments jointly have 21/ pressed

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19/ Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 516.

20/ In one observer's words, "In Arab eyes, Israel is a powerfu' colossus, influential in the hierarchies of the world's great powers. Thus World Zionism, with its invaluable assistance to Israel, is a specter constantly raised by the Arabs in answer to Israelis' description of their apparent physical limitations." Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: Holt, Rinehard & Winston, 1963), p. 296.

21/ The pattern of British relationships relevant to this region, of considerable complexity, is detailed in H.B. Sharabi, Government and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962), pp. 262 ff.

demands in the United Nations for independence for the sultanate of Oman and for investigation into political conditions within the Crown Colony of Aden and surrounding protectorates. 22/ The Israeli problem, however, is what most sharply epitomizes the Arab states' collective failure to act effectively while representing the one point on which they have been able to coalesce at all. Israel is interwoven with the history of the League of Arab States—both its failures to achieve its goals and its success in holding onto existence at all.

The League is the preeminent and most inclusive international alignment in the range concerned. It was founded in the late stages of World War II with the United Kingdom's encouragement in hope of providing a framework for stability and cooperation in an area then on the threshhold of many problems related to the prospective emergence of a considerable number of Arab countries into independence. The League rests formally on a principle of mutual respect for autonomy—with each member state pledged to "respect the form of government obtaining in other States of the League. . .and. . .not to take any action tending to change that form." The League began with the participation of all Arab states then independent. Those subsequently attaining independence have been added so that the League includes all predominantly Arab areas except the enclaves of lingering British influence along the Arabian littoral. 23/ Palestine is given vicarious representation as a symbol of frustrated Arab ambitions to overcome Israel. The League stands as the oldest existing regional organization countenanced by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 24/ Among them, its compass is unique in being described in cultural rather than territorial terms. The framework of cooperation is stated with more completeness and explicitness than that of any other regional international organization.

The League is conceived as an institution for establishing unified policies over a wide range of policy concerns—economic matters and finance, including trade, customs, currency, agriculture, and industry; communications, including railways, highways, aviation, navigation, posts, and telegraph; cultural affairs; matters concerned with nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments, and extradition; social welfare, and health. Clearly such a broad scope of collaboration, if fulfilled, would put the Arab states in position of presenting a united establishment in dealing with states beyond the realm. This concept is borne out in a provision whereunder the League would perform in unity in relation to all international organizations of a wider span, including implicitly the United Nations.

The League is conceived also as an organ for settling disputes in lieu of use of force, which members undertake to renounce in their relations with each other. With respect to disputes which get out of hand between members, the League is to function as a collective security organization. With respect to aggressions or threats affecting a member from the outside, the League is designed as an institution for collective defense. By terms of an additional Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Treaty entered into in 1950, the principle of considering an act of aggression against any member to be an act of aggression against all is specified. 25/ This embellishment is a reflection of characteristics of the Organization of American States and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, both of which came into existence subsequently to the Arab League as originally designed, and also to the intervening experience of a breakdown of military collaboration in the so-called first Palestine war undertaken to prevent the establishment of Israel.

The supreme authority within the League structure is a Council inclusive of repre-

22/ New York Times, Nov. 29, 1962 and May 4, 1963.

23/ The originating members were Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. The ones subsequently added are Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia.

24/ It actually preceded the Charter. The date of origin of the Arab League pact was March 22, 1945. For a text of the pact, see B.Y. Boutros-Ghali, "The Arab League", International Conciliation, No. 498. pp. 444-47.

25/ The date of origin was June 17, 1950. For the text, see ibid., pp. 447-48.

sentatives of all member states. The Council is obliged to meet twice yearly. 26/ At other times, it is subject to being called into session by any two member states or, in event of an aggression or threat of aggression, by one member. On procedural and organizational matters a majority vote is to be decisive. On substantive matters, unanimity ordinarily is required. A dispute between two members voluntarily submitted by them to the Council may be settled by a majority vote of the members other than the disputants, however, and the disputants are pledged to abide by the decision. The Council is authorized also to mediate between members or between members and a nonmember in a dispute likely to lead to war, and its actions are in such cases to be effective on a majority vote subject to concurrence by the disputants. In acting against an aggression committed by one member against another, unanimity of all except the transgressor is required. In deciding on collective action to repel aggression from outside, the requirement is absolute unanimity.

The Council is supported by a Permanent Secretariat headed by an elected Secretary General and a staff drawn from all Arab states, with an array of subordinate operating units. The Council also has an elaborate set of committees composed of appropriate ministers of member states dealing with specialized functions related to the League's undertakings of collaboration in technical and welfare matters. The most ambitious supporting structure, however, is indicated for the collaboration in economic cooperation and joint defense pledged in the 1950 treaty.

An Economic Council, consisting of Ministers for Economic Affairs of participating states is to meet annually 27/ to coordinate recommendations—requiring a simple majority vote—to the Council for giving effect to purposes "to bring about...prosperity in Arab countries...and to raise the standard of life in them" and "to collaborate for the development of their economic conditions, the exploitation of their natural resources, the exchange of their respective agricultural and industrial products, and generally to coordinate their economic activities."

A Joint Defense Council is established to give effect to a parallel pledge of participating states to cooperate "in consolidating and coordinating their armed forces." It consists of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Defense of those states. It is a joint planning body, with a requirement of a two-thirds majority for decisions. Immediately below it, as a staff appurtenance, is a Consultative Military Organization composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the military establishments of member governments. It in turn is served by a Permanent Military Commission composed of representatives of the chiefs of the respective armed establishments. The Council, thus staffed, is to inventory the military resources of the members, to prepare plans for dealing with "all anticipated dangers or armed aggression," to project appropriate military contributions to be made by members in event of common military action, to prepare proposals for organizing and correlating the armed forces of all member states, including minimum force levels; to prepare proposals for improving and modernizing training and equipment with a view to unifying the forces; to prepare plans for economic warfare involving the exploitation of natural, agricultural, industrial, and other resources against any common enemy; and so on. Only one final element of military coordination is missing—unified command itself. This is reserved until the moment of the onset of hostilities, whereupon unified command will be entrusted to the state having the largest military contingent in the field—unless the member states should unanimously decide otherwise.

The League's deliberations are secretive. Scant information about its operations is published. What is forthcoming is generally confined to Arabic. Yet some clear conclusions, mostly negative, can be drawn. The disparity between precept and performance has been great. The fact of nonfulfillment remains an abiding factor in Arab discourse. With all the solemnly proclaimed goals of cooperation, the Arab states have managed an abiding unity only on the proposition of desiring the obliteration of Israel as a state.

26/ No limitation of numbers of representatives from any state is specified, but each state is limited to one vote.

27/ Libya alone among the League members is excepted from participation, not having ratified the additional treaty.

The reasons for the shortcomings are not abstruse. Inter-Arab economic cooperation, however salutary as an abstraction, has small basis in practicality. The Arab states are not complementary to each other as markets and producing areas to the degree necessary to realize the goals. The sources of what they need, and the places where they must seek markets, are largely beyond the Arab realm. The situation is still as described a few years ago—

> ...to a great degree the Powers still govern the destinies of the Middle East —far more directly than they govern, for example, those of Southeast Asia or South America. For one thing, the Arab countries are (oil apart) practically barren of natural resources. They depend for their progress and their security upon the industrial systems of the outside world. Several states benefit from foreign subsidies, of one kind or another. 28/

The idea of joint use of resources becomes largely a claim by the states lacking petroleum to share in the advantages falling to those endowed with it. 29/ Notwithstanding their periodic assertions of anxiety and defiance regarding Israel, the Arab states have not been united by common considerations in reference to security. The Israeli menace is ritualistically alluded to throughout the Arab area, but it is not uniformly felt as a reality. Pledges of mutual respect for each other's autonomy are faithfully repeated in Arab discourse. At the same time, as stated by one observer: "We also have the spectacle of several Arab leaders who, while professing attachment to the goal of Arab unity, engage in violent personal attacks on each other and become involved in intrigues and subversive movements in each other's states." 30/

A basic factor in the disappointing record rises from Egypt's special position—implicit in the Arab League undertaking. Egypt's inherent predominance is derived in part from central position in the Arab range and in part from advantage in population. It is enhanced by articulate leadership, characterized by a talent for intrigue. Egypt's ascendancy is reflected in the headquartering of the League in Cairo and in the provision for assigning unified command of Arab forces, in the contingency of hostilities, to the state with the largest forces in the field—Egypt. The military undertakings contemplated in the Arab League, if realized, would undoubtedly tend toward subordination of other Arab forces to Egyptian control. That point alone would suffice to explain why the pledge collaboration has never been fulfilled in practice. Egypt's preeminence in advocacy of Arab unity, appearing as pharaonism to other asserted devotees of Arab unity, thus stands in the way of the cause. As others put it, 31/ there can be no Arab unity without Egypt, and no Arab unity with it.

The Northern Tier

Two of the states of the northern tier of the Middle East reflect a revisionist attitude—that is, an attitude of dissatisfaction with existing arrangements of jurisdiction—found broadly over the Arab portion. These are Afghanistan and Pakistan, both of them conditioned by relative short experience in world affairs.

Afghanistan's revisionist aims, by turns active and latent, pertain to what is probably a desire for access to the sea. They focus in a challenge to the finality and legitimacy of

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28/ James Morris, "Four Clues to the Mideast," New York Times Magazine, Dec. 8, 1957, p. 9.

29/ For example, the President of Syria, as reported in the New York Times, March 9, 1965: "He directed his remarks to the states of the Persian Gulf, which he called 'artificial' and which he said 'have wealth far exceeding their requirements.'" The account continues: "The wealth of the gulf states, he said, 'is not the property of these states alone; it also belongs to the entire Arab nation.' He added: 'Therefore it must be mobilized in the Arab battle.'"

30/ Cremeans, op. cit., p. 19.

31/ Lewis, op. cit., p. 93.

Pakistan's grip on its northwestern borderlands. This difference, which aligns Afghanistan against Pakistan, has quieted down somewhat in the past two years—a consequence of a Cabinet change in Afghanistan and of mediatorial efforts by the Shah of Iran. Afghanistan has continued, as over the preceding decade, to receive assistance from the Soviet Union, including military assistance, which extends to training and to the creation of military infrastructure. To this degree, Afghanistan may be described as aligned with the Soviet Union, though it has not been the beneficiary of active Soviet support on respect of its external issues.

Pakistan's revisionist attitude concerns territorial arrangements with India, principally the disposition of Jammu and Kashmir. It is motivated also to seek exterior material and diplomatic support to redress its disadvantages in numbers and resources in relation to India.

The purpose has carried Pakistan into wide-ranging ventures in diplomacy and in military alignments. In the first phase following independence, Pakistan sought—in vain, as time proved—to enhance its relative position by cultivating close ties with other states having preponderantly Muslim populations in hope of establishing itself in preeminence among them. In the second phase, beginning roughly a dozen years ago, Pakistan sought to develop and to capitalize on, a special relationship with the United States. It became a participant in the Manila Treaty of 1954 and in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization designed to give effect to that treaty. At the time, Pakistan sought to amend the project so as to make it relevant to Pakistan's territorial differences with India. Denied this aim, Pakistan went along with the project anyway. Pakistan persevered in emphasizing its asserted special relationship with the United States—with a view to redressing the balance against India—until this idea was deprived of most of its value by the United States' extension of military assistance to India in the sequel to the Chinese incursions from Tibet in late 1962.

The other two of the four northern-tier countries, namely Turkey and Iran, are singular among Middle Eastern states in being long-established in independence and fairly self-assured of their status. Both—also a relatively rare characteristic within the area—are non-revisionist; that is, satisfied concerning the existing arrangement of jurisdiction. 32/ With respect to security, both are preoccupied mainly with pressures from the north—from the Soviet Union, with which Turkey is contiguous for some 300 miles and Iran for some 700.

In Turkey's case, the pressure is associated with Russian ambitions and anxieties concerning control of Russian maritime access to the exterior world through the Straits and has a background running far back into the Tsarist epochs. Against this pressure, Turkey, for more than a century, has had to rely on outside support. By turns, its patron was usually either Germany or Great Britain. The latter's material incapacity to carry on that role, combined with the circumstance that Soviet pressure was then impinging heavily on Turkish control in the Straits area, was one of the circumstances occasioning the Truman Doctrine in 1947, and the launching of the United States policy of containing the Soviet Union with the bounds of its position as then established. The United States took up a function formerly discharged by European powers. What began in the Eastern Mediterranean was soon enlarged to encompass the broad expanse of Europe in the European Recovery Program and then the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Turkey was included initially in the former and, after brief delay, was incorporated into the latter undertaking.

In Iran's case, the pressure relates to Russian wishes—occasionally manifested and presumably ever latent—to gain control of an alternative water route through the Persian Gulf. As an additional factor, Iran lies athwart a potentially significant land route from

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32/ Turkey is sometimes appraised as inherently revisionist, being a former empire recently divested of its imperial holdings. In high probability, however, "the Westernized official classes . . . have found in the Turkish nation . . . an adequate compensation for the loss of . . . an unmanageable empire." Binder, op. cit., p. 18.

the Soviet Union to more southerly ranges of the Middle East. In a succinct expression of the matter—

> ...No country of the Middle East has had as much experience of Russia as Iran. And of all Middle Eastern countries Iran is the one to have experienced repeated Russian invasion and occupation of its territory. Since the turn of the century the Russians have invaded and occupied Iranian territory three times, from 1909 to 1911, 1914 to 1918, and 1941 to 1946. Twice after the Communists took power in 1917 a Soviet republic was established on Iranian soil under Russian protection: in Gilan in 1920 and in Azerbaijan in 1945. 33/

Iranian resistance in the latter episode—with strong and articulate support from the United States—is often cited as the first overt break in the unity of the prevailing coalition of World War II: the opening signal of the Cold War.

A broad distinction between the northern tier countries and the predominantly Arab zone is implicit in what has been said. The inward-looking tendency characteristic of the Arab Middle East, with regimes preoccupied with the inter-play of concord and animosity in issues close at hand, is not duplicated in the northern tier. Afghanistan is somewhat of an exception, but the others are concerned with security problems arising from beyond the zone. The difference shows in the pattern of alliances and alignments.

The broadest alliance relevant to the northern tier originated as a device not only for drawing three of the countries, namely Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran, together into a mutual defense arrangement by which Western—specifically British and, more importantly, United States—military strength might be brought to bear to provide bolstering against pressure from the Soviet Union. It was originally designed also to extend into the Arab portions of the Middle East. This fact is indicated in the original name—the Baghdad Pact—for the instrument was first signed between Turkey and Iraq on February 24, 1955. 34/ By an article still included, the pact is "open for accession to any member state of Arab League." By inference, this provision, if realized upon, would erode the Arab League. The pact was—and remains—an undertaking whereby the contracting parties "will cooperate for their security and defense," whereas the Arab League is designed as an instrument of like purpose on an Arab basis exclusively.

With its focus reduced to the northern tier by Iraq's defection following the overturn in 1958 of the regime that had subscribed to the Baghdad Pact, the venture has been renamed the Central Treaty Organization. On its face, the Pact is focused on security and defense primarily. The mutual obligations are not articulated. The contract embraces merely cooperation for security and defense and leaves it to "competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties" to "determine the measures to be taken." By pursuant agreement, a permanent Council has been established and meets once or twice a year, usually attended by chiefs of government or by Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers. A council of deputies consisting of a representative of the Turkish Foreign Office and ambassadors accredited to Turkey by the member states meets fortnightly. A Secretariat, under a Secretary General chosen by unanimous agreement of the participants, functions continuously.

The only member from beyond the northern tier is the United Kingdom. The United States, however, participates by invitation in the Council, in the deputies' activities, and in the CENTO committees. Its abstention from formal membership has been explained unofficially as due to anxiety to avoid complicating relations with both Israel and its Arab adversaries and officially as due to there being no necessity for formal adherence in view of preexisting links with the members—co-membership with the United Kingdom and Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and with the United Kingdom and Pak-

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33/ Sharabi, op. cit., p. 4.

34/ For the text, see The Story of the Central Treaty Organization (Ankara: CENTO Public Relations Division, 1959), pp. 38-39.

istan in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and mutual defense assistance agreements with Iran made in 1950 and with Iraq and Pakistan in 1954. 35/

In the summer of 1958, the United States was strongly pressed to adhere. Instead, it proffered and entered into much stronger bilateral agreements with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. The agreements, subject to being renounced by either participant on a year's notice, reflect a grant of authority approved by Congress in 1957 in a Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, asserting that "the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East"—an expression not defined—and declaring the United States' readiness, when the President might find it necessary, "to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism." The relevant agreements, besides 36/ pledging the United States to continued "military and economic assistance as may be mutually agreed upon," promises "In case of aggression... the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution... will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon...in order to assist"—subject to a request of the government to be assisted. 37/

Though much hedged about, the agreements project some calculable probability of military involvement on the part of the United States in extremity. As elements in the alliance pattern of the northern tier, they are probably of more substantial importance than the Central Treaty Organization itself. The organization has developed in directions not even hinted at in the originating pact, assuming increasingly the character of a regional organization for cultural and economic cooperation. 38/

Cyprus

Cyprus belongs in this account not because it is closely related to the political problems in wider ranges of the Middle East but because it does fall within the area as usually defined. With an area of 3,572 square miles, it is within 40 miles of the southern coast of Turkey and 60 miles of Syria. Its population of somewhat less than three-quarters of a million is four-fifths of Greek extraction—the balance being mostly Turkish. Under the sentiment of self-determination, the idea of union with Greece—700 miles away--runs strongly. Strategically, however, the island is of great importance to Turkey because of its proximity to the Turkish southern littoral. Its potential as a bone of contention between Turkey and other countries was neutralized by the United Kingdom occupation, with Turkish consent, in 1878. The arrangement was entered into as part of a Turko-British alliance against Russia. It was annexed by the United Kingdom on Turkey's entry into World War I in 1914 and ceded by Turkey in 1923. In 1925 it became a Crown Colony.

A long struggle for independence culminated in the establishment of a separate republic in 1960. The constitution represents a compromise designed to satisfy Greek, Turkish, and United Kingdom interests. The President is to be of Greek blood, the Vice President of Turkish. The Vice President is to have a veto power on foreign affairs, defense, and some financial questions. Both President and Vice President are to appoint ministers—seven to be Greek and three Turkish. The same ratios are to apply in the elected legislature, in addition to which the Greek and Turkish populations are to have separate legislative chambers for communal affairs. Cyprus undertakes to preserve its independence. This is guaranteed by the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey, and Greece is entitled to keep 950 troops and Turkey 600 troops on the island as garrisons, while the United Kingdom is assured continued access to bases.

35/ Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf, 1962), pp. 796-97.
36/ Ibid., pp. 791-92.
37/ For a prototype text, see The Central Treaty Organization, pp. 40-42.
38/ See article by Warren Unna in The Washington Post, Aug. 2, 1964.

This complex arrangement has been at issue ever since. To the Greeks on Cyprus, it impinges on their rights to run their own affairs in independence. The issue reverberates into Greek politics. To the Turks, the prospect of overturning the jerry-built constitution represents a threat to ethnic Turks on Cyprus. The issue therefore reverberates into Turkish politics as well. The problem has been made more complicated by Soviet and Egyptian support of the ethnic Greek cause on Cyprus—presenting Turkey with a danger of hostile lodgement nearby.

Cyprus presents an instance of artificial and therefore unstable alignment.

III. The Implications of Disarmament and Arms Control

The Arab Area

With respect to possible effects of measures for disarmament and arms control, the distinction between the two great zones comprising the Middle Eastern area needs recapitulation and emphasis.

The Arab Middle East is divided not only by a confrontation between Israel and the Arab states, particularly those in proximity. It presents also an array of complex and shifting divisions within the Arab circle such "that only an expert can be quite sure who is on which side at any given moment." 39/ The League of Arab States has alternated between ambiguous successes and outright failures in regard to its purpose of composing differences among the Arab states themselves. Its one enduring success in marshaling Arab unity has been in maintaining a front of opposition to the existence of Israel—but that has not been a success in the measure of achieving the end sought.

The interactions between Arabdom and Israel and the interplay between unity and animosity within the Arab zone itself have tended to become entangled with strategic and political differences between the great powers outside the area. This has been the case especially since the time nine years ago when Egypt, reacting to what it regarded as an attempt to supersede the League of Arab States by inclusion of Iraq in the Baghdad Pact and the extension of a general invitation to other League members to follow Iraq's lead, countered by arranging to acquire arms from sources within the Communist orbit. That development indicated, for states of the region, a power of choice that is new in recent history—a choice whether to cultivate relations with Western powers or with the Soviet Union or whether to play for advantages by cultivating relations in both directions. 40/

The Arab states have reacted differently. Syria followed the course set by Egypt in becoming amenable to Soviet assistance, overdid it, for a time amalgamated with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic so as to avoid Soviet domination altogether, then dissolved the tie with the United Arab Republic, but has continued as a client of Soviet assistance. Iraq has intermittently been involved as a recipient of Soviet assistance—by terms seeming to approach and then to draw away from the status of a Soviet client. Other Arab states, notably Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have, in contrast, relied on Western sources, particularly the United States, for military equipment.

The Soviet Union has been enabled to play its hand from a formal position of nonintervention; it adheres to the assertion that:

> ...The Soviet Union has no selfish purposes or hidden, ulterior motives in the Near and Middle East. The Soviet Union has no bases there; it has no oil concessions, no capital investments. The Soviet Union has not invested one

39/ James Morris, "Why the Arabs Do Not Unite," New York Times Magazine, Dec. 6, 1959, p. 28.

40/ Badeau, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

dollar in the economies of these countries. There is not one Soviet soldier in these countries. 41/

The United Arab Republic and Algeria, nevertheless, have accommodated themselves as way stations for transfer of Soviet military equipment for use in unconventional wars to the southward in Africa. An Egyptian military venture into Yemen, drawing on Soviet support, has provided the Soviet Union opportunity to construct an air complex in Yemen with a potential for Soviet use as a forwarding point between the Soviet Union and the southern reaches of Africa and as a facility even for reaching Cuba more conveniently. 42/

The United States, meanwhile, has persevered in a policy of trying to maintain a military balance of power in the Middle East and the Arab states. On this basis, it has channeled military items indirectly to Israel through the Federal Republic of Germany. The United Arab Republic has succeeded in the closure of this channel by the political maneuver of making a gesture toward establishing relations with the German Democratic Republic. The United Arab Republic has carried through its gesture anyway by receiving the head of the Communist regime in the People's Republic—the first such reception by a non-Communist state. In retaliation, the Federal Republic of Germany has proposed opening diplomatic relations with Israel. In counter-retaliation the United Arab Republic has rallied eleven Arab states to recall their diplomatic representatives from the Federal Republic. 43/

The United States has been under importunity from Israel as well as from Saudi Arabia and Jordan for military assistance—the first for standing as a direct client in military assistance and the latter two for increased amounts of assistance. Thus the United States has been presented with a dilemma in being the supplier of both sides in an arms race in pursuit of military balance. The United States has acceded to the undertakings. 44/ The supplying of arms is, of course, governed by the principles of the tripartite declaration of May 25, 1959, barring use of such arms for aggression.

The United Arab Republic's President has publicly challenged the concept of military balance: "If they buy 200 tanks and we buy 200 tanks, this is not the way. We must accomplish what they cannot do. We can mobilize five million. They cannot mobilize five million." 45/ The statement is an exaggeration amounting to hyperbole, but the discourse is linked to Arab threats over the past year to renew or at any rate to risk hostilities in a dispute with Israel over rival plans to preempt use of Jordan River waters. Each side calls the issue vital. The United Arab Republic's President has spoken dramatically of the extinction of Arabdom as the wage of failure in another military venture against Israel. The rhetoric may be discounted as exaggeration indulged in for purposes of political manipulation among and within the Arab states, but such discourse is a part of reality in the Arab zone, and Israel, as the one directly affected if the language should turn out to be something more than hyperbole, cannot afford to discount it altogether. Instead it has to maintain the state of military readiness cited on the other side, to justify its own cries of alarm and defiance. 46/

41/ The words are from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andre Gromyko, in the United Nations Security Council. New York Times, Aug. 14, 1958.

42/ Ibid., July 30, 1963.

43/ Ibid., March 11, 1965.

44/ Ibid., March 7, and April 10 and 14, 1965.

45/ Ibid., March 9, 1965.

46/ Israel's situation has been set forth as follows by J.C. Hurewitz in Fisher, op. cit., p. 92. "...A frontier of 750 miles—four-fifths of it on land—is uncommonly long for a country less than 8,000 square miles in size; the central coastal plain, for a distance of some thirty-five miles, is scarcely wider than a dozen miles; no point within Israel is more than ten minutes by slow, propeller-driven plane from a hostile land frontier; and the Mediterranean coast apart, Israel has no permanent boundaries. By resorting to economic and political blockade practices, the Arab governments continue to seek to isolate Israel. The state was born in a war for survival,

Viewed from the standpoint of calculating reason, the relevant zone of the Middle East seems to offer great opportunity for arrangements, reciprocal among the states concerned, for alleviating the dangers inherent in the existing military confrontation. Some of the possible arrangements have greater potential usefulness than others.

A budgetary limitation on military outlays, for example, would hardly be appropriate. If related to ratios of population, it would place Israel at a disadvantage in relation to its neighbors. If redressed in Israel's proportional favor, it would put the Arab states nearby on a presumably unacceptable inequality. An approach attempting to establish equilibrium on a basis of professional effective military forces again would not be fitting. Israel provides for security on the basis of a highly militarized civilian populace,—"the only example of a close identification of the military with society as a whole through universal military training and service," 47/ whereas the Arab states have vocationally separate military forces. An agreement on demilitarized border zones—with armies mutually withdrawn a certain distance for safety—again seems hardly applicable, because the narrowness of the Israeli position leaves no margin for such an arrangement.

On a purely theoretic basis, an instant communication service among seats of authority on the respective sides might seem to offer some usefulness. Examined in detail, its utility diminishes. The dangers to which one side or the other professes repeatedly to be compelled to respond are not necessarily subject to central knowledge and control. The inherent pattern of trust necessary to give relevance to such an arrangement is lacking, moreover. The stationing of interior observation forces in accord with some reciprocal accommodation might add marginally to the security provided by present arrangements for perimeter vigilance, but not much more than marginally. An additional conceptual possibility is the stationing of still further peace-observation forces in addition to those provided under existing armistice arrangements, but it is not clear that this would offer any increment of security to either side.

An agreement to desist from war-like propaganda or from disseminations designed to upset general tranquility would be of some usefulness in the area. It would indeed contribute to a betterment not only along the Israeli-Arab front, but also within the Arab zone itself. Even more to the point, a mutual agreement to stabilize competition in armament by ruling out or quantitatively limiting certain types of armament might contribute greatly to tranquilization of the area. Of special value would be dependable arrangements barring acquisition of nuclear capability, related both to the warheads and to delivery vehicles—a point reserved for further discussion.

An essential aspect to be taken into account in pondering the effects of measures thus to lessen tension and to abate the dangers of the continuing armed confrontation between Israel and its Arab neighbors is the probability that agreements on such measures would entail direct negotiations on matters of reciprocal concern between the opposed govern-

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and its neighbors have not yet given up the aspirations of wiping Israel off the Middle East map. Of this objective, the Israelis are reminded almost daily on the air and in the press by responsible Arab spokesmen.

"'You are at the moment seated,' Brigadier General Hayyim Herzog, Director of Military Intelligence, opened his address on military censorship in Israel before delegates to the International Press Institute conference at Tel-Aviv on May 30, 1961, 'within the range of the medium artillery of an army whose government (Jordan) maintains that it is in a state of war with Israel. Had your original plan been carried out, namely to meet in Herzliyah a few miles north of here, you would have been within field artillery range of the guns of the self-same army. When you visit the Knesset (in Jerusalem) you will be within light mortar range and in some Government offices you will be in pistol range.' This may sound like over-dramatization to some, but not to Israel's security planners, who are acutely conscious of their state's vulnerability and who argue that Israel cannot afford to lose a war, since it may never have a second chance..."

47/ John Campbell in Fisher, op.cit., p. 108.

ments—barring the conceivable alternative of a tacit agreement or arrangements concluded through third-party agency. Such negotiations would of themselves imply a reversal of the Arab case. They would signal willingness on the part of Arab states to deal with an independent Israel as a continuing reality in a position entitling it to enter into contracts rather than in impermanent intrusion. The reaching of agreement—or implicitly the act of negotiating in a political relationship—would indicate acceptance of a basis for mutual trust. Israel would be confirmed in statehood by its neighbors. Its boundaries, however demarcated, would be legitimized. Recognition by the Arab states of the existence of Israel as a permanent entity would involve a renunciation of the asserted Arab right to rule exclusively from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf—an abdication of the one proposition on which it has proved possible to make an enduring manifestation of the inter-Arab unity that is supposed to be both the basis and the purpose of the League of Arab States. The implications would not be substantially affected if some alternative to direct negotiations should be employed.

In this sense, some of the most profound effects that one might reasonably infer from an agreement or set of agreements between Israel and its Arab antagonists looking to disarmament and arms control on a regional basis would be inherent in conditions precedent to agreement. It is not simply a case of what results might be expected to flow from such a development. It is a case of hypothesizing the necessary transformations from which any formal undertaking of the character of such an agreement might result.

Israel's emergence into regular political relationships with the surrounding states might be expected to have enormous effects. In the Arab view—

> Israel has everything to gain and very little to lose by a peace settlement, even at the price of a generous compromise. For the Arabs are fearfully aware that an Israel, released from her present Ghetto-like existence to become part of her geographic, economic, and human environment, would be a dominant nation in the Middle East. 48/

Israel would have vindicated its case. Those who have led the way and have staked their prestige in opposing any concessions to Israel—notably the regime in Egypt, or the United Arab Republic—would be unequivocally refuted by events in a region in which considerations of face and prestige count enormously.

It is in point also to consider, theoretically, certain consequences presumably to flow from efforts to alleviate the problems of the zone through agreements by outside powers to act in concord with respect to the Arab countries and Israel. Here it is necessary to hypothesize that the outside powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, might find parallel, if not identical, interests as a basis for common action, however improbable the hypothesis might appear, when tested against reality. Such an undertaking putatively might extend to a renunciation of attempts to enlist political support in the area, to liquidation of the bases and renunciation of any future attempts to locate bases there, to withdrawal and withholding of outside forces, and to a joint refusal to deliver arms or certain types of arms.

A question whether it would fall within the capability of the powers concerned to make such undertakings effective—in view particularly of Communist China's options in the area—may be put aside for the moment, and the effectiveness may be assumed for purposes of analysis.

An attempt by outside powers to determine the future of the zone would in all probability be repugnant to the Arab states, especially those most militantly disposed on the issue of Israel's existence; for the essence of Arab aspiration has been, and remains, to establish the autonomy of the area and to move beyond the circumstances of a time when the basic situations and the basic decisions regarding the Arab realm were devised in the foreign offices of exterior powers. 49/

48/ Sharabi, op. cit., p. 179.
49/ Cremeans, op. cit., p. 8.

The effects of any agreement along the lines suggested would not necessarily all be peaceable. Specifically, for example, an attempt, if effective, to shut off the supply of military equipment to Jordan might well result in making it impossible for the existing regime to continue to claim support of the Jordanian military establishment—with consequences of being unable to hold on. The finishing off of that regime would open up a highly sensitive question of who would take over in the sequel. Israel presumably would act to preempt accession by any of the surrounding Arab regimes to the west bank of the Jordan River. 50/ The immediate consequence might well be the resumption of active hostilities.

The idea of agreement entailing renunciation of bases raises another set of speculative considerations. The position and interests of the great powers are asymmetrical in this regard, inasmuch as the Soviet Union formally has no bases in the region, while the United States and Great Britain do have. The British base at Aden, which provides a strategic anchor important for the entire Indian Ocean area, is probably the most significant of the positions retained. 51/ An agreement for vacating bases confined to the Arab zone would be disproportionate in strategic effects. It would probably be contrary to the interests of the Western powers unless linked to an undertaking for reciprocal resistance from all military measures in the region—such as would prevent the Soviet Union from using its accesses to such countries as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, the United Arab Republic, and Algeria.

On the other hand, it is highly improbable that the Soviet Union would ever accede to such an undertaking, without reciprocal retractions by Western powers, including the United Kingdon and the United States, from accesses to positions in a wider arc including such places as Cyprus, Turkey, and Iran. Such an agreement might be imaginable under an assumption that the great powers concerned had established a community of interest with respect to the entire area. A community of interest might be theoretically conceivable, everything else being equal, in event of the forming of common policies against Communist China. Yet that hypothetical development itself would probably require the retention of stakes in the area. Moreover, the practicability of any reciprocal undertaking between the Soviet Union and the United States and other western powers to place the whole zone militarily off-limits would depend on establishing such a wide concert in support of the undertaking that the restrictions could not be breached by some other government. Obviously, an agreement that neutralized the Soviet Union as a source of military aid to countries of the region, but left Soviet satellites unobligated, would be of no value. Obviously, also, an agreement that left Communist China unhindered as a source of military aid would be baleful in its effects.

The purpose here, however, is not to trace all the factors that render unlikely the realization of any such ranging agreement but to ponder its hypothetical effects, if it

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50/ The paradoxes in relation to assistance to Jordan have been covered briefly in an item by Sam Pope Brewer in the New York Times, Nov. 18, 1958. In essence, the Jordanian regime, though committed overtly to an anti-Israeli position, is in practice relatively moderate in its approach. Thus, Western military and other aid to Jordan, even though it is formally an enemy of Israel, helps maintain a situation implicitly more in the interest of peace in the neighborhood, and therefore more in Israel's interest, than any foreseeable alternative.

51/ An agreement with Algeria involving concession to the Soviet Union of submarine base rights was reported—but not confirmed—at the time of Nikita Khrushchev's visit there in May of 1964. Washington Post, May 26, 1964. The interpretation given was that the Soviet Union might be acquiring such a stake as a basis for trading off against the United States' base rights in Spain. An air base at Wheelus Field in Libya is the remaining significant establishment of the United States in this zone. It is operated under an agreement entered into in 1954 for a 17-year period, is not to be renewed on expiration, and may be vacated sooner. The British have base rights there for a 20-year period dating from 1953. These also will not be renewed on expiration. Liquidation of these bases has been agitated for intermittently by the United Arab Republic. New York Times, Aug. 23, 1964.

were reached, on alliances and alignments within the area. An agreement of that sort would not ipso facto reconcile Arabs and Israelis or tranquilize the relationships among Arab states. The League of Arab States would presumably continue as an expression of the goal of concord among a number of widely divergent and mutually distrustful states. The great effect would flow from the circumstances making such agreement a reality. They would signal a basic harmonizing of interest between the United States and other Western powers and the Communist realm, especially the Soviet Union. In such a situation, it would no longer be feasible for states of the area to play off one side against the other in the wider world. The leverage available especially to the more intransigent Arab states would be greatly diminished. That factor alone would have enormous consequences in reducing the scope of opportunity that has been open to the more militant Arab states.

The same observation applies—with emphasis—in an attempt to divine the consequences for the region of an effective undertaking for general and complete disarmament. In such a situation—insofar as it may be given to anyone to imagine what it would be like—the rivalry among great powers would have abated, mutual confidence would have been strengthened and institutionalized, and their strategic concerns would have been alleviated. The role of the region concerned as it developed in modern times would be drastically changed. No longer would it be a focus of interests on the part of great powers anxious for access to it because of interest in situations lying beyond its perimeters, and anxious to preempt it from use by strategic rivals. The basic intractability of the zone would no longer be of exigent concern to governments relieved, under new conditions in world relations, from having to worry about strategy. In that situation, the troubles of the zone would become, for perhaps the first time in all history, solely its own. Its contradictions and restless rivalries would simmer down to matters of purely local importance. They might lose their zest and die away. In that event, the Arab Middle East would have become transformed as part of a transformed world. In such a situation, the League of Arab States might persist as a forum for ceremony and communication, but its mission as an alliance would have expired, and its role of a coordinator of economic policies would probably remain unfulfilled, with the components still compelled to look elsewhere rather than to each other for satisfaction of their economic wants.

The Northern Tier

A basic point of contrast between the northern tier and the Arab zone is worth reemphasis. Relations within the Arab zone are highly introverted. Such is not the case within the northern tier. The regimes do not have much of a political impact on each other and on each other's populaces. They do not share a common discourse. In the main, no one of them entertains political ambitions susceptible of being realized at the expense of another state of the region. The significant exception is the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. There, an element of irredentism is found, the Pushtu language reverberates on both sides of the border. The two countries face each other with some degree of tension and military vigilance. From time to time, violence breaks out along the frontier. Pakistan and Iran, however, are not at cross purposes, and neither are Turkey and Iran. Their anxieties are focused in other directions.

A disarmament undertaking confined to the region therefore would be of small practical relevance, beyond what effect one might theoretically have as between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Such an agreement would presumably entail demarcation and legitimization of a boundary mutually acceptable to both governments. That might well serve to alleviate tensions rising sporadically from the circumstance that the tribal peoples in the frontier areas are not strong in conscious identity with the respective regimes, that relationships tend to reverberate across the standoff line irrespective of control from either capital, and that both governments feel pressed to maintain a close and substantial military watch.

Turkey's position on the Straits involves it in the security equations of the whole Mediterranean area. Turkey is essentially a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-

tion. Turkey's place vis-a-vis any undertaking for arms control and disarmament on a regional basis is a facet of the European and North Atlantic security complex. Pakistan, at the other extreme, is mainly preoccupied with security problems concerning India, and that preoccupation, in existing circumstances, has drawn it far along in the direction of collaboration in policy with Communist China. An arms control and disarmament arrangement involving Pakistan would raise a question of the equations of Pakistan and India and, by implication, would bear on the relations of both respectively with China and, by further implication, theirs and China's relationship with the great powers. Iran, too, though its security concerns respectively are far more restricted than those of its neighbors, Turkey and Pakistan, is involved in a security equation between Western powers, notably the United States, and the Soviet Union.

In sum, the question of an arrangement for arms control and disarmament in this range of the Middle East is scarcely a regional problem at all, but rather a problem involving security questions over an enormous range. Such an arrangement, far from being feasible on a regional basis, would involve accommodation over a wide arc. It might reasonably be said that such an arrangement affecting the whole northern tier of the Middle East would be conceivable only as part of a worldwide undertaking. It would mark a point well along on a course toward general and complete disarmament.

In any event, it is not apparent that such a development would entail profound effects on the main inclusive collaborative undertaking related to the area—namely, the Central Treaty Organization, whose practical character, as has been noted, has turned more and more from its original military and security guise to becoming more and more an arrangement for economic cooperation among the northern tier members. The usefulness of the pact presumably would continue even if its military character were eroded by a lapse of the United States' ancillary pledges of military assistance.

One may also speculate on the consequences for Pakistan of developments permitting a settlement with India over the Kashmir issue—presumably an essential condition for any accommodation between them looking to disarmament and arms control. Such terms would entail either a submission on Pakistan's part or an accommodation on India's part. Either might have disruptive effects on the unity, such as it is, between Pakistan's eastern and western wings—for the idea of an intransigent India toward which Pakistan dares not relax, is one of the main elements underlying Pakistan's national existence. An agreement with India might, by loosening the ties between the components of Pakistan, lead toward a closer association between the western province and the neighboring states of Afghanistan and Iran.

Cyprus

It is difficult to come to informed speculative views about Cyprus under any version of disarmament and arms control. In an observer's words—

> There are some problems in international relations that are, in the strict sense, insoluble, and I believe the Cyprus dispute to be one of them. For by a solution I mean a settlement that all parties to a dispute can be induced by mere reason to accept as giving them adequate satisfaction of their claims. 52/

The observations seem as valid now as before the experiment in independence. The Cyprus questions seem to have small relation to the problems of disarmament and arms control in a wider sphere. The place is torn by parochial issues. Amid a tranquilized world, from which strategic rivalries in the Eastern Mediterranean had been eliminated, the Cyprus problem might be reduced to parochial concern. Its present troublesome character rises from its effects—to some degree not even intended or taken into account

52/ Christopher Montague Woodhouse, in Philip W. Thayer (ed.), Tensions in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 165.

by the primary trouble-makers—on strategic relations within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and therefore affecting the strategic factors in the equation between Western powers and the Soviet Union.

Short of the remote and theoretic situation in which the strategic repercussions of trouble on that island had been obviated, the best course might be to cancel Cypriot independence in favor of simultaneous annexation of the respective portions to Greece and Turkey—but that is a theoretic notion put forth without regard for the diplomatic entailments.

IV. Implications For Arms Control and Disarmament

Neither of the principal zones of the Middle East provides much of a basis for reassurance concerning probabilities of significant progress toward arms control and disarmament—the Arab zone because of the inward character of its political problems, the northern tier because of the breadth of its political connections. The Arab zone naturally attracts one's attention the more simply because it, more than the northern tier, does appear to be all of a piece. Yet it is subject to conjecture and doubt whether, within the calculable future, any Arab regime, especially one close to Israel, would feel sufficiently self-assured to make the implicit or explicit accommodations necessary to enter into relevant formal agreements or even to undertake negotiations looking to that possibility. It is also subject to doubt that any of the Arab regimes, even though less militant toward Israel, would undertake the risk of attempting open initiatives that would split the Arab front against Israel and thereby incur recriminations and possibly open hostilities from the more intransigent Arab states. In respect of theoretic freedom of action, the regime in Cairo has probably the strongest basis in domestic political support among all Arab regimes, and it, for reasons related to its efforts to pursue and to maintain ascendancy among Arab states, is also probably the one least likely to accommodate toward Israel. The inhibitions are made the more difficult by the linkage of the Arab regimes ranged against Israel to military support. Among them, according to one observer's summary, "There is no example at all of the purely professional army under full civilian control." 53/

The prevailing situation among regimes is that of being creatures of the armed forces rather than vice versa. It is difficult to imagine regimes based thus on military ascendancy contracting themselves into a new situation likely to bring about their own transformation But such a development, if realized, would obviously be one of enormous importance for the future of the region. This consideration is one of the main reasons for doubt about the prospects for arms control and disarmament. One still must wonder whether some alleviating action is not within reach of the outside powers. A clue to one possibility may be found in a recent essay by the French commentator, Raymond Aron. His suggestion is along the line of a joint undertaking that might appeal both to the United States and to the Soviet Union, irrespective of their conflicting aims with respect to the region concerned, which would not require consent and accommodation on the part of the governments of the region, and which would not entail any elaborate paraphernalia for enforcement. To quote Mr. Aron:

> The Middle East is one region where intervention of atomic weapons on either or both sides would fatally aggravate tensions, for two conclusive reasons. For one, Israel is a small country in close proximity to Egypt, whose cities in turn are of major importance; this would make for a highly unstable situation in that the advantage of a pre-emptive strike would be enormous and quite possibly decisive. Furthermore, the stakes in a conflict between Israel and the Arab countries are part and parcel either of the defense or of the reconquest of the land itself, so that wiping out the entire population now occupying the territory would in no way be incompatible with the aims of one of the belligerents. When it comes to imposing a Carthagenian

53/ Campbell, loc. cit., p. 108.

> peace, the atomic weapon constitutes a supremely efficient instrument, since extermination of the enemy can precede victory. If there is one area in the world where the big powers have an obligation to block the introduction of nuclear arms, it is certainly the Middle East. Israel and Egypt both signed the partial test ban. Though both sides have missiles, no outside country will for the time being supply warheads, the manufacture of which in turn requires time, money, and outlawed tests.
>
> But however great and perhaps fatal the danger to which Israel and Egypt would expose themselves by introducing nuclear components into their present arms race, it would once again take a fertile imagination to see the Big Two dragged into a holocaust by the possible insanity of Middle Eastern nations. In fact, it seems to me almost certain that once nuclear arms make their appearance in the area, a diplomatic subsystem would automatically detach itself from the global system. The Big Two are less and less able to impose their will upon the small states because the threat of extermination as a measure of constraint is far too disproportionately outrageous to be plausible; but they could convey to one another their intent of nonintervention, or at least they could renounce their promises of unconditional assistance the moment enemies, allies, or uncommitted nations come into possession of atomic weapons. 54/

The suggestion involves a question with respect to the phrase in the last sentence quoted—"their promises of unconditional assistance." This appears to assume the existence of some such pledge currently in effect on the part of the Soviet Union with respect to the region concerned, but the existence of such a pledge is not demonstrable. Presumably if such a pledge had been given, it would have been given publicly, for otherwise it would have no deterrent effect. This point does not necessarily weigh against the suggestion, however.

The proposition that introduction of nuclear weapons into the region would be so contrary to the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union as to put them at one with respect to their basic approaches may be sound. Whether that premise can provide a basis for their joining in advance to make the point explicit, without each side being constrained by suspicion that the other might turn the situation to its advantage, is another question. The Aron proposal suggests that, whatever the difficulties of doing so with respect to other regions, the circumstances in the Middle East provide an exception. The distinguishing difference is postulated, rather than proved. If such a concerting of policies to prevent proliferation is feasible with respect to the one region, it might be so with respect to others. The Middle East in that case provides a beginning point for a common policy to prevent nuclear proliferation.

54/ Raymond Aron, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons," The Atlantic Monthly, January, 1965, p. 46.

4. ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AREA

by

William C. Johnstone, Jr.

I. Introduction

Cold War Politics in Asia and the Pacific Area: Some Basic Assumptions.
Relevant Characteristics of Asia and the Pacific Area.
Changing Conflict Patterns.

II. Alliances and Alignments in Asia and the Pacific Area

III. Relationship of Arms Control and Disarmament Measures to Alliances and Alignments

Measures Relating to Nuclear Weapons.
Measures Relating to Conventional Armaments.

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I. Introduction

The history of alliances in Asia and the Pacific area before World War II, as well as the history of successful and unsuccessful attempts at arms control and disarmament suggests that there is a close interconnection between agreements relating to armaments and adjustments or changes in existing alliances and alignments. Each kind of agreement, moreover, not only reflects the political-military climate in the area and in the world at a given time, but also depends on at least some adjustments of political differences among the participants. The states involved in agreements on armaments are the same states, in most cases, that are parties to alliances and alignments. It is the impact of disarmament on these alliances and alignments that will be the focus of this essay.

The geographic area involved stretches from the Republic of Korea and Japan on the northeast, around the southern borders of Communist China to Afghanistan on the west and includes the island states and numerous colonies and trust territories in the western and southwestern Pacific. Over one billion people inhabit the seventeen states and the colonies and trust territories of the area. 1/ All of the Western powers and all states within the Communist bloc have interests in this area in varying degrees. Far from being isolated from the main stream of international politics, the states and territories of Asia and the southwest Pacific have become progressively more involved with the rest of the world since 1945. Likewise, the Cold-War struggle has progressively expanded within the area along the borderlands of Communist China, so that it can be accurately asserted in 1965 that a considerable part of Asia and the Pacific area has become one of the most active arenas of the Cold War.

Cold-War Politics in Asia and the Pacific Area: Some Basic Assumptions

Any examination of the interconnections between arms control and disarmament measures and existing alliances and alignments in the area must take account of the current political-military climate in Asia and elsewhere. To be useful, such an examination must posit certain assumptions about this political-military climate now and for the immediate future. The briefly stated assumptions that follow underlie the analysis in the subsequent sections of this study. These are:

1. There is not likely to be any change in the basic Communist objective of establishing eventual hegemony over as much of Asia as possible by causing the erosion and eventual elimination of Western power and influence from the area. This objective is

1/ The seventeen states are: Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, The Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam. Bhutan and Sikkhim are protected states of India. Hong Kong and Brunei are British territories. Macao and half of the island of Timor are Portuguese territory. Okinawa and Guam are U.S. Territories. The island territories of the western and southwestern Pacific are administered under UN Trusteeship agreement by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

likely to remain as one common denominator of both Moscow's and Peking's long-range goals, with the Chinese Communist regime pursuing this goal more vigorously in Asia than the Soviets.

2. It is likely that the rivalry between Moscow and Peking for influence over governments in the area and for control of political movements and Communist parties in the countries of the area will continue and could possibly become more virulent. It is also likely that the Chinese Communists will continue to exercise the more predominant influence in Asia over some governments and certain political groups unless Sino-Soviet rivalry or international situations take unexpected turns.

3. Communist China's international record in Asia since 1958 has been one of caution and conservatism in any situation that might risk direct confrontation with the United States or that might provoke direct U.S. action against Chinese Communist territory. It is likely that this Chinese caution will continue in the immediate future unless circumstances outside of Peking's control force the United States into more direct and extensive military intervention on the Asian continent.

4. As a result of the Sino-Soviet split and of the disruption caused by Khrushchev's ouster, the Kremlin has been unable and/or unwilling to exert any significant restraining influence on Communist China's policies and actions in Asia. In a sense, Moscow has been playing second fiddle to Peking in Asia since 1959 and does not seem to have defined the full range of its interests in Asia or the exact role the Soviet Union should play in the rapidly changing events taking place. This Soviet condition is likely to continue for the immediate future barring drastic change in Cold-War politics.

5. It is likely that both Moscow and Peking, with their Communist allies on the one hand, and the United States and its Western allies on the other hand, will continue to provide military assistance and arms aid to states of the area friendly to them or that they believe need such help and might become more friendly to them as a result. Thus, a continued arms increase by states in the area is likely to be assisted by states outside the area for the immediate future.

6. Current intraregional tensions and conflicts, as well as recognition of outside threats contribute to the arms build-up now taking place, and unless a substantial reduction of tensions and conflict occurs, which seems unlikely for the immediate future, the expansion of armamerts within the area is likely to continue.

7. Communist China's possession of potential nuclear weapons capability will continue to be an extra complicating factor in the international politics of Asia and the Pacific area, in the defense posture to be assumed by states around Communist China's borders and most certainly in any future arms control and disarmament negotiations.

In sum, much of Asia and the Pacific area is in a stage of disorder, conflict, and tension inextricably tied into Cold-War politics and beset by international and intraregional rivalries. This is the context in which the analysis in this study must take place.

Relevant Characteristics of Asia and the Pacific Area

It is obvious that the vast geographic area to be considered in this study is an arbitrary delimitation that has relevance only in the context of international politics. The states and territories of Asia, the western, and southwestern Pacific have little in common save the fact that they are a part of the non-Communist world and are linked through the international politics of the Cold War. The chief characteristics of the states and territories in the area are diversity and disparity.

India's population of 450 million is second only to China, but its area is only slightly one-third that of Australia, which has some 10.5 million people. Three states, Indonesia, Japan, and Pakistan each have a population of between 90 and 100 million people but in all

other respects are not comparable. Ceylon is twice the size of Taiwan with slightly fewer people, but while the latter is close to the point of self-sustaining growth, Ceylon still has a long way to go. It would be difficult to say whether Laos or Nepal is the least developed of the seventeen states. It is not difficult, however, to point to Australia, New Zealand, and Japan as advanced nations. Disparity in economic development among these seventeen states is one obvious complication to closer cooperation.

In the area as a whole and within all but a few of the states, there is the greatest diversity of culture, ethnic-linguistic groups, religious and historical roots. In the states of southeast Asia, primitive animism and spirit worship are widely prevalent among the rural populace and the mountain tribal groups. Hindu philosophy, religious practices, and customs were an early export from the sub-continent, to be succeeded by Buddhism, which spread northwards to China, Korea, and Japan as well as taking root in southeast Asia. The Muslim religion also spread from the Indian subcontinent into Malaya, the Indonesian archipelago, and the southern Philippines, while Catholic Christianity was able to win substantial adherence in the Philippines and in the Indo-China states.

Again, for historical reasons, there is a great diversity of political systems. Only four of the seventeen states—Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Thailand—have had a continuous history of independence, while all of the others are former colonial territories. 2/ Very few of these former colonial states have been able so far to achieve that degree of national unity or a substantial acceptance of national identity by their people that is the mark of the modern nation-state. Australia and New Zealand have been successful parliamentary democracies since their inception. Japan, the Philippines, India, and Malaysia today possess reasonably stable representative governments. Burma is governed as a socialist state by a military junta. Cambodia has a one man, one party rule under former king, Prince Sihanouk. Laos suffers a "troika," "neutral" government of sorts as a result of the Geneva agreement of 1962. South Vietnam's political system is impossible to characterize except to say that a kind of political framework exists within which a growing number of rival factions struggle for political power. Pakistan is currently experimenting with "basic democracy," which still permits the strong will of President Ayub Khan to function. Indonesia is also suffering from political changes that have not yet run their course.

It is interesting to note that there are five monarchies in the area. Japan and Malaysia are constitutional monarchies with a parliamentary system of government. Thailand is a constitutional monarcy run by an oligarchy through a political process notable for its virtually bloodless coups d'état. The king of Nepal is currently ruling his country directly without benefit of constitution or parliament. The king of Laos is a figurehead. The Republic of China on Taiwan has been continually dominated by the presence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, but with recent concessions in self-government granted to the majority group—the indigenous Taiwanese. The Republic of Korea has not exhibited a steady or remarkable political development since the Korean armistice. And finally, Ceylon is moving steadily towards a socialist system.

At least seven of the seventeen states in the area have a record of political instability that could result in changes at any time. 3/ In addition, the present political systems of Pakistan and Thailand do not preclude a change in the structure of the state or a violent change of leadership. One characteristic common to many of the seventeen states is the volatility of their political leadership and the pressures of political factionalism, which in turn have hindered steady political development and economic growth. Likewise, a strong tendency towards state socialism pervades the policy goals of Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, and Indonesia. It is also present to a considerable degree among important political segments in Japan, Korea, South Vietnam, Laos, Malaysia, and India.

There is also a wide disparity among the states of the area in natural resources, man-power resources, and stages of economic growth. Many are truly underdeveloped

2/ Nepal was never a colony but was under British protection until 1947.
3/ These are: Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Laos, Nepal and South Vietnam.

like Nepal, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, and Indonesia. Others suffer equally from uneven economic development and population pressure, India, Pakistan, and, to a certain degree, the Philippines. Nevertheless at least seven states—Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Taiwan, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand—have stable economies in which progress has been marked.

There are over four million men under arms in the seventeen states of the area, but again there is a wide disparity of military capability. The most advanced states, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan have relatively small armed forces. The Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and Indonesia have armed forces of over half a million men each. The first two have been armed by the United States as protection against aggression by the Communist bloc and their forces are clearly committed only for self-defense. Indonesia has been largely armed by the Soviet Union, but its forces at present are committed to limited warfare against Malaysia. The build-up of the Indian Army has continued steadily since the Chinese Communist invasion of 1962, while the smaller Pakistan armed forces, supplied mainly from the United States, are committed to defense against possible aggression from the Communist bloc by agreement, but actually are considered by Pakistan as a defensive force against possible aggression by India. The situation in South Vietnam and Laos requires no special comment. Other forces are hardly more than necessary for internal security purposes.

To date, there have been few instances in which the military component of the national power of any one of these seventeen states has been a significant factor in the exercise of its political influence in the area or in world affairs. Exceptions might be India-Pakistan over Kashmir, Indonesia during the crisis over West Irian, and the current Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation. Otherwise, influence exercised by any one of these states on Asian situations or situations elsewhere has derived from other factors, political, economic, or diplomatic. Where threats of aggression have occurred and the use of military power was believed necessary, major assistance has come from the outside, mainly from the United States as in Korea, the Formosa Straits, and South Vietnam or from Britain as in the case of Malaysia.

The characteristics of diversity noted briefly above have also been a factor preventing any development of regional cohesion. For in addition to diversity of race, religion, culture, political systems, resources and the like, each of these seventeen states has had a variety of different ties with the outside world. For over two centuries before World War II, the colonial territories had the closest links with their respective metropoles, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Japan, or the United States as the case might be. Trade, traffic, and ideas moved in and out of each colony to and from the metropole. While many political or economic problems common to all of the colonies of the area could be identified, there was no impetus even for exchange of information, let alone intra-area cooperation. The departure of the colonial powers after 1945 did little to change this picture. Consequently, it is fair to assert that another relevant characteristic of this whole area is an almost total lack of regional cohesion. This lack has colored the relations of these states with the rest of the world and has affected the policies of both the Communist bloc states and the Western powers with respect to the conflict situations that have arisen in the past two decades.

The foregoing should also emphasize another characteristic that needs to be kept in mind. To the elements of great diversity and absence of regional cohesion must be added the desire for rapid modernization by all of the former colonial states requiring, as they were to discover soon after independence, considerable assistance from the advanced nations. It was only with the Korean war, however, that the leaders of the new states began to gain a full realization of the meaning of Cold-War politics in relation to their goals of modernization. This highly competitive Cold-War contest between the two power blocs of the East and the West was an unpalatable fact to swallow, for it meant that none of the new states was completely free to follow its own course. Independence had brought with it dependence on the outside world for aid and assistance of all kinds. And no matter how much the leaders might wish to exempt this dependence from the politics of the Cold War, this proved impossible. The result has been to produce an acute consciousness of the

politics of the Cold-War struggle among the leaders of all the states in the area, a consciousness that intrudes in almost every aspect of their domestic and foreign policies and on their internal politics as well.

This awareness of the Cold-War struggle and the many and diverse political and economic ties developed between these seventeen states and the outside world must be coupled with the fact that because of conflict situations in the area, the main contestants in the Cold-War struggle have turned the major part of it into a vital arena in which the prize is dominance for one side or the other. Again, this is not a palatable fact for the political leaders of the seventeen states to digest. It is even more unpalatable because the nature of the Cold-War struggle itself has changed. The contest for Asia and the Pacific area is no longer one between the United States and the Soviet Union, but one in which other states have intervened. Communist China, Great Britain, France, Australia, and even Canada and Japan have become involved in helping to change the configuration of power that existed for over a decade after 1945.

This changing configuration of power has been due mainly to the activities of Communist China resulting from its growing independence of the Soviet Union since 1959-60, in short, a consequence of Sino-Soviet rivalry. Thus, Pakistan today is less than a staunch ally of the United States and is supported by Peking in its dispute with India over Kashmir. India, the great Asian neutral of the first fifteen years is now aligned against Communist China, is supported by Moscow in the Kashmir dispute and is closer to the United States than before. Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia, Laos, and Indonesia have been the objects of a tug-of-war between Peking and Moscow since 1962 with the Western powers either pushed aside as in Burma and Ceylon or maintaining only a precarious influence as in Indonesia and Laos. The efforts of France to regain influence in southeast Asia are noteworthy, but DeGaulle's recognition of Peking and attempts to extend French influence in Cambodia have not yet borne fruit. Finally, the most recent Japanese Premier, Sato, has asserted Japan's right to take a more active role in Asian affairs.

This changing configuration of power is a final and relevant characteristic of the area under consideration that has an effect on conflict situations, on existing alliances and on any measures for arms control and disarmament equally with the other characteristics described in this section.

Changing Conflict Patterns

Unlike Africa or Latin America, the area of Asia and the western and southwestern Pacific was a theater of large-scale warfare from 1941 to 1945. The emergence of thirteen new nations after 1945, the rise of Communist China and the continued struggle of a number of the new nations with internal insurrections plus their growing involvement in the politics of the Cold War has produced an almost constantly changing series of conflict patterns throughout the area. These have had significance for the construction of alliance systems and will be significant in any attempted agreements for arms control and disarmament in the future.

Every major war produces new conflict situations and exacerbates old rivalries. In a world war, military powers engaged in hostilities in areas far from their home territory inevitably become involved in the postwar consequences of wartime disruptions. They have undertaken heavy obligations, which they inevitably desire to liquidate to the greatest extent feasible when hostilities end. This process of liquidation by the major powers is more prolonged and more complicated when there is no general peace settlement among the contestants. Consequently, conflict situations arising directly from the nature of war operations and wartime decisions by the major powers are often prolonged to become bound up with new rivalries, and new conflicts, political or military, for years thereafter. These war-produced conflicts leave a bitter legacy that cannot be ignored.

The history of the immediate postwar years in Asia and the Pacific area—virtually the first decade from 1945 to 1954—offers many illustrations of continuing conflict situations,

the legacy of World War II. First of all, both Great Britain and the United States were heavily and willingly engaged in a liquidation process. The British Labour Government quickly and completely granted independence to Burma, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan, thus largely liquidating Great Britain's Asian Empire. British control of Malaya was retained until 1957 almost solely in order to liquidate by military means the communist insurrection of wartime origin. When this obligation was fulfilled, Malaya and Singapore were joined together in a new nation, and in 1963 the British territories of Borneo and Sarawak were added in an enlarged Malaysia Federation. One political decision made by the British government, however, failed to eliminate a conflict that still persists. The decision to partition India into two new states brought severe communal rioting and killing between Muslims and the Hindu and Sikh communities, and the effects have not been wholly forgotten. Within this general decision of partition, however, was the important decision to permit the Indian states to accede to India or Pakistan and the resultant Kashmir explosion has left a conflict situation between India and Pakistan that still seems to defy solution and could yet result in more conflict.

Again, the British decision in 1947 to free Burma quickly, came before the future status of India and Pakistan as members of the British Commonwealth had been determined, leaving the new Burmese government a prey to left-wing elements desirous of cutting every tie with Great Britain. Thus, Burma alone of the British colonies in Asia was cut adrift in a hostile world eventually resulting in an almost complete elimination of any Western influence. Burma's neutrality is precarious and its ties with neighboring India, Pakistan, and Thailand have been weakened.

The United States, far more heavily involved in the war in Asia and the Pacific than was Great Britain, was equally determined to reduce its postwar obligations. As promised, the Philippines were granted independence. Attempts to mediate the civil war in China foundered on the weakness of the Nationalists and the unlooked for strength of the Communists, and the United States began its disengagement from mainland China affairs. But the success of the Chinese Communists was not effective enough to prevent establishment of the Nationalist government on Taiwan, and the United States halted its disengagement short of withholding support for the Nationalists there. American occupation of Korea and Japan was considered necessary only long enough to enable these two nations to stand on their own feet. Unfortunately for Korea, wartime military decisions produced a divided country with the Soviet Union undertaking a new obligation to occupy the north. The American government hoped to shift its burden to the United Nations and had reduced its commitments when the Soviet-supported North Korean regime attacked South Korea. The ensuing war halted the whole liquidation process and forced the United States to undertake even heavier obligations than anyone had thought possible in 1945. American occupation of Japan was successfully liquidated by the peace treaty in 1951 without producing new conflicts.

For the remainder of southeast Asia, it is often forgotten that the sudden surrender of Japan in late August 1945, caught the allied powers wholly unprepared to face the consequence of peace. France and the Netherlands unlike Great Britain and the United States were unwilling to quickly liquidate their empires in Asia. Yet they could give small aid to the predominantly British forces assigned to take the surrender of Japanese armies in Indonesia and Indo-China. There was an interval of many months after Japan's surrender before the full return of French and Dutch forces and administrators to their colonies. These colonies as well as Malaya and Burma had become saturated with surplus weapons easily obtainable by rebel groups intent on selfish gain or on a quick realization of their goal of freedom from colonial rule.

The Dutch policy, first in attempting to regain control of Indonesia by force and only reluctantly granting freedom to an Indonesian government, and second, in attempting to retain control of West New Guinea (West Irian) against the demands of the Indonesian government, prolonged a conflict situation that was not resolved until 1963. Likewise, French policy in attempting to regain full control of the Indo-China territories by force resulted in a war between the French and the Vietnamese communists, which led to a French defeat, a divided territory, and creation of the only Communist state in southeast Asia, the regime of Ho Chi-Minh.

These war-bred conflict patterns almost inevitably became bound up in the politics of the Cold War, of which the war in Korea was the beginning. In the two decades since 1945, there are more conflict situations in Asia and the Pacific rather than less, more instability rather than steady development. It is important to see why this is so. If one looks back a decade, it would seem that by the end of 1954, the liquidation of war-produced conflict situations had not been wholly unsuccessful and for the first time, international conflict was absent. The Korean war had ended in a stalemate armistice. The Geneva accord had ratified the departure of France from Asia as a colonial power and the two new states of North and South Vietnam were tacitly recognized and momentarily at peace. Indonesia was still negotiating with the Netherlands over West Irian but had not yet acquired the means to brandish weaponry in the dispute. United Nations teams patrolled the cease-fire line in Kashmir, and India and Pakistan evidenced no intent of broadening the conflict between them over that unhappy territory. Equally important internal insurrections in Malaya and Burma had been brought under control, and elsewhere no new rebellions had arisen to threaten the security of any state in the area.

When the Asian and African states met at Bandung, Indonesia for the first Afro-Asian conference in the spring of 1955, it appeared that the future might see a lessening of tensions and a reduction of conflict situations. The Soviet Union had just discovered India and southeast Asia but seemed to have no other interest than offering economic aid and technical assistance "without strings." Communist China's peripatetic Chou En-lai had given full publicity in India, Burma, and elsewhere to the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" as the foundation of Peking's foreign policy. It appeared that a certain aura of calm had settled over the area that might give the new nations, finally, an opportunity for political and economic development unhindered by intraregional conflicts and disputes and unhampered by more than the polemics and the shouting of the Cold-War contestants. This deceptive calm lasted only a few years. It is worthwhile looking back at what happened to destroy it.

Between 1954 and 1959, it appeared that communism had been checked in south and southeast Asia. Malaya became independent, and if elsewhere political stability was still far from a reality, Communist influence either Chinese or Russian, did not seem to have made significant gains. The one effort of Peking to redress the balance of power in its favor—the Formosa Straits battle of 1958—ended in a real defeat for Peking. Apparent Soviet refusal to supply Peking with up-to-date planes and nuclear weapons foreshadowed the deterioration in their relationships.

Looking back, this period of some five years seemed to lull the fears of leaders in the countries of southern Asia that the Chinese Communists constituted any real danger to their independence. Americans were constantly being told that the United States was much too preoccupied with the "communist danger." United States offers of economic aid and military assistance to various nations of the area were too often taken for granted as help which the United States—a rich nation—was somehow morally obligated to provide. What happened?

It now appears from various analyses of Chinese Communist policy that between 1957, when the Soviets sent up their first "Sputnik," to 1959, the oligarchy in Peking were engaged in a thorough reappraisal of their future course. It appears that they convinced themselves that the balance of power in the world had shifted to the "communist camp" and that, therefore, Communist China could move to assert its place in the world as a great power, beholden to no nation, a position that Chinese leaders had been striving for, historically, since the Chinese revolution of Sun Yat-sen. It appears that the ruling group in Peking decided that Communist China was ready for the "take-off point" as a world power, the equal of any. They had also convinced themselves that they, more than the Soviets had the "correct" Marxist-Leninist answer to the problems of the newly developing nations. The policy they devised was to support "wars of national liberation." These were "just" wars, while any armed resistance to such Communist conquest supported by Western "capitalist-imperialist" nations were "unjust" wars. Support of "national liberation movements" meant, essentially, the elimination of all Western influence from a country. In short, sometime between 1958 and 1960, the oligarchs in Peking revived an his-

torical Chinese goal, which Asians now call "Han-imperialism," nothing short of the eventual establishment of Chinese Communist hegemony over all of Asia, and the exercise of Chinese power in Africa, Latin America, and the fringes of Europe to the point where final recognition of China's "great power status" would be given by all. Peking's policies and actions since 1959 have provided ample testimony to these decisions.

The increase in tensions and the proliferation of conflict situations in Asia and the Pacific area since 1959 can be ascribed to this change in Chinese Communist policy and to the consequent split in Sino-Soviet relations. This explanation may be satisfactory, but it does not account fully for all of the proliferation of conflict in the past five years. A more satisfactory explanation, perhaps, involves the very nature of international politics and, in particular, the inevitable consequences of world wars. No matter what provisions are or are not made after a world-wide war for the settlement of international disputes or the establishment of a "status quo post bellum," few states remain satiated or satisfied. Discontent breeds discontent in international affairs, and sooner or later states determine to become revisionist in their foreign policies. However they pursue revisionist policies, their dissatisfaction with their boundaries, their economic progress, or their political status in the world of nations leads them to attempt change by whatever means they may have at their disposal. It is this trend toward revisionism on the part of a great many of the states in Asia and the Pacific and, especially, on the part of Communist China that provides a rational explanation for the current status of conflict and tension in the area. It was this new postwar tendency toward revisionism that broke the deceptive and short period of relative calm between 1954 and 1959.

The first move was the battle of the Formosa Straits in 1958, in which Communist China failed to revise, to its advantage, the status of Taiwan. The second move was made by the Chinese Communists in 1958 and 1959 in seizing 12,000 square miles of territory claimed by India in the Ladakh province of Jammu and Kashmir state. Then came Ho Chi-Minh's drive to revise the Geneva settlement of 1954 by provoking guerrilla warfare in Laos and South Vietnam. Next the Chinese Communists moved into northeast India in support of their claims to extensive territory stretching into Assam. Twice, after showing their strength, they declared a unilateral cease-fire and retreated, but their primary objective appears to have been, not the revision of the Sino-Indian frontier, except in Ladakh but a much broader aim of political revisionism, that of destroying Indian leadership of a truly neutral bloc—that is neutral between East and West. In this they substantially succeeded, since the leadership of India in the Asian world has been vitiated.

Underneath the verbiage of Peking's propaganda, the Chinese Communist oligarchs have striven to revise the balance of power in southeast Asia, not only by their support of the Pathet Lao in Laos and Ho Chi-Minh's Viet Cong allies in South Vietnam, but by attempting, with considerable success to date, to win the allegiance of the Communists and pro-left parties in southeast Asia. With Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia, and Indonesia close to alignment with Peking on major issues, the Chinese Communists have "revised" the balance of political forces in southeast Asia to their advantage to a very considerable degree since 1960.

"Revisionism" as an explanation for the proliferation of conflict situations in Asia and the Pacific is by no means confined to Communist China. Japan and Korea each aim to "revise" their relationships on such questions as fisheries, territorial waters, and other matters. Japan is anxious to change American occupation policy in the Ryukyus to the point where the United States can be persuaded to return this Japanese territory to full Japanese jurisdiction. Cambodia is asserting its right to revision of boundaries and relations with both South Vietnam and Thailand. The Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation, the Kashmir dispute and all of the other well-known conflict situations reflect this increase in the spirit of revisionism, which is an element of the conflict patterns of international politics in many parts of the world. Only Australia, Burma, Ceylon, and New Zealand of the seventeen nations in the area have exempted themselves from policies of revisionism—changes in territorial boundaries, efforts to change their political status, or serious disputes over jurisdiction or economic and political questions.

Finally then, the area under study exhibits a pattern of conflict and tension both intraregional and extraregional. It is an area in which all major powers are involved in either cooperation or conflict. It is an area of the dissatisfied, the unsatiated where undeclared wars and warfare, subversion, and armed intervention have been the norm since 1945 except for a brief four years and, above all, it is an area where Communist China's avowed goal of nuclear capability constitutes the first non-European state to begin the unhappy process of nuclear proliferation.

II. Alliances and Alignments in Asia and The Pacific Area

In 1949, indigenous Communist insurrections were in progress in Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, and Vietnam. By the end of that year, the Chinese Communists had completed their seizure of mainland China, driving Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government into exile on Taiwan. Alarm at possible Communist expansion in Asia was expressed in many quarters. Suggestions for some sort of mutual defense arrangements to halt Communism in Asia were made by British, Australian, Chinese Nationalist, and Filipino officials. The United States Government, however, while expressing support for defense agreements or a defense organization, refused to take the initiative, asserting the initiative should be taken by Asian nations.

The Korean war, and particularly the intervention of the Chinese Communists changed the balance of power in Asia and set in motion the wheels of United States rearmament. By the beginning of 1951, the U.S. government was more receptive to creation of a Pacific defense system, something of a counterpart to NATO. The decision to terminate the occupation of Japan and discussions concerning the peace treaty with that country and its future as an independent state provided stimulus to action. The United States was not yet ready to initiate a counterpart of NATO for the Pacific, but did recognize the legitimate concern of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines over a future revival of Japanese aggression as well as the general fear of Communist expansion. In addition, since post-occupation Japan was virtually disarmed, some measures had to be taken for protection of its independence.

As a consequence of these developments, at the San Francisco Conference at which the peace treaty with Japan was signed on September 8, 1951, the United States concluded the first round of its defense treaties as the basis for an alliance system in Asia and the Pacific area.

Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines August 30, 1951

This treaty binds the two parties, first to develop their capacity to resist armed attack; second, to consult if their territorial integrity, political independence, or security is threatened in the Pacific; and, third, to take appropriate action if either party is the object of an "armed attack" in the Pacific area. Article V provides that the "armed attack" referred to shall include not only one on the metropolitan territories of the Philippines or the United States but also one on, "island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific."

Tripartite Treaty with Australia and New Zealand

On September 1st, the United States signed a tripartite security treaty with Australia and New Zealand. The same obligations as noted above in the Philippine treaty were included in this treaty, which has become known as the ANZUS pact. In addition, Article VII provides for establishment of a tripartite council to consist of the Foreign Ministers or their deputies to meet at least annually for consideration of any problems related to their treaty obligations. This council was authorized to maintain "consultative" relationships with states and regional organizations in the Pacific area, "pending development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific," foreshadowing the establishment of SEATO.

The Treaty of Peace and the Security with Japan

Under the Japanese constitution, war is outlawed as an instrument of national policy and only armed forces sufficient for internal security and self-defense are permitted. In the Japanese Peace Treaty, Japan is obligated to live peacefully with other nations and "to settle its disputes with other states by amicable means." It is expressly stipulated, however, that this obligation does not deprive Japan of the "right of individual and collective self-defense."

The special situation of Japan and the special position of the United States in Japan necessitated quite different obligations in the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, also signed on September 8, than in the treaties with the Philippines and Australia and New Zealand.

In the preamble to the Japan security treaty, the hope is expressed that Japan will "increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense." The treaty provides, first, that the United States has the right to dispose its land, sea, and air forces in and about Japan and that these forces may be used not only to protect Japan but also "to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." It was also provided that on express request of the Japanese government, United States forces there could be used to "put down large-scale internal riots or disturbances in Japanese territory caused through instigation or intervention of an outside power or powers."

Japan is also obligated not to grant bases or military facilities to any third power without U.S. consent. In this treaty, Japan undertakes no obligations to help defend any United States territory if it should be under armed attack, for the obvious reason that Japan had no means at its disposal to do so in 1951. Since it was expected that Japan would develop its own self-defense force before long, this treaty was called, "provisional" and subject to renegotiation by concurrence of the two parties.

This first round of treaties was concluded while the Korean war was still going on and before the French debacle in Indo-China. It was obvious that once these two conflicts ceased, further defense treaties and perhaps a more comprehensive alliance system might be constructed.

Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea, October 1, 1953

Following the armistice between the United Nations Command and the Communist armed forces in Korea in mid-1953, the security position of the Republic of Korea was still precarious. Just as the United States had committed itself to defend Japan against armed attack, it followed that some provision had to be made for the protection of South Korea.

The treaty provisions for mutual defense of territories, maintenance of capability for self-defense and for consultation in the event of external armed attack are similar to those of the Philippine treaty. A different kind of clause was added in Article III, however, which states that in the event of an armed attack on either party to the treaty "in territories now under their respective administrative control or hereafter recognized by one of the parties as brought under the administrative control of the other, endangers its own peace and safety, each party will act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." This provision was added to preclude any United States support for a South Korean attack on North Korea—territory claimed by the Republic of Korea, but not under its administrative control.

Article IV is similar to Article I of the Japanese treaty. It grants the United States the right to dispose its land, sea, and air forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea, but it does not provide for U.S. assistance in suppressing riots and internal disorders.

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) September 8, 1954

From 1949 until the spring of 1954, there had been many proposals for a collective defense system in Asia and the Pacific. Apart from support in the U.S. Congress and in some segments of the Eisenhower administration, British, Australian, New Zealand, and Filipino officials and public figures had urged such action. The Korean armistice and the conclusion of a U.S. defense treaty with the Republic of Korea had started the second round in the expansion of the American-supported alliance system in the Pacific. It was the French debacle at Dienbienphu and the Geneva accords on Indo-China in July 1954, that provided the impetus for SEATO. Secretary of State Dulles had been reportedly against a collective pact in January 1954, but by April he had proposed one. In his original proposal, he indicated the pact might include the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the three associated states of Indo-China (Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam), the Philippines, and Thailand.

Secretary Dulles' proposal was roundly attacked in the Moscow and Peking press and the smaller states and neutrals were under heavy pressure to stay out. Great Britain urged the so-called "Colombo powers"—Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan—to join in the proposed conference. All but Pakistan refused. The refusal of India, where the proposed pact was heavily criticized, undoubtedly influenced the others. For obvious reasons, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China were not invited to attend the conference at Manila, which opened on September 6, 1954.

In the end, the Manila Conference was attended by the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, with Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand the only Asian states present. Since the Western powers had held preliminary talks in Paris beginning in June, the ground work for the conference had been well laid. On September 8, 1954, the treaty and supporting documents were signed.

The SEATO treaty is somewhat similar to previous defense pacts like the ANZUS treaty but departs from them in several notable respects. First, as in previous treaties, the parties undertake individually and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid "to develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." But unlike previous U.S. defense treaties, this obligation extends to preventing and countering "subversive activities directed from without against the territorial integrity and political stability" of the signatories.

Second, in Article III, the parties to the treaty pledge themselves to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate in further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed to promote economic progress and social well-being.

Third, as in previous treaties each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area would endanger its own peace and safety and all agree to consult if, in the opinion of any one of them, there is such a threat or a situation that might endanger the peace of the area. It is also agreed that action taken on the territory included in the treaty area shall be taken at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned. The "treaty area" as defined is limited. It excludes some territory covered in previous treaties and some under administration of one of the parties to the treaty, for example, Hong Kong.

A fourth departure from previous treaties is found in two attachments. An "understanding" incorporated with the text of the treaty by the United States declares that the armed aggression referred to in Article IV as dangerous to peace and security would be Communist aggression. This was designed to relieve the United States of obligations arising from intraregional conflict where no Communist aggression was involved. A protocol attached to the treaty designates the states of Cambodia, Laos, and the free territory under jurisdiction of the Republic of Vietnam as states or territories to be included in the treaty area. These states can be defended by SEATO signatories on request or with their consent, and they are also eligible for economic assistance through SEATO.

Like the ANZUS pact, this treaty establishes a Council to meet at least annually and deal with problems of treaty implementation, joint military planning, and coordination and nonmilitary activities. The treaty became effective on February 19, 1955, and the first Council meeting was held February 23-25, 1955. The organizational structure of SEATO is more extensive than that of ANZUS but not nearly so complex as that of NATO.

At the first Council meeting consisting of the foreign ministers of the member countries, it was decided to appoint Council representatives to carry on the business of the organization between Council meetings. These representatives are the Ambassadors of the member states accredited to Thailand. The Thai representative is a senior official of the Thai Foreign Ministry. Under the Council representatives, three committees were established: the Committee of Security Experts; the Committee of Economic Experts, and the Committee on Information, Cultural, Education, and Labour Activities.

In 1956, a staff for the headquarters organization of SEATO in Bangkok was established. The second Council meeting had set up a Permanent Working Group to assist the Council representatives as well as a full-time Executive Secretariat. The secretariat includes a Research Service Office; Public Relations Office; Cultural Relations Office, and an Economic Services Office. Meetings of the Permanent Working Group take place several times a week, while those of the Council representatives average about once a month.

The Military Advisor's Group is charged with coordination of the military obligations of the SEATO members and consists of one high-ranking staff officer from each member state and meets twice a year. There is under this group a full-time Military Planning Office responsible for coordinating joint military action and joint exercises each year by military units of the member states. Both the Council Representatives and the Military Advisors Group make use of ad hoc Committees on special problems, and a number of special meetings have been held to consider the problems of dealing with subversion and armed infiltration.

In the nonmilitary field, SEATO has been quite active in a small way in sponsoring a variety of economic, technical assistance, and cultural projects in various locations. These are generally small projects not coming within the purview of the United Nations, the Colombo Plan, or bilateral aid programs.

As a collective defense arrangement, SEATO has yet to be tried. Military assistance to states or territories of the treaty area when threatened by Communist aggression has so far been initiated almost wholly by the United States in the situations in Laos and Vietnam and in direct action with Thailand in 1961. SEATO has not been left out, but it has not been pulled in. Recently, the United States has endeavored to persuade other nations to share the burden of protection of South Vietnam. SEATO members have so far responded minimally and individually, along with a larger number of states outside of SEATO such as the Republic of China and Japan. 4/ It would seem, therefore that because of its membership and because of the present heavy unilateral commitments of the United States in Asia as well as U.S. obligations under other defense treaties, SEATO has not demonstrated its efficacy as anything like the regional, collective security organization it was hoped in 1954 it might become.

4/ Assistance has included medical personnel and supplies, teachers and school equipment, seeds, tractors and agricultural technicians, industrial equipment and funds for economic development, and military advisory personnel along with a small amount of military logistical support. States providing support in one or more categories of the above, (as of March 1965) include: Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Japan, India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Israel, Italy, Greece, Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, Brazil, Ecuador, and Tunisia. Of the twenty-six states giving assistance to the Republic of Vietnam at the request of that government and of the United States, only ten are parties to any Asian and Pacific Area defensive alliances.

Mutual Defense Treaty with Republic of China, December 2, 1954

Negotiations for a defense treaty with the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan were begun after the Korean armistice. Following the establishment of SEATO, these negotiations were pushed to a speedy conclusion. In Article II, the obligation to maintain and develop the capacity to resist armed attack is similar to that in the Korean treaty, but there is an additional clause expressing the signatories determination to build up a capacity to resist "Communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability." Article III is similar to the SEATO treaty concerning the strengthening of free institutions and promotion of economic progress and social well-being. Article IV provides simply for consultation together "from time to time regarding the implementation of this treaty." Article V, like provisions of some of the other treaties, stipulates that an armed attack on the territories of one party would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the other but refers specifically to an armed attack "in the Pacific area." (The Korean treaty does not define any area, while the Philippine and ANZUS treaties use the phrase "in the Pacific," and include armed attacks on the "armed forces, public vessels and aircraft" of the parties. This latter is omitted from the China treaty.)

Article VI defines the territories to which the treaty applies as "Taiwan and the Pescadores," but stipulates it may be made applicable to "other territories" when "determined by mutual agreement." Article VII is similar to the Japan and Korean treaties in granting the United States "the right to dispose such land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense as determined by mutual agreement."

The offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu are not mentioned specifically in the treaty. Whether these territories come within its scope is arguable either way, but there is little doubt that if these islands were under attack, the United States could easily construe that assistance to the Chinese Nationalist forces on these islands was necessary to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, thus acting within the scope of the treaty.

Revision of Defense Treaty with Japan, January 19, 1960

The revised defense treaty with Japan was a mark of respect for Japan's rapid economic growth since 1951 and an attempt to treat Japan as an equal, thus removing some elements of friction in American-Japanese relations. Another reason for revision was the fact that in less than ten years Japan has built a small, but efficient, self-defense force of some 230,000 men in its land, sea, and air arms.

The new treaty makes several significant changes. The original treaty did not obligate the United States to assist Japan in case of an armed attack against its territory, although it was assumed the United States would do so. The new treaty states that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that each party would act to meet the common danger "in accordance with its constitutional processes." Thus, the United States is obliged to come to Japan's aid if its territory is under armed attack, but the obligation is not mutual as in the other Pacific defense treaties. Japan is not obliged to aid the United States if U.S. territories are under armed attack.

Article VI provides explicit Japanese assent to the disposition of United States land, air, and naval forces in and about Japan, but it is not an assent to a "right" by the United States as in the first treaty. Nor does the treaty deny Japan the right to make similar concessions to a third power. Also, this treaty does not permit the United States to use its armed forces "to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances" as did the earlier agreement. The new treaty also adds that the two parties undertake to develop their capacity for self-defense within the framework of their respective constitutions. Many Japanese disagree with their government's liberal interpretation of the "no armed forces" clause in the constitution as permitting "self-defense" forces. This treaty, un-

like some of the other defense treaties has a ten-year expiration date when it will either have to be extended or revised or dropped altogether.

U.S. Defense Commitments in Asia and the Pacific.

By the various treaties just described, the United States has undertaken qualified defense commitments over a large geographic area. To be sure, the obligations of these treaties are not nearly as automatic as the NATO treaty, yet as in Western Europe, the United States already has forces, bases, or facilities in the territories of treaty signatories—Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Pakistan. By the protocol attached to the SEATO treaty, Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam were brought under the SEATO "defense umbrella." It is on request, or with the consent of the South Vietnam government that U.S. forces are operating in South Vietnam at present. Although Thailand is a member of SEATO, when the situation in Laos had deteriorated badly early in 1962, the United States gave special assurance of assistance to that country. These assurances were backed up by establishment of large United States bases not far from the Laos border in northeast Thailand that are maintained in readiness for as many as 5,000 troops with air support.

Originally, the territories of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo were under the SEATO "umbrella" since they were still under British jurisdiction in 1954. Although some urged the new state of Malaya to join SEATO when it became independent in 1957, the new government preferred, as a member of the Commonwealth, to conclude a Defense Agreement with Great Britain. This defense treaty requires Britain to afford to the government of the Federation of Malaya "such assistance as it may require for the external defense of its territory." In return, Malaya agreed to give Britain the right to maintain forces in and about Malayan territory. There are provisions for consultation in the event of armed attack or an external threat to the security of Malaya. When the Malaysian state was created in 1963 by the federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak, the defense agreement was continued, but some disagreement arose over interpretation of the articles referring to Great Britain's use of bases and facilities. The question was whether these facilities and bases could be used to combat armed attack outside of Malaysia in support of Great Britain's SEATO commitments but without Malaysia's consent. So far, the Malaysian government has interpreted the clauses liberally, including the provisions of Article I allowing Great Britain, and other Commonwealth countries to form a "Commonwealth Strategic Reserve" based in Malaysian territory.

Following the assertion by Indonesia's President Sukarno vowing to crush Malaysia, guerrilla warfare developed in Borneo, and attempts were made by Indonesia to land guerrilla bands on the coasts of Malaya itself. Great Britain now has a sizable naval force and nearly 50,000 troops in Malaysia for defense against Indonesian attacks. Statements by the United States Government clearly indicate that it would assist in protecting Malaysia's independence against armed attack if such help were needed, although the United States has no treaty obligation to do so.

The Chinese invasion of India in 1962 and consequent changes in the Indian government then and since Nehru's death have subtly changed the former posture of the world's largest neutralist state. India has accepted U.S. arms aid and has apparently given tacit consent to the deployment of a U.S. naval force in the Indian ocean including a Polaris Missile submarine. This represents a considerable extension of implicit United States defense commitments from the western Pacific into the Indian ocean, without benefit of treaty obligations.

It is obvious that the various alliances among the Western nations for Asia and the Pacific area developed in a piecemeal fashion with the broadly stated objective of containing Communist expansion in Asia. Compared to the NATO system and the OAS, Western alliances applicable to Asia and the Pacific can hardly be called a "system" at all. Certainly, the bilateral and multilateral defense treaties described in the previous section

do not constitute a collective defense system for Asia and the Pacific, for none of the treaties provide specifically for common or collective action by the signatories under prescribed conditions. The best that can be said is, that the SEATO and ANZUS pacts establish a mechanism for collective consultation and possible collective defense efforts, as well as providing for peaceful collective military planning and training.

The effectiveness of Western alliances for Asia and the Pacific area can be understood if some of their principal disadvantages in relation to their primary objective of Communist-containment are mentioned. First, individual or collective action under these multilateral agreements can be undertaken only at the request of or with the consent of the government whose territory is subjected to Communist aggression. United States military assistance to South Vietnam is presumed to be in fulfillment of this provision, but in view of the multiple changes of government in this war-torn country in recent months, the legal basis for the United States military activity in South Vietnam appears more obscure day by day. As previously mentioned, the United States has requested and is receiving a variety of technical and military assistance from other nations in the struggle against the Viet Cong. To date, such assistance has been minimal, and some of the states providing assistance are not signatories to either the SEATO or the ANZUS pacts. For example, 2,000 Korean combat troops arrived in Saigon in late February 1965, as "security guards" and for other duties. The legal status of their presence in South Vietnam has not been made clear, at least publicly. In essence, the United States has been the principal supplier of military assistance to the beleaguered South Vietnam forces. Likewise, the United States has been the principal supplier of armaments to other signatories of the various defense agreements described in the previous section of this study.

Second, unlike the provisions of NATO and of the OAS, no clear definition of U.S. interests or of the interests of its allies can be found in any of the defense treaties described. In fact, there appears to be some overlapping and even some contradictions in the obligations assumed by the signatories to these bilateral and multilateral defense treaties.

Third, it would appear that conclusion of these treaties between 1951 and 1955 was largely motivated by the experiences of the Korean war, and, more importantly, in anticipation that further Communist aggression would take the shape of massive land warfare initiated by the Chinese Communists in Korea. To date, this has not occurred, and much of U.S. diplomacy and other action has been directed at avoiding such a massive confrontation with Communist China's land forces. On the other hand, the SEATO agreement recognized the dangers of Communist infiltration, subversion, and guerrilla warfare. The signatories of the agreement undertook to study this problem and to make recommendations for countering this kind of Communist aggression. Some studies were initiated at the SEATO headquarters, and a number of meetings were held on this subject. The results have remained classified, but there is no overt evidence that any positive action has come from this effort. When the United States was confronted with Communist-style revolutionary warfare tactics in Laos and on a massive scale in South Vietnam, any cooperative action by signatories of the various defense treaties was largely on an ad hoc basis, with the United States bearing almost the whole burden of devising counter-insurgency action.

Finally, there are two characteristics of defense alliances in Asia and the Pacific that should be noted. Unlike the NATO or the OAS system, none of the signatories to defense alliances for Asia and the Pacific are contiguous in territory to any of the others. This fact presents a special handicap in countering Chinese Communist aggression on the Asiatic continent, because only the United States possesses large enough sea and air forces to support and protect Western land forces engaged on the continent. It should also be noted that the one signatory to SEATO most vulnerable to Chinese Communist aggression—Thailand—is flanked by two nations, Burma and Cambodia, both of which are heavily influenced at present by Communist China and because of their "neutral" posture, both are even more vulnerable to Chinese Communist infiltration and subversion than Thailand at any time the Peking regime decides to move in their direction.

In summary, therefore, the series of bilateral and multilateral alliances sponsored by the United States for Asia and the Pacific do not at present constitute a collective defense system and, because of the disparate nature of the various treaties, as well as the geographic separation of the signatories, it is difficult to see how this alliance "system" could constitute an effective grouping either for development of peace-keeping functions or cooperative negotiations of arms control and disarmament measures applicable to the area.

Communist Alliances and Alignments in Asia

As a preface to a discussion of the Communist system of alliances in Asia, it must be cautioned that several factors, among them secrecy regarding military affairs and interparty relations, make it difficult to determine the nature and scope of military commitments and alignments between communist states and between them and their noncommunist neighbors. It may be hazarded that informal military and political commitments are as binding as formal commitments between these states. For example, it is not clear whether there existed a formal military alliance between North Korea and either the Soviet Union or China before or during the Korean war. Yet, Soviet military assistance and apparent policy direction preceded the war, and Chinese assistance made its continuation possible. Similarly, there seems to be no formal alliance between North Vietnam and either of the great communist powers, but fraternal bonds and mutual interest are indisputable, and they have taken the form of military assistance.

Formal communist alliance commitments in Asia consist of bilateral treaties of mutual assistance or nonaggression pacts, the most significant of which is the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed on February 14, 1950. The casus foedoris of the treaty is an attack by Japan or any state allied with Japan on either party and consequent involvement by that party in a state of war. The obligation to render assistance is unusually strong: "... [immediate] . . . military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal." The treaty also calls for consultations on international matters of mutual interest and provides for economic and cultural cooperation and assistance.

Sino-Soviet military relations never developed in the scope and cordiality implied by the treaty. Throughout the period from the signing of the treaty until 1960, when Sino-Soviet military relations were virtually severed, the Soviet Union was sparing with its military assistance and cautious in interpreting the defense obligations assumed in the treaty. The treaty was accompanied by an agreement to extend $300 million in development credits to China over a five-year period. The Soviet Union also began to provide military advisers and equipment. Assistance was stepped up during the Korean war, and the Soviets made a significant contribution to the air power of the Chinese forces. However, it was subsequently revealed that China was made to pay for this Soviet aid. 5/ After the Korean armistice, the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) was reorganized and modernized with Soviet aid and advice. Nevertheless, China never acquired the most modern equipment the Soviet Union had to offer, and Soviet assistance contributed little to the development of indigenous Chinese arms industries, thus keeping China dependent on outside assistance.

After Stalin's death, relations between the allies improved. Soviet rights to joint occupation of Port Arthur and to joint ownership of several Chinese industrial enterprises were withdrawn. More Soviet assistance was forthcoming, some of which was used to help develop a Chinese aircraft industry. It has been estimated that before 1957 China received some $2 billion in military assistance from the Soviet Union about half of which was covered by Soviet credits. 6/

5/ General Lung Yun, Hsinhua, June 18, 1957, cited in Raymond Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Relations", The Annals of the American Academy (September 1963), p. 85.

6/ Harold Hinton, "Communist China's Military Posture", Current History (September 1962), p. 152.

In the middle and late 1950's, differences over the proper strategic approach toward the United States and toward national liberation movements arose, along with the issue of military assistance, to cause real strains in the alliance. Whereas the Soviets showed increasing restraint as their military power and the risks of using it grew, the Chinese wanted to exploit Soviet technical advances by assuming a more militant strategy, and they also wanted the fruits of Soviet technical expertise—assistance in developing their own nuclear weapons and missile systems.

The years 1958 and 1959 marked a significant turn for the worse in Sino-Soviet relations when Khrushchev was not willing to provide Peking with nuclear weapons assistance. Chinese scientists had studied at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research outside Moscow, and the Soviets had supplied China with an experimental atomic reactor, but not with assistance in developing nuclear weapons. China subsequently cited an agreement of October 15, 195[illegible] to provide China with "new technology for national defense" and accused the Soviet Union of unilaterally repudiating this agreement by refusing in June 1959 to give China a sample atomic bomb and technical information for its manufacture. 7/

Relations deteriorated further over Soviet reluctance to come forth with a sure promise to use their own nuclear capability to support China during the Matsu and Quemoy crisis of 1958. Since 1960, with the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations on all levels, more blatant statements have been made by Soviet spokesmen indicating the fragility of the Soviet mutual defense commitment. In 1962, Marshal Malinovsky cautioned that the Soviet Union stands ready to defend "those socialist states friendly to us." 8/ In addition, the Soviets have made it clear that their military power is not available for the support of Chinese special interests that do not coincide with the Soviet's view of the interests and well-being of the entire communist camp.

In the early years, the Sino-Soviet alliance served to inhibit the growth of Chinese power and to circumscribe China's actions in Asia and within the bloc. But since 1958-59, China has been determined to rely on its own resources for economic and military development and to maintain an autonomous international position.

Most of the other military treaty arrangements between China and its Asian neighbors are in the form of nonaggression pacts rather than mutual defense agreements. Three such treaties of Friendship and Mutual Non-aggression were signed with Burma, Cambodia, and Afghanistan in January, July, and August 1960, respectively. Each follows the same pattern—a pledge to respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the other party and to settle all disputes through negotiation; a pledge not to carry out acts of aggression against the other party or to take part in any military alliance directed against the other party; 9/ and a promise to develop and strengthen economic and cultural ties between the two parties. In effect, these pacts are agreements binding the lesser powers to refrain from military alliances. At the same time, China probably views them as manifestations of alignment with it and against Western imperialism. A Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed with Nepal in 1960, excluding the provisions on mutual nonaggression and abstinence from antagonistic alliances.

In addition to the series of nonaggression pacts, China, in 1960, gave Cambodia an informal guarantee of support in the event of a threat against its frontiers; and, on July 11, 1961, China signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with North Korea identical to a treaty signed by the Soviet Union and North Korea five days earlier. The treaty is the same as the Sino-Soviet treaty, although it is directed against "any state or coalition of states" that should launch an attack which results in a state of war.

The extent of Chinese military relations with North Vietnam is unclear. Chinese assistance to the North Vietnamese army in the form of training, military advisers, and

7/ Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 218.
8/ Pravda, Jan. 24, 1962.
9/ Emphasis added.

some equipment dates back to 1950. Ho Chi-minh was approached in late 1960 by a Chinese military mission, which offered to negotiate a military pact, but Ho refused. It has been speculated that a secret military pact may have been signed after the Cuban missile crisis, when Liu Shao-chi went to Hanoi with the news that the Sino-Soviet dispute appeared to be irreparable. 10/

Both North Vietnam and North Korea have been caught in the middle of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Both have veered toward the Chinese side in recent years, but North Vietnam has made a more conscientious effort to keep open channels for aid and support from the Soviet Union, which is able to supply more sophisticated military and development aid. Outer Mongolia, which has a Mutual Assistance Pact with the Soviet Union signed in March 1936, has also felt the pressure of the Sino-Soviet dispute but has favored the Soviet position.

China and the Soviet Union are also competing for influence in Indonesia—the Soviets primarily by means of extensive military assistance and the Chinese primarily through influence in the large Indonesian Communist party and more recently as a potential supplier of nuclear weapons assistance.

In addition to formal ties of military nature, therefore, China has cultivated special relationships with certain Asian countries—relationships that can be viewed as quasi-political alignment with China (Chinese-oriented nonalignment). These relationships began to grow first in the period beginning with the Bandung Conference, when China was espousing a policy of competitive coexistence, and subsequently developed in the atmosphere of intimidation surrounding China's vast power potential and demonstrated willingness to assert itself militarily if necessary.

It can be said that this quasi-political alignment embraces Burma and Cambodia, which are in the direct shadow of Chinese power and ambitions, and Ceylon and Indonesia for whom Chinese friendship contributes to foreign policy goals. China has given substantial grants to Cambodia and Ceylon and loans to Burma. Trade with China is significant for the Burmese and Ceylonese economies. Chinese support for Indonesia's anti-imperialist designs in West Irian and Malaysia has contributed to their friendship. Although Pakistan is a member of SEATO and is basically Western-oriented, its fundamental fear of India and caution toward China dictated a border settlement in March 1963.

III. Arms Control and Disarmament Measures

In the initial section of this study, a number of basic assumptions were made concerning Cold-War politics in Asia and the Pacific. The significance of these assumptions with respect to arms control and disarmament measures can be summarized as follows: the present involvement of both the Soviet Union and of Communist China in Asia constitutes an important obstacle to conclusion of any substantial arms control and disarmament measures; the success, to date, of the Chinese Communists in reducing United States and Western influence in southeast Asia by means of subversion, infiltration, and guerrilla warfare tends to make the Peking regime less receptive to any agreement that might restrict its war-making potential; and finally, Communist China's possession of potential nuclear weapons capability has injected a new element into all negotiations on control or reduction of nuclear weapons by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France.

These basic assumptions and their significance, when viewed in the light of present instability and conflict in southeast Asia, make any estimates of the effects of arms control and disarmament measures on existing alliances a matter of educated conjectures at best. As a consequence, the analysis that follows will be concerned, first, with measures relating to nuclear armaments and second, with measures relating to conventional

10/ Paul F. Langer, "Outer Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam" in The Communist States at the Crossroads, Adam Bromke ed., (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 161.

armaments. Within each of these categories, for purposes of discussion, consideration will be given to the following factors: The extent to which changes in existing alliances and/or development of new or different alliance combinations might be a precondition of negotiations on arms control and disarmament measures; or an integral part of such negotiations or a consequence of successful negotiations. The extent to which a settlement of some, if not all, of the key political problems affecting the vital interests of two or more of the negotiating parties might be a precondition or an integral part of negotiations on arms control and disarmament measures. The possible effect of participation or of nonparticipation of Communist China in any negotiation relating to nuclear and/or conventional armaments, and, with respect to settlement of vital political problems in the area.

Measures Relating to Nuclear Weapons

1. It is possible to envisage further agreements on control of nuclear weapons by the present four nuclear powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France—such as additional test-ban agreements, inspection procedures, non-proliferation accords and even an agreement on a nuclear free zone for Asia, as proposed by some Asian states. Such agreements, theoretically, might be concluded without the participation of Communist China or any other potential nuclear powers such as India. If one takes this range of agreements or similar ones that do not reduce the nuclear capability of the nuclear powers, but only limit the use of this capability, then it would seem unlikely that agreements on such measures would materially affect existing alliances in Asia and the Pacific. For such agreements, in the author's opinion, would not remove the fear of nuclear war. So long as the nuclear weapons capability of the United States and the Soviet Union is not materially reduced, there are few leaders of Asian nations willing to believe that such agreements might not be violated if a conflict situation escalated to the point where the vital security interest of one of the major nuclear powers was affected.

On the other hand, one can guess that such agreements, if consummated, might produce some feeling in Asia of a lessening of the Cold-War tensions, so that many leaders of Asian states might not feel the need for new alignments or defense agreements beyond those presently in effect.

While no one can say whether the Peking regime will insist on being a party to future negotiations on nuclear armaments, it could be argued that further agreements on control of nuclear arms, as outlined, might not be considered as harming Communist China's vital interests, and therefore Peking might well act as the passive bystander. It might even be argued that such control measures, as outlined, might be viewed by Peking as enhancing its position, since certainly any limitation on use of nuclear weapons would be to the advantage of the Chinese Communists in their present success with conventional and unconventional non-nuclear warfare.

2. Beyond the rather small list of measures providing for limited control of nuclear armaments, are a variety of measures directed toward the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems of the Great Powers with a view to preventing any use of such weapons by one power against any others. It is not necessary here to consider whether such real reduction of nuclear armaments might be accomplished in stages or by a series of step-by-step agreements. What is important is to consider the consequences of the end result.

If the whole series of such nuclear disarmament measures were agreed to either at once or in sequence, it is obvious that the result for the United States would be a very serious retrenchment in the military capability of the United States in Asia and the Pacific. If no comparable disarmament measures were adopted respecting conventional armaments, the United States would still face problems of readjusting its armed forces to the sole use of conventional weapons. It would appear that elimination of the threat to use nuclear weapons alone would reduce United States power to affect situations in Asia simply because other nations, particularly Communist China, could undertake military adventures with far less risk of total destruction than is the case now.

It is possible that one or more of the Great Powers would refuse to enter into serious negotiations unless all were agreed on full participation by Communist China. It is possible the Peking regime would insist on being a party to such negotiations and might very well inject various political conditions into the process. It is also possible, that Communist China would remain aloof indicating no desire to be bound to any substantial nuclear disarmament agreements, a posture the Peking regime could regard as highly advantageous.

It is possible, again, that the international climate at such a time as the Great Powers were willing to begin serious negotiations on extensive nuclear disarmament measures might lead the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France to proceed without Communist China, including such rearrangement of alliances or revisions of defensive agreements and the settlement of key political problems as they believed would contribute to lessening of tension and maintenance of international peace and security. Such a concerted action by these four powers may be difficult to imagine at present, but it is possible to envisage conditions where this might happen, and which could result in a new Great Power coalition strong enough to prevent Communist China from disrupting the nuclear disarmament process or of developing further nuclear capability.

Needless to say, the foregoing speculation only serves to emphasize the statement previously made that Communist China's possession of nuclear capability and its apparent intent to develop this capability injects a new and complicating factor into all discussions of arms control and disarmament measures affecting Asia and the Pacific area.

From the speculative analysis regarding measures relating to nuclear armaments, it can be adduced that a limited number of measures might be agreed to without materially affecting the existing alliance structure in Asia and the Pacific and even without the necessity of political settlements. Beyond these limited measures, however, the extremely fluid political-military situation in Southeast Asia, involving as it does, not only the nuclear powers but Communist China and most other Asian states, provides too many imponderables to make careful, rational analysis possible. For changes in alliance structures affecting any area of the world come about much more often as a result of conflict situations, changing power relationships, or war than as a consequence of negotiations involving arms control or disarmament. New alignments for defense purposes in Asia have been proposed even while this is being written (March 1, 1965). Prince Sihanouk has suggested an alignment of the four Indo-China states, and Japan and the Republic of Korea are considering possible mutual security arrangements. A closer defense arrangement between Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and possibly including Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia is not outside the realm of possibility. Because of the involvement of all the major powers in Asia at present, it is arguable, at least, therefore, that before any series of measures directed toward the elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems can be considered seriously by the major powers involved, there will have to be a settlement of the Indo-China conflict and perhaps other political issues in Asia simply to create a climate in which fruitful negotiations on nuclear armaments can take place. It is almost certain, also, that resolution of current Asian conflict situations will result in some realignment of at least some Asian states and the Western powers and some restructuring of present defense alliances.

Measures Relating to Conventional Armaments

In relation to alliances and alignments for Asia and the Pacific, arms control and disarmament measures respecting conventional armaments present quite different problems than those arising from nuclear arms capability. If the four nuclear powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France—plus Communist China all agreed on control of nuclear arms and on a series of measures directed toward elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, they could collectively stop the nuclear arms race and prevent any proliferation of nuclear arms capability. In such circumstances, it would be unnecessary to seek agreement of other nations, although for certain measures this might be desirable.

In the field of conventional armaments, however, any effective measures for control and/or drastic reduction would require agreement by many of the states in Asia and the Pacific area including Communist China. For in the field of conventional armaments a number of states have considerable capacity for production of conventional armaments so that few effective controls or little effective disarmament could be secured if any arms producing states were omitted. On the basis of the foregoing, a brief analysis can be made along the lines of discussion in the preceding section.

1. It is possible to envisage a series of measures, primarily in the category of controls on conventional armaments that would be designed to halt and reduce the arms race in Asia. These might include a ban on military assistance, or any kind of arms aid to Asian states by any states outside the area; a "freeze" on arms production by all Asian producers; a ban on any arms shipments across borders in Asia; budgetary limitations on defense expenditures; and a ban on production of heavy weapons and planes capable of delivering heavy fire power or large bombs.

To be effective, such measures would require agreement by a considerable number of states, not only Asian producers, but also any other states capable of producing quantities of conventional arms, surplus to their own defense needs. Such control measures would also require agreement by Communist China, since few Asian states would be willing to begin negotiation on such measures unless they had assurance that the menace of Communist China's huge land forces would be substantially removed.

If conditions were favorable to negotiations on measures for control of conventional armaments in Asia, three possibilities might be assumed with respect to existing alliances and alignments. First, certain key nations might well insist on abrogation of existing U.S. alliances, particularly SEATO as a precondition to negotiations or at least assurances of such abrogation if agreement were successfully concluded. Second, changes in the alliance structure or complete revisions respecting both the purposes and the obligations of the parties might take place concurrently with the arms control negotiations. Third, the possibility of successful negotiations on control of conventional armaments might well cause the United States and the other nations to reassess the whole situation in Asia and the Pacific with a view to strengthening the United Nations peace-keeping capability in this area or to establishing a true collective security system for the region within the general provisions of the United Nations Charter.

In other words, agreement even on limited measures for control of conventional armaments in this area would most likely necessitate changes in the existing alliance structure. Whether the alliances or new alignments that emerged, however, would result in several, possibly competing groupings of states is impossible to predict.

2. The foregoing projection assumes that control measures applicable to Asian states would also be agreed to by the larger states and by other arms producing states outside of Asia. It should be emphasized here that it would also have to be assumed that the major conflict situations in Asia would have been moderated prior to the start of negotiations on these measures, for it would seem logical that none of the Asian nations involved in these conflict situations or the United States would agree to controls on conventional armaments unless a considerable degree of peace had been restored to Asia.

3. Measures for control of conventional armaments have been proposed as part of the effort to secure general and complete disarmament. Certainly, any negotiations directed toward this end would require drastic revision of existing alliances and the development of some effective peace-keeping machinery for Asia and the Pacific area, which is now lacking.

The question remains whether the United States should agree to any measures affecting conventional armaments that would reduce its ability to help maintain peace in Asia or to protect its own security in Asia and the Pacific. The OAS has existed as a viable regional organization almost wholly because the total power of the United States is behind it and can be used. Whether any similar organization might be established for Asia and

the Pacific is doubtful, but it could hardly be effective as a mechanism for settlement of disputes or control of local conflicts without U.S. military power behind it or an equivalent combination of power supporting it.

For it is important to assert that arms control and disarmament measures, even if agreed to by all of the nations involved, do not, of themselves stop conflict or eliminate conflict situations. In Asia, perhaps more than in any other area of the world, there exist deep-seated antagonisms between peoples, which have resulted in a resort to arms and which can produce the same result in the future. This is true for one reason, that control of conventional armaments is much, much harder to maintain and police than control of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. No Asian nation is likely to agree to reduction of conventional armaments below the forces and weapons it believes are required for maintenance of internal security and self-defense. Nor are the United States and other nations outside of Asia likely to take such steps.

It would appear, therefore, that for the foreseeable future, there are likely to be changes in the existing alliances and development of new alignments or alliance groupings. These may spring from or be related to, negotiations on arms control and disarmament measures, or they may result from future political and military changes growing out of existing or new conflict situations. Only one thing is certain, that the picture of alliances and alignments in Asia and the Pacific area in relation to arms control and disarmament measures a decade hence, or even five years from now will have changed markedly.

From the analysis in the foregoing sections, certain conclusions can be reached.

1. In view of Communist China's nuclear capability, it would appear that continuing efforts should be made to reach agreements between the present nuclear powers and Communist China on at least two series of arms control measures: (a) extension of the ban on nuclear testing in the atmosphere; and (b) restriction on dissemination or transfer of nuclear weapons and components of delivery systems. Unless some such measures are agreed to within the next two or three years, the Chinese Communists may have developed their nuclear capability to the point where Peking might be unwilling to enter into such agreements at all. Further, in the absence of any agreements on nuclear armaments that include Communist China, pressures may force India and possibly other nations into the nuclear arms race.

It is obviously in the interests of the United States to prevent, if possible, such a proliferation of nuclear armaments. Although Communist China might insist on settlement of political issues in Asia or changes in the whole U.S. defense position in Asia as preconditions for such negotiations, this is not certain. Peking might be more likely to attempt this kind of bargaining at such time, three to five years hence when its nuclear capability was farther advanced.

2. In respect to measures directed toward elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems coupled with drastic reduction of conventional armaments, it would seem, in so far as Asia and the Pacific are concerned, that settlement of major conflict situations and a restructuring of the U.S.-supported alliance system to make it a more effective collective security system are two necessary steps in creating a political climate in which disarmament negotiations might take place with some reasonable chance of success.

It is unlikely that the United States will attempt any restructuring of its alliance system while the current conflicts in Asia remain unsettled, nor would it gain any advantages from such a move.

3. From a wholly different point of view, there appears to be no direct relationship between possible agreements on arms control and disarmament measures and the development of intraregional economic cooperation. In the first place, effective economic cooperation is not possible unless developed nations of the area such as Japan and Australia, as well as developed nations outside the area are participants. Only one purely

regional organization exists—the Association of Asian States (ASA) whose members are Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Settlement of existing conflict situations in the area would seem to be the prime prerequisite for further development of regional economic cooperation.

4. Considering the present conditions of instability and conflict in Asia and considering the present commitments of the United States in Asia, any arms control or disarmament measures must be evaluated by the United States with respect to its relative power in Asia and the Pacific. Arms control or disarmament agreements that would result in a reduction or retrenchment of U.S. military power in Asia and the Pacific compared to its adversaries would certainly affect U.S. security and might also affect the viability of any peace-keeping operations or machinery in the future.

5. AFRICA

by

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5. AFRICA*

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I. Introduction

The new states of Africa have fewer arms and smaller armies than the nations of Europe, Asia, and the Americas. Moreover, they have unanimously adopted a general posture of nonalignment in the Cold War. These two basic facts make Africa in 1965 a marginal area for a study of the possible effects of disarmament and détente on alliances and alignments.

The complexity of the subject is enhanced by the large number of Africa's volatile new states. While Europe, Asia, and Latin America each have about twenty states, Africa will have about forty in 1965, with still more to come. These new states have not yet lived through the transition period that naturally follows the end of colonial rule. Now engaged in an avid search to define themselves through a new ideology of Africanism, they have not had the time necessary for a clear and lasting formulation of their own national interests. In a perceptive analysis of African foreign policies, the Foreign Minister of Senegal points out that African states have neither the long experience in world affairs that enables policy-makers to develop a broad historical perspective, nor governmental institutions tested by long usage, nor political philosophies separate from the will of the leaders. 1/

Africa's inventive and highly experimental search for "une voie originale," has nonetheless given birth to an unusually large number of regional and other alliances and alignments that are relevant for this study. In fact, they give the subject an added dimension. Several of these transitional regional arrangements have already been judged inadequate by Africa's leaders, and have been replaced by new interstate groupings, the most significant of which is the continent-wide Organization of African Unity.

Cold War Viewpoints vs. African Viewpoints

What role could these alignments play in a disarming world, and how would disarmament itself affect them? In assessing these questions, it is important to strike a proper balance between the bias of the "Cold-War" specialist and that of the specialist on Africa regarding the nature of the ideological struggle. To many Sino-Sovietologists, the ideological struggle is the struggle between communism and democracy. The Africanist does not deny the importance of the Cold War, but he is more impressed by the fact that, in the minds of Africans, it is not the key issue. In their quest for a unique ideology, Africans strive to establish their own balance between new and old forms of society, of culture, of religion, and of development. The Africanist is acutely aware of this African ideological struggle, and it conditions his attitude toward nonalignment and disarmament. While

* The author is indebted to Chester A. Crocker for research assistance in the preparation of this chapter. Mr. Crocker is a Ph.D. student in the Program of African Studies at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

1/ Doudou Thiam, La politique étrangère des états Africains (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1963), p. 9.

the Cold-War specialist tends to call nonalignment "a function of bipolarity," 2/ the Africanist regards it as a manifestation of Africanism.

The contrast in these two aproaches is illustrated by the sharp difference in the writings of Arnold Rivkin and James S. Coleman regarding arms control in Africa. Mr. Rivkin, who first developed his interest and competence in African affairs when he was involved in the implementation of the Marshall Plan, has retained an understandable Cold-War emphasis. Since 1959, he has advocated limitations by the great powers on arms shipments to Africa. 3/ Mr. Coleman, who began his career as a student of Africa, has acquired a deep empathy with African views. In his opinion, "attempting to deny African states, as distinguished from other sovereign states in the world, the full sovereign rights to develop military establishments of their own, smacks of that holier-than-thou paternalism that has historically conditioned the West's position . . . ." Mr. Coleman believes that "the non-African world can neither expect nor demand that Africans manifest a special restraint or a higher morality." He is not opposed to disarmament and control of the military but insists that it be treated as "a universal, not an African, problem." 4/

The Role of Nonalignment in Africa

As already noted, most Africanists also differ from the Sino-Sovietologists and other Cold-War specialists in their evaluation of nonalignment. It is therefore essential, in this study of African alliances, to clarify the role of nonalignment in Africa. All African states except the Republic of South Africa, are by their own definition, nonaligned in the Cold War. When they approved the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, they agreed in Article III, 7 to "a policy of nonalignment with regard to all blocs."

As a manifestation of Africanism, nonalignment is closely related to African nationalism and Pan-Africanism, and to the fear of neo-colonialism and Balkanization. However, the spectrum of nonalignment covers a wide range of attitudes toward the Cold War, and positions shift from time to time for tactical reasons, either domestic or external. Many observers question the nonalignment of the former French territories because most of them have defense agreements with France, as well as treaties for economic and cultural cooperation, and they even receive direct budgetary support from France for the cost of running their governments. It is, nonetheless, politically important for their leaders to say that their policy is not to take sides in the Cold War, but to attempt to "reconcile the sides." As President Senghor of Senegal expressed it, even before the 1963 Summit Conference in Addis Ababa, "In the area of foreign policy, we define ourselves by nonalignment."

It is true that President Bourguiba of Tunisia in a speech in July, 1958, used the word "pro-Western" to describe his foreign policy. But at the Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned Countries in September 1961, he declared that "nonalignment has been a fundamental element of our policy for many years." Egypt's President Nasser puts it more colorfully: "I will not become the stooge or satellite or pawn or hireling of anybody." President Julius Nyerere gives us a subtle insight when he declares that Tanganyika is unwilling to have "a friendly country choosing enemies for us." The late Sylvanus Olympio, President of Togo and one of Africa's ablest leaders, illuminated still another aspect of nonalignment when he said, "We have so much to ask for and so little to bargain with." And President Nkrumah refuses to associate Ghana with the Common Market of

2/ Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism," Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs, Laurence W. Martin, ed., (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 94.

3/ A. Rivkin, "Arms for Africa?", Foreign Affairs (October 1959), pp. 84-94; and A. Rivkin, The African Presence in World Affairs (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 252-57.

4/ J. S. Coleman and Belmont Brice, Jr., "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, John J. Johnson, ed., (Princeton, 1962), pp. 359-405.

the European Economic Community on the ground that "above all," states entering the Market "will lose their option of nonalignment and find themselves dragged into the diplomacy of imperialist cold war politics. . ."

None of these declarations, however, clarifies the complex attitudes that underlie nonalignment. Since these attitudes will affect both disarmament and the future role of alliances and alignments, let us probe a little deeper into their causes.

When Africans are warned of the threat of Soviet imperialism, they are seldom impressed. They like to emphasize that the danger they know comes from their own personal experience with the colonialism of the past, and the neocolonialism of the present. In fact, they often say, Westerners had better stop exaggerating the Soviet threat to Africa. A Nigerian member of the staff of the University of Ibadan recently declared that he and many others no longer listen to any foreign broadcasts except those of the BBC, because they are sick of the Cold-War propaganda of both the Voice of America and Radio Moscow. A Ugandan faculty member at the University College of East Africa warns us that the Soviet Union is asking the right questions about Africa. The West, he says, instead of saying that Western colonialism has its good aspects and that Soviet colonialism is bad, should start trying to answer the questions the Russians are asking. Anyone who interests himself in our problems, he adds, is our friend. He reminds us that Great Britain allied itself with the Soviet Union to fight a common problem in World War II, and affirms that Africans would likewise be willing to work with the Soviets until Africans are free in Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies, and South Africa. Westerners are too impatient, he says. If the Soviet Union ever really threatens Africa's hard-won independence, Africa will turn to the West quickly enough.

A distinguished Nigerian lawyer, who is more conservative, answers in still another way. It is true, he says, that we do not know the Russians, but we do know the West, and our long life under foreign rule unfortunately taught us to believe that we cannot trust the West. Our distrust of our former rulers is the basic cause of our nonalignment. If we commit ourselves, he concludes, it will be to ideas—meaning the ideas of human freedom and dignity—not to the West. A Cameroonian adds that as far as our distrust of foreign rule is concerned, Africans consider Russia a part of the West. And a Ghanaian professor attacks the Marxist theory of Historical Materialism as imperialist because "it sees in Europe the key to African history. It does not see Africa as Africans see it."

Africans are more pragmatic than moralistic in arguing the case for nonalignment. They usually base the case for nonalignment squarely on the doctrine of national interest. A professor from Sierra Leone has compared the nationalist views of the founding fathers of the United States with those of African leaders today, showing how both wanted (1) "no entangling alliances," (2) fewer trade restrictions, (3) rapid economic development and industrialization, (4) the full and free exercise of the right of sovereignty, (5) the withdrawal of foreign governments from their continent, and (6) a hemispheric association of states.

Cold-War specialists sometimes argue that the basic cause of nonalignment lies in its potentialities for "black-mailing" both the Western and Soviet powers for economic aid. It is true that Africans are quite pragmatic in stating that they want aid from both sides in order to achieve their major objective of rapid economic development. In private, one hears occasional references to the Cold War as "a blessing in disguise," because of the aid it brings from both power groups. However, this is obviously not the original cause of nonalignment. When Nehru set the tone of nonalignment back in 1947, the cold war competition to aid Asia and Africa had not yet begun. It was not until 1955 that the Soviet Union began to give assistance to Asia, and not until 1958 that it began to aid Africa (aside from military help to Egypt in 1955).

A full understanding of the reasons Africans favor nonalignment and condemn neocolonialism is found in the area of political psychology. When they are asked to acknowledge the material benefits of colonialism, Africans are reluctant to do so. They are more likely to contend that any material benefits of colonialism are irrelevant; its evil lies in the spiritual realm because of its degrading and humiliating effect on human beings.

A deeper appreciation of the strong African emotions on this point is needed for more than a superficial comprehension of nonalignment. These latent feelings also account for African hostility toward neo-colonialism. The memory of colonialism stimulates both the fear of neo-colonialism and the desire for nonalignment. Because of this emotional reaction, many Africans are naturally hypersensitive about the remaining external influences and controls that still affect them after independence. In their minds, alignment has definite implications of neo-colonialism. For Westerners who are irritated by African attitudes, the essence of the matter is illuminated by Jean-Paul Sartre in the opening lines of his Black Orpheus: "What would you expect to find, when the muzzle that has silenced the voices of black men is removed? That they would thunder your praise?"

II. African Alliances and Alignments

Nonalignment is thus an integral and powerful part of the ideology of Africanism. However, one must now point out what appears at first glance to be a paradox. Despite their declarations of nonalignment, African states do participate in three broad types of alliances and alignments: (1) regional and inter-African groupings of political and military significance; (2) bilateral or multilateral military arrangements between African states and external powers; and (3) economic and other ties of political significance between African states and external powers. It must not be forgotten, however, that African alliances and alignments are still in a state of flux. In particular, the remaining bilateral military ties of certain African states with external powers are under fire from both the political opposition at home and from African countries that have severed such ties.

Regional and Inter-African Groupings

Many of these regional groupings are the product of the efforts of African leaders to realize the Pan-African ideal. The variety of alignments reflects the divergence of views on how to attain the ideal. Whether through economic and technical cooperation under a loosely organized secretariat, or through political integration involving the surrender of sovereignty, nearly all African states are attracted by the potential benefits of regional or even continental economic arrangements. Until May 1963, African states were divided into competing and overlapping alignments: the Casablanca, Brazzaville, and Monrovia-Lagos groups, and the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa. However, when the OAU Charter was signed at the Addis Ababa Summit Conference on May 25, 1963, nominal unity was at last achieved, and many of the previous groupings either withered away or were disbanded. The differing ideologies of the radical and the more conservative African nationalists naturally persist within the OAU. Thus, for example, the OAU's Congo Conciliation Commission was immobilized largely by differences of opinion on the legitimacy of the Tshombe regime in Léopoldville. To a degree this split reflected the old Casablanca-Monrovia rivalry. To explain clearly the structure, functions, and character of the OAU, it is helpful to survey first the historical evolution of the rival groups out of which the OAU originated.

The Brazzaville group. The Brazzaville group, which numbered fourteen French-speaking states in mid-1964, was launched in late 1960. Often termed the most "conservative" group in African politics, it is officially nonaligned with either great power bloc, but most of its members have close defense and other ties with France. Prior to its formation, the short-lived Federation of Mali (Senegal and Soudan) had come into being in April 1959. This federation, as originally conceived, was designed to include Upper Volta and Dahomey, but the opposition of President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast led to the formation on May 29, 1959, of a rival arrangement, the Conseil de l'Entente, consisting of the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey. While the Mali Federation was a constitutional union with a federal parliament, the Entente under Houphouet's leadership provided only for economic, technical, and diplomatic cooperation among the members, the center of gravity always remaining the wealthier Ivory Coast. Shortly after

this development, the equatorial states of Gabon, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Congo-Brazzaville formed a customs union on June 22, 1959 (Cameroon joined in 1961). The four original states of this Union douanière équatoriale (UDE) customs union have joined with France in establishing an Equatorial Defense Council, which will later be discussed.

Both the Entente and the UDE favored cooperation, not integration, of their respective members, and both included one relatively wealthy state (Ivory Coast in the Entente, and Gabon in the UDE), which had not enjoyed sharing its wealth with poorer neighbors under the two French colonial administrative federations, Afrique occidentale française and Afrique équatoriale française. The Entente and the UDE proved more durable than the Mali Federation, which broke up because of differences of ideology and internal policy just two months after receiving its independence from France in June 1960. After this rupture, Mali joined the revolutionary nationalist company of Ghana and Guinea; Senegal on the other hand, took up a position closer to the Entente and the UDE.

Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny—confronted with the radical trio of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, as well as the explosive issues of the Algerian War, the Congo crisis, and Moroccan irredentism over Mauritania—decided to call a conference of French-speaking African states at Abidjan in October 1960, to discuss these questions. Starting from a premise of friendship for France, these ten states (Entente, UDE, Senegal, and Mauritania) favored mediation between the parties in Algeria, and Mauritanian independence. A further conference was called in Brazzaville, in December 1960, from which the group takes its name. In addition to common diplomatic positions on Algeria, Mauritania, and the Congo, the group (now eleven with the Malagasy Republic participating) made plans for economic, cultural, and other cooperation and committed themselves to nonintervention in each other's internal affairs. The principle of nonintervention, often repeated by the Brazzaville and Monrovia powers, is an oblique reference to Ghana's supposed intrigues in Togo and the Ivory Coast, and to Guinea's harboring of Cameroonian rebels. A series of meetings followed to implement these commitments: January 1961, at Dakar; March 1961, at Yaoundé (Cameroon had joined) where the functional arm of the group, the Organization africaine et malgache de la coopération économique (OAMCE) was launched; and September 1961, at Tananarive where the twelve states signed the Charter of the new Union africaine et malgache (UAM). The twelve agreed to take the following steps: (1) the Heads of State were to meet twice a year; (2) a U.N. caucusing group was to be formed; (3) a defense organization was to be established at Ouagadougou; (4) postal and telecommunications headquarters were to be set up in Brazzaville; (5) a joint commercial airline, Air Afrique, was to be set up in Abidjan; and (6) the Cameroon Embassy in Paris was to be the group's liaison with the European Common Market. The UAM sought to enlarge its membership to all of French-speaking Africa; in 1963, Togo and Rwanda joined, and overtures were being made in 1964 to include Mali and Guinea.

However, when all African states except South Africa joined the new Organization of African Unity in 1963, the French-speaking states had to reconsider the role of the UAM. They decided to consolidate its functions. At Dakar in March 1964, the UAM heads of state, now fourteen in number, decided to dissolve the political machinery of the UAM, but to retain its economic, technical, and cultural machinery. The OAMCE was given a new title, the Union africaine et malgache de la coopération économique with headquarters in Yaoundé. A new Charter was initialed in Nouakchott in April and a final heads-of-state meeting was scheduled for December 1964. However, when the meeting finally took place in Nouakchott in February 1965, the group's sentiment had changed. Primarily because of foreign and African intervention in the Congo, it was felt that an alignment with political and diplomatic overtones would prove useful. Accordingly, the UAM is reborn under a new name: l'Organization commune africaine et malgache (OCAM). Thus, while some of the political arms of the old Union—the Secretariat in Cotonou and the U.N. caucusing group in New York—have been disbanded, new ones will probably be formed; meanwhile, the Defense Pact at Ouagadougou, Air Afrique in Abidjan, the post and telecommunications headquarters in Brazzaville, and the OAMCE Secretariat in Yaoundé are still intact.

The Casablanca Group. At the opposite ideolgical pole from the Brazzaville fourteen were the six states known from 1961 to 1963 as the Casablanca group. They included three sub-Saharan states with a revolutionary nationalist outlook--Ghana, Guinea, and Mali--and three North African associates--Algeria, Morocco, and the U.A.R. Although the Union of African States (the first three) and the Casablanca group (all six) have been disbanded, the ideology and foreign policy for which they stood are still distinct positions in African politics. One of the main elements in this position is the movement for Pan-African unity which President Nkrumah of Ghana aspires to lead. Calling for unity as Africa's only defense against "Balkanization" and neo-colonialism, Nkrumah has used numerous channels to plead for a United States of Africa, including a series of Conferences of Independent African States, a series of nongovernmental All-African Peoples' Conferences, and the meetings of the Ghana, Guinea, Mali Union of African States (UAS).

The UAS grew out of the sudden independence of Guinea in 1958 and the near collapse of its administration and finances. Ghana made available a £10,000,000 credit, and the two signed a provisional agreement for a Ghana-Guinea Union in November 1958. Formally established on May 1, 1959, this Union was a close political alliance based on the principles of independence from both Cold-War blocs, rapid transformation of internal socio-economic structures, and continuation of the nationalist revolution throughout Africa. After the break-up of the Mali Federation, Mali joined Ghana and Guinea in December 1960 and the Charter of the UAS was signed in April 1961. The significance of the UAS was not in its institutions, which were practically nonexistent, but in the fact that its foreign policy was the most cohesive of any African grouping.

Anxious to broaden their diplomatic alignments the UAS states along with the U.A.R., the Algerian Provisional Government, and Libya (which later left the group), accepted Morocco's invitation to a conference in Casablanca in January 1961. The recent formation of the Brazzaville group, along with the Congo crisis and Morocco's search for support of its claims to Mauritania, stimulated Morocco to call this conference. A four-part Casablanca Charter was signed in May 1961 establishing economic, political, cultural, and military committees. Before the cohesiveness of the group began to decline in mid-1962, a wide range of paper institutions were set up including an African Development Bank, an African Common Market, an African Payments Union, an African Cultural Institute, and a Joint African Military High Command. The High Command was allocated $700,000, and was headed by an Egyptian General, with headquarters in Accra; but there is no evidence that the General ever had any troops at his disposal. In fact, the Casablanca group did little more than proclaim its agreement on a wide range of African issues at periodic meetings of heads of state. The group was largely defunct before the Addis Ababa Summit in May 1963, and Sékou Touré stated in August 1963, that "we have solemnly renounced" both the Casablanca Charter and the UAS.

The Monrovia-Lagos Group. Outside the twenty states involved in either the Brazzaville or Casablanca groups were about ten others, some of whom deplored the growing split in the African camp and were influential enough to do something about it. These "independents" or "moderates", as they were sometimes called, included such states as Nigeria, Liberia, Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Togo. It was their initiative that led to the association of all African states in 1963 in the Organization of African Unity. However, it should not be forgotten that Nkrumah had already set a precedent for an all-Africa organization by inviting all independent African states including South Africa (which did not accept) to a Conference of Independent African States in Accra in April 1958. This conference, which was a unity meeting rather than an alignment, was followed up by two other meetings--one in Addis Ababa in June 1960 and the other a special emergency meeting in Léopoldville on the Congo crisis in August 1960.

Meanwhile, President Tubman of Liberia had been trying since 1959 to promote the idea of a loose grouping of all African states modeled to some extent on the Organization of American States. In May 1961, hoping to end the Casablanca-Brazzaville split and to bring the French and English-speaking states together, he invited all of them to a conference in Monrovia. This meeting was attended by the "independents" and the Brazzaville powers, a combine that came to be known as the Monrovia group. The Casablanca

six decided not to attend because of Morocco's objection to the presence of Mauritania and because the Brazzaville powers would not accept an Algerian delegation since Algeria was not yet independent. When the Casablanca group also boycotted second and third meetings, held in Lagos in January and June 1962, the Monrovia group decided to go ahead and draft a charter for an all-African organization. This charter was signed by foreign ministers at a fourth meeting in December 1962, creating the Inter-African and Malagasy States Organization (IAMO). This December meeting prepared the way for the Summit Conference of heads of state at Addis Ababa in May 1963, which approved a revised charter and gave the new body the name Organization of African Unity. On this occasion, all the Casablanca powers were represented except Morocco, which remained unappeased over Mauritania. The only other missing state out of a total of thirty-two was Togo, which was not represented because the IAMO group did not want to condone the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio by recognizing the new Grunitzky regime.

The Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA). Meanwhile, in East Africa a grouping developed more or less autonomously from those of West and North Africa. The Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa was formed by nationalist leaders at Mwanza, Tanganyika, in late 1958. Unlike other groups, it was not an interstate alignment but a front of political parties in the still dependent territories of East and Central Africa, headed by Tom Mboya of Kenya, Julius Nyerere, of Tanganyika, and Kenneth Kaunda, of Zambia. Their regional approach to Pan-Africanism was considered more practical, though less ambitious, than West African proposals for continental unification; nevertheless, at its largest, the movement was expanded to include representatives of all twenty territorial units in East, Central, and South Africa, and its name was changed to PAFMECSA. However, since its primary function was to foster regional solidarity and enthusiasm for liberation in white-held areas, its importance tended to dwindle with the achievement of independence in the political centers (Dar-es-Salaam, Nairobi, and later, Lusaka). When independence came, the new leaders were glad to join the loosely structured Organization of African Unity in order to broaden their diplomatic and other relationships. Moreover, PAFMECSA's liberation function was taken over by the OAU whose Committee of Nine sits at Dar-es-Salaam, thus underlining Tanzania's key role in the freedom struggle.

The Organization of African Unity. The Addis Ababa conference was among the most important diplomatic events in African history. To some, the OAU represents the first step in a long process of evolution toward a form of confederal government; to others, notably Nkrumah, it symbolizes an opportunity to develop a genuine African federal union as soon as practicable. However, so many unknowns impinge on its future, that only its present significance can be evaluated. Today, the OAU is: (1) a forum in which African political leaders can express their views on national, regional, and international problems; (2) a military, economic, and diplomatic coalition of the independent states of Africa against colonialism in all its forms, especially in southern Africa; and (3) a coordinating body for inter-African cooperation in matters of security, economic development, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

The OAU Charter also articulates a number of other principles and purposes relevant for this study. In addition to the principle of "nonalignment with regard to all blocs" (III, 7), a Summit Conference Resolution "decided" on the "removal of military bases from Africa and disentanglement of African countries from military pacts with foreign powers." A third was the principle of peaceful settlement of inter-African disputes, and a fourth was recognition of the sovereign equality of all members, and renunciation of interference in each other's internal affairs.

The OAU institutions provided for by the Charter include an Assembly of Heads of States and Governments, a Council of Ministers, a General Secretariat, and a permanent Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. Article XX of the Charter also provides for such Specialized Commissions as the Assembly deems necessary, including an Economic and Social Commission, an Educational and Cultural Commission, a Health, Sanitation, and Nutrition Commission, a Defense Commission, and a Scientific,

Technical and Research Commission. A final organ of significance, established not by the Charter but by Conference Resolution, is the Liberation Committee (Committee of Nine) set up to coordinate aid and assistance to national liberation movements.

Thus far, the OAU's chief activities lie in three fields. First, African states have intensified the liberation struggle. On May 25, 1963, the Summit Conference demanded that all African states break off diplomatic and consular relations with Portugal and South Africa, and asked for "an effective boycott" of the foreign trade of the two countries by import prohibitions and the denial of port and airport facilities. Portuguese and South African planes were also to be forbidden to overfly the territories of all African states. At the Cairo meeting of the OAU in July 1964, moreover, this ban was extended to cover all ships and planes en route to or from South Africa and Portugal. If this decision were fully implemented, it would impose serious hardship on a few of the new states. In its first half-year, the OAU's Liberation Committee raised $675,000 (two-thirds of it from Algeria and Nigeria) much of which went into propaganda in colonial territories. Several of the more militant African states are training saboteurs and freedom fighters. The committee also seeks to unite rival liberation movements in colonial areas in order to maximize their effectiveness; as a part of this effort, the OAU recognized the provisional government of Holden Roberto in Angola.

The second major area of OAU activity is the peaceful settlement of inter-African disputes through the Mediation Commission established at Addis Ababa. Although it has not been fully tested, its existence and the spirit behind it played a notable part in the cease-fire between Algeria and Morocco, which was negotiated with the aid of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie and President Modibo Keita of Mali. Perhaps the "spirit of Addis" was also evident in the frontier delimitation treaty negotiated in February 1963 and signed in July by Mauritania and Mali. Moreover, the long conflict over the Ethiopia-Somali border also eased after an appeal by the OAU foreign ministers in February 1964.

A third field of OAU political activity deals with internal instabilities that might lead to regional disorder. In February 1964, soon after the January mutinies in East Africa, President Nyerere called an emergency OAU Foreign and Defense Ministers meeting in Dar-es-Salaam. Out of this meeting came the decision to provide Nigerian and Ethiopian forces to replace the British forces that had been called in by the Tanganyika Government to restore order. Another emergency session of the OAU Council of Ministers was held in September 1964 to deal with the spreading civil war in the Congo. The Council decided to create an ad hoc Congo Conciliation Commission under the chairmanship of Kenya President Kenyatta to attempt a reconciliation. Unfortunately, the commission was paralyzed by inter-African squabbles.

Bilateral and Multilateral Military Arrangements Between African States and External Powers

In addition to the loose Pan-African military alignments already described, African states have made three types of military arrangements with states outside Africa—defense agreements, arrangements for foreign military bases in Africa, and agreements for foreign military assistance.

Defense Agreements. Defense agreements have been signed by France with most of its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. Bilateral defense agreements exist between France and Dahomey, Gabon, Senegal, Mauritania, the Malagasy Republic, and Togo. Multilateral regional defense agreements have been signed between France, the Ivory Coast, and Niger, and between France, Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, and Gabon. These agreements were concluded either shortly before or after independence in 1960. Among the former French territories, only Upper Volta, Guinea, Mali, and Cameroon are not involved in such accords. A 1960 bilateral agreement with Cameroon was not renewed in 1964. Under President Sylvanus Olympio, Togo was independent of such ties, but the new regime of Nicolas Grunitzky negotiated a bilateral agreement with France in July 1963.

These agreements provide for (1) collaboration on defense problems, (2) provision of mutual military facilities, aid, and assistance, (3) appeals by African governments for French help against aggression, (4) establishment in Africa of French military installations including bases. Special agreements also make possible the participation of French armed forces in the maintenance of public order if requested by an African Government and approved by the French Cabinet. It was presumably under these latter arrangements that French troops were flown into Brazzaville in August 1963, to maintain order during the rioting that led to the resignation of President Fulbert Youlou. The reputation for political neutrality, which France established during that governmental crisis, was reportedly seriously damaged by its intervention to restore President Léon Mba in Gabon in February 1964. French Information Minister Peyrefitte affirmed in Paris on February 26, 1964 that France had intervened under these defense accords ten times since independence in 1960 and would do so again to maintain stability in the area. 5/ France has thus assumed certain responsibilities for both the national defense and the internal order of the eleven fledgling states that participate in these agreements. French officials point out, however, that France has no "obligation" to send in troops; intervention is "neither a right for Africans nor a duty for France," says Armed Forces Minister Pierre Messmer. 6/

Outside the French-speaking area, only Liberia and Libya have alliances with Great Powers. On July 8, 1959, the United States and Liberia signed a defense agreement, which was made public on September 10, 1959. This was the first time the United States formally extended its defense commitments to cover an African nation, although its official presence had been strongly felt in Liberia for decades; military aid and training programs had been established in Liberia since 1951, while other military ties go back to a Lend-Lease agreement signed in 1943. According to the text of the 1959 Treaty of Cooperation, the two governments will "immediately determine what action may be appropriate for the defense of Liberia" in the event of aggression or threat of aggression. The agreement also reaffirms the U.S. intention to furnish whatever assistance may be mutually agreed on to aid Liberia's economic development and to preserve its national independence and integrity.

Libya is the only North African nation to have defense commitments with an external power. On July 29, 1953, Great Britain and Libya concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, which was supplemented by an agreement concerning military facilities and financial arrangements. The crucial second article provides that in the event either party becomes "engaged in war or armed conflict" the other will come to its assistance. The two are to consult if hostilities appear imminent. The treaty, of which the defense agreement is a part, is to last twenty years.

Military Bases. Foreign military bases in Africa are steadily diminishing. France has drastically reduced its military presence in Africa in the past two years and has evacuated numerous bases in the wake of independence, although an important core remains. In North Africa, the only strategic base remaining in French hands is the Mers-el-Kebir naval base in Algeria. In April 1964, this base was "declassified" and is no longer considered strategic. According to the Evian Treaty of 1962, the French were to have the use of this base for fifteen years on lease renewable by mutual agreement. As a result of Algerian demands, French atomic testing installations and communications facilities at the bases of Colomb-Bechar, Reggane, In-Amguel, and Ain Ekker were to be dismantled or turned over to the Algerians by October 30, 1964, instead of July 1, 1967, as the Evian Treaty provided.

In black Africa, the major French bases are at Dakar (Senegal) and Diego Suarez (Malagasy Republic). Other bases exist at Fort Lamy (Chad), Pointe Noire (Congo-Brazzaville), Abidjan (Ivory Coast), and Port Etienne (Mauritania). Over 25,000 troops

5/ The New York Times, Feb. 27, 1964.
6/ Simone Landier, "The Changing French Military Role in Africa," Africa Report (November 1964), p. 21.

remain in sub-Saharan Africa, including 5,000 at Dakar, which is headquarters of Command Zone I, and 8,000 in the Malagasy Republic, mostly at the strategic Indian Ocean naval base of Diego Suarez. Except for the Algerian bases, there had been no schedule for the evacuation of France's bases in Africa. In October 1964, however, France indicated that considerations of economy will force it to reduce its troop strength in Africa from some 27,800 to 6,600 by July 1, 1966; it was stressed by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Deloncle that the reduction of troop strength would be compensated for by creating a highly mobile "fire brigade" force based in France for service in Africa. This "Eleventh Intervention Division" is a 16,500-man force of three brigades, one of which is to be entirely paratroops. The fact remains, however, that in order to fulfill its defense obligations, France requires a certain minimum of military installations and standby troops in Africa. By July 1965, France expects to have only 2,500 troops at Dakar, with a detachment in Atar, Mauritania; 600 at Abidjan, with a detachment at Niamey, Niger; 1,000 at Fort Lamy, with a detachment at either Bangui or Bouar, Central African Republic; and, 2,500 at Diego Saurez, Malagasy Republic, with a detachment at Antsirabé. These bases will be the headquarters of four French military zones; Fort Lamy and Diego Saurez have replaced Brazzaville and Djibouti under these new arrangements.

African reactions to this change are ambivalent. About 10,500 African soldiers in the French Army will be demobilized, in addition to the reduction of French troops. Senegal, for example, has announced that it will suffer an annual loss of $28,375,000 when French troops leave. However, sensitivities about foreign troops on African soil were eased by the French announcement. 7/ In the Bizerte naval and air base crisis of 1961, it might be recalled, more than 1,000 Tunisians were killed by French forces.

After World War II, the United States developed military facilities in Morocco, Libya, and Ethiopia. U.S. military installations in Morocco (which cost over $500 million) included the SAC bases of Nouasseur, Benguerir, Ben Slimane, and Sidi Slimane, as well as the naval station at Port Lyautey. In response to nationalist demands, all five of these installations were turned over to the Moroccans by the end of 1963, although small aid and training teams remain.

When Eritrea federated with Ethiopia in 1952, the United States was already operating the Kagnew communications station at Asmara. On May 22, 1953, the United States and Ethiopia signed an agreement that permitted the United States to lease the station for twenty-five years. In addition to a military aid group, the United States maintains about 1,300 personnel at the Kagnew station. United States authorities expect the treaty to run its full course to 1978.

In Libya, three external powers established a military presence after independence in 1952—France, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Before Libyan independence, France sought to incorporate the Fezzan into French Equatorial Africa, or at least to maintain a military presence in the area in order to protect French possessions to the south. The Libyan Government, however, refused to sign any but temporary agreements on the use of Fezzan airfields. In August 1955, an agreement provided that France and Libya should consult together in the event of aggression or threat of aggression in Africa north of the Equator, a provision that is now considered by Libyan officials to be inoperative. France also agreed to evacuate its forces from the Fezzan within one year. However, it was not until November 1963 that both parties announced the evacuation of French forces from airfields at Ghadames, Ghat, and Sebha.

The United States and Libya concluded a treaty on September 9, 1954, which provided for the use of military bases in Libya. The United States agreed to pay Libya an annual "rent" fee, in addition to military and economic aid. The United States then established the Wheelus Air Force Base near Tripoli, primarily a staging base and a training center for the Air Force. In 1964, about 4,000 military personnel were stationed there. The Government of Libya has been under pressure from the U.A.R. and Algeria to abrogate the agreement. Despite U.S. assurances that its military operations in the country "are

7/ Ibid.

not prejudicial to the sovereignty and security of Libya", the Libyans have proved highly sensitive to Nasser's criticism of "imperialist bases." In March 1964, the Libyan Chamber of Deputies unanimously passed a resolution urging negotiations to abrogate the treaties and evacuate foreign military personnel, both British and American. Since that time continuous negotiations have been held. It was announced in August 1964, that the United States and Libya had agreed in principle to the evacuation of Wheelus, but no date has been set.

The Anglo-Libyan Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of July 1953, was accompanied by an agreement regarding military facilities, and a financial arrangement. Under these supplementary accords, Great Britain has the use of an Air Force staging base at El Adem, Army bases at Benghazi (1,500 men) and Tripoli (1,000 men), and a small guard force at Tobruk until 1973. Great Britain has agreed to reduce its forces by the end of 1965 and has accepted the principle of evacuation of army bases, though not of its staging facilities. It appears that final dates for complete evacuation will have to be set if the Libyans are not to abrogate unilaterally their agreements with both the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Kenya independence agreement of December 1963, provided that Great Britain was to evacuate its 5,500-man strategic reserve at Kahawa and Gilgil as well as Royal Air Force detachments at Eastleigh by December 12, 1964, the first anniversary of Kenya independence; the evacuation of troops was begun in mid-October 1964, and was completed by mid-December. These forces formed part of the Middle East Command with headquarters in Aden. Fears that the East African mutinies of January 1964, would disrupt the evacuation schedule proved ill-founded, and in June 1964, Commonwealth Relations Secretary Duncan Sandys announced that an agreement had been reached granting the RAF overflight and landing rights and the right to use certain transmitting facilities in Kenya until the end of 1966. In addition, the British will continue to use the small naval maintenance base at Mombasa.

Finally, mention must be made of the South African base at Simonstown. On June 30, 1955, the United Kingdom and South Africa exchanged a series of letters constituting an agreement regarding the Simonstown naval base and the defense of the South Atlantic. The agreement provided that Great Britain return the base to South African control and administration, but the British retained the use of Simonstown facilities in peace, and with its allies may use them in time of war whether or not South Africa is at war. The Royal Naval Commander-in-Chief was to retain his authority over certain telegraph installations at Slangkop, Klaver, and Cape East until both parties agreed to transfer them to South African administration. No terminating date was set in the agreement. South African Defense Minister Fouche has made it clear that South Africa wants to continue these arrangements as long as possible, and the South African Government takes pains to emphasize the strategic importance of the Simonstown for the West.

Military Assistance Agreements. In addition to their defense agreements, and their base arrangements, African states have negotiated many arrangements for the procurement of military hardware and for the training of military personnel. The embryonic nature of most African armed forces makes it necessary for African states to seek outside military assistance. It is equally clear that such military aid will have political significance.

France supplies military aid to all of its former colonies in Africa except Guinea. However, there is considerable variety in the aid arrangements of these states. Several accept military aid only from France—Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Mauritania, Gabon, and Togo. Others, while accepting token contributions from the United States, West Germany, or Israel, are predominantly dependent on France through military technical assistance agreements—Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, the Malagasy Republic, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. In sub-Saharan Africa, Mali, and Guinea are the only former French colonies to have broken this "single dependency relationship." Guinea's major external aid source has been the Soviet bloc, although it has recently taken help from West Germany—while Mali has counterbalanced French aid with substantial Soviet bloc and U.S. aid. Unlike the thirteen other former colonies, neither

Guinea nor Mali has a technical military assistance agreement with France. The three North African states of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia have created "multiple dependency relationships," although the American press sometimes suggests that Algeria has accepted so much Soviet bloc aid that it has merely switched its dependency. Tunisia substituted the United States for France as major economic aid supplier after the Bizerte crisis, while Morocco has received substantial amounts of both U.S. and Soviet bloc military aid.

Among Britain's former colonies, excluding Egypt and South Africa, Ghana is the outstanding example of a nation attempting to diversify its sources of military aid. Starting in 1961, Ghana has replaced British with other Commonwealth training cadres, and its aid sources now include the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Israel, India, Pakistan, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. A defense agreement signed between Great Britain and Nigeria at independence was abrogated in January 1962, because it had been widely "misunderstood"; internal and external political pressures combined to negate Great Britain's only attempt to retain formal defense ties with a sub-Saharan state. However, Britain is still the major source of military aid, along with West Germany, Canada, and the United States. Sierra Leone is still dependent on Great Britain and, secondarily, Nigeria, for military aid, while Kenya recently signed an agreement with Great Britain for $28 million of military aid and training. Ugandan officer training has been supplied by Great Britain and Israel, but the last British officers left Uganda at the end of August 1964. Tanganyika has determined not to rely principally on Great Britain for military assistance; after the January mutinies, forces from Nigeria and Ethiopia were called in to replace British troops, and the Tanganyikan Government signed an agreement with West Germany in July 1964, for $10 million of military aid. In addition, the Tanzania Army is receiving training and substantial amounts of military equipment as part of a $42,000,000 aid agreement signed with Communist China last June. Sudan, with a somewhat longer experience of independence, has balanced British training assistance with supplies from the U.A.R., the U.S.S.R., and West Germany. The Somali armed forces were formerly British trained and supplied; however, when negotiations over a $10 million military aid package involving the United States, West Germany, and Italy broke down in 1963, a $30 million deal was closed with the Soviet Union. The Soviet airline Aeroflot has landing rights at Mogadiscio, and port facilities have been arranged at Berbera, but the Somali Government insists there has been no change in its policy of nonalignment.

Rwanda and Burundi are still completely dependent on Belgium for the training and supply of their armed forces, although all Belgian troops left the two countries in August 1963.

Liberia continues to maintain its single dependency on the United States for military aid.

Ethiopia's primary source of external military aid was Great Britain until 1951, but since then the United States has taken over this position; Ethiopia has received approximately one-half of all U. S. military aid to Africa. Other suppliers include Sweden, Norway, India, and Israel.

Libya has looked to its closest external associates, the United States and Great Britain, for nearly all its military aid and training, although West Germany, Italy, the U.A.R., and Turkey have also helped.

The United States and Belgium have taken over major responsibility for the training and equipping of the Congo's armed forces. Under Prime Minister Tshombe, this tendency to rely on the West is likely to continue. The United Nations, Israel, Canada, Italy, and Norway have also participated in Congolese training programs. In August 1964, the United States and Belgium agreed to step up economic and military aid to the Congo, a decision that intensified the Cold-War complexion of the country's civil warfare.

Nonmilitary Relations of Political Significance Between African States and External Powers

African states have many nonmilitary relationships with external powers in the economic, educational, and cultural realms. These ties are of three kinds: (1) the continuing direct links of each African state with external powers, especially their former metropoles; (2) their relationship within larger Western-initiated groupings, such as the (British) Commonwealth of Nations, the Franco-African Community, the European Economic Community; and (3) the new links formed by African states with Asian and other nonaligned groups in order to reemphasize their commitment to an independent posture in world politics. Although it is difficult to determine the significance of these relationships, they are in some ways more instructive and possibly more lasting than formal military commitments.

Direct Links. The continuing economic and cultural links between the West and the new states of Africa are so extensive that, at first glance, they might seem difficult to reconcile with a political posture of nonalignment. In the realm of economics the bulk of African trade is still conducted with the former colonial powers. Western Europe has made a striking recovery in its sales of industrial products to the nonaligned countries, its share now being about two-thirds of the world total. Moreover, Western Europe is a market of great importance for tropical products, importing well over 50 percent of many African commodities. In total trade, the franc area has more than 70 percent of the trade of former French territories in Africa, and the sterling area has well over 50 percent of the trade of former British territories.

Europe is also the main source of private long-term investment in Africa, and all the new states want more private investment from overseas. The government aid programs of Western Europe and the United States are also vital to African leaders whose major objective is rapid economic development. Moreover, these strong economic relationships between the West and the nonaligned countries are not just continuing; they are increasing. In Africa, France is providing between $700 and $800 million worth of aid a year, and the United Kingdom about $150 million. The Common Market countries of Europe provided nearly $500 million worth of aid to Africa during the first five-year period and have agreed to increase this to about $730 million for the next five years. Aid from the United States to Africa jumped from $208 million in 1960, to $472 million in 1961, and $505 million in 1962.

In the cultural and educational realm, a similar expansion is evident. In many African countries, the number of whites has increased since independence. Forty thousand French nationals are today teaching in the schools of developing countries. Seventeen thousand of them are paid by the French Government as a part of its cultural effort. The many new higher educational institutions of middle Africa, which are already receiving major assistance from Western countries, may need 7,000 more teachers from overseas to help meet an expected rise in the student body from 46,000 in 1961 to 274,000 in 1980.

The foreign languages Africans know are mainly English and French, not Russian. The foreign cultural traditions they know, and often admire, are also Western. And there are today far more African students in Western countries than ever before. In the academic year 1963-64, there were 20,000 Africans studying in the United Kingdom and more than 11,000 in France. At present, the number studying in the United States has jumped to 6,200 and there were 1,300 Congolese in Belgium, and another 1,200 Africans in Israel, in 1963. Meanwhile, there were some 6,400 African students in all Soviet bloc countries.

These close economic and educational relationships with the West are not difficult to reconcile with the political posture of the nonaligned countries It is a matter of psychology. Perhaps because of these continuing ties with the West, Africans feel all the more need to demonstrate their political independence by emphasizing their nonalignment. That is also why they brand many of these relationships as neo-colonialism. It is a kind of psychological compensation for their inability to get rid of all the old world of colonial relationships in their new world of freedom.

One must acknowledge, however, that it is more than a matter of psychology. The economic reality of Africa's continuing dependence on the West cannot be denied. In his book, The African Nations and World Solidarity, the former Senegalese Prime Minister, Mamadou Dia, cites examples in Eastern Europe, as well as in the Middle East and North Africa, to show that "economic neo-colonialism" is "the successor of classical imperialism." The only way to escape Balkanization and neo-colonialism is "a true inter-regionalization of economies" and the ending of "the hegemony of guiding nations." In Mamadou Dia's blend of economics and psychology, Pan-African movements thus appear as escape routes from neo-colonialism.

Alignments with Western-Initiated Groups. The Commonwealth of Nations is a unique grouping of white and nonwhite peoples with certain British traditions. Its bonds are primarily intangible; aside from a general obligation to consult, membership does not involve any political or military commitment. Each Commonwealth nation makes its own arrangements for regional security and defense, frequently with non-Commonwealth powers. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth tie has political and military as well as economic and educational significance. Great Britain is able to provide military training facilities, staff conferences, scientific and strategic information for Africa's nine Commonwealth members. The highest political organ, the annual Commonwealth Prime Minister Conference, gives African leaders a useful forum for private exchanges of views on delicate issues of mutual importance. For example, at the conference in July 1964, African leaders were able to get the explosive Southern Rhodesian issue on the agenda. Since they obtained sufficient assurances for the time being, they shortly afterward obtained the withdrawal of a censorious reference to Great Britain at a meeting in Cairo of the heads of state of the countries of the O.A.U.

The French effort to create a Franco-African Community to parallel Great Britain's Commonwealth of Nations has withered on the vine. An institutional framework for it was elaborated in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic in October 1958. In 1960, however, new pressures induced General de Gaulle to grant the Mali Federation independence inside the Franco-African Community, an action that irritated Houphouet-Boigny and other leaders to the point of demanding independence outside the Community. By the fall of 1960, only six of the former French territories had confirmed their membership within the Franco-African Community—Senegal, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Central African Republic, Gabon, and the Malagasy Republic. Community institutions therefore ceased to function.

A third larger grouping is the association of certain African states with the six European countries in the Common Market. The eighteen African participants are Congo-Léopoldville, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and all the former French colonies in Black Africa except Guinea. As set forth in Articles 131-136 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, African association with the Common Market was designed to integrate further the complementary economies of tropical Africa and industrial Europe, mainly by progressive tariff reductions on African primary products and by economic aid to Africa. When African dependencies attained independence, a new Convention of Association had to be negotiated. Initiated on December 19, 1962 by the European Economic Community's Council of Ministers and the African heads of delegations, the Yaoundé Convention went into effect on January 1, 1964. The new convention enlarged the development fund and recognized the political equality of European members and African associates. Besides its obvious economic implications it was, in the words of a Malagasy Finance Minister, "a political act of the first order." Since it tended to tie the development of much of Africa to Europe, it became the target of sharp criticism by Nkrumah and certain other radical African nationalist leaders.

Links with Asians. Finally, in addition to these Pan-African and Eurafrican arrangements, Africans have joined Asians in certain movements of a more ideological character, which are loosely held together by a common belief in three of the major commitments of the non-Western world—nonalignment, anti-colonialism, and the urge for economic development. These are the Bandung Conference Group powers and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization. On two occasions, at Belgrade in 1961 and at Cairo in

1964, the Afro-Asians also participated in major nonalignment conferences with a broader geographical scope.

The Bandung Conference of April 1955 involved twenty-nine states and territories including six from Africa—Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Liberia, Sudan, and the Gold Coast. Although there was little solidarity or unity at Bandung, the Afro-Asian states did manage to generate a sense of anti-colonial community and of self-confidence in response to the Cold War. Primarily Asian in inspiration (Indian and Indonesian), the élan of the Bandung neutralist tradition is symbolized by Lumumba's threat to call in the "Bandung Treaty Powers" if the United Nations failed to act against Belgian "aggression" in July 1960. A second Bandung conference was planned in a preparatory meeting in April 1964 at Jakarta; it will open on June 29, 1965 in Algiers.

The twenty-five nations that met at the Belgrade Conference in September 1961 conformed to a definition of nonalignment that excluded many African states; taking place at the height of the Casablanca-Monrovia split, the Belgrade Conference included only ten independent African states—Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, U.A.R., Tunisia, Congo-Leopoldville, Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia, as well as the Provisional Government of Algeria. While leaning toward a pro-Soviet position on several issues, the conference refused to endorse major Soviet policies such as the Troika proposal or recognition of two Germanys. By the time the Cairo sequel to the Belgrade meeting assembled in October 1964, Africa was less divided; as a result twenty-seven African states and territories joined Yugoslavia, Cuba, and eighteen Asian countries.

The resolutions adopted in Cairo resulted in a compromise document. Reciprocal support was given to special interests such as Arab concern over Israel, but the radical Chinese and Indonesian positions failed to gain significant support. On nuclear weapons, the conference called on all states to acceed to the limited Test-Ban Treaty. All heads of state also declared their readiness "not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons and to call on all countries including those who have not subscribed to the Moscow treaty to enter into a similar undertaking."

The most militant of these ideological groupings is the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). AAPSO is generally considered by Western governments to be a Communist front; it was formed as an offshoot of the Soviet sponsored World Peace Council in December 1956. The organization has held three major conferences in Africa—Cairo, 1957, Conakry, 1960, Moshi, 1963—and has a permanent Secretariat in Cairo. Both Soviet and Chinese representatives have used AAPSO to make and maintain contacts with sympathetic groups and individuals in African countries. Since independence, however, African leaders have found AAPSO less and less useful as an anti-colonial ally. African participants include few important figures today, and African governments, disgusted with Sino-Soviet battles during conference and council meetings, have threatened to remove both the U.S.S.R. and China from the Secretariat.

III. Changing Conflict Patterns

Before assessing the relationship between these many alignments and the possibilities for disarmament, it is necessary to evaluate briefly Africa's changing conflict patterns—the milieu in which alliances, arms, and armies operate. The most important of these changing conflict patterns include three that emanate from outside Africa, and three that originate inside Africa.

The three external pressures are the Soviet-American détente and the problem of how real it is, the Sino-Soviet split and the growing Chinese penetration of Africa, and the tensions in Africa and in NATO resulting from the African interests of Portugal, France, and other NATO powers. The three changing conflict patterns originating inside Africa are the possible border conflicts and irredentist movements of the future, the tensions

caused by internal mutinies, coups d'état and assassinations, and the mounting bitterness of the racial conflict in southern Africa.

The Soviet-American Détente

How would a real Soviet-American détente affect African attitudes toward alliances and armaments? Many African leaders share the view of Algeria's Ferhat Abbas in his book, La nuit coloniale, "Without the existence and power of the socialist world, we would still be at the stage of colonialist literature and wordy promises of Woodrow Wilson". Would détente be a "disaster" for those African leaders who welcome the Cold War as a "blessing in disguise?" The Cold War presumably improves their prospects for getting economic aid from both sides. It also gives them a status and importance in international meetings well beyond their physical power, because it enhances their bargaining position in winning the support of the great powers for UN resolutions, offices, and Security Council, commission and other memberships they seek.

Would détente and disarmament free more funds for economic aid to Africa? Or would it weaken the U.S. administration in its annual battle with Congress for the appropriation of foreign aid funds as an "arsenal in the Cold War"? On balance, while a thaw in the Cold War might deprive Africans of some of their bargaining power, it is unlikely to lead to major changes in African attitudes because the Cold War is not the key issue. They would still be preoccupied with the domestic imperatives of nation-building and economic development, while striving simultaneously to build African unity and to free the rest of Africa from white supremacy and foreign rule. Moreover, a Soviet-American détente would not necessarily change the underlying goals of the United States and the Soviet Union in Africa. The Soviet Union would still support the "liberation" of Africa, while the United States would still attempt to prevent the expansion of Communism. Possibly neither would consider it safe to lower its level of aid to Africa.

It is possible, however, that a thaw in the Cold War might make certain African leaders somewhat less ideological. In their rationale for nonalignment, African leaders sometimes stress their positive role as a "third force" for international peace and stability. To the extent that hostility between the first and second forces diminishes, this rationale for an ideological third force is partially undermined.

The Sino-Soviet Split and Chinese Penetration of Africa

The problem of how a Soviet-American détente would affect African attitudes toward arms and alliances is further complicated by the Sino-Soviet rift and the mounting Chinese penetration of Africa. Whatever the United States and the Soviet Union do, Peking is now engaged in an interventionist policy apparently designed to develop in the long run a new revolutionary international among the poor peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. If this plan were to succeed, the present struggle between communism and democracy might recede into the background in coming decades in favor of a new conflict pattern between the rich "haves" and the poor "have-nots." Such a prospect recalls the fanciful 1958 suggestion of a French writer, Eugene Guernier, that perhaps Russia will even join the West when China takes Siberia as its first colony! In any event, this new brand of revisionism is forcing both the Soviet Union and the United States to react to a new threat in Africa. It seems likely to accelerate both Soviet aid to the countries of middle Africa, and Soviet subversive activities in the white supremacy redoubt in southern Africa.

Peking's efforts in Africa date back at least to the Bandung Conference in 1955 where numerous contacts with African leaders were made. In 1958, official Chinese delegations began to visit black Africa, and Chinese Embassies were opened in Khartoum in 1958, Conakry in 1959, Accra in 1960, and Mogadiscio in 1961. Meanwhile, larger numbers of visiting delegations and African students were traveling to and from Africa and Peking. By 1963, Peking's struggle for ideological supremacy over Moscow was in full bloom in Africa. A November 30 declaration by the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity

proclaimed that the time to act had come, particularly in Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, French Somaliland, Bechuanaland, South West Africa, and South Africa. Chinese attacks on the Soviet policy of coexistence were so bitter in March 1964 at the meeting of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization in Algiers, that the Sino-Soviet rift threatened to break up the organization. Africa's new priority in Chinese foreign policy reached a peak early in 1964 when Premier Chou En-lai and a staff of about sixty made a widely publicized seven-week visit to ten African countries.

In the past five years, Peking has made available about $140 million, which is less than one-fourth the amount of Russian aid to Africa. This includes grants to the governments of Algeria, Somalia, Zanzibar, Guinea, Mali, Dahomey, Libya, Tanganyika, and Ghana, and small subsidies to politicians in Basutoland, Kenya, Uganda, Mali, Ghana, and Guinea as well as to rebel leaders in Congo-Léopoldville, Rwanda, Cameroon, Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, and South Africa. Peking now has 17 diplomatic posts in Africa, compared to Moscow's 26. 8/ However, Chinese-supported subversive activities in Malawi, Zambia, Congo-Léopoldville, and other new states in 1964 aroused the hostility of numerous African leaders. It is therefore too early to assess Peking's prospects for the future. Having burned their fingers in Burundi, the Congo, Kenya, and the Sudan, the Chinese, like the Russians and Americans, may tread more warily in the future. Their opportunities could grow, moreover, if social revolutions sweep Africa to throw out the leaders who won the political revolution.

Special mention must be made of the Chinese attitude toward disarmament schemes affecting Africa. Since the call for armed uprisings against colonialism and neo-colonialism is an integral part of Chinese ideology, Peking takes the view that disarmament struggles are inapplicable to nations struggling for liberation or to newly independent countries. At an Afro-Asian writers' conference in 1962, for example, Chinese opposition prevented a resolution for general and complete disarmament from gaining the floor. The Chinese also contended in 1963 that the U.S.S.R. serves neo-colonialism by joining the United States in agreements on disarmament. Whether this Chinese attitude will change now that Peking has its own nuclear weapons is another uncertainty. Peking now claims to advocate total nuclear disarmament, bargaining its two demonstrations of atomic know-how and the general fear of nuclear expansion against the nuclear stockpiles of the United States and the Soviet Union. African reactions to the Chinese nuclear explosion were somewhat ambivalent. However, even if it is true that some of the more radical elements in Africa reacted with a vicarious "shiver of pleasure down the spine" at the thought of a non-white nation demonstrating its capacity for such heights of technical achievement, most African leaders will continue their campaign for nuclear disarmament. A final point of relevance is that Peking's proclivity for supplying conventional arms to Africa will probably continue to grow, thereby reducing the chances for Soviet-American or other great power agreements to control arms shipments to Africa. On November 9, 1964, it was reported that the Russian and Chinese arms race in Zanzibar had spread to Tanganyika where a shipload of weapons, including anti-aircraft and field guns had been unloaded by a Russian freighter at Dar-es-Salaam and "taken in all-night convoys for two nights to Colito barracks, where seven Chinese instructors are training the raw Tanzanian army in the use of Chinese weapons unloaded in bulk from the Chinese freighter Heping ('Peace') on September 2." Three armed Russian ships were also reported to be anchored off the mouth of the Ruvuna River on the border between Tanganyika and Mozambique. 9/

8/ On Chinese penetration see Tom Stacey, "Yellow Peril in Africa," The Sunday Times (London), Sept. 20, 1964; Richard Lowenthal, "The Sino-Soviet Split and its Repercussions in Africa," The Soviet Bloc, China and Africa, S. Hamrell and C. G. Widstrand, eds. (Uppola, 1964); and W. E. Griffith, "Moscow, Peking and Africa," ms to be published in a forthcoming issue of Survey.

9/ Tom Stacey, "Red Influence Is Spreading in Zanzibar," Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1964.

Africa and NATO

NATO has always been under fire in Africa. This is partly because Communist and Communist-front organizations make it a major target for anti-imperialist resolutions. More important, however, is the animosity aroused in Africa by the use of arms from NATO countries against Africans, formerly by France in North Africa, and later by Portugal in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. In the resolutions adopted at the Addis Ababa Summit Conference in May 1963, Africa's leaders issued a warning which "informs the allies of colonial powers that they must choose between their friendship for the African peoples and their support of powers that oppress African peoples." As long as Portugal retains its African territories, NATO will suffer from the stigma of being a "weapon of Western imperialism." This could become even more true, now that the Organization of African Unity's Liberation Committee has made Portuguese Africa the first target in its campaign against foreign rule and white supremacy in southern Africa. Conversely, when the three Portuguese territories become independent states, NATO might be viewed less negatively by Africans, some of whom might become more sympathetic to the case for NATO as an alliance mechanism for maintaining international stability.

Independence for Portuguese Africa would also take away from the Chinese and Russians a major issue for exploitation in the Cold War. And if China and Russia step up their subversive activities inside new African states, some of Africa's leaders might even come to regard the power of NATO as a useful deterrent to the further expansion of Communist power.

African Border Conflicts and Irredentist Movements

During the past decade, many observers have prophesied the coming of a new conflict pattern of border wars and irredentist movements as Africans try to bring the old colonial political boundaries into line with traditional ethnic borders.

In the European state system from which most of the theories about international relations are derived, border conflicts and irredentist movements were a major determinant of national attitudes toward armaments and alliances. The unification of Germany and the subsequent settlement of the Franco-German border in 1871 were to contribute to a pattern of alliances and an armaments race that led to World War I.

Thus far, however, Africa has witnessed relatively few efforts to revamp its colonial heritage of arbitrary political boundaries. If Africans began to reshape borders according to the criteria of ethnicity, language, religion, and culture, Africa could have not thirty-seven countries but hundreds of tribal states. Africa's first generation nationalist leaders are fully aware of the potential "Pandora's box" that might result from too much tribal self-determination. Fear of parochial chaos has combined with what Julius Nyerere has called Africa's "sense of unity." Out of the Summit Conference at Addis Ababa, which established the Organization of African Unity in May 1963, came the "spirit of Addis," which includes mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and the desire for peaceful settlement of disputes. The force of this spirit was exhibited in the successful negotiation of cease-fires, at least for the time being, in the border crises between Algeria and Morocco, and Somalia and Ethiopia, under pressure from organs of the OAU although a final settlement of these border problems has not yet been achieved. It is true, however, that the continuing turmoil over the Congo crisis is undermining the "sense of unity."

Since most of Africa's leaders have not yet consolidated their internal positions, they do not, in most cases, constitute a direct threat to each other; they can increase their power without doing it at the expense of their neighbors. This acceptance of the inherited order, at least as a starting point, is reflected in the fact that Africa has not witnessed the development of hostile military alliances and arms races; this kind of balance of power does not operate here. Rather, a "confederal," regional approach to security not unlike that of Latin America has combined with the continuing presence of France and

Great Britain and U. S. support for the United Nations to give Africa some degree of order.

Whether this Addis spirit of respecting present boundaries will continue remains to be seen. Its chief test today comes from Somalia, which claims about one-fifth of the national territory of both Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as a major portion of French Somaliland. Moreover, in the councils of the OAU, Somalia contends that there can be no talk of unity until Africa's "misdrawn" boundaries are revised. In November 1963, the news was revealed that Somalia had turned down a U.S.-West German-Italian military aid package in favor of a much larger Soviet deal, totaling about $30,000,000. The Russians and the Somalis claimed that the arms provided would supply an "internal security" force of 20,000, but the deal naturally aroused further tension in the area. Far from wanting to disarm or remain nonaligned, the fundamentally revisionist Somalia seems likely to search for arms and support wherever it can. Moreover, the Somalia imbroglio has produced the first African case of two states allying themselves against a third; on July 13, 1963, Kenya and Ethiopia signed a Mutual Defense and Cooperation Agreement. Since Kenya and Ethiopia have close ties with Great Britain and the United States, and Great Britain has interests in the Gulf of Aden, while Somalia has signed recent aid agreements with the U.S.S.R. and China, the possibilities of conflict in the area are dangerous. The undecided factor is the degree to which Somalia is willing to isolate itself from Pan-African trends by threatening the basic rules of the game.

There are numerous examples of other states, it is true, which make territorial claims on each other even though they lack ethnic, religious, and linguistic homogeneity. Moroccan irredentism covers not only parts of Algeria but most of Mauritania on the basis of claims of historic suzerainty in the area. Upper Volta has been subjected to pressure from both Mali and Ghana, while Togo and Ghana have a running border dispute. Dahomey and Niger are presently attempting to settle a dispute over the possession of the five-mile long Lete Island in the Niger River, which led to a near rupture in their relations. Other examples could also be cited.

Nonetheless, from the perspective of irredentist dangers, Africa is perhaps fortunate in having few other states of the Somalia-type that have a common indigenous language, religion, and culture. For there is no reason to suppose that nationalism of this type will produce foreign policies different from those it has produced in Europe or elsewhere. Regional security arrangements and arms control are unsuitable policy instruments for nations that do not accept the existing order.

Internal Instabilities

Another significant conflict pattern evolving in Africa today is the growth of tension over internal instabilities within individual states. These tensions are superficially reflected in many recent plots, mutinies, coups d'état, and assassinations. In West Africa, President Nkrumah of Ghana has been the target of assassins five times. Nigeria's stability was threatened by the discovery of a plot sponsored by leading politicans of the Western Region's Action Group in October 1962, a startling event that contributed to the uneasy atmosphere culminating in the electoral crisis of January 1965.

The leaders of the French-speaking states have also been under fire. President Olympio of Togo was the victim of three plots ending with his assassination in January 1963, and his successor Nicholas Grunitzky has had to deal with counterplots. Two unsuccessful coups inspired by tribal and ideological differences have been directed against the regime of President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. In Senegal, Prime Minister Mamadou Dia waged an unsuccessful revolt against President Senghor in December 1962, which led to Dia's imprisonment. Two plots have been reported against the government of President Sékou Touré in Guinea; and President Diori in Niger faces a continuing source of instability in the activities of the outlawed Sawaba party, which has been using Ghana and Dahomey as its sanctuaries. The regime of President Tombalbaye of Chad has confronted several emergencies of ethnic and other origins.

In addition to the Togo coup, which resulted in Olympio's death, other successful uprisings include the overthrow of President Fulbert Youlou in Congo-Brazzaville in August 1963 and the toppling of President Hubert Maga by Colonel Soglo and an 800-man army in Dahomey in September 1963. These successes may have encouraged army figures in Gabon to attempt a similar overthrow of Léon Mba in March 1964, but the French Army acted quickly under its defense accords to restore the pro-French regime.

In northern Africa there have been several coups d'état in Egypt and the Sudan, as well as riots and fighting in Libya. Moreover, President Ben Bella of Algeria, who took over from Ben Khedda, is having trouble with his own rebels. In December 1960, the world was surprised by an abortive uprising against the time-tested Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia. Ethnic divisions have broken out again in the Sudan along Arab-Negro lines and this North-South split remains the central issue in Sudanese politics.

In East and Central Africa after the ousting of the Sultan of Zanzibar in January 1964, mutinies broke out in Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda, which were put down with the help of British troops. Meanwhile the Wahutu in Rwanda were killing 8,000 Watusi. And in June came the return of Moise Tshombe, often accused of complicity in the murder of Patrice Lumumba, to become Prime Minister of the Congo—an event that stunned the world and was followed by an expansion of civil war, the massacre of white hostages, and new forms of foreign intervention.

No wonder that African heads of state are worried about internal instabilities. For perspective, however, it is worth recalling that the Latin Americans, who have been independent for a century and a half, still have enough mutinies, coups d'état and revolutions to compete with Africa's record. Moreover, most of the African leaders who won independence for their countries are still in power; in fact, some of them who looked vulnerable have surprised observers by their staying power.

Africa's troubles are nonetheless symbolic of a basic instability that could breed greater conflict in the future. Political opposition groups, labor groups, youth groups, and others on the radical left will seek to exploit failures to meet rising expectations by calling for drastic social change to complete the African revolution. Other out-of-power politicians on the radical right may well seek to exploit in certain areas a natural "resistance to change," a widespread and varied phenomenon that expresses itself in numerous ways but is usually given the ambiguous label of "tribalism."

These instabilities and failures in nation-building will influence both the level of arms and armies in Africa, which will be discussed later, and the pattern of Africa's alliances and alignments. Whether present leaders retain their power or new leaders replace them, both will use foreign policy as a method of obtaining domestic political advantages. As revisionist governments come to power, status quo powers may find it expedient to revert to the traditional balance-of-power practice of nation-states in forming mutual defensive alliances. The example has been noted of Kenya and Ethiopia, which formed an alliance against Somali irredentism when both states evidently decided that neither the United Nations nor the OAU offered them sufficient "collective security" protection.

Race Conflict in Southern Africa

By far the most dangerous of Africa's changing conflict patterns is the rising African bitterness against whites in Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and above all, South Africa. The leader of the British Labour Government's delegation to the United Nations, Lord Caradon, is an eloquent exponent of the thesis that mankind's greatest danger is the threat of a world-wide racial war between white and nonwhite peoples. In Caradon's view, South Africa is the fuse that could set off the explosion. It is interesting to note that his central thesis is shared by the former Conservative Prime Minister, Lord Home. Speaking to the Commonwealth Press Union in June 1964, Home declared that the "greatest danger" facing the world was the possibility of racial conflict between the rich white nations and the poor colored ones.

The determination of African leaders to rid the continent of Portuguese rule, and to overthrow the white supremacy governments in Rhodesia and especially South Africa, is the most obvious and consistent and all-embracing common denominator of African foreign policies. Since the OAU's Liberation Committee is subsidizing and otherwise aiding revolutionaries in Portuguese territories, Rhodesia, and South Africa, some observers ask whether the OAU is not an alliance for aggression rather than defense. Africans respond that the original seizures of African territories by invaders from Europe were and remain illegal acts of aggression. In this view, the OAU's Liberation Committee is only continuing the defense of Africa against these aggressors.

In any event, whether the OAU is an offensive or defensive alliance, the most powerful psychological force holding it together is its absolute unity against foreign rule and white supremacy anywhere in Africa. South Africa's policy of apartheid is therefore doomed to remain "a cancer gnawing at world peace and tranquility," to reverse a phrase once applied to the United Nations by South African Prime Minister D. F. Malan. In the words of Louis Rakotomalala, a UN spokesman of the conservative Malagasy Government:

> To the Government of South Africa. . .we very frankly say: "This Liberation will be carried out—with you, against you, or without you. . .Let not this appeal fall on deaf ears, because it is no longer 12 million coloured men, unarmed and defenseless, that stand before you: it is 200 million Africans. . .determined to free their brethern." 10/

In their UN battles against apartheid, Africans and Asians seem to place a higher priority on the human rights provisions of the Charter than they do on the preservation of peace. 11/ In Africa, the longer the struggle lasts the more bitter and bloody and openly racist it will become.

As far as alliance systems are concerned, this struggle might have an unexpected by-product, namely a formal counter-alliance of South Africa and Portugal, and possibly an independent white government in Rhodesia. Moreover, it could kill all efforts to limit the growth of arms and armies. By 1963, Portugal had 40,000 to 50,000 white troops in Angola, 20,000 in Mozambique, and 6,000 in Portuguese Guinea. In South Africa, a great buildup of arms and armies in the past three years now enables the government to put perhaps 250,000 white troops and citizen force trainees into the field. In these circumstances, it becomes even less likely that the new states of middle Africa will find it practicable to limit their own armaments. On the contrary, they will be under pressure not only to increase their armaments, but to ensure their supply lines by diversifying the sources from which they obtain arms.

However, the extent to which the OAU states can sustain a long effort against the white redoubt in southern Africa is also problematical. How far will each state go in its fight against apartheid? Will it jeopardize its development plans by carrying out the OAU's projected secondary boycotts against the ships and planes of third countries doing business with South Africa? Will Africans go further than this and discriminate against international firms in tropical Africa, if those firms do business in South Africa? Presumably, Africans are not yet sure of the answers to all these questions. At the moment, since they do not have the power to win the battle themselves, they are waging a skillful campaign to place the major Western powers in the position of having to fight the battle for them. While it may be true that many African leaders are not as passionate as their words suggest, the constant repetition of the slogan that "None of us is free until all are free" is nonetheless building up a social myth that could prove stronger than reality. In the imagery of President Sékou Touré of Guinea, Africa is like a human body—if one finger of it is cut, the whole body feels the pain.

10/ As cited in United Nations Review (August-September 1963), p. 21.
11/ For an interesting elaboration of this point, see A. Mazrui, "The UN and Some African Political Attitudes," International Organization (Summer 1964), pp. 499-520.

Attention should also be called to the fact that the OAU as an alliance system could be seriously affected if the African onslaught on the white redoubt seemed to result only in failure and frustration. In that event, some of the more conservative and pragmatic states might conceivably want to slow down or back away from the financing of the Liberation Committee. The degree of Tshombe's future success in the Congo, and his attitude toward the white redoubt are imponderables that might also affect the situation. Conceivably, the more radical and ideological states, some of which also have the largest armies in Africa, might react to this possible trend with such hostility that it would tend to break up the OAU or at least weaken its solidarity as an alliance system.

With these changing conflict patterns in mind, the various alternative proposals for disarmament will be examined, and their possible repercussions in Africa assessed.

IV. Disarmament Alternatives and Their Possible Repercussions in Africa

Arms control and disarmament measures that might affect the continent of Africa may be divided into two categories: first, those that are regional or local in scope and would directly ban or limit arms in Africa itself; second, those that are general in scope, applying either to all states or to the great powers, and having a more intangible and indirect effect on Africa. It is useful to note the line between arms measures that Africans can bring into being themselves, and those that they can only demand, denounce, support, or ignore.

Proposals to limit arms shipments to Africa

The two main regional plans for African disarmament are the Great Power proposals for controlling the shipment of conventional arms to Africa, and the African proposals to make Africa a nuclear free zone. Africans are keen to have a nuclear-free zone, but there is no indication that they are willing to limit their conventional arms. Nearly all the new states are increasing the size of their armed forces, although Africa is not now in the midst of a spiraling arms race. Egypt, South Africa, and Algeria apart, the new military establishments are not excessive and in some cases are still inadequate for internal security. Armies are needed not only for security but as symbols of nationhood and national prestige.

During the colonial period, only small internal security forces were maintained since the whole system relied basically on the economic and military power of the metropole; European troops could be called in if needed. The new states, however, are under strong pressures to avoid reliance on outside troops; the military dependence of most French-speaking states on French troops is regarded by many Africans as a setback to African independence and dignity. Despite their modest size, African armed forces are significant not only in internal politics but in the struggle for regional and continental influence. President Nkrumah of Ghana has proclaimed his intention to build up the best armed forces in Africa, including an air force capable of supporting the army "in any role it may have to undertake either in Ghana or in Africa." Such African bids for power and influence were further stimulated by UN operations in the Congo. Realizing that Africa constitutes the world's major vacuum of military power, the new leaders are sensitive on the issue of UN peacekeeping forces. When such forces are necessary, African leaders prefer them to be African in composition. Such troop contributions are a means of asserting authority despite control of the Security Council by the great powers.

African states will therefore arm, not disarm, for some time to come. According to one recent analysis, while sub-Saharan Africa devotes about the same portion of its GNP to defense as Latin America (1.7 percent), it spends 50 percent more per member of the armed forces than any other underdeveloped area. This indicates both the small size of

African forces and the heavy initial investments that these embryonic armies require. North Africa, with a somewhat longer experience of independence, has had more time to build up its armed forces; force levels are also higher there because of the colonial inheritance, the more violent independence struggle and in the case of Egypt, the Arab-Israeli dispute. At the other end of the continent, as already noted, South Africa is still adding to its defense establishment despite the fact that it has Africa's most modern and experienced air force and a potential army and citizen force of about 250,000.

The evidence that African states are not interested in conventional arms reduction or limitation schemes was less clear five years ago when only ten African states were independent. In the years 1959-61, when many new states came into being, a series of proposals to limit or ban arms shipments to Africa were made with the thought of forestalling the waste and destruction of arms races. Moreover, western observers feared the possible effect of Soviet bloc arms shipments to the newly independent "radicals," especially Guinea. Great Power agreements to limit arms shipments were considered practicable partly because Africa is largely dependent on the major industrialized nations for military hardware, and partly because of the hope that new nations would want to spend their funds on development while relying mainly on police forces for internal security.

In October 1959, Arnold Rivkin outlined a plan involving a UN convention to guarantee Africa against aggression and subversion and to impose a moratorium on arms shipments above the needs of internal security. Rivkin suggested that Africans would welcome the opportunity to substitute a guaranteed neutrality for the burden of maintaining costly military establishments. In the period just before the abortive Paris Summit of May 1960, there was talk in NATO capitals of a possible Big Four ban on arms shipments to Africa. British Prime Minister Macmillan was considering a plan that was to form part of the British agenda proposals for the Summit. In August 1960, Chester Bowles proposed a "Charter of Conduct" for all non-African powers in Africa that would include a commitment not to feed Africa's arms races. Bowles' African Charter was similar to the Macmillan proposal, which would have restricted arms shipments to those necessary for internal security. Finally, in his address to the UN General Assembly in September 1960, President Eisenhower outlined a five-point program for Africa. All powers were to pledge noninterference in African affairs and to make a concerted effort to "choke off" competition in armaments. He urged African states to use regional security machinery, avoid arms races, and thus "give the whole world a welcome lesson in international relations." Shortly after the Eisenhower proposal Soviet Premier Khruschev announced that he was prepared to sign an arms embargo. However, this flurry of interest in 1960 was not followed up by concrete action.

Several reasons for the lack of continued interest in controlling arms shipments to Africa have already been noted. In addition, it is increasingly hard to define the line between internal and external security needs in view of Africa's changing conflict patterns. Clearly, many new African states feel they have not yet reached adequate force levels. Moreover, if African states decide they want armaments, an outside embargo could only be temporary because African states are potentially capable of future production of arms up to and including jet aircraft. Egypt can already, and South Africa is well on the way. But the basic problem is political: a freeze or cutoff in arms would leave certain ambitious states better armed than their neighbors, and it would leave African demands for the overthrow of white minority regimes in southern Africa unsatisfied.

Conventional arms reduction in Africa, whether imposed from without or supported by Africans themselves, might do more to undermine security than guarantee it. That is because African instability does not result from an excess of arms, but from such factors as fragmentation and ethnic rivalries, race conflict, and elite competition for power. A reduction or limitation of arms available to Africans would further reduce the ability of most of the new states to defend themselves, to ally for mutual defense, or to contribute to collective security and peacekeeping machinery through the United Nations or the OAU. Africans would be faced with the politically unacceptable choice of total dependence on the United Nations or on a single great power for their national security.

However, it might be both possible and useful to limit certain categories of heavy equipment such as jet aircraft and warships. If so, such an agreement is as likely to be tacit as explicit.

Proposals for an African Nuclear-Free Zone

In sharp contrast to conventional arms control measures, proposals for a nuclear-free zone in Africa are enthusiastically welcomed by nearly all African states. Moreover, there are today few reasons the Great Powers should not support a treaty to declare Africa a nuclear-free zone. In fact, it might be politic to obtain agreement now before opposition can develop in such countries as Egypt and South Africa.

With the continuing revolution in military technology, the strategic "reach" of the great powers has eliminated the need for nuclear bases in Africa. No one has ever envisioned the use of nuclear weapons in Africa; rather, it has been a question of testing, storing, and transporting such weapons on African soil. The French test series in Algeria is probably nearing its end. The evacuation of U. S. SAC bases in Morocco in early 1964 probably means that Africa is already becoming a nuclear-free zone. Information is unavailable whether nuclear warheads are stored at either the British or U. S. bases in Libya. In any case, recent political pressures in Libya make it clear that the Anglo-American presence through military bases cannot long continue. This prospect, combined with recent Sudanese sensitivity to British overflight, have led to speculation that Great Britain will have to obtain new routes of access for its strategic bombers and transports bound for the Far East. With nationalist sensitivity increasing throughout Africa, Great Britain may be forced to develop an island route around Africa, including new bases in the Indian Ocean.

The removal of nuclear weapons from Africa, it should be noted, does not reduce the influence and importance of NATO powers in African affairs. These powers would still have national interests in Africa along with the economic and military power to support them. It is true, however, that if the Western powers need African port and fueling facilities for nuclear armed submarines, they might find the proposal for an African nuclear-free zone difficult. This would be particularly true if the transshipment of nuclear weapons through territorial waters is included in the definition of a nuclear-free zone.

In several recent declarations, most African leaders have indicated their willingness to sign a treaty in which they would pledge not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. Fear of the effects of radioactive fallout was widespread after the French tests, and the general fear of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons is also mounting. However, the main purpose of African leaders in supporting the proposal, since they have no nuclear arms themselves, is somewhat ideological: they seek to eliminate the Cold War, foreign bases, and Great Power arms races from Africa.

African leaders first openly proposed a nuclear-free zone in 1960 when the French tests in the Sahara began. At this stage, however, they were not unanimous. Although Morocco and the Sudan made sharp diplomatic protests, while Ghana and Nigeria employed economic sanctions as well, many of the French-speaking states supported France's right to test. When a draft resolution calling for a de-nuclearized Africa was put to the vote in the UN General Assembly in November, 1961, ten French-speaking states of the former UAM as well as South Africa, abstained. Adopted by a vote of 55-0-44, the resolution (General Assembly Resolution # 1652-XVI) called on member states to refrain from any form of nuclear tests in Africa; to refrain from using the territory, territorial waters, or airspace of Africa for testing, storing, or transporting nuclear weapons; and to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a de-nuclearized zone.

When the Addis Ababa Summit Conference met in May 1963, however, it was thought that the French tests had come to an end. In any case, the principle of a nuclear-free zone for Africa was therefore approved by all African leaders in a Summit resolution.

At subsequent meetings of the OAU, as well as at the Cairo conference of nonaligned states in September 1964, the principle was again unanimously endorsed. And Africans have now proposed that the issue be placed on the agenda of the 19th session of the General Assembly in order to guarantee African de-nuclearization by treaty. South Africa is the only African state not to have supported the principle, and its position would probably change if the major NATO powers came out in favor of a nuclear-free zone for Africa.

The Soviet Union has indicated its willingness to join in guaranteeing Africa's denuclearized status if the other nuclear powers do the same. United States support has been qualified by three conditions: (1) provision for verification, (2) the states in the region must wish it, (3) it must not upset existing defense arrangements or the regional military balance. It is clear that de-nuclearization would not affect regional defense arrangements or the African military balance; moreover, if withdrawal from strategic bases and test installations in North Africa had upset the balance of world power, it seems unlikely that the Western powers would have pulled out. However, the need to provide for verification continues to worry U.S. officials, though it can be questioned whether verification would be necessary in the general multilateral treaty guarantee for Africa under UN auspices as proposed by Africans. Aside from the French installations, there are no nuclear sites in Africa, and the nuclear powers have no incentive to develop them.

Although the primary purpose of such an agreement would be to recognize the status quo, a convention of the type envisaged would also serve as a moral sanction to deter African states from thinking of nuclear weapons development in the future. It would add the force of treaty to the force of emotion and ideology. And it might have the advantage of outliving the Cold War and of having a limiting effect on the future of conflict patterns such as the Arab-Israeli dispute. The U.A.R., it might be recalled, is rumored to be interested in the development of radiological weapons and is known to have a well advanced ground-to-ground rocket program.

Proposals for general nuclear disarmament

Measures of general arms control or disarmament, applying either to all states or to the great powers, would also affect Africa, although more indirectly and intangibly. Since progress in disarmament negotiations cannot be dissociated from détente, any assumptions made about changes in the military environment are related to assumptions about changes in the political environment. Changes of importance to Africa are those that (1) increase or decrease the ability and the willingness of Africans to ally with external powers, and those that (2) influence the inter-African power balance, including the alignment structure and mechanisms of collective security.

Let us first speculate about the possible effects of general nuclear disarmament. Partial steps toward nuclear disarmament may be said to have the same general effect as nuclear disarmament itself; the difference is a matter of degree. For purposes of analysis, it may be useful to concentrate on "ultimate" effects even if ultimate steps of complete disarmament are not foreseeable. Certain measures designed to stabilize the military environment—such as the "hot line" and the test ban treaty—must be considered separately from others that are designed to change the military environment. The former will not noticeably affect the African military situation, which is characterized by relative weakness, military dependence on Western powers, the need for "peacekeeping" operations, and gradual efforts to evolve an African regional security system through the Pan-African OAU. Real changes in the global military environment, however, are bound to have repercussions in Africa since it so obviously does not have a self-contained sub-system of international order.

Measures of real nuclear disarmament such as the destruction of delivery vehicles and the conversion of fissionable materials from weapons to nonmilitary use would presumably increase the importance of conventional arms in world politics. The Great

Powers would have an incentive to increase their conventional arms in order to maintain their predominance. Moreover, the use of conventional arms by the Great Powers in Africa would involve less danger because the deterrent fear of escalation into a nuclear holocaust would be gone. Accordingly, Great Powers might be less hesitant and more able to bring their overwhelming industrial and economic power to bear in trouble spots. Africans might therefore find themselves the objects of concerted or individual "police action" as often as in the past, or perhaps more often.

If this were to happen, it might have the net effect of moving African states toward greater military cooperation on a regional basis to ensure that African brush-fires are put out by African fire brigades. Or, alternatively, if African states proved unable to develop an effective regional military force, it might increase the willingness of individual African states to live with Great Power fire brigades such as that of the French Eleventh Intervention Division. In either case, African leaders might find that with the decreased fear of war in a non-nuclear military environment Great Powers would be less hesitant and more able to act as Great Powers always have. Africa's freedom of maneuver would therefore decrease.

The contrary view that nuclear disarmament and an accompanying decrease in political tension would notably decrease great power concern over the fate of the underdeveloped world is probably wrong. In this view, Soviet and American preoccupation with Africa and Asia is only part of the Cold War; when the latter subsides, so will the former, and the Great Powers will lose interest. Since the great powers would no longer woo its leaders with foreign aid, Africa would degenerate into an endless round of local coups d'état, revolutions, and border conflicts. Those who take this Cold-War view of Africa consider it only a second rate Southeast Asia, destined to become a political backwater as did the new states of Latin America for nearly a century. This view has several flaws. As already emphasized, the world's concern with order and stability in Africa is not based exclusively on the Cold War. A major determinant of British and French policy in Africa is the legacy of the colonial experience; for reasons of both interest and prestige, Africa's former metropoles are committed to orderly development of these non-Western societies into full membership in the nation-state system. Moreover, even though the present East-West struggle continues to decline in intensity, that a new North-South conflict pattern offers the Communist Chinese a ripe field for revolutionary leadership has been noted. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will abandon Africa and Asia to the Chinese. Finally, it must be stressed that Africans are anything but status-quo oriented. They are committed to varying degrees of revolutionizing their societies, economies, and polities.

However, general nuclear disarmament might affect alliances and alignments in another way. Africans believe that the nonalignment of the "third force" helps to lessen the danger of nuclear war. Nuclear disarmament and a decline in the Cold War would thus remove or minimize one of the reasons for African avoidance of alliances with external powers. It might also become more difficult for African states to avoid closer economic alignment with Great Britain and France by obtaining aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union. And Africans might be less reluctant to participate in multilateral economic alignments such as the EEC, or possibly even to develop closer links with such military groups as either NATO or the Warsaw Pact powers.

Proposals for a general reduction of conventional arms

Conventional disarmament is not likely to take place without prior reductions in nuclear weapons. Moreover, many observers feel that the danger of nuclear war has clarified the vital role conventional arms continue to play. To do away with conventional, but not nuclear, weapons would be to scrap all but the ultimate weapon. Nonetheless certain types of reductions in conventional arms might follow nuclear disarmament.

A reduction in the conventional strength of great powers, however, would mean a reduction in the ability of those powers to intervene militarily in trouble spots and power

vacuums beyond their borders. It would also reduce the military power differential between states in general, while enhancing the absolute significance of regionally dominant military powers—in Africa, the U.A.R., Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa.

Thus, to the extent that large conventional forces of major powers are a deterrent to lesser, but often revisionist, powers, this deterrent would disappear; external forces would no longer be a major factor in the African balance of power. In such an environment, security arrangements Africans make through the United Nations, the OAU, or through embryonic alliance systems such as the pact between Kenya and Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa would play a greater role in the stability and security of the continent. Hence, security policy would become more important in African foreign policies than it is at present.

If conventional disarmament were pursued to the ultimate end of reducing forces to the level required for internal security, it would tend to freeze the territorial status quo or, at least, ensure that adjustments were made peacefully. It should be recalled, however, that the changing conflict patterns described earlier are a major obstacle to the achievement of conventional disarmament in Africa. Military forces are a means of both maintaining and changing a status quo; until the creation of a strong Pan-African union government, or of an effective international police force, mechanisms of order and change will rely at least partially on the military power of individual states.

It should be reemphasized that the present role of Great Powers in Africa is not based wholly on weapons; it is basically their economic and industrial power that makes their influence felt around the globe. Disarmament would remove one aspect of this pervasive influence, but it would hardly reverse the technological and economic superiority of Western and Westernized powers.

However, disarmament would release resources that could be used for other policies, including foreign aid. African leaders, who come from a continent of aid recipients, continually stress this point. For example, a joint memorandum tabled by the three African members (Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the U.A.R.) of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in June 1963 supported a test ban because it would "release the nuclear powers' much needed energy, funds, and technical know-how and channel them to peaceful endeavors, to more profitable enterprises which are badly needed by the majority of mankind, especially by the African, Asian, and Latin-American peoples." 12/ Although it is not clear that the Great Powers would respond favorably, the mounting pressure for an increase in the level of foreign aid was again demonstrated at the recent Geneva Conference on Trade and Development. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that general disarmament must be accompanied by an increase in economic aid if it is to have constructive results in Africa.

African Alliances and Alignments as Pressure Groups for Disarmament

While this analysis has focused mainly on the possible effects of arms control measures on African alliances and alignments, it is also interesting to turn the question around and ask how alliances affect disarmament. One usually thinks of alliances and armaments as natural partners aiming at the same objective. In Africa, however, this generalization requires qualification.

It is true that inside the African sub-system of international relations, individual African states are behaving in the traditional way. They are arming themselves for security reasons, and they are trying to develop the OAU as an African alliance system. Among Africa's leaders, there is very little interest in the idea of limiting their own conventional weapons.

12/ "Joint Memorandum submitted by Ethiopia, Nigeria, and the United Arab Republic to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Question of Cessation of Nuclear Tests, June 10, 1963," Documents on Disarmament 1963, USACDA Publication 24 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1964.)

When one examines African attitudes toward the weapons of the great powers, however, a quite different picture emerges. Here one finds an active and articulate African pressure group for disarmament, working in close and effective collaboration with Asians. The machinery employed by this pressure group is the host of conferences already described in the section on African Alliances and Alignments—the Bandung group, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conferences, the Conferences of Independent African States, the All-African People's Conferences, the Belgrade Conferences, Nkrumah's "World Without the Bomb" conference, and several lesser meetings. All of these sessions in which Africans talk to each other, or to Asians and others, have aroused enthusiasm for disarmament proposals, and have helped to clarify and organize the tactics and objectives of their disarmament campaign in the most important forum of all—the United Nations.

At the First Conference of Independent African States held in Accra in April, 1958, Conference Resolution XII called on the great powers to discontinue the production of nuclear weapons and weapons tests, and urged that atomic energy be used solely for peaceful purposes. Such an appeal has been echoed at most subsequent inter-African conferences, although it was most frequently and forcefully expressed by the so-called "radical" African states of the former Casablanca group. On a few occasions, the Africa caucusing group in the United Nations was divided on disarmament issues; General Assembly Resolution 1652 (XVI) on declaring Africa a nuclear-free zone divided the UAM states from other African states in 1961, while Resolution 1649 (XVI) affirming the need for an effective nuclear test-ban shortly after the Soviet violation of the moratorium separated the Casablanca powers from the rest at the same Assembly in 1961. Generally, however, African states have supported the most advanced positions on disarmament provided these positions did not unduly favor one side or the other in the Cold War.

To strengthen their campaigns for an African nuclear-free zone and for general nuclear and conventional disarmament, Africans began early to ask for greater participation in international disarmament discussions. However, the blanket support that Africa gave to resolutions condemning the use of nuclear weapons as contrary to the UN Charter made the great powers fear that the new states would be unrealistic in their approach to disarmament questions. For example, President Sékou Touré of Guinea had remarked that GCD was an "essential factor for stability and peace" and therefore "greater importance cannot be given to the question of control than to the very subject at issue. . . ."

It soon was decided, however, that the opportunity to work with problems of disarmament at first hand might modify somewhat the more extreme positions of African and other nonaligned states. Accordingly, in December 1961, the United States and the U.S.S.R. gave their support to an Assembly resolution setting up the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to continue talks that had been suspended since June 1960; among the eight nonaligned members now included were three African states, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and the U.A.R. It has been contended that this step modified the nonaligned position if only because the new states were forced by the logic of their ideology to take a central position rather than an anti-Western one. The test-ban memorandum tabled by the three African members in June 1963 reflected this shift in its recognition for the need for control and inspection. Similarly, the 1963 Addis Ababa Summit Conference Resolution on disarmament reflected a modification of African views when it supported a GCD agreement "under strict and effective international control."

Two African states, Ghana and Algeria, have also held special disarmament conferences in their capitals with strong support from outside sources. In June 1962, the Accra Assembly on the "World Without the Bomb" took place in the Ghanaian capital. Both the Assembly and its Secretariat have become standing bodies with close connections with several Scandinavian peace groups. Attended by 130 delegates from nonaligned countries, the 1962 conference urged that teams of disarmament experts be set up under UN auspices. Interestingly, a Ghanaian, J. H. Mensah, proposed a comprehensive program for African disarmament, an idea that received notice in U.S. academic circles, 13/ but seems to have attracted little notice in Africa itself.

13/ See the Journal of Disarmament and Arms Control (Autumn 1963), pp. 171-83 for a reprint of the Mensah proposal; for American support see Amrom H. Katz, African Disarmament—A Proposal Seconded, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California (February 1964).

In July 1964 a conference on the de-nuclearization of the Mediterranean met in Algiers under the sponsorship of the Algerian Committee for Peace, an affiliate of the communist front World Peace Council. A major emphasis of the conference was the denunciation of U.S. base arrangements for nuclear submarines, of NATO bases in Libya and Cyprus, and of defense agreements between nuclear powers and Mediterranean states.

Africa's commitment to nuclear disarmament was again revealed in a recent message sent by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana to Mao-tse Tung and Chou-en Lai on the explosion of the Chinese bomb. Nkrumah began, "I sympathize with and appreciate the considerations which made this course of action a political necessity for your government." But, he continued, China's proposal for nuclear disarmament immediately after it exploded the bomb created "a certain amount of resistance to an excellent proposal." The disarmament initiative should have been made by a "third party," the five sponsors of the October 1964 Nonaligned Conference in Cairo: Ghana, Yugoslavia, India, Indonesia, and the U.A.R. Nkrumah added his praise for the Chinese feat as "a positive indication of what developing nations are capable of doing given the necessary resources in men and material," but cautioned that developing nations must be "somewhat anxious about committing our limited resources to expenditures on nuclear arms." 14/

It is difficult to evaluate the direct effects of the long Afro-Asian campaign for disarmament. The test-ban and the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow would perhaps have come into being without any pressure from Africans and Asians. It is nonetheless interesting and encouraging to observe the evolution of African opinion on a crucial issue of world-wide significance. No doubt, Africans and Asians find in disarmament an issue that incidentally helps them to increase their status and prestige by developing their vision of themselves as a "third force" in world affairs. Whatever their motives, however, their continuous pressure has certainly helped to build a favorable climate of opinion for nuclear arms control.

Conclusions

Several major conclusions arise from the preceding discussion of the African military and political environment.

1. It is in the interest of the United States to help preserve and strengthen the Organization of African Unity. African states mustered enough solidarity to form the OAU only after a tortuous three-year period of maneuvering, and this embryonic effort at collective security is still susceptible to the old differences and divisions. U.S. policy in Africa should do everything possible to avoid undermining this fragile unity. When U.S. policy raises either Cold-War or neo-colonial issues in the African environment (or gives the Soviets a blanket opening to do so) it in effect weakens the OAU. Thus, in the Congo crisis last fall, Western failure or inability to mobilize multilateral support for peacekeeping led to a unilateral, interventionist posture that could only split Africa against itself. As a result the radical-moderate split is again appearing, with some African states giving aid to the Congo rebels and others (notably the new OCAM) taking a clear stand for tolerance of the Tshombe regime.

2. The need to minimize the neo-colonial aspects of Africa's ties with the West. These ties frustrate many African leaders because they tend to keep new states dependent in the economic and military spheres. They can only continue if accompanied by a basic respect for the African political revolution. If the West acts in such a way as to make a mockery of African sovereignty, the result is likely to be greater tension and instability. Since the presence of external power in Africa will continue for some time until African states can develop greater power and consensus themselves, it is vital to employ discreet methods. Two recent examples of indiscretion, perhaps unavoidable in the second case, certainly not in the first, will illustrate. After the Gabon coup of February 1964, French Information Minister Peyrefitte did not explain the legal justification for

14/ Agence France Presse Africa South of the Sahara, #1119, Nov. 9, 1964, p. 9.

French intervention, namely the defense accords described above along with France's general support for legitimate governments in Africa. Instead, he supported the action by announcing that France had acted similarly ten times since 1960 and would do so again if need be, a statement that brought forth forceful denunciations from Presidents Tombalbaye and Daddah of Chad and Mauritania, respectively. In the recent case of the intervention by Western forces in the Congo, the planes carrying paratroops to Stanleyville were already airborne before U.S. Ambassador to Kenya William Attwood ended negotiations with the rebel and OAU representatives. This unfortunate circumstance was hardly calculated to soothe the effect of the intervention.

3. Turning specifically to arms proposals, it is not in the U.S. interest for African states to disarm their still meager arsenals. This would probably only create more instability. Although arms alone cannot create order, they are probably a necessary condition of some form of order unless one assumes that Africans are to rely on outside intervention for the maintenance of order. Hence, U.S. arms policy, while not attempting general reduction in Africa, should do two things: it should remain flexible enough to enable the United States to assist one side or the other in African conflicts, which might otherwise explode; and, it should not encourage military imbalance by focusing aid on a few favorites or attempting to isolate radical states (and thereby, perhaps forcing them to accept Soviet bloc aid).

4. The United States has no interest in seeing a reduction of the ability of Britain and France to use conventional forces to help stabilize Africa. Security in the small and weak French-speaking states is already highly dependent on French military forces at the same time that France is beginning to rethink its involvement in African affairs. Great Britain, also, may have other opportunities to do what it did in East Africa a year ago. Africa has long been a part of the British and French spheres of influence, and the Indian Ocean area is still largely dependent on the forces of these two powers for regional security. The United States is not prepared to fill all the gaps in security that would be created if Great Britain and France were to pull out of Africa entirely.

5. There are few convincing reasons why a treaty to guarantee a nuclear-free zone in Africa should not obtain Great Power support, though it would be more attractive to the United States if it contained verification and inspection provisions. Perhaps its main value would lie in the sphere of propaganda, but a treaty would also involve elements of moral suasion on Africans to avoid nuclear armament themselves.

6. A general reduction in nuclear armaments would have a similar propaganda value with the nonaligned world. This, however, cannot be considered adequate justification for serious steps toward nuclear disarmament. Presumably, nuclear disarmament would release resources that might be channeled into aid for the developing nations, but this might be illusory since the impact of a smaller arms budget on the domestic politics of the Western countries would not necessarily lead to support for additional aid. A final and more cogent argument for nuclear disarmament in the African context is that it would reduce the dangers resulting from outside intervention in Africa and the possibility of confrontations such as that developing today in Vietnam. Thus it would enhance the ability of Western powers to eliminate or cope with pockets of instability in Africa.

6. THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

by

John C. Dreier

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6. THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

John C. Dreier

I. Relevant Peculiarities of the Area

Scope of this Essay

This essay will deal with the role of the Western Hemisphere alliance system in a disarmed or disarming world. The major focus will be on the Inter-American System and its main agency, the Organization of American States (OAS), which have been established by the United States and the twenty Latin American countries. The two new independent states of the Caribbean, Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago are included by virtue of their imminently prospective entry into the OAS.

Although a major country of the hemisphere, Canada's primary involvement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) makes it desirable to treat its bilateral and multilateral alliances in connection with the North Atlantic area. However, Cuba's role as a member of the Soviet bloc will receive attention.

Outside of the OAS system and Cuba's ties with Moscow and Peking, there are no international alliances or alignments in the area that merit separate consideration for the purposes of this essay. The five small countries of Central America have traditionally cherished a vision of union, and recent years have seen a flowering of this ambition primarily in economic and cultural matters. The Central American grouping does not, however, involve political or military arrangements outside of the participation of these countries in the broader hemisphere system. The United States has also entered into bilateral military agreements with many of the Latin American countries under which military assistance is made available to them. These agreements, however, are within the general context and in implementation of the hemisphere defense alliance, and therefore do not constitute distinct or separate alliances or alignments between the countries involved.

Regional Characteristics Bearing on This Study

Certain peculiarities of the Latin American area, differentiating it from other regional or political groupings, have a bearing on the development of the alliance system and the impact that may be expected from various disarmament measures. Some of the more significant factors are mentioned herein, although they by no means comprise a comprehensive statement of all the principal influences contributing to the international behavior of the Latin American countries.

Geographic and Cultural Isolation

Most of the Latin American area is separated by large oceans and long distances from all other continents, and especially from most of the main centers of western civilization. The isolation that naturally resulted from the physical obstacles to contact and communication until the latter part of the nineteenth century was reinforced by the nature and policies of the Spanish and Portuguese empires, which controlled the area for some three centuries and jealously guarded it from outside influences of all kinds. Thus, despite

intellectual curiosity displayed by small, educated segments of the population, the area was slow in developing an outward look and an appreciation of the realities of world politics.

The same factors have contributed to the development of a strong regional self-consciousness among the Latin American countries, reflected in a preoccupation with their internal problems and the adoption of many commonly shared cultural and political attitudes. They seek jealously to guard their independence as sovereign states. There is a distinct preference among the Latin American countries for dealing with their regional problems in their own way and relatively free from outside interference.

Geography has, however, provided one important exception to the fact of isolation: the proximity of Latin America to the United States, which by the end of the nineteenth century became militarily and politically predominant throughout most of the area. The Latin American region presents the interesting situation, therefore, of a group of relatively weak nations being closely associated with a major world power whose supremacy in the area has not been successfully challenged by any other world power for almost a century, and whose influence penetrates virtually every important aspect of their national interests.

Role of the Military

With a few minor exceptions, the armed forces of Latin America play a key role in the political life of their respective countries. Most of the Latin American constitutions recognize the armed forces as a major institution of the state, with responsibilities not only for defending the national territory but for upholding the constitutional order and maintaining internal security. The history of most of these countries has been characterized by a series of military dictatorships, and while the armed forces are in most cases becoming politically more sophisticated and rarely indulge in such baldly personalistic seizures of power as was formerly the case, they remain on the whole the final arbiters of political issues. In some countries, the influence of the military is also great in technological fields and therefore in economic affairs. Since the end of fighting in the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1935, no major armed conflict has taken place in the Latin American area. With the strengthening of the Inter-American collective security system and the radical changes in the character of modern warfare, the traditional military defense function of the Latin American armed forces has steadily decreased. This has not, however, prevented them in most countries from acquiring or seeking to acquire modern weapons, a major purpose of which is to appeal to nationalist sentiment and thus to protect the privileges, power, and prestige enjoyed by the military.

Interest and Position of the United States

Since the days of the Monroe Doctrine (1823), it has been a cardinal principle of U.S. foreign policy to oppose the intrusion of any unfriendly power in the Latin American area. The United States has pursued this objective in a variety of ways. At times, it has exerted its overwhelming military power, as in the military interventions of the early twentieth century. It has appealed to the idealism of the Latin American peoples by subscribing to the mysticism of hemisphere solidarity based on both geographical and ideological factors. Special political arrangements, which will be described below, have been evolved, covering a wide variety of common interests. Over the past half century or more, the economic interest of the United States has also grown, Latin America now constituting a major area of trade and investment, comparable with Canada and Western Europe. In all areas of international relations, it has been the purpose of the United States not only to preserve the independence of the essentially weak Latin American states from powers antagonistic to its interests, but to mobilize and strengthen the capacity of the twenty countries of the area to contribute to the broad political purposes of the United States in the world arena.

With Latin America deeply involved in political and social ferment related to the demands of those countries for economic growth, a major concern of the United States today is to minimize the opportunity for intervention by Communist powers. This involves the pursuit by the United States of specific goals: the maintenance of international peace in the area; the preservation of internal order; and the nonviolent transformation of Latin America's political, economic, and social institutions into those of a modern, open society.

Cuba's Alignment with the Communist Bloc

When Fidel Castro led his triumphant revolutionary forces into Havana on January 1, 1959, Cuba was still a member of the OAS and thus formally aligned with the United States and the other Latin American countries. Despite growing tensions with the United States, and with the OAS, Cuba retained its membership in the regional system for another two years. However, by the latter part of 1959 signs were already discernible of Castro's movement toward the Communist bloc. In February 1960, Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan of the Soviet Union visited Havana and concluded an economic agreement with the Cuban government. A communiqué issued at this time also proclaimed the desire of the Cuban and Soviet Governments to collaborate in the United Nations. In May Soviet-Cuban diplomatic relations were reestablished (having been broken in 1952), and by July, Chairman Khrushchev was intimating that Soviet rockets would defend Cuba in the event of a United States invasion. Military as well as economic assistance was given to Cuba by the Soviet Union and by mid-1961, it had become abundantly clear that the Castro government was fully aligned with the Soviet Union. In December 1961, Castro openly proclaimed his Marxist-Leninist convictions, and the following January the Organ of Consultation of the American States, meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, excluded the Castro Government from further participation in the OAS.

Cuba has been heavily dependent on the Soviet bloc for economic support ever since being denied access to the United States market. Castro has also relied on Soviet sources for military equipment and training with which he has built up the largest military force in Latin America. Yet the limits of the Soviet Union's commitment to support Cuba in a military sense were revealed by the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuban launching sites in October 1962, in the face of United States demands.

On its part, Cuba now serves willingly as the center for Communist activities throughout Latin America and particularly in the Caribbean area. In this connection, Castro has exploited the Sino-Soviet split to increase his leverage with the Kremlin. Drawing from his own experience as a successful guerrilla fighter, Castro obviously favors an active insurgency to advance the Communist cause in Latin America. Yet, conscious of his deep dependence on Moscow, he has refrained from open alignment with Peking in the struggle for political control. A meeting of Latin American Communist parties held in Havana in November 1964, issued a communiqué indicating the continued acceptance of Moscow's leadership, while emphasizing an increased interest in the tactics of violence in several Latin American countries. The strong appeal of the Chinese Communist ideology to many Latin Americans accustomed to violence as a political tactic, enhances Fidel Castro's key position as a leader capable of supporting Moscow's control of Communist parties of the region in return for the economic aid that the Soviet Union provides him.

Active support by the Cuban government of subversive forces in Venezuela was confirmed by the Organ of Consultation of the OAS at the Ninth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in July 1964. Diplomatic and economic sanctions were imposed on the Castro government under the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, and the possibility of a future resort to armed force was suggested. Cuba continues, nevertheless, to constitute the spearhead of Communist aggression in the area.

II. Background of the Alliance System

The core of the OAS alliance system is the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed in 1947 and known as the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, to which the United

States and the twenty Latin American countries are parties. This treaty, the first of several regional defense pacts concluded by the United States in different parts of the world, provides for mutual assistance in cases of armed attack or threats of aggression by any state on an American state. Yet this treaty is but one feature, albeit a major one, of a broader context of treaties, agreements, and accepted principles of international conduct that make up the Inter-American System. The major, but not the only, institution through which the Inter-American System operates, is the Organization of American States. Its Charter, signed in 1948, incorporates the results of several decades of the evolutionary development of the relations of the participating countries. Both the Latin American countries and the United States have made distinctive contributions to the growth of the Inter-American System, and both have strongly influenced its rather unique character.

Latin American Initiatives

The first initiative for the creation of an alliance system among the states of the Western Hemisphere came from Latin America. On achieving independence, the former Spanish colonies, fearing efforts of the Holy Alliance to reestablish the imperial rule, sought to create a confederation and alliance to further their common defense and development. At a congress called by Simon Bolivar at Panama in 1826, a treaty of confederation was drafted. It was an abortive effort, for the Latin American countries, ill-prepared for independence, entered on a period of political chaos that made any stable international or domestic political arrangements impossible. The Treaty of Panama never entered into effect. At various times during the nineteenth century, renewed efforts were made, in the face of threats of European aggression, to create a league or confederation of the Latin American states along similar lines. 1/ These attempts also proved fruitless. Yet in these frustrated efforts, the Latin American jurists proclaimed a set of principles that ultimately played a vital part in the present OAS. Notable among these principles are the juridical equality of states, nonintervention, and the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

The United States Position

The United States had watched these efforts of the Latin American countries with varying degrees of interest, but had refrained from participating in them even when invited to do so. Equally concerned about the security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States had followed a unilateral policy that contrasted markedly with the collective approach adopted at least in theory by its new world neighbors to the south. While the Monroe Doctrine, which embodied this policy, supported the same fundamental objective as the Bolivarian movement—namely, the independence of the Americas from European domination—the United States followed a strictly unilateral path and for more than a century rejected all suggestions for alliances with the Latin American countries. Yet it was a United States initiative, under Secretary of State Blaine, in the 1880's that launched the Pan American movement that ultimately blossomed into the OAS and its treaty of alliance.

The original Pan American movement fell far short of an alliance. Until the period of World War II, it confined itself largely to projects for the peaceful settlement of inter-American disputes and the promotion of commercial and cultural relations. The United States continued to avoid politico-military commitments relying on its own strength, unilaterally exercised, for the defense of its security interests.

Conflict and Conciliation

The Latin American countries responded to the Pan American policy of the United States with mixed emotions. They welcomed the United States opposition to the

1/ The principal conferences of a political nature were those held at Lima, Peru in 1847-48; in Santiago, Chile in 1856; and again in Lima in 1864-65. Brief summaries of them can be found in Aaron J. Thomas and Ann Thomas, The Organization of American States (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), pp. 8-11; and in Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea, Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954), pp. 51-60.

intervention of European powers in Latin American affairs. 2/ They also liked the idea of elaborating juridical formulas for settling their international disputes—a purpose to which they had already devoted frequent, if frustrated, efforts. Promotion of increased and mutually advantageous trade with the United States also received their favorable response. But they were deeply concerned by efforts of the United States to extend its political or economic power over them whether by military interventions (as in Mexico and the Caribbean) or to bind them in a relationship of economic dependence. As the power of the United States grew, and its virtual hegemony over the Western Hemisphere became increasingly recognized and accepted, 3/ Latin American fears of U. S. domination mounted. They were happy to be protected from European intervention, but not at the price of being reduced to a state of vassalage. The Pan American Conferences took on a further significance for them as a means of developing an inter-American juridical system that would restrain the United States in the unilateral exercise of its power.

Under the pressure of these forces, the association of the American states developed along well-marked lines. The bitter resistance of the Latin American countries to the unilateral exercise of power by the United States forced the latter increasingly to accept a collaborative and multilateral approach to the matters of hemisphere security and gradually to yield its freedom of action in this respect. Not until the United States agreed to the Latin American principle of nonintervention in 1933, culminating many years of controversy on the subject, was it possible to start the development of a system of continental security against foreign aggression. Steps toward that end were stimulated by the growing imminence of World War II during the late 1930's.

The war provided a significant experience of collaboration between the United States and the Latin American countries, who acted as allies even though no formal treaty of alliance existed. Not until after the war, at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, and at Bogota in 1948, were the two basic treaties signed that bind the American states together in the OAS. A glance at these two documents reveals the nature of the association.

Main Features of the Present OAS

In the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, aggression from outside the continent and the maintenance of peace and security among the American republics themselves are dealt with together, little distinction being drawn as to the source of the aggression. The obligations for mutual assistance are the same whether an act or threat of aggression comes from outside the continent or is directed by one American state against another. In either case, each party to the treaty is obligated to give assistance in meeting an armed attack, and to abide by the decisions of the consultative body (Organ of Consultation) when measures are approved by a two-thirds majority. Without the right of veto, which it enjoys in the Security Council of the United Nations, the United States has thus subordinated its freedom of action to the decision of two-thirds of the Latin American countries once the issue is drawn. The Treaty of Rio has functioned well in regard to the maintenance of collective security within the Latin American community. It has functioned less effectively in regard to Communist aggression from without, primarily because the problem as posed in the cases of Guatemala (1954) and Cuba (1960 -) became deeply involved with other highly charged political issues such as nonintervention. The direct military threat on the American continent that appeared in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, however, gave an example of the alliance working swiftly and well.

The Treaty of Rio is but one aspect of the broader inter-American association the scope of which is fully revealed by the Charter of the OAS. This treaty first establishes

2/ For example, the proposition advanced in 1902 by the Argentine Foreign Minister, Luis M. Drago, to the effect that the use of force by any European country against an American state for the collection of a public debt should be prohibited, was characterized by its author as an economic corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

3/ The de facto situation created as a result of the extension of American power in the Caribbean was implicitly recognized in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1902 in which Great Britain relinquished its then existing treaty rights to participate with the United States in the building and control of a trans-isthmian canal in Panama.

the principles of the OAS, including a strong statement of the nonintervention doctrine and the respect for the sovereignty of states. It calls for the peaceful settlement of inter-American disputes as well as solidarity against aggression from any source. The Charter proclaims principles of economic and social cooperation, and touches, albeit somewhat warily, on the merits of political democracy and respect for human rights. Finally, the Charter sets up agencies to deal with a wide variety of political, juridical, economic, social, and cultural problems. It is richly endowed with expressions of the mystique of hemisphere solidarity.

Three Functions of the OAS Alliance

In the context of this broad arrangement, the Western Hemisphere alliance system may be seen to involve three different but related functions wrapped up in one package. It is first an alliance of the United States and the Latin American countries for the purpose of defending the territorial integrity and political independence of the Americas. It is this function that has been and continues to be of primary interest to the United States. The OAS is also, however, a political arrangement by means of which the Latin American countries have banded together to restrain the power of the United States on the one hand and to induce the application of U. S. power and resources to their needs on the other. This aspect of the OAS is no doubt of major concern to those countries. Finally, the OAS alliance system may be seen as a collective security system designed to maintain the peace in the Latin American area itself.

All three phases of the OAS alliance system are intimately related to each other. If, from the standpoint of the United States, the primary purpose is to protect the political independence of the hemisphere from potential enemies, the maintenance of a strong alliance required that adequate attention be given to the other two functions as well—and particularly to the second function, which concerns the application of U. S. power and resources to the problems of the Latin American republics. Just as the acceptance of the nonintervention principle and the adoption of the Good Neighbor policy were measures to strengthen inter-American relations in the disordered world of the 1930's, so was the Alliance for Progress a response to the need for strengthening the alliance in the period of the Cold War.

III. Environmental Conditions Relevant To the Impact of Disarmament Measures

Certain factors, primarily of a political nature, encountered in the Latin American area impose severe strains on the OAS alliance system at this time. These forces must be understood in assessing the impact of any disarmament measures on the Latin American scene.

Latin American Resentment at United States Predominance

The predominance of the United States in the military, political, and economic affairs of virtually all of the Latin American countries (with the recent and notable exception of Cuba) is one of the major facts of life in the hemisphere. Not only are the Latin American armed forces inconsequential as compared with those of the United States; they are also closely linked to the United States through bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for common doctrine, training, and provision of much equipment. Economically, the Latin countries look to the United States as the chief market for their exports and the major source of both public and private investment. The political influence of the United States is therefore inevitably great—although varying considerably from country to country.

United States predominance in the area has contributed substantially to economic and social progress in the Latin American countries and has provided indispensable support for the regional system of collective security. Yet the very existence of this predominance produces a widespread and deep resentment among Latin Americans. They are constantly reminded of their dependent status, while past instances of the unilateral intervention of the United States in smaller Latin countries have engendered a fear of the northern "colossus" that persists despite the record of the Good Neighbor Policy and the Alliance for Progress.

Resentment at United States predominance and fear of intervention are twin forces that constitute a major source of strain on the inter-American alliance system. Every proposal to strengthen the power and effectiveness of the regional organization arouses the fear that the United States will dominate the machinery and apply it to the pursuit of its own national interests at Latin America's expense. It was such an attitude that has stood in the way of the establishment of any effective regional military agency in the inter-American system. Opposition to the Alliance for Progress has also taken the form of criticism of the United States for "intervening" in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries when it calls for economic and social reforms as a necessary counterpart to the provision of external capital.

Political Instability

Strains on the alliance system of the Western Hemisphere also arise from the chronic condition of political instability for which the Latin American countries are notorious. That this chronic condition persists is evidenced by the fact that in the brief period since 1962, governments have been overthrown by force in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru, while abortive efforts to accomplish the same end were witnessed in other countries.

Political instability does not only mean that some governments are overthrown by force. It also means that many governments enjoy a precarious existence in which their future is in constant jeopardy. In Latin America, this instability tends to create a polarized political scene composed of populist-type democracies or pseudo-democracies on the one hand and dictatorships, usually of the military type, on the other. Many countries oscillate between these two extremes in the process of political change.

Political instability imposes strains on the continental alliance in several ways. The existence of dictatorships, which is one manifestation of instability, has traditionally been a major cause of international tensions in the area as exiles plotted from across national boundaries to dislodge their enemies from power at home. The violence characteristic of Latin American political instability presents major opportunities for communist subversion and creates for the alliance a serious problem of internal security against extracontinental aggression. Finally, political instability further obstructs the development of consistent governmental policies and programs whether in the political or economic field, adding to the difficulties that must be overcome in the process of building strong and viable nation-states and firm international relationships.

Nationalism

If resentment against U. S. domination and fear of U. S. intervention are essentially negative responses to the outward situation, they contribute strongly to the positive force of nationalism, and tend to give it a strongly anti-U. S. bias. Nationalism is, no doubt, a necessary cohesive force in the present stage of Latin American development. Yet in its more virulent form, it is closely identified with "anti-Yankee" sentiment. There is a widespread feeling among the Latin American countries that while they long ago achieved the forms of political independence, they are still economically, and to some extent politically, in a colonial status, dependent on the export of basic commodities to foreign markets, "exploited" by foreign investors and pressured to support the anti-communist

bloc in the Cold War. Nationalism, evoking popular emotions in the pursuit of independence, is inevitably directed against both U. S. business and the U. S. government, which are portrayed as symbols of foreign domination. Communists obviously seek to associate themselves with anti-U. S. nationalism, but strong native roots for this sentiment exist quite apart from foreign stimulation, imposing a serious strain on the political basis of the OAS alliance.

In the field of foreign relations, nationalism also emphasizes the desire to be freed of U. S. influence, and has led to the adoption of what is termed an "independent foreign policy." By this is meant a policy that, while recognizing the validity of international treaty obligations such as those of the OAS and adhering to the broad philosophical goals of western civilization, will in other respects be based more firmly on the national interest rather than following the lead of the United States. Its main features have comprised the establishment of commercial and diplomatic relations with countries of the Communist bloc (a step that the United States is often believed to view with disfavor), to proclaim a firm adherence to the principles of self-determination and nonintervention (which has tended to limit action against the Castro regime in Cuba), and to take a position of sympathetic alignment on world economic issues and colonialism with the underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (which tends to place Latin America in opposition to the United States and Western Europe in United Nations councils).

The current wave of nationalism in Latin America is characterized also by the resurgence of a strong regional, or "macro" nationalism in which the traditional sentiment of Latin spiritual and cultural unity is being given expression in economic and political terms. The establishment of the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) has been the major, and as yet uncertain, development in the economic field. Political manifestations of this regional sentiment are even more tenuous. Calls for a closer coordination of Latin American foreign policies in support of the common interests of the area vis-à-vis both the United States and Europe are often heard. They are frequently associated with criticisms of the OAS as being "inadequate" and with demands for its alteration. 4/ While there need not necessarily be any fundamental conflict between the desire for "political, economic and social integration" of Latin America and the continuance of the OAS alignment, this pressure tends to increase the emphasis on the function of the OAS alliance as a Latin American instrument for dealing with the United States rather than one directed at the defense of the hemisphere against outside military or political aggression.

Social Revolution

Both political instability and nationalism are intimately related to the process of revolutionary change through which Latin America is now passing. In their striving for economic progress and social justice, the emerging masses of the Latin American countries are seeking to bring about drastic reforms in the traditional institutions that have governed the exercise of political power and the ownership and distribution of wealth. The burning issues in Latin American societies at this stage concern not whether revolutionary change is necessary but how it is to be achieved: particularly whether sufficiently profound alterations in the social system inherited from the past can be brought about peacefully or require a resort to destructive violence.

This revolutionary fervor strikes at the OAS Alliance system in two major respects. Whether justifiably or not, the image of the United States has, in the popular view, been deeply involved with the traditional privileged groups against whom the revolutionary movement is now directed. The United States government is widely believed to have supported military dictatorships that denied political liberties to the people and suppressed their efforts to achieve social justice. Both the United States Government and U. S. business interests have been considered to be primarily allied with the interests of the

4/ See, for example, the Resolutions of the VI Latin American Congress of Christian Democratic Parties as published in Politica y Espiritu, No. 284 (January-May 1964), Santiago, Chile, pp. 54-61.

"oligarchies" and coldly unconcerned with the crying need for social reform. As the revolutionary movement has grown in political influence, it has brought to the surface the underlying antagonism toward the United States and undermined the political basis of the hemisphere alliance. The Alliance for Progress, in which the United States sought to identify itself with social reform, at first encountered difficulty in changing the negative image of the United States in Latin America. As the "Nine Wise Men" reported in 1962, "Latin America is not used to seeing the United States as either a 'revolutionary' or a 'reformer.' . . . That is why the reform program of the Alliance. . .is looked upon with skepticism and incredulity by broad sectors of the Latin American population." 5/

The consistent support of the Alliance by the United States and the increasing acceptance of its purposes and principles by broad sectors of the Latin American people during the last two or three years have, however, done much to create a more favorable political standing of the United States in Latin American eyes.

The revolutionary movement in Latin America has also tended to view developments in the Communist world and elsewhere with heightened interest. Often skeptical of the possibility of achieving their revolutionary goals through the procedures and institutions of liberal democracy as they have experienced it, Latin American intellectuals and reformist leaders have searched for other and more promising social philosophies. They have been deeply impressed by the material and cultural achievements of the Soviet Union and other Communist states. Fear of losing political liberties carries little weight with those who have never truly known them. While the complete acceptance of Marxism-Leninism is still restricted to a small minority in Latin America outside of Cuba today, the sympathy with which Marxist ideas are viewed by reformist groups breeds at least a wide tolerance of communism and offers a fertile field in which Communists may cultivate anti-Yankee sentiments.

The tactics of the Communist parties of Latin America in seeking to exploit the revolutionary sentiment vary in the light of circumstances within each country and in the Communist world as a whole. In no Latin American country, except Cuba, is the party large enough to command any substantial following at the polls by itself. The parties have therefore followed the well-known policy of working through front organizations dominated by nationalist and anti-United States views, and of combining with other left-wing groups in popular front coalitions in countries where the "objective conditions" for communism appeared to warrant such tactics. In other countries, efforts to develop the "objective conditions" have taken the form of terrorism, insurgency, and other methods of promoting disorder and disillusionment with the existing political system. There is as yet no evidence that the Soviet domination of the Latin American Communist parties has been successfully challenged as a result of the Sino-Soviet split. Nevertheless, the parties appear to be in some disarray, and splinter groups have appeared proclaiming their adherence to the Chinese line. 6/ The smashing defeat administered to the Communist-backed popular front candidate in the Chilean elections of September 1964, and the ouster of the Goulart government in Brazil earlier that year, dealt a serious blow to the policy of political collaboration and may be expected to give added weight to the Chinese view. Castro, despite his economic dependence on Moscow, remains the symbol and chief exponent of violent revolutionary action—a course that, as indicated above, appeals not only to Communists but to other extremist elements among the revolutionary groups.

Attitude Toward the Cold War

The factors mentioned in the foregoing pages indicate some of the major influences that determine the attitude of the Latin American countries toward the Cold War. Despite their political, economic, and cultural ties with the United States and the West, the

5/ Report of the Panel of Experts to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1962), p. 35.
6/ Tad Szulc in New York Times, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 11.

Latin American countries are far more strongly influenced by their overriding preoccupation with their internal problems and the demands which their interests, as they view them, place on their international posture. Roberto Campos, present Minister of Planning of Brazil, a brilliant economist and friend of the United States, has stated the contrast between the U. S. and Latin American views in these terms:

> For Latin America there is another chasm as relevant as the East-West conflict. It is the abyss that separates the prosperous industrialized countries of the Northern Hemisphere from the rest of us. The Western industrialized countries, for which external aggression is the only relevant threat, tend to view the Cold War as a problem of security; the Latin American countries, faced with internal threats of poverty and dissatisfaction, are less concerned with external security than with internal development.
>
> It is thus no wonder that these countries, while conscious of their basic solidarity with Western ideals, view the Cold War from a different perspective and are readier to accept the competitive coexistence of the two systems. This is not only because coexistence seems the only viable alternative to global holocaust or to a rigid partition of the world into ideological compartments, but also because they believe that the competition with socialism will render democratic capitalism more humane and socially conscious and may prod the West into greater efforts in helping underdeveloped areas. 7/

This view is, in Latin American terms, an essentially moderate one. It recognizes the basic allegiance of Latin America to Western civilization but not necessarily to democratic capitalism as now practiced. It accepts the idea of defending the hemisphere against overt aggression in accordance with the Rio Treaty, but falls far short of any interest in joining a crusade to overcome communism. On the contrary, it suggests that the world will benefit more from a mutual interaction between the two systems than from the triumph of one over the other. The predominant Latin American attitude toward the Cold War is thus ambivalent, but marked more by detachment than by any direct involvement therein. The conflict between the East and West is often seen simply as a power struggle for world domination that obstructs international collaboration for economic development, and in which the smaller countries have no part or interest. 8/ Forced to choose between the two Superpowers, most responsible Latin American leaders outside of the Communist camp, fully aware of how much the economic future of their countries depends on the cooperation of the United States, would no doubt lean to the West. But the very fact of having to take sides in a struggle they do not feel is their own is in itself repugnant. The less sophisticated and more emotional spokesmen for the revolutionary groups often find even this compromise with the realities of world politics virtually impossible to accept.

IV. The Impact of Disarmament Measures on the Latin American Area

In the previous section, there were set forth the principal political, economic, social, psychological, and military factors that dominate the scene in the Latin American area today and that may be expected to continue to do so during the next decade. They create a picture of an area characterized by continual turmoil and far-reaching political and social change, in which the West, led by the United States, and the Communist bloc, led by

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7/ Roberto de Oliveira Campos, "Relations Between the United States and Latin America" in Mildred Adams (ed), Latin America: Evolution or Explosion? (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1963), p. 38.

8/ "The Mexican Delegation [to the Fourth Conference of the Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Group] recalled the words of President Lopez Mateos and said that the cold war is the manifestation of a desire for political, military and cultural predominance, and that is why it should be ended." Fourth Conference of Mexico-United States Inter-Parliamentary Group, H. Rept. 1531, 88 Cong., 2nd sess. (1964), p. 5.

the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent by China, are competing for political influence. Yet, although the area is thus the scene of instability and conflict, it is not one in which the impact of disarmament itself is likely to be great, at least in its early stages. Geographical remoteness minimizes military threats from outside the area, and a well-developed collective security system minimizes those from within. The vast preponderance of the United States power in the area is not likely to be changed by anything short of the drastic decreases in U. S. strength, which can be envisaged only in the more advanced stages of a disarmament program. The low level of Latin American armaments themselves likewise removes the military establishments of those countries from the impact of anything but virtually complete disarmament. In short, armaments play a less significant role in the international politics of the Latin American area than in most other geographical regions.

Since the concern of this study is essentially with disarmament as applied to states exercising significant military power in the hemisphere, it seems reasonable to approach the analysis of the possible impact of disarmament measures on the alliance system on the basis of two postulates: first, the conclusion of an effective agreement between the major powers for the elimination of nuclear weapons; and second, the reduction of conventional weapons to the point where the United States capacity to bring military force to bear on conflict situations in various parts of the world, including the Western Hemisphere, would be drastically curtailed. The effect of these measures on the OAS alliance will be considered. The role the regional system might be called on to play in the achievement of the goals of disarmament and the solution of problems associated therewith will also be discussed. The question of Latin American disarmament will be discussed in the latter connection rather than on the basis of a third, independent postulate.

Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

For the purposes of this section, the conclusion of an international agreement will be assumed, under which the likelihood of nuclear warfare is virtually eliminated. Such an agreement would involve the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as other nuclear powers including Communist China. The technical details of such an agreement are not relevant to this discussion except to say that they would have to be of such a character as to give ample basis for confidence in the effectiveness of the agreement. Since none of the Latin American countries is likely to possess nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future, the agreement would not affect their strength. Nor would it materially affect the continued overwhelming preponderance of U. S. military strength in the hemisphere with reference to conventional weapons.

The conclusion of such an agreement among the nuclear powers would be greeted with widespread and enthusiastic approval in Latin America as elsewhere. The spectre of nuclear warfare, carrying with it the possibility of widespread physical damage to even so remote an area as South America, and certainly ending all prospects for economic and social advancement, is a major concern of the Latin American countries in the present stage of the Cold War. The elimination of this possibility would give a great boost to their hopes for further progress toward a peaceful world order and open up fresh vistas of the dedication of larger resources to economic and social development. Apart from this obvious general relief from anxiety, how would the elimination of the threat of nuclear devastation affect the Western Hemisphere alignment?

Military threats to the security of the American continent have historically constituted the strongest cement of hemisphere ties. The most recent example of this was the prompt, vigorous, and unanimous response of the Latin American countries to the Cuban missile crisis in October of 1962. Their positive support of the United States in its quarantine, and their sanctioning of even more vigorous measures in case of necessity, contrasted starkly with their vacillating and reluctant reaction to earlier U. S. proposals for measures to counter the political danger implicit in the Communist takeover of Cuba from 1960 on. A general belief that a direct nuclear threat to the hemisphere could not again develop might be expected, therefore, to relax the bonds of the OAS defensive

alliance. This effect would be enhanced by the belief among the Latin American countries that the conclusion of such an agreement represented a relaxation in the East-West tensions and therefore would also reduce the already slim possibility of any other form of military attack against the American continent.

Relief from the fear of military aggression, would therefore tend to encourage the indigenous trends in Latin America toward a greater freedom of action in the world at large—trends deeply rooted in the micro- and macro-nationalism, and fervent demand for social change that have previously been noted.

An agreement to eliminate the threat of nuclear war would imply a fuller acceptance of the idea of political and economic competition between the West and the Communist world. Latin Americans have long maintained that the United States has overemphasized in its foreign policy the military aspects of the Cold War, and that, particularly in their area, the true defense of Western institutions should be sought in strengthening economic and social conditions as a means of preventing Communist political conquest. From about 1958 on, and especially after the Castro triumph in Cuba, the United States gave increased recognition to this oft-repeated Latin American view, and responded with the Alliance for Progress as its major initiative directed toward rallying popular and governmental support for the reinforcement of Pan American ties. That considerable success has been achieved in this purpose, despite the existence of widespread criticisms of the execution of the Alliance, was evidenced in the triumph of "peaceful revolution" over Communist and Castro-inspired opposition, in the popular elections held last year in Venezuela and Chile, as well as by the wide public acceptance of the ouster of the extremist-infiltrated Goulart government by a combination of military and civilian forces in Brazil. An even greater pressure for economic aid as an indispensable means of bolstering political support might, however, be one of the consequences of the elimination of the strictly military threat to the continent by the conclusion of a nuclear weapons ban. Such a development might well, therefore, place additional demands for economic aid on the United States as the price of maintaining the alliance in the face of the disruptive factors noted in section III.

As has been indicated above, there is a widespread tendency among the Latin American countries to view the Cold War as a struggle between two military blocs, each seeking world domination. The Latins profoundly dislike having to choose between these two powers and accept subordination to the policies of either. They consider their true interests as more intimately related to those of the other "poor" countries regardless of their social systems. The stimulus given to the idea of "coexistence" by the conclusion of a nuclear weapons agreement would to some degree increase the desires of the Latin American countries to stretch out in all directions in their search for ideological inspiration and material assistance in wrestling with their own problems of development. A confirmed peaceful "coexistence" would make the countries of the Communist bloc more respectable and would no doubt open the doors to wider contact between them and Latin America. The prospects of obtaining Latin American support for OAS action against the Castro regime in Cuba would become increasingly dim, barring the adoption by Cuba of a more aggressive policy of intervention in the affairs of other Latin countries. 9/

The effect of such developments on the relative strength of the United States and the Communist Bloc in Latin America involves some highly contradictory forces whose net evaluation is highly speculative. On the one hand, the release of the Latin American peoples from the fear of military attack, and the increased acceptance of the idea of competitive coexistence with the Communist world, may well open the door to more active political penetration by Communists enjoying a greater respectability in Latin eyes. It

9/ The idea of finding some peaceful solution whereby Cuba could be brought back into the OAS was, for example, advanced by the recently elected President of Chile, Eduardo Frei, and his supporters in the leftist but anti-communist Christian Democratic Party. Unsuccessful soundings in this connection were taken by the Chilean Delegation during the opening of the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1964.

is doubtful that Latin tolerance of Communist-inspired political subversion would extend to the conduct of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, against which a number of vested interests now exist within the Latin American countries themselves—notably in the armed forces and the non-Communist "revolutionary" political parties. However, the fomenting of popular dislike of the United States, drawing on large reservoirs of traditional anti-Yankee feeling, would be acceptable among wide circles in Latin America, including those who increasingly seek to detach themselves from an allegiance to either major power bloc. The OAS alliance would in such an event be placed under heavier political pressures which, though not necessarily creating positive support for the Soviet Union and its allies, could decrease the prestige and influence of the United States and obstruct the development of those forms of political and social organization that this country favors.

While the increasing acceptance of "coexistence" might thus expose the United States to intensified efforts at political warfare, the same forces could, however, be expected to limit the positive advantage the Communist countries might hope to obtain thereby. With the removal of the threat of Soviet nuclear attack, the military power of the United States in the Western Hemisphere would be increased relative to any other power. No longer would a potential Castro be able to look to an extra-continental power for military support against the United States. It can be hardly maintained that Castro's initial antagonism to the United States depended on a hope for Soviet support. However, there would appear to be a sound basis for believing that Castro's assertion of loyal membership in the Communist bloc was strongly influenced by his desire to seek the protective covering of Soviet missiles once his break with the United States had reached the point of no return. An agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate the threat of nuclear warfare, which has been invoked in Cuba's protection, would confirm the Soviet Union's withdrawal of this threat in October 1962. In fact, it has even been suggested that the conclusion of an agreement eliminating nuclear weapons might imply an understanding between the two Superpowers to leave each other free within their relative spheres of interest—that is, the United States in Latin America. 10/

On the other hand, it was not only the possibility of Soviet retaliation with rocket-borne nuclear devices that deterred the United States from any outright military invasion of Cuba to destroy the Castro regime. Political considerations affecting relations with the hemisphere as a whole—and, in fact, the entire underdeveloped world—were also a powerful force inhibiting direct U. S. military action. If, under the influence of an East-West détente featured by a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, the hemisphere alliance system becomes increasingly concerned with political factors rather than military action, the inhibitions on the exercise of unilateral power by the United States in the hemisphere will grow rather than decrease. If the elimination of nuclear weapons deprives the Communist powers of their most effective means of deterring the United States from military adventures in the hemisphere, so will the same factor increase those political inhibitions that serve to protect the sovereignty of the Latin American states from U. S. encroachment.

The foregoing discussion may be summarized in these terms. The conclusion of an agreement among the nuclear powers that would virtually eliminate the threat of nuclear destruction in the Western Hemisphere would have little direct effect on the OAS alliance system. Such effect as it might have would derive from the political implications read into such an agreement. They would tend to strengthen the already powerful trends in Latin America toward greater detachment from the Cold War, and thus contribute to the increasing emphasis on the political and economic factors in the alliance, which has been in evidence since 1958.

10/ See, for example, a statement by the Christian Democratic Youth of Chile, in Política y Espíritu, June-August 1964, expressing concern over the rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union because it "embraces the danger for Latin America that Russia will cease to be the counter-weight, even though a distant one, to the power of North America and that we shall be left more isolated than ever in the face of [Yankee] imperialism."

Whether these developments will weaken the hemisphere alliance will depend in large measure on how well both the Communist powers and the United States play their political cards when the nuclear trumps are removed from the deck. If the United States is able to pursue a politically sophisticated policy involving a tolerance of differences in social systems, and a restraint in the use of power, and can accompany this with a skillful application of the economic power and prestige at its command, it should be possible to keep the hemisphere alliance viable and strong. A return to a policy of disregard or neglect, or to the support of political forces opposing the drive for social change, such as characterized U. S. policy during most of the 1950's, would have consequences even more serious for the hemisphere system in the future than it did during the pre-Castro period.

Before leaving the subject of the elimination of nuclear weapons, mention might be made of another initiative in this general field: the adoption of an agreement for the denuclearization of the Latin American region itself. Proposals for such a plan were put forward in 1963 by a group of Latin American countries led by Brazil and Mexico, shortly after the crisis precipitated by the introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba. Receiving the blessing of the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 1911 (XVIII), the initiative has been carried forward with the establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the Denuclearization of Latin America, with headquarters in Mexico, which is now preparing a draft treaty. The project involves fundamentally an agreement among all independent countries of the Latin American region not to permit the existence in their territories of nuclear weapons or launching facilities. The proposals put forward in the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee also envisage the acceptance of such an agreement by powers outside of the region (still to be defined), which have responsibility for non-self-governing territories within it, as well as undertakings from the nuclear powers to respect the denuclearization plan.

The significance of an agreement resulting from this initiative would depend in large measure on the willingness of Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the United States (with particular reference to Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Canal Zone) to accept and respect it. This question would in turn depend on the willingness of the other nuclear powers, especially Communist China, to do likewise. The Latin American proposal, therefore, can be considered as a limited form of the agreement among the nuclear powers for the elimination of nuclear weapons that was postulated above. By removing the likelihood of another Cuban missile crisis, the agreement would contribute to a sense of disengagement from the Cold War, which is, no doubt, the principal objective of the proponents. The political effects on the alliance system, though less significant, would be similar to those discussed in the preceding pages.

Should either Cuba or the nuclear powers refuse to subscribe to the plan, it is difficult to perceive any effect that it might have on the Western Hemisphere alliance system, since it would merely ratify in legal form the present state of affairs. This is not to say that the successful negotiation of a denuclearization pact among the Latin American countries alone might not encourage similar movements in other regions where small powers desire to disengage themselves from the Cold War and avoid the disaster of nuclear conflict.

Drastic Reduction in United States Conventional Forces

The second assumption selected as a basis for analysis is that world disarmament, having accomplished the elimination of nuclear weapons, reaches the point where the United States drastically reduces its conventional strength. By "drastic" is meant a reduction in armed forces to the point of seriously crippling the capacity of the United States to bring effective military force to bear on situations of conflict in areas distant from its own territory. With specific reference to Latin America, this would mean that the United States would no longer be able to intervene, or threaten to intervene, effectively in any conflict of significant proportions in the Western Hemisphere.

For such a measure of disarmament to be accepted by the United States, it may be assumed that certain other conditions would first have been met. One of those would be

a similar reduction in the military strength of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and any other powers that might be capable of upsetting the political balance in various areas of the world. For the Latin American area, this would virtually exclude the danger of any outside military aggression against the American continent.

There would remain in the Western Hemisphere, however, the danger of two kinds of conflicts the outbreak of which might call for the application of military force in order to protect fundamental interests of the United States. The first kind consists of international conflicts between Latin American states, arising primarily from nationalistic rivalries or historic controversies such as border disputes. The likelihood of such conflicts taking place in the future is substantially decreasing with the gradual elimination of many of the chronic situations that have given rise to tensions between Latin American countries in the past, and the increasing acceptance of the OAS system of collective security and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The possibility of such eventualities cannot entirely be dismissed, however, so long as certain longstanding controversies such as the Peru-Ecuador boundary dispute remain and nationalism continues as a powerful force. The outbreak of any international military conflict in the area would do serious damage to the fabric of inter-American unity and thus obstruct progress toward the U. S. objective of political and economic stability in the hemisphere.

The second type of conflict—of even greater concern to the United States—consists of internal disorders ranging from insurgency to violent revolutionary upheavals and civil war in which communists and their sympathizers have a part. The slender margin by which a civil war was averted in Brazil at the time of the resignation of President Quadros in 1962, and the collapse of the reformist MNR government in Bolivia in October 1964, suggest that the possibility of conflicts of this character during the coming years cannot be entirely dismissed. An intensification of political warfare by the Communist powers in the context of coexistence would increase this danger. It is quite possible that internal violence, originating in political and ideological difference within a country, would in the future, as they have in the past, precipitate international conflicts between states supporting opposing political views. The potentially explosive situation in the Caribbean, involving the primitive tyranny of Duvalier in Haiti, the long-standing animosities between that country and the neighboring Dominican Republic, and Castro's efforts to export his revolutionary program, are obvious cases in point.

Recognizing that prompt and forceful action might be called for in previous situations of this sort the United States has in the past at least intimated that it would be prepared to bring its power into play should the need arise. On September 4, 1962, President Kennedy, having in mind the growing military preparations in Cuba, said:

> It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the western hemisphere.

Nine days later the President repeated this warning, which constituted a virtual guarantee of unilateral military action by the United States should it be necessary, and specified that "this country will do whatever must be done to protect its security and that of its allies."

Apart from the case of the Cuban missiles, which concerned a direct military threat on the United States by the Soviet Union, it is difficult to know whether the guarantee stated by President Kennedy had any desired effect on purely intra-Latin American situations. The most urgent crisis at that time was no doubt that in Venezuela, where the progressive, anti-Communist government of President Betancourt was being attacked by Cuban-supported terrorists and insurgents. The Venezuelan situation was resolved satisfactorily with the eventual triumph of the Betancourt party's candidate at the polls and without any further suggestion of possible intervention by the United States. Only one incident can be pointed to where the threat of United States military—in this case naval—force was successfully used to influence directly an internal political crisis during the

period since Castro's rise. In December 1961, during the transitional period following the assassination of the dictator Trujillo, the United States underscored its opposition to the return of the Trujillo family to the Dominican Republic by stationing naval vessels in international waters off Santo Domingo—an action taken to forestall the growth of pro-Castro sentiment in that country, which a return of the Trujillos would have stimulated. The maneuver was repeated a month later to help check a military coup.

Whatever may have been the political effect of the availability of United States military power during the period of Caribbean turmoil, it would be greatly reduced under the assumptions of disarmament stated in this section. If United States power were to be so severely diminished, the OAS alliance would have to find some alternative source of power in order to cope with its greatest danger, the problem of internal security.

National Forces in Latin America

The first alternative course that suggests itself as a means of filling the vacuum that would be created by the virtual interdiction of American military power is for the United States to turn increasingly to the national military forces within each Latin American country. This course would require the further development in those forces not only of an assured capability for dealing with threats to the public order, but also a favorable political orientation toward the United States and its policy objectives. It would argue for the further strengthening of ties between the United States and the military forces of the Latin American countries—a purpose that the continued technological superiority and leadership of the United States could continue to serve even though its disposable forces were drastically reduced. The direct linking of military forces of Latin America with the United States, within the framework of the inter-American political alignment of the Rio Treaty—an objective the United States has pursued ever since World War II—might be likened to an alliance within an alliance. The circumstances envisaged in this section could argue for increased and more sophisticated efforts in that regard.

Experience has also shown, however, that any attempt to tie the interests of the United States more firmly to the power of the armed forces in Latin America would encounter serious objections. So long as most of the military establishments of Latin America incline heavily toward the protection of traditional interests and institutions, including most particularly their own privileged position, a reliance on them for the maintenance of political stability would obstruct the achievement of the fundamental goal of U. S. policy, which is to encourage the modernization of archaic social structures within a context of political freedom.

Secondly, a policy of supporting national military forces within the Latin American countries would have an important bearing on the general objective of world disarmament. The forces and equipment that are needed in Latin America to deal with problems of internal security are not great. Yet the appetites of the Latin American military go far beyond what considerations of internal security alone would dictate. As has been pointed out, the "prestige" factor associated with heavy armaments occupies an important place in the self-image of the Latin American military, and even plays a part in arousing nationalistic tolerance, or even support, among the public for the uneconomic investment of scarce resources in military equipment. One of the most vexing questions confronting the United States in its bilateral military assistance programs in Latin America has been how to cooperate in the rational organization and equipment of the Latin forces for missions that appeared to be desirable in the interests of the hemisphere security, and yet not become involved in the necessity of acceding to requests for "prestige" items and other types of equipment that do not relate to those missions. If the armed forces of Latin America are to be accorded a more significant role in protecting the hemisphere from indirect aggression or insurgency and in coping with inter-Latin American conflicts, it is likely to become even more difficult to restrain the appetites of the militarists.

The increased incentive to armament would thus add weight to both the political and economic objections to a policy of relying on the national military establishments in

Latin America. It would seem, therefore, that any such policy should, for strong political reasons, be accompanied by the institution of an arms limitation program for the Latin American countries themselves. The objective of such a program would be to limit armaments to levels and types needed for the maintenance of internal security, and would require strict controls over both domestic manufacture and international trade in arms.

The question of Latin American disarmament will be discussed later. Before leaving the present subject, however, it should also be pointed out that while the Latin American military forces might well be physically capable of maintaining internal security within their respective countries for extended periods, they would hardly be acceptable in the light of Latin American nationalism, as a means of controlling or suppressing international conflicts between Latin American states so long as they retained their separate national identity. This first alternative course in the search for sources of military power that might replace that of the United States in the Western Hemisphere would, therefore, at best, fall short of meeting the problem posed by anticipated conflicts.

Collective Security Forces

The second alternative that might be pursued in replacing United States military power as a means of controlling conflicts in the Latin American area would be to rely on some form of international regional force. Within the OAS alliance system, this might range from the use of national forces under a collective political sanction to the establishment of a truly international peace-keeping force under the OAS. The difficulties in setting up such a force will be discussed in the next section, where the potential role of the regional organization in helping to meet certain basic problems of a disarming world will be examined.

V. The OAS and Problems of a Disarming World

If progress toward world disarmament implies the necessity for creating international agencies and authorities to perform functions for which national armed forces are now maintained, it is logical to assume that in the Latin American region a major role should be assigned to the OAS. It is intended in this section to discuss the possibility of using the OAS to deal with three major problems associated with the purpose of disarmament: the prevention of international conflicts; the establishment of a collective peacekeeping force; and the development of an effective disarmament program for the Latin American countries. Before proceeding with a discussion of these specific problems, a few words are in order concerning the basic political dilemma facing the OAS as it seeks to meet the challenge of the contemporary world.

The concepts, doctrines, and policies that were embodied in the two basic treaties of the OAS when they were drafted in 1947 and 1948, belonged essentially to the past. To be sure, the broad purposes of peace and progress stated in the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty are universal and not limited in time. But the international community envisaged in these documents was not one keyed to the circumstances that have developed in the world, including the American continent, during the last 15 years. The main functions the Inter-American System had performed up to that time were essentially defensive: defense against aggression from outside the hemisphere; defense of the weaker Latin American states against intervention by the United States; defense of national sovereignty and territory against aggression from a neighbor. The cornerstone of the edifice erected to perform these functions was the principle of nonintervention. All other considerations were subordinate to this principle under the protective covering of which a highly nationalistic concept of untouchable sovereignty flourished.

The Inter-American System, as embodied in the OAS, found itself ill-equipped to deal with the new and complex problems of the postwar period. The Cold War, with its worldwide political conflict, the revolutionary pressures for rapid economic and social

progress, and the demand for political systems more responsive to the popular will, imposed new burdens on the regional system and generated deep conflicts with the patterns of the established international order. The need for an increasingly international approach to the solution of new problems conflicted with the fierce nationalism that the old order had consecrated. The growing and ineluctible international concern with internal situations in individual countries clashed head-on with the sacred doctrine of nonintervention. Driven by demands for greater economic and social welfare toward more intimate patterns of international collaboration, the members of the OAS have been at the same time held back by an unwillingness to surrender their cherished sovereignty or to tolerate threats to the nonintervention principle.

While some progress in overcoming this dilemma seems to have been made in the field of economic cooperation under the banner of the Alliance for Progress, frustration and impotence have been the more common experience in other areas. This pattern is clearly manifest in regard to the problems associated with a disarming world, which will be considered herein. As a general rule, it may be said that the OAS will be severely hampered in coping effectively with these basic problems so long as the nonintervention principle in the extreme form it has assumed in the Inter-American System retains its hold on Latin American attitudes toward international relations.

The Prevention of International Conflicts

An obvious and significant role for the OAS in a disarmed or disarming world lies in the prevention of conflicts between states of the region. The record of the regional system in this respect has on the whole been effective and laudable, and gives grounds for an optimistic view of its continued usefulness.

Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro in 1948, some sixteen cases involving disputes between Latin American states have been considered and acted on by the OAS under the Treaty, and an approximately equal number of cases have been brought before the Inter-American Peace Committee. 11/ The nature of these disputes has varied all the way from minor but emotionally inflated diplomatic irritations to armed conflicts. Practically all of them concerned the smaller and politically less developed states of the Caribbean and revolved around the traditional issue of border controversies, the revolutionary activities of political refugees, personal enmities, and racial tensions. Many of these explosive situations have been chronic over a period of many years. The action of the OAS has generally served to calm passions, prevent open armed conflict, and, where it did break out, to terminate it promptly. The peaceful settlement of immediate causes and of underlying issues has normally been the objective sought.

The favorable record established by the regional peace machinery has profited by, and in turn strengthened, the tradition of peaceful settlement of international disputes in Latin America. This, plus the fact that many of the causes of these traditional disputes are being gradually eliminated, lends credibility to the belief that the OAS should be able to continue to serve a valuable function in preventing conflicts and thereby contributing to an international atmosphere more conducive to disarmament.

The capacity of the OAS to fulfill this role would be enhanced by certain improvements in the present structure and procedures of the collective security and peaceful settlement systems to enable it to assume a more positive initiative, to act with greater flexibility, and to replace frequent improvisation with a more ordered approach. Some proposals to this end are in fact now under discussion. 12/ The major obstacle to the adoption of

11/ For an account and analysis of these cases, see the report The Future Character and Role of Peace Observation Arrangements under the United Nations, "Cases under Inter-American Organizations and Procedures" (Study Project ACDA/IR-34, 1964).

12/ A special Inter-American Conference scheduled by the OAS for the spring of 1965 will take up a number of such proposals.

measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the OAS in this, as in other respects, is the reluctance of the member governments to increase the authority of an international agency that might some time intervene in their affairs. It has already been pointed out that an optimism about the future capability of the OAS does not extend to the problem of indirect aggression and insurgency from communist sources in regard to which the powerful nonintervention sentiment has thus far erected a seemingly insuperable barrier.

It must also be borne in mind that the efforts of the Inter-American community to establish an effective system of pacific solution of controversies met with practically no success until the Rio Treaty provided the OAS with the ability to back up its demands for peaceful solutions with the threat of collective sanctions. These in turn depended to a large extent on the support of the United States. OAS decisions have been reinforced by real or potential military support from the United States, by its political influence, or by the exercise of its economic power. Economic pressure has, in fact, been a principal weapon used in the two cases (Dominican Republic in 1960 and Cuba in 1964) when sanctions were voted by the regional organ of consultation against a Latin American aggressor. Even in a disarming or disarmed world, the economic power of the United States will continue to be available. However, as has been indicated earlier, the OAS must in the long run face the problem of how to replace United States military power in the enforcement of peace if the OAS capacity to prevent conflicts is to be maintained in the advanced stages of disarmament.

Establishment of a Collective Peacekeeping Force

The reluctance of the Latin American governments to create any formal military agency for the regional alliance was reflected in the rejection in 1948 of proposals that would have provided for a permanent military council in the charter of the organization. The Inter-American Defense Board, created by a resolution of the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1942, is authorized to act only as an advisory agency in the formulation of plans for hemisphere defense against outside aggression, and is therefore not empowered to take cognizance of any conflicts between or within American States. The few suggestions for the creation of some kind of inter-American military force made in recent years have been little considered.

In 1955, in connection with the conclusion of the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan conflict, the representative of Ecuador in the Council of the OAS urged that the American Governments consider calling a Meeting of Foreign Ministers to deal with, among other subjects, the possibility and desirability of establishing an Inter-American Police Force to protect the member states from aggression. 13/ Receiving little support from other quarters, the proposal was merged into a larger topic covering the strengthening of the collective security system and the limitation of armaments that was to be included on the agenda of the Eleventh Inter-American Conference. The Eleventh Conference has, of course, never been held, and no serious attention has since been given to the Ecuadoran proposition. Interest in the subject has also been expressed by the U. S. Congress. The Foreign Assistance Act beginning with 1961 has included a statement of "the sense of the Congress that an important contribution toward peace would be made by the establishment under the Organization of American States of an international military force." 14/ A lack of enthusiasm among the Latin American countries for the idea has been at least one important factor in the failure of this suggestion to bear fruit. Strong nationalism, a fear that the United States would dominate such a force and subordinate it to North American interests, plus a deep-seated repugnance to the idea of permitting foreign troops of any sort and under any conditions to share in the national defense, contribute to the obvious coolness of the Latin American governments toward any plan for a multilateral peacekeeping force in the OAS. This lack of interest is found even when the subject is connected with the more popular idea of arms limitation or disarmament as it was in the Ecuadoran initiative referred to above.

13/ Pan American Union, Applications of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 1948-1956 (Washington, D.C.: 1957), p. 190.

14/ See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pt. II, Chap. 1, Sec. 502.

Only once has anything resembling a collective military force been organized. 15/ That was the naval quarantine of Cuba in October 1962—an operation carried out almost exclusively by United States forces with some token participation from Latin American governments. This incident highlights the fact that military action has in fact been considered by the OAS only in connection with extra-continental military threats. A resort to force has never been contemplated in relation to a conflict between Latin American countries, and much less with reference to situations of internal security.

The Cuban case, furthermore, underscores the highly important fact that it is the military strength of the United States that gives strength to the OAS security system. If this strength is depleted, as would be the case under the second disarmament assumption stated in the previous section, the Inter-American collective security system would be deprived of the major actual and potential force on which confidence in its viability ultimately rests.

Nor does the prospect for using Latin American national forces under a collective banner appear favorable in present circumstances. The strong opposition of the Latin American civilian authorities to the adoption of military measures by the OAS in intra-continental conflicts rules out the use of their own armed forces as much as it does those of the United States. Civilian political leaders, pressed by the public clamor for economic and social reform and political liberty, are far more apt to call for disarmament than to favor the establishment of an international force. They would maintain, with considerable justification, that the very goal of a peaceful continental community requires the disarmament of the Latin American military establishments as a step toward relaxing nationalistic tensions among the countries of the hemisphere.

As a case in point, the OAS has not yet found the means of coping effectively with the problem of Cuban-supported insurgency in other Latin American countries. In July 1964, the Ninth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS convoked under the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro to consider the substantial evidence of Cuban support of guerrilla activities against the Government of Venezuela, was unable to do more than vote for a suspension of diplomatic and consular relations, trade, and transportation with the Castro regime—steps that most of the Latin American governments had already taken. Efforts by the United States and a few other countries to secure approval of some form of effective multilateral surveillance and control over the export of arms, personnel, and funds from Cuba met with no success.

Perhaps the hope of working out some plan for an inter-American peacekeeping force should not be completely abandoned. One of the few Latin American political writers to discuss the subject objectively and analytically has suggested that the problem of reforming the military institutions of Latin America in line with modern realities, should, like the basic political, economic, and social problems of the area, be approached increasingly on a continental basis, and with the collaboration of the more modern-minded military themselves. 16/ If a plan could be devised that would remove the more obvious objections mentioned above, by minimizing U. S. participation and consequent domination of a multilateral force, and concentrating at least in the first stage on the tasks of a truly international character such as the patrol of international waters and air space to prevent aid from being carried to insurgent forces, some beginning to the establishment of an inter-American peacekeeping force might be made.

15/ In the Dominican crisis which erupted at the end of April 1965, after this study was completed, an emergency Inter-American Force was established by the OAS consisting largely of the United States troops which had already occupied parts of Santo Domingo and contingents from Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. The long range implications of this emergency measure for the OAS are as yet unclear.

16/ Victor Alba, El Militarismo (Mexico: 1959), pp. 152-64.

The need for such a force at this time arises primarily with reference to Castro-supported insurgency in the Caribbean—an area in which the larger South American states have little direct interest in assuming responsibilities. Moreover, any plan for an inter-American force would, in order to gain public support, have to be conceived in the context of a broader policy for dealing with the problem of militarism in the Latin American countries and be related to the provisions of military training and equipment by the United States, the encouragement of productive nonmilitary roles for the armed forces (such as the present "civic action" program), and ultimately to disarmament itself. The enormous obstacles to be overcome render progress on this broad front highly unlikely. The conclusion seems inescapable that little can be expected of the OAS in this regard during the immediate future. It is possible that if any international peacekeeping functions are to be performed for the region in a disarmed world of the future, a United Nations force might constitute a more feasible instrument in that it could exclude the United States and other countries politically involved in the area.

Disarmament in Latin America

The problem of disarmament in Latin America is only partly concerned with the maintenance of internal and international security. The far larger and more difficult phase of the problem has to do with the entrenched position of the military as a privileged group and their powerful political influence in most of the Latin American countries. It is not within the scope of this essay to analyze the complex political, economic, social, and psychological factors that contribute to the phenomenon of militarism in Latin America and stand in the way of its control by civilian forces. Suffice it to say that these factors concern the whole spectrum of Latin American political, economic, and social development—a process in which the OAS plays a limited role. The more specific topic to be dealt with here is to what extent the OAS might be found a useful vehicle for promoting and carrying out a regional disarmament program if the present resistance of the military to such action were overcome.

It is axiomatic that no disarmament program for the Latin American or any other area can be envisaged without the establishment of some form of international security. Since the ratification of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro in 1948, two major proposals for general disarmament in Latin America have been advanced. In 1958, Costa Rica proposed a program in the OAS that envisaged the reduction of all Latin American armed forces to the status of a national guard needed for internal security. Less ambitious proposals were advanced separately by Chile and Peru in 1960. All of these plans rested on the explicit or implicit assumption that in the Rio Treaty the American states had established a system of international security the reliability and effectiveness of which was guaranteed by the military might of the United States. In view of the already demonstrated reluctance of the Latin American countries to establish any collective military force to guarantee the security system of the Rio Treaty, it is clear that the progress of disarmament within the context of the OAS would depend on the continued ability of the United States to enforce the peace in the hemisphere. Only a guarantee of this nature would enable the larger Latin American countries to consider reducing their armaments. Yet the overt acknowledgement of such a guarantee would no doubt provoke strong political objections from Latin American nationalists, as was evidenced in the debates on the Costa Rican proposal.

It has been the traditional preference of the Latin American countries to handle their regional political and security problems through regional arrangements. However, other factors would tend to limit the capability of the OAS to deal effectively with disarmament as a regional matter apart from world-wide programs under the United Nations auspices.

Some of the larger Latin American countries aspire to a role in international affairs that is by no means limited to the Western Hemisphere. Brazil and Mexico, for example, have played an increasingly active part in the United Nations, participating in United Nations disarmament discussions, both in the General Assembly and at the Geneva Conference. They view this subject as world-wide in its dimensions. Brazil has contributed

troops to UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and Africa. It is doubtful that these and perhaps other major Latin American countries would view with favor a strictly regional program that would limit their sovereign right to possess and acquire arms and thus place them in an inferior position vis-à-vis other countries of the world having comparable interests, influence, and responsibility for world affairs.

The initiative in early 1963, of the Presidents of Brazil and Mexico (in which they were joined by the chiefs of state of Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador), declaring their willingness to enter into a Latin American de-nuclearization agreement might appear to contradict this view. The de-nuclearization proposal, however, must be seen in the light of the role of Brazil and Mexico as members of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and their desire to use Latin America as the first step in a program that would be extended to other regions of the world. 17/ Moreover, a Latin American agreement on nuclear weapons would only involve giving up arms that the participating countries neither had, nor were [illegible]y to acquire—which would, of course, not be the case with regard to an agreement for the limitation or reduction of conventional armaments.

Practical considerations also underscore the limitations inherent in a regional approac[illegible]o disarmament. The problem of geographical coverage was one of the major reasons for the failure of the Latin American initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-free area. Was it to include the dependent territories in the area, the new states of Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago, which are not yet members of the OAS, and the Panama Canal Zone? Cuba's present affiliation with the Soviet Bloc and exclusion from the OAS impose severe obstacles to the conclusion of a regional disarmament agreement embracing all the Latin American States. A regional disarmament agreement for Latin America, involving control of arms traffic, would benefit from the collaboration of the arms producing countries outside the region from which the Latin American states acquire military equipment.

Finally, there is the problem of inspection and enforcement. The establishment of an inter-American agency capable of carrying out the highly complex and delicate task of verifying and enforcing any disarmament agreement would impose a burden on the OAS far in excess of anything it has yet considered attempting. The authority such an agency must have would conflict head-on with the strong Latin American resistance to allowing an inter-American agency to meddle in their internal affairs. If the Latin American countries progress substantially in their willingness to merge their national sovereignties in an international regime, the difficulties mentioned above might be ultimately overcome. For the present, however, the technical, administrative, and political problems associated with the establishment of a regional disarmament agency would constitute virtually insuperable barriers for the OAS.

In conclusion, little possibility is seen that the OAS could in the foreseeable future be used effectively for the establishment and supervision of a regional disarmament program in Latin America. The main direct contribution that the regional body might make to such a development would consist of the strengthening and perfecting its collective security system and encouraging a more consistent application of the already widely accepted principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes. In making this judgment, however, one must not overlook the important and indirectly related function of the OAS as an instrument for the promotion of political, economic, and social modernization in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress. In the long run, it may be hoped that the achievement of the purposes of this undertaking will permit the development of greater internal stability and of civilian political control, which are also prerequisites for any successful effort to limit armaments and reduce the military establishments in the area.

17/ See preamble of the Declaration of the five Presidents in UN Document A/5415/Rev. 1, 14 November 1963.

Part III

Comparison Among the Different Areas and Conclusions Concerning Both Their Common Features and Their Differences in Respect to the Subject of the Report

by

Arnold Wolfers

COMPARISON AMONG THE DIFFERENT AREAS AND CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING BOTH THEIR COMMON FEATURES AND THEIR DIFFERENCES IN RESPECT TO THE SUBJECT OF THE REPORT.

Arnold Wolfers

The discussion in Part I rests on the assumption that certain features are common to alliance policies irrespective of areas and their diversity. Part II, which deals with each area separately, confirms this assumption. All three major sets of determinants of alliance policy discussed theoretically in Part I as the links connecting disarmament and the role of alliances are found to be relevant both for the alliance policy within each area and for the impact of disarmament on the alignments. Thus, the prevalence of conflict everywhere in this period of history has made countries sufficiently insecure to stimulate their resort to military alliances, even in Africa where reluctance toward at least some alliances expresses itself in an ideological commitment to nonalignment. Everywhere also, the distribution of power and its changes proves to be so relevant for the alignments that any changes in this distribution whether or not induced by disarmament measures has far-reaching consequences for the spread, form, and function of existing alliances. This is true both in areas like the Far East or Latin America where the overwhelming superiority of one ally over the others—in both instances the superiority of the United States—gives the leading power a decisive protective role, and in those areas like the Near and Middle East and Africa where the relatively even distribution of power among the countries of the area makes them peculiarly sensitive to moves, including disarmament agreements, that might effect their relative power vis-à-vis one another. The prohibition of arms shipments to such areas or an arms freeze applicable to them are mentioned specifically in this connection because they offer illustrations of disarmament agreements that affect the power of countries in the area differently, tending to favor those that happen to be ahead of the others in the arms race. The third major set of determinants discussed under the heading of alliance mindedness comes up in the discussion of every area though the degree of sensitivity to moves in the disarmament field that bear on mutual confidence among allies or on allied solidarity varies from place to place and from time to time. It is particularly conspicuous in the NATO area where protection by the major ally takes the form of a "nuclear umbrella" and requires, therefore, in order to be convincing to the allies, that they have faith in the credibility and reliability of a potentially highly self-destructive threat of nuclear intervention by the United States.

Before taking up the differences among the areas or among groups of countries within areas that share common traits, one aspect of the relationship between disarmament measures and existing alliance patterns should be stressed that dominates, as might be expected, the analysis of all of the areas: it is the predominantly negative effect of disarmament measures—and in many cases of mere disarmament discussions and negotiations—on the stability and intensity of alliances. The impact of disarmament on nonmilitary alignments is found throughout to be of an indeterminate character and marginal at most. Because alliances take shape as a response to external threats and serve to supplement national armaments, it stands to reason that disarmament measures, the primary purpose of which is to reduce conflict and the reliance on military force, will if effective tend to diminish the need for alliances no matter what the character of any particular area is. However, the erosive effect is strongest where as in Europe and the Far East, a single and acute conflict provides the incentive to the existing alliances whether with the United States or with the leading Communist powers. In both of these areas, the mere impression of a détente between the major adversaries tends to place a great strain on allied solidarity and to weaken the alliances even before any change in the conflict situation warrants their demise.

The fact that in the other areas overlapping and often contradictory conflicts exert a simultaneous impact on alignment policy complicates an assessment of the probable effects of disarmament measures and requires that the different types of measures be considered separately. Thus, in Latin America the partners of the United States in the OAS are motivated both by fear of external Communist aggression and by concern over United States dominance. Here, then, disarmament measures that would lead to a retrenchment by the United States would relieve the concern about such dominance and thereby would enhance the willingness to cooperate with the United States. This same retrenchment would undermine confidence in U.S. protection and therefore stimulate a reorientation in the alliance policy of countries that can find a substitute for the U.S. shield.

The likelihood that a disarming process will exert an eroding effect on many alliances poses a dilemma for the United States, which has come to place so much reliance on military alliances with other countries but is eager at the same time to promote disarmament wherever and whenever the circumstances permit. The point is that disarmament policy may have a positive rather than a negative effect on alliances with some countries. Some alliance partners of the United States that are in particularly acute need of protection, such as West Germany or Nationalist China, tend to be alienated by vigorous U.S. disarmament initiatives, or by efforts aimed at détente. In general, however, there are many other countries in the non-Communist world, allied or unaligned, whose willingness to be partners of the United States is enhanced by U.S. moves in favor of disarmament. They welcome them because such moves or initiatives lessen their fear of excessive militancy on the part of the United States. The report mentions how these contradictory attitudes of two groups of countries in whose support and alignment the United States is simultaneously interested may on occasion leave no other way open but to opt for the group that promises to make greater contributions to U.S. security.

As one turns from the more general features of the problem to specific types of disarmament measures and their effect on alignments in various areas, dissimilarities come to the foreground. But while each area is different from all others, some can be grouped together as bearing important common features and standing out against other groups. Thus it makes sense to compare the areas in which highly industrialized and militarized countries prevail with those to the south in which most of the nations have barely enough military strength for purposes of internal security. Reduction in force levels and weaponry will affect the latter only indirectly and, provided they are not allied with industrialized countries, tend to profit them by leveling down the superiority of the militarily advanced nations.

Two other categories of countries can be compared that differ with respect to their interest in nuclear weapons: Latin American and Far Eastern countries, even if dependent for their security on protection by a major power outside the area, do not place their reliance on a "nuclear umbrella". And the Eastern European allies of the Soviet Union must certainly look as much to conventional as to nuclear protection. Therefore, the countries falling into this category are less sensitive to changes in the nuclear balance than are, for instance, most nations of Western Europe. They consider the East-West strategic nuclear stalemate their chief safeguard, and react strongly to any unfavorable change in the balance of nuclear armaments or in the deployment of nuclear weapons. In connection with Africa, particular mention is made in Part II that nuclear disarmament is a favorite propagandistic objective of African countries, which indicates that fear of nuclear war prevails here over any specific interests they might have in the nuclear power of either potential protectors or potential adversaries. While the Latin American area lies no less on the outer rim of the realm of nuclear armaments than Africa—a situation that may not be permanent in either instance—attention is drawn in the essay on Latin America to the fact that the Cuban crisis has raised some fear of Soviet nuclear intervention and that as a result interest in nuclear disarmament measures has been intensified.

Certain other features are common to some areas but are lacking in others: In some areas states actively seek reliable allies and are thus highly sensitive to any eroding influences on alliances. In others alliance-mindedness is at a low level either because the

countries in the area are not much concerned about external threats or because they lack the abilities that are required to make a nation alliance worthy to others. There is little that deserves the name of a military alliance among the nations of the Near and Middle East. In Latin America where the OAS does represent a comprehensive alignment with some of the traits of an alliance, military interests are overshadowed by the dominant concerns for economic aid from the United States and for regional nonmilitary cooperation through which to place restraints on U.S. intervention and pressure.

There are similarities as well as differences in the way disarmament measures may affect the alliances of the Soviet Union and Red China on the one hand, the U.S. alliances both in Europe and the Far East on the other. On the two sides of the Iron Curtain, there are signs of ambiguity in the attitude of the lesser allies. While they have an obvious common interest with the leading powers within their group that the balance of military power with respect to the adversary not be adversely affected by any disarmament agreement, they have a strong desire at the same time to improve their position or autonomy vis-à-vis the leader of their group.

In conformity with the treatment of the subject in Part II, similarities and dissimilarities among areas have been stressed. It should be noted, however, that some of the most striking similarities and dissimilarities exist among individual countries belonging to different areas. There is hardly an area today, for instance, in which one or the other country may not qualify as a potential candidate to the nuclear club. These countries, wherever located, are affected adversely in their alliance-mindedness if other members of their alliance favor anti-proliferation agreements. At the same time, a majority of the countries in every area can be assumed to be afraid of nuclear proliferation and will therefore be attracted to those nuclear nations that initiate and promote anti-proliferation measures. It may be impossible to find a type of reaction for or against any specific disarmament measure that could be called typical of a particular area. Instead countries belonging to each of the areas are likely to group themselves according to their particular national interests and the way in which they believe those interests would be affected. This accounts for the difficulty of uniting the members of an alliance system or the peoples of an area behind any disarmament proposal. To give an illustration, a ban on arms shipments to the Near East or to Africa may join together countries inside and outside the area that either favor the prohibition or oppose it. Nations possessing an advantage in the arms race tend naturally to be favorably inclined toward measures freezing the military status quo.

Speaking in terms of specific disarmament measures it is necessary to emphasize the reasons that narrow the range of meaningful comparisons and preclude any but general and tentative ones.

The first reason is that propositions concerning future contingencies to which all new disarmament measures and accords belong are highly speculative even when a single area is being considered. With changes occurring continuously in the political environment and in the outlook of governments disarmament measures that look attractive today may be unacceptable tomorrow. A good case in point is the Indian outlook on nuclear anti-proliferation. Only a short time ago, it might have seemed predictable that India would take a leading part in advocating anti-proliferation; but the appearance of the Chinese nuclear capacity is forcing the Indian government to take a new look. And even if it decided not to try to match the Chinese capacity, India's new interest in being protected against Chinese nuclear attack may induce that country to accept outside guarantees that in fact, even if not in legal terms, would constitute a break with its policy of nonalignment. Here would be a case in which an event in the arms and arms control field could trigger a significant change in the alignment pattern.

A similarly unpredictable but conceivable change might occur in Central Europe and with similar consequences for both arms control and interstate alignments. West Germany is strongly opposed to the plans that have been put forth in many quarters for some form of nuclear freeze or disengagement limited to Central Europe. In fact, any support of such plans by its Western allies might put dangerous strains on its ties with these

allies whether because West Germany sees in them a new discrimination against Germany or because it interprets them as an attempt to freeze the political status quo and thereby the division of Germany. Under such strains, Germany might be driven to re-evaluate the nature and substance of its alliance structure.

A second reason comparisons between areas are so difficult and speculative in the field under discussion arises from the fact that all disarmament accords among countries of certain areas appear utopian unless one assumes radical changes in the political structure of the particular area. Thus in the Near East, the refusal of Israel's Arab neighbors to accept its existence as a state precludes as long as it lasts any idea of disarmament agreements requiring an accord among all the countries in the area. Similarly, in the Far East, it seems futile even to speculate about the effects of arms agreements as long as the area is split into hostile camps. In fact, the Far Eastern situation places obstacles greater even than the Near Eastern situation in the way of any major arms agreements bearing directly or indirectly on the area. In the case of the Near East, it is at least conceivable that, active together, the two Superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, which since the signing of the test ban agreement can be considered capable of arms agreements between each other, might induce conflicting parties in the area to agree to measures with which to check a spiraling local arms race. They might, if joined by Great Britain and France, place serious obstacles in the way of arms shipments to the area even if the countries of the area refused their consent. It is hard to imagine similar Soviet-Western accord with respect to Red China, both because of the size of the territory involved and because Red China is not likely to yield to pressures even though they emanated from the two Superpowers. In any case, if a Soviet-U.S. agreement on Red China should ever become practical, it would be indicative of a reversal of alliances on a world scale in which the existing opposing alliance systems of the United States and the Soviet Union would have been superseded by a Soviet-American alignment.

Among the major types of disarmament measures and accords, none holds a place in the public interest comparable to that pertaining to nuclear weapons, whether the accords look toward the control of such weapons, or to their reduction or eventually to their prohibition. After all, efforts to promote disarmament in the present time gain most of their momentum from the fear of nuclear war and of other wars that might escalate to the nuclear level. Yet if the concern about nuclear confrontation is a universal phenomenon, there are marked differences from area to area and among nations within areas when it comes to the attitudes and reactions of responsible governments vis-à-vis specific nuclear disarmament proposals. Thus, when it comes to agreeing to general nuclear arms reductions, one may expect more reluctance among the members of NATO than one would find in Africa where the countries of the area with the possible exception of Egypt and South Africa have little desire or chance of becoming nuclear powers themselves. Moreover, they cannot rest their security on the U.S. nuclear deterrent because it has too little credibility when their interests are at stake.

Generalizations about the NATO area in matters of nuclear disarmament are difficult because of the ambivalent situation of most overseas NATO countries regarding nuclear weapons. While these weapons constitute the greatest danger to them when in the hands of their adversaries, they rely at the same time for their protection on the ability of their major ally to assure a nuclear stalemate. As a result, any nuclear disarmament proposal or accord places a strain on U.S. ties with other members of the alliance whenever in their estimate it threatens to tip the balance in the direction of the adversary or to weaken the deterrent.

Nuclear disarmament measures serving the purpose of non-proliferation, including non-dissemination and non-acquisition agreements, tend to facilitate the alignment of existing nuclear powers with all countries that have no nuclear aspirations. Even nonaligned countries that seek to remain aloof from the "military blocs" of the Cold War might agree to align themselves with nuclear powers if this proved the best way of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to nations in their area. At the same time, however, non-proliferation proposals or accords are peculiarly disruptive of alliances with countries determined to develop their own nuclear capacities. The reactions of Red China and

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isolation. While the highly militarized countries would be relieved from the burden of great military expenditures, and although a successful disarmament process would both constitute a reflection of greater security and provide a basis for it, whether and in what way reduced arms costs and enhanced security would reflect themselves in the nonmilitary relations and alignments among states will depend on many conditions. Experience shows that economic cooperation in Western and in Eastern Europe has developed even in an armed and insecure environment. And areas such as Latin America, where armaments have remained at a relatively low level, are beset by great difficulties when attempting to build up regional alignments directed at economic collaboration.

Part IV

Biographical Note on the Authors of the Essays

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