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
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**The KMAG Advisor (U)**  
**Role and Problems**  
**of the Military Advisor**  
**in Developing an Indigenous Army**  
**for Combat Operations in Korea**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

22 April 1957

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SUBJECT: Technical Memorandum ORO-T-355, "The KMAG Advisor" (U)

TO:

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1. A copy of subject Technical Memorandum is attached  
for your information.

2. The assumptions, facts and discussion contained in this study are considered valid and appear to support the conclusions and recommendations. However, the Department of the Army recognizes that other priority requirements and conditions impose limitations that make impracticable complete implementation of all recommendations.

3. This study should be of particular value to offices establishing criteria for assignment of personnel to Military Assistance Advisory Groups.

FOR THE CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:

1 Incl  
TM ORO-T-355

  
ROLAND P. CARLSON  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Operations Research  
Division

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## **WORKING PAPER**

This is a working paper of a member of the technical staff of the Tactics Division concerned with ORO Study 11.10.

It is the objective of the study to explore the experience in Korea in utilizing local nationals as military troops, particularly in the later period of the Korean conflict. Three memorandums make up the study: "Problems in the Development of a Local National Army," ORO-T-336; this paper, "The KMAG Advisor," ORO-T-355; and, "Integration of Korean Soldiers into US Army Units (KATUSA), ORO-T-362, in preparation. The study is related to ORO Study 11.11. The findings and analysis of this paper are subject to revision as may be required by new facts or by modification of basic assumptions. Comments and criticism of the contents are invited. Remarks should be addressed to:

The Director  
Operations Research Office  
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7100 Connecticut Avenue  
Chevy Chase 15, Maryland

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~~XXX~~ DIVISION  
~~RESEARCH~~ GROUP  
Technical ~~Document~~ ORO-T-355  
~~February~~ February 1957

**The KMAG Advisor (U)**  
**Role and Problems**  
**of the Military Advisor**  
**in Developing an Indigenous Army**  
**for Combat Operations in Korea**

by

Alfred H. Hausroth



**OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE**  
The Johns Hopkins University Chevy Chase, Maryland

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### **FOREWORD**

This is a study of the job and problems of US officers (in all commissioned grades to major general) assigned as KMAG advisors under combat conditions, particularly during the last year of the Korean War. Its significance arises from the fact that military advisory duty has become an important and wide-spread responsibility of the US Army. Through advisory assignments the influence of individual officers may have a far-reaching effect on the US security program and the peace of the world.

It has been suggested that this document may serve three specific uses. It may: (a) furnish Department of the Army officials with insight into problems experienced by personnel in advising local national military forces under combat conditions such as existed in Korea; (b) furnish officials of Army schools, and officers preparing for assignment to such duty, with information on the nature of the task, the type of problems that may arise, and means of meeting these problems as experienced by KMAG advisors; and (c) furnish officials of military missions and military assistance advisory groups with information about advisory duty that may be useful to them in planning and conducting their own operations.

An attempt is made to throw light on the background and conditions under which advisors worked in order to relate their reactions to their respective situations. Wide diversity of individual experiences and strongly held beliefs—often in conflict one with another—contributed to the GS, Department of the Army, request for the study, and to the problem of the research team in attempting to find consensus and clues to differences.

Study was done in two phases. The first phase consisted of exploratory interviews and data collection in Korea during the last year of the Korean War. This work was done by a team of analysts composed of the author and a group of staff members of International Research Associates, Inc. The latter group, under contractual arrangements, was headed by Dr. Richard C. Sheldon, and included Elmo C. Wilson, Dr. John P. Kishler, John W. Orton, and Charles Sobel, all of whom participated in the field. Mr. Sobel also supervised the machine tabulation and statistical analysis in Tokyo and the US. A preliminary manuscript was written by Dr. Sheldon, based on the early interviews and a questionnaire. Some data were also collected by a field team of Far East specialists from Michigan State University, headed by Dr. Wesley R. Fishel, with Allan A. Spitz assisting. Some material reported by them in a preliminary manuscript ("Language Problems of the US Army in Korea," unpublished ms, Aug 54, CONFIDENTIAL) has been used. The author worked with both teams

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and also collected additional data independently in the US and the Far East. These activities completed the first phase.

The second phase covered further data collection and analysis, including extensive evaluation and critical review of the field data reported in the preliminary report, extensive interviews with former KMAG officers since returned to the US, supplementary data collection from other sources, and the preparation of this memorandum, which attempts to integrate the additional data with that included in the first phase. The second phase was the exclusive responsibility of the author.

The author wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the unstinting cooperation and aid he received during the course of this study from all Army personnel with whom he had occasion to work. Special thanks are due officers: in the Department of the Army; of the ACoS for G3, G4, G1, and G2, CONARC; in the Far East and Pacific Branch of G3, Department of the Army; in G3, AFPE, and the Eighth Army; and throughout KMAG, including the Chief, his staff, and KMAG officers and enlisted men throughout Korea. In the latter group the author had the advantage of obtaining information from a number of officers who occupied the same KMAG positions at different times.

The study is one part of a larger field of investigation, requested by the Far East Command and G3, Department of the Army, "Utilization of Indigenous Manpower in Korea," ORO-R-4(FEC), Aug 51, SECRET. Other studies in this field include: "Problems in the Development of a Local National Army," ORO-T-336, Aug 56, SECRET; "Integration of Korean Soldiers into US Army Units (KATUSA)," ORO-T-362, in preparation, CONFIDENTIAL; and "Language Problems of the US Army during Hostilities in Korea," ORO-T-358, in preparation, CONFIDENTIAL.

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**SUMMARY**

**PROBLEM**

To examine the job and problems of the KMAG advisor, particularly from the advisor's viewpoint, in the last year of the Korean War.

**FACTS**

The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) were created in 1948. At that time the Provisional Military Advisory Group was set up to assist the ROK in building up its internal security forces, particularly a national police force. It was superseded by the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) in 1949.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 Jun 50, President Syngman Rhee placed the ROK armed forces under US (Eighth Army) command. Simultaneously KMAG was placed under the command of the Eighth Army, and designated as Eighth Army's advisory agent to the ROKA.

After hostilities began KMAG's mission was shifted from establishing a police force to the twofold task of keeping ROK forces fighting in the war and developing an expanded army able to cope with a powerful aggressor.

ROKA units were commanded by ROKA officers, who were advised by US officers assigned as their advisors. Some ROKA commanders occasionally delayed or resisted acting on advisors' recommendations, despite the fact that the ROK government and the Eighth Army Command had agreed that any ROK commander who failed to take the advisor's recommendations in serious situations would be relieved of duty.

KMAG advisors had the following responsibilities in addition to the usual duties of military assistance advisory group (MAAG) officers:\*

- a. Responsibility for the performance of ROKA units without command of those units.
- b. Maintaining a KMAG communications network (independent of the ROKA Command communications network) linked with US command and KMAG headquarters.
- c. Gathering and reporting (over KMAG communications network) tactical information to higher US commands on the tactical situation in the advised ROKA units.
- d. Living with advised units of the ROKA in the field, often in isolation from other US personnel.
- e. Attempting to get accurate and prompt information from local national commanders, particularly when the military situation was adverse (almost no US personnel in Korea could speak or understand the local national language).

\*Principal or only exceptions: US advisors in tactical units (at division and corps levels in the field) in the Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) in Greece during combat operations of 1948-1949.

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### SUMMARY

Advisors in tactical units were an operational part of a tactical command of a US field army, with administrative responsibility to KMAG; advisors assigned to other KMAG duty in the Korean communications zone (KComZ) remained under KMAG command, with logistic support from KComZ.

### DISCUSSION

This study is concerned primarily with the advising of tactical and service units, with emphasis on the former because Korea afforded a special opportunity to study advisory duty under active combat. Augmented by observations and records, the study is based on the experiences, opinions, feelings, and judgments of KMAG personnel and included former KMAGers in addition to those on duty in Korea, in the summer of 1953, when field data were collected.

### CONCLUSIONS

1. Each of the assigned duties of KMAG advisors to local national tactical units was necessary and could not be safely reduced without compromising the success of the operation, even though these duties placed a heavy burden on officers serving as advisors. KMAG advisors were usually confronted with problems and responsibilities normally encountered by officers two ranks above their own.
2. Advisory duty in a tactical unit of a local national army, particularly under combat conditions, is exceedingly difficult and frequently frustrating, and personnel selected for such duty must be temperamentally and physically able to withstand these stresses, in addition to being professionally competent. Qualities needed include tact, patience, emotional stability, self-sufficiency, self-discipline, and—in tactical units—command and combat experience if possible.
3. The size of KMAG tactical detachments as provided in Korea during combat operations was at minimum practical levels, considering the multiple mission assigned. The pressure of the advisory job was most acute on the regimental advisor in infantry units during the shooting phase of the war.
4. Living constantly with local national army tactical or isolated units, support regiments removed from personal association with other US personnel had adverse effects on advisors' morale and efficiency. KMAG advisors in combat units needed the relaxation offered by periodic social contacts and off-duty companionship with other US personnel, and more frequent R&R than personnel serving with US units.
5. The KMAG advisor had to recognize that certain practices of a local national group, such as the "welfare fund," were deeply rooted in the local national culture, and that the advisor's responsibility was to see that these practices did not jeopardize the military effectiveness of the unit.

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6. In tactical units the success of the advisor's mission, his personal safety, and sometimes his life, depended on his relation with his ROKA counterpart. For a KMAG advisor to work effectively with his ROKA counterpart it was important that he:

a. Establish rapport based on both mutual confidence and respect for ability, professional competence, and experience and mutual regard and consideration for integrity and personality.

b. Practice military courtesy and protocol appropriate to the counterpart's rank and the advisor's level of operation as a member of the counterpart's personal staff.

c. Maintain close and constant association with his counterpart during working hours, including visits to the field, and be available to observe and advise on all matters that arose.

d. Check and inspect closely every day the execution of the counterpart's orders and the performance of subordinates and units in the command.

e. Initiate advice—in private—to the counterpart on all matters requiring attention, with particular attention to premeditated problems and plans, decisions on current matters, and follow-up of orders or supervision of subordinates.

7. When a really important issue was involved and the counterpart would not voluntarily act in accord with the advisor's proposal, the advisor had to assure compliance by bringing pressure on his counterpart.

8. Logistic support of KMAG advisors serving with local national units, particularly in remote or isolated places, was an acute problem that required special attention.

9. Advisors for MAAG-type assignments needed training in the form of a short intensive orientation before being sent to their duty stations.

10. KMAG advisors did not need to know the local language to perform their missions; but some knowledge of the language was an important asset in advisory duties; efforts to learn the language facilitated personal relations.

11. A tour of duty as an advisor in a MAAG is worth-while professional experience as well as being a highly important military service.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Selection qualifications for MAAG advisors should be based on:

a. The officer's professional competence, preferably demonstrated by command experience—including combat command if possible—for advisors to line units.

b. Special screening of officers and enlisted men for qualities of temperament and fortitude to withstand the strenuous psychological and physical demands of advisory duty in tactical units of a local national army, particularly under combat conditions.

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c. Personal characteristics of tact, patience, emotional stability, self-sufficiency, and self-discipline that will enable the officer to work effectively and harmoniously with local national personnel and that will induce a respect and confidence in Americans and the US.

d. Preference to officers with facility in the local language.

2. Advisors should be given orientation for MAAG-type assignments, preparatory to entering on such duty, and be explicitly briefed on: their advisory duties and responsibilities; the structure, organization, and the known strengths and weaknesses of the local national army; and the culture and customs of the local nationals and methods of working with them. Language study should be encouraged and facilitated by short intensive courses and/or on a self-study basis, unless more thorough preduty language courses are required at the option of the chief of the MAAG involved.

3. During combat operations and during the development stage of an immature local national army the regimental advisor should be provided with at least an assistant advisor, and also with battalion advisors to operate from the regimental detachment.

4. MAAG advisors assigned to local national units in the field should be grouped together and live in MAAG detachments at regimental or higher headquarters insofar as possible, and advisors assigned to tactical or isolated units where they are removed from normal daily personal association with other US personnel should be required to spend the equivalent of one 24-hr period per week at a higher MAAG or US detachment.

5. The length of continuous assignment for tactical advisors living with advised units in the field under combat or isolated conditions should be not less than 6 nor more than 9 months, and for advisors living in decentralized MAAG detachments 9 to 18 months.

6. Indigenous interpreters in tactical units should be military personnel of the local national army assigned to the US unit, MAAG or otherwise, and under the control of the US officers to whom the interpreters are responsible. This control should include discipline; efficiency rating; recommendations through channels to the local national army for the interpreters' promotions, additional schooling (including that in US schools), and awards; and (at the option of the MAAG chief) messing, billeting, and some supplementary pay in money or kind when needed. In nontactical units civilian interpreters should be authorized, but they should be under corresponding US control and direction.

7. Local national officer-interpreters prior to assignment to US commanders and MAAGs should receive training in the service branch to which they are assigned as interpreters (officer's basic course, branch material).

8. The factors found important for MAAG advisors to work effectively with their ROKA counterparts should be referred to, for the information and guidance of advisors in other MAAGs, particularly in underdeveloped or Asiatic countries.

9. MAAG or military-missile type problems should be included in the curriculums of the Army's principal service schools, with particular emphasis in schools for advanced career officers.



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out by officers assigned as field advisors to ROKA units who had had at least 1 month of service in an advisor's job at the time of the survey in 1953. All were surveyed while still engaged in the job. All had had active advisory duty during hostilities. A small number of advisors in key jobs at KMAG Hq who were involved in direct responsibility for tactical advisors was also included. A total of 287 questionnaires was received from all KMAG detachments in tactical units of the ROKA; 32 questionnaires, however, arrived too late to be included in the tabulations, which were thus based on the answers of 255 respondents. Spot checking indicated that there were no significant differences between the responses on the 32 late returns and the 255 included in the tabulations. Of the tactically involved advisors, 21 percent were attached to ROK corps headquarters, 62 percent were with divisions, (including the smaller units of the divisions, such as infantry regiments and field artillery battalions), 9 percent were with various separate security and training units, and the remaining 8 percent were serving at ROKA or KMAG Hq. Other details on the composition of the KMAG advisor population are given in App D.

Many of the active advisors who responded to the questionnaire, and in addition some who had had earlier KMAG experience, were subsequently interviewed in considerable depth to identify local situations and information and to explore individual attitudes, reactions, and judgments not fully revealed by the questionnaire responses. Selected responses are quoted throughout the document to illustrate the variety, range, and intensity of individual viewpoints.

Analysis of data included attempts to find interrelations among responses to different questions and between individuals. No consistent pattern of responses to different questions was found, such as would occur if some individuals were indiscriminately negative—or favorable. Extreme responses on one item did not seem to be reflected by extreme views on other items. In similar fashion, patterns of responses among subgroups of advisors were sought. Cross-comparison of differences in such subgroup areas as Regular Army and Reserve, rank, length of service in Korea and in KMAG, and region of birth showed no significant differences. Only in a few cases—infantry vs artillery officers, tactical vs support units, and field vs headquarters advisors—were differences found; these are reported separately.

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### **RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ADVISOR**

This section describes the job of the advisor in the development and operation of the ROKA. The advisor's responsibilities are discussed from the viewpoint of both the advisor and the advisor's official mission. The purpose of this discussion is to set in proper perspective the many diverse and strongly held opinions of KMAGers regarding the tasks involved in advising a local national army.

### **RESPONSIBILITIES OF MAAG ADVISORS IN GENERAL**

MAAGs are usually extensively involved in training and advisory duties as well as in logistic aspects (allocation and delivery of US materiel). In some MAAGs the training function may extend only to a small number of key personnel in the aided country, for familiarization training with the delivered equipment. In countries that have not recently supported modern military forces the advisory and training functions may extend to the development of a whole modern military establishment, including a military school and training system. Examples are KMAG in Korea (the largest program including the longest combat period); the MAAG in Formosa, and the MAAG in Japan (currently the largest in operation, with more than 2500 US personnel involved).

### **RESPONSIBILITIES OF KMAG ADVISORS**

KMAG advisors had a number of duties that can be considered typical of those that occur in MAAG and in some military missions to foreign countries, particularly in underdeveloped countries like those that may be found in Asia.

(a) Advisors are responsible for the requisitioning and/or the delivery of US equipment and supplies.

(b) Advisors are responsible for the training of local nationals in the proper maintenance of equipment.

(c) Advisors are to guide and supervise training in the use of US equipment and military doctrine.

(d) Advisors are responsible for getting information across to their counterparts in spite of the language barrier.

KMAG advisors also had a number of other responsibilities. For example, during active combat KMAG advisors were responsible for guiding local national

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commanders who had command authority and were superior in rank to the advisor in spite of their relative youth and their inexperience as military commanders. Advisors assigned to tactical units of the ROKA also lived and fought in the field with these local national forces. Along with responsibility to assure maximum combat effectiveness of the advised unit, these advisors had the duty of maintaining liaison with US command channels that directed the local national army, often over KMAG communication nets and through KMAG advisors as intermediaries. In addition KMAG advisors were usually stationed with units far removed from US bases of supply, and advisors of necessity had to operate their own logistic supply lines, drawing food and other needed supplies from "nearby" US units or QM supply points. To all these must be added the problems of living in a poverty-stricken and war-ravaged country, among people of a vastly different cultural background and language (which made communication difficult), and in an area of rugged terrain, extreme climate, and nonexistent or poor roads.

In the early days of KMAG—from 1949 through 1952—officers assigned to advisory duty in KMAG were briefed on their duties at KMAG Hq and/or by their superior officer after reporting to their detachment or advised unit. Many directives and instructions prepared at KMAG Hq also reached them from time to time, and furnished some supplementary guidance on their duties, responsibilities, and procedures. But under the chaos of fluid warfare, chronic personnel shortages and rapid turnover, and expansion in KMAG operational responsibilities, many officers were plunged into KMAG duty with only broad general instructions on their mission and job.

### OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF KMAG ADVISOR'S MISSION

In 1953, 3 yr after the war began, KMAG Hq published and distributed the KMAG "Advisor's Procedure Guide." Intended as an aid to advisors, it described their duties and methods of operation. The mission of a KMAG officer was stated as follows:

Mission of KMAG officers. Most KMAG officers have a dual mission:

- (a) To advise their Korean counterparts, providing them with the benefits of the advisor's military experience, so the counterpart may accomplish the over-all combat mission.
- (b) To function as an information gathering and reporting agency so that accurate and timely reports on all phases of the military operation can be forwarded through US Signal communication channels to the appropriate UN (US) commander.<sup>5</sup>

The scope of the advisor's mission is broad, covering all aspects of military operations. He is expected to accomplish his mission without command authority and without himself performing the staff work required of the units he advises. This he is directed to do through advice to his counterpart. The "Advisor's Procedure Guide" states these responsibilities:

From the Chief, KMAG, who acts as Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff, ROK Army, down through every echelon of the Korean Army, an officer or NCO of the United States Army acts as advisor in all phases of military operations to key ROK Army personnel. Though their mission is not one of commanding ROK units, or of actually performing ROK staff functions, the advice they provide for their counterparts is evident in every

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plan, activity and decision of ROK Army. This has been accomplished through the patient, tireless efforts and professional skills of KMAG advisors and has won for them the respect and confidence of the ROK Army.<sup>4</sup>

The Chief of KMAG assembled all corps and division Senior Advisors for a "Senior Commanders Conference" during late May 1953. During this conference he explained in detail the duties and responsibilities of advisors.

Later, as a further guide to advisors, the Chief of KMAG prepared and issued the "Ten Commandments for KMAG Advisors," which reflected the concept of the Chief of KMAG regarding the mission and job of the advisor.\* Its context follows:

### "Ten Commandments" for KMAG Advisors

As Advisor to a ROK Army Unit, I will:

- (1) Take the initiative in making observations and rendering advice. Without waiting to be asked, I will give advice for such corrective action as I would take if I were the unit commander.
- (2) Advise my counterpart forcefully, yet not command his unit.
- (3) Follow up to insure that advice has been acted upon. If it has not, take it up with next higher KMAG-ROK Army Echelon for decision and action. (In ROK Divisions with US Corps, take up with the US Corps Commanders.)
- (4) By sound advice and follow-up:
  - (a) Develop fully the combat power of all units of the command.
  - (b) Coordinate and control elements of the command so as to gain the greatest effectiveness in destroying the enemy.
  - (c) Restore promptly any part of the command which may have been lost or destroyed.
  - (d) Recognize battlefield conditions which might damage the potential of the command.
  - (e) Insure efficient use of supplies and equipment furnished the command.
- (5) Keep abreast of the tactical situation by frequent personal contact with all units of the command, using the presence of myself and my counterpart to motivate the troops and give them confidence. A minimum of my time will be spent in the unit command post. (This applies particularly to Senior Advisors and G2, G3 Advisors.)
- (6) Give special attention to the training of Reserve elements, with emphasis on realism and correction of deficiencies developed during combat.
- (7) Report all tactical information promptly to the next higher KMAG level regardless of reports initiated through ROK Army channels.
- (8) Report deficiencies promptly to the next higher KMAG level; follow up on necessary corrective action. (Corps Senior Advisors will keep Chief, KMAG, personally informed of existing deficiencies and necessary corrective action within their purview in order that failure may be prevented rather than corrected.)
- (9) Devote particular attention to the welfare of the individual and to the maintenance of high morale and professional standards in my KMAG Detachment.

\*Original prepared during the period of heavy fighting in June and July 1953 and issued to KMAGers on a card in August 1953. The slight revision reproduced here made some items more specific, spelled out certain details, and added a few new points, including "give special attention to the training of Reserve elements, with emphasis on realism and correction of deficiencies developed during combat," "a minimum of my time will be spent in the unit command post," and "I realize that I stand or fall with my counterpart. I share in credit for his successes and in blame for his failures."

It is probable that printed copies of "The Ten Commandments" did not reach some KMAG field advisors, at least until the late summer of 1953—after the truce had been signed (27 Jul 53). Among all advisors interviewed in Korea during July, August, and early September, none mentioned this list of duties. The copy reproduced here was obtained from the Office of the Chief, KMAG. The time at which "The Ten Commandments" reached field advisors may explain the apparent conflict in opinion, pointed out later in this study, between field advisors who considered instructions on their responsibilities and duties to have been too general, and KMAG Hq personnel, who were inclined to consider instructions adequate.

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(10) Be responsible for good order, discipline, housekeeping and efficiency, not only in my own Detachment, but in all KMAG Detachments advising ROK elements subordinate to the command I advise.

I realize that I stand or fall with my counterpart. I share in credit for his successes and in blame for his failures.

### ADVISOR'S OWN CONCEPT OF MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

From interviews it was determined that the KMAG advisor saw his major responsibilities to be:

(a) Most importantly, providing experience and training to his counterpart. He did this both by giving counsel derived from his own background and by seeing to it that his counterpart gained experience and training of his own.

(b) Safeguarding proper and economical utilization of the materiel furnished to the ROKA by the US government.

(c) Keeping his US superiors informed of the realities of the situation as he saw it.

It will be noted that KMAG officers conceived their mission to include the safeguarding of US equipment and supplies, even though this aspect of their mission was not stated in the "Advisor's Procedure Guide." Responsibility for US equipment seems to have been impressed on advisors through other means, including the procedural requirement for them to sign all requisitions for materiel.

### Providing Training and Experience for Local Nationals

Training was the original and presumably the chief mission of KMAG advisors. Its need was acute. Under the Japanese occupation Koreans were not permitted to hold positions of responsibility in the puppet governments that ruled them, and for a Korean to rise even to the rank of lieutenant in the Japanese Army was rare. In terms of the leadership of the ROKA this restrictive policy had serious consequences. It meant that in building the new republic's military machine tremendous responsibilities had been assumed by Koreans who had neither the training nor the experience required by their new roles. There were generals in the ROKA who had been sergeants only 10 yr earlier. Moreover the bulk of ROKA leadership consisted of men who were in their early or middle thirties or younger.<sup>2</sup>

The ROKA was also handicapped by a shortage of the technicians and technological specialists necessary to keep its young army functioning efficiently and effectively. The scarcity of personnel with technical abilities vital to the most basic maintenance, logistic, engineering, and communications needs of a fighting army was attributed to several factors. Among these were: (a) The Korean economy is primarily an agricultural one. The introduction of modern equipment has always been kept to a minimum and therefore the need for technical skills has not been great. (b) Under Japanese rule, technological needs of the Korean economy were met by Japanese nationals; thus, Koreans had no opportunities or incentives to acquire and practice technical specialties.

As a result of conditions of this type the ROKA was seriously handicapped by undeveloped leadership and a lack of command, staff, and technical experi-

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ence. These shortcomings were particularly manifested in (a) the underdeveloped faculty of ROKA leadership to see the over-all picture and to plan for the future, (b) the unwillingness of ROKA officers to exercise initiative, and (c) the inadequacy of ROK civilian technical training.

Koreans' Inexperience in Planning. Advisors cited the importance of their own abilities to evaluate situations in terms of future plans and the over-all picture. In the opinion of many, the Korean's limited experience and peculiar training caused him "to lack the ability to project himself into the future and make plans." Therefore the advisor's job was not merely one of standing by and waiting to be asked what to do when situations became critical. The advisor's role was an active one of detecting and foreseeing situations and providing needed advice. As one advisor put it:

Our job is to give operations advice to the ROK Army. Many times they come to us and ask for advice, but often that's not adequate. We must look ahead to future difficulties and aggressively give them advice.... You have to force advice on them—but tactfully. They don't think things through; those are the things you've got to catch before they happen.

Another emphasized this need by saying: "You've got to keep the constant initiative to know what the ROKs are doing. You've got to keep asking questions."

Koreans' Reluctance To Exercise Initiative. Another difficult problem with which KMA Gers had to deal was a general reluctance on the part of ROKA officers, particularly in the lower echelons, to exercise independent leadership and initiative. Although this problem may again be traced in part to the recent history of Korea and in particular to the Japanese occupation, it is common to Oriental culture. Unlike Americans who place an economic and social premium on the successful exercise of resourcefulness and imagination, Koreans have been conditioned to unthinking obedience to authority and fatalistic acceptance of given situations. Coupled with general inexperience and lack of specific training, such an attitude can have disastrous consequences. Often this attitude was revealed when officers did not give the orders necessary to adjust to critical situations. Many advisors believed that with the passage of time these problems became less serious, although many others reported that the tendency persisted. This remark is typical of this viewpoint: "They (the ROKs) are inclined to be lax in doing what needs to be done until it is ordered. They wait for higher command decisions. They know what should be done but wait for orders. Suggestions do not go up (through command channels); they only come down—as orders."

Inadequacy of ROK Civilian Training. As most advisors saw it, the foregoing shortcomings had been accompanied and heightened by inadequate civilian technical training. This shortcoming was recognized particularly by advisors to Korean officers whose jobs required technical and mechanical proficiency, such as in engineering, ordnance, transportation, and equipment maintenance. The statement of one advisor who had served as an advisor to a ROKA engineering officer typifies this feeling. Speaking in terms of his own specialty he pointed out how the lack of knowledge of the Koreans concerning technical matters made the presence of an advisor absolutely essential: "The equipment is too technical. They push this lever and pull that one and the bulldozer goes. They don't care if pistons are coming out all over. They just operate by rote until the equipment stops. Also, they don't have the knowledge for designing technical construction."

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Koreans are not universally inept in technical matters. Most of them have had little or no exposure to such training or experience in civilian life; very few have had adequate technical training (except in mathematics of which many have a good command). Large numbers of Koreans respond readily to technical training, e.g., American officers were enthusiastic about the proficiency of trained ROKA artillery.<sup>2</sup> In general, however, Koreans were unprepared and untrained in activities involving technical or mechanical equipment.

It is the advisor's role to help overcome these deficiencies in his ROKA counterpart and in the ROKA officers under his counterpart's command and to develop all the military knowledge, experience, and skill his counterpart needs. The advisor is a guardian, trainer, and counselor.

### **Safeguarding Equipment and Supplies**

Many advisors defined their mission in terms of the US investment in the ROKA. By and large all weapons and other military equipment are furnished to the ROK by the US, and many advisors felt that they had a personal as well as official obligation to see that this materiel was effectively utilized. One advisor who felt that the ROKs had come a long way operationally was nevertheless convinced that the advisors job called for him to assure economical use of supplies furnished by the US. "As long as the American taxpayers are supporting the Korean Army, there should be KMAGers...to be watchdogs on supplies...." The abundance of American goods made available to the ROKA posed a tremendous temptation to its underpaid officers and men, as well as to refugees, orphans, and other civilians who had lost everything. Stealing was commonplace, impelled by necessity for survival or hope of profit. The inflated Korean economy included a flourishing black market and ready buyers for merchandise of all types. The advisor had to be doubly alert to keep these practices checked. He also recognized that it was his job to see that military equipment was properly maintained and put to its legitimate use.

Accountability for use of supplies and equipment, inspection of maintenance practices, and similar activities were not incompatible with the advisory function; in fact they frequently aided the advisor in performing his advisory duties, since such "supply-check" duties required him to inspect and inquire into practices at all echelons—some of which he might never have seen otherwise.

### **Obtaining Information**

Because KMAG operated in an active tactical situation the reporting mission of KMAG officers was particularly important. Under the heading "Standards for Advisors," the "Advisor's Procedure Guide" elaborated on the reporting function as follows:

In the execution of his information gathering and reporting mission, the Unit Advisor is charged with rendering certain periodic and flash reports as prescribed, with particular attention to their accuracy and timeliness. Senior Advisors are directly responsible to their United States Army superior officer for the accomplishment of this mission. They alone are responsible that communications are Always Open—Never Closed Down. They must know the normal radio traffic procedures, and must assign outgoing messages sufficiently high priority classification to insure timely encoding and transmission. Accordingly, the signal personnel and the communications net must be keyed to meet the needs

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of the tactical situation, the movement of command posts, and changes in the composition of forces. A backlog of incoming messages must be anticipated and, when necessary, normal procedures modified and signal personnel placed on an overtime basis. Senior advisors must insist that all members of their staffs know the capabilities, limitations, and working rules of the communications team necessary for efficient execution of the timely transmission and receipt of official messages.<sup>5</sup>

The need for prompt dependable reporting by American observers was regarded as a necessity by the US command. Because of the active combat situation in Korea this function of KMAC operations was more highly developed than normally would be required in a MAAG.

One Chief of KMAC reported the reason for the information-gathering responsibility of KMAC advisors as follows:

It is well known that a Korean officer did not like to report failures. For example, if they lost a hill they would make every effort to retake it before reporting it. Since it was essential that commanders in the chain of command know the situation in order to take prompt action with their own reserves, I directed that KMAC advisors use their KMAC communications to see that higher commanders were informed in any such case. For example, the regimental advisor should report promptly to the division advisor over KMAC communications whether or not the ROK regimental commander reported the situation.

Since the US has a heavy investment in the advised army and in the aided country it is sound economy—and in the national interest of the contributor—to keep informed of the status of that investment. The prospects that justify continued support and the nature of this support are, or may be assumed to be, related in part to the local situation. The advisor is the contributor's local representative, and as such advisors recognized their obligation to pass along pertinent information through report channels. Difficulties involved in the information-gathering function of the KMACer will be discussed in a later section.

### RESPONSIBILITY, THE CRITICAL ELEMENT

The KMAC advisor was held responsible for the performance of the local national unit he advised, but he had to achieve results through a Korean counterpart by "advising" not "commanding."

In subsequent sections the problems and methods of "advising" will be examined in more detail, but in order to place this process in proper perspective it is necessary first to consider the definition of "advising." Actually the KMAC officer does not and cannot occupy the role of a pure advisor. As subsequent discussion indicates, his role is modified by virtue of the fact that he is held responsible for the performance of the unit he advises. He must therefore not only see to it that his advice is offered; he must see to it that his advice is taken, and his role becomes in effect that of a "commander," although a commander without command authority. The problem of why the advisor must be judged as a commander, the kind of "command" he must exercise, and the effect of his role as a commander in terms of the problems it creates are considered next.

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### Advisor "Stands or Falls with his Counterpart"

The Chief of KMAG repeatedly affirmed the precept: "The advisor stands or falls with his counterpart." This statement left no doubt in advisors' minds that as a general rule higher command held them responsible for results. The following viewpoints were typical: "The KMAG advisor is accountable for a successful mission." "In an American Corps the Senior Division Advisor better feel responsible, for the Corps Commander certainly considers him so."

Advisors were troubled by uncertainties about the degree to which they would be held responsible for not only actions the ROKA commander might take without consulting the advisor or actions he might take—or fail to take—in conflict with the advisor's will, but also any unsatisfactory performance of the ROKA unit. Many advisors contended that their instructions were not explicit enough to dispel their uncertainties. Advisors felt they did not know whether allowance would be made for poor performance due to weak commanders, inadequately trained troops, etc. Again and again advisors said in substance: "The advisor feels that he is held responsible for the performance of the unit he advises, but this responsibility was never spelled out."

Many advisors felt they were held to standards of performance that could be expected only of superior fighting units but had to be obtained from sub-standard units under inexperienced (local) officers. "The showing of the unit was taken as a direct reflection on the advisor." The advisor is expected to step in and do more than simply advise—he is expected to correct an undesirable situation whenever one develops (although in the first place he is expected to prevent an undesirable situation from developing).

### AUTHORITY IN A NEW ROLE

The advisor did not have a formal position of command; he was specifically defined as an advisor and not a commander, and hence had no authority to issue orders.

[Advisors] are cautioned to avoid issues over authority, remembering that they are advisors and not commanders. They will insure teamwork in the preparation of plans in checks on execution of orders, and in coordination of logistical support essential to the accomplishment of operational mission. In an advisory capacity to training, the Advisors will insure correct military doctrine is followed, that errors of omission as well as commission are observed and corrected. With a unit in combat the Advisor will insure that sound tactical doctrine is followed in operational missions.<sup>6</sup>

Many advisors construed this condition to mean they had "responsibility without authority." This was not true. Advisors could not issue orders to their counterparts, and some advisors thought this meant they lacked authority. What they lacked was command authority over their counterpart; what they had was control authority.

It was the intent of the Chief of KMAG that advisors have all the authority they needed to carry out their responsibilities, and KMAG and Eighth Army stood ready to support the advisor accordingly. Speaking of the policies of his predecessor as well as of his own, one Chief of KMAG said:

Advisors had ample authority. While they had no command over their ROK counterpart or ROK Army units, they were directed to report to next higher commanders, US or

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ROK, any dereliction or serious departure from advised procedures. Eighth Army commanders were prepared to back up the advisory function when needed, by issuing orders through command channels to insure appropriate military performance. Advisors were cautioned, however, against referring trivial matters, and were urged to work out satisfactory procedures directly with their counterpart.

The point to be made was that whereas advisors had no command over ROKS, they had access to command channels that gave them weight and authority approximating that possessed by actual commanders.

An advisor is primarily a teacher or trainer—even more than a commander is normally—because he cannot resort to orders when his trainee fails to understand or agree on the course of action he desires. He must achieve his purposes by less direct means, but with a high degree of certainty that the trainee's performance will be successful. These conditions, required of advisors, added a new emphasis, if not a new element, to the role of an officer—to lead without command. "Most KMAG positions test the ingenuity and ability of the person filling the job. The KMAG advisor had to influence the operation of a unit that he did not command."

### OTHER ASPECTS OF THE ADVISOR'S JOB

#### Korean vs US Standards

In pursuing their mission and responsibilities some advisors were troubled by conflicts between Korean and American standards. The question arose: How far should an advisor go in trying to remodel Korean customs? On the basis of their own experiences, some advisors acted on the principle that certain areas were not directly related to military performance and that certain matters were outside the advisors' domain because certain practices were implanted in the Korean culture.

More than one advisor found himself in a dilemma when confronted with some of the disciplinary methods employed by ROKA. Should he ignore these and confine his activities solely to operational training? What should he do about "welfare" activities, and by welfare I refer to quasi-official activities conducted by the ROK Army to supplement the pay of the military? These are just a few questions but there are many more which clouded the role of the advisor so that sometimes it interfered with his purely "military advisory" role.

Although ROK practices in these matters often were contrary to American practices and principles, there was a strong feeling among many advisors that in terms of KMAG's over-all purpose they had an obligation to try to effect changes. KMAGers indicated that the advisor must not interfere in matters his counterpart considered none of his business. Yet as part of the advisory process it was the advisor's duty to inform and guide his counterpart into improved ways of doing things. Personnel practices are a particular case in point.

#### Disciplinary Methods

Foremost among the ROKA practices that ran counter to American traditions were the disciplinary methods within ROKA units. In this area the Korean system was greatly at variance with American policies and methods.

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The ROKA, in the Oriental tradition, permitted its commanders complete jurisdiction over their subordinates; justice was often arbitrary and summary. Interview data indicated that a few advisors closed their eyes to much that went on, no matter how repugnant.

The advisor may dislike the beatings that take place in ROK units, but this is part of their way, and the advisor shouldn't mess with it.

Once my counterpart, the division commander, got so furious with a battalion commander who suggested retreating from a position that he whipped out his pistol and shot him on the spot. I saw this happen, but I did not get involved with it.

Other advisors were troubled by the honest question of how completely American customs and practices could be substituted for those of long standing in the Korean culture. Advisors reflected these viewpoints in a statement often repeated: "We may go too far in interfering in Korean discipline." Others said:

We have loused up the Korean Army by insisting that they do things the American way. Their military justice is based on the Japanese system. We bring in the IG, the JAG, etc. Now the Koreans run to the IG, demand courts-martial, and so on. But this is surface. The oriental basis still remains.

This is a real problem. The ROKs are quick to adopt all outward trimmings of the US Army, even though many innovations spoil their basic strength of simplicity and direct action.

Because the nature of the advisor's job necessarily involved him in many ROKA activities, it was difficult for the individual KMAGer to know which matters merited his attention and which were better left to the Koreans—for better or for worse. The solution of some advisors was to guide themselves by an arbitrary rule of thumb: to stay as far away as possible from problems peculiarly Korean. For example: "If it didn't affect me or the American taxpayer, I ignored it. The important aspect for me was seeing that they used the equipment and material as well as possible." Despite various views the consensus of most advisors was that their responsibility inescapably extended to such matters.

### Advisory Duties All-Inclusive

Typical views of advisors on the inclusiveness of their advisory function and on disparities between Korean and US standards were:

The advisor's role covers all aspects of the ROK Army. Some practices should not be made matters of issue early in the advisor's tour. However, he should learn as much as possible, and try to correct when the opportunity arises.

You cannot be a good advisor and keep away from supply, personnel, etc. You cannot close your eyes to such matters. Advisors that overlook such matters are weak.

Although a small minority of advisors did not act accordingly, there can be no question but that the advisor's duty extended to advising on all aspects and problems encountered in operating a military unit. The problem to the advisor was one of determining the time, place, and manner of offering such advice; not of whether to offer advice.

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Few assignments that an officer may have in his career are likely to approach in variety, complexity of problems, and difficulty an advisor's job—particularly under combat conditions as they existed in Korea. Among these problems are several that were well stated in the "Advisor's Procedure Guide":<sup>5</sup>

Each Advisor in KMAG must be ever-mindful that his Korean counterpart, and all other officers and enlisted men of the ROK Army with whom he is in daily contact, will emulate his military bearing, appearance, efficiency, industry, even his personal and moral habits. It is therefore incumbent upon each Advisor to set an outstanding example at all times.

In overcoming such obstacles as the language barrier, archaic beliefs, superstitions and a general lack of mechanical skills, the task of the Advisor has been an arduous one. The function of the Senior Advisor to a ROK regiment perhaps best illustrates the problems an Advisor faces. Living, working, fighting and training with a regiment, an Advisor must be acquainted with every phase of the regiment's operations. He must be abreast of the tactical and logistical situation. He must know the strong and weak points of the command and his subordinates. It is upon him that the regimental commander depends for knowledge that will teach him teamwork in the employment of infantry, artillery, air, signal communications and armor in a combat operation and of the various services in support of the same. He must criticize their mistakes without causing them embarrassment or "loss of face." He must teach them economy without seeming to deprive them of their needs. He must hold them to proven military methods and standards while still applauding their improvisation and, last but not least, he must do these things with a view toward building their confidence.

### **SUMMARY**

Duty in an advisory group is by no means typical Army duty. For example the KMAG advisor's functions are defined as advisory only. The advisor has no command, yet he "stands or falls with his counterpart" in the performance of the units he advises. He must deal with tactical and other problems normally dealt with by officers having greater experience and higher rank. He continually works, and sometimes lives, with individuals whose culture and way of life are greatly different from his own, and with whom he has considerable difficulty communicating. He may spend only a small part of his time with other Americans, and even less with friends or persons of his choice.

It is evident the advisor cannot limit his functions to giving advice when consulted, nor even to giving advice whenever he deems it necessary. He must in addition anticipate the needs of his counterparts; initiate consideration of plans or decisions in advance of time for action; induce his counterpart to think through possible courses of action ahead of time, discuss and evaluate the merits of each alternative, and arrive at a sound decision; and he must see to it that his advice is followed.

The advisor is expected to provide experience and training for his counterpart. This is a type of on-the-job training; the counterpart learns as he carries out the duties of his command. To ensure that the counterpart does learn, advisors must not assume command functions. Advisors who were regarded as most successful understood and generally practiced this responsibility. They also acted on the principle that as far as possible each advisor must see that his counterpart understands why it is important to do things in the way the advisor suggests.

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The responsibilities of KMAG advisors went beyond those ordinarily required of US officers in more usual types of military duty. It might be argued that the responsibilities should be changed to conform more nearly to the US duty pattern, but this kind of change would be unsuited to KMAG duty and would seriously compromise the probable success of the mission and the US investment in the security of Korea. The Korean situation was unique in that ROKA units and commanders were under US command, but US command had to assure itself through US representatives (KMAG advisors) that information was reliable and that orders were understood and executed. The responsibilities of the KMAG advisor grew out of the necessity of the situation. Each of the duties of KMAG advisors to local national tactical units was necessary and could not be reduced safely without compromising the success of the operation. Advisors to headquarters and service or technical units also had to accept a wide range of similar responsibilities, although not under as acute and strenuous conditions.

### **Conclusions**

- (1) Advisor's duties included advising on all aspects and problems encountered in operating a military unit.
- (2) In an operation such as was conducted by the US Eighth Army under combat conditions in Korea, each of the duties and responsibilities of KMAG advisors to local national tactical units was necessary and could not be safely reduced without compromising the success of the operation, even though these duties placed a heavy burden on officers serving as advisors.
- (3) Advisors' duties and operational procedures were adequately specified by KMAG Hq during the last year of the war, and before that time may not have been adequately disseminated to advisors; and the earlier lack of detailed SOPs contributed to the difficulties and tensions advisors experienced on the job prior to 1953.
- (4) KMAG advisors were necessarily and usually confronted with problems and responsibilities normally encountered by officers two ranks above their own.

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### QUALIFICATIONS FOR KMAG DUTY

This section describes some of the previous military experience and personal characteristics considered desirable for KMAG advisors.\* One experienced advisor believed proper qualification for advisory duty important enough to say:

"One of our most critical needs in the [US] Army today is an officer corps which is trained or naturally able to deal with foreign peoples."

This study supports the view that special qualifications are needed for MAAG-type duty, but suggests that qualified officers may be drawn from the officer population of the Army as needed without setting up a MAAG career expressly for continuous MAAG duty.

#### MILITARY EXPERIENCE

Advisors considered certain types of previous military experience preferable to others as preparation for duty with KMAG. Whatever their preferences, however, they generally recognized the basic importance of capability, stressing that in the first place a good KMAGer should be a good officer. As one advisor put it, "if an officer is not capable of commanding a US regiment or battalion he certainly should not be thought capable of advising a ROKA division or regiment." A typical view was: "The ROK officer is as good as the counterpart advisor is competent. Where the advisor was a competent, efficient officer, the Korean officer, likewise, would be efficient and strong. Again, I stress the point that it is important that the KMAG officers be outstanding leaders with combat experience."

In fact a higher standard was sometimes recommended for KMAG duty. Some respondents recommended that advisors should be "hand-picked men," or "the top men in their branch." "In general, the American [KMAG Advisor] must be professionally capable of performing at one or two grades higher than his present rank. Failure in this regard was KMAG's most critical problem."

Consideration of the particular types of experience suggested by KMAG advisor respondents as best preparation for duty with KMAG (see Table 1) reveals a preference for practical experience in leading troops over experience in training them. More than two out of every three respondents reported that KMAG

\*The reader should note that these qualifications are those KMAGers believe necessary. Data to prove or disprove the truth of these assertions do not exist.

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advisors should have had extensive combat experience. One officer stated it as follows:

One important point is the matter of combat experience. All advisors should have combat experience before they are assigned to military advisory groups. I had great difficulty in assigning inexperienced combat officers to ROK Divisions. Some of the ROK officers had as much as three (3) years' combat experience and would sense the weakness of an inexperienced American advisor. Under such conditions, the ROK would lose confidence in the advisor.

(In interpreting statements of this nature it must be borne in mind that a majority of advisors whose judgments are reported had been assigned in combat units.)

Table 1

### PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IMPORTANT FOR KMAG ADVISORS

Experience	Percent of ROK respondents <sup>a</sup>
Extensive combat experience	89
Command experience above company level	85
Experience in a training command	89
Experience in dealing with National Guard, ROTC, Reserve, or other civilian components	35
Attendance at CGSC	19
Experience in other military advisory groups	19
Foreign military mission experience	7
Other	15
No answer	6

<sup>a</sup>Adds to more than 100 percent because respondents were requested to give three kinds of previous experience.

Nearly as many stated that command experience above the company level is necessary for an advisor. In contrast, only one-half the respondents mentioned experience in a training command as important background for the advisory job. Essentially they believed it is command experience at battalion or higher level and knowing what do to in combat that makes the advisor.

These views were also held by higher authority than the advisors themselves, as evidenced by an official policy worked out by agreement between the Chief of KMAG and the CG of Eighth Army.\* It was agreed that a copy of all DA orders for officers assigned to the Eighth Army would be sent to KMAG for screening. Those officers who were judged by KMAG to fit their needs were requested for and usually assigned to KMAG duty. Furthermore, combat experience in Korea was valued as a prerequisite for assignment as an advisor to a ROKA corps or division. One Chief of KMAG reported that previously there had been a tendency to assign the most outstanding officers to US combat

\*Direct information to author.



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units, leaving KMAG assignments to be filled as a second choice. This was corrected to assure a fair share of the first-choice officers to KMAG. "We had colonels with directed MOS's, the upper 10 to 15 percent in the Army, assigned to KMAG after six months of command experience in US units. We used US regimental and battalion commanders as division and regimental advisors."

A quarter of the advisor respondents believed that experience in dealing with the National Guard, the ROTC, the Reserve, or similar civilian components of the US Army was useful experience for a KMAGer. The rationale behind this, as stated by one advisor with National Guard experience, was that the officer who deals with civilian components is handling men who, like the ROKA counterparts, are not formally under the absolute command of the officer in question. Dealing with civilian components was regarded as good training in asserting the leadership that derives from personality and experience rather than from direct command and absolute authority. In addition it gives practice in imparting training. "National Guard duty [Advisor to National Guard] helped me in Korea—got into same problems."

The reverse is also true. Service as a KMAG advisor was found helpful in later assignments as National Guard advisor. After being assigned as a National Guard advisor, one former KMAG advisor reported that: "It's the same kind of duty in the National Guard. You have to accomplish your job by advice and persuasion."

Ratings of the relative importance of each type of experience varied among the advisors according to the type of duty they performed with KMAG. For example, officers in technical and service units, who were less likely than others to experience combat, seemed to consider command experience more important than extensive combat experience. Combat experience was not considered by these officers to be much more important than experience in a training command. Officers in artillery units, on the other hand, although essentially technical experts and supervisors rather than leaders, were more likely to have been in combat. To them extensive combat experience was more important than command experience.

In short, military experience of the following types was considered most important for advisors. These are listed in order of importance:

- (1) For tactical advisors:
  - (a) Combat experience
  - (b) Command experience above company level
  - (c) Training command or National Guard advisory experience;
- (2) For technical and service advisors:
  - (a) Command experience above the company level
  - (b) Combat experience
  - (c) Training command or National Guard advisory experience.

This study confirms the view that professional military competence for officers assigned as advisors was an essential qualification, but though it may have been KMAG's "most critical problem" in the earlier years, by 1953 KMAG seemed to be staffed with able officers. Certain personal qualities were at least of equal importance, and each was a principal cause of difficulty.

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### PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

One objective of this study was to determine how much and what type of knowledge of people and of country is needed by a KMAGer if he is to operate successfully as an advisor and as a worthy representative of the American people.

When Korean officers were asked "What are the most important qualifications of a KMAG advisor to work successfully with his Korean counterpart?" the limited number of respondents consulted put "good personality" first, followed by military competence (based on experience, particularly in combat if in a service operating on the line). They emphasized the personality factor by saying it was considerably more important. These comments included reactions from Korean officers who had had both "successful" and "unsuccessful" advisors. When questioned about how they judged "success" and "failure" in an advisor, they answered it was their own judgment, based on how well the work went and in some cases on poor relations as well. One case was cited of an advisor who had had four different ROKA counterparts in sequence—all of whom were characterized as operating their unit ineffectively. Finally the Korean commander was court-martialed by his Korean superiors, but he was exonerated. Subsequently KMAG removed the advisor for ineffectiveness.

Table 2

#### PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES DESIRABLE IN KMAG ADVISORS

Quality	Percent of 255 respondents*
Patience	87
Tact	86
Emotional stability	80
Friendlyness and good humor	80
Perseverance	41
Thoroughness	38
Good personal appearance	38
Dignity and reserve	36
Self-reliance	35
Liking for foreign nationals	30
Incorruptibility	16
Temperate drinking habits	7
Other	2
No answer	1

\*Adds to more than 100 percent because respondents checked more than one quality. They were asked to check five.

The Korean officer who conducted the court-martial pointed out that the trial brought to light the fact that the advisor could not adjust what he had been taught about US operations to the differences in the Korean situation, and that he just couldn't get along with Koreans. The significance of these reports is that they indicate that in Korean eyes personality characteristics play an even

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When speaking of the importance of keeping their feelings under control, they usually emphasized the need to avoid unseemly behavior in the presence of ROKA officers. The Oriental concept of "saving face" was frequently mentioned, in this case applied to the advisor:

Don't show fear even though you may be shaking in your boots. Set an example for the ROKs.

You must never let your counterpart know that you are on the verge of blowing your top. As representatives of the United States, KMAC officers must be careful of all their actions when they are with ROKs. . . . It is as important for KMAC officers to maintain face before their counterparts as it is for ROKs themselves.

Good humor was considered important not only as a means of fostering good personal relations with the ROKs, but also for its value to the advisor himself: "Retain a sense of humor. Frustration will make you useless. Don't take the job too seriously, . . . [i.e.], recognize how far you can go and don't worry unnecessarily."

Traits that were considered important whether or not there was direct contact with other persons, such as perseverance, thoroughness, and self-reliance, were stressed by fewer respondents, but some who advocated them as desired characteristics in KMAC advisors felt strongly enough to regard them as "indispensable."

To throw light on Korean viewpoints of personal characteristics of Americans, some data can be drawn from responses to interviews and questionnaires employed in another study.\* A Korean language questionnaire was completed by 102 Koreans employed by US or UN organizations or units, or serving in the ROKA.

About one-fourth of the Koreans interviewed or responding to questionnaires did not express any opinion about Americans they had met in Korea. Two-fifths expressed favorable opinions only, and one-third mentioned both "good" and "bad" characteristics of Americans they had contacted.

Among the "good" qualities, "Brave" (55 percent), "Honest" (33 percent), and "Kind" (31 percent), topped the responses, with lowest places going to "Efficient" (10 percent), and "Generous" (6 percent). Similarly, "bad" qualities drew top responses on "Materialistic" with only 13 percent response, ranging to "Profiteering" and "Inefficient," each at 2 percent response at the low end. Little can be deduced from these responses.

Approximately 250 Koreans—mostly officers, responsible officials, merchants, and farmers, with some professional people and some enlisted men—were interviewed in Japanese, English, and occasionally in Chinese (Mandarin).† These interviews were often more frank, and added emphasis to what Koreans expect in personal relations.

Lack of patience, tact, courtesy, and empathy with Koreans is reflected in these critical comments: "Americans are too rude and impatient." "Feel inconvenience owing to ignorance of each other's minds and liability to misunderstanding on account of difference in customs." "There were language difficulties which prevented a knowledge of mutual courtesy."

\* Most of this material was collected and reported by Dr. Wesley R. Fisher, who spoke Japanese, and Allan A. Spitz, who spoke Chinese and Japanese.<sup>2</sup>

† Texts of questionnaire responses cited here are as translated by Korean linguists at 500 military intelligence service units in AFCE and the Army Language School.

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### Self-Sufficiency

Interviews with KMAG advisors added depth to the estimate of desired qualities. Chief among these qualities—after tact and patience—was what KMAGers variously called self-reliance or self-sufficiency. Advisors associated these traits with resistance to feelings of isolation, frustration, and being fed up to a point of despair. Among those in the last group were some who drowned their troubles by excessive drinking and had to be removed. It is true that, as one advisor phrased it: "[Isolation calls for] special efforts on the part of the advisor to take care of himself and those he is responsible for."

Forgotten Men? It was not surprising that some advisors said when they were in the field they felt forgotten:

No one is interested in what you do, what you need. When you come to Headquarters, they look on you as trouble, someone to take care of.... Nobody comes up to see us, to find out how we are doing.

KMAGers get a feeling that they are completely forgotten. No one ever visited them until after the armistice. They should send someone up at least to indicate that they want to know whether you are still alive.

Such feelings, although not universal, were acute and intense among those advisors who experienced them. Other advisors did not feel so negative, and some advisors disparaged complaints as outpourings from disgruntled officers. Undoubtedly some situations contributed to already heightened stress; others were quite tolerable. The following are typical of some viewpoints:

The bulk of complaints are unwarranted. They must stem largely from detachments who had poor leadership at the Division Advisor level. In 12 months with the 7th ROK Division in 1951 and 1952 (6 of which was in a Regt in the most mountainous terrain in Korea) I ate better than I've ever eaten anywhere at anytime. We had a close, well organized detachment that took care of one another. Our logistical support through US units and KMAG was completely satisfactory. [Similar remarks from the Capital Division.]

I believe I had the greatest number of advisors—enlisted men and officers—in isolated spots. I had one officer, Major \_\_\_\_\_, who was the advisor to a construction battalion on the East Coast of South Korea. His headquarters was in the vicinity of Kangnung. This officer had the fine leadership ability to carry out his mission regardless of isolation.

The number of complaints regarding isolation expressed in interviews made it clear that the problem and its effects should not be considered lightly nor glossed over.

Loneliness. The loneliness of advisors surrounded almost exclusively by Koreans seemed to induce feelings of discouragement or insecurity, and required strong personal qualities of self-sufficiency.

These feelings grew more intense under conditions of continued isolation from other US personnel of similar interests and backgrounds, and by sheer boredom. In most of their previous military duty officers had served in close association with their fellow officers. The change required by advisory duty in tactical units was particularly acute, and one to which many officers could not adjust readily. An example follows:

Once they assign you and send you out to the field, you feel like an orphan.... When you're in an American division, you're in a family, everyone helps you. It's a wonderful feeling; if you're hurt, you're treated like a baby brother. In KMAG, you feel that you're all alone in the world. It's a hell of a feeling, especially in a fight.

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### Preventive and Corrective Measures

Advisor Visits. Therapy was needed to arrest or attenuate the frustrations and discouragements of advisors. It was observed and reported that an effective remedial measure was the opportunity to get away from the local situation, associate with other US officers, and exchange experiences with those serving in similar duties. It appears that frequent contacts or visits among advisors were necessary for personal morale and efficiency; they should be officially encouraged.

If such contacts of advisor to advisor, or advisor to other US officer personnel, were frequent and normal—such as would be provided when advisors live in MAAG detachments at division, corps, or other headquarters—the morale of advisors was found to be relatively good. Among advisors who were isolated from association with their peers—such as regimental and battalion advisors—arrangements should be made to assure such associations.

One method of assuring such associations would be to require an advisor in a unit below division to report in person for 1 day (24-hr period) each week at the MAAG detachment at division, unless he were required to remain at his duty station by current combat operations or by orders of his MAAG superior. When events prevent these weekly visits to his MAAG detachment, at the earliest opportunity the advisor should be given equivalent cumulative leave for relaxation at an available center of his own choice.

Recognitions and Awards. Tensions and frustrations are inherent in the advisory job and probably have to be accepted as the kind of situation to be anticipated by advisors to local national tactical units, particularly in underdeveloped countries. The Department of the Army, and higher echelons in our government, can make this type of duty worthy of the personal sacrifices involved by acknowledging to the officers and proclaiming to the public through press releases and speeches of high officials the high national importance of military advisory duty in the new US "first line of defense," its direct value in deterring war, and its value in serving to keep warfare that does break out confined to local wars far from US shores. The DA and the nation can also give status to and reward this type of service with public and personal recognition. Recognition in such forms as accelerated promotion, preferred later assignments, increased leave and home visits, special allowances, honors, citations, medals, and other incentives and awards for meritorious service in advisory duty should be given serious study within the Army.

Another and more direct supplementary procedure is to make it clear to an officer assigned to advisory duty that his immediate and higher-echelon superiors are aware of the tensions and difficulties of advisor duty and will reflect this in his efficiency reports and the support offered him in the field and in general, stand ready to support him with anything he needs, within their power of supply. In this connection it is well to point out to the advisor the type of problems and difficulties he can expect to encounter as an inevitable characteristic of his duty assignment. These approaches can be given emphasis in assigning officers to advisory duty and in the orientation or briefing all newly assigned advisors receive.

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### **SUMMARY**

To recapitulate, KMAG in Korea represents about as extreme a situation as any in which US officers may be called on to serve as advisors, particularly under combat conditions. It calls for the highest order of competence as a soldier and diplomat.

The success of KMAG advisors in these unfavorable situations is reassurance of the competence, loyalty, and resourcefulness of the US Army officer, and of the workability of coalition operations between US military forces and cooperative local national military forces when the latter are advised by US officers on a counterpart basis, if future needs should require such operations. A MAAG shoulder patch in general, and a KMAG patch in particular, deserves recognition in the Army as a symbol of a combat-tested type of Army activity calling for qualified officers of the highest talents and personal fortitude.

The job of MAAG advisor—particularly in tactical units under the combat conditions that occurred in Korea—requires qualities not found in all officers.

### **Conclusions**

(1) Advisory duty in a tactical unit of a local national army, particularly under combat conditions, is exceedingly difficult and frustrating duty (more nerve-racking than combat in US units), and personnel assigned to such duty have to "be able to take it."

(2) Qualities required of KMAG advisors were found to be: (a) professional military competence; and (b) personal qualities of tact, patience, emotional stability, self-sufficiency, and self-discipline. Advisors to tactical units needed in addition: (c) command experience above the company level; and (d) combat experience, if possible.

(3) Living constantly with ROKA tactical units; infantry regiments; artillery battalions; engineer, signal, and similar units; or MP and security units over periods of several months in isolation from other US personnel had adverse effects on advisors' morale. KMAG advisors in combat units needed the relaxation offered by periodic social contacts and off-duty companionship with other US personnel at higher headquarters, at rest camps, or on leave. Access to rest and recreational facilities—particularly officers' clubs, movies, and libraries—and access to such creature comforts as hot showers, an occasional à la carte meal, comfortable quarters, and barber service when these were available at headquarters or on leave, went a long way to rejuvenate morale.

### **Recommendations**

(1) Officers and enlisted men for advisory duty in tactical units of a local national army, particularly under combat conditions, insofar as possible should be selected for temperament and fortitude to endure the strenuous psychological and physical demands of the situation.

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(2) Selection qualifications for MAAG advisors should be based on:

(a) the officer's professional competence, preferably demonstrated by command experience, including combat command experience, if possible, for advisors to line units; (b) personal qualities of the officer that enable him to work effectively and harmoniously with local national personnel and that will induce respect and confidence in Americans and the US; and (c) the officer's facility in the local language.

(3) Field advisors assigned to units below divisions in a local national army should be required to report in person for 1 day (24-hr period) each week at the MAAG detachment at division, or to a nearby US detachment of comparable size, unless required to remain at their duty stations by current combat operations or by orders of MAAG superiors. When events prevent such weekly visits to the MAAG detachment, the field advisors should be given equivalent cumulative leave for relaxation at an available center of their own choice.

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### PREPARATION FOR KMAG DUTY

This section considers the means that were employed to orient or prepare officers for duty as KMAG advisors, reports the opinions of advisors regarding the adequacy of their preparation, and offers suggestions for meeting this problem in the future and possibly in other MAAGs. The briefing of newly assigned officers, printed materials furnished them, and breaking in on the job, will be considered in sequence.

#### BRIEFING OF NEW ADVISORS

Briefings at KMAG Hq in 1953 consisted of a 1- to 4-hr orientation lecture (frequently led off by the Chief of KMAG, or in his absence by the CoGS of KMAG) followed by talks or conferences with key officers at KMAG Hq.\*

Prior to that time briefing procedures were more variable, under the exigencies of war. A number of KMAGers complained that their briefing had not been specific enough or that they had received practically no briefing at all when they had been assigned in 1952 or early 1953.

My mission was not clearly specified at the time of my assignment. I came as a replacement and was given a two-hour briefing about the position of the outfit to which I was assigned. I was given no instructions on how to work with the ROKA. I was left on my own. I definitely had the feeling that my missions were undefined and that I was on my own.

Many were never briefed. A briefing was listed as part of the processing, but frequently did not take place.

It is incontestable that urgency in getting advisors to their units without delay during active combat curtailed or precluded scheduled briefings for many of them. Other officers praised the briefing given at headquarters or considered it the best that could be offered during active warfare. "Upon occasion some briefings of KMAG personnel were curtailed due to operational necessity but in general it is believed that adequate briefings were given newly assigned KMAG advisors."

After the armistice was signed in mid-1953 the briefing program became more regular.

\*Departures from this plan were sometimes necessary. This writer sat in on each briefing that was conducted by the Asst G3, Asst G1, and Plans Officer. This was during the heavy Communist attacks and breakthrough in mid-July 1953.



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Reference briefing of KMAGers, derogatory comments cannot be denied. However, the entire briefing system was reorganized (in mid-1953) to include senior field grade officers, so that they received the same briefing as their junior officers. This was a four-hour job, including a film on the Korean Army, and a recorded address by the Chief of KMAG, as well as the briefings by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration and the four Assistant Chiefs of Staff.

One Chief of KMAG described the briefing given at headquarters to all newly assigned KMAG personnel as follows:

As of the summer of 1953 a definite briefing program existed within KMAG, both for officers and enlisted men, and covered at KMAG Headquarters in Taegu the responsibilities of advisors, their conduct, their relationship with their counterpart, organization of KMAG and ROK Army, KMAG supply system and logistics problems and Chief of KMAG's policies. All officers and enlisted men received this orientation unless operational emergencies precluded the briefing and, upon occasion, persons missing the briefing were recalled to Taegu to be briefed when the operational emergency was eased.

Another Chief of KMAG, commenting on this same period, believed the over-all orientation process for KMAG personnel was adequate and as comprehensive as was worth-while for advisors. He indicated that the formal briefing (using maps and charts and with G3 and G1 staff officers presenting most of the material) occupied most of 1 day. The orientation period covered up to 1 week at KMAG Hq, including issue of supplies. Orientation also included trips through KMAG and ROKA Hq, where officers were introduced to personnel and given a glimpse of the organizational plan and its operation.

However, the purpose of this discussion is neither to praise nor damn past KMAG briefing practices. The purpose is threefold: (a) to point out that at least some KMAGers considered that they were inadequately briefed,\* (b) to raise the question of how and where the briefing should be accomplished, and (c) to indicate what should be included.

It was the consensus among KMAGers that new advisors should be given background information about the people, country, and army with which they will have to deal. Respondents to the KMAG advisor questionnaire were asked to indicate which kinds of background information would be most desirable in such briefings. Their replies are shown in Table 3.

Recognizing that information may be useful without being essential, a further question was asked: "How important, for an officer assigned to KMAG, is briefing in the items you have checked above?" Gross results are reported in Table 4.

Analysis of responses in Tables 3 and 4 grouped into categories revealed that almost one-half the present advisors said that briefing on Korean customs and habits was desirable, and nearly as many said that it was necessary. Only 2 percent considered it unimportant. Their rationale was obvious from interview data. The new advisor is placed among people he does not know who have a way of life different from his own. He is expected to exert a high degree of influence on these people. To accomplish this he needs to be given information that will enable him to adjust to these people and act so as to induce optimum results. He also needs to be made aware in advance of the problems and frustrations he is certain to encounter in dealing with local nationals, so that he

\*In subsequent discussions results attributed to incomplete briefing will be presented.

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will be better prepared to cope with them and bear up with less feeling of discouragement or despair.

Table 3

### MOST USEFUL INFORMATION IN BRIEFING KMAG ADVISORS

Information	Percent of 255 respondents*
Customs and habits of Korean people	87
Structure, organization, and functions of ROKA	87
Biographic information about counterparts	53
Health and sanitary conditions in Korea	50
Information about ROKA units (combat records, history, etc.)	47
Korean history and geography	41
Korean government and politics	31
Resources and economy of Korea	28
Other	9
No answer	5

\*Adds to more than 100 percent because most respondents checked more than one item.

Table 4

### RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF USEFUL ORIENTATION INFORMATION

Importance to advisor of information in Table 3	Percent of 255 respondents
Necessary	68
Desirable	29
Unimportant	2
No answer	6
Total	100

Because identical or similar questions were included in three questionnaires administered to different groups in Korea in the same period (June-August 1953), the responses of KMAG advisors can be compared with those of Koreans and of US officers and men in US units. Table 5 presents these data.

The scope and depth of area, culture, and language knowledge needed by advisors need further consideration. Advisors differed on the amount of knowledge needed; the range was from those who advocated a special 3- to 12-month preparatory course in the Korean language and culture to those who thought any instruction of this type was needless or even detrimental. One KMAG official commented on these conflicting views as follows: "... there

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is little advantage in training an officer with a smattering of area and language knowledge. Either the officer should have a rather thorough and lengthy training to a high level of competence or he is better off with practically no training in this line."

Table 5

## INFORMATION NEEDED BY US MILITARY PERSONNEL TO WORK WITH KOREAN MILITARY PERSONNEL<sup>a</sup>

Information	Mean rank	255 KMAC advisors		194 US military personnel		139 Korean military personnel	
		Percent <sup>b</sup>	Rank order	Percent <sup>b</sup>	Rank order	Percent <sup>b</sup>	Rank order
Koreans:							
Language	2	56 <sup>c</sup>	3	47	2	26	2
Customs	1	47	1	62	1	41	1
History	7	41	7	22	4	16	3
Geography				9	6	9	6
Government	3	21	3	27	3	19	3.5
Health and sanitation <sup>d</sup>	6	30	5	—	—	—	—
Resources and economy <sup>d</sup>	9	28	9	—	—	—	—
Structure, organization, and functions of ROKA	3	22	2	13	5	19	3.5
Combat records of ROKA unit <sup>d</sup>	8	47	6	—	—	—	—
Information about counterparts <sup>d</sup>	4	33	4	—	—	—	—

<sup>a</sup>This table is a composite of responses to the same or similar questions in three different questionnaires, each administered to a different group.

<sup>b</sup>Adds to more than 100 percent because respondents checked more than one item.

<sup>c</sup>Composite of various levels of language knowledge (see Table 9).

<sup>d</sup>Not included in US military personnel or Korean military personnel questionnaires.

The consensus of advisors' opinions on this subject, and observations of working relations in the field, indicate that a moderate amount of properly selected area or culture information adequately presented was needed and that both culture and language knowledge would be helpful but advisors could get along without language knowledge.

The conclusion supported by this study is that KMAC advisors can succeed without knowledge of the Korean language better than they can without knowledge of Korean customs and culture. Fortunately the latter can be more readily acquired.<sup>3</sup> Most advisors believed the orientation process should include some information on the customs and habits of the Korean people; but that erudite lectures on such topics as "the Oriental Mind" or "Oriental psychology" should be avoided.

Advisors' comments suggest a differentiation between general and specific briefing and between briefings at KMAC Hq and in the field. On the basis

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"The Ten Commandments," a short list of guiding principles printed on a card that advisors could carry in their pockets, has also been discussed previously. It was distributed to all advisors in 1953.

Advisors welcomed these tangible statements of what they were supposed to do. Earlier issuance of the "Advisor's Procedure Guide" and "The Ten Commandments" probably would have avoided some advisors' criticisms of their orientation and briefing at KMAG Hq.

In the future such materials should be made available for distribution in MAAGs where advisors are separated from their headquarters, and an attempt should be made to prepare and distribute them in advance of tactical operations when possible.

Briefings cannot be considered fully satisfactory substitutes for such printed instructions and directives, although in emergencies less than fully satisfactory procedures must often be employed.

### BREAKING IN ON THE JOB

To facilitate breaking in on the job and specific briefing at the unit level—concerning the job as well as counterparts and units—most advisors recommended a period of overlap between the time a new advisor reported to his ROKA unit and the old advisor left. Such a period need not be long. Almost all the advisors said that something less than 2 weeks was required; a majority thought that 1 week or less was all that was necessary (Table 6).

Table 6

#### OVERLAP REQUIRED

Time	Percent of 255 respondents
None	3
1 or 2 days	13
3 to 6 days	42
1 to 2 weeks	31
Over 2 weeks	6
No answer	5
Total	100

Staff advisors tended to believe that more overlap was required for their jobs than did command advisors (Table 7). This was presumably because they felt that it took time to learn the complicated procedures and paper work necessary to work with the ROKA, whereas the command advisors had more "direct" jobs based on familiar tactical doctrine. An experienced command advisor could impart his experience to his counterpart without the necessity for elaborate briefing in particular procedures.

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Even for the command advisors, however, some briefing or breaking in was considered necessary. Its importance was pointed up by the following statement of an artillery battalion advisor:

I had little trouble taking over the battalion. Three American officers and several enlisted men were still with the battalion, completing its training. They were able to break me in. It's a real problem if you don't have anyone to break you in. You have to get to know the battalion, to know which officers you can work with and which you are wasting your time with.

Table 7

OVERLAP REQUIRED FOR VARIOUS KMAG ASSIGNMENTS

Time	Percent of respondents in various KMAG assignments			
	Of 33 Hq and staff advisors	Of 36 Inf Regt advisors	Of 43 Arty advisors	Of 45 Tech Sec advisors
None	1	—	10	3
1 or 2 days	6	19	23	11
3 to 6 days	35	44	42	49
1 to 2 weeks	42	33	23	28
Over 2 weeks	10	—	2	8
No answer	6	4	—	2
Total	100	100	100	100

The Chief of KMAG recognized the desirability of a period of overlap with an advisor's predecessor. He pointed out why it could not be achieved as often as desired.

This was precluded by personnel problems beyond the control of KMAG, which did not provide for any overlap of advisors on the job.

A period of overlap for advisors is desirable but it must be kept in mind that personnel ceilings and shortages of personnel during combat do not habitually permit this.

In general the period of breaking in lasted considerably longer than the basic overlap period. Even so most advisors felt that they were fairly well broken in on the job by the time 1 month had passed. Most, in fact, said that 2 weeks accomplished this purpose (Table 8).

Obviously the period of breaking in depended on the complexity of the job, and for such officers as division advisors it took longer than for others. Even in these cases, however, the period did not last longer than a few weeks, as witness this typical statement by a Senior Advisor to a ROKA division: "In my first three weeks with the division, I did no advising. I had to feel my way into the situation. I learned the tactical situation first, then the supply situation."

A caution against too long an overlap during the break-in period was voiced by one advisor: "Too much break-in (overlap) tends to let the new advisor assume the prejudices of his predecessor. Old KMAGers were frequently bitter."

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Some advisors whose personalities were not well suited to advisory duty showed their maladjustment to this type of duty by bitterness; others expressed feelings of frustration, some even bordering on despair.

The biggest factor in dislike of the job is the people you are working with, the fact that you think you have arrived at the point where you are accomplishing something and then the next day they have it all backward. There is a tremendous sense of frustration. You are dealing with people who think differently from you, act much more slowly.

Table 8

### TIME REQUIRED TO BREAK IN TO PRESENT JOB

Time	Percent of 255 respondents
None	16
Less than 2 weeks	42
1 month	32
2 months	5
3 months or longer	2
No answer	5
Total	100

<sup>a</sup>Less than one-half of 1 percent.

Some advisors also pointed out that among their number were some who were judged to be incompetent. "In many cases KMAG was handicapped because the quality of available personnel was not sufficiently high for them to absorb completely the many elements of the complex situation." The new advisor is considered to be better off with no overlap or breaking in with an ineffective predecessor.

### ADVISABILITY OF LEARNING LOCAL LANGUAGE

In spite of the problems created by the language barrier, advisors did not universally agree that training in the Korean language should be made a prerequisite for KMAG duty. The majority of the advisors questioned believed the advisor needed no training in Korean or only a cursory acquaintance with basic terms and phrases (Table 9). Some advisors did learn enough Korean in the first few weeks or months of their advisory duties to demonstrate that most others could have done so too if they had tried.

The experience of KMAG advisors, and also of their ROKA counterparts demonstrated that it was possible for US personnel to operate successfully as advisors even though they knew practically no Korean. However, the task was more difficult, frustrations more frequent, and distaste or even intense dislike for their assignment much more common among the group of KMAG advisors who made no effort to learn the local language. In short, facility in the indigenous language was an asset to the KMAG advisor, but it was possible to operate successfully without it.

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The greater interest and success of foreigners in learning English probably contributed to the attitude often heard expressed among American personnel: "If they want something from us, let them learn English. Why should we learn their language when we will only be here for a short time?" "No point in Americans learning Korean—we'll be in Timbuktu next year."

Table 9

### NECESSITY FOR LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION

Need	Percent of 255 respondents
None	42
Enough to understand basic terms and phrases	42
Enough to converse, though not with ease	7
Enough to converse with ease	3
Enough to converse fluently	5
No answer	3
Total	100

Even though American personnel demonstrated resistance or reluctance to learning Korean, all evidence in the form of observed relations and interview information indicated that even a modest effort to learn the Korean language paid rich dividends to those advisors who made the attempt. It is probable that rudimentary knowledge of the language facilitated communication, but, however slightly it may have done so, the effect on the Koreans was to stimulate them to even more strenuous efforts to learn English. Moreover, rapport was apparently strengthened, and its by-product seemed to be greater responsiveness to the advisor's suggestions.

The situation in Korea indicated that American military personnel will probably never be available in sufficient number to meet the demand for linguists in each of the indigenous languages of the many countries in which the US Army or US military advisors may be required to function. This situation does not suggest an all-or-none decision. The experience in Korea illustrates that a continuous and even expanded training program at the Army Language School would undoubtedly be worth its cost to train a limited number of military career linguists to levels of competence that would enable them to serve in high-level discussions and negotiations. A greater number (including Reserves) with enough mastery of the language to serve with missions or at headquarters and in coalition operations when needed would also help protect American interests.<sup>4</sup>

For the majority of military personnel assigned to KMAC and to other MAAGs, there can be no doubt that a rudimentary knowledge of the indigenous language is an asset not to be overlooked as part of the advisor's stock in trade. Short courses or self-instruction materials would be useful to advisors. Whether or not such materials are supplied, the advisor with some effort on

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his own part can pick up an elementary working knowledge of some of the more common words and expressions. Korean personnel were eager to help advisors who showed interest in learning their language. Language knowledge, however modest it may have been, facilitated the work of advising for those advisors who made the effort necessary to acquire it.

It will be recalled that 102 Korean respondents to a questionnaire (see Table 5) considered language knowledge less important than knowledge of Korean customs on the part of KMAAG advisors and other US officers with whom they had to unite.\*

It is interesting to note that in none of the questionnaires completed by Koreans was there any suggestion that Americans should take the trouble to learn the Korean language. On the contrary, 18 percent of the questionnaires contained suggestions or requests that the respondent be given a chance to learn English. In fact Koreans seemed to attribute difficulties in communication to their own inability to speak English rather than the inability of Americans to speak Korean.† For example, many Korean respondents to the questionnaires reported that they had experienced difficulties with Americans because as Koreans they did not know the English language (Table 10). Another type of evidence—the common, widespread study of English by Koreans, particularly officers of higher ranks—indicated that was a quite genuine attitude rather than a shibboleth.‡

Table 10

### KOREANS' DIFFICULTY IN COMMUNICATION WITH AMERICANS

Responses of Koreans	Percent of respondents
Experienced difficulty with Americans because did not know English	45
Experienced no difficulty with Americans because did not know English	21
No response	34
Total	100

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Conclusions

1. A tour as a MAAG advisor is sufficiently unique and important duty to justify some special preparation on the part of an officer.

\*It is conceivable, however, that the Americans' inability to understand Korean gave Koreans one advantage; namely, security and freedom to exchange information among themselves in the presence of Americans without the Americans knowing what they were talking about.

†In appraising this situation, allowance was made for the typical Oriental form of courtesy in which one always expresses personal unworthiness or blame for any inconvenience to another person.

‡Ability to speak English was to the personal advantage of the Korean—in professional and in economic values. No equivalent advantage existed for the US officer who learned the Korean language.

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would an American officer of superior rank. Such behavior preserves a formal status in which a general officer can accept the counsel of an officer of lower rank, as he would that of a staff officer. However, in the case of many lower-ranking counterparts, address often could be much less formal after the initial period of rapport-building. As with higher-ranking ROKA officers the advisor saluted his counterpart, in formal situations, if the latter were superior to him in rank.

Although some advisors also tried to build a cordial, informal relation with their counterparts, the majority relied on their professional competence and on an atmosphere of mutual respect to get the job done.

I was always formal at the CP; in our personal quarters we were very informal. KMAG must win the confidence of ROK counterparts in the first month in strictly formal contacts.

I worked hard to gain the respect of the ROKs. I took pains not to think of the Koreans as "gooks." You've got to treat them like human beings.

Unfortunately some advisors found it difficult to conceal their personal feelings of superiority. Koreans were quick to recognize this attitude.

One high-ranking KMAG officer\* summarized his own experience and his wide observation of relations between advisors and their ROKA counterparts by saying: "The best way of dealing with a Korean officer was to treat him with the same courtesy and respect one would use with an American officer of the same rank."

This study indicates that when courtesy and respect for the Korean officer are based on the sincere attitudes of the US officer, advisor-counterpart relations are facilitated. To the extent the advisor is able to make his experience, judgment, and military competence helpful to his counterpart, the ROKA officer responds with similarly sincere expressions of courtesy, respect, and personal consideration for the advisor's advice, comfort, and interests.

### Problem of Rank

Another factor to be taken into consideration in discussing the establishment of rapport between individual advisors and their counterparts is difference in rank. In the majority of instances the advisor was no more than one or two ranks lower than his counterpart. This difference seemed to have worked out satisfactorily in most cases. From the US point of view, nearly equal rank guaranteed that the advisors had enough background to advise effectively. At the same time, less than equal rank made more economical use of the available pool of qualified officers.

Questionnaire respondents were asked, "How much difference in rank can there be between a KMAG advisor and his counterpart without creating difficulties?" The large majority reported that the advisor could be one or two ranks below his counterpart (Table 12).

One-half the respondents thought that difference in rank between advisor and counterpart should not be greater than one rank; one-third thought it could be two ranks. The research team observed evidence of good rapport between

\* This US officer established a cordial and lasting friendship with his Korean counterpart, based on mutual respect. As an expression of his high regard for his US advisor the Korean officer named his son with the given name of the US officer.

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Several higher-ranking officers in KMAG believed that respect for advisors and relations between advisors and counterparts were fostered by maintaining KMAG as an example of a tight military organization, exhibiting the formalities of military courtesy. Evidences of this policy were observed. KMAG officers were expected to wear scarves and carry officers' batons at certain times. Although fatigues were the uniform of the day they were tailored, and were freshly laundered each day. A number of KMAG advisors stationed there commented, "KMAG Hq is too formal." Others commented, "KMAG Hq is no more formal than any large headquarters" and some added "in the States."

The Chief of KMAG believed these more formal aspects of tighter military discipline and high standards of military courtesy and dress of US officers earned the respect of ROKA Hq personnel. Rank, position, and prestige were important to Koreans. It is probable that respect and confidence were more closely associated with tight control, strict discipline, and the formalities of military courtesy than many KMAG advisors realized.

It was reasonable that relations between KMAG and ROKA officers were somewhat different at fixed installations such as headquarters than at the necessarily less permanent CPs of tactical units in the field. It was also probable that relations at higher levels of rank were typically more formal—although not less cordial.

### EFFECTIVE METHODS OF DEALING WITH COUNTERPART

As illustrated by Table 15, the large majority of advisors agreed that the most effective way of dealing with their counterparts in the daily process of

Table 15

#### MOST EFFECTIVE METHODS OF DEALING WITH COUNTERPART

Methods	Percent of respondents <sup>a</sup>		
	Of total 255	Of 72 isolated advisors	Of 183 others
Talking over problems with him	76	81	75
Making suggestions to him	73	85	69
Giving him general instructions as to what he should do	18	13	20
Telling him what to do and exactly how to do it	2	—	3
Letting him learn things by watching you do them	6	1	—
Other	2	3	1
No answer	7	—	8

<sup>a</sup>Totals add to more than 100 percent because respondents checked more than one method. They were asked to check two.

<sup>b</sup>Less than one-half of 1 percent.

advising was talking over problems and making suggestions. This approach, which is the training approach, permits the ROKA officer to carry out the functions of his position himself while drawing on his advisor for guidance. As

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ROKs don't ask for advice.... You have to be aware of what's going on and make suggestions.

I travelled with my counterpart all the time. He would ask questions. If he didn't, I would offer advice.

Table 19 reveals the circumstances under which advisors offered advice. The great majority of KMAGers made suggestions to their counterparts whenever they felt that it might be helpful. In so doing they asserted their advisory role aggressively, as they should have done.

Table 19

### CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH ADVISOR OFFERS ADVICE

Circumstance	Percent of 255 respondents
Usually only when a critical situation has arisen	2
Usually only when things appear likely to go wrong	7
At any time suggestions might be helpful	85
No answer	7
Total	100

\*Less than one-half of 1 percent.

Only relatively few advisors waited until things appeared likely to go wrong or until a critical situation had already arisen.\* The majority tried to premeditate and prevent rather than correct mistakes.

An illustration may serve to clarify the advisor-counterpart relation in the process of give-and-take discussion and advice. A Senior Division Advisor, whose counterpart was CG of the 1st ROK Division, was discussing how advantage could be pressed against the enemy when he was off-balance. The advisor made the point of prompt pursuit and the possibility of inflicting a decisive defeat and asked for the commander's idea of how he could exploit his advantage. The ROKA commander† suggested a plan involving a river crossing at a shallow point some distance away and a flanking movement to cut off the enemy's retreat and reinforcement route while maintaining pressure directly ahead. Capabilities and logistics details were then discussed. (The commander's proposed plan was even more bold and venturesome than the advisor had in mind; but the commander's more intimate knowledge of the terrain and area and the prospect of success made the commander's plan appear good to the KMAG advisor.) "Good idea?" asked the ROKA commander in English. "Very good," answered the advisor. "Me do," answered the commander, and he did. The action was carried through promptly, an important city was taken, and a whole motor vehicle park and all equipment were captured in the flanking movement.

\*It is possible that in rare instances advisors may have been guided by the principle that a reluctant addressee can be brought to welcome advice more frequently if allowed to make minor mistakes or verge on more serious ones because he did not seek or follow advice early enough.

†Brig Gen Paik Sam Yup, later Lt Gen and ROKA Chief of Staff. (Source Col Robert Hazlett, Senior Division Advisor, capture of Pyongyang, October 1951.)

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At other times the ROKA commander might originate a discussion by referring to a situation and asking the advisor, "What you think?" Then, after considering the pros and cons, if the decision were "good" or "OK," or sometimes even the Korean colloquial "Number One," the ROKA commander would conclude, "Me do."

The advisor's responsibility, however, does not end with the commander's decision to "do." From this point on the advisor is a close observer of each step in carrying the decision through, making a quiet suggestion such as "Do you think it would be a good idea to...?" or "What are you going to do about...?" where some necessary order or action may not have been evident.

### VISITS TO THE FIELD

#### Checking and Inspection by Advisors

In the course of the many interviews conducted with KMAGers frequent reference was made to the necessity for advisors constantly to check on their counterparts and on the ROKA field installations they commanded. In some cases this necessity existed because the inexperience or lack of ability of ROKA officers necessitated constant supervision to ensure efficient operations and safeguard tactical situations. In other cases vigilance on the part of the advisor was called for to prevent abuses of military material or its utilization for nonmilitary purposes. Still other reasons were to ensure that ROKA rations were being properly distributed and to see that ROKA officers were doing as much as possible to provide at least minimum sanitary conditions for their troops.

The following comments illustrate the type of problems that made checking by visits to units in the field a regular responsibility of the advisor.

The senior division advisor must constantly inspect to be sure that he is informed of the tactical situation and of any supply irregularities.

Often at inspections I would find Company Commanders could not account for their personnel. When I discovered this I would make it a point to have the Company Commander account for every man. In the beginning they would give me as many excuses as inexperienced American Army Company Commanders would give. Here again, is the case of corrective action to be taken by the advisor.

On a normal day I tried to check each of the three firing batteries. I also checked weapon and vehicular maintenance. I would check with the S-3 to see where the equipment was supposed to be. Then I'd go out to see if it was actually there. We had four graders and 150 miles of road to take care of; the grader was generally there, but the driver was asleep. Sometimes reports would come in that the job was completed, but it was so often incomplete that finally, standing orders were issued that the equipment was always to be kept at the job until the advisor could get there and check it.

Then you go out to a regiment. You go into a motor pool, check the maintenance records, spot check the vehicles, and make recommendations about improving efficiency. When regiments came off the line we made complete showdown inspections. This was done by a team of ROKs under the division ordnance officer and was checked by the advisors. Once a month we would inspect all vehicles and all ordnance material of all service units. But I feel that more comes out of spot checks. . . . They prepare too well for scheduled inspections. They really shine things up.\*

\*KMAG officers pointed out, however, that this preparation for "inspection" is not unlike that made by US troops.

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The most important function of the advisor was to check requisitions. That is the only control you have over them. An American officer signs the requisition in the US Army, but in the ROK Army the CO leaves his chop\* on the desk and his subordinates use it to sign. It's all out of order. They requisition too much.... The advisor has to check. The present group CO is pretty good about this; he signs his own name. He is honest but he couldn't check all the requisitions. The checking is supposed to be done by his staff, hence there were often faulty requisitions. But the advisor always checked.

Their ammo supply companies could operate on their own, without advisors, though not as efficiently as with one. They would wander off the team—pretty up the yard when they should be moving ammo, take off and go gardening and not get back to work on time after lunch, store wrong materials next to others like the time they put the white phosphorus illuminating shells next to the rockets—an explosion in the white phosphorus would set the rockets off. They put too much dynamite in one stack—I caught them once putting 50 tons of demolition material, dynamite, composition C, etc., in one stack when the limit should have been 20 tons.

### Frequency of Visits

Depending on their individual assignments KMACers had varying opinions as to the proper frequency and importance of visits by advisors to field installations under their counterpart's command, as shown in Table 20. Eighty-nine percent of the infantry regiment advisors and seventy-five percent of artillery advisors believed that advisors should check field installations at least several times weekly. Most headquarters and technical service advisors, who responded also felt that such frequent visits were desirable.

Table 20

#### DESIRABLE FREQUENCY OF VISITS TO FIELD INSTALLATIONS UNDER COUNTERPART'S COMMAND

Frequency of visits	Percent of respondents in various KMAC assignments			
	Of 83 Hq and staff advisors	Of 36 Inf Regt advisors	Of 48 Artillery advisors	Of 65 Tech Svc advisors
Less than once a week	7	—	—	3
At least once a week	23	8	12	29
Twice a week	5	3	12	3
Several times a week	16	25	33	29
Practically every day	31	64	43	30
No answer	18	—	—	6
Total	100	100	100	100

Probably because of the physical proximity in which they operated, infantry regiment advisors, artillery advisors, and technical advisors all found it more possible to meet acceptable standards of frequency of field visits than advisors at headquarters installations. Table 21 indicates that a much higher proportion of regimental advisors than of other types of advisors meet these self-imposed

\*Personal seal used in the Orient to sign documents, similar to a rubber stamp.

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standards. The most frequently mentioned reason for failure to visit field installations as often as was considered desirable was that administrative duties and other responsibilities kept advisors too busy. "KMAC Hq personnel did not get out to visit enough. Pressure of work at the Hq made visits difficult to schedule."

Table 21

## DEGREE TO WHICH DESIRABLE FREQUENCY OF VISITS TO FIELD INSTALLATIONS COULD BE ACHIEVED

Frequency of visit	Percent of respondents in various KMAC assignments			
	Of 83 Hq and staff advisors	Of 36 Inf Regt advisors	Of 48 Arty advisors	Of 45 Tech Svc advisors
Usually found it possible to visit field installations as often as I felt I should	42	41	75	42
Usually did not find it possible to visit field installations as often as I felt I should	37	19	23	35
My job was such that I did not need to visit field installations	10	—	2	—
No answer	11	—	—	3
Total	100	100	100	100

Table 22

## MOST IMPORTANT ITEMS TO CHECK ON VISITS TO FIELD INSTALLATIONS

Items to check	Percent of respondents in various KMAC assignments <sup>a</sup>			
	Of 83 Hq and staff advisors	Of 36 Inf Regt advisors	Of 48 Arty advisors	Of 45 Tech Svc advisors
Maintenance of heavy and technical equipment, vehicles, and weapons	19	19	32	32
Supply levels, logistics	24	19	10	10
Physical condition of troops	13	28	17	8
Tactical situation	11	17	21	6
Administrative matters	14	6	10	14
Condition of buildings and installations	7	14	4	2
Food, mess facilities	10	11	6	3
Personnel utilization	2	6	4	6
Communications	2	6	12	2
Coordination and cooperation with other units	1	3	—	3
Other; checking to see that counterpart is "doing his job"	12	30	10	15
No answer	16	—	4	3

<sup>a</sup>Totals add to more than 100 percent because most respondents checked more than one item.

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### **Substance of Inspections or Supervision**

As reported in Table 22, headquarters advisors felt it was particularly important to check supply levels and logistics and maintenance of weapons and equipment, and somewhat less important to check on administrative matters and the physical condition of the troops. Among infantry regiment advisors the emphasis was on general checking to see that ROKA counterparts were doing their job, and on the physical condition of the troops, logistics, maintenance, and the tactical situation. Artillery advisors were particularly concerned with maintenance and care of weapons and equipment; they also felt it important to check on the tactical situation, the physical condition of the troops, and on communications. Technical advisors were most involved with logistics, maintenance, and administrative matters.\* "Field advisor must constantly be out checking--just as any commander should." The checking of maintenance and supply ranked high not only because of the intrinsic importance of these matters but also because of strong Korean tendencies toward neglect, misuse, or diversion of equipment and supplies.

### **CONCLUSIONS**

(1) The following factors were of high importance for a KMAC advisor to work effectively with his ROKA counterpart:

(a) Establishing rapport based on mutual confidence and respect for ability, professional competence and experience, and on mutual regard and consideration for integrity and personality.

(b) Practicing military courtesy and protocol appropriate to the counterpart's rank and the advisor's level of operation as a member of the counterpart's personal staff.

(c) Maintaining close and constant association with counterpart during working hours, including visits to the field, and being available to observe and advise on all matters that arise.

(d) Checking and close inspection every day of the execution of the counterpart's orders and of the performance of subordinates and of the units involved.

(e) Initiating advice--in private--to the counterpart on all matters needing attention, with particular attention to premeditated problems and plans, decisions on current matters, and follow-up of orders or supervision of subordinates.

(2) In tactical units the advisor's personal safety, and sometimes his life, depended on his relation with his ROKA counterpart.

\* This distribution serves to point up the differences in the KMAC advisor's mission as one shifts from headquarters to field assignments.

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### SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN ADVISING

#### LANGUAGE BARRIER AND THE INTERPRETER PROBLEM

The obstacle presented by the language barrier must be constantly borne in mind as a complicating factor that made other problems more difficult for advisors to handle.\*

#### Communication with Counterparts

Since practically no advisors achieved or even attempted to achieve some mastery of the Korean language, communication with counterparts presented problems. Means relied on by advisors are reported in Table 23.

Table 23

#### METHODS OF COMMUNICATION WITH COUNTERPART

Method	Percent of 235 respondents*
English (no interpreter)	59
Korean (no interpreter)	—
ROKA interpreter	19
Korean civilian interpreter	3
US Army interpreter	—
Pictures, writing, or gestures	25
Other	2
No answer	6

\*Adds to more than 100 percent because some advisors checked more than one method.

The largest number of KMAgers necessarily relied on the ROKA interpreters attached to the advised unit for communication with their counterparts. However, most advisors considered speaking directly to their counterparts in English, if the counterpart understood some English, the most effective means of communication and advisors used this method extensively.

\* The language problem is also discussed in two other ORO memorandums.<sup>3,4</sup> In the data collection stage for language study a different questionnaire and a separate set of interviews particularly focused on language problems were independently administered to KMAC advisors. The results of this study<sup>3</sup> confirm the findings reported here. That portion of the study that bears on the KMAC language problem is reproduced in App D.



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The Korean commander with whom I worked was 28 years old, a general. I tried to teach him English and he proved an eager and apt pupil. Advisors look for a cooperative attitude on the part of the ROK officers and their willingness to learn English is an indication of it. I had one ranking Korean officer removed from his job because he was uncooperative and would not try to learn English.

I spoke directly to my counterpart and no serious situation resulted. If I tell them something and they don't get it, I know it. When I see that smile come on their faces, I know they got it.

The latter comment illustrates a danger in direct communication in English. The advisor who relies on a smile from his counterpart to indicate understanding runs the risk of delusion. It is likely that the idea that gets across to the counterpart is not the idea the advisor intended. Such pseudo comprehension can result in serious error. The advisor must make certain of his counterpart's idea by following up on details of implementing plans or by independent translation into English, through an interpreter, after the counterpart has indicated his "understanding."

It was common for ROKA commanders to study English. Many of them could grasp simple statements spoken in English; some could speak English well enough to converse. Almost all high-ranking Korean officers down to division commanders, and a considerable number below that level, particularly in technical units, training centers, and schools, were able to converse in English.\* One KMAG officer who during his tour of duty as KMAG G3, had four different counterparts reported: "I never used an interpreter with three of my four counterparts. They all could speak English very well. With the fourth I sometimes used an interpreter." This investigator had similar experiences with ROKA officers. Only about one out of four general officers and colonels with whom he spoke (in English) required an interpreter to converse; whereas about three out of every four lieutenant colonels depended on interpreters. Unfortunately, however, although English was often used it was not always adequate. Direct communication in English often needed to be supplemented by reliance on interpreters.

### Competence of Interpreters

The interpreter system, the most common means for conversation between advisors and counterparts, was far from ideal. In many cases the interpreters were inadequately trained to do a really competent job. This was particularly true where the mission of the advised ROKA unit involved the use of higher-order military and technical equipment and concepts. Most interpreters had learned their English as liberal arts students in the Korean universities. Taken into the ROKA, many of them were commissioned directly as lieutenant interpreter-officers without any further training in military or technical terminology.†

\* Many higher-ranking Korean officers had been preselected for ability to understand English, first to be sent to US service schools for training and later for assignment to key spots in the ROKA.

† Later some effort was made to give interpreters a short OCS course, to assist in acquainting them with military situations and terms. This was done as part of the training in the Interpreters School, one unit of the ROKA AG School.

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The following quotations illustrate the variety of opinions concerning interpreters:

We're hindered by an insufficient number of good interpreters. Interpreters are assigned from ROK headquarters as first lieutenants. The pay is very low and they draw low calibre people. There are good interpreters at high echelons. We could not operate without them.

Language is probably our biggest problem. The ROKs... make a genuine effort to learn English. It's been suggested that we learn Korean, but that is difficult. Interpreters vary in quality. The one we use most of the time is excellent; he understands slang.... The language barrier slows down the operation all the time. Interpreters are students who learned the English language. I recommend that they be given a course in military instruction and terminology. Now, they don't know what you mean by MSR, and so forth.

The language barrier is most serious. Interpreters are not familiar with technical terms.... [They] are not trained in tactics, they need more training.

The battalion CO didn't speak English, but he had two interpreters who had been with the battalion for two years and knew their stuff. They could have been artillery officers, and they knew English well. I had the interpreters run missions like the S-3. They knew all the artillery terms.

They go from excellent to poor. It varies by the individual.... I had an excellent interpreter who knew the job and helped me to do my job.

I had three interpreters of whom two could not speak English. One of these would "translate" written English to Korean. One could speak a little. He would say he understood but experience showed that he didn't.

The interpreter should be given a basic course in the branch concerned. He doesn't have the vocabulary to put technical things over to his counterpart.

There were four [interpreters] at division. They tend not to be the best. The best seem to be at headquarters; they get worse as you go down the line.

I had no trouble whatsoever.... I had a good interpreter; he made polite but accurate translations. I could check on this through an American sergeant who spoke Korean.

As the following statements indicate, advisors often managed to find means for circumventing the interpreter stumbling block; in some cases they were fortunate enough to have counterparts who attempted to learn and understand English themselves and in other cases they used civilian houseboys, who, though they had only picked up "GI English" and a local variety of pidgin English, often had a better grasp of the language than some of the interpreters.

They [the ROKs] used schoolboys, university students, who have studied from four to ten years of English, as interpreters.... They are generally poor interpreters; the ROK Chief of Staff and the Commander of the \_\_\_ Division could speak English. Most senior officers had learned English—especially to understand, rather than to speak it. Later KMAGers conformed to the Korean Army practice of having houseboys. I had a seventeen year old. He soon learned to speak English and interpreted to the interpreter. This was typical.

I had a civilian interpreter. He had been with the Company for three and a half years. He spoke fair English and knew ordnance terms. He had served as a houseboy and he was better than a ROK interpreter. I could talk normally with officers through this interpreter using simple sentences.

One KMAG advisor summarized the situation in the following statement:

Believe this [interpreter] problem is overemphasized. Dealing with interpreters was frustrating, but with experience the advisor could learn how to use them and tell

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them when they were misinterpreting or being evasive. Many of the problems are from Advisors assuming the interpreter knows fluent English and talking too rapidly or using unfamiliar words.

### Distortion by Interpreters

The interpreter problem was further complicated because the situation was structured in such a way that whereas the KMAG advisor was forced to rely heavily on the interpreter, the latter often could not or would not act in a manner that could be relied on. This was mainly due to the fact that the interpreter was an officer in the ROKA, under the administrative and disciplinary control of the same superior ROKA officers who were being assisted by the particular KMAG advisor for whom the interpreter was working. Add to this the fact that because of differences of a social, educational, and military background, antagonism or lack of respect often existed between interpreters and other ROKA officers. As one KMAGer put it, "Interpreters are torn between the devil and the deep." As interpreter for the KMAG advisor, his job was to transmit advice from the advisor to his counterpart, to furnish the advisor with needed information from his counterpart, and generally to facilitate communication between the two. As a ROKA officer under the control of ROKA commanders he was frequently under actual or assumed obligation to distort or withhold from the advisor information that might prove embarrassing to his ROKA superiors. In addition interpreters were reluctant to interpret strongly worded advice or corrections accurately for fear of offending their superiors. The net result of these attitudes was that interpreters sometimes distorted or modified advice or colored or completely held back information the advisor should have had. Thus some advisors reported that "all ROKs have a tendency to lie—to save face" or that interpreters "cover for their ROK superiors."

The relationship between the ROK officer and the interpreter is also important. The interpreters are often considered schoolboys and the officers expect the interpreters to protect them, not to tell the truth to their boss, the advisor.

The language problem is the biggest problem with advising. . . . Interpreters pull the same old stunt; they misinterpret in order to keep from offending. The interpreters figure that when we [the Americans] go, they've "had it" if they alienate their ROK commander.

I have experienced the same problem, i.e., information being distorted by interpreters. When I suspected such a practice I would use my Korean chauffeur, who was a fair interpreter, and question him about a conversation between my counterpart and me as passed through the interpreter. Often I would be informed that the interpreter did not convey my thoughts to the Korean counterpart. It was necessary, therefore, to bring this deficiency to the attention of my counterpart in a very diplomatic manner to "save face" on the part of the interpreter.

That the problem of distortion is an important one is borne out by the figures in Table 24. Although one-half the advisors believed it was "not too serious," one-third considered the distortion problem "serious" or "very serious." Only 12 percent said the issue is "not serious at all."

Distortion by interpreters also arose from the Oriental tendency to "tell you what will please you." It is significant that this type of distortion was frequently mentioned in informal conversations with US personnel in the Far East but was infrequently mentioned by KMAG personnel. For example: "They tell

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you what they think you would like to hear. It's common for them to distort the truth. You must correct this privately, so they won't lose 'face.' Once they lose 'face' you can't do anything with them. They get so far down that they can't get over it." Both in free response or questionnaires and in serious conversations and structured interviews with KMAG and Eighth Army this problem, when mentioned, was usually an afterthought. It appears that "the tendency to

Table 24

### SERIOUSNESS OF PROBLEM OF DISTORTION BY INTERPRETERS

Seriousness of problem	Percent of 255 respondents
Very serious	13
Serious	21
Not too serious	50
Not serious at all	12
No answer	4
Total	100

give answers that please" was not too frequent a problem for KMAG advisors, when the "answers" were important to their safety, success, and security of the individuals themselves, their unit, and their country. This more serious regard for the truth in advisor-counterpart relation may have been a product of closer rapport between the two as well as of the import and personal consequences of the truth among brothers in arms facing action or impending combat operations.

#### Assignment of Interpreters

Primarily because they believed that it was the best way to ensure more reliable interpreting, a majority of advisors reported that interpreters should be assigned to the staff of the KMAG advisor rather than to that of his ROKA counterpart. Advisors who favored this shift felt that it would have the effect of protecting interpreters from possible reprisals or disciplinary action by their ROKA superiors, and would also structure the situation so that the interpreter's primary duty clearly would be to further the advisory mission by seeing that the advisor received complete and accurate information and by interpreting for him in the same spirit. As one such advisor phrased it, "If interpreters are given some sort of immunity from domination by their ROK superiors, they can do their job." Advisors also favored the attachment of interpreters to the KMAG staff because such assignment would make the interpreter constantly available to the advisor and in general give the advisor better control of the situation. Table 25 summarizes these views.

Those advisors who believed it better that interpreters remain under ROKA control gave several reasons. Some believed that in the ROKA the interpreter was in a better position to help the advisor because he was on the spot and could see if advice was being carried out and report to the advisor. Others

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believed that for administrative and disciplinary reasons it was better to keep the interpreters under ROKA control, and a few felt that serving with US units would reduce the interpreter's chances for advancement in the ROKA. Advisors who responded that it didn't make any difference whether the interpreter was attached to the KMAG or ROKA staffs were generally those who felt that the interpreters were incompetent and that the nature of their assignment could not alter their basic incompetence.

Table 25

### SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT OF INTERPRETERS

Suggested assignment	Percent of 255 respondents
Should be assigned to the KMAG advisor's staff	58
Should not be assigned to advisor's staff	22
Doesn't make any difference	16
No answer	4
Total	100

Of even more significance, however, some advisors reported that no matter whether the interpreters were assigned to the ROKA or to KMAG they would still feel a primary loyalty to the ROK, if only because the Americans will some day leave Korea, and when that happens the ex-interpreters will be left to the tender mercies of any ROKA commander whom they may have happened to offend. An example of this view follows:

The assignment of interpreters to KMAG detachments will solve nothing. The pressure placed on interpreters will not be lessened. In fact, it would probably be increased. Such action may, in some small measure, release daily pressure. However, the interpreter fully realizes that eventually the ROK commander can reach him. This is a very real problem that can be solved only by the advisor through an astute and comprehensive analysis of his counterpart plus an untiring effort to insure that he is as well aware of the facts as his counterpart.

It is doubtful if assignment of interpreters to KMAG rather than the ROKA would materially change the basic difficulty. It appears that the interpreter situation will continue to be a difficulty inherent in the KMAG situation, and that effort should be directed toward making the best of it instead of seeking panaceas.

An aid in the solution of the language problem suggested by several advisors is that all communications being sent to advised units be presented in both Korean and English, so that no matter which staff gets the message first it will be understandable. Advisors feel that such a procedure would increase efficiency markedly. How much this might slow communications is not known; it could be tried experimentally and the results judged.

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### GETTING INFORMATION

One of the most serious problems KMAGers faced in carrying out their functions as advisors and as sources of tactical information for Eighth Army was the difficulty involved in getting responsible reports from their counterparts. Quite often this happened when the military situation was unfavorable and the counterpart was reluctant to give the advisor information that might reveal that he had made a mistake or had made a poor showing. Magnified by the Korean emphasis on face, such a discovery on the part of an advisor and the counterpart's own superiors might seem severely humiliating to a ROKA officer, in addition to exposing him to possible corrective action. Another possible cause of this reluctance to give the advisor complete information, even when the military situation was not unfavorable, was the desire of the ROKA officer to be on his own—to show that he could operate independently of an advisor. Often, too, the advisor had trouble getting information simply because the staff and clerical work of the Koreans were slow (as judged by American standards), their administrative procedures were cumbersome, and their communications were less efficient than American communications.

The reports are slow—done by hand. If they're needed in a hurry, they would work day and night.

Koreans take longer on reports. Translation, copying, mail service, etc. are much slower. Americans do these things much faster. Advisors have to learn to accept it.\*

As indicated in Table 26, nearly one-half the KMAGers reported that they had difficulty in getting information "sometimes," "frequently," or "almost always" when the military situation was unfavorable; this figure dropped to one-third when the situation was favorable or static.

The following statements by KMAG officers provide some examples of the difficulties experienced by advisors in getting complete and accurate reports:

In any adverse situation we got no information. When things are going well we get plenty of information, but as soon as they had any casualties we got no information.

There is difficulty getting strength reports; they wouldn't report people in hospitals, etc., if they weren't immediately available for duty. They tried to beef up allowances.

Americans have made some progress in getting accurate reports—but not much. ... one outfit had orders to take a hill. They announced that they had taken it. KMAG reported to Corps and everyone relaxed. Then came the report that the hill had not been taken. The ROKs then denied that they had said they took it. KMAG found out it hadn't been taken because the volume of phone traffic continued high; the ROKs run their fights by phone. The interpreter knew the ROKs were lying but wouldn't say anything. He'd rather deny the whole thing later.... Patrol reports were also not accurate.†

\* Koreans were slowed in making reports by their time-consuming methods of hand copying and hand duplicating, without typewriters and duplicating equipment as in US units.<sup>2</sup>

† Things like this happened; still, the KMAGer had performed an operational role in reporting to corps that the hill had been taken. The ROKA commander should have made the report, and thereby would have been responsible for the information.

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These comments refer to tactical and operational reports. A special problem existed with regard to getting information about nonmilitary activities involving military equipment and personnel.

I had no trouble getting reports—except about what the trucks were doing. The \_\_\_th Co told me when a truck was out on a "kimchi run"\* and what it was doing; the \_\_\_th never let me know what their six Jap trucks were doing, although it kept its GI trucks pretty much on the job.

Table 26

### FREQUENCY OF DIFFICULTY IN GETTING INFORMATION FROM COUNTERPART

Frequency of difficulty	Percent of 255 respondents	
	Unfavorable military situation	Favorable or static military situation
Almost always	5	4
Frequent	13	7
Sometimes	27	21
Infrequent	34	23
Rare or never	22	34
No answer	9	6
Total	100	100

KMAGers found various means of dealing with the information and reports problem. Their solutions fell into three categories: (a) reduce these difficulties by winning the confidence of one's counterpart; (b) label the sources of information and reports made by US and by Korean personnel; and (c) enforce compliance. Comments typifying the last two solutions follow:

We submitted only KMAG-verified reports as official. Other reports stated "Korean sources report." This assists in evaluation.

I wouldn't trust any report made out by any ROK. You must depend on US reports.

From Army levels on down, you should require the counterparts to give information. If they don't, action should be taken against the Korean officer. The advisor gets tired of hearing lies and half-truths.... Korean officers may be competent but they won't give information. Therefore, it is not feasible to remove them. The only thing you can do is to make a report to the higher organization.

Both questionnaire and interview data indicated that the problem of getting information from or through ROKA counterparts was plagued with difficulties. Some difficulties were inherent in organizational factors, communications practices, the language, etc. Such difficulties as these existed even when ROK personnel wanted to supply information. Another type of difficulty represented human frailties, particularly the attitude of "cover up."

\*Unauthorized use or renting out of US Army trucks.

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They cover up. They do not admit their mistakes. They make a better story of an event. For instance, their after-action reports give the wrong story on MIA and overestimate enemy forces.

They [the ROKs] will count people present who are off in the woods cutting fuel or out scrounging food. They'll report 150 present when they may have only 75 there.

Inaccurate reports of jobs being completed were quite frequent. The CO was reluctant to admit he had not finished the job. You got daily reports that the job was 10 percent complete, 20 percent complete, etc., right on schedule, but inspection showed the contrary. I hate to think what would happen if we didn't have the advisor to check on this.

The inability to get information when needed was very annoying and frustrating to advisors.

It is probable that Koreans were frequently blamed for reluctance to pass along information when one cause of the difficulty may have been ineffectiveness in communications. During a period of active combat information flow was seriously delayed. It was at such times that KMAC advisors and US headquarters were particularly anxious to get information. At many such times information probably just was not available. The uncertainty of the accuracy of the meager reports that did reach ROKA commanders probably added to their reluctance to pass this information along into American channels.

It was also at such times that American headquarters were likely to use KMAC communications channels and KMAC advisors as sources of information and avenues for orders. It is possible that as KMAC channels became operational ROKA command channels were more reluctant to feed information into the KMAC system that might only result in the further complications to them of possibly receiving conflicting or uncoordinated orders through two chains of communication.

Over and beyond these deterrents to information flow must be added another. By Oriental standards poor information flow may have been acceptable; by US standards it was not. For Koreans to feed certain information into US command channels was to risk incurring displeasure, distrust, loss of confidence, and perhaps discipline or disgrace for the Korean commander.

Allowing for differences between American and Oriental standards in information flow in tactical situations, it is probably significant that one-half or more of the KMAC advisors did not report difficulty in getting information from their counterparts (Table 26). Progress has been made and improvement in information flow is continuing. This appears to be another illustration of the progress made in training Koreans on US doctrine and their readiness to adopt American ways in place of their traditional practices.

#### **SUPPLY, WELFARE-FUND, AND BLACK-MARKET PROBLEMS**

##### **Hoarding of Supplies**

KMAC advisors had to keep on the alert for overrequisitioning of supplies and had to check on the use of supplies. Many advisors reported that Koreans had a tendency to stockpile just in order to have lots of supplies and equipment on hand, and that if stockpiles, motor pools, and similar places were not checked

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carefully there was likely to be both overrequisitioning and inefficient usage of materiel on hand.

Certain peculiarities of the Korean situation led to notable abuses in the use of equipment and supplies. These abuses derived basically from the low state of the local economy and the low rate of pay in the ROKA. Neither officers nor men could live on their pay, especially if they had families to support.\*

### Welfare Funds

A widespread method of compensating for low pay was the creation of a so-called "welfare fund" in each military unit (the size of unit involved varied with circumstances). The unit engaged in commercial activities, the proceeds of which were placed in the welfare fund and periodically distributed to the officers and perhaps also to the enlisted men. Several kinds of money-earning activities were employed. Many of them created problems for the advisor.

One of the most common of these activities was the unauthorized use or renting of military vehicles to transport rice, lumber, and other supplies for purposes of sale on the civilian market. Every night an unknown number of Army trucks were out on the road on these trips, popularly called "kimchi runs."†

Some kimchi runs were legitimate. These involved the actual hauling of kimchi—the Koreans' favorite vegetable food—to military units. "Seoul was the principal source of kimchi [for units on the west side of the line]. All units had trucks involved—hauling vegetables to their units. They hauled charcoal, lumber, etc. down—kimchi back." The practical Koreans made their trucks carry pay loads both ways.

Some trucks were out for extended periods of time and made extremely long runs. In many cases trucks were not idle enough or were not subject to enough regular supervision to ensure proper maintenance. Often there was resistance on the part of commanding officers to deadline trucks for repair or maintenance, because deadlining decreased cash intake. KMAG advisors therefore paid particular attention to vehicle maintenance and attempted insofar as possible to prevent overuse of vehicles on commercial runs and to restrict these runs mostly to old Japanese Army trucks.

The KMAG officer had to watch for real abuses of supplies and of activities to support the welfare fund. This was difficult when he had only vague information to guide him (the activities of the welfare fund usually were shrouded in mystery). These abuses greatly increased the difficulties of his job. What the advisor had to watch for was to see that equipment was not being mistreated, that requisitions were justified, that supplies were not hoarded or diverted to illegitimate uses, and that profits were not being made at the expense of troops—that the latter were getting the rations and other supplies intended for them. Although he could not regulate the actual commercial

\* Monthly cash pay ranged from about 50 cents for a private to 8 dollars for a major general.<sup>2</sup> In addition a small rice allowance, about 1500 calories per person, was provided the soldier's family. This low pay rate is common in the Orient, and among "have not" countries elsewhere.

† The Korean Army had some Japanese Army trucks, expropriated when the Japanese Army surrendered in WWII. ROKA units had been supplied US Army trucks also. The Koreans considered their Japanese trucks as their "own" property, not accountable to the US in the same way as US trucks. Therefore by tacit agreement Japanese trucks were used extensively on kimchi runs, US trucks in a more restricted manner. Of course the only gasoline available for either was that supplied by the US.

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practices directly, he tried to keep them within reasonable bounds, and many or most ROKA commanders cooperated with the advisor in this endeavor.\* Differences between proper and improper activities related to welfare-fund and associated activities were not always clear. It was inevitable therefore that black-market activities existed.

### Black-Market Operations

ROKA personnel had considerable temptation to engage in black-market practices with military supplies, particularly in rear areas, where the civilian population was concentrated and an active demand existed for black-market supplies. "Front line units were relatively less involved in these activities. Hoarding of supplies was more common than black market activities, among front line units."

Typical comments of advisors were:

One constant problem we face is the black market operations that go on all through the ROK Army. I found it is impossible to discourage this completely; their pay is so low and the practice is so universal. I did reach unofficial agreement with my counterpart to keep it under control. I saw to it that the additional food allowances provided for the ROKs did actually buy some food for the troops. Although KMAC has no control over these funds, we would check with the troops to see how they were eating. When abuses seemed to have gone too far, the advisor would step in. If we couldn't reason with the commander, we would threaten to refer the entire matter to higher echelons. It was only occasionally necessary to do this.

The low pay of the ROK officers leads them to private enterprise with American equipment—the trucks and so forth,—also to black market activities. These activities are widespread and apparently it is impossible for KMACers to do anything about it.... It's also possible that over-requisitioned supplies are being stockpiled as well as used for personal gain.

More extreme views were expressed by a few advisors:

Americans don't mind the welfare fund provided it is used for the benefit of the soldiers, but they don't like it when it is used to make the officers rich.

The pay of the Korean EM is nothing. This is the mission of the welfare fund. It is the source of graft and corruption; it makes all officers thieves.

Abuses undoubtedly occurred along the lines mentioned by these advisors, but these extreme types were not typical. One aspect of this problem that was most frustrating to KMACers was their belief that to the best of their knowledge no higher-echelon policy was announced with respect to these activities.†

\*It must not be thought from this discussion that a large part of the officer personnel of the ROKA was necessarily engaged in really illegitimate practices. Some officers certainly were, but a great number, perhaps the large majority, were not. The point of the discussion is that there is a large area of ROKA activity about which KMAC officers have had only vague information and about which it was almost impossible for them to obtain details. Usually the advisor maintained a hands-off policy, based principally on the following three premises: (a) If he inquired too much about these financial activities he would create considerable friction with his counterpart, and he would not learn much anyhow. (b) If there were slightly illegitimate activities going on, the Koreans could not be blamed, because it was the only way they and their families could live—it was almost universal Korean practice and it didn't do much real harm to the war effort. In fact it may even have done more good than harm on an over-all basis, because it enabled the personnel of our largest allied army to exist in Korea. (c) It was tolerated if not actually authorized anyhow, or something generally entitled a "welfare fund" was authorized, and there was no exact specification about what the welfare fund was or what specific activities were authorized in connection with it.

†As of August 1953.

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As indicated earlier, advisors acted or ignored the situation—according to their individual judgments—without direct official guidance. Many advisors stated that they would have been better equipped to take action against ROK abuses of supplies and equipment if KMAG had published policies clarifying their role in these matters. The following comments reflect the views of some advisors who were baffled by this condition:

I didn't know what I was supposed to do on the job. I don't think that KMAG Headquarters knows what they're supposed to do. . . . I've been trying since I've been here to learn what we're supposed to do about the welfare fund. Nothing is published about it. There is no policy. We must make our own decisions and we're held responsible. . . .

I went to the G-4 and asked him how much gas to allow the Koreans. The reply: "I'll tell you if it's too much." He never complained to me. I just don't know what's desired.

KMAG lacks a specific plan formulated with the ROK government. We should say: "We will support and supply your army, but under these terms: we will issue in accordance with authorized tables of allowances. It is your responsibility to protect that equipment. . . ." The ROKs haul logs from the North for the welfare fund in vehicles and with gas supplied by the US. Nineteen trucks were issued to the ROK Corps. All nineteen were never available. At least two were leased to a private contractor south of . . . . [I saw] seven trucks, all loaded with logs. Two were from my own unit—they were not authorized. . . . There should be a contract between the two governments.

The difficulty described by these advisors probably had its origin at higher levels than KMAG and Eighth Army Hq. There was no explicit statement, agreed to by official representatives of the two governments, that was known to the advisors. This fact in itself should have been a guide to advisors, since it seems to have been recognized by most of them. In the absence of more specific instructions advisors were expected to and did use their own judgment. For example:

It is possible that the ROKs could do with less supplies than they get. They requisition a lot and they sell a lot of what they get. But you can't be too tough about clamping down on the requisitions because if they don't have the stuff—even if they don't have it because they sell it—it may mean the advisor's life in an attack.

Most of the advisors interpreted their responsibility to be to keep unauthorized, or at least not officially sanctioned, activities under reasonable control. It is doubtful if an official policy—at policy level—could be recognized and announced on a specific matter of this type. Such a policy might acknowledge a questionable activity on the part of the aided government and sanction or condone an extralegal or quasi-official use of equipment and supplies furnished by the donor government.

### CONFLICTS INHERENT IN THE ADVISORY SITUATION

The fact that the advisor stands or falls with the advised unit, yet is not in command, exposes him to certain strains and possible conflicts. As a result of these tensions various requirements enter into the advisory process that are not present in ordinary advising.

The major conflict reported by advisors seems to have resulted from the psychological impact of the advisor's direct personal responsibility with-

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out direct authority. This type of situation was particularly acute in combat situations when ROKA units formed part of American corps or groups. The higher American commanders could not be concerned with details of whether their orders were carried out through an advisory process or not, but were vitally interested in having their orders carried through promptly and in getting the mission accomplished. In such pressure situations, incidents like the following occurred: "[The Corps Commander] came up and gave me direct orders not to let the regiment bug out—as if I were in command. I wasn't . . . . This sort of thing is very common when the ROK unit is operating under an American unit."

It is clear that KMAgers sometimes found themselves in situations in which—as they judged it—they were ordered to carry out actions that were the proper and direct responsibility of their counterparts. It is understandable that the urgency of the situation, the risks of misunderstanding because of language difficulties, and delays that might result from orders delivered through normal (ROKA) command channels, might be conducive to these special circumstances. The short circuit or bypassing of normal command channels was not confined to transmission of orders from US to ROKA commanders. It also occurred in the heat of battle within units of the same national group. Nevertheless KMAg advisors felt very severely tried when they were involved in these situations. At such times KMAgers reacted differently, as the following extreme viewpoints indicate:

I would [command] if given authority [orders].

We will do everything we can, but we will not command. We must have both the responsibility and the discipline; if we don't have the [power to] discipline, we cannot be held responsible.

A more typical situation is represented by the following comment:

[In a US corps with a ROKA division] Usually the senior officer will issue orders to KMAg officers while the ROK officer is standing there. It should be that the order is given to the Korean officer and the American is told to check to see that it is done.

One KMAg officer emphasized a key point in getting counterparts to act on advisor's recommendations or suggestions:

Koreans will go to unlimited ends to carry out orders of the No. 1 man, the CIL. This is true whether Koreans or Americans are in command. They thrive on praise from higher authority and then endeavor to carry out suggestions and orders to the fullest extent. Not so of indirect orders issued thru advisors or thru staff channels.

By subtly capitalizing on this tendency advisors can assure more complete compliance. The type of situation in which higher commanders pass along orders through the KMAg advisor is likely to occur in dealing with local national commanders. The advisor needs tact and resourcefulness to get the order into proper channels without delay and without embarrassment. Sometimes it would be possible for the advisor to relay the order to the commander, in the sort of role an aide or interpreter might play: "(Superior officer) wants you to (the order)." "Did you understand his order in English?" or "Can I help in any way?" Another possible tactic might be "(Superior officer) spoke to me because he does not speak Korean, and did not know you understood

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of operating. The American has been encouraged to meet situations on his own initiative in the absence of orders from above. Not so the Oriental. He has been so indoctrinated that he normally prefers and is inclined to await orders from higher command rather than take needed action on his own responsibility. This difference between US and certain other nationals presents one of the most difficult problems of MAAG advisors. Only under the most serious conditions, and only as a last resort—in effect, attesting to the incompetence of the commander—should advisors step out of their mission as advisor and usurp the responsibility of command.

In addition to their other duties, advisors were representatives of the US government and custodians of US materiel, supplies, objectives, and lives. It was standard procedure for the advisor to gather information and to report on matters of direct American concern. This reporting function, however, could be interpreted by the counterpart as spying on his performance and possibly as a betrayal of the bond of confidence between counterpart and advisor. On the other side, the ROKA officer had a similar role to perform for his superiors and his government, i.e., that of reporting on US personnel and activities.

A reaction of suspicion or distrust could be fostered by an attempt at covert reporting, or even by suspicion of such activity. It is doubtful if the advisor could make such reports through KMAG communication lines without the Koreans learning about it sooner or later. The alternative appears to be that the advisor should be frank and straightforward and take steps to see that the counterpart is made aware of the nature of these requests and of the general tenor or content of the advisor's reports.

It is obvious and proper that subordinate officers of any army should feel a high responsibility to give their superior what he wants when he wants it, and without question. This is particularly acute in combat. It may be that during less critical periods the superior, or more often the staff officer through whom the order is transmitted, is not fully briefed on the local situation and would welcome on-the-spot information from the subordinate that would apprise him of it. Perhaps subordinates do not fulfill their obligation to their superiors as well as they should when they refrain from comment in a situation of this type. The personalities and rapport of the men involved has a bearing on what would be an appropriate action. Probably more often than the subordinate officer realizes, his superior would welcome more information on the subordinate's situation. Since the subordinate usually will be in touch with a staff officer of his superior, he can often discuss the problem more freely along such lines as the following: "Roger, I will probably have to work this out myself. As you know, my mission is to get the ROKs to do these things themselves. But if they do it, it will take longer. The general will have the information by the time he wants it."

Unless the staff officer feels he can present these facts to his superior and get a modification in the request, the KMAG advisor is left no alternative but to assure compliance. Then the advisor can inform his counterpart of the request and the deadline. The requested information can be worked out through the counterpart if he can deliver in time; otherwise the advisor can explain to the counterpart why he must work up and supply the information himself.

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### APPLYING PRESSURE TO COUNTERPART

One of the perplexing problems that face advisors was what to do if the counterpart did not take the advice offered. Did the advisor resort to pressure? Some did; some did not.

The advisor-counterpart relation was different in nature from usual military relations. The advisor was constrained at all times to operate with a maximum of tact and diplomacy, so that he would not alienate his counterpart and consequently jeopardize the advisory mission. However, some situations arose in which ROKA officers for any number of reasons resisted advice, delayed in taking necessary action, operated in a nonmilitary fashion, or decided to do things the advisor had advised against. At such times advisors felt their counterparts needed a little persuasion. If persuasion or pressure were not exerted, the performance of the unit might suffer. In addition the authority of the advisor was on trial, and if not established might suffer a serious setback.

The following comment represents the general view of most KMA Gers who expressed themselves in interviews on the subject of applying pressure:

I never had to threaten my counterpart by writing to General Van Fleet. That was not the correct procedure. It seemed to me that something was wrong when the advisor had to go to such extremes. When a troubled condition would arise, I would withdraw from the discussion and settle the matter at a later time. A kind of "cooling off" period.

Table 27

#### FREQUENCY OF NECESSITY OF BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON COUNTERPART

Frequency of need	Percent of 255 respondents	Frequency of need	Percent of 255 respondents
Never	30	Frequent	5
Very rare	36	No answer	5
Once in a while	24	Total	100

As reported in Table 27, the necessity to bring pressure to bear on a counterpart was an occasional problem for some advisors and possibly a frequent problem with a few advisors. However, a situation need only be mishandled once in order to damage irreparably a working relation that has been painstakingly built up over a period of months. In most cases in which the advisor applied pressure to his counterpart he caused his counterpart to lose face if the situation were not handled carefully. Advisors were reluctant to embarrass their counterparts for several reasons. For one thing there was often a bond of mutual respect and friendship built up between advisors and counterparts that the advisor (and probably also the ROKA officer) preferred not to destroy. The consequences in terms of performance made it extremely unwise to cause a ROKA officer to lose face. To a ROKA officer, feeling he had been disgraced or humiliated was a very serious matter; he might not cooperate with the advisor thereafter. Further, in certain circumstances, if

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the advisor had to take drastic steps in pressuring his counterpart, his own record as an officer and his assignment in KMAG might suffer. He might be judged as not having sufficient qualities of leadership or sufficient ability to get along with Koreans to succeed as an advisor.

For these reasons advisors were reluctant to let conflicts between themselves and their counterparts reach the showdown stage. As Table 23 points out, a majority of KMAGers relied on argument and persuasion to settle differences of opinion with their ROKA colleagues. A second method, less extensively employed because of the reasons cited earlier, was to refer matters over which there was disagreement to higher KMAG or ROKA echelons for action. Still less often advisors refused to countersign ROKA supply requisitions, or merely threatened to refer disputes to higher echelons as a means of "extorting" cooperation. Only 3 percent of the KMAGers surveyed reported giving direct orders or countermanning orders given by counterparts as a method of settling disputes. The last type of action is in reality a termination of the advisor-advisee relation, and logically results in one or both of the team being relieved. It is a testimony that both the advisor and the advisee have failed in their relation.

Table 23

### KINDS OF PRESSURE USED BY ADVISORS

Pressure practice	Percent of 281 respondents*
Argument and persuasion	53
Referring the matter to higher ROKA or KMAG echelons	28
Refusing to countersign ROKA supply requisitions	8
Threatening to take the matter to higher echelons	7
Giving counterpart direct orders or countermanning his orders	3
Other	6
No answer	2

\*Adds to more than 100 percent because respondents were asked to give multiple responses.

The spontaneous comments of a number of advisors, some of which are presented here, throw light on the minority views expressed in Table 23.

I found it constantly necessary to check up on my counterpart. Although I could not give direct orders to troops, I could apply pressure to my counterpart—either through recourse to higher echelons or control of supplies. I was aware of my counterpart's Oriental concern with "saving face." When I had to discuss a serious problem with him or argue him into reversing an order, I saw to it that this discussion was a completely private one. This way, I could tell him what was on my mind without anyone else knowing about it, and the General could keep his dignity intact. He appreciated this as an act of consideration and, as a matter of fact, doing it this way increased his willingness to be cooperative and frank. . . . I occasionally had to use the countersigning of supply requisitions as a weapon—to apply pressure to prevent over-requisitioning, stock piling, black marketing, and so on.

I tried to use polite means of getting cooperation from the ROKs. When I really had to bring pressure to get results, I referred the matter to higher echelons who would

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handle the matter through ROK channels. Americans shouldn't try to impose their ways on the ROKs—or on any other nation. There are some areas in which we've got to adjust to the Korean way of doing things. At least, Americans should be aware of the differences and know what the Korean methods are.

It was necessary to exert pressure many times. [ROK officer] was not very truthful. KMAG inspectors found that he had a warehouse full of batteries and signal equipment for distribution to the ROK Army while he kept submitting requisitions for additional material. The Advisor refused to sign the requisition for a whole month, forcing the ROK to distribute the material on hand. This is the only pressure a KMAGer in the technical services can bring to bear. Threats to report him do no good if he has political pull. At field grade or above, 50 percent have such pull. There's not much below field grade.

It is obvious that KMAG advisors differed widely in what they called "pressure." The basic problem was to get the counterpart to do things in a certain way or to issue and carry out a certain order. Means of getting these results spread over a continuum from an indirect suggestion to a direct order. Pressure implies force, and this force is intended to overcome the resistance offered by the counterpart. It is obvious from the comments cited that some KMAG advisors considered as "pressure" any devious method of getting a counterpart to follow a particular course of action. The writer prefers to discuss the problem of pressure in a more restricted meaning of the term, that of getting a counterpart to take a course of action contrary to his will. In this meaning the result was achieved not by changing the counterpart's will but by bending his will with the direct or indirect threat of consequences that the counterpart regarded as more serious than the issue at stake. Considered in this more restricted meaning the two following comments represent advisors' attempts to avoid the need for applying direct pressure through resort to more subtle means:

Some form of pressure was quite usual [in 1952]. Pressure should be disguised. Pressure can be placed on a higher Korean officer by the advisor bringing to his attention delinquencies of subordinate Koreans. This allows the Senior Korean to take action himself without losing face in the process. The Senior Korean gets the idea of what is acceptable to the advisor.

Koreans don't respond to pushing from someone outside their chain of command. You have to persuade them, pat them on the back. The advisor doesn't make out their efficiency reports or pay them. The only hold the advisor has over them is if they like and respect him. It's up to him to make them do this. How you do it is a personal thing. It depends on the personality of the advisor and the counterpart.

With these points in mind, and referring to Table 28, it is clear that KMAG advisors have resorted to indirect and private means such as argument, persuasion, and refusal to countersign supply requisitions instead of exposing the counterpart to external force exerted by his superiors or challenging him before his peers or subordinates. This was as it should be.

In ascending order, therefore, a pressure scale would start only after suggestion and indirect methods have failed. The sequence might be: (a) persuasion, (b) refusal of the advisor to perform some act that would facilitate the counterpart's plan, (c) reminder that the advisor will have to report the situation to his superiors, (d) direct threat to take the matter up with higher echelons of command through the advisor's own channels, (e) the actual referring of the matter to higher echelons, (f) giving direct orders to the counter-



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part or in lieu of the counterpart, and (g) countermanding the counterpart's orders (if he can make them succeed).

The last three or four stages represent the higher levels of pressure and rarely should be employed. Advisors generally believed that pressures of this type should not be exerted unless the issue was vitally important and the advisor was prepared to see it to a final conclusion. Perhaps it is necessary in some circumstances for an advisor to carry through such a series of pressure steps with a recalcitrant counterpart. Many advisors believed it would be better to bring pressure, when other means fail, on an issue that reflects an honest difference of opinion rather than on an issue that would mark the "loser" as incompetent. In this way it might be possible to keep the issue a problem of military effectiveness and not allow it to become a matter of personal conflict. However, where subtle means fail and an important issue is at stake, the advisor must apply pressure—in the least irreparable way possible—to assure the counterpart's compliance.

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

(1) Indigenous interpreters were a necessary adjunct but many were not adequate; and working through them caused many errors, misunderstandings, and tensions in the advisory relation. Many local national commanders had learned enough English to communicate directly with the advisor in English, and where this means of communication was possible it offered an effective solution to the language barrier in Korea.

(2) Korean interpreters were not fully satisfactory when: (a) they were not responsible to or under control of the US officers in charge of the units to which they were assigned; and/or (b) they had not received training in the military service or arm to which they were assigned.

(3) When an important issue is involved and the counterpart will not voluntarily act in accord with the advisor's proposal, the advisor must assure compliance by bringing pressure on his counterpart, preferably in the least irreparable form.

(4) The KMAG advisor had to recognize that certain practices of a local national group, such as the "welfare funds" and "kimchi runs," were deeply rooted in the local national culture and were probably an economic necessity, in spite of the fact that these practices were or might be in conflict with American standards. The advisor's responsibility was to see that they did not become extensive enough to jeopardize the military effectiveness of the unit or the physical well-being of its personnel.

#### Recommendations

(1) Indigenous interpreters, military and civilian, should be authorized, in the numbers recommended by the MAAG Chief, to make up any deficiencies that cannot be filled by US military or civilian linguists or that do not require US citizens for security reasons.

(2) Indigenous interpreters, military or civilian, needed in a MAAG unit, should first be trained in the branch to which they are to be assigned, and when

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assigned should be placed under the control of the Senior MAAG Advisor of the unit.

(3) When ROKA units operate under US or UN command and orders are transmitted to ROKA commanders through ROKA command and/or over ROKA communication channels, copies in English of all such orders should be sent through local KMAG command and/or over KMAG communications channels to KMAG advisors concerned.

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### **ADVISORS' VIEWS OF KMAG HQ AND POLICIES**

In previous sections the KMAGer as an advisor dealing with ROKA counterparts is discussed. This section is concerned with the advisor's reactions and relation to advisory-group organization and policies. It focuses on features KMAGers judged to be acute or peculiar to the advisory situation.

### **COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS**

Tactical advisors worked in small detachments that were assigned to units of the ROKA. The ROKA units formed part of the US Eighth Army and operated in Eighth Army territory. Since KMAG Hq, i.e., the advisors' administrative headquarters, was under Eighth Army Command but did not operate tactically in the Eighth Army zone, KMAG advisors and detachments were in a chain of command different from their parent organization. They were in the position of working under the command of a tactical organization, in units of the Eighth Army, while belonging and responsible to another organization, KMAG, whose headquarters was far away. In addition advisory detachments were often small and frequently had only rudimentary administrative facilities; many detachments were also physically isolated from other US units. This combination of factors presented certain administrative, communication, supply, and morale problems peculiar to the advisory situation.

### **Problems of Logistic Support and of Transportation**

Detachments that operated far from their parent organization required special procedures to obtain supplies. The problem of supply procurement was further complicated when these detachments were attached to units of a foreign army, as to a ROKA division under a ROKA corps. In such cases advisors operated in an area in which their parent organization, KMAG, did not appear in the corps command channels. The standard method for solving the supply problem, as prescribed by KMAG Hq and used by KMAG advisors, was to draw supplies from nearby US units. For most advisors this appeared to have been an entirely satisfactory arrangement.

I drew supplies and lived with US Engineer Combat Group. I got nothing from KMAG Headquarters, but I needed nothing.

I drew clothing at KMAG Headquarters and took it to \_\_\_\_\_ with me. American units there were 100 percent cooperative, too. If you needed something, you could always get it.

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KMAG supply was poor thru KMAG channels. The KMAGers who sat and waited got little. However, the aggressive and self-reliant advisor did not lack.

Other advisors, not so favorably located or perhaps less resourceful, reported that they were forced to "scrounge" for supplies, at times getting from American units only what they could spare. Such so-called "begging" and dependence on the "good will and favors" of American units were reported by these particular advisors as being extremely destructive to morale and as consuming valuable time. Examples of these attitudes follow:

I had to scrounge everything, including a place to live. A KMAGer, in order to accomplish his mission, has to be a first-class scrounger. He has to scrounge, beg, borrow, even steal, just to accomplish his mission.

My opinion of KMAG Headquarters couldn't be lower—the way it operates. For example, we requisitioned winter clothes, got only half of them in January. Thus we needed to scrounge from American units up there. Otherwise, we would have frozen to death.

We became beggars—had to scrounge for supplies—but we didn't have the time.

Although situations of this type undoubtedly occurred, particularly in the hectic early days of desperate fluid action and pitifully inadequate resources of personnel and materiel, they were less frequent in 1952 and 1953, as supplies were poured into Korea. Moreover, although the advisors quoted blamed KMAG Hq, some of these conditions were of the advisors' own making. For example, one advisor castigated KMAG Hq for not supplying blankets for his detachment, and finally called headquarters to complain only to learn that he had received instructions (which he had not read carefully enough) telling him to draw supplies from the nearest US unit. When he followed these instructions, previously issued to him from KMAG Hq, he obtained the blankets within hours—only as much time as was required for a truck to make the round trip to the closest US unit.

In addition to written SOPs supplied all advisors in the field, in 1952 and 1953 these matters were included in the standard orientation, were repeated to advisors by headquarters personnel during their visits to field units, and were common knowledge among most advisors. For example, the Chief of KMAG reported:

I told them in any case of failure in supply, to get on the telephone and call the Chief of Staff or myself so that it could be corrected immediately rather than be delayed by paper work. In addition, there was never to my knowledge any difficulty in drawing supplies from nearby US units. In this connection, US corps commanders who commanded ROK divisions took an active interest in seeing to the supply of their KMAG detachments. During heavy combat such as the Chinese offensive against the Second ROK Corps in July 1953, General Paik, I, and my principal supply staff officers such as the KMAG G-4 and KMAG Signal Officer, visited the units under attack which had taken losses, verified the losses of equipment and resupplied it promptly prior to any requisitioning or paper work on the part of the KMAG detachments or ROK units.

One of the staff officers referred to in this quotation independently\* made the following statement: "Deficiencies in logistical support were brought to my attention on my many staff visits and corrections made accordingly." Never-

\*Independently verified by observations of the author during his visits and contacts with advisors and ROKA units in the field at that time.

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enforce measures aimed at preventing laxness of performance. In addition this advisor pointed out that there were a number of "miscellaneous US groups of individuals" serving as advisors to units of the division who were not even attached to the main division detachment but operated on their own, although they ate at the main detachment mess.

This advisor's understanding of his position was evidently due to a carry-over of more fluid practices prior to 1952 before procedures were worked out, to his lack of orientation, briefing, or understanding of the nature of his responsibility and authority, or to his assumption that KMAG Hq had enunciated no policy or procedural guidance. All KMAG detachments were in fact under the command of the Senior Advisor, who was held responsible for all advisors operating in units subordinate to his own and as detachment commander possessed summary court-martial authority.

Other advisors, in substantial number, disagreed with the viewpoint that there was no KMAG command or control vested in the Senior Advisors. They said: "As Senior Division Advisor I had all the control over any subordinate advisor that I would have had in any unit." "I had power to relieve any man and send him to KMAG Headquarters. Maybe not legal, but I did it."

A command report from another division in August 1953 pointed out that personnel management procedures had disintegrated because of the continued assignment of KMAG personnel to ROKA units rather than to KMAG detachments. This report reiterated the point made by another advisor that although the detachment commander was responsible for all KMAG personnel the majority of such personnel were not assigned to his command. It added the complaint that staff sections in KMAG Hq frequently directed the assignment and reassignment of KMAGers by direct telephone contact rather than by dealing with the administrative section of the detachment. It recommended that KMAGers be assigned to KMAG detachments so that the detachments would be able to operate as more efficient and cohesive military units.

It was difficult for KMAG Hq to understand why these conflicting views existed in the minds of different KMAGers in 1953. Isolation, poor communication, and carry-over of earlier practices all had an influence. Apparently there were differences among KMAG detachments due to the various understandings of KMAG policies and directions on the part of individual Senior Advisors who were in charge of detachments.

When the Chief of KMAG observed in 1952 that some of these details had been undefined or vaguely understood, he took the following action:

When I joined KMAG the corps advisor took no responsibility for the division advisor, and division advisor took no responsibility for regimental advisors. I corrected this situation immediately and placed the corps senior advisor not only in command of his own detachment, but also in command of division advisors. Division senior advisors were in command of division detachments and the regimental and battalion advisors. Furthermore, division and corps detachment commanders were in fact unit commanders with summary court martial jurisdiction.

Other high-ranking KMAG officers asserted that this system had been the common practice prior to the action reported.

### Headquarters Problems in Assigning Advisors

The foregoing comments by individual Senior Advisors reflected their attitudes to their dual roles: commander of a KMAG detachment and Senior

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Advisor to a ROKA corps or division. The other side of the coin was the problem confronting KMAG Hq in assigning personnel they received. First, there were shortages of available personnel. "The personnel situation of the Far East Command was such that fully qualified personnel were not available in the quantities needed." Second, KMAG received a large percentage of short-term personnel—those who had only a few months to serve in Korea before being rotated or reassigned back to the States. This was due in part to Eighth Army's effort to augment KMAG by drawing personnel from other Eighth Army units. "Eighth Army pool to support this augmentation came generally from short-term personnel. Thus, there was a constant flow of short-term personnel moving through KMAG." Finally, among personnel sent to KMAG was the inevitable percentage of cast-offs: incompetents, alcoholics, and other misfits who are normally obtained from the process of levying on other units.

Unless an officer's incompetence was known of in advance by KMAG Hq, or until he proved incompetent in his performance on the job, there was little alternative but to give him a chance. Officers of known competence were sought and assigned to the more critical positions, but too few were known. Some failures did occur in KMAG. They were more easily dealt with than the somewhat greater number of men who were near-failures, or not quite good enough for the job. Many of the most disgruntled comments and the most adverse criticisms came from these two groups. "Getting worthless advisors relieved was easy. Poor advisors presented a greater problem. KMAG Hq tend to use certain undesirable locations as collecting points for inefficient officers or those with disciplinary troubles. This was bad on morale of good officers at those places."

It is to be noted that the confusion about command authority over KMAG detachments, the conflicting viewpoints, and the references to less able KMAG advisors did not apply to the large majority of KMAG officers. They occurred, but were not the rule.

### Competence of KMAG Personnel

A number of key officials in KMAG were questioned about the quality of personnel assigned to KMAG. Their viewpoints showed some variation, but as an over-all statement the following comment may be considered typical for the 1952-1953 period: "KMAG had about the same distribution of officers [in terms of competence], as one would find in any large segment of the Army." However, there appeared to be considerable variation at different periods in KMAG. At times, when personnel were desperately needed, any "warm bodies" were taken; at other times careful screening was possible, and it paid off with a higher percentage of outstanding officers, as mentioned previously.

During the early period of advisory duty in Korea (1948-1950), following the occupation and prior to open hostilities, assignments in Korea were regarded as not very desirable duty and perhaps not very important duty. Officers with good combat records or with long periods of overseas duty during WWII were rewarded with "home" assignments. Thus until the Korean War started in mid-1950 there was no great significance in assignments to PMAG or KMAG. When the war began, KMAG suddenly became a critical element in keeping the Korean forces in the war, and had to be rapidly expanded with whatever personnel could be rushed to Korea. An even more urgent need existed for expan-

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sion of US combat forces in Korea. With an acute shortage of available US officers and enlisted men in the Far East, heroic efforts were required to rush skeleton US units into Korea, augmented by local nations\* rounded up in the streets of the cities and villages of Korea. Since ROKA units were then regarded as inferior, they were not generally considered worthy of the best US officers. US Reserves were called up and draft calls were issued. The paucity of US officer and enlisted personnel continued through 1950 and 1951, easing somewhat in 1952. By that time the military situation had become stabilized, and emphasis shifted from fighting the war with US units assisted by ROKA units to building up the ROKA to progressively take over the major defense load. KMAG then became recognized as relatively more important, and the Chief of KMAG, supported by the CG of Eighth Army, was able to raise the screening standards for KMAG duty. This improvement was reflected in the following comment by a KMAG G3 at that time:

KMAG had its problems—we did not get the best officers out of the pipeline into Korea except for a short time from mid-1951 to early 1952. Much of our difficulty came from this source. These officers were eager, patriotic, willing and courageous but professionally weak. What a way to assign such an officer required to make decisions at least two grades higher than his rank. The amazing thing is that the professional ability of the few spread so thoroughly across the many less qualified.

### Problem of Keeping in Touch

When advisors were on duty at some distance from their KMAG detachment, their contacts with other Americans were limited, and to that extent they tended to feel out of touch. When in addition they had to draw supplies and services from a unit to which they were not assigned, the feeling of being at the end of the line often led them to think they were being neglected by higher command. Here is an example of how this situation appeared to one advisor starting out on his first duty:

KMAG sent me out, said my battalion was somewhere in the \_\_\_\_\_ Corps, gave me a jeep and trailer and part of the equipment I should have had, and said, "Go to Seoul and see if you can find out where your battalion is up there." I was loaned a tent, stove and sleeping bag. I should have had a cot, air mattress, cooking stove. I ran into a warrant officer in Seoul picking up supplies for the battalion. He took me up there, scrounged me a bed and a stove for cooking what food I could scrounge. All KMAG advisors scrounge food except those in divisions.

Once you got in the field, Headquarters forgot about you. . . . KMAG Headquarters personnel never came around—to pat you on the back, tell you that you're doing a good job—not once.

A number of advisors' statements included a suggested remedy—more frequent visits by responsible KMAG officials:

KMAG Headquarters should keep in touch with its field advisors and cause them to feel that they are actually a part of the organization, and keep them in KMAG channels and give them proper support.

Have technical services advisors [from KMAG Hq] get to forward units—regiments or FA battalions—to find out what the problems are in the field.

\*Augmentation troops were integrated in US combat units as riflemen. For example, the US 7th Division received about 7000 Koreans before its amphibious landing at Incheon in September 1951.<sup>2,7,8</sup>

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[We need] close supervision, more inspections in the field by KMAG Headquarters. They should be constructive, not destructive. Inspections could show patterns of deficiencies.

It may be charged that these visits amounted to coddling the advisors and that Army officers should not expect such treatment, but a more liberal view would be that the officers in question were performing in a new and strange situation unlike any previous duty, and would have benefited from closer supervision.

### Visits to Field Units by Headquarters Personnel

As desirable as field visits were, both for headquarters officials and field advisors, the large number of KMAG units severely limited the frequency of visits to individual units. This was recognized by headquarters personnel perhaps more clearly than by field advisors. The following statement illustrates this point:

During the period 50-51 there were approximately 25 general and special staff officers in Headquarters KMAG who could, in any way, be called upon for field visits and inspections. For instance, the G-3 section during this period consisted of six to nine officers split between a main and forward CP. When you consider the fact that the ROK Army was spread over the entire peninsula from Cheju-do to the front lines in well over 100 installations, it was impossible for all of these installations to be visited as often as necessary. Chief, KMAG was well aware of this deficiency and directed that maximum effort be made to overcome it without distracting from the efficient operation of the Headquarters.

During the principal period under study (1953) the Chief of KMAG had a policy of field visits in effect for KMAG Hq staff. Two successive Chiefs of KMAG not only prescribed this policy but practiced it themselves, spending more than half their time in the field. These Chiefs said:

Periodic liaison visits were made by me and my staff. Considerable emphasis was placed on this subject and records were maintained including written comments on the unit by the visiting staff officers.

As you [the research analyst] very likely observed, General Paik and I were absent from Taegu visiting ROK units and installations for a much greater proportion of our time than we remained in Taegu. Upon my arrival at KMAG I found that the KMAG staff had not been in the habit of visiting units sufficiently and issued directives to correct this at once. I should say that the ROK corps, divisions, and major training installations such as RTCs and the school center were visited frequently. It is true, and almost unavoidable so, that advisors with small units such as an engineer company or a national police battalion were not visited very often. I realize that this would be unpleasant. However, with the staff available it was almost unavoidable. Further, I did not believe that the staff should be pyramided in order to insure frequent visits to all small units.

The great number of KMAG detachments, their dispersion over all of Korea from Cheju-do to North of the 38th parallel, coupled with limited transportation difficulties, preclude every unit being visited on a weekly or even monthly basis. However, every week without exception, and practically every day, members of the KMAG staff were out on visits to numerous KMAG units or installations.

Several field advisors mentioned specifically to this investigator that they had been visited by Chiefs of KMAG in the field.

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The number of KMAG units in the field were so numerous, their dispersal so great, and advisors' turnover so frequent that it would have been physically impossible for responsible KMAG officials to visit each KMAG installation once during each advisor's tenure at that place. Neither could headquarters officials possibly reach all units during their own tenure and perform their other duties. By scattering their visits, some headquarters personnel probably could have visited isolated stations more frequently than they did. But under war conditions they did not schedule visits for their morale effect—they visited where operational needs were most urgent and obvious to them. In the most isolated spots (such as at a lone relay station, a security battalion, or a ROKA regiment) the fewest KMAG personnel were located. Such locations were also frequently weathered in, thus making in-and-out transport very precarious on a tight time schedule. In short, as valuable as field visits were to the isolated advisor, both for information and morale, visits of KMAG Hq personnel could not be very frequent.

Officers from Eighth Army Hq also visited KMAGers in the field. Field visits by headquarters officers served to help the field advisors most when the visits were coordinated and announced in advance, so that the advisors felt that headquarters were interested in them as individuals rather than only in the jobs they were doing. KMAG Hq was reported to have attempted such coordination: "Chief, KMAG, . . . further recommended to Eighth Army that the visits of staff officers from that Headquarters could be coordinated with KMAG. This was done and operated in a very effective manner." One advisor who had served both in the field and at KMAG Hq pointed out that in spite of field visits some advisors felt neglected: "Visits did not solve the morale problem resulting from what appeared to field advisors to be a lack of interest in them within KMAG Headquarters. No amount of explanation seemed to resolve this attitude."

Visits, although partaking of the nature of field inspections, were regarded by headquarters personnel primarily as means of keeping in touch with the advisory situation and by the advisors themselves as partial antidotes to the tensions of the job. These visits included the talking over of problems, explanations from KMAG Hq of the causes of some of these problems, and remedial action on those problems that could be met.

### COMPOSITION OF KMAG DETACHMENTS

At the time of this study KMAG had an authorized manpower ceiling of 1918 officers and men. Eighth Army augmented this out of its own resources. At one time—about mid-1953—KMAG strength reached a peak of 2886. KMAG detachments at corps headquarters had an authorized strength of 92 officers and enlisted men; the strength of a division headquarters detachment was 44 officers and men, including 16 signal enlisted men attached from KMAG Hq. The staff at KMAG Hq itself was much larger than at corps or division.

#### Size

In response to the question, "Under combat conditions, is your present KMAG detachment too small, just about the right size, or larger than is nec-

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essary to carry out your mission effectively?" 46 percent of the respondents replied that the size of their detachments was "just about right" (Table 29). Almost as many, 40 percent, felt that their detachments were "too small." Only 3 percent considered their detachments "larger than necessary."

Table 29

### ADEQUACY OF SIZE OF KMAG DETACHMENTS

Size	Percent of 255 respondents
Too small	40
Just about right	46
Larger than necessary	3
No answer	11
Total	100

The larger the size of the advisor's detachment, the more frequently he responded that the size was adequate. Advisors in staff assignments at headquarters were members of larger detachments, and most of them said that their detachments were large enough. Most advisors agreed on one aspect of size and function of advisory groups: "Advisory groups should be kept small. I say this on the assumption that the advisor's mission is top level advising and not routine detail or administration." Many of the technical and service advisors also had what appeared to be large staffs; a majority of them likewise felt their detachments were adequately large. Only one specific suggestion of possible reduction in TD was made: "An administrative officer is not needed in my own unit, there's not enough work for him to do. I have no shortages—10 officers and 15 enlisted men."

Infantry regiment detachments, on the other hand, had an authorized strength of four individuals—two officers and two enlisted men, and many advisors considered them understaffed.\* Artillery battalion detachments were even smaller. Advisors in each of these types of tactical units tended to the view that their detachments were too small.

Table 30 shows the response of the members of each group of advisors.

At least some advisors were periodically overworked. In most KMAG detachments work that in the ordinary American unit would be handled by a large number of people had to be done by a relatively small number of KMAGers. Headquarters attempted to provide relief by sending a "replacement package," from headquarters staff principally, to assist during crises. Nevertheless infantry regiment detachments needed more "assistant" advisors.

It must be remembered that the size of KMAG detachments referred to here is for that period which included overt tactical operations in the final months of the war and during the period immediately following. Personnel in Korea at that time believed the truce was precarious, and anticipated only a respite during which the enemy would build up in preparation for another offensive.

\*In addition to advisory and housekeeping duties this staff had to maintain a 24-hr communication contact.

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After the truce stabilized, the size of KMAG detachments was further reduced, and the problem of isolation was also reduced by drawing KMAG personnel together into a unit to serve a ROEA division from a central location. The training and advisory function continued.

Table 30

### ADEQUACY OF SIZE OF KMAG DETACHMENTS AS JUDGED BY ADVISORS IN VARIOUS ASSIGNMENTS

Size	Percent of respondents in various KMAG assignments			
	Of 83 Hq and staff advisors	Of 36 Inf Regt advisors	Of 48 Arty advisors	Of 65 Tech Svc advisors
Too small	37	39	52	34
Just about right	48	44	38	51
Larger than necessary	1	—	6	5
No answer	14	5	4	10
Total	100	100	100	100

### Specific Personnel Needs

Advisors who reported that additional personnel were needed were thinking of either officers or enlisted men, sometimes both. Their specific recommendations varied with the type of unit to which they were assigned. Artillery advisors recommended additional enlisted men as often as officers; staff advisors recommended additional enlisted men almost as often as officers. Advisors with technical and service units, on the other hand, expressed a need for

Table 31

### ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL RECOMMENDED FOR KMAG DETACHMENTS

Personnel	Percent of respondents in various KMAG assignments*			
	Of 83 Hq and staff advisors	Of 36 Inf Regt advisors	Of 48 Arty advisors	Of 65 Tech Svc advisors
Additional OH	28	34	35	18
Additional NCOs and EM	22	15	35	28
No answer	56	53	45	60

\*Totals add to more than 100 percent because some respondents made more than one recommendation. In addition a few respondents other than those who felt their detachment was too small also answered this question.

additional enlisted men more often than for officers. Infantry regiment advisors usually felt the need was for more officers rather than enlisted men. Table 31 summarizes the recommendations made by each group of advisors.

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Some of the reasons underlying these different recommendations may be found in Table 32, which lists the various duties for which additional personnel were desired. Staff advisors, e.g., were thinking of not only the needs of their own detachments but also those of subordinate units, in making recommendations for additional officers and men. Half their recommendations for more officers were for additional advisors at regimental and battalion level, and a large proportion of their recommendations for more enlisted men were for NCOs to work with field detachments as operations sergeants or assistants to advisors.

Table 32

## DUTIES FOR WHICH ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL WERE WANTED

Duties	Respondents in various KMAC assignments							
	Hq and staff advisors		Inf Regt advisors		Arty advisors		Tech Svc advisors	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
<b>Additional Off</b>								
At division level	14	—	—	—	3	—	—	—
At regimental or battalion level	32	—	39	—	38	—	23	—
For field artillery battalions	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—
For technical services	14	—	12	—	15	—	23	—
For training	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Total</b>	<b>67</b>		<b>71</b>		<b>65</b>		<b>65</b>	
<b>Additional NCOs and EM</b>								
As operations sergeants or to assist advisors	22	—	6	—	13	—	25	—
For motor pools, maintenance	3	—	6	—	19	—	8	—
For technical services, supply	3	—	6	—	19	—	19	—
For training	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—
For housekeeping, clerical	22	—	12	—	3	—	3	—
<b>Total</b>	<b>50</b>		<b>30</b>		<b>65</b>		<b>70</b>	
<b>Additional personnel total<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>35</b>		<b>17</b>		<b>25</b>		<b>25</b>	

<sup>a</sup>Totals add to more than 100 percent because some respondents made more than one recommendation.

Infantry regiment advisors, however, were obviously thinking of their own assignments, for most of their recommendations for additional officers specified they were wanted for assignments at regimental level, i.e., as assistant infantry regiment advisors. Their requests for enlisted men were to fill a variety of needs—e.g., "someone who can speak English to handle telephone calls," or, "to help inspect and instruct."

Artillery advisors were also thinking primarily of their own type of duty. They wanted additional officers for battalion duty above all, and they wanted enlisted men or NCOs as additional assistants for supply and maintenance duties, which were extremely burdensome duties in artillery units.

The greatest need for additional personnel was in the small combat units, as shown in Table 32. The foremost reason tactical advisors gave was the

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need for relief during crises so that the few advisors present could get some sleep and do more than sit at the telephone and relay orders given in English by higher headquarters. An additional reason frequently given was the need for specialists. Here was how an artillery battalion advisor and an infantry regiment advisor phrased it:

One man can't possibly know all the staff work of a regiment; the battalions, fortifications, and so forth, and be available 24 hours a day with his counterpart.

I was the whole staff. That was the big deficiency. No one artilleryman knows all the aspects of an artillery battalion. Some are good at certain things, others at something else.

Some infantry advisors suggested that additional advisors should be assigned to each battalion, "for information and liaison, so you know what's going on; for example, that ROK soldiers aren't getting enough to eat," because "the officer at regiment has to go like hell to find out what goes on in the battalions," or because "my advice, as regimental advisor, would be more timely and effective, particularly during combat."

Finally, in the artillery and technical services a need was felt for enlisted men to supervise maintenance and supply. This need for enlisted men to supervise technical aspects of work dealing with heavy equipment or guns was the primary reason why artillery and technical advisors requested them more than did other advisors.

They are needed in supply, to keep check on stock inventory, keep stock level control. Lots of times the ROKs wouldn't order small things—nuts, bolts, and so forth—and when you needed them, they didn't have them. An NCO is needed to keep reviewing stock record cards. . . . In the maintenance companies there could be improvement. An NCO advisor is needed to check vehicles with Koreans, to show them deficiencies and teach them proper procedures. He should be there to make constant checks on repair procedure, tools. One officer can't catch it all.

KMAGers were also asked, "If some cuts had to be made in your KMAG detachment, how could this be done to minimize the loss of effectiveness of the unit?" Thirty-six percent of the respondents suggested ways in which this could be done (Table 33).

At the time referred to in these replies, advisors were reacting on their experience under combat conditions, and under the threat of renewed hostilities after the truce was signed. They were also judging the size of advisory units on the stage of development of ROKA leadership at that time. It was assumed that as the training efforts of KMAG improved the level of leadership and staff skills in the ROKA, KMAG could be progressively reduced. Reductions were effected in late 1954 and early 1955, mainly by withdrawing infantry regiment and artillery battalion advisory staffs into a centralized KMAG detachment at each ROKA division, and having a reduced number of advisors "ride the circuit."

Interviewees in 1953 stressed their views that the advisory function would have to be continued as long as the US supplied the ROKA. They felt that advisors would be needed to assure proper requisitioning, maintenance, and use of US materiel, even if continued guidance on leadership, supply, and training were perhaps no longer needed.

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This study leads to the conclusion that officers and enlisted personnel were spread too thin at the lower-echelon KMAG detachments, and correction of such a condition is most important in developing a fighting local national army. In a situation where the US command is not responsible for the performance of local national units—but only interested in offering advice—there would be more justification for the smallness of lower-echelon KMAG detachments. However, it is doubtful if US MAAG officers should be expected to function at these levels without augmented strength during actual combat.

Table 33

### MEANS OF CUTTING SIZE OF KMAG DETACHMENTS WITH MINIMUM LOSS OF EFFECTIVENESS

Means	Percent of 255 respondents*
Couldn't be done, would hurt effectiveness	22
Suggestions for making cuts	
Cut technical service advisors	11
Cut staff advisors	4
Cut battalion and company advisors	5
Cut administrative and internal help	4
Reduce EM advisors and supervisors	9
Other	3
No answer	43
Total	36

\*Adds to more than 100 percent because a few respondents made more than one suggestion for cutting size of detachments.

## PERSONNEL POLICIES

This discussion focuses on a number of policy matters peculiar or directly related to the advisory situation as viewed by advisors.

### Length of Assignment

One problem that faced the advisory group was the length of time advisors should be kept in their assignments. The advisors contacted in this survey were asked what they believed to be the optimum length of a KMAG assignment. The results indicated that a KMAG assignment may be treated about like any other assignment in a combat area. The respondents were mainly divided among 6, 9, and 12 months as the optimum length of assignment, with a majority (57 percent) favoring assignment of more than 6 months, from about 9 months to 1 year (Table 34).

Staff, infantry regiment, and technical advisors differed very little in their opinions. All three groups answered in approximately the proportions shown in Table 34. Among artillery advisors, however, 52 percent said that the assignment should be about 6 months, and only 15 percent said it should be

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as long as 1 year. This was apparently influenced by the fact that in crises, such as the one that closely preceded their questionnaire responses, artillery advisors felt they were not much more than message clerks being forced to

Table 34

### OPTIMUM LENGTH OF KMAG ASSIGNMENT

Time	Percent of 255 respondents
About 3 months	2
About 6 months	35
About 9 months	24
About 1 yr	28
Longer than 1 yr	5
No answer	6
Total	100

remain at the phone receiving fire orders from higher headquarters. The artillerymen's opinions apparently were based largely on other factors than their relative isolation. Infantry regiment advisors were probably even more isolated than artillery battalion advisors, but only 32 percent of infantry advisors said that the length of assignment should be as short as 6 months.

A tour of duty of less than 6 months was not recommended by more than a handful of advisors; they believed more time was required to achieve a proper grasp of the job and make an effective impact on the advised unit.

KMAGers should not be switched in their assignments every three or four months, as was done prior to April, 1962. They are now normally held on assignment for eight or nine months. They need this long a term to do their best work.

I disliked my KMAG tour because I shifted so frequently. I had just got started in each job when I was shifted. I recognize that the problem occurs because personnel come and go so rapidly—reserves, national guardsmen, and short termers—and that regulars have to be shifted and are kept on longer. But I recommend that the tour of duty be longer.

Those who recommended a 6-month tour said primarily that the strain of working with "inefficient units" and "foreigners" made it difficult for the advisor to maintain interest and high standards for a longer period.

The KMAG job shouldn't last longer than six months. It's a strain. . . . You get sick of the sound of the language, and have to be on your toes all the time to understand it.

You get very lonely with no one to talk to but your interpreter. Six months is the maximum time; after that it gets you and you begin not to give a damn. My friends agree. I was glad to get the job when I was assigned to it, and I enjoyed it for a few months, but after that I began to get pretty stale on it and felt quite \_\_\_\_\_ off for the last month, partly, perhaps, because I knew I was going to be rotated and getting impatient.

Of those who recommended longer tours many reflected standard practice with reference to length of time and rotation from Korea. A few were more explicit.

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An advisor can stay a long time with an outfit if he gets along well with his counterpart and it is a good outfit. If he gets a frustrating outfit, it's a different story. If the outfit is not efficient, it's frustrating. [Tactical unit]

The optimum length of service in a KMAG assignment is hard to determine. In the beginning I, too, felt that a year was long enough. However, when I became more familiar with my responsibilities and I realized the importance of the job, and I could see the ROK Army was beginning to crystalize, I stayed and enjoyed twenty-one (21) months of my assignment as senior advisor. [Technical advisor at Hq]

When tours longer than a year were in question, another factor was mentioned. This was the feeling that although KMAG service might be interesting and valuable, it was a sideline with respect to a career in the Army and hence should not be too prolonged.\*

The usual KMAG tour of about 9 months was acceptable general practice, but a general practice does not fit all KMAG situations. Rotation eligibility, shortage of personnel, and the usual requirements for reassigning officers made it inevitable that many short-term assignments were made in KMAG, particularly in combat units. The optimum period of service as an advisor in tactical units should be not less than 6 nor more than 9 months, in proportion to the strain in the particular job—whether due to intensity of combat or frustrations in dealing with particular units.

Because many competent officers were available only for shorter periods, due to their accumulation of points in other units (US units) and impending rotation, they were available only for short-term assignments. Such personnel should rarely be assigned as advisors to tactical units for less than 4 months. One advisor stated an ideal arrangement.

Six-seven months with a US unit to gain experience with Koreans, terrain and learning to do it the right way—then 6-7 months as an advisor in the next higher echelon. That is, a US Lt Col should advise Regts, Regt S-3 or S-2 should be Div G-2, G-3 advisors.

In staff, technical, and service units longer tours were common (rotation point accumulation was slower) and it appeared to be most satisfactory if advisors were scheduled for a year or more. A typical remark of such personnel was: "Tour should be long enough to know job and Koreans—a year or more." It was among the technical and service groups that a few advisors said, "My work is not finished here. When my points come up, I'm going to ask for an extension."

### Rotation

During the shooting phase of the Korean War the two most popular subjects to US personnel were (a) rotation and (b) rest and recuperation leave (R&R). The system in practice in Korea at that time provided for rotation of officers after the accumulation of 40 points (38 in combat units). Enlisted men in combat units rotated with 36 points. Points were awarded in accordance with the nature and location of the actual unit with which personnel were operating.

Personnel serving in US units received credit for a fixed number of points per month in accordance with the following schedule: (a) in units forward of

\*Another reason mentioned by several advisors was, "Also, there is a tendency to go native."



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regimental headquarters personnel received 4 points per month when the regiment was on the line; (b) regimental headquarters personnel received 3 points per month when the regiment was on the line; (c) personnel of battalions in reserve, physically located behind the regimental CP, received 3 points; and (d) units behind division CPs received 2 points per month.

The official KMAG policy for KMAG personnel serving with ROKA Units was as follows: (a) regimental and division advisors received 3 points per month; (b) all other KMAG personnel received 2 points per month; and (c) all KMAG personnel were rotated with 40 points.

The different base for rotation (40 points for KMAG officers and enlisted men, and 38 for officers and 36 for enlisted men in US units) was one sore point with many KMAGers; and the number of points credited per month was another. KMAG personnel normally were not assigned to units operating forward of regimental headquarters, and hence KMAG personnel received a maximum of only 3 points per month. Thus a regimental advisor received 3 points, as did an artillery battalion advisor. Division advisors also received 3 points. Corps and technical service advisors received 2 points.

Many KMAG advisors in tactical units felt that the system of basing points on the location of the command post with which they worked rather than the location of the units they inspected, supervised, and visited daily in company with their ROKA counterpart awarded them fewer points than they should have been entitled to. In this sense the KMAG advisor's responsibility and field of operation was somewhat equivalent to that of the US officer in a US unit who corresponded to the advisor's counterpart. Thus the regimental advisor to a ROKA regiment could be assumed to be deserving of the same number of points as a US regimental commander. In this case each received 3 points per month. The case could be argued that US regimental commanders and KMAG advisors assigned as regimental advisors to the ROKA should have been awarded more than 3 points per month, possibly 3½. There appears to be some justification, however, for the attitudes expressed (sometimes quite bitterly) by many KMAG advisors that the point system was unequal between US officers assigned in US units and those assigned as KMAG advisors to equivalent ROKA units. An example follows:

In combat areas in the field, morale was very very low, because we didn't feel we were getting equal treatment with other American officers. The average regimental combat advisor was fighting, dying, yet he got only three points and no R&R, while officers in American units were getting four points, R&R, and were rotated off the lines. We probably put in more actual combat days than the average US battalion commander.

In support of this view, it is theoretically possible that a KMAG advisor of a particular rank, say lieutenant colonel, was assigned as a division advisor where he received 3 points per month. Had he been assigned to a US unit instead of to KMAG, he might have been a battalion commander of a US unit, where he could receive 4 points while his battalion was on the line. This line of reasoning was based on what he would have earned if assigned to a combat unit forward of regimental CP. He was not thus assigned and hence was not unfairly treated. The only real basis of inequity was 40 instead of 38 points, and in those few special situations where KMAG advisors served with infantry battalions on the line.

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Real and fancied inequities in the assignment of points to individuals was a constant topic of conversation in forward units. In addition, rotation of KMAC advisors was sometimes delayed because it was not always possible to replace an advisor on schedule. The same thing occurred in US tactical and support units, but because of a larger complement of officers it was more often possible to bridge a gap in US units. In some cases an advisor's replacement was delayed in arrival and the advisor was obligated to stay beyond his time quota. The reverse situation also occurred when KMAC advisors were sent home days or even weeks ahead of schedule. The availability of replacement personnel and the tactical situation at the time were usually the causes of these modifications, as they were in US units also.

It would seem obvious that the principle of equal points for equal duty should be followed. Officers and men should receive rotation points according to their actual assignments and not according to the location of their headquarters, but the situation was not this simple. Advisors, because they were so few in number in any given unit, were less dispensable than other individual officers. If a number of officers from an American regiment were rotated or went on R&D the regiment could still operate effectively. If, on the other hand, the lone KMAC advisor were absent from a ROKA regiment, the operations of the regiment could be severely affected. The advisor had to be replaced immediately, but KMAC had no replacement pool. It was generally considered in KMAC Hq that KMAC was operating with the minimum necessary amount of personnel, and the KMAC G1 had considerable and constant trouble filling vacancies as they occurred. There were no officers for a replacement pool, and until such a pool is formed, any increase in the speed of rotation and R&R would cause great difficulties. By one means or another, however, KMAC personnel should be assured rotation on the same basis as other US personnel in Korea.

### Rest and Recuperation

At the time this study was made, complaints about rotation and R&R were particularly strong. Heavy activity on the front was confined largely to ROKA units during the final months of hostilities, and it was KMAC combat advisors who on the whole saw more combat and took more casualties than other American officers. The following comments of advisors to tactical units were quite typical of the period just preceding the truce and shortly thereafter: "Lack of R&R is another morale factor. A KMACer can get only on R&R during a standard tour, but officers in US units can get two, sometimes three. It's not fair." "I never got any R&R."

A viewpoint from KMAC Hq discounted the seriousness of advisor's reactions to rotation and R&R on the following grounds: "Since, upon occasion, certain KMAC advisors are known to have turned down R&R or requested deferment of rotation when their units were in a flap it is not believed that morale was seriously affected by the R&R or rotation situation."

It is possible that just such differences in viewpoint intensified the feeling among some tactical advisors that headquarters did not evaluate their reactions (and morale) sympathetically enough. One tactical advisor reflected this view even after having served in KMAC Hq—in a sort of self-criticism: "An active interest in the individual advisor, in his problems and a recognition

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of the importance he would have in influencing a large portion of the combat forces under US-UN control would have solved the problem."

The tensions and strains of working as an advisor to a local national unit have been previously discussed. Feelings of frustration or of being fed up with the job, as well as fatigue, are to be expected in many KMAG assignments. KMAG advisors in isolated, substandard, and combat units needed R&R as acutely as any officers serving in Korea. Even though special arrangements such as relief advisors may need to be provided, KMAG advisors should be eligible for one R&R period for each 10 rotation points accumulated in a pressure assignment (tactical unit advisor or combat-zone duty) or in an isolated location (security battalion, etc.) and for each 20 points accumulated while serving in a training or service assignment in rear areas in association with larger groups of US officers.

### **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **Conclusions**

(1) Logistic support of KMAG advisors serving with local national units, particularly in remote or isolated places, was an acute problem that required special attention, which KMAG Hq gave through special arrangements. Special arrangements also had to be established to provide AG, medical, QM, ordnance, and signal services. Items such as vehicles, and signal equipment maintenance service, food, personal supplies, mail, and pay were particularly important. The advisor needed to be thoroughly informed of these details before he departed from KMAG Hq for his field station.

(2) Visits of detachment commanders and KMAG Hq officers to field advisors assigned to lower-level tactical units and in isolated locations were important in keeping in touch with problems and in bolstering advisors' morale and efficiency.

(3) The size of KMAG tactical detachments as provided in Korea during combat operations was at minimum practical levels, considering the multiple mission assigned.

(4) The pressure of the advisory job was acute on the regimental advisor in infantry units during the shooting phase of the war, owing to his lack of assistance and to his need to be on the job with the regiment 24 hr per day.

(5) Length of assignment in particular KMAG jobs was closely related to advisors' morale and efficiency.

(6) R&R for KMAG advisors in tactical, isolated, or substandard local national units was needed on a more frequent schedule than was provided them in Korea in 1953.

(7) Real and fancied inequities in rotation policy was a cause of much dissatisfaction and lowered morale among tactical advisors.

#### **Recommendations**

(1) Length of assignment to a particular duty in a MAAG in underdeveloped countries should be optimally: (a) not less than 6 nor more than 9 months for tactical advisors living with advised units in the field under combat or isolated conditions; and (b) 9 to 18 months for advisors living in decentralized detachments.

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Of the few artillery advisors who felt their KMAG duty had hindered their careers, several believed they had not learned as much as they would have learned in US units.

Table 37

### EFFECT OF KMAG EXPERIENCE ON ARMY CAREER AS JUDGED BY ADVISORS IN VARIOUS ASSIGNMENTS

Effect on Army career	Percent of respondents in various KMAG assignments			
	Of 83 Hq and staff advisors	Of 36 Inf Regt advisors	Of 46 Arty advisors	Of 65 Tech Svc advisors
Helped	58	64	48	62
Made no difference	22	28	40	19
Hindered	6	3	18	13
No answer	8	3	2	6
Total	100	100	100	100

The ways in which advisors judged their careers to have been helped or hindered by their KMAG experience are reported in Table 38.

A KMAG assignment was seen by advisors to have helped their careers mainly in two ways. First, it was helpful through the particular kinds of military experience and training it provided, permitting an officer to do things he could not do at his grade in the US Army. Specifically, the advisor operated at a higher command level and took part in higher-level planning. Second, it afforded an opportunity to work with a foreign army and foreign peoples, and gave the officer a better understanding of Asiatic (Korean) people and the problems of a local national army in an underdeveloped country. In addition a few individuals saw value to their careers and themselves in the patience, tact, or personal qualities they cultivated, or in the personal satisfactions they derived from their work.

On the negative side, when KMAG duty was criticized it was usually for its assumed adverse effect on the future of an officer in such matters as chances for promotion and influence on other assignments. A company-grade Reserve officer's viewpoint was:

Some day I'll probably realize that this KMAG assignment was a good one, although now I can't see it. I feel that I would have ended up as a battalion S-3 if I had been on duty with an American unit. I was an S-3 in the States ever since I was on active duty on this tour; I like the work, and I would like an S-3 job on my record even though I am going back to civilian life. And I might have made major.

However, it is well to keep in mind that 81 percent of KMAG officers were Reserve officers called back into active duty from civilian life. It may be assumed that Reserve officers, whose careers are oriented toward civilian rather than military life, would not be too concerned with the long-range effect of KMAG experience on a career in the Army.

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A Regular Army officer who had served as Senior Advisor to a ROKA division and also as G3 at KMAG Hq commented:

KMAG officers serving as advisors with ROKA units in combat [should] be given full "combat command" credit on US personnel records. KMAG [officers] should not be held back in their career because of not commanding a US unit. Equivalent credit could be arranged.

Table 38

## WAYS IN WHICH ARMY CAREER WAS JUDGED TO BE AFFECTED BY KMAG EXPERIENCE

Effects on Army career	Percent of 235 respondents*
Ways career was helped	
Gained military experience and training; opportunity to operate at higher level than rank would usually permit	25
Experience in working with foreign armies, learning how Oriental mind works, problems of dealing with foreign peoples, better understanding of Korean people and problems of ROKA	21
Personality development experience; learned patience and tact	3
Personal satisfaction	2
Subtotal	52
Ways career was hindered	
Will hurt future, hurt chances of promotion, assignments	6
Didn't learn as much as would have learned in US units	2
Subtotal	8
No answer	42

\*Adds to more than 100 percent because a few respondents named more than one respect in which their careers were helped or hindered. Percentages of those who mentioned ways in which their careers were helped or hindered were, respectively, smaller than percentages of those who said they were helped or hindered by KMAG duty (see Tables 36 and 37) because some respondents neglected to answer this question; i.e., neglected to specify how they had been helped or hindered.

The manner in which the Career Management Division of TAGO, DA, credits KMAG experience was checked. It was learned that it is now standard practice to include an assignment either in "training" or as an "advisor" in the planned experience of a career officer once he reaches the rank of lieutenant colonel. This experience is referred to as an "instructor/advisor" assignment, and may apply to US Reserve forces or to foreign forces, as in MAAG assignments. Furthermore a set of functional equivalents is being used, patterned on one worked out in MAAG-Formosa, by which Career Management credits service in a MAAG as equal in experience to a particular type of service in a US unit. For example, service as G3, KMAG, was given credit as equal to service as G3 in a US corps. The credit follows the rank of the officer rather than the rank of his counterpart in the foreign army. Thus, a lieutenant colonel or colonel serving as Senior Advisor to a ROKA division

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the CGSC, for example, instruction was given entirely in Korean. There was in this school no barrier to understanding on the part of the student officers. Rather there were difficulties for the KMA Gers, who found it "hard to keep up with what is going on."

A principal difficulty at the CGSC was bridged when it was decided that the field manuals to be utilized for instructional purposes would be translations of US Army manuals rather than completely new texts. The problem here lay in the fact, first of all, that the Korean language is a nonmodern tongue in the sense that it often lacks terms for technical and modern colloquial words and phrases found in other languages. It was often impossible to find equivalents for American military terms. This problem is the basic problem of language and applied to all training literature and communications throughout the ROKA. Second, in order to ensure a reasonable degree of accuracy in translation, a practice was followed in which manuals were initially translated from English into Korean and then independently retranslated into English to ascertain how much of the original sense and flavor had been retained in translation. This process took approximately 6 months. It was found in the course of manual preparation that different translators differed as to which terms were proper and accurate translations of the original language.

By way of example the following pertinent instances may be cited. The ROKA wanted to set up an AG school for officers who had been graduated from the ROKA Infantry School and were candidates for transfer out of their branch to AGC. The phrase "Officers' Basic Course" was translated into Korean; checking by retranslation into English disclosed that the Korean equivalent was "Officer Candidate's Course," which of course was an inaccurate designation. Again, the word "effectives" has no precise Korean equivalent—one had to be devised. "Honorable discharge" might only be earned, if one were to trust the official translation into Korean, by suffering a combat wound so severe as to necessitate one's severance from the service. Accordingly a man who broke his leg in combat and was therefore separated from the service might not receive an "honorable discharge." Subsequent investigation indicated to KMA Gers supervising the relevant document translation that this was not an intentional departure from US practice but an error in translation induced by the peculiarities of phrasing of the Korean language.

ROKA line schools faced similar difficulties in preparing translations of appropriate US field and technical manuals for use of their students and faculty. For instance, whereas Americans customarily speak of "setting up" a defense position, it was learned that in Korean one must "establish" such a position, because in Korean "to set up" means literally and only to "stand on end." Again, the common tactical phrase "to approach by bounds" could not be translated precisely into Korean. The language simply possessed no equivalent thought. Therefore an expression was utilized that retranslated into English: "to move the weapon to one point and then to another." In Korean the phrase "contact with the enemy" means body contact and nothing else; "securing a bridge" means only taking it over, whereas the English significance of the term is far broader.

The point that expert Korean linguists made time and again was that the Korean language is not flexible enough for special-purpose terms. In written presentations this shortcoming could frequently be overcome by the addition of

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Chinese characters (which are understood by most literate Koreans, chiefly officers) to express the desired thought. But in oral communication the hurdle was frequently insuperable. There was no word in the Korean language for "gas port." The thought can be expressed in Chinese characters, but verbally it was still a "gas port" and therefore a meaningless term to the Korean. In oral communication such terms must be explained in the course of use. And it should be added that experience in the Korean theater showed that specialized terms such as this could not be sent in coded radio or telegraph messages simply because of the absence of Korean equivalents.

No matter how many times you may have cracked the manual you won't find any chapters explaining how to instruct KATUSA [Korean augmentation troops] in complex signal construction procedures. . . . The big problem in putting across the instruction is the language barrier. . . . To put some of the material across the soldier-teachers in the long-lines group have to use gestures to punctuate their sentences. "If they tied our arms to our sides we wouldn't be able to say anything," remarked Sgt Billie J. Wood. . . .<sup>31</sup>

With continued usage many American terms, such as M1, OP, tank, etc., were adopted into the Korean language and were used with complete understanding in oral communication. They presented an added difficulty in written material because no standard characters existed for them.

The language problems appeared to be substantially similar among all ROKA school advisors; in technical branches language problems involved somewhat more technical terminology than was the case in the combat arms.

### ROKA INTERPRETER GROUP

To attempt to overcome the language obstacle KMAC utilized ROKA interpreter-officers, members of an interpreter corps in the ROKA, through 1953. This group was established under the control of the Chief of Staff of ROKA on 1 May 50, to replace a civilian interpreter system previously used by KMAC. Under the old system, civilian interpreters were classified as Grade 7 employees, which was equivalent to the rank of first lieutenant in ROKA. Under the new system 191 men were given temporary commissions as first lieutenants\* in the Army Interpreter Group on 12 Jun 50. On 7 Jul 50 the UN Liaison Officer Group was established as a consequence of the arrival of UN forces on the peninsula, and replaced the earlier organization. Its personnel contained the students of English Interpreter (UN Liaison) Officer classes 2 to 5, the successful graduates of which were commissioned first lieutenants on completion of their course of training.

\*ROKA Interpreter-Officer Temporary Regulation No. 28, 20 May 50. This regulation states (Art. 2): "All interpreters who work for the army and wish to be commissioned can be given temporary commissions as Army interpreter lieutenant through examinations provided by the army." Other pertinent portions of this regulation are:

Arts. 11, 12: "Interpreter officers cannot assume any responsibility except interpreting and translating."

Art. 14: "Interpreter officers will have the same obligation as other-branch officers to observe all army regulations."

Art. 19: "Interpreter officers will be exempted from draft call only during their service in the army."

Art. 20: "Officers of the interpreter branch will receive the same pay and allowances as other-branch officers." (Translation corrected from original translation supplied by Hq KMAC 12 Aug 53, and enclosed with letter to Dr. Wesley R. Fishel from the Acting AG KMAC.)

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During the intervening years the training of officer-interpreters within ROKA has undergone several changes and modifications. In 1953 it was under the supervision and control of the AG School and its KMAG advisors.\* The POI provided for 25 percent of the student's time (i.e., 89 hr) at the school to be spent studying military English. It should be noted in this connection that of 204 KMAG officers who responded to an ORO questionnaire concerning the language barrier, 20 percent reported that their ROKA officer-interpreters lacked understanding of military terms or situations, and 25 percent reported their interpreters' command of the English language generally was "poor." Twenty-nine percent also stipulated that they did not trust their interpreters' accuracy in translation. In interviews the same complaints were voiced. The following were typical comments by KMAGers.

I have 23 interpreters here who theoretically can be used. One I would rate "fairly satisfactory" and a second one is "barely satisfactory." The rest of the lot are mediocre—you just have to draw pictures for them. [ROKA Inf School Advisor]

Our ROKA interpreters simply don't understand military terms until they've been out on the job for a minimum of two months, and that is the minimum. [ROKA CGSC Advisor]

This regiment has two interpreters: one is raw—he doesn't speak much English and he's virtually useless. The other one is only slightly better. As you can imagine I have some real problems getting information and thoughts across and back. [ROKA Inf Regt Advisor]

The interpreters we have secured from ROKA are not very good quality. Maybe mediocre is a better word. They aren't familiar with military terms either in Korean or English. [Div Senior Advisor]

The 204 KMAGers responding to ORO questionnaires were asked to rate their ROKA interpreters or indigenous civilian interpreters on several counts; their responses are shown in Table A1.†

From these responses it would follow that satisfaction with one's interpreter generally ran across the board in the sense that those officers reporting satisfaction with the loyalty ("security") of their interpreters also were satisfied with their honesty and to a slightly lesser degree with their accuracy. It is also worth noting that those respondents who classed their interpreters' ability as "excellent" or "good" were the ones who responded affirmatively to the question concerning the "accuracy" of the interpreters.

Even those who were "satisfied" with the over-all features of their interpreters recognized that these ROKA aides had shortcomings or weaknesses. Of

\* In the KMAG-approved translation of the POI for the Interpreter Officers Candidate Course, increased from 3 to 6 weeks in June 1953, the purpose of the 360-hr course is stated as follows:

"To train the selected Republic of Korea personnel in the Republic of Korea Army military English; techniques of interpretation and translation, and the technical military working knowledge and the basic military training as they required to the service of the excellent interpreter [English] officer in every field of army organizations so that they can contribute to the sufficient operations of the Republic of Korea Army which has been held by the most close cooperation and coordinations with the United Nations Army, and also to the development of the Republic of Korea Army."

†Prerequisites for candidates are stated as follows:

"Must be the man of the Republic of Korea, civilian or army personnel [EM] who have completed the entire course of high school or higher. The service experience of the English interpreter or English typist in army organization of civilian life are most desirable."

†Of 204 respondents, 79 percent reported using ROKA interpreter-officers for communication with their counterparts; 8 percent reported using indigenous civilian interpreters. On the basis of respondent analysis, it is estimated that approximately one-half (9) of these civilian interpreters were employed by the Korean National Police, to which KMAG advisors were also attached.



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these, fear of their ROKA superiors was most frequently mentioned, followed closely by the aforementioned criticism that they did not understand military terms or situations. There was also close correspondence between those responding that their interpreter's ability was either "fair" or "poor" and those

Table A1

### KMAGer RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT INTERPRETERS

Questions and responses	Percent of 394 respondents
a. Do you trust your interpreter from the standpoint of security?	
Yes	69
No	21
No response	10
Total	100
b. Do you trust his accuracy in interpretation?	
Yes	63
No	29
No response	8
Total	100
c. Do you trust his honesty?	
Yes	77
No	12
No response	11
Total	100
d. What are your interpreter's weak points?	
English generally poor	25
Doesn't understand military terms or situations	29
Afraid of ROKA officers	33
Other	30
No response	24
Total	123 <sup>a</sup>
e. Rate your interpreter's ability	
Excellent	31
Good	34
Fair	23
Poor	6
No response	6
Total	100

<sup>a</sup>Adds to more than 100 percent because of permissibility of multiple responses.

replying negatively to the questions concerning accuracy in interpretation and command of English.

Perhaps the outstanding fact that emerges from Table A1 is the generally high (63 to 77 percent) degree of satisfaction with ROKA interpreters reported

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by KMAGers responding to the questionnaire. It should be noted that in interviews a smaller percentage of KMAGers rated their interpreters as "satisfactory." The gist of their comments seemed to indicate that they managed to work with their ROKA interpreters but that the latter were not fully satisfactory. This view seemed to be shared by interpreters themselves, who, when interviewed by ORO representatives\* frankly admitted fears of their own lack of competence on the basis of their experiences on the job. To a man, these interpreters considered the course they had taken at the Interpreter School to have been too short and sketchy to meet their actual needs, and recommended that it be increased in length from 3 to at least 6 weeks; in three instances the suggestion was that it be at least 2 months long. The course subsequently (June 1953) was increased from 3 to 6 weeks.

Although KMAG was the principal user of graduates of the Interpreter School, it did not have full control over selection of entrants to that school. KMAG made every effort under the existing system of candidate selection to ensure that political or nepotistic appointees were not admitted to the school unless they otherwise met the qualifications for entrance. The selection procedure began with an application to ROKA Hq by the would-be interpreter. Those whose applications were passed by this headquarters then appeared for a written examination administered by ROKA. A special KMAG Selection Board (under the KMAG AG) then gave those who passed the written test an oral examination. This board recommended to ROKA AG and GI those candidates it found competent to enter the school. Theoretically these were the members of the prospective student body, but in practice the KMAG board found that ranking ROKA officers occasionally "slipped a few poor ones" past the board and permitted them to enter the school for personal or political reasons.

The school was supposed to give periodic examinations to students during their course of interpreter training (the content of which was controlled by KMAG), and to fail those who did not pass these examinations. Advisors reported that KMAG had satisfactory control over such eliminations. Furthermore KMAG recommended assignments for graduates of the school, and also recommended shifts of assignment for interpreters who were not successful in particular assignments. The usual causes for shifts in assignment were complaints by KMAG advisors in the field about the performance of their interpreters. The most frequent complaint received from advisors was that their interpreters were not trustworthy (i.e., on security grounds). The second most frequent complaint was that they were poorly trained and consequently not competent to perform their duties satisfactorily. Absenteeism was also cited occasionally, but it did not compare in frequency with either of the previous two complaints.

Discussions between ORO representatives and Interpreter School staff, faculty, and advisors brought general agreement that several steps could and should be taken in an effort to minimize the frequency of complaints concerning the trustworthiness and competence of ROKA officer-interpreters.

In the first place it was agreed that the school should be assigned an American instructor—preferably one who understood Korean—to teach idiomatic

\*In addition to interviewing civilian (indigenous) interpreters in the course of this investigation, ORO team members interviewed and submitted questionnaires to 36 ROKA officer-interpreters who had been graduated from the ROKA Interpreter School. Analysts also visited the Interpreter School, observed classes in session and discussed the problems involved in the operation of that school and the preparation of its students for their future duties with the KMAG advisory staff assigned there and with the ROKA staff and faculty of the school.

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American military terminology. In the interpreter system operated in KMAG in 1953, the interpreter might pass on to the Korean counterpart the question asked by the American, but since the interpreter was not versed in American idiom, as often as not he did not understand the meaning or significance of the question. As a consequence KMAGers reported that frequently an answer to a question they had posed was received through the interpreter, but had nothing to do with the original question. It is not enough that the interpreter transfer the words used; he must be able to transfer the thoughts of both parties. It was the interpreter's mission, but not his practice or capability, to make certain that both parties to the conversation understood each other.

Second, in these discussions at the Interpreter School it was agreed that American personnel who were to be in frequent contact with Koreans and must depend on the services of an interpreter should be previously instructed in "the art of using an interpreter." This principle has been accepted by the US Department of State, which publishes a brief guide for its personnel who must work with interpreters,<sup>12</sup> and it was also emphasized to ORO team members by Korean interpreters who were interviewed. Two brief examples of the type of points involved here are cited. Stockwell advises (and most linguists seem to agree) that:

One should look at, and talk directly to, the foreign national with whom he is conversing. He should address his utterances to the foreigner as though he were understanding every word. One should not address him in the third person through the interpreter. Thus, rather than saying something like "Tell him I'm glad to be here," one should simply say directly "I'm glad to be here."<sup>12</sup>

Experienced KMAGers emphasized that as the interpreter is a junior officer in the ROKA, he must be indoctrinated by his American "employer" with the idea that he must translate a sharply worded phrase addressed to an officer of his own nationality senior to him exactly as it has been said. For reasons inherent in the social class system of Korea and other Asian countries and in the concept commonly referred to as face, the interpreter will normally, unless otherwise instructed, smooth or mitigate the sharpness of the original English phrase. On the other hand, it was argued by some interpreters that the American who was using the interpreter should be informed that in Korea it simply is not approved interpersonal procedure for a junior in status or in age to speak sharply or roughly to a senior. Such conduct is vulgar and, as one interpreter phrased it, "barbarian." Despite this cultural barrier the US officer must insist that his statements be translated accurately—as he says them.

### Interpreter Problem in the Combat Unit

The most serious stress area in respect to the interpreter problem was that involving KMAG advisors in ROKA combat units. As one KMAG regimental advisor phrased it in discussing the problem with an ORO interviewer, "we're completely at the mercy of the interpreters." Similar expressions were heard from advisors at both divisional and corps levels.

The dual mission of the KMAG officer was officially described as follows:

- a. To advise their Korean counterparts, providing them with the benefit of the Advisors' military experience, so the counterpart may accomplish the overall combat mission.

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from units subordinate to their counterparts (Table A2). Respondents reported also that in static or favorable situations many of them still had difficulty securing necessary information.

Table A2

### KMAGer RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT COUNTERPARTS

Questions and responses	Percent of 304 respondents
a. When the military situation is unfavorable, do you have difficulty getting complete and accurate reports from your counterpart?	
Yes	34
No	54
No response	12
Total	100
From subordinate units?	
Yes	43
No	34
No response	23
Total	100
b. When the military situation is favorable or static, do you have difficulty getting complete and accurate reports from your counterpart?	
Yes	18
No	68
No response	14
Total	100
From subordinate units?	
Yes	24
No	53
No response	23
Total	100

This state of affairs might be accounted for in part by poor communication between the subordinate units and the ROKA commander; in part it might also lie in an unsatisfactory relation between the KMAGer and his interpreter or in the interpreter's lack of complete competence. But most importantly, it was stated by KMAGers time and again, and acknowledged by interpreters and even by a few ROKA officers interviewed in the course of this study, that fear of loss of face caused Korean officers to withhold reports of losses or of other unfavorable situations until the situation had been remedied. Remedial action was not always possible, and the result was that ground equipment and men were often irrevocably lost before a report was rendered.

Knowing of the reluctance of Korean commanders to admit that a situation was developing in favor of the enemy while there still remained time to save the day, it would seem natural for the affected KMAGer to quiz his interpreter in an attempt to obtain the needed information. However, it was also a recognized

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fact that many interpreters feared their ROKA commanders and other line officers. Consequently they hesitated to pass along to the KMAGer information that they knew the ROKA commander might not appreciate. As one ROKA interpreter put it: "The interpreter is always in the middle. If things don't go the way my commander wants, he blames me for not getting the right advice from [the KMAG advisor]."

The result of this situation was that interpreters often did not pass on to the KMAGer information he needed to function adequately; they feared recriminations by their commanding officer should they do so and be found out. Table A3 reports the pertinent question asked KMAGers in the questionnaire on this point.

Table A3

### KMAGer RESPONSES TO QUESTION ABOUT WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION

Question and responses	Percent of 204 respondents
Does your ROKA interpreter tell you things your counterpart does not wish you to know?	
Yes, always	2
Yes, frequently	8
Yes, from time to time	24
No	52
No response	14
Total	100

Implicit in this discussion is the idea that the situation could be ameliorated if KMAGers were not altogether dependent on the charity of their counterparts or the courage and loyalty of their ROKA interpreters. From the circumstances there can be no question but that the utter dependence of KMAG advisors on Koreans for vital military information, and as a corollary the inability of KMAG advisors to obtain information directly through use of the Korean language, hampered them in the accomplishment of their mission and resulted on numerous occasions in unnecessary loss of territory and lives or wastage of ammunition. As one Senior Advisor said: "For an individual who does not understand the language the barrier is as complete as his counterpart or interpreter wishes to make it." Another KMAGer singled out this comment as "the key to the entire problem."

One example is typical of seven that were recounted in detail to ORO investigators: In the midst of a Chinese attack the KMAG advisor to a ROKA infantry regiment was told that an adjacent ROKA regiment had succeeded in retaking a hill just lost to the Chinese. His counterpart asked that he request the division KMAG to move artillery fire out to 300 yd beyond the hill to prevent the Chinese from regrouping for a counterattack. Two hours later the advisor learned from US artillery observers, and, after questioning, from his ROKA counterpart that "a mistake" had been made: there were no ROKA troops

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on the hill; in fact, they had never gotten back onto the hill! This advisor also learned later from his interpreter (whom he characterized as "okay, but scared to death of his colonel") that his counterpart had known the true situation throughout the period in question, as indeed had the interpreter and the members of the regimental commander's staff, but the counterpart had forbidden the interpreter to tell the advisor the facts.

A highly important observation by one KMAGer throws additional emphasis on the interpersonal relations: "A Korean interpreter would do his utmost to do his job right in those cases where he knew that the KMAG advisor had the confidence of his counterpart."

### American Face

In this regard it may be well to note that the ORO field team consistently received unsolicited critical comments from Korean interpreters and translators in numerous headquarters regarding the prestige, recognition, and status of US Army officers, stemming from the inability of more than a few US personnel to speak either Korean or Chinese with any degree of fluency. Most of these expressions, it should be added, were made in a spirit of sympathy and helpfulness, while talking privately with ORO representatives in an Asiatic language. Face is a concept of which Americans in the Far East are keenly aware, though its meaning is not always clearly understood. Insofar as the present problem is concerned, face involves the maintenance of American dignity, respect, and prestige by demonstrated ability to cope with all situations, including those arising from the language barrier.

Numerous incidents were described by these Korean interpreters (such as that related in the preceding subsection) to show that a KMAG officer's inability to understand the Korean language sometimes, or even often, resulted in his being ignored or bypassed by his ROKA counterpart in stress situations. A number of the situations described by Koreans involved implicit or even explicit scorn of the KMAGer by his counterpart, who was safe in the knowledge that the former could not understand what was going on around him. Insofar as the counterpart and other Koreans present were concerned, the US officer's dignity and prestige had been damaged.

### POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO LANGUAGE PROBLEM

Pertinent then is the question: How does the Army solve the problems that arise from a lack of Korean-speaking US Army officers available for KMAG duties and the corollary dependence of KMAGers on their English-speaking counterparts and their ROKA officer-interpreters? There are several possible solutions to problems of this sort.

#### Ideal Solution Not Attainable

The ideal solution is to require fluency in Korean as a qualification for KMAG advisory posts.\* This would relieve the advisor of the necessity of rely-

\* Such language competence is required for attache and MAAG assignments in certain countries, particularly in Central and South America. But such assignments involve fewer individuals and languages more widely known among the group assigned.

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ing on an interpreter, enable him to communicate directly and easily with his counterpart, and enhance his (and the US Army's) prestige and standing among Korean military men. It is also expensive and time-consuming, and in the present situation impracticable. KMAGers reached by questionnaire were queried as to their views on the question of learning Korean to do their work more efficiently. Their responses are given in Table A4.

Table A4

### KMAGer RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT NEED FOR LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION

Questions and responses	Percent of 288 respondents
a. Should someone doing your present work be given instruction in the Korean language before starting the job?	
Yes	25
No	45
Total	100
b. If your answer is yes, should the person be trained to:	
Fluency?	4
Converse with ease?	17
Converse, though not fluently?	42
Understand basic terms and phrases?	36
Total	100
c. How would your relation with your counterpart be affected if you could speak Korean?	
Would help	39
More effective	42
Would hurt	0
Less effective	0
Would have no effect	19
Total	100*

\*Adds to more than 100 percent because of possibility of multiple responses.

More than one-half the KMAG respondents who answered that some knowledge of the Korean language would help in their jobs added comments. Typical of such comments were the following:

All KMAG advisors should be required to study and to receive instruction in the Korean language. [Spec Staff Advisor, 8th ROK Div]

The only way to overcome the language barrier completely is to learn the language. [Staff Advisor, 12th ROK Div]

Believe all KMAG officers should get some training in the language before hand. With such a basis he will learn it well in 3-5 months for his needs, and be much more effective. [Regt Advisor]

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Suggest all advisors attend a Korean language school before being assigned. [Spec Staff Advisor, 12th ROK Div]

I have found that learning about 5 words a day, and also learning to write it, has caused a much better relationship and a quicker tool for leverage into their confidence. [Regt Advisor]

Give all advisors a short course in the Korean language prior to being assigned to a unit. [Regt Advisor]

Being unable to understand their language, most times you receive only the information they wish to pass on to you or what information they want you to know. Being able to understand their language you would be able to check them on various reports. [Food Service Advisor]

Have the whole command go through 30 minutes of practical phrases and words everyday or every other day. [Div Sig Advisor]

If I could speak Korean, I could overcome all obstacles presently existing and perfect this unit tactically and technically. [Senior Div Arty Advisor]

There is a definite need for language training for advisory personnel going to a foreign country. [Asst Advisor, G3 ROKA]

Why can't we be allowed or encouraged to learn this language? Using the few words I've been able to learn by myself has helped my relations with Koreans a great deal. [Senior Advisor, ROKA service school]

The tenor and frequency of these remarks was such as to indicate a sharp recognition by KMAgers that inability to understand the Korean language has been a clearly felt handicap to them in their work. Impracticable though it would be to train all KMAgers to fluency in Korean (or all MAAG or military mission personnel to fluency in the language of any Asian country), the possibility of a short course in Korean and other appropriate languages for prospective advisors would appear worthy of serious consideration by the Army. Support for this idea is recognized:

Frequently interpreters are not present or are inadequate. Each advisor should acquire a basic vocabulary of Korean sufficient to enable him to make basic matters understood. Artillery terms are not difficult in Korean. By using them the Advisor will find his job simpler and more effective. He will also gain stature in the eyes of his Koreans. ROK officers constantly study English and they appreciate the Advisor's efforts to learn their language.<sup>5</sup>

### US Interpreters

Alternative to the utilization of ROKA officer-interpreters or the training of KMAgers to fluency in Korean, the advisor could be provided with a US interpreter. Although US personnel who could serve as Korean language interpreters did not exist in Korea at the time this study was made, training quotas in the Korean course were stepped up at the Army Language School. It is reported that graduates of this course later became available in considerable numbers and have been assigned to the Far East Command.\* In a regiment, i.e., the lowest infantry line unit to which KMAg advisors were regularly assigned and where the advisor was in constant contact with his counterpart and the latter's staff, the US interpreter would serve as an invaluable aid to the

\*Information from Colonel Wright and General VanAtta, G2, Training Branch, DA, and CONARC.



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advisor. In addition to the language assistance he could offer, he would have a primary loyalty to the US, rather than to the ROK, as was the case with Korean civilian or military interpreters. But one disadvantage of using a US interpreter at the regimental level—especially an enlisted interpreter—would consist mainly of the interpreter's probable inability to gain the respect, confidence, and trust of the ROKA counterpart officer and his staff. It is likely that a ROKA regimental commander (colonel) and his staff would consider a US enlisted interpreter too far below him to lower his own dignity and position by depending on his services or acknowledging him as worthy of confidence. Another even more fundamental difficulty is the scarcity of US personnel who can serve as interpreters of the Korean language.

### Korean Civilians in US Employment

Another possibility would be for KMAG to hire Korean civilian interpreters (CMS), clothe them in US uniforms and US insignia, house them and feed them with KMAG detachments—as if they were in reality DACs. It has been a virtually universal experience of KMAG advisors that their interpreters, being ROKA junior officers, were often afraid to interpret honestly, accurately, or sometimes at all, to the advisors because of possible recriminations by the Korean counterpart. The latter was the interpreter's commanding officer whom he feared, because in the typical pattern of Asian military officers (and of ROKA unit commanders) they were traditionally supreme and unmerciful. This fact reported to ORO investigators by KMAG officers and ROKA interpreters alike, is a major consideration in the problem of securing adequate, effective interpretation.

It may be objected that a Korean civilian interpreter employed directly by KMAG would be primarily a Korean, a civilian subject to drafting by the ROKA if his work displeased a senior ROKA officer, and more expensive to use than a ROKA officer-interpreter. In opposition to such an objection it may be pointed out that the danger of such interpreters being drafted was a real one, but KMAG was itself not without power to influence such situations, or even to influence the tenure of a ROKA commander who would engage in such recriminatory activities.\* It ought also to be observed that although the man certainly would remain a Korean, the experience of other US units that used Korean civilian interpreters was that a certain degree of loyalty accrued to the American employer. Furthermore the actual material advantages of US employment (higher pay; better food, clothing, and housing; US discipline, justice and protection) have been known to have reacted tangibly to the benefit of the US employer.

### ROKA Interpreters under KMAG Control

Even so relatively minor a change in ROKA interpreter status as occurred in June 1953 in the 8th ROK Division had favorable consequences. When General Song became CG of this division, he ordered control of the ROKA interpreters in the division shifted from his own G1 to the KMAG G1 advisor in the division. KMAG advisors reported this change resulted in a "100 per-

\* KMAG advisors informed the writers of two cases in which ROKA regimental commanders were removed from their commands because of complaints concerning their conduct by their KMAG advisors.

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cent improvement in morale and effectiveness of the interpreters. This was also done in other ROKA divisions, at times throughout the war, and throughout the war in the Capitol ROK Division. KIMAG controlled the ROKA interpreters and they lived in the KIMAG part of camp.\*

The interpreters themselves reacted enthusiastically to the move. One informed the Senior KIMAG Advisor that he was happy the change had been made. He noted that the majority of the interpreters in ROKA are better educated than most Koreans,\* but that they "are used like dogs." In addition to and at times instead of the duties for which they had been trained, in ROKA units ROKA interpreters were assigned duties as orderlies, strikers, etc. Under KIMAG control their work was confined to interpreting. This then may be a fourth solution to the typical unsatisfactory situation. An additional improvement, in the words of one KIMAGer: "Also the interpreter should be assigned to the KIMAG officer, and if satisfactory, always remain with him."

Employment of civilian interpreters by KIMAG is considered a somewhat better solution, however, principally because the civilian is at least two steps removed from subservience to and possible hostile action by a ROKA counterpart officer. Secondly, as a Korean civilian his loyalty was fundamentally to his people rather than to the ROKA, which meant that he probably would offer greater loyalty to his KIMAG employer than a ROKA interpreter-officer could be expected to do. A possible source of civilian interpreters is the considerable number of civilians past military service age. Many of these men, however, were already serving as interpreters for commercial houses whose wage scale was higher than that of the Army.

### US Interpreters to Monitor Korean Interpreters

At division level, where a number of KIMAG advisors and their counterparts used interpreters, but where the strain of combat was less acute than at regiment, a US officer-interpreter, assisted by a US enlisted interpreter, could render valuable assistance to the KIMAG staff, and could monitor interpretations and operational situations such as occur in division war rooms during periods of action. In addition such American personnel would possess a positive loyalty to the US and therefore could be used when security was a consideration, whereas under the existing program the KIMAG advisor had a choice of confiding in a ROKA officer or doing without assistance.

Under emergency conditions like those that occurred in active combat in Korea from 1950 to 1953—the period of prime need for the Army—US military interpreters were not available. But US civilians—missionaries, clerics, and to a lesser extent businessmen, journalists, and educators—were available. Many of them could have been used as US interpreters as an interim measure. Although they were lacking in military knowledge and may have been constitutionally unsympathetic to the bloody business of war, such knowledge and attitudes were, or probably could have been, more quickly modified than the alternative of US military personnel becoming equally proficient in the Korean lan-

\*A statement that was repeated to ORO representatives and one that the present study bears out. It should also be added that many Korean interpreters viewed their job as more than just work. The comment was made to members of this ORO team time and again by interpreters that the difficulties of their position were more than compensated for by the knowledge that they were contributing to the betterment of Korean-American relations by overcoming the language barrier.

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guage. For the future the Department of the Army would be well advised to develop plans for gathering in and reassigning such persons where they might be employed in duties of real value to the US and to their "second country."

### BRIEFING THE PROSPECTIVE KMAGer

Respondents to ORO questionnaires were asked whether their preassignment briefing on their duties had been sufficient. Their replies indicated substantial satisfaction (Table A5). This finding is in contrast with the findings of

Table A5

#### KMAGer RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT ADEQUACY OF BRIEFING

Questions and responses	Percent of 204 respondents
a. Were you adequately briefed about the purposes and problems of your work as a KMAG officer before you were placed with a ROKA unit?	
Yes	69
No	27
No response	4
Total	100
b. What kinds of information were you given? <sup>a</sup>	
(1) Structure, organization, and functions of ROKA	77
(2) General background about Korea, including history	68
(3) Customs and habits of the Korean people	57
(4) Health conditions	45
(5) Information about the ROKA unit you were joining	38
c. In your opinion in which of the kinds of information listed above would a more thorough briefing be "most" helpful to a prospective KMAG officer?	
(1) Information about the ROKA unit you were joining	62
(2) Structure, organization, and functions of ROKA	39
(3) Customs and habits of the Korean people	48
(4) Biographic information about your counterpart	45
(5) Korean government and politics	25

<sup>a</sup>The list presented included nine possible choices. Only the top five are recorded here in each case.

earlier studies when KMAGers reported inadequate briefing. By mid-1953 the exceptions seemed to be under pressure of combat. It will be observed that briefing on the customs and habits of the Korean people was acknowledged by 57 percent of prospective KMAGers and yet was listed by 48 percent of KMAG respondents as information in which a more thorough briefing would be "most" helpful.

In response to other questions on the KMAG questionnaire, 45 percent of the 204 respondents affirmed that "they had experienced difficulty with Koreans because they did not know the Korean language" and another 18 percent knew

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of difficulties that had occurred to them "because of ignorance of Korean customs and habits." The latter figure of course does not reflect the possible total of such occurrences, because men who are not informed on local customs may be unaware that they have violated them or that difficulties had arisen out of their ignorance.

### **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **Conclusions**

1. The language barrier has been a serious handicap in combat units, ROKA service schools, and support units.
2. Thorough briefing for KMAG officers prior to their assignment to units was a practical necessity—this briefing to include cultural information (nature and customs of Koreans), how to use an interpreter, and how to acquire enough knowledge of the language to communicate with the counterpart, in addition to information on KMAG military mission and operating procedures.
3. Ability to speak and understand the Korean language was an important asset and increased the effectiveness and rapport of the KMAG advisor in working with Koreans; but it was not an absolute necessity.
4. ROKA officer-interpreters had three principal shortcomings: (a) primary loyalty to their ROKA superior; (b) fear of recrimination by their ROKA superiors; and (c) lack of understanding of military and colloquial English.
5. The objective of language training for KMAG officers should be to enable them to carry on simple conversations in Korean.
6. The majority of KMAG officers would have profited from more complete briefing before entering advisory work.

#### **Recommendations**

1. Officers hereafter assigned to KMAG as advisors, particularly in peacetime, and whenever possible under combat conditions, should be given an introductory orientation or course of training for their KMAG duty, prior to assignment to units, to include: the rudiments of the Korean language,\* the technique of using an interpreter, and information on Korean customs, habits, military organization, government, and politics.
2. Graduates of the Korean course at the Army Language School should be given preference for assignments in Korea, including KMAG, requiring use of their language skill.
3. US Army language specialists qualified in a shortage-category local language, serving in a foreign theater and occupying TOE positions that do not require knowledge of their language skill, and who are not otherwise critically needed in a nonlanguage position, should be released for reassignment to critical vacancies in the MAAG requiring their language skill.
4. Korean civilian interpreters (CIS), hired as US employees by KMAG, and clothed, housed, and fed with KMAG detachments, should be authorized on the basis of one per ROKA regiment. They should be screened and supervised

\* Preferably a minimum of approximately 40 hr to an optimum of about 160 hr of instruction given at the Army Language School, en route to the Far East, or in lieu of that, in the theater after arrival.

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by the US language specialist officer in the next higher KMAG unit, and should be under the direct control of the KMAG advisor to whom they are assigned.

5. US military units operating abroad should make greater use of US civilians as interpreters, drawing them from among those who through experience in the local country have learned the language and know the local people and their customs.

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### LANGUAGE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR KMAG ADVISORS

**INSTRUCTIONS:** In each multiple choice question, check the box ☐ (or boxes) before the appropriate answer (or answers). DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME ANYWHERE ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE. RETURN QUESTIONNAIRE IN ENCLOSED ENVELOPE.

(1) # \_\_\_\_\_ (4) Date \_\_\_\_\_ (6) How old are you? \_\_\_\_\_ years.

(7) Where in the U. S. is your home located?

☐ New England

☐ Midwest

☐ Mid-Atlantic

☐ Rocky Mountain

☐ South or Southeast

☐ Southwest

☐ North Central

☐ West Coast

(7a) Was your home community: ☐ City? ☐ Town? ☐ Village?  
☐ Rural?

(8) Circle the highest grade or year of education you completed.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

(9) What is your rank?

☐ Warrant Officer

☐ Major

☐ 2nd Lt.

☐ Lt. Col.

☐ 1st Lt.

☐ Col.

☐ Capt.

(10) Are you a Reserve Officer? ☐ Regular Army? ☐ West Point Grad? ☐

(10a) How many months have you been in Korea? \_\_\_\_\_ months.

(11) How many months have you been with KMAG? \_\_\_\_\_ months.

(11a) How many months have you been in your present assignment? \_\_\_\_\_ months.

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- (12) What is your present assignment? \_\_\_\_\_  
(e.g. Senior Adv., ROK Division, Radio Operator, ROK Regt.)
- (13) What was your last assignment? \_\_\_\_\_
- (14) If you are a reserve officer, what was your civilian occupation?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
- (15) What is your MOS? \_\_\_\_\_
- (19) Describe briefly the work you ordinarily do in your present assignment.  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
- (20) Can you speak or understand any language other than your own? (That is, any words or phrases other than "hello" and "goodbye"?)  
☐ Yes ☐ No

(20a) If you know ANY foreign language, answer the following:

What language?

- |                                   |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Japanese | <input type="checkbox"/> French          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Korean   | <input type="checkbox"/> Russian         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Chinese  | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (name it) |

How well do you speak:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| (21) Japanese                                     | (22) Russian                                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fluently                 | <input type="checkbox"/> Fluently                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly fluently          | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly fluently          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Converse with difficulty | <input type="checkbox"/> Converse with difficulty |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Know a few words         | <input type="checkbox"/> Know a few words         |
| (23) Korean                                       | (24) French                                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fluently                 | <input type="checkbox"/> Fluently                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly fluently          | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly fluently          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Converse with difficulty | <input type="checkbox"/> Converse with difficulty |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Know a few words         | <input type="checkbox"/> Know a few words         |

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(25) Chinese

☐ Fluently

☐ Fairly fluently

☐ Converse with difficulty

☐ Know a few words

(26) Other

☐ Fluently

☐ Fairly fluently

☐ Converse with difficulty

☐ Know a few words

How well can you READ each of the foreign languages?

(21) Japanese? ☐ Excellent ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Poor

(22) Russian? ☐ Excellent ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Poor

(23) Korean? ☐ Excellent ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Poor

(24) French? ☐ Excellent ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Poor

(25) Chinese? ☐ Excellent ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Poor

(26) Other? ☐ Excellent ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Poor

(27) Have you attended:

☐ The Army Language School?

☐ The School of Military Government?

☐ Strategic Intelligence School?

☐ General Intelligence School?

☐ AFPE Language School?

☐ Command and General Staff School?

(28) How do you and your counterpart make yourselves understood to each other?

☐ (1) Your own language (English)

☐ (2) U. S. Army interpreter

☐ (3) Counterpart's language (Korean)

☐ (4) Through a person speaking a third language, such as Japanese

☐ (5) Pictures, or writing, or gestures

☐ (6) ROKA interpreter

☐ (7) Korean civilian interpreter



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(29) Which of the above listed means of communication are most effective?

☐ (1) ☐ (2) ☐ (3) ☐ (4) ☐ (5) ☐ (6) ☐ (7)

(30) If a ROKA or Korean civilian interpreter is used, do you trust him from the standpoint of security? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(30a) If you do not trust him, state why. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

(31) Do you trust his accuracy in interpretation? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(31a) Do you trust his honesty? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(32) What are your interpreter's weak points?

☐ English generally poor

☐ Doesn't understand military terms or situations

☐ Afraid of ROKA officer

☐ Other (list it)

(32a) Rate your interpreter's ability.

☐ Excellent ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Poor

(33) Should someone doing your present work be given instruction in the Korean language before starting the job? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(33a) If your answer is yes, should the person be trained to

☐ fluency? ☐ converse, though not fluently?

☐ converse with ease? ☐ understand basic terms and phrases?

(33b) How well do you enjoy the confidence of your counterpart?

☐ Excellent ☐ Good ☐ Fair ☐ Poor

(34) How long did it take you to reach this degree of confidence?

☐ Less than one week ☐ Less than two months

☐ Less than one month ☐ Less than six months

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(34a) How would your relationship be affected if you could speak Korean?

- ☐ Would help      ☐ Would hurt      ☐ Would have no effect  
☐ More effective      ☐ Less effective

(35) How would your relationship be affected if you were assigned a U. S. Army Korean interpreter?

- ☐ Would help      ☐ Would hurt      ☐ Would have no effect  
☐ More effective      ☐ Less effective

(35a) How would your relationship be affected if you were assigned a Korean civilian interpreter employed by KMAC?

- ☐ Would help      ☐ Would hurt      ☐ Would have no effect  
☐ More effective      ☐ Less effective

(36) Do you regard your counterpart as

- ☐ Unusually able?      ☐ Mediocre ability?  
☐ Competent?      ☐ Not competent?

(37) List his three most commendable qualities.

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_

(38) List his three least commendable qualities.

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_

(38a) What percentage of your conversations with your counterpart is concerned with military matters?

- ☐ less than 25%      ☐ less than 75%  
☐ less than 50%      ☐ 75 - 100%

(39) When the military situation is unfavorable, do you have difficulty getting complete and accurate reports from your counterpart? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(39a) From subordinate units? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(39b) When the military situation is favorable or static, do you have difficulty getting complete and accurate reports from your counterpart? ☐ Yes ☐ No

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- (39c) From subordinate units? ☐ Yes ☐ No
- (40) Does your ROKA interpreter tell you things your counterpart does not wish you to know?
- ☐ Yes, always ☐ Yes, from time to time
- ☐ Yes, frequently ☐ No
- (41) Which of the following best define your mission as a KNAG officer?
- ☐ To instruct counterpart in proper methods and procedures.
- ☐ To offer advice, but not to give orders, to counterpart.
- ☐ To offer advice, and, if necessary, to give orders to counterpart.
- ☐ To show counterpart proper way to do his job, by actually doing it yourself.
- ☐ To make counterpart do things properly.
- (41a) How does your counterpart react to your advice, suggestions, orders?
- ☐ Consistently asks for advice and suggestions.
- ☐ Always responds favorably and happily.
- ☐ Often responds favorably, but occasionally seems to resent advice, etc.
- ☐ Occasionally responds favorably, but usually seems to resent advice, etc.
- ☐ Seldom responds favorably. Often rejects advice, etc.
- ☐ Must be ordered to take proper action.
- (42) Were you adequately "briefed" about the purposes and problems of your work as a KNAG officer before you were placed with an ROK unit? ☐ Yes ☐ No
- (42a) What kinds of information were you given?
- ☐ (1) General background about Korea, including history
- ☐ (2) Customs and habits of the Korean people
- ☐ (3) Structure, organization, and functions of ROKA
- ☐ (4) Korean government and politics
- ☐ (5) Korean geography (including climate)
- ☐ (6) Health Conditions
- ☐ (7) Biographic information about your counterpart(s)
- ☐ (8) Information about the ROKA unit you were joining

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- ☐ 3. 3 months - 6 months 9  
☐ 4. 6 months - 12 months 0  
☐ 5. More than 12 months X  
Y
14. Exact position
- (a) 16
- (b) 17
35. How frequently are you in contact with your counterpart?
- (a) 28-1  
☐ 1. Practically all the time 2  
☐ 2. Usually spend most of the day with him 3  
☐ 3. Spend about half of the day with him 4  
☐ 4. Am in contact with him several times a day 5  
☐ 5. Am in contact with him once a day 6  
☐ 6. Am in contact with him several times a week 7
- (b) 29-1  
☐ 1. Practically all the time 2  
☐ 2. Usually spend most of the day with him 3  
☐ 3. Spend about half of the day with him 4  
☐ 4. Am in contact with him several times a day 5  
☐ 5. Am in contact with him once a day 6  
☐ 6. Am in contact with him several times a week 7
36. Which of the following are your most important means of contact with your counterpart? (check no more than three).
- 30-1  
☐ 1. Personal contact at briefings 2  
☐ 2. Personal contact in his office 3  
☐ 3. Personal contact in my office 4  
☐ 4. Personal contact in the field 5  
☐ 5. Personal contact at messes or clubs 6  
☐ 6. Direct contact by phone 7  
☐ 7. Contact by means of memos 8  
☐ 8. Contact through our staffs 9  
☐ 9. Other (specify) 0
37. Have you ever found it necessary to bring pressure to bear on your counterpart to follow your advice or suggestions?
- (a) 31-1  
☐ 1. No, never 2  
☐ 2. Yes, but very rarely 3  
☐ 3. Yes, once in a while 4  
☐ 4. Yes, frequently 5
- (b) 7  
☐ 1. No, never 8  
☐ 2. Yes, but very rarely 9  
☐ 3. Yes, once in a while 0  
☐ 4. Yes, frequently X
38. If yes, which of the following methods have you used to do this?
- 32-1  
☐ 1. Argument and persuasion 2  
☐ 2. Giving counterpart direct orders, or countermanding his orders

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- \_\_\_ 3. Referring the matter to higher KMAC or HOKA echelons 3
- \_\_\_ 4. Threatening to take the matter to higher echelons 4
- \_\_\_ 5. Refusing to counterclaim ROK supply requisitions 5
- \_\_\_ 6. Other (specify the method used) 6
- \_\_\_ 7 7
39. When the military situation is unfavorable, how often do you have difficulty getting complete and accurate reports from your counterpart?
- (a) \_\_\_ 1. Almost always 33-1
- \_\_\_ 2. Frequently 2
- \_\_\_ 3. Sometimes 3
- \_\_\_ 4. Infrequently 4
- \_\_\_ 5. Rarely or never 5
- (b) \_\_\_ 1. Almost always 6
- \_\_\_ 2. Frequently 7
- \_\_\_ 3. Sometimes 8
- \_\_\_ 4. Infrequently 9
- \_\_\_ 5. Rarely or never 0
40. When the military situation is favorable or static, how often do you have difficulty getting complete and accurate reports from your counterpart?
- (a) \_\_\_ 1. Almost always 34-1
- \_\_\_ 2. Frequently 2
- \_\_\_ 3. Sometimes 3
- \_\_\_ 4. Infrequently 4
- \_\_\_ 5. Rarely or never 5
- (b) \_\_\_ 1. Almost always 6
- \_\_\_ 2. Frequently 7
- \_\_\_ 3. Sometimes 8
- \_\_\_ 4. Infrequently 9
- \_\_\_ 5. Rarely or never 0
41. How frequently does your counterpart ask for advice?
- (b) \_\_\_ 1. Very frequently 35-1
- \_\_\_ 2. Frequently 2
- \_\_\_ 3. Sometimes 3
- \_\_\_ 4. Infrequently 4
- \_\_\_ 5. Rarely 5
- (b) \_\_\_ 1. Very frequently 6
- \_\_\_ 2. Frequently 7
- \_\_\_ 3. Sometimes 8
- \_\_\_ 4. Infrequently 9
- \_\_\_ 5. Rarely 0
42. Under what circumstances does your counterpart ask for advice?
- (a) \_\_\_ 1. Usually asks advice even in routine matters 36-1
- \_\_\_ 2. Tends to ask for advice even when he is competent to handle the situation himself 2

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- \_\_\_ 3. Usually makes most decisions himself but asks for advice when he recognized his limitations 3
- \_\_\_ 4. Usually asks advice only after emergencies have arisen 4
- \_\_\_ 5. Rarely asks for advice under any circumstances 5
- (b) \_\_\_ 1. Usually asks advice even in routine matters 6
- \_\_\_ 2. Tends to ask for advice even when he is competent to handle the situation himself. 7
- \_\_\_ 3. Usually makes most decisions himself but asks for advice when he recognized his limitations 8
- \_\_\_ 4. Usually asks advice only after emergencies have arisen 9
- \_\_\_ 5. Rarely asks for advice under any circumstances 0
43. How frequently do you give advice or suggestions to your counterpart without being asked by him first? X
- \_\_\_ 1. Very frequently 37-1
- \_\_\_ 2. Frequently 2
- \_\_\_ 3. Sometimes 3
- \_\_\_ 4. Infrequently 4
- \_\_\_ 5. Rarely 5
44. Under which one of these circumstances do you most frequently give advice or suggestions without being first asked by your counterpart? 6
- \_\_\_ 1. Usually only when a critical situation has arisen. 9
- \_\_\_ 2. Usually only when things appear likely to go wrong. 0
- \_\_\_ 3. At any time when suggestions might be helpful. X
45. In dealing with your counterparts, which two of the following methods have you found most effective? Y
- \_\_\_ 1. Making suggestions to your counterpart 39-1
- \_\_\_ 2. Talking over problems with your counterpart 2
- \_\_\_ 3. Letting him learn things by watching you do them 3
- \_\_\_ 4. Giving him general instructions as to what he should do 4
- \_\_\_ 5. Telling him exactly what to do and how to do it 5
- \_\_\_ 6. Other (name it) 6
46. How long did it take you to win the confidence of your counterpart? 7
- (a) \_\_\_ 1. Less than one week 39-1
- \_\_\_ 2. 1 to 2 weeks 2
- \_\_\_ 3. 2 to 4 weeks 3
- \_\_\_ 4. 1 to 2 months 4
- \_\_\_ 5. Over 2 months 5
- (b) \_\_\_ 1. Less than one week 6
- \_\_\_ 2. 1 to 2 weeks 7
- \_\_\_ 3. 2 to 4 weeks 8
- \_\_\_ 4. 1 to 2 months 9
- \_\_\_ 5. Over 2 months 0
- X
- Y

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47. How often should an advisor visit field installations under his counterpart's command?

- |   |      |
|---|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Less than once a week | 40-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. At least once a week  | 2    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Twice a week          | 3    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Several times a week  | 4    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Practically every day | 5    |
|   | 6    |

48. Did you usually find it possible to visit field installations as often as you felt you should?

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Yes  | 9 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. No   | 0 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. My job was such that I did not need to visit field installations | 1 |

(a) If not, why not? 1  
41

49. What have you found to be the most important things for you to check on during your visits to ROK installations?

42

52. Which of the following have you found the most effective means of communicating with your counterpart? Check the two most effective.

- |   |      |
|---|------|
| (a) <input type="checkbox"/> 1. English (no interpreter used)   | 54-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Korean (no interpreter used)        | 2    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. ROKA interpreter used               | 3    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Korean civilian interpreter used    | 4    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. US Army interpreter used            | 5    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Pictures, writing, or gestures used | 6    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Other (specify) _____               | 7    |
|   | 8    |

- |   |      |
|---|------|
| (b) <input type="checkbox"/> 1. English (no interpreter used)   | 55-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Korean (no interpreter used)        | 2    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. ROKA interpreter used               | 3    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Korean civilian interpreter used    | 4    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. US Army interpreter used            | 5    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Pictures, writing, or gestures used | 6    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Other (specify) _____               | 7    |
|   | 8    |

53. It has been said that ROK interpreters are inclined to distort their interpretations in order to avoid embarrassing the persons for whom they are interpreting or for other reasons. From your experience, how serious a problem is this?

- |  |      |
|--|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Very serious       | 56-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Serious            | 2    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Not too serious    | 3    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Not serious at all | 4    |
|  | 5    |

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54. Do you think that ROK interpreters should be assigned to KNAG advisor's staff rather than to the ROK unit?

- ☐ 1. Yes, he should be assigned to KNAG advisors staff 7
- ☐ 2. No, he should not be assigned to advisors staff 8
- ☐ 3. It doesn't make any difference 9

(a) Give your reasons: 0

57

57. How much difference in rank can there be between a KNAG advisor and his counterpart without creating difficulties?

- ☐ 1. Their ranks should be equal 61-1
- ☐ 2. The KNAG advisor's rank can be 1 rank lower than his counterpart's 2
- ☐ 3. The KNAG advisor's rank can be 2 ranks lower than his counterpart's 3
- ☐ 4. The KNAG advisor's rank can be 3 ranks lower than his counterpart's 4
- ☐ 5. The KNAG advisor's rank can be 4 ranks lower than his counterpart's 5
- ☐ 6. It doesn't matter what their difference in ranks is 6

58. Which is the optimum length of time a KNAG officer should be kept on your job?

- ☐ 1. About 3 months 62-1
- ☐ 2. About 6 months 2
- ☐ 3. About 9 months 3
- ☐ 4. About a year 4
- ☐ 5. Longer than a year 5

59. How long did it take you to "break-in" to your present job?

- ☐ 1. No time at all 63-1
- ☐ 2. Less than two weeks 2
- ☐ 3. 1 month 3
- ☐ 4. 2 months 4
- ☐ 5. 3 months or longer 5

60. When a newly assigned advisor comes in to your job, how long a period of overlap with his predecessor is required?

- ☐ 1. No overlap is required 64-1
- ☐ 2. 1 or 2 days 2
- ☐ 3. 3 to 6 days 3
- ☐ 4. 1 to 2 weeks 4
- ☐ 5. Over 2 weeks 5

61. How much does the paper work required of KNAG officers interfere with the job of advising?

- ☐ 1. Doesn't interfere at all 7
- ☐ 2. Interferes, but not seriously 8
- ☐ 3. Seriously interferes 9

0



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62. From the following list check the three types of previous experience you consider the most important for KMAG advisors

- |  |      |
|--|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Extensive combat experience  | 65-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Command experience above company level   | 2    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Attendance at Command and General Staff College  | 3    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Experience in a Training Command   | 4    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Experience in other military advisory groups   | 5    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Foreign military mission experience  | 6    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Experience in dealing with National Guard, ROTC, Reserve, or other civilian components | 7    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 8. Other (specify) _____  | 8    |
|  | 9    |

63. From your experience, what personal characteristics, attitudes, etc., are desirable in KMAG officers? From the following list check the five most important items.

- |  |      |
|--|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Tact                         | 66-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Emotional Stability          | 2    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Patience                     | 3    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Perseverance                 | 4    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Liking for foreign nationals | 5    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Temperate drinking habits    | 6    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Incorruptability             | 7    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 8. Thoroughness                 | 8    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. Self-reliance                | 9    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 10. Dignity and Reserve         | 67-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 11. Friendliness and Good Humor | 2    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 12. Good personal appearance    | 3    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 13. Other (specify) _____       | 4    |
|  | 5    |

64. Which of the following kinds of information would be most useful in briefing a prospective KMAG advisor? Check not more than five items.

- |  |      |
|--|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Korean history and geography                                 | 68-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Customs and habits of the Korean people                      | 2    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Structure, organization, and functions of ROKA               | 3    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Korean government and politics                               | 4    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Resources and economy of Korea                               | 5    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Health and sanitary conditions in Korea                      | 6    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Biographic information about counterparts                    | 7    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 8. Information about ROKA units (combat records, history, etc.) | 8    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. Other (specify) _____  | 9    |
|  | 0    |

65. How important, for an officer assigned to KMAG, is briefing in the items you have checked above?

- |   |      |
|---|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Necessary   | 69-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Desirable   | 2    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Unimportant | 3    |
|   | 4    |

66. How much instruction in the Korean language, if any, should be given a prospective KMAG advisor before he is assigned to a job like yours?

- |                                  |      |
|----------------------------------|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. None | 70-1 |
|----------------------------------|------|

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- |   |   |      |
|---|---|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 2. Enough to understand basic terms and phrases | 2    |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 3. Enough to converse, though not with ease     | 3    |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 4. Enough to converse with ease                 | 4    |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 5. Enough to converse fluently                  | 5    |
|   |   | 6    |
| 67. How valuable a professional military experience has your KNAG assignment been to you?   |   |      |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 1. More valuable than any other assignment      | 71-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 2. Very valuable                                | 2    |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 3. Valuable                                     | 3    |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 4. Of doubtful value                            | 4    |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 5. Not particularly valuable                    | 5    |
|   |   | 6    |
| 68. Do you regard your KNAG assignment as having helped or hindered your Army career?   |   |      |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 1. Helped                                       | 7    |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 2. Made no difference                           | 8    |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 3. Hindered                                     | 9    |
|   |   | 0    |
| a. In what ways has it helped or hindered your career?  |   |      |
|   |   | 72   |
| 69. Under combat conditions, is your present KNAG detachment too small, just about the right size, or larger than is necessary to carry out your mission effectively? |   |      |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 1. Too small                                    | 73-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 2. Just about right                             | 2    |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | 3. Larger than is necessary                     | 3    |
|   |   | 4    |
| 70. If you think the KNAG detachment is too small, what additional personnel should be added?   |   |      |
|   |   | 74   |
| 71. If some cuts had to be made in your KNAG detachment how could this be done to minimize the loss in effectiveness of the unit?                                     |   |      |
|   |   | 75   |
| 72. What suggestions have you for improving the present organization or functioning of KNAG? Explain briefly.   |   |      |
|   |   | 76   |

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## COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE OF 255 RESPONDENTS TO QUESTIONNAIRE FOR KMAG FIELD ADVISORS

Data	Percent	Data	Percent
<b>Rank</b>		<b>Education, yr</b>	
Field grade officer	79	Less than 9	—
Company grade officer	29	9-12	29
No answer	1	13-16	56
Total	100	More than 16	22
		No answer	1
<b>Duty</b>		Total	100
Senior and staff advisors <sup>a</sup>	33	<b>Present Army status</b>	
Infantry regiment advisors	14	Regular Army	18
Artillery advisors	19	Reserve	81
Technical and service advisors	25	No answer	1
Other <sup>b</sup>	9	Total	100
Total	100		
<b>Race or ethnic group</b>		<b>Total service in Korea</b>	
White	93	Less than 6 months	39
Negro	1	6 months to 1 yr	43
Other	1	1-1½ yr	19
Total	100	More than 1½ yr	7
		No answer	1
<b>Region of birth</b>		Total	100
Northern state	37	<b>Total service with present ROKA unit, months</b>	
Southern state	29	Less than 1	7
Midwestern state	29	1-3	34
Southwestern state	5	3-6	23
Outside US	2	6-12	33
No answer	7	More than 12	4
Total	100	No answer	4
		Total	100

<sup>a</sup>At ROKA Hq, corps and division.

<sup>b</sup>Staff officers at KMAG Hq.

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### OUTLINE FOR EXIT INTERVIEWS WITH KMAG ADVISORS COMPLETING THEIR KMAG ASSIGNMENTS\*

1. Interviewee's rank
2. Army or Service
3. Race
4. Home State: Northern or Southern
5. Brief history of military service in Korea
6. Counterpart (a)
  - a. Rank
  - b. Length of service with present unit
  - c. Exact position
7. Did you fill out questionnaire?
  - a. What did you think of it?
  - b. Was it incomplete?
8. (37-38) Pressure on counterpart. Describe incidents and end results.
  - a. Typical methods
  - b. Unusual methods
9. (39) Getting information. Incident.
10. (41 thru 45) Giving advice. When, how, where do you advise? Describe job of advising.
11. (46) Confidence of counterpart — how won? (Particular time which marked the turning point of your relationship to your counterpart)

On what was this confidence based? (Ability, personality, etc.)

\* These interviews were conducted at KMAG Hq in Korea—23, 24, 25 Aug 53—at the end of officers' KMAG assignments just prior to rotation to the US. Numbers in parentheses refer to questions in questionnaire for field advisors.

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12. (52 thru 54) Communication with counterpart -- language. Describe incidents where the language difficulty caused trouble.
13. (51) Ability of counterpart
  - a. How long should KMAG continue operating, given no war?
  - b. What if unlimited war should break out? At what levels would ROK commanders be competent?
14. (56) What are the deficiencies of ROK soldiers?

What are the excellencies?

As individuals, squads, platoons, companies?
15. (50) What is weak or wrong with G-1, G-2, etc. work of ROK O's?
16. Do you know any KMAG officer who wasn't effective? Why not?
17. (64-65) When first assigned did you feel lost?

What were your problems, etc.?
18. (61) What paperwork for KMAG higher headquarters could be cut out?
19. (71) What did each of your staff members do all day?
20. (72) (a) How could KMAG headquarters have helped you more?
  - (b) How did they interfere with your operation?
  - (c) How did they help with your operation?
21. What's the prevailing opinion among ROK O's regarding former Katusas?
22. Morale of KMAGers. What could be done to improve it?

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**Appendix E**

**COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE OF 162 KOREANS CONTACTED IN STUDY**

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## COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE OF 102 KOREANS CONTACTED IN STUDY

In the course of the investigation designated units of the US Eighth Army were contacted. Koreans were contacted wherever they were found—in charge of activities to be studied, or on duty in support activities at the time these units were visited. They were interviewed directly by the analysts in English, Japanese, or Chinese Mandarin—or in Korean by means of an interpreter. They ranged from the president of the republic to jeep drivers and KATUSA in official ROKA jobs; and from merchants to house boys among the civilian population.

Data	Percent	Data	Percent
<b>Rank</b>		<b>Months in area</b>	
Enlisted	64	18-24 or more	17
Company officer	14	12-17	4
Field officer	15	7-11	11
Civilian	5	Less than 6	68
No response	2	No response	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Education, yr</b>		<b>Combat</b>	
6 or less	19	Yes	43
7-9	19	No	49
10-12	23	No response	8
13-16	23	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>
Over 16	7	<b>Unit designation, general</b>	
No response	18	US	66
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	ROKA	28
<b>Duty</b>		Other	5
Translation and interpretation	27	No response	1
Supply	11	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>
Gunnery	7	<b>Unit designation, specific</b>	
Driving	19	Infantry division	27
Artillery	10	Arty battalion	25
Administrative	8	QM supply unit	6
Medical	7	Field Med unit	10
Communications	3	Transportation unit	15
Other	7	POW camp	7
No response	1	Other (mostly CA)	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	No response	1
		<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

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**SOURCES**

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**175**

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**177**

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The following officers and civilians made special contributions to the over-all study. During the period covered by the study they occupied positions with direct responsibility for certain duties related to the study. Many were consulted at length and gave unstintingly of their time. A considerable number also carefully reviewed the author's preliminary manuscripts to detect errors or omissions in order to assure a more complete and accurate coverage of the subject. Not all who cooperated are listed; the list is incomplete. Some personal experiences and reactions were given in confidence, and considerable information was gathered anonymously. Too many contributed information through questionnaires and field interviews to be listed individually.

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