INPUT SUBSTUDY F

TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF INDIAN AND JAPANESE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

By: W. L. Daugherty

Note: Because this Input Substudy is classified, it has been bound under a separate cover.

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STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER

SRI Project 1533

January 1972

Technical Note
SSC-TN-1832-1

INPUT SUBSTUDIES A THROUGH E:
IMPLICATIONS OF INDIAN AND/OR JAPANESE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FOR U.S. DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING (U)

By: H. P. JONES, H. M. ROOD, R. M. LAWRENCE, S. E. YOUNG, F. K. MEANS

Prepared for:
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

ARPA Order No. 2170

CONTRACT DAHC15-72-C-0233

AD061807

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Technical Note
SSC-TN-1933-1 A - E

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ARPA Order No. 2170

CONTRACT DAHC15-72-C-0236

Approved:

Richard B. Foster, Director
Strategic Studies Center

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ABSTRACT

The individual research papers contained in this volume analyze the circumstances which could lead to Indian and/or Japanese nuclear proliferation, and the regional and world wide impact of such developments. (Technical data are contained in Substudy F, bound under separate cover.) These studies provide the data basis for the final analysis presented in the final summary report.

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CONTRACTUAL TASK

This Technical Note is submitted in partial fulfillment of research under Contract DAHC15-72-C-0236, ARPA Order No. 2170.

CONTENTS

INPUT SUBSTUDY A

IMPACT ON ASIA OF A DECISION BY JAPAN OR INDIA TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

By: H. P. Jones

CONTENTS

I INTRODUCTION

This paper is based primarily upon extensive personal interviews with high-ranking diplomatic officials both from the countries immediately concerned and from the United States. The information contained herein is therefore privileged and cannot be attributed to specific spokesmen.

The author stresses that the views expressed in this paper are the personal views of the individuals interviewed and do not necessarily reflect the official government positions of the nations involved. However, it can be assumed that these views will be of crucial importance in the formulation of the future positions taken by the various governments of the countries concerned. Further, the conclusions are the author's. They are based upon a synthesis of his own interpretations and those of Asian and American officials in the United States and abroad.

The author has just returned from a three month survey of the situation in Asia during which the views herein set forth were checked and confirmed through extensive personal interviews with leading governmental representatives of the United States and most of the countries involved in this report.

II CONTEXT OF A JAPANESE DECISION TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The image of Japan in Southeast Asia is a contradictory one. Japan's growing wealth, its tremendous economic power, the high and rising level of its standard of living, its extraordinary technological and scientific achievements are admired throughout the region. There is also considerable regional pride in the fact that Japan, an Asian nation, has succeeded in its dramatic climb to a respected position of authority and influence in world affairs.

But, although the new Japan is admired in Southeast Asia, bitter memories of the old Japan remain to call into question the future courses that nations might pursue. For if Southeast Asian leaders admire and respect the new Japan, they are also fearful lest the old Japan reappear out of the shadow cast by the new.

The threat of economic domination, implicit in the postwar patterns of economy which link Southeast Asian nations to Japan, raises serious apprehensions among these countries. They recognize, as do others, that Japan has largely achieved its wartime goal of economic dominance in the region by peaceful means. Such preeminence and the economic dependence it fosters exposes Japan to the sensitive issue of whether or not economic penetration precedes political and military involvement. Japan wisely has pursued a policy of maintaining as low a political and military profile as possible, but both the people of Southeast Asia and their leaders continue to be wary of that dynamic nation.

For the foreseeable future, it appears probable that Japan will continue its low profile political and military policies in an effort to reassure the nations of Southeast Asia and to strengthen existing mutual economic ties. However, the larger, more independent role which Japan has begun to play in Asian and world affairs may assume a logic of its own. That is, Tokyo may come to view its security requirements in a different light, especially if present arrangements with the United States

no longer seem to fulfill Japanese needs. A growing sense of independence, coupled with the knowledge that the nation must look to its own interests, especially in the area of defense, may presage the expression of a strong nationalist sentiment in Japan.

It is this sequence of events which Southeast Asians fear most--and it is this sequence which will be understood by Southeast Asians to have occurred in Japan should that nation acquire nuclear weapons.

To the leaders of Southeast Asia, nuclear proliferation is a facet of major power diplomacy. Except for Indonesia, none of their countries is presently capable of countering Japanese proliferation by developing nuclear weapon systems of their own. And, even if such a course were open, the costs in terms of money and talent would be so high as to be prohibitive. If Japan acquired nuclear weapons, the nations of Southeast Asia would be constrained to do as they have done in the past--seek shelter against an increasingly threatening nuclear climate.

In the past, Southeast Asian nations have sought this end by a variety of means. Some have sought security by attempting to resolve outstanding differences with their former colonial rulers in the hope of obtaining meaningful security guarantees. Still others were drawn to participate in interlocking defense arrangements sponsored by the major Western powers, notably the United States. Other means of seeking shelter have included considering the establishment of regional defense structures with other Southeast Asian nations or seeking neutralization of the region with security guaranteed by the major powers. To date, however, these efforts have been largely theoretical.

Leaving aside the development of regional defense or neutralization, these options have been limited both in terms of effectiveness and attraction. During the course of the last decade, Burma, Indonesia, and Cambodia attempted to maintain relatively nonaligned postures. All three were badly buffeted in their dealings with major powers and, likewise, all three nations were convulsed by internal upheavals with varying results. Burma has become the hermit nation of Southeast Asia, living quietly in the shadow of China and maintaining scant communication with the outer world.

Cambodia is beset with the problems of a widespread guerrilla war; its former "nonaligned" leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, is in exile in Peking; and the future of the present Western-oriented government is uncertain. Indonesia, the largest of the nations of Southeast Asia, has passed through a most trying and turbulent decade. Although the country is nominally nonaligned, Indonesian security in an unstable Asia continues to be a principal concern for its government and has resulted in its seeking the shelter of the American shield in the Pacific. The point is that nonalignment in Southeast Asia had done little to increase the security or internal stability of the nations which adopted it.

The nations which have sought shelter by maintaining or reestablishing defense ties with former colonial powers have also fared badly. The relations between Southeast Asia and the former metropolitan centers of Europe were subject to great stress and bitterness during the period when Southeast Asian nations threw off the colonial yoke. The inevitable misunderstanding and hostility engendered by the rise of nationalism and the struggle for independence by Southeast Asian nations undermined their search for security. And this factor was compounded by the passing of the Age of Europe.

Great Britain, France, and Holland were required by circumstances to adjust to more modest roles in international affairs after World War II. They could not stay the tide of rising nationalism in Southeast Asia nor, in the long run, could they provide adequate security guarantees to former colonies or distant Asian allies in a world driven by conflicting nationalisms and dominated by superpowers.

The bitterness, hostility, and suspicion which characterized Indonesian-Dutch relations obviated the development of meaningful defense arrangements between the two nations in the early postwar era. The blast of revolutionary warfare in Indochina shredded any hope of French-Indochinese defense structures, and the British withdrawal from East of Suez in 1970 confirmed the Eastern drift of history. Western European and Asian leaders alike realized that the projection of European power into Southeast Asia was a thing of the past. It could not guarantee the territorial or political integrity of Southeast Asian states.

Nonalignment and dependence upon European power failed as guarantors of Southeast Asian security. Serious reservations now exist in regard to the efficacy of relying upon interlocking alliance systems sponsored by the United States. The seemingly endless tragedy of Indochina has impressed upon Southeast Asia that limitations of power exist even for superpowers. Further, the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine has raised the issue of whether or not the United States seriously desires to commit itself to such a task. It is against this backdrop of Southeast Asia's fruitless search for security and stability that the problems and fears created by a Japanese decision to "go nuclear" can be seen most clearly.

III FEAR OF JAPANESE INTENTIONS

The immediate effect on Southeast Asia of a Japanese decision to acquire nuclear weapons would be to compound existing apprehensions about Japan and its intentions in Asia. Most Southeast Asians would regard the decision as a first step toward establishing the political and military corollaries of Japan's economic domination of the region. Further, these nations would see the development as still another factor of destabilization in major power relations in the Far East. They would be required to redefine their attitudes and policies toward the major powers in accord with their security needs.

In the hope of stabilizing the Asian power balance and, thereby, their own immediate external environment, the governments of most Southeast Asian nations would probably urge the United States to return to a larger, more active Asian role. They would seek to persuade the U.S. to abandon the low military and political profiles suggested by the Nixon Doctrine and would strive for firm security commitments from the United States to balance and offset what to them would be a sudden increment in Japanese power.

North Vietnam would probably turn to the Soviet Union and/or China for shelter against a nuclear Japan. However, the view from Hanoi would be conditioned by relations among the two great communist powers and Japan. If Soviet-Japanese relations continued on an even and friendly basis despite Japanese proliferation, the North Vietnamese could be expected to seek an accommodation within that arrangement. Likewise, should Sino-Japanese relations continue to develop along amicable lines, North Vietnam would probably seek a similar accommodation. In short, North Vietnam would likely be willing to seek shelter from the threat implicit in a nuclear armed Japan by riding the coattails of either or both of the major communist powers into whatever friendly or cooperative arrangement those states might be willing to make with Japan--so long as basic North Vietnamese security requirements were met.

In the event that either or both of the communist powers entered into security arrangements with Japan that ignored or threatened North Vietnamese security, that nation would significantly alter its attitudes toward the U.S. role in Asia. By the same token, should China and/or the USSR become unwilling or appear unable to guarantee North Vietnamese security, North Vietnam could find itself in the position of explicitly or tacitly encouraging the United States to expand its role in Asia and redress the balance of power. South Vietnamese reaction to a nuclear Japan will be conditioned by the form its government takes as a result of the projected peace arrangements for Indochina. Whatever the form of government, however, apprehension of a nuclear Japan must remain high.

China's role in an Asia with a nuclear Japan would be the subject of sharp scrutiny in Southeast Asia. The nations of that region, including North Vietnam, have long been fearful of China. Its geographical propinquity, militantly revolutionary ideology, military power, at least in conventional terms, and its recent diplomatic initiatives designed in part to give China a freer hand in Asia have raised concern throughout Southeast Asia. Although the People's Republic is currently pursuing policies designed to place its relations with other nations on a more conventional footing, it has not abandoned its espousal of "wars of liberation" throughout the underdeveloped world--the "storm centers" of world revolution. China continues to give heavy propaganda support to revolutionary and potentially revolutionary groups in Southeast Asia, and the Chinese-oriented "Maoist" or "Marxist-Leninist" communist parties are most active in promoting revolution in their respective countries. These factors, in combination with a thousand years of Chinese imperial domination in northern Vietnam, provide a more than adequate base for Southeast Asian apprehension of China.

These same factors serve to indicate the security quandary of Southeast Asia. Should the Asian power balance be dominated by a nuclear armed Japan and China--whether in sharp contention with one another or, as some Southeast Asians fear, in collaboration and cooperation--Southeast Asia would be caught between the anvil and the hammer.

The Soviet Union's awakened interest in Asia includes Southeast Asia. It has recognized the security problems of Southeast Asia and, in December 1969, offered to sponsor an Asian Collective Security Pact designed to allay those fears. Southeast Asian response to the proposal has been very cool, but changing circumstances may alter present attitudes. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan under conditions in which there is but slight Chinese reaction and a continued or accelerated U.S. withdrawal from Asia would probably have the effect of heightening Southeast Asian interest in security measures advanced by the Soviet Union. Feeling themselves exposed to a renascent Japanese militarism, neglected or abandoned by the Americans, and suspicious of the Chinese, Southeast Asian governments may look to the USSR for security arrangements. Coupled by links of trade and aid, this development might offer a means of shelter to Southeast Asia and an alternative to the power vacuum some fear may be created by the Nixon Doctrine.

It would not, however, be without risk. The People's Republic of China--fearful of Soviet encirclement--would be bound to react adversely toward those who participated in the pact. American aid programs might become subject to sudden and, as in the case of India, unfavorable review. Japan could not be expected to become a party to the pact and probably would not view the proceedings without misgivings.

The Soviet option, then, may not be as attractive as it first seems. To Southeast Asians, it may appear more as a lightning rod, attracting the wrath of the other major powers, than as a shelter.

Untried options which may offer hope of protection to the nations of Southeast Asia do exist. Two in particular are important to consider as part of a Southeast Asian reaction to Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The first is designed to secure major power recognition and support for Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality. The proposal originated in Malaysia and has elicited interest and approval from the governments of Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. Significantly, North Vietnam, while not endorsing the proposal, has reacted with cautious approval toward it.

At present, neutralization is at an exploratory stage of development, and high level discussions continue. However, should Japan acquire nuclear weapons, there is little doubt that a note of urgency would be interjected into the discussions. If Southeast Asian perceptions of the dangers of a nuclear armed Japan are pronounced, these nations may be willing to subordinate longstanding differences among themselves and collectively approach the major powers with a specific and detailed program for neutralization and its guarantee.

Should Japan acquire nuclear weapons, Southeast Asian nations might move toward the development of a regional defense system. This second untried but important option has been, like neutralization, a topic of considerable discussion, although discussions have been informal and largely theoretical. However, in the event that Japan were to acquire nuclear weapons, the movement toward regional defense would probably be accelerated, especially if plans for neutralization seemed hopeless.

In either case, whether neutralization or regional defense, the movement would be toward untried options. The fact that they are untried may make them even more attractive--certainly the options of the past have left much to be desired--and both options are centered specifically upon Southeast Asia as a region sharing common security problems and common fears.

Southeast Asians recognize their region is one in which all of the great powers have deep interests but none have binding commitments. It is an area wherein each of the big powers is relatively free to engage in political and diplomatic maneuver. And, in part, it is for these reasons that Southeast Asia is a region of high tension and instability--both in terms of its relations with the major powers and in intraregional relations.

Given the instability of the area and its vulnerability to the vagaries of major power diplomacy, the apprehensions of Southeast Asia's leaders are understandable. They do not share the major powers' expectation and acceptance of an occasional shower of sparks in such areas of high tension and conflicting big power interests. They not only see

sparks struck from conflicting interests, but live in fear of the ruinous conflagration they could ignite. Should Japan acquire nuclear weapons, those fears will be heightened and Southeast Asian vulnerability more keenly felt.

IV SOUTHEAST ASIAN VIEWS ON INDIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Southeast Asian reactions to Indian nuclear proliferation would not be as sharply apprehensive as reactions to a similar development in Japan. There are several reasons for anticipating this lower-keyed reaction.

In terms of the historical perspective, Indian relations with the nations of Southeast Asia have not been marked by national wars, military conquests, or economic domination and dependence. Rather, they have primarily been those of trade and of a sharing in great intellectual, philosophical, and religious systems of thought. Relations between India and Southeast Asia have developed through centuries of time and have resulted in the shaping of an underlying accord based on this ancient comingling of world views, myths, religions, and thought.

In more recent times, Indian-Southeast Asian accord has been strengthened by a common awakening to the modern, Western-dominated world, by mutual aspirations, by similar struggles to throw off Western colonialism, and by the on-going attempt to establish their nations as free and independent entities in the world community. The flowering of the Indian nationalist movement was carefully watched by Southeast Asian nationalists and the words and actions of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru had a meaning in the Southeast Asian context as well as in India. In the post-World War II years, it was Indian policies of nonalignment in a bipolar world which convinced many, including Southeast Asians, that there was indeed "a third way" toward world peace.

Southeast Asian perceptions of India are not based entirely on historical and ideological relationships with that nation. In terms of Realpolitik, Southeast Asians believe they have little to fear from India, even a nuclear India, because India lacks sufficient internal cohesion to become an aggressive Asian power. Southeast Asians point out the existence of deep political cleavages in India and underscore the potentially turbulent forces that would be let loose should India embark upon an expansionistic course. Unlike Japan, Southeast Asians do not believe

that the state of India's economy could long withstand the rigors imposed by a militaristic policy. Further, Southeast Asians observe, Indian ambitions are checked by three powerful nuclear states operative in the area. The Indo-Soviet relationship would, in the Southeast Asian view, serve to keep Indian ambitions in check in much the same way that Japan may be restrained by the U.S.-Japan security pact. So, too, would the presence of a suspicious and potentially hostile China. Finally, the United States, in cooperation with either the USSR or China, might be brought into conflict with India should that nation seek to upset the already tenuous balance of power in Asia.

It is for these generally shared reasons that Southeast Asian leaders feel they have little fear from a nuclear India. Should India go nuclear, the dominant Southeast Asian reaction would be to do or say little. Their understanding of the situation would be that India had chosen the nuclear option to offset the nuclear threat posed by China.

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FOREWORD

The stability of the contemporary international system, especially the relations among the superpowers and their mutual allies, is dependent on the achievement of some form of stable relationship in military, particularly nuclear, power. The question of nuclear weapons proliferation is thus a central issue in international politics. It has direct implications for U.S. policies on strategic, tactical nuclear and general purpose force procurement as well as for U.S. policy in SALT and on a host of other foreign policy questions. This report addresses the problem of Indian and/or Japanese nuclear weapons acquisition.

This study was performed as part of the continuing research of the Strategic Studies Center on the problem of nuclear proliferation. This program has included studies of the technical capabilities of potential nuclear powers, the international security implications of nuclear proliferation, an assessment of the threat of unconventional nuclear delivery for U.S. security, and the implications of Chinese Communist nuclear capability for U.S. and Asian security.

The detailed research upon which this Summary report draws is contained in two separate volumes; one "Input Subetudies A through E: Implications of Indian and/or Japanese Nuclear Proliferation for U.S. Defense Policy Planning" UNCLASSIFIED and "Input Substudy F: Implications of Indian and/or Japanese Nuclear Proliferation for U.S. Defense Policy Planning" (U), SECRET RESTRICTED DATA, CNWDI.

The study was conducted under the direction of M. Mark Earle, Jr. The research was conducted by R. M. Lawrence, W. R. Van Cleave and S. E. Young with the assistance of F. K. Means, H. W. Rood, Y. L. Wu, W. L. Daugherty, H. P. Jones and M. B. Schneider.

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V INDONESIAN REACTION

Indonesian attitudes toward Asian nuclear proliferation are based upon the well-founded conviction that Indonesia is an incipient great power. Both Indonesians and Southeast Asian analysts recognize that Indonesia's future world importance confers upon that nation a significant, even critical, role as an Asian power--and as the leading nation in Southeast Asia.

Stressing the talent and activity of its people, their numbers, Indonesia's strategic location in regional, Asian, and world geography, and its vast resource potential, Indonesian officials regard problems posed by nuclear proliferation on the part of Asian powers as matters with which they are competent to deal.

If Japan or India were to announce possession of nuclear weapons, the Indonesian reaction would be one of watchful waiting. At present, Indonesians indicate that proliferation would probably not result in major changes in foreign policy. However, if either or both proliferating nations seemed to be moving toward an aggressive, jingoistic international stance, Indonesia would naturally respond to the pressure.

A. The Indonesia Reaction toward Japan

In this regard, Japan is the primary consideration. Indonesians remember the Japanese occupation of their country and are attentive to the possible reawakening of this chauvinistic strain in Japanese politics. They do not see it protruding to a significant degree at the present time and are hopeful that Japan has outgrown extreme nationalism. Along with the United States, Japan is seen by the Indonesians today as the most solid power operating in the region.

If Japan acquires nuclear weapons, this fact alone probably would not grossly affect Indonesian-Japanese relations. However, should Japan show any inclination toward the expansionistic attitudes which marked

its national policies in the prewar period, Indonesian reaction would undoubtedly be driven toward a closer security relationship with the United States. Indonesian officials state, however, that Japanese proliferation would not have the effect of causing Indonesia to seek closer relations with either the Soviet Union or China.

A resurgent Japanese jingoism would also cause a heightened Indonesian interest in regional defense structures. In the Indonesian view, ASEAN is the logical and acknowledged vehicle of leadership in the Southeast Asian movement toward regional cohesion. In an expanded, military form, the organization would probably serve as the foundation of regional defense.

However, for the foreseeable future, Indonesia will continue to follow a policy of "national resilience" with regard to military defense and not seek collective defense arrangements. This would be true even if Indonesia faced a nuclear-powered Japan, unless the acquisition of such power were accomplished by a resurgence of threatening nationalism. The Indonesians are currently advocating that each nation in Southeast Asia stand on its own feet to the extent possible in its external security structure and not undertake at this time collective security arrangements which might be interpreted by a China, newly converted to detente in the area, as provocative.

B. The Indonesian Reaction toward India

The Indonesian attitude toward Indian proliferation is far less apprehensive. Indonesian officials say they would not regard Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons as a threatening development. Instead, they view Indian proliferation primarily in the context of Sino-Indian relations. Nuclear acquisition, according to Indonesian spokesmen, would be a move directed mainly at redressing the advantage China presently enjoys in possessing nuclear weapons. They do not discount a secondary motive in India's possible acquisition of nuclear capability, that is, India's drive toward major power status, but consider this in the category of a national prestige item rather than representing a threat to India's neighbors.

Indonesians are concerned about the Indo-Soviet relationship, especially as it applies to increasing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. However, this is viewed as a political problem which will neither expand nor diminish if India acquires nuclear weapons.

C. Would Indonesia Seek Nuclear Capability?

Indonesia has no present interest in acquiring nuclear capability, and the acquisition of such capability by either Japan or India or both would not in the foreseeable future spur Indonesia to do likewise. Should Indonesia perceive a nuclear threat from either Japan or India at some point, however, and one which was not countered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, it is not inconceivable that Indonesia would consider her security required her to acquire the bomb, regardless of the high cost involved. In this event, Indonesia would turn to the U.S. for assistance, rather than to the USSR, China, or Japan.

VI PHILIPPINES OBSERVATIONS

The question of whether or not Japan will join the nuclear powers is viewed with deep concern by the government of the Republic of the Philippines. It believes that Japan is increasingly drawn toward the pursuit of an independent policy in Asia. If this trend continues, Filipinos believe, Japan must develop a nuclear weapon program.

In the Filipino view, Japan's tendency toward an independent policy in Asia is shaped by the new realities of diplomacy in the Far East. At the international level, Japan is beginning to have serious reservations about the depth of the U.S. commitment to Japanese security. Should Japan decide that it cannot rely upon the U.S. security shield, Filipino spokesmen argue, it must "go nuclear" for basic security reasons. They point out the growing fluidity of Far Eastern major power diplomacy and stress the nuclear facts of Japan's existence. That is, Japan is geographically placed between nuclear powers to the north and south. There is a growing coolness between the United States and Japan and, at the same time, the United States appears to be placing less emphasis upon its Asian commitments.

If Japan should take the nuclear option, there would be strong, adverse popular reaction in the Philippines. The fear, shock, and brutality of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines would be immediately and vividly recalled. The reaction, both popularly and at the official level, would be away from Japan and toward the United States. The anti-U.S. attitudes which are frequently expressed in the Philippines would quickly be dampened, not by governmental decree but by a sober historical reassessment of American-Philippine relations. The traditional, but recently untapped, reservoir of goodwill toward the United States would probably be reopened.

At the governmental level, the Philippines would hope that the United States would reaffirm its security agreements with the nation

and make clear that the U.S. nuclear umbrella included the Philippines under its shelter. In the considered opinion of key Filipino diplomats, the Republic of the Philippines has no recourse but to rely entirely upon the United States should a threat to Philippine security develop in any quarter.

In the absence of a specific threat from a nuclear Japan, the Philippine government would seek and, if possible, establish diplomatic relations with both the Soviet Union and China. While these initiatives would not be designed to establish security ties with the major communist powers, they would be undertaken in the hope that diplomatic relations would expand communication and mutual understanding, lead to a reduction of tension in Asia, and, perhaps, open the door to unforeseen but beneficial developments. In this regard, some discussions have already been held with the Soviet Union. While similar discussions with the Chinese are possible some time in the future, they are unlikely to occur until the domestic situation in the Philippines stabilizes.

In regional terms, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan would probably induce the Philippines to move into a closer relationship with Indonesia, its larger, more powerful neighbor to the south. In addition, a broader and more general movement toward regionalization would probably grow out of the Japanese decision. The foundation of the movement would likely be a preexisting regional organization. Filipino spokesmen regarded the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an especially good vehicle for this purpose. They pointed out that ASEAN may be metamorphosed by overriding regional security concerns into a regional, collective defense arrangement. In long-range terms, they indicated their belief that this is the direction in which Southeast Asia ought to move in the future. If Japan became a nuclear power, this process would probably be accelerated. But they also emphasized that such a development could be anticipated only at some vague date in the far distant future.

At present, and for the foreseeable future, the Republic of the Philippines must rely upon the United States for security. If Japan were to "go nuclear," this reliance would be more keenly felt than at present and would have the effect of turning the Philippines sharply in the direction of the United States.

VII THAI CONSIDERATIONS

In the Thai view, a Japanese decision to acquire nuclear weapons would have grave implications for Southeast Asia. To a large extent, the gravity of the situation would result from the impact of the decision on the People's Republic of China.

China would be placed in the position of contending with two nuclear powers on its borders and, if India chooses the nuclear path, three such powers. The result, according to responsible senior Thai officials, would be to turn China inward to Asia to counter the pressures exerted. In such circumstances, China would become insistent upon its traditional Asian prerogatives, and the states of Southeast Asia should expect a stronger, more pervasive Chinese influence throughout the region. Southeast Asian nations would find their latitude for diplomatic maneuver, singly or collectively, much reduced and their "China problem" much expanded.

The impact of a nuclear Ja an would have two immediate effects on Thailand. First, Thailand would be constrained to move much closer to the United States, if this remains a possibility. Like the Philippines, it will continue to rely upon the United States for external security. According to high-ranking Thai diplomats, Thailand simply has no other direction in which to turn in matters affecting the territorial and political integrity of the nation.

The second major effect on Thailand of a Japanese decision to acquire nuclear weapons would be to awaken a strong awareness among the Thai people of the dangers of the nuclear age. At present, this awareness is not a part of the popular consciousness of the Thais. Should Japan go nuclear, however, responsible officials say, the Thais will be sharply awakened to the grim realities of a nuclear world.

The same general effects on Thailand would result from an Indian decision to acquire nuclear weapons, but Indian acquisition would cause

even greater concern for security in Thailand. This added dimension of apprehension results from India's deep involvement with the Soviet Union. Senior Thai officials fear India's growing nationalism and "national arrogance." They consider that India would seek an expanded role in Southeast Asia, both in terms of its own nationalistically enlarged ambitions and as a willing cat's paw for the Soviet Union. The Thais, in this instance, would expect a substantial increase in Indian influence in the region and an expanded Soviet influence. Increased tensions throughout Southeast Asia would flow from this development as it would undoubtedly stimulate a Chinese response.

In regional terms, Thai diplomats stress the importance of strengthening ties with other Southeast Asian governments on the basis of common security needs. If India and/or Japan develop nuclear weapons, the importance of regional cohesion would be underscored and movement in that direction hastened. But these same officials make it clear that any effective regional defense organization would require a long period of time to develop. Additionally, they see no possibility of any effective regional defense arrangements without the backing of the United States.

Internally, the effects of Japanese and/or Indian proliferation would require the government of Thailand to seek tighter, more direct control of its domestic problems. Internal security, as in the case of the Philippines and South Korea, would become a more acute concern. Democratic reforms would most likely be sacrificed to direct governmental controls. It is more important, Thai officials say, to save the country and lose democracy than to lose the country and save democracy. The present authoritarian regime is the result of this kind of thinking, which stresses the importance of running a tight ship of state as the nation heads into possible stormy waters. The necessity for increased internal security and the tamping down of domestic tensions is enhanced by the large and influential overseas Chinese element in the Thai society.

VIII AUSTRALIAN VIEWS

In the Australian view, Japanese proliferation is a very remote contingency. If Japan should opt for nuclear weapons under present circumstances, Australian reaction would not be charged with apprehension. Under different circumstances and conditions, for example, if proliferation occurred in the context of a greatly expanded Japanese naval program, Australian reaction could be to establish its own nuclear program, although this would depend upon its confidence (or lack thereof) in the security afforded by the United States nuclear shield.

The basis for Australia's external military policy is its security arrangement with the United States through the SEATO and ANZUS pacts. Australia would in all probability continue to rely upon this security foundation in the event of Japanese proliferation.

Regional defense arrangements are of keen interest to the Australians. If Japan acquired nuclear weapons, Australia's present interest in ASEAN as a basis for regional defense would undoubtedly increase. ASEAN has never been "a white man's club," however, and Australia remains dubious as to whether the organization would invite Australian participation. It has not to date. Should this attitude change, Australia would be interested in participating--especially if Japan announced possession of nuclear weapons.

Australian diplomatic officials evinced very low threat perceptions in considering the problem of Indian proliferation. In their opinion, India's acquisition would have no purpose beyond counterbalancing the Chinese nuclear threat. Nationalism would be a secondary reason for Indian nuclear acquisition, but neither Indian nationalism nor its possession of nuclear weapons poses any real threat to India's neighbors, the Australians believe.

IX SOUTH KOREAN REACTIONS

A Japanese decision to acquire nuclear weapons would "send a shudder through South Korea" and give that nation pause in considering its slowly improving relations with Japan. There would be increased and marked apprehension of Japan both among the Korean people and their government.

The Korean government would attempt to move the nation into a closer relationship with the United States and would hope for strong reaffirmation of U.S. guarantees of South Korean security; Korea, like the Philippines and Thailand, would seek shelter beneath the nuclear umbrella of the United States. At present, and for the foreseeable future, Korea must rely upon the United States for protection from the other nuclear powers.

In its relations with the communist powers, Seoul would probably not seek diplomatic relations with either China or Russia--at least until Korea becomes a member of the United Nations. But the effect of Japanese proliferation would have the probable result of pushing North and South Korea into a closer relationship and, perhaps, quickening the unification of the country. North Korea would be as perturbed as South Korea over Japan's going nuclear. While it would count on China to guarantee its security, the benefits deriving from reunification would be increasingly self-evident.

Internally, the effect of the Japanese decision would probably be to snuff out any remaining sparks of democratic sentiment. Since the time of the U.S.-Chinese detente, Korean democracy has been moribund. The existence of a nuclear Japan would confirm Korean analyses, which hold that the country must prepare itself for a severe buffeting from the major powers in the near future. Democracy is too unwieldy a political form to provide the discipline, central direction, and internal security which the times seem increasingly to require, according to Korean diplomats.

X. PAKISTANI PERCEPTIONS

Pakistanis are preoccupied with severe internal difficulties and are eager to avoid any form of confrontation with a major power. Pakistani diplomatic officials stressed the need for good relations and expanding trade with Japan and expressed little fear of a nuclear Japan. In their view, Pakistan must accommodate itself to the role of a small nation. In that position, they feel no real threat from Japan.

Pakistani perceptions of a nuclear India are likewise extremely temperate. Officials indicated that should India acquire nuclear weapons, they would not regard it as a development aimed at redressing old arguments with Pakistan but, rather, a move to balance the nuclear might of China. The increment in Indian power would only be a matter of degree in relation to Pakistan and would not stand in the way of a Pakistani desire to improve relations with India as time and circumstances permit.

Pakistan has long sought to balance the combination of India and the Soviet Union by maintaining security arrangements with both the United States and China. In the future, it will continue relations with both of these nations as a counterweight to the Indo-Soviet relationship.

Pakistan's economy is in shambles, and the nation's morale is extremely low as a result of its defeat by India and the loss of Bangla Desh. The Indian military forces are acknowledged as superior. Consequently, the additional power India would derive from a nuclear capability is considered (a) not to be aimed at Pakistan and (b) meaningless in terms of present Indian-Pakistan realities.

Pakistan would under no foreseeable circumstances be able to acquire nuclear capability. If faced by the unlikely possibility of a nuclear threat from Japan or India, it would have to look to China or the United States for protection. Pakistan's relations with China are excellent, and Pakistani diplomats comment favorably on the way in which the Chinese are conducting themselves in the administration of their aid programs,

being meticulous by refraining from imposing--and even cautious about even expressing--their views.

Pakistan's recent withdrawal from SEATO is one illustration of the government's recognition of its current limited role on the Asian stage and the disappearance of cold war considerations from its foreign policy and diplomacy. Neither Japan's nor India's going nuclear would affect this course.

XI BURMESE CONSIDERATIONS

Japanese and/or Indian nuclear proliferation would have little or no effect upon Burma. Burmese energies and attention are centered upon the enormous internal difficulties with which the nation must contend.

The current Burmese government, led by the ailing General Ne Win, exists on a tenuous foundation. Economically, the country is stagnating under the government's socialist economic policies and is further undercut by a lively black market. The civil service is laced with discontent, and important elements in the military show signs of frustration and restlessness at the slowness with which the government has moved toward solving its problems.

Outside of the central plains area, the central government faces the continuing, bitter problem of discontented and rebellious hill tribesmen and growing antigovernment forces. There are expectations of general offensives against the government within the next months in the Shan territories. Led by the Chinese-supported White Flag Communists, these offensives may cause increasing instability in the central government. An even more serious threat derives from an upsurge of rebel activity among the Burmese-Thai border. These forces, which appear to be expanding, are viewed with great alarm by the Rangoon government. Reportedly well-trained and ably led, they have the sympathy of many Burmese in civilian, military, and bureaucratic circles.

In terms of its foreign relations, Burma lives quietly in the shadow of China. The USSR has long attempted to expand its influence in Burma through aid and advisory programs, but Burmese foreign policy continues to be based on continuing good relations with China and avoiding expanded relations with those countries which might carry Burma into controversy with its large neighbor.

Indian and/or Japanese nuclear proliferation will not be of great import to the troubled and, perhaps, quietly desperate Burmese. They will continue to be preoccupied with the internal economic, political, and military problems of their country and leave consideration of nuclear proliferation to the major powers.

XII MALAYSIAN CONCERNS

Malaysia would be deeply concerned should Japan and/or India develop nuclear weapons. Its reaction would be to turn toward an accelerated program encouraging closer regional associations and, at the same time, more actively to seek the neutralization of Southeast Asia with support and guarantees of security from the major powers.

Malaysian representatives would probably urge the nations of Southeast Asia to join in promoting and developing a greater sense of regional consciousness and cohesion through expanded bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In the Malaysian view, these developments would provide a base for regional solidarity and enhance regional security. In addition, they would provide a means of demonstrating that the collective activities and policies of Southeast Asian nations would not adversely affect the legitimate area interests of the major powers. Further, regional cohesiveness and cooperation would enable nations of the area collectively to seek major power guarantees for the creation of a neutralized Southeast Asia.

Indian and/or Japanese nuclear proliferation would add impetus to the Malaysian movement toward expanding regional cooperation and/or securing neutralization of the area in some form. Finally, in view of Malaysia's problems with Chinese-supported guerrillas and its fear of subversive elements within the country, Japan's or India's acquisition of nuclear capabilities would tend to move Malaysia closer to the United States as its only possible shelter now that the British have withdrawn from East of Suez.

XIII INDOCHINESE ATTITUDES

A. Indochina: Cambodia and Laos

Japanese and/or Indian nuclear proliferation can have little meaning for the countries of Cambodia and Laos. Caught in the swirl of violence which has held the whole of Indochina in a deepening vortex for more than two decades, these small nations are literally engaged in a struggle for survival. The problems posed by war-shattered societies, failing subsistence economies, and widespread guerrilla warfare claim their every attention.

B. Indochina: North and South Vietnam

The attitudes and reactions of North and South Vietnam will be to a large degree dependent upon the outcome of present efforts to arrange a peaceful settlement of the Indochinese war. If peace between North and South Vietnam is secured, the relationship between the two contending areas of the country will be critical in determining Vietnamese reactions to Japanese and/or Indian nuclear proliferation. If peace fails, Vietnamese attitudes will be largely shaped by current North and South diplomatic, economic, and military relationships with the great powers. But irrespective of future relations between the North and South or the great power relations which support the contending governments, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan would call forth a much sharper reaction in Vietnam than would Indian proliferation.

As in the rest of Southeast Asia, Vietnamese recall the years of Japanese occupation and are fearful of a resurgent Japanese militarism. The economic might of Japan must also foster Vietnamese fears of economic exploitation and domination. Vietnam, North or South, wants no part of a new East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere dominated by an aggressive, nuclear armed Japan. Neither does that country, North or South, want an Asia dominated by the two great Asian powers--China and Japan.

If current peace efforts fail, South Vietnam will necessarily attempt to cling to its security arrangement with the United States. Its reaction to Japanese proliferation would doubtless be to seek security assurances from the U.S. in the event that Japan evinced aggressively ambitious designs in Southeast Asia. For those same assurances, the South Vietnamese governme.; would likely support American reactions to Japanese and/or Indian proliferation.

Regional security arrangements with other Southeast Asian nations would probably be regarded as desirable by the government of South Vietnam. But with continued hostilities between the North and South, this option may not be open to it, especially if the United States continues its withdrawal from Asian affairs. On the contrary, South Vietnam without U.S. support would probably find itself isolated from such arrangements because of the security threat implicit to small nations in close relations with South Vietnam.

North Vietnam would continue to have a wider latitude for maneuver should hostilities continue. Unlike South Vietnam, it is not entirely dependent for survival on a single major power relationship. Should Japan go nuclear, North Vietnam would probably seek a sheltering relationship with either or both of the major communist powers, depending upon the state of Sino-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese relations. It might also lend important support and participation in regional efforts to neutralize Southeast Asia. Regional defense arrangements would likely not be attractive to North Vietnam unless security relations with the USSR and/or China were considered insufficient to offset the threat perceived in Japanese nuclear proliferation.

Finally, assuming that substantial U.S. economic assistance is receive' by North Vietnam, the closer relations thus fostered may conceivably provide the North Vietnamese with a final option: explicit or implicit protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

XIV REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S PERSPECTIVE

Indian nuclear proliferation would probably be viewed with approbation by the government of the Republic of China, Taiwan. Such a development would represent the appearance of another source of potential nuclear pressure upon the People's Republic and contribute to the containment of what, in the Nationalist view, is an expansive, aggressive communist state. The current isolation of Taiwan in international affairs, however, would likely preclude attempts on its part to fashion a strong relationship with the new anti-Chinese nuclear power. Likewise, India would probably be reluctant to court the possibility of conflict with the People's Republic by responding favorably or initiating a broader understanding or security arrangement with Chiang Kai-shek's government on Taiwan.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan might also be regarded as an encouraging factor by the Nationalist government if the development served to create antagonism between China and Japan. The question of Japan's intentions toward Taiwan could certainly be raised. If Japanese attitudes were reassuring, that is, were not reminiscent of the fifty year occupation of Taiwan by Japan, the Nationalist government may see advantages to Japanese nuclear proliferation where other nations do not.

In any event, Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons would tend to persuade the Nationalist government that Japan had attained major power status in the Pacific and could well lead to efforts, openly or clandestinely, to obtain Japanese support in resisting any attempt by Peking to take over Taiwan.

Should Taiwan perceive Japanese proliferation as a threat to its independence, it would likely continue to place its hope for security on the United States. If Japan were seen as a direct menace, compounding or buttressing the threat of Peking, and if the United States security no longer seemed adequate protection, Taiwan may seek a close security relationship with the USSR to offset the threat or threats perceived.

XV SINGAPOREAN CONSIDERATIONS

The small nation of Singapore bases its foreign policy upon its ability to accommodate and adapt to circumstances it cannot control. While Singapore would not approve of nuclear proliferation by either Japan or India, it would attempt to make a meaningful adjustment to the new, and, in the case of Japan, fearful circumstances.

Japanese and/or Indian nuclear proliferation would not necessarily mean that Singapore would be driven into the arms of one or the other of the great powers in Asia. It would prefer to steer a lone course and align itself with no single nation or bloc of nations. Neither would it find regional defense an adequate answer to the security problems suggested by Asian porliferation. Antagonism between Indonesia and Singapore lingers, although in muted terms, and would cause that nation to hesitate in accepting membership in a regional military arrangement which would most likely be dominated by the region's largest military power.

For all intents and purposes, Singapore will strive to operate at a level above the strains and tensions induced by Asian proliferation. In the event that its security were directly threatened, or appears to be directly threatened, Singapore will seek security arrangements sufficient to offset the threat perceived. In the last analysis, Singapore would likely turn to the United States to counter Japanese pressure.

XVI SEQUENTIAL PROLIFERATION

Nuclear proliferation by India and/or Japan would cause grave concern throughout Southeast Asia and would doubtless trigger an immediate review of foreign policy by all nations concerned. However, the sequence of proliferation by both powers or individual proliferation by either India or Japan would have little effect in terms of Southeast Asian reaction.

Whether now or at some date in the foreseeable future, Southeast Asia must regard nuclear proliferation as part of major power maneuver and diplomacy. There is little that these small nations can do, either individually or collectively, to exert sufficient influence to prevent or hasten the decision to go nuclear in Japan or India. Likewise, the sequence in which Asian proliferation occurred would not affect the attitudes of the Southeast Asian nations as set forth in this paper.

INPUT SUBSTUDY B

INDIA:
INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

By: R. M. Lawrence

CONTENTS

I INTRODUCTION

It is one conclusion of this paper that New Delhi will attempt to develop a nuclear weapons capability should certain events occur. Most important relative the Indian decision to "go nuclear" are: (1) success in the 1970-1980 Indian nuclear and space research programs (even partial success in these programs would provide the necessary infrastructure for development of a nuclear weapons capability), (2) a continuation of the type of events which have shocked, hurt, and frustrated Indians in the international arena since the 1962 clash with China, and (3) the continued viability of India as a nation, but with the central government's perceiving a need to demonstrate dramatic scientific achievement to undercut criticism from internal dissidents.

Should a combination of these events move India to make the decision to develop nuclear weapons, the question remains as to whether the resulting weapons will be "political nuclear weapons" or "military nuclear weapons." The distinction is based upon differences in the purpose for which the weapons are obtained as well as on differences in types and numbers of weapons. Much in the Indian literature suggests that should India develop nuclear weapons, the first generation will be "political." Several reasons exist for this prognostication. First, the purpose of a "political nuclear weapon" is not to pose a credible threat of use; rather, its utility lies in international bargaining. This may be of several kinds: (1) to gain entrance into the circle of nations composed of the U.S., USSR, England, France, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the basis of having demonstrated the technical capability which, if one is left out, could be used to obtain a "military" nuclear capability; (2) to force reductions in the nuclear strength of others based upon the threat that the "political nuclear weapon" capability will be increased to the militarily useful level; or (3) to obtain what is perceived as fairer treatment from the "military nuclear weapons" (and perhaps other) states. The three types of bargaining may be grouped together into general pressure to gain dignity and respect, enabling the nation in question to

be taken seriously in the councils of the world with the implicit, or, if necessary, explicit, threat being that if it is not treated properly, it will become a "military nuclear weapons" state. In contrast, the purpose of obtaining "military nuclear weapons" is to pose a credible deterrent to counter a perceived direct threat.

The second difference between "political nuclear weapons" and "military nuclear weapons"--differences in types and numbers of weapons--further suggests that should India develop nuclear weapons, the first generation will be "political," since a "political nuclear weapon" need not be a weapon at all. It can instead be an underground plowshare detonation for "peaceful" purposes. As such, it can be developed far more cheaply and in a shorter length of time than a force of nuclear weapons and correlative delivery systems sufficient to serve as a credible deterrent. It should be noted that the differences between a "political nuclear weapon" and a "military nuclear weapon" in types and numbers offer the advantage that by obtaining a "political nuclear weapon," a nation does not run as great a risk of preemption as if it were obviously building a military force; nor does it run the risk of as much disapprobation from the world community as if it had brazenly detonated a nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, the nation in question obtains--or hopes to obtain--considerable leverage for bargaining with other states.

It is unwise to attempt to suggest a specific date for the acquisition by India of either "political" or "military nuclear weapons." It can be stated with some assurance, however, that the further limits for the latter capability seem to be the early to mid-1980s, while the nearer and less likely threshold date would be the late 1970s. The demonstration of a single fission explosion, i.e., obtaining a "political nuclear weapon," could conceivably come at any time from 1973 onward.

The second conclusion of this paper is that the above postulated future need not develop into reality at all should a different set of circumstances prevail. The most important of these are: (1) that the Indians fail in their ambitious efforts in nuclear science and space

research to the extent that the infrastructure is insufficient for nuclear weapons development. It is not likely that such a failure would occur as to preclude the acquisition of the "political nuclear weapon"; in fact, the requisite capabilities for it may already exist. A "military nuclear weapons" program would be far more likely to be dramatically set back by future research failures. (2) India could dissolve as a nation for any number of reasons. (3) The Indian agricultural situation could become so acute that submission to foreign desires (primarily U.S. or Soviet) relative nuclear weapon status would be a necessity in order to ward off disastrous starvation. (4) The international shocks, frustrations, and fears of the past decade could be replaced by more harmonious relations with such nations as China, the United States, and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan. (5) The Soviet Union may not attempt to pressure India. (6) India may be accorded the dignity and respect it believes it deserves. (7) Finally, the internal status of the central government might be relatively high based upon a number of possible achievements.

It is not prudent to suggest which set of circumstances will, in fact, transpire. However, it should be noted that the United States possesses considerable leverage regarding some of the circumstances. In particular, it has the capability to reconfigure to a considerable extent the dignity and respect accorded New Delhi; and Washington may influence the degree to which India participates in important international decision-making. The U.S. certainly can either refrain from, or increase, its activities in the Indian Ocean and adjacent land areas. Under some situations, it may be able to influence the development of nuclear arms by others in a way which would calm Indian fears and thus placate some of the Indians who favor nuclear weapons acquisition.

Whether or not the United States actually undertakes the above actions would depend upon the trade-offs relative objectives other than nonproliferation and consideration of the possibility that such action could be viewed abroad as tantamount to submission a priori to Indian nuclear blackmail.

The third conclusion of this paper is that should India develop "political nuclear weapons," even followed by the development of

"military nuclear weapons," these events in and of themselves need not constitute a threatening situation for the United States. Whether or not Indian proliferation will actually become a threat to the United States depends to a large extent upon the kind of proliferation and the circumstances which brought it about. Under some circumstances, "political" as well as "military" nuclear proliferation by India could be perceived as contributing to U.S. security interests should those interests be defined in the context of seeking a balance of power in Asia. An example of such "benign" proliferation would be a situation in which either China or Russia, acting alone or in conjunction, would seek to extend their borders by force or threat of force. Under such circumstances, the addition of Indian nuclear weapons or, in the case of "political nuclear weapons," the demonstrated capability to acquire "military nuclear weapons," could serve as one constraint upon the expansionist proclivities of the aggressor. In such a situation, the acquisition of nuclear weapons would be positive from the perspective of United States security interests.

Under different circumstances, Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons, particularly "military nuclear weapons," would pose either a direct or secondary threat to vital American interests; such proliferation could be termed "malignant." An example of such proliferation would be a case in which India, armed with "military nuclear weapons," would become aggressive, seeking to carve out an empire in Asia, the Middle East, and the Western Pacific. Another example would be a hypothetical Hindu mission to spread that religion by armed might. While some would extrapolate that, based on the Indian seizure of Goa, a real danger of Indian empire-building would exist should New Delhi possess "military nuclear weapons," this seems highly unlikely since Indian expansionism would surely be checked by China or the Soviet Union. Further, while there certainly has been bloody religious strife in India, fears that a nuclear armed India would attempt to bring Hinduism to the world with a nuclear sword neglect to take into account the nonevangelical nature of Hinduism. India has little sense of "manifes' destiny," "Lebensraum," thirst for empire, or international faith to spread (such

as communism), as there was in the United States, England, Germany, Italy, Japan, or the Soviet Union when those nations surged ahead in the development of an industrial base.[1/] In time, the "realist-pragmatic" philosophy might form the locus for a belief system that would argue that India, by right of achievement, should expand and impose its hegemony on lesser peoples; but this kind of thinking is not present to any noticeable extent now.

Still another form of "malignant" Indian proliferation would involve the incorporation of an Indian nuclear force in that of either the Soviet Union or China, thus presenting the world with something like 45 percent (in the case of incorporation with China) of the world's population united and armed with nuclear weapons. This possibility seems unlikely because the powerful force of Indian nationalism.

Some would suggest that any kind of proliferation which puts "more national fingers on nuclear buttons" is "malignant" because of the resulting increase in the mathematical chance of accidents. Some also contend that Indians are not ready to handle sophisticated and dangerous equipment and defense doctrines. Further, it is argued that a backward nation like India is not used to exercising power and cannot really be trusted with the responsibility of possessing nuclear weapons. There are two responses to this point. The first is suggested by the Indians themselves. It holds that nations such as Sweden and India are more responsible than the five current military nuclear states which are characterized as being two powers (U.S. and USSR) with long records of intervention, two excolonial powers (Great Britain and France), and a messianic power (China) seeking world hegemony. The other response to those who fear that accidents might follow from deployment of Indian nuclear weapons can be found in U.S. safeguard development, i.e., by careful

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1/ Even among the most militantly favorable political party to nuclear weapons development, there appears to be very little, if any, feeling that nuclear weapons would be useful to extend Indian hegemony over nearby states. Nuclear weapons are not seen as necessary to dissolve Pakistan, which may dissolve of its own contradictions.

transfer of safeguard technology and related command and control doctrines, the developing Indian nuclear forces could be insulated from both the human and mechanical errors (as have the U.S. forces).

The above conclusions were drawn from an examination of the following facets of the Indian nuclear weapons decision context: the philosophical background, decision-making, political parties and the polls, threats, impact of the Nixon Doctrine, scientific and technical considerations, economic considerations, incentives and disincentives, and possible nuclear force configurations.[1/]

1/ It should be noted that the material in this treatment is drawn from a much lengthier paper which can be consulted should more detailed information be required.

II PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND

There is a philosophical conflict present in India today, the outcome of which will bear heavily upon the question of nuclear weapons acquisition. On the one hand, there is what may be termed the "traditional-idealist" perspective for which the acquisition of nuclear weapons is anathema. On the other hand, there is the "pragmatic-realist" school of thought which contains persons who support the development of Indian nuclear weapons now and others who argue that if current conditions continue, principally what they view as wrongs done to India in the international arena, India should very seriously consider the development of nuclear weapons.

The leading exponent of "traditional-idealist" thought in modern day India was Gandhi. He taught that the weak and the humble should resist evil forces and their domination while seeking the establishment of justice and righteousness by nonviolent means. Gandhi felt that the spiritual forces of truth would eventually overcome all evil. The first Prime Minister of India, Pandit Nehru, developed an application of the Gandhian philosophy to Indian foreign policy which, although discredited now in some circles in India, still serves as a base upon which the opposition to the acquisition of nuclear weapons rests.

The essence of Nehru's foreign policy, which was consistent not only with Gandhian thought but with the general perspective developed as far back as 1885 by the group which became the ruling Congress Party, was set forth in a statement of principles called the Panch Shila, or Five Principles of Peace. The principles are: (1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) nonaggression, (3) noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistance. In 1955, Nehru stated his view as follows:

> These principles form the basis of our relations with other nations. If Panch Shila were fully and

sincerely accepted by all countries, then peace would be assured to everyone and cooperation would follow.[1]

Although not included as one of the five principles, opposition to the development and spread of nuclear weapons was a dominant theme in Nehru's world perspective. He repeatedly stated that India would not develop such weapons and deplored nuclear weapons' development by other states.

Over the years, Panch Shila has clearly not been established as the rule by which nations govern their relations among themselves; in New Delhi's perspective, Panch Shila has not formed the basis for the relationships extended to India by other states--most notably Pakistan, China, and the United States. Instead, beginning with the 1962 border clash with the Chinese, followed by the two Indo-Pakistani wars (the last of which involved the United States in an apparently supportive role to Pakistan as the matter is viewed from New Delhi), events have caused many Indians to contend that it is power, not spiritual force or good intentions, which constitutes the ultimate determinant of a nation's foreign policy. Out of this perspective, which combines realism and pragmatism, has grown the "realist-pragmatic" school of thought.

The "realist-pragmatic" perspective is found more often among the younger politicians than the older ones; it appears among younger bureaucrats and technocrats in the government departments closely associated with science and technology more than among other governmental offices. It appears occasionally among military personnel and journalists, but the military seems to have no clear strategy for the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons. Some of the most articulate advocates of the "realist-pragmatic" perspective are the few "defense intellectuals" in the government and the universities. The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi serves as a particular locus for publications of the "realist-pragmatic" school. This organization was created several

[1] Quoted in Major Governments of Asia, George M. Kahin, ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959), p. 355.

years ago with government funding to serve as a clearing house for defense/foreign policy ideas, provide research on such matters, and upgrade the popular understanding of defense and foreign policy issues.

A number of Indian "defense intellectuals" such as the economist Raj Krishna, the late nuclear physicist largely responsible for the development of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission Homi Bhabha, the diplomatic historian Sisir Gupta, the Harvard-trained economist Subramaniam Swamy, and the Director of the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses K. Subrahmanyam have publicly called for nuclear weapons development or indicated their support for such development should those nations with which India must come into contact continue to follow what they view as a "power politics approach" toward India.

Of all the persons belonging to the "realist-pragmatic" school, K. Subrahmanyam is by far the most prolific regarding the need for serious consideration of the nuclear weapons acquisition question. Several quotations from his writing suggest the tenor of this perspective.

> Any nation-state which does not develop national power commensurate with its size and population, is not likely to be permitted to continue that way for long. It will be reduced in size and population commensurate with its power. So long as nuclear power and political power are correlated elements in world politics it is necessary that India take a close hard look at its defense posture on a long term basis, and view nuclear power as an integral part of its defense and deterrence system.[1/]

> All those intellectuals who wrote learned theses on the dangers of proliferation may pause and reflect how unrealistic were their theses. Nuclear weapons do not increase tension and add to the risks of war breaking out. They inculcate a sense of realism among those afflicted with the arrogance of power. If India had had nuclear weapons, the USS Enterprise would not have dared to come into the Bay of Bengal.

1/ K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Security," reprinted in Survival, May 1971, p. 158.

> In the future if India acquires nuclear weapons, some successor of Nixon will make a journey to Canossa like trip to New Delhi and offer his apologies for the behavior of the Nixon Administration.[1]

Because of his criticism of the United States, and because of his reasoning that the Indian nation should seriously consider acquiring nuclear weapons in opposition to the wishes of the United States, Subrahmanyam is not well received among certain circles in America. It is therefore doubly interesting to note the similarity in approach between Subrahmanyam and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who recently (October 1972) addressed some blunt words to Washington.

> But it is necessary to take note of the dispatch of the warship Enterprise to support a ruthless military dictatorship and to intimidate a democracy, and the extraordinary similarity of the attitudes adopted by the United States and China...
>
> A great power must take into account the existence not only of countries with comparable power, but of the multitude of others who are no longer willing to be pawns on a global chessboard.[2]

The last sentence from the Prime Minister's article goes a long way in summing up the attitude which may decide India to "go nuclear," although there will be a number of other reasons given in support of the decision, too. The feeling that to be taken seriously in Moscow, Peking, and Washington, one must possess the modern analogue to the ancient "arbitor of kings"--nuclear weapons--is becoming ever more widespread in India.

Some Indians have been fairly skillful in rationalizing the acquisition of nuclear weapons so that it seems consistent with the "traditional-idealist" philosophy of Gandhi and Nehru, even suggesting that acquisition of nuclear weapons by India would advance the peaceful principles for which both leaders worked.

1/ K. Subrahmanyam, in an unpublished manuscript dated July 1972.

2/ Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, "India and the World," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 1, October 1972, p. 75.

One example of this type of reasoning is given by Dr. Sampooran Singh, explosives expert and Director of the Terminal Research Laboratory at Chandigarh. Singh wrote in 1971:

> The anti-bomb lobbies invoke the names of Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru in support of arguments against India going nuclear. Gandhi stressed nonviolence as the preferred means of resisting evil, but his central message was that evil must be resisted. Gandhi wrote..."I am a member of an institution which holds a few acres of land whose crops are in imminent peril from monkeys. I believe in the sacredness of all life and hence I regard it a breach of Ahimsa [the non-injury principle] to inflict injury on the monkeys in order to save the crops. I would like to avoid this evil. I can avoid it by leaving or breaking up the institution. I do not do so because I do not expect to be able to find a society where there will be no agriculture and therefore no destruction of some life. In fear and trembling, in humility and penance, I therefore participate in the injury inflicted on the monkeys, hoping some day to find a way out."[1/]

Without mentioning either Gandhi or Nehru, Raj Krishna made the point that nuclear weapons in the possession of India might contribute more to the Indian goal of advancing world peace than would be the case should India refrain from developing nuclear weapons. To Krishna, an India without nuclear weapons means an India lacking the power probably needed to enable New Delhi to discuss nuclear disarmament with the five nuclear weapons states. He put his case in the following fashion:

> Nuclear abstention by us may only bring about the spectacle of our being encircled on all sides by nuclear nations, mocking at our powerless virtue. The common belief that proliferation increases the risk of war has a grim truth in it but it needs some qualification. The belief is based on the assumption that the Asian and African nations who may possess nuclear power hereafter will be necessarily less responsible than the Euro-American nations who have had nuclear weapons so far. This

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1/ Sampooran Singh, India and the Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: S. Chand and Company, 1971), pp. 104-105.

assumption is very weak. If a nuclear balance can diminish the risk of war in the West because of the West's love for survival, there is no reason why the same instinct should not have a similar effect in other parts of the world.

In this connection, I must point out that while the probability of accidental war increases, the probability of a premeditated war decreases as the number of nuclear nations increases, because the outcome of a nuclear initiative becomes increasingly uncertain and the risk increasingly prohibitive.[1/]

Subrahmanyam offers a recent version of the reasoning that an India with nuclear weapons can play a greater part in world peace than an unarmed (in a nuclear sense) India in an article whose title indicates the thrust of the argument, "Can Nuclear-Arms Proliferation Contribute to World Security?" The following quotations make his point.

A further increase in the total uncertainty about the use of nuclear weapons, resulting from their possession by other powers, would perhaps add to their disusability.

In this respect, powers which could not under any circumstances be considered as interventionist or Messianic should develop nuclear weapons so that in future it will be possible for them collectively to enhance the general deterrence operating against the five present nuclear powers.

It was difficult to initiate rational steps towards nuclear disarmament in a world where there was only one nuclear power with a substantial superiority. This was the time when an irresponsible doctrine like 'massive retaliation' and the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons was propounded by the strategic intellectual community and adopted by the military establishments. In a world of two major nuclear powers, there was a greater degree of realism and sense of responsibility, and this paved the way for a detente. When China established a nuclear-weapons capability, creating three distinct nuclear-power centres (the United Kingdom and France being not wholly independent of one of these three) the 'era of confrontation' was converted into an 'era of negotiations'. If there are more independent centres of decision-making with deterrent weapons capability,

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1/ Raj Krishna, "India and the Bomb," India Quarterly, April-June 1965, pp. 136-137.

> the era of negotiations may quite probably further progress into an 'era of non-intervention', which may in due course lead to an 'era of disarmament'.[1/]

Thus, members of the "realist-pragmatic" school suggest that Panch Shila may be reached through nuclear weapons acquisition. Although the Indian literature to date does not make an overt distinction, an examination of the "realist-pragmatic" literature reveals that members of this school of thought in general would be satisfied with "political nuclear weapons," at least until it became obvious that they did not provide the leverage desired relative to disarmament.

Coexistent with the schools of thought labeled "idealist-traditional" and "realist-pragmatic" and cutting across their perspectives is a general proposition increasingly held by Indians of various political persuasions. Although Indian writers have not agreed upon a term with which to describe it, this view is characterized by a preoccupation with what is perceived as the unjust and inequitable treatment of India by the U.S., USSR, and China, and with an effort by the superpowers to keep India permanently in second class status.

Before examining in more detail the Indian concern over what is claimed to be unequal treatment, two general points should be made. First, the concern over unequal treatment in international councils and by the superpowers is similar to arguments expressed by the French and Chinese regarding their ascension to nuclear weapons status, as well as in discussions of nuclear proliferation by other nonnuclear weapons states, most notably Sweden. Second, there appears to be a remarkable similarity between the feelings the Indians have regarding unequal treatment in international relations and the demands for "equal protection under the law" by ethnic minorities in the United States. In this regard it is interesting to note that some of these groups have adopted the idea that the only way left to get the "establishment's" attention in the drive for equal rights is through militancy. This parallels the growing view in India that the only way to gain equal treatment from the superpowers is to acquire nuclear weapons.

1/ K. Subrahmanyam, "Can Nuclear-Arms Proliferation Contribute to World Stability?" Impact of Science on Society, No. 3, 1972, p. 248.

Indian concern over unequal treatment, and the linkage between that feeling and the nuclear acquisition question, is best seen in the context of India's rejection of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Almost every Indian who has expressed himself on it in public believes the NPT to be a discriminatory document and that instead of signing it, India should "keep her options open" regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The inequalities perceived in the NPT are: (1) the inequity of obligations set forth for the nuclear weapons states vis-à-vis the nonnuclear weapons states. What concerns the Indians here is what has been termed the banning of "horizontal proliferation" and permitting of "vertical proliferation."[1/] (2) China, with which India has engaged in active hostilities, does not adhere to the NPT and thus continues improving its nuclear arsenal, while India is asked to accept the NPT and its strictures upon acquiring nuclear weapons possibly needed for dealing with the Chinese at a later date. (3) The inequity between the inspection of laboratories and industrial facilities required for India should New Delhi sign the NPT and the freedom from similar inspection for the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. (4) The application of certain prohibitions regarding the peaceful use of nuclear technology which are applied differently to nuclear weapons states than to nonnuclear weapons states which sign the Treaty. Of specific concern in this regard is the prohibitions of peaceful nuclear explosions which the Indian Government claims it may wish to undertake for such standard purposes as digging harbors and exploiting mineral resources. Until these discriminatory features of the NPT are eliminated, it is unlikely that New Delhi will accept the Treaty. The incremental movement of the Indians toward the technical ability to acquire at least a "political nuclear weapon" capability may or may not elicit the hoped for response from Moscow and Washington. However, an

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1/ This charge was made by the former Indian Ambassador to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. "Horizontal proliferation" is defined as addition of new states to the nuclear weapons group. "Vertical proliferation" is defined as the qualitative and quantitative enhancement of their nuclear arsenals by the U.S. and the USSR. See V. C. Trivedi, "Vertical Versus Horizontal Proliferation: An Indian View," James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, eds., Arms Control for the Late Sixties (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1967).

increasing number of Indians advocate "keeping their options open." Should India feel it necessary actually to become a nuclear weapons state in order more forcefully to present its views regarding nuclear disarmament in general and the NPT in particular, it seems probable that the first nuclear step will be the demonstration of "political nuclear weapons" status.

Much the same feeling about the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) exists as has been described concerning the NPT. For example, a former Deputy Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs, C. R. Gharekhan, declared regarding SALT, "One can be fairly certain that the U.S. and the USSR will not agree on any measures of vertical non-proliferation."1/

One other facet of the "realist-pragmatic" perspective remains to be discussed, i.e., the possibility that India might accept guarantees of protection from the superpowers in lieu of developing its own nuclear weapons. As one would expect, members of the "realist-pragmatic" school do not place much credence in United States or Soviet promises to come to India's assistance should it be the object of a nuclear attack. What confidence there is in the two superpowers is decreasing in direct proportion to the increase in the Chinese capability to hurt the Soviet Union and the United States. Even the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation apparently did not inspire much confidence among members of this school. K. Subrahmanyam noted that at the time of the 1962 Sino-Indian confrontation in the Himalayas, the Soviet Union did not assist the Indians despite previous Soviet agreements to supply India with military equipment. His explanation for this lack of Soviet support was the concurrent Soviet involvement with the United States in the Cuban missile affair, which, in terms of Soviet national interest, transcended any commitment to assist India. Thus, he argues:

1/ C. R. Gharekhan, "Strategic Arms Limitation--II," India Quarterly, October-December 1970, p. 389.

> In a world of three nuclear powers, is it rational for India to depend all the time on the Soviet deterrence? If an international crisis in which the Soviet Union gets locked into a confrontation with either China or the United States coincides with a threat from the third nuclear power to India, the Soviet deterrent may not prove effective.[1/]

In spite of such disparagement of superpower guarantees, it can still be argued that until China acquires the nuclear power to make United States/Soviet intervention on behalf of India unthinkable, there may, in fact, exist a superpower deterrent against overt Chinese aggression directed at India. During this "grace" period, it appears India will continue to take advantage of whatever deterrence is exercised by the superpowers to strive toward greater military and economic independence and creation of a broader infrastructure as a base from which to build a nuclear weapons capability if that becomes necessary.

In concluding this section, it should be noted that, with the exception of lack of faith in superpower guarantees vis-à-vis China, most of the perceived utilities for nuclear weapons status can be met at least initially with "political" rather than "military" nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the least offensive manner for gaining nuclear weapons status from the viewpoint of the "idealist-traditional" school would be the demonstration of a "political nuclear weapon" capacity rather than the direct acquisition of a "military nuclear weapons" force.

1/ K. Subrahmanyam, in an unpublished manuscript dated July 1972.

III DECISION-MAKING, PARTIES, AND POLLS

Situated between the poles represented by the "traditional-idealist" and the "realist-pragmatic" schools is the Government of India. Former Prime Minister Nehru was unequ vocally opposed to Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons and as such appeared to fit into the "traditional-idealist" fold. Even the 1962 confrontation with China, which shocked India and gave impetus to the developing "realist-pragmatic" school of thought, did not cause him to alter his position regarding nuclear weapons acquisition.

Nehru's successor, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, initially reiterated the views of his predecessor regarding nuclear weapons acquisition. However, with the Chinese nuclear tests (the first of which was in October of 1964) and the growing pressure from the developing "realist-pragmatic" school, Shastri began to express willingness to reconsider the nuclear weapons issue.[1/]

India's third Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, has shown even more flexibility on the nuclear weapons question, although she has not actually endorsed nuclear weapons acquisition. In one of her first official statements on the subject, she reiterated that it was India's policy not to acquire nuclear weapons, "...despite the fact that we possess the necessary technical capability." However, referring to the challenge from "...the aggressive policies of the People's Republic of China," she declared that it would be the policy of the government to defend Indian sovereignty.[2/]

After the third Chinese nuclear test, Mrs. Gandhi observed that India's nuclear weapons policy was "not irreversible" and that "the government had never committed itself to refrain forever from making nuclear weapons."[3/] However, she declared that the Chinese nuclear

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1/ "India Raises Possibility of Joining Club," Washington Post, 17 November 1965, p. 17.

2/ "Excerpts from Mrs. Gandhi's Speech at the National Press Club in Washington," New York Times, 30 March 1966, p. 16.

3/ "Indian Congress Heads Call for Nuclear Weapons," New York Times, 12 May 1966, p. 9.

weapons development did not require an immediate reversal of the Indian policy of refraining from nuclear weapons acquisition. The matter would depend, in the last analysis, upon the "paramount consideration of the country's defense."[1/]

In 1970, under the shadow of the successful Chinese launching of an earth satellite and fears that it might presage an eventual ICBM capability, Mrs. Gandhi reiterated the basic Indian policy of no nuclear weapons but added that she was not ignoring the military considerations which were inherent in the Indian nuclear programs.[2/] The Prime Minister had already agreed to request the Indian Atomic Energy Department to calculate the costs of developing Indian nuclear weapons.[3/] At about this time, the late Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, Director of the Atomic Energy Department, made a low-profile nuclear threat by stating, without giving a timetable, that he considered underground nuclear explosions to "tap the country's underground resources" to be compatible with India's atoms for peace program.[4/] (Such an underground explosion would be legal under the terms of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to which India is signatory.) A year later, Mrs. Gandhi stated that studies were in progress concerning the economic benefits of underground nuclear explosions.[5/] Whether the Indian Government is sincere in discussing the use of underground nuclear explosions for gas stimulation, releasing oil from oil shale, or mining copper and nickel or is, in fact, using such talk as a "cover" for legally demonstrating a nuclear weapons capability is not clear at this time.

Analysis of the principles enunciated relative to Indian foreign policy through the years, the still-strong legacy of Gandhi and Nehru, the experiences of having force used against India and of having to "bite

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1/ "Demand in India for the Bomb," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 19 May 1966.

2/ Statement made before the Rajya Sabtia (Council of States or Upper House of the Indian Legislature) on 27 August 1970. (Cited in K. Subrahmanyam, unpublished manuscript, July 1972.)

3/ Ernest Weatherall, "Indian Door Slightly Ajar for A-Arms," Christian Science Monitor, 3 August 1970, p. 3.

4/ Ibid.

5/ "World Digest," Nuclear Engineering International, September 1971, p. 687.

the bullet" and reply in kind, and the mounting arguments of the "realist-pragmatic" school all suggest that the Government of India is operating under the following unenunciated doctrine: Panch Shila is still the preferred context within which nations ought to conduct their international relations with one another. However, some of the most powerful nations, such as the two superpowers, and some of the most threatening nations from India's perspective, such as China and Pakistan, do not practice the Five Principles. Therefore, in order to move from this current imperfect condition to the Panch Shila environment, India may, as a last resort, have to consider acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, such a regression from Panch Shila would not be a permanent condition. After the acquisition of nuclear arms by India, so the reasoning goes, interventionist-inclined states will pay attention to Indian demands, and all will agree to disarm.

The Indian literature suggests that many Indians are concerned over the means/ends relationship in regard to nuclear weapons acquisition. They are sensitive to outside opinions that India practices hypocrisy--hypocrisy regarding Goa, hypocrisy regarding Pakistan, and hypocrisy regarding acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, it should be recalled that in regard to Goa and Pakistan, the Indians were rather adept in rationalizing the use of force. One may therefore expect that if it becomes necessary, New Delhi can likewise reconcile the acquisition of nuclear weapons with long term peaceful aspirations. To the charge that an India, which has tasted the use of force and savored the feeling of power, will become increasingly aggressive while proclaiming herself virtuous, Indians now counter that when force must be used, it is safer in the hands of those constrained by a nonviolent tradition such as the Indians.

It may be suggested that the "realist-pragmatic" Indian posture has little to do with an effort to realize Panch Shila by different means; neither does it have much relationship to the principles and goals of Gandhi and Nehru. Rather, one could argue that it is determined by an understanding of India's weaknesses, which dictated a meek stance in the world community. Thus, Panch Shila can be regarded as a "cover" which permits

that violence of which India is capable, while maintaining an image of moral superiority.

Until more information is available, one may safely assume that some Indians are sincere in thinking India will only grudgingly depart from Panch Shila, and then only temporarily, while other Indians, those who never believed in Panch Shila, await the day when India has the capability to act assertively in the international arena. Again, an underground demonstration of a "political nuclear weapon" seems to best fit the needs of both groups.

The existence of important decision-making centers in addition to those around Mrs. Gandhi necessitates a brief examination of the bureaucracy.

India is a democracy in the sense that the political leaders of the country must from time to time face the electorate and can be retired from office with an adverse vote. However, India's defense and foreign policy processes are relatively closed to the public and are conducted by bureaucratic elites not directly responsible to the people.

The relatively small and closed group of administrators, bureaucrats, and scientific/technical personnel within the government contains many who believe India should continue to build a base which would enable it to develop,or threaten to develop, nuclear weapons on relatively short notice. Such persons do not run the government, yet they are in a position, even without express governmental approval, to build toward the infrastructure necessary for nuclear weapons acquisition. Because of their access to government funding, their organization, prestige, and high levels of education, the bureaucratic elites and the growing number of defense intellectuals outside the government exercise a disproportionate amount of influence. Should such persons, particularly in the Departments of Atomic Energy and Space Research, be provided with the flexibility and initiative, more rapid progress toward nuclear weapons development may be made. This could probably be done without ordinary politicians' and the general public's being aware of how close the scientific/technical elites were to achieving a nuclear weapons capability. Although the

Government of India has not publicly endorsed progress toward a nuclear weapons capability, it has apparently taken no steps to hamper the infrastructure building going on in the Departments of Atomic Energy and Space or to silence leading spokesmen of the "realist-pragmatic" school.

It should be noted that most of the momentum for nuclear weapons development appears centered not in the military but in the scientific/technical bureaucracies of atomic energy and space and with the nongovernmental defense intellectuals. Nevertheless, occasional articles appear by Indian military men suggesting utilities in nuclear weapons acquisition. At this time, however--and this could change very soon--the military confines itself largely to discussion of conventional matters such as tactics, strategy, logistics, and command.

Public opinion polling is less sophisticated in India than in the United States, hence the scattered reports of polling on the nuclear weapons question should be treated with some reservations. Twice in recent years (1968 and 1970) the Indian Institute of Public Opinion in New Delhi has conducted polls on this matter. In the first poll, the results were 75% in favor of developing nuclear weapons; and in the 1970 poll, 69% favored acquiring nuclear weapons. In the latter poll, there was a direct correlation between the amount of education of the respondents and their support of nuclear weapons acquisition--the relationship being the more education a respondent had, the more likely the person was to favor nuclear weapons.

The parties most vocal in support of acquiring nuclear weapons are the minority parties Jana Sangh, Praja Socialist Party, and the Congress (O), none of which have ever controlled a government. The dominant party, the Congress (R) headed by Prime Minister Gandhi, has never come out in favor of nuclear weapons. Mrs. Gandhi has moved from her father's stance of "never" to a position of "keeping our options open," which suggests a flexibility not found during the days of Nehru, as well as, perhaps, India's increasing technical ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Further, the Congress (R) support of the 1971 war with Pakistan put it much closer

to the "realist-pragmatic" perspective than to the "idealist-traditional" grouping. After some initial controversy, the ruling party largely accepted the view set forth six months prior to the war by K. Subrahmanyam as the justification for the Indian attack:

> The explosive situation in East Pakistan is leading India inexorably towards political bankruptcy, economic catastrophe and domestic revolution. Since Pakistan is unwilling to de-fuse the situation, India must accept the burden, even at the cost of a war--which would have to be both soon and brief.[1]

1/ Statement credited to K. Subrahmanyam in L'Express of Paris, 16 August 1971.

IV THE THREAT

Pakistan, unless given substantial outside assistance, does not constitute a threat sufficient to warrant development of nuclear weapons according to the view in New Delhi. The creation of Bangla Desh greatly reduced the power of Pakistan; however, it may, together with other unstable nations in South and Southeast Asia, offer opportunities for Peking to support movements directed at extending Chinese hegemony over considerable territory in the region.

China is generally perceived in New Delhi as the primary threat to India. The type of threat expected from Peking is hardly ever that of a direct nuclear attack upon Indian cities; rather, it is seen as nuclear blackmail, support for insurgent activities in India or along its borders, or an attraction for the allegiance of Indians and other peoples in Asia and Southeast Asia because of the demonstrated power of Chinese accomplishment.

It is generally felt in India that the revamped (since 1962) Indian Army, fresh from the 1971 victories over Pakistani forces and increasingly supplied with modern equipment (often of Indian manufacture), can handle any conventional Chinese military threat. The same can be said for the Indian Air Force in regard to the Chinese Air Force, and the Chinese Navy is not at present perceived as constituting a credible threat in the Indian Ocean, although this may change with its growth and increased activity.

The Government of India is ambiguous concerning its faith in superpower guarantees relative the Chinese threats, including the recently signed treaty with the Soviet Union. Indians appear to hold that decreasing faith should be placed in superpower assistance vis-à-vis a Chinese confrontation as the capacity of the Chinese to hurt the Soviet Union and the United States increases. This is similar to the decreased faith the French placed in the promise of the U.S. to respond massively should there be a Soviet attack upon the NATO states.

Finally, some Indians see a nuclear capability as being useful in fending off superpower meddling--or the threat thereof--in South and

Southeast Asian affairs and in preventing a growing concentration of superpower naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

For the purposes of this study, it should be noted that in regard to most threats perceived from New Delhi, the acquisition of a "political nuclear weapon" capability would be sufficient. Only should the threat perception of China increase, specifically in regard to a direct threat to destroy Indian cities, can much of a case be made for an Indian "military nuclear weapons" capacity. Further, it should be noted that very little, if any, interest exists in India regarding Japanese-Indian joint nuclear development. The Japanese are generally viewed among the Indians as a prime example of material acquisitiveness not to be emulated by Indians.

Acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan would not be perceived in India as constituting a military threat to which New Delhi would have to respond immediately. However, such action by Japan would probably be perceived as a measure to achieve near-superpower status, quite likely at the expense of India. Should Japan's role in international councils increase after acquisition of nuclear weapons, the pressure would be very heavy in India for development and demonstration of a "political nuclear weapon." Pressure for "military nuclear weapons" would not build to any extent unless a nuclear armed Japan began to apply pressure on its neighbors or attempted to use the nuclear status to support discriminatory trade practices.

V THE NIXON DOCTRINE

India is ambivalent regarding the possible U.S. withdrawal from Asia. On the one hand, such a withdrawal would vindicate the charge that the United States had no just reason for participating in the Southeast Asian war. But on the other hand, the withdrawal of most American forces is seen as a possible signal to China (part of a quid pro quo) that it may extend its sphere of influence in Asia, probably at the expense of India. Some Indians suspect that the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam is actually only a shift of forces elsewhere, including the Indian Ocean, in which case the Indians would have to decide whether the resulting redistribution of U.S. forces served as protection from China, or constituted meddling in the affairs of others.

VI SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS

The nuclear development program embarked upon by India is justified in public statements in terms of its contribution to the industrialization of India. However, in moving toward greater industrialization based in part upon civil nuclear power, the Indians are gradually freeing themselves from various implicit and explicit constraints relative to the decision to go nuclear. If the 1970-1980 nuclear development program progresses according to schedule, India after 1975 should have unfettered plutonium available for a weapons program from commercial reactors; at a later date, U-235 will become available; and later still, there should be U-233. Given the generally accepted belief that, at least in regard to nominal yield fission weapons, there remain no technical secrets barring the path to manufacture, it would appear that a scientific cadre successful in carrying out only a portion of the impressive 1970-1980 nuclear development program would be competent to develop fission weapons in the 1970s and possibly thermonuclear weapons late in the decade or early in the 1980s.

The major facets of the 1970-1980 nuclear development program are set forth below.

1. 2700 MW of nuclear power to be commissioned before 1980. This means approval for four new power stations of 1700 MW for which construction should start during the Fourth Plan.

2. Design and construction of advanced thermal reactors of about 500 MW unit size which would lower the capital cost of power stations while still producing plutonium for future needs in fast breeder reactors.

3. Completion of a fast breeder test reactor and experience to be gained with the technology of plutonium enriched fuel, its fabrication and reprocessing, sodium coolant technology, and experience with thorium bred U-233 fuel.

4. Augmentation of heavy water production to about 300 tons per year to back up the program for the use of natural uranium in power reactors.

5. Design and construction of a large 500 MW prototype fast breeder test reactor.

6. Development of gas centrifuge technology for U-235 isotopic enrichment. Development of special materials including carbon filament structures.

7. Development of the Narwapahar Uranium Mines and facilities for extracting uranium from low grade ore. Also development of processes for the extraction of ore from tailings in copper mines.

8. Early completion of the Nuclear Fuel Complex to manufacture special materials and fuel elements for various programs.

9. Widespread application of isotopes to industrial processing, food preservation, sterilization of medical products, medicine, and research.

Only this year the Government of India separated the space effort from the Atomic Energy Department and established a separate Department of Space Research. The 1970-1980 research program of the Space Department is ambitious and, if carried out, should provide India by the end of this decade with the experimental basis for moving into an IRBM delivery capability sometime in the 1980s. Currently, India does not appear to have the technical capability to design and deploy IRBMs unless very extensive assistance is extended to New Delhi from a more advanced nation.

The major facets of the 1970-1980 Space Research Program are set forth below.

1. Augmentation of the facilities for R&D at the Space Science and Technology Center (SSTC) to develop a capability to build scientific and communication satellites and test them environmentally.

2. Operate facilities at the SSTC for the development of inertial guidance systems and onboard miniaturized computers.

3. Development at the Space Science and Technology Center and related facilities of high performance missile tracking radars and communication systems for installation on the mainland and upon the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal for the satellite program.

4. Construction of a plant for manufacture of large solid propellant blocks at SHAR and a facility for static testing of these under simulated high altitude conditions.

5. Completion of a rocket fabrication facility at Trivandrum for the manufacture of large size rocket casings and hardware for rocket motors including the development of special materials and rocket motor systems.

6. Development of in-flight guidance systems for rockets.

7. Development of a "Scout" type four stage launcher which would burn solid propellant and be capable of putting into orbit a satellite of about 40 kg. payload by 1973-74. This would be followed by the development of more advanced rocket systems capable of putting 1200 kg. payloads into synchronous orbits.

8. Fabrication of communication satellites capable of providing high quality point to point service between metropolitan areas and direct broadcast of television by 1975.

9. Development of sensors and techniques for remote sensing.

The above programs are expected to cost Rs. 12,500 million for atomic energy and Rs. 1,650 million for space research until 1980.

VII ECONOMIC FACTORS

Perhaps the most difficult variable to evaluate in the nuclear weapons context is the cost of a nuclear weapons effort and the effect of such an effort upon Indian activities in other developmental areas. The cost range extends from $600 million for a small force of soft fission IRBMs[1/] to something on the order of $10,000 million for a force roughly comparable to the current French nuclear weapons force.[2/] It must be remembered, however, that the figures are meaningless without knowledge of the situation in which nuclear weapons are developed. In other words, India might not be able to afford the $600 million in a low threat environment, but it might very well afford the $10,000 million effort if national survival appeared to depend on it. A "political nuclear weapon" would cost very much less than the above figures which relate to "military nuclear weapons" forces. Further, a significant portion of the cost would be borne by the research program which is being undertaken in any event.

1/ Subramaniam Swamy, "Systems Analysis of Strategic Defense Needs," Economic and Political Weekly, 22 February 1969, pp. 401-409; and India's Nuclear Strategy in the 1970s, a paper delivered before the International Security Program Colloquium on Multipolar Strategy, University of California, Berkeley, 26 May 1969.

2/ For estimates of the costs for the French strategic nuclear force, see Judith H. Young, The French Strategic Missile Program, Adelphi Paper, No. 38, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967. For a number of costing estimates for various nuclear weapons postures, see Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons, United Nations Secretary General's Report, A/6858, 1968.

VIII POSSIBLE NUCLEAR FORCE CONFIGURATIONS

In terms of what can be done in India technically, and in regard to likely Indian needs, three types of nuclear weapons forces should be considered for the 1970s to early 1980s.

First, there is what has been termed a "political nuclear weapon." This would be the easiest to acquire from a technical perspective and the cheapest in terms of funding. This type of "weapon" could be demonstrated in an underground explosion, ostensibly a peaceful applications test, but would indicate that India had mastered fission technology and wanted it known. Such a means of demonstrating nuclear capability would afford a minimally credible deterrent, but it would also create the least amount of hostile reaction and would break no treaty to which India is signatory or create any fallout. Further, if done with unfettered Pu-239, it would breach no reactor safeguard agreements. A "political nuclear weapon" would enhance India's prestige beyond her borders, increase the prestige of the central government internally, serve notice to other nations that if India were not regarded seriously it might move toward a "military nuclear weapons" capability, and indicate to would-be enemy states that further pressure on India could result in the building of a real nuclear force.

Second, the Indians could develop tactical nuclear weapons primarily for use in the Himalayas. Currently operating aircraft could deliver such weapons, or they could be used in the form of ADMs. Such weapons might prove useful in the high passes with little harm to noncombatants. However, some argue that to be really effective as a deterrent, tactical nuclear weapons must be back-stopped with strategic forces and that tactical nuclear weapons really are not needed to confront the Chinese on India's northern borders; the Indian Army, it is contended, can do that. Of the three modes of nuclear weapons acquisition, this is probably the most costly relative to its utility and, hence, not likely.

Third, there is the possibility of building a "military nuclear weapons" force which would have strategic purpose vis-a-vis the Chinese,

lesser capability against the USSR, and no capability against the U.S.[1/] [2/] Such a force would have as a delivery means either IRBMs or bombers, with SLBMs a later possibility. The Indians have apparently accepted the view that, because of their vulnerability, bombers are not suitable for a second-strike force. However, there appears to be no systematic study of the matter in the open literature. Most of the writing on a strategic force centers around IRBMs, first in a soft mode, possibly followed by hard-site and/or submarine based missiles. Clearly, such a force would not be needed unless it was to counter a direct Chinese threat or was thought necessary to force India's way into various international arrangements.

1/ The economic cost of nuclear weapons is more a fact which hinders their development, thus a disincentive. Regarding "political nuclear weapons" the cost is much less a factor than relative "military nuclear weapons."

2/ An extreme option would be orbital weapons based upon techniques and hardware developed during the current Indian effort to place TV reflecting satellites in stationary orbit. Such a capability would have complete effectiveness against China, less against the U.S., and much less against the USSR given its probable anti-satellite capability.

IX GENERAL INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES

Indians who write about the nuclear option for their country--whether they favor or oppose nuclear weapons acquisition--generally agree upon the conditions necessary for greatly reduced interest in obtaining such weapons.

The first condition for reduced interest in nuclear weapons acquisition is associated with the modification of the NPT. Changes in that document which would substantially undercut the motivation for nuclear weapons acquisition in India are the following: (1) that the nuclear weapons states commence disarming relative nuclear weapons; (2) that the nuclear weapons states accept the same type of inspection they now seek to have the nonnuclear weapons states adopt to ensure compliance; and (3) that there be no discrimination between the nuclear and the nonnuclear weapons states concerning the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. To the Indians, adoption of these changes in the NPT would go a long way toward convincing them that nuclear power-politics could be safely eschewed.

The second condition which, if it occurred, would reduce the interest in nuclear weapons in India would be an improvement in the general treatment of India in world councils and a reduction in what the Indians feel is meddling by the superpowers, and possibly China, in the affairs of others. The meddling which most concerns New Delhi is, of course, that closest to home, i.e., in the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal, the small nations which border India, and in Southeast Asia.

The third condition conducive to relieving the pressure for an Indian nuclear weapons program would be the commencement of harmonious Sino-Indian relations. If truly harmonious, such a new relationship would permit the Chinese to continue their nuclear arming without serious objection by the Indians. This would be due to an Indian understanding of the Chinese need to build a suitable deterrent vis-à-vis the Soviets and, secondarily, as protection against a renewed confrontation with the United States. Further, a friendly, nuclear-armed China would likely be perceived in India as contributing to the limitations placed upon superpower intervention.

The fourth condition which would contribute to diminished interest in an Indian nuclear weapons program is the continuation of the current situation in which neither Japan nor Germany, nor any other Nth power, possesses nuclear weapons.

Finally, a general confidence by Indians in the scientific accomplishments of the central government would be conducive to reduced pressure for Indian nuclear weapons.

Conversely, there are five conditions whose occurrence would surely generate very significant pressures to develop at least a "political nuclear weapon."

The first of these would be a continuation of the nuclear weapons states' amassing of more and better weapons, i.e., engaging in what the Indians call "vertical proliferation," coupled with efforts to impose discriminatory inspection and practices regarding peaceful nuclear research upon India. Under such conditions, it is very unlikely that India would sign a document which required it to refrain from "horizontal proliferation."

The second condition supportive of nuclear weapons development is associated with Indian nationalism and the desire--hunger almost--to be taken seriously in the councils of the world, especially in the eyes of the superpowers and near-superpowers. Associated with this feeling is the desire to have the superpowers and China refrain from intervention in that part of the world which might almost be called India's sphere of interest. Thus continued U.S. or Chinese activities in South Asia could cause India to adopt the nuclear weapons option.

The third nuclear weapons triggering condition, and the one which would most quickly lead to a "military nuclear weapon" (as opposed to a "political nuclear weapon"), would be perception of a direct nuclear threat from China.

The fourth triggering condition would be acquisition of nuclear weapons by another Nth power with resultant increase in that nation's international stature.

The fifth event which would develop significant pressure for a nuclear weapons program would be a domestic lack of confidence in New Delhi which the demonstration of a technical feat, such as detonation of a nuclear device, would offset.

In conclusion, having taken into account India's reasons for postulated nuclear weapons acquisition, it is clear that the most easily acquired nuclear option--a "political nuclear weapon"--appears best suited to the requirements for a nuclear weapons posture generated by four of the five nuclear weapons triggering circumstances mentioned above. Of course, the demonstration of a "political nuclear weapons" capability may not bring about the hoped for results. In this case, New Delhi may seriously consider moving ahead to the development of "military nuclear weapons." The context which would hold the greatest probability that New Delhi would desire a "military nuclear weapons" capability would be a direct nuclear threat perceived from China. Even in that case, however, a "political nuclear weapon" would constituto a necessary step toward development of a real nuclear deterrent force vis-a-vis the Chinese.

INPUT SUBSTUDY C

IMPLICATIONS OF JAPANESE AND/OR INDIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FOR SOVIET POLICY

By: F. K. Means

CONTENTS

I INTRODUCTION: THE SOVIET UNION AND THE FAR EAST

The Soviet Union is a Far Eastern power of the first rank with deeply rooted historical interests throughout Asia. Two thirds of its vast bulk lies outside the Western European continent, on the Asiatic steppes and tundras. In the years immediately following World War Two, this fact was too often overlooked.[1/] It has only been within the past decade that a fuller understanding of Soviet Russia's Far Eastern interests and involvements has been impressed on the minds of Western observers.

The Korean War, the Sino-Soviet accord, the early stages of the war in Vietnam, Soviet-Japanese and Soviet-Indian relations, and Soviet initiatives in Southeast Asia had all taken place against the backdrop of more dramatic and, seemingly, more important European developments. Indeed, events in the Far East involving Soviet relations with the nations of that region or Soviet-U.S. disagreement or accord in that area seemed more an extension of European-centered problems than issues arising specifically within an Asian framework.

This curtain of misconception has been torn away by the developments of the last ten years. The bitterness and danger of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the enormity of the Soviet military forces deployed in Inner Asia, the expansion of Soviet influence in South Asia, its diplomatic and economic initiatives in Southeast Asia and Japan, all serve to underscore the Soviet Union's fundamental interests in the Far East.

1/ For example, see Samuel B. Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Army (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 111. In October 1949, during hearings before the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives, representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps set forward their concepts of a future war. General Griffith notes that during these "tendentious" proceedings "...all eyes were fixed on Europe to the utter exclusion of Asia, an area never mentioned as a possible theater of operations..." Air Force witnesses refused to conceive a war "... anywhere but in Europe..."

If Western observers were preoccupied with a European-centered outlook in assessing the interests of the Soviet Union, that same outlook was also predominant in Moscow.[1/]

The historical reasons for this postwar myopia are clear. Russian and Soviet defense has centered almost exclusively on the security of the nation's western border. Major threats originated in the West. The only real exception to this pattern was the imposition of Mongol rule during the 13th and 14th centuries. Even the expansion of the Muscovite state and the later Russian empire was predominantly a movement to the east and south which embroiled Russia in a series of wars against European states.

In the troublesome West, Russia faced highly organized nation states with large populations and relatively well developed economies. These countries were separated from the most vital areas of Russia by comparatively short distances. The only significant natural obstacles to invasion from the west were the Pripet Marshes, the north-south river systems, and the low-lying Carpathian mountains. By contrast, the East offered no such threats. There were vast and sparsely inhabited distances. The terrain was a rough and jagged mixture of deserts, tundra, and mountains. History and geography combined to turn the face and thoughts of Russia toward the West.

The training of Russia's educated elite, lawyers, diplomats, political leaders, and military men was decidedly Europe-oriented. In the 19th century, Western ideas flowed into the country in a continuous stream. Russia's economic, political, and military structures took on an increasingly

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1/ G. Jukes, in "The Soviet Military in Asia," World Review, Vol. 9, No. 11, p. 23, comments, "Most strikingly, a standard Soviet work, Military Strategy, edited by Marshal Sokolovsky, the former chief of the General Staff . . . devotes most of its discussion of future war to the conduct of the European campaign . . . and dismisses operations outside Europe in a handful of inconclusive paragraphs."

Western cast as the impact of these ideas was felt. The new ideas spread throughout Russian society with an ever greater rapidity as the popular level of literacy and political awareness increased.[1/]

During this same period, the Far Eastern borders of the nation were expanded at the expense of China as part of a gradual expansion toward the East that had been going for several centuries; but the focal point of Russian concern remained in the West. The disastrous war with Japan at the turn of the present century did little to shift this focus. Nor did the involvement of Soviet troops in the Far East and Siberia during the Civil War period significantly alter the Soviet preoccupation with its western frontiers. The East--Russia's Asian heritage--slumbered out of sight and nearly out of mind.

After the Revolution of October 1917, ideology seemed to reinforce history, geography, and training in the new Soviet state. Marxism-Leninism linked the economically advanced capitalist nations of the West together in an international conspiracy designed to destroy the Soviet Union and suppress the development of a rising proletarian consciousness among the laboring masses of the world. Here again, the focus was upon the Western working man. The Soviet view held that it was in the capitalist countries of the West that the revolutionary potential of the masses was highest and most volatile. For the Soviet Union, as well as the rest of the world, Europe in the 1920s and 30s remained the effective center of world politics. Even the potential of a revolutionary China was subordinated to the Soviet preoccupation with its relations with the West and the need to "consolidate socialism" in the Soviet Union.

This is not to say, however, that the Soviet Union's eastern borders and its eastern defense system were entirely neglected. The bitter war with Japan in 1904-5 had clearly demonstrated that the supply line from Moscow to the Russian Far East was woefully inadequate. The primarily

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1/ Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made Revolution (New York: The Dial Press, 1964), pp. 1-11, passim.

single-track Trans-Siberian Railway could not adequately supply troops located four times as far from Moscow as they were from Tokyo. In consequence, the road was doubled and track laid around the southern shores of Lake Baikal to obviate the necessity of ferrying trains across the lake before they resumed their journey. Security for the vulnerable line was increased by the stationing of a permanent force (the Independent Red Banner Far Eastern Army) at its eastern end. When Japanese forces pushed into Soviet territory in 1938, it was this force which checked their advance. In 1939, however, when a Japanese army crossed the frontier of Outer Mongolia, Soviet forces stationed there had to be reinforced by troops from elsewhere, including the European USSR. In the far greater operations against the Japanese in 1945, the great bulk of the troops involved had been transported from the European theaters of war after the cessation of hostilities there.[1/]

In the early years of the post-World War Two era, the Soviet Union retained its sharp focus on the securing of the western frontiers. Its forces had played a major role in the defeat of Germany and advanced into Central Europe. The states of Eastern Europe were kept in tight Soviet control and formed into a forward defense, or buffer, zone against possible attack from the West. This did little, however, to offset the advantages of the West's technological achievements. The Western threat, though changed in form, remained.

The new threat to the Soviet Union was embodied in the recently established United States bases in Europe. There were strategic bombers capable of striking the Soviet Union with atomic weapons. The buffer zone of Eastern European states did little to impair the United States' potential effectiveness in the event of war. On its part, the Soviet Union had no nuclear weapons in its arsenal, no strategic bombers capable of striking the United States. Backed by a strategic bomber force and a strong deep-water navy, the United States was a global power, whereas the Soviet Union was a strong, but vulnerable, regional power.

1/ Jukes, op. cit.

Until the mid-1950s, the response of the Soviet Union to the new Western threat was one of "indirect deterrence." Massed Soviet ground forces were kept poised on the western borders. Never less than twenty divisions, half of them armored, were maintained in readiness to provide a Soviet capacity quickly to overrun Western Europe in the event of war. Apparently, Soviet strategic thinking was that the United States did not have a sufficient number of nuclear weapons in its stockpiles to completely destroy the USSR as an organized society and therefore war would be prolonged beyond a nuclear exchange. Soviet armies would thus be able to wage war on, and from, a Western European base. This raised questions as to whether the United States "nuclear umbrella" could actually shelter Western Europe from the USSR's military might and whether, in the event of war, the United States would use nuclear weapons against Soviet armies on Western European soil. By this means, the Soviet Union was able to maintain a constant, serious pressure upon the United States and its Western European allies.

Advances in military technology in both the United States and the Soviet Union reduced the importance of indirect deterrence by the early years of the following decade. The development of thermonuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems made it increasingly less likely that the outcome of a world war would be dependent upon conventional military campaigns and the presence of massive numbers of troops. Further, as the military might of the Soviet Union continued to increase, new dimensions of power on a global scale were opened to it.

In the decade of the 1960s, the Soviet Union began the transformation from a very strong regional power to one with at least some features of a global power. Its new power status brought the Soviet Union expanded dangers and increased responsibilities. It also caused some nations in the "socialist camp," particularly China, to charge that the Soviet Union had become an hegemonistic "great power," more interested in exercising its might to preserve the international status quo than in furthering the aims of the world revolution.

II CHINA AND THE SOVIET STAKES IN ASIA

The Soviet Union's Far Eastern interests are composed of a closely interwoven complex of territorial, political, military, and ideological factors. For the first fifty years of this century, they were not carefully attended by either the Tsarist or the communist governments. The weakness of Tsarist Russia's commitment to its Far Eastern interests was made clear by the ease with which Japan inflicted an ignominious defeat upon that nation at the turn of the century. Those interests were further neglected throughout Russia's involvement in World War I.

During the period of civil war which followed the October Revolution, the internal problems of consolidating power at the center and apprehension for the security of the state served to push Far Eastern interests even further into the background. While the new Soviet government provided advisers to aid in the reorganization of Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang, its efforts in China bogged down in a swirl of ideological disputation and political maneuver for power within the Soviet Union.[1/] After 1927, the Chinese Communist Party received little encouragement, less aid, and much misdirection from Moscow.[2/]

In the 1930s, the Soviet Union continued to be preoccupied with affairs on the European continent. War clouds began to mount on the western horizon, and Soviet diplomatic activities were centered on stratagems to offset the dangers implicit in this development. However,

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1/ "The Breakdown of the United Front Strategy," in A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, eds. (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 92-93.

2/ See John Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967); Harold Isaacs, Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, 2nd rev. ed.(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961); Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951) for pertinent comment regarding CCP and Comintern relations. See also Susan E. Young, "Sino-Soviet Relations from Lukouchiao to the Invasion of Russia," an unpublished paper, 1970.

a new peril in the East--a strong, militant Japan--required the Soviet Union to consider its Far Eastern territories in a fresh light. Armed clashes with the Japanese in 1938 and 1939 in Inner Asia raised the real possibility of a two-front war against Germany and Japan. Joseph Stalin's final response to this danger came in April 1941, when the Soviet Union and Japan signed a mutual nonaggression pact. To Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, Stalin declared significantly, "We, too, are Asiatics."[1/] While Soviet Far Eastern interests had been neglected, they were certainly not forgotten.

There was logic in Stalin's declaration. Russia's vast eastern territories were acquired over a period of two and a half centuries. Freebooters, adventurers, explorers, traders, and small military forays expanded the Russi. borders eastward. By the early nineteenth century, Russia could lay claim to almost all the free territory north of India except Tibet. By 1860, Russia had wrested all its current Far Eastern territorial holding from the grasp of a weak and dying Manchu Dynasty in China. While the other European imperialist powers quarreled and wrangled over trading privileges and spheres of influence along the seacoast of China, Russia quietly consolidated its Inner Asian claims and exerted pressure on China from the north. Nor was it content with the lands and influence already gained.

Manchuria loomed large in Russia's Far Eastern strategy. In 1898, by means of force and diplomacy, Russia secured a twenty-five year lease on the Kwangtung Peninsula from China. The Chinese Eastern Railway was constructed to link Manchuria to Russia's easternmost possessions via the Trans-Siberian Railway. Direct access by rail to Mukden, Port Arthur, and Dairen was achieved through the building of the South Manchurian Railroad. Russian capital was used to begin the industrialization of Manchuria. Steel mills were built and coal mines opened. Full annexation seemed the next step. Accomplishing this, Russia could conceivably have emerged as the strongest power operating in the Far East. The weak Peking government

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1/ Harrison Salisbury, The War Between Russia and China (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 19.

would have been under the domination of Russian guns from Mongolia to Manchuria. Moreover, Russia may well have developed a strong Far Eastern industrial base and also provided a securely founded land base for its military.

Russia's ambitions, however, exceeded its abilities. Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria and Korea conflicted with Russian designs. In the ensuing war, Japan inflicted a surprising and humiliating defeat upon the Russians. The Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, also ended Tsarist Russia's dream of domination in the Far East. Still, the Russian presence lingered.

Japanese power and influence waxed and Russia's waned. The conflicting interests of the two nations flickered and sometimes flared into brief military clashes. But however much Russia and Japan may have been at cross-purposes with each other, they shared a common view of China in strategic terms. Both nations preferred a weak, divided, and irresolute China to a China united, independent, and militarily strong.

The Russian desire for a weak and divided China is not difficult to understand. China and Russia share a 4500 mile border, the longest common border in the world. The border lands which separate the two nations are in large part agriculturally productive and rich in relatively unexploited mineral, petroleum, and timber resources. The population of China is enormous, the population of Russia's border regions extremely small. China's vital centers are located in relatively close proximity to the border area; Moscow is over two thousand miles distant from its eastern provinces. Traditionally, Sino-Russian relations have been marred by Russian territorial aggrandizement, conflict, and mutual suspicion. The whirl and flow of Inner Asian events created a legacy of bitterness, distrust, and, sometimes, bristling hostility on the part of the Chinese.

So long as China remained a weak, inconsequential, or dependent nation, Russia could remain oblivious to its resentments, exploit it as often as opportunity and inclination joined, and utilize its broad spaces and numerous population as a buffer zone against the projection of military power from the Pacific area by either Japan or the United States.

A united, independent, and militarily strong China was a different matter entirely. This circumstance would transform China from buffer zone to a potential regional threat immediately. The sparsely inhabited border lands would have to be defended along a 4500 mile front in proportion to the threat perceived. The logistics of supplying the men and materiel for that purpose would pose an exceedingly difficult and expensive task considering the numbers and distances involved. And should defense be neglected, the lure of sparsely inhabited lands rich in natural resources might prove irrisistible to a heavily populated China. Obviously, in view of Russia's heavy military and political commitment to stabilizing its European frontiers, the emergence of a strong rival power on its eastern border would create a gravely serious strategic imbalance. The specter of a two-front war would once again be raised.

When the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in October 1949, the historic rivalry and conflict between China and Russia and the stark strategic facts of geographical proximity seemed to evaporate in the warmth of their cordial relations. The apparent ideological harmony which obtained between the two nations seemed to fuse them together in the pursuit of the common aims and objectives of Marxism-Leninism.

But even at that early stage of their relations, there were serious reservations in Moscow about the new China's leader. According to Boris Zanegin, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Moscow, "certain circles" in the Soviet Union were keenly aware that Mao Tse-tung was politically "unreliable." This assessment was based on Mao's "petit bourgeois" nationalist attitudes and policies in China during the Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. Mao had rejected Comintern guidance during the crucial years of the communist struggle for survival in China and had debased the proletarian character of the Chinese Communist Party by indiscriminately accepting as Party members large numbers of nonproletarian individuals with diverse socio-economic backgrounds--i.e., peasants, military men, former landowners, and bourgeois intellectuals. He had also forged his own "naive" theoretical views, drawing from the writings

of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, and his personal experiences in revolutionary China.[1/] More ominously, Mao's government promptly announced that the Chinese people "...were going to seek a revision of their frontiers, and specifically of the unequal treaties imposed on them by the imperial powers in the last century."[2/] Clearly, Tsarist Russia had been among those powers.[3/] Just as clearly, the Soviet Union, partly because of its Western European commitments to stabilize critical new border areas, was in no position to undertake major border revisions in the Far East.

These considerations were pushed into the background as Sino-Soviet relations developed within the larger context of global relations with the United States. But they did not disappear from the memories of either the Chinese or the Soviets. In what appeared to most Western observers to be a coordinated and harmonious relationship, there were fundamental, though muted, discordancies.

From the Soviet point of view, these discordancies occurred along a whole spectrum of relations between the two nations. Politically, the central leadership of the People's Republic of China was unreliable and had, in the not too distant past, rejected Soviet attempts at "guidance."[4/] Ideologically, the Maoist theoretical system represented a potentially heretical attempt to establish a rival leadership claim to doctrinal authority within the socialist camp. Geopolitically, the new China had quickly shown itself to be unreconciled to the limitations placed on its traditional territorial claims by the "unequal" and "unfair" treaty

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1/ Professor Boris Zanegin, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Moscow. Private conversation, 29 August 1972.

2/ Brian Crozier, "The Split in the Open" in The Sino-Soviet Conflict, Labedy and G.R. Urban, eds. (Chester Springs: Dufour Edition, 1965), p. 33.

3/ For a Soviet account of the legitimacy of Moscow's Far Eastern territorial claims see "Moscow Cites Historical Proofs on Border Issue," in Radio Free Europe Research, 28 June 1972, pp. 1-5.

4/ Zanegin, op. cit.

agreements with the European imperialist powers. In sum, the People's Republic of China gave every indication of becoming a strongly unified nation bent upon making its own assessments of its basic interests and capable of pursuing an independent role in its relationship with the Soviet Union.

The Sino-Soviet dispute became apparent in 1957 and has persisted in varying degrees of intensity, including limited armed conflict, to the present. In general, the issues which separate the two nations today stem from the considerations presented above. In 1969, the dispute seemed to drive China and the Soviet Union to the very brink of war.[1/] Since that time, there has been some reduction of tensions between the two countries. Nevertheless, there has been no indication that the serious differences which divide them have been effectively ameliorated. Their current relationship is one of controlled hostility and mutual suspicion. Current estimates place the number of Soviet military forces operating in the Far East along the Sino-Soviet border at 49 divisions.[2/] Likewise, the Chinese have deployed large numbers of soldiery along the frontier.

The impact of the Sino-Soviet split upon the USSR has been considerable. The Chinese challenge affects Soviet policy not only in the Far East but also in Europe. There, Soviet policy has been based upon keeping its border areas stable. Chinese insistence upon revising the Sino-Soviet border raises Soviet apprehensions that similar claims may be made in the West. Further, from the Soviet point of view, the Chinese have made serious attempts at undoing Soviet Eastern European security by anti-Soviet diplomacy carried out among the Eastern European states and with those of Western Europe, particularly West Germany. The main thrust of Chinese diplomacy has been to identify China with the nationalist aspirations of the Eastern European countries and to encourage their independence from

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1/ Thomas W. Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes (Santa Monica: RAND, 1970), p. 2.

2/ International Defense Review (Geneva), Vol. 5, No. 6, December 1972, p. 578.

the Soviet Union. This effort has met with some success, and divergencies from Soviet policies in Eastern European states have appeared, notably in Albania.

The Chinese diplomatic offensive against the Soviet Union in Europe includes a strong ideological component. In the recent past, the Soviets have maintained their predominance over the Eastern European nations by enforcing their adherence to Moscow's ideological prescriptions through the threat or actual use of force under the sanction provided by the Brezhnev doctrine. China's response has been to denounce the Soviet Union as resorting to "social imperialism" to compel smaller or weaker communist nations to follow the Soviet lead in the development of a "revisionist" brand of socialism in their countries. While the effect of these Chinese moves in Eastern Europe has not produced great changes in Soviet-Eastern European relations, it has introduced a potentially dangerous element into the volatile diplomatic mix in Eastern Europe. A strong Chinese influence throughout the region might become an important factor in fusing together obvious discontent with Soviet policies and latent Eastern European nationalism. The Soviet Union would then be faced with serious difficulties in the West as well as in the East.[1/]

Another important aspect of the Chinese challenge to the Soviet Union has been in the realm of ideology and the loose knit world communist movement. Here the Chinese have sought to displace the Soviet Union from its position of leadership. The "amplification" of Marxism-Leninism by the "Glorious Thought of Chairman Mao" constitutes a rival claim to doctrinal authority in the socialist camp. The result of the polemics sparked by the conflicting interpretations of Marxist doctrine has been the splitting of the world communist movement into two large opposed "camps" and, secondarily, the fostering of more independent points of view on the part of the smaller communist parties throughout the world. The overall effect of the controversy has been to loosen Soviet control of the movement.

1/ Zanegin, op. cit.

To summarize briefly, the Far Eastern interests of the Soviet Union are political, geopolitical, economic, military, and ideological. They are complexly interwoven but can be distinguished, especially when viewed against the historical backdrop of Chinese-Russian relations. Further, Soviet Far Eastern interests are directly related to its European interests. The Sino-Soviet conflict serves to highlight Soviet interests in Asia, Europe, and the world communist movement. It provides an important context for understanding Soviet-Indian and Soviet-Japanese relations and the impact which a nuclear decision by either or both those nations might have upon the Soviet Union.

III SOVIET INTERESTS IN INDIA

India has seemingly moved away from the neutralism which once characterized its foreign policies. The Soviet Union has afforded that nation important elements of support in forging its new foreign policies. It has assiduously reinforced the strong currents of nationalism in India which have carried the nation to a position increasingly closer to the Soviet Union. On 9 August 1971, India and the USSR signed a twenty-year treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko declared the treaty had been prepared by the entire previous development of relations between India and the Soviet Union. The new treaty, in his view, had "ripened" through decades of time and had now become a strong "political and legal base" for relations between the two countries and constituted a landmark whose importance was "difficult to overestimate."[1/]

Despite Gromyko's characterization of the event as one which had been developed over a long course of time, pronounced Soviet interest in India is a relatively recent development, dating from about 1955. Prior to that time, Soviet interest and activity in India were low-keyed and relatively ineffective. Although the Communist Party of India was formed under the sponsorship of the Comintern and the Soviet Union in 1925, its past has been marked by internal dissension, and its performance to date has been mediocre. At present, the Party is split into three contending factions (Soviet-oriented, Independent, and Chinese-oriented) and is swimming against the full tide of Indian nationalism. Total membership in all three branches of the Party is estimated to be about 170,000.[2/] Until recently, Moscow's concern with the CPI was largely theoretical.

1/ Robert H. Donaldson, "India: The Soviet Stake in Stability," Asian Survey, Vol. XII, No. 6, June 1972, p. 475.

2/ Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, "India," ed. by Richard F. Staar, ed. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p. 571.

In the pre-World War II years, the lack of Soviet initiative in South Asia can be traced to British control in India and to Soviet military weakness, its preoccupations with the West, and its concentration on building "socialism in one country." In the immediate postwar years, the Soviet Union once again focused its attention and energies on the West, and this was compounded by Joseph Stalin's scarcely concealed attitude of contempt for bourgeois-nationalist leaders and movements in Asia. However, after Stalin's death, the less doctrinaire approaches of his successors and the appreciating power of the Soviet Union led to the promulgation of new and more influential policies throughout the area.

The new policies of Stalin's successors were initially aimed at exploiting existing differences between the Western powers and the emerging nations of Asia. They were predicated on the understanding that neutralism or nonalignment not only was genuine but could be usefully exploited.[1/]

The Soviet Union's new leaders pursued policies more reflective of a shrewd opportunism than ideology. They were quick to point out to Asian leaders the common aims and aspirations of the Soviet and Asian peoples. Thus Pravda could declare, on the occasion of Nehru's 7 June 1955 visit to the Soviet Union:

> ...the Soviet and Indian peoples have much in common; they are peace-loving peoples. Throughout the Soviet Union and the Republic of India, factories and plants are being erected, electric power stations are being built and barren deserts are being transformed into fertile lands. Peace is essential if construction is to continue. Our common desire is to live in peace and friendship with all peoples. Both our countries are actively fighting to preserve and strengthen peace and are advocating the settlement of disputed international issues by peaceful means, through negotiations. This unites the Soviet and Indian peoples.[2/]

1/ William J. Barnds, "Moscow and South Asia," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXI, No. 3, May-June 1972, p. 15.

2/ Pravda, 7 June 1955.

Three interlinked purposes underlay the new Soviet policies toward India. In the initial phases, Soviet policy was directed at undermining the Western international system and offsetting Western influence in Asia. Secondly, Soviet policies provided a means of intruding a permanent presence into areas previously outside the scope of Soviet capabilities and activities. Thirdly, Soviet policy was directed at containing the power and influence of China on the subcontinent.[1/]

These broad purposes have provided the foundation for Soviet economic and technical assistance to India since 1955. The welcomed diplomatic support for the Indian position on Kashmir (until 1966), the alignment with India, after some hesitation, against China in 1962, the impressive and extensive military aid given the Indians since 1965, and the strong support for the Indian position relative to the Bangladesh issue have all served to move the Soviet Union, for the first time in its history, to the forefront of developments on the Indian subcontinent. In short, India is the cornerstone of Soviet policy in South Asia.[2/]

India lies on the southwestern flank of the People's Republic of China. It maintains, with Soviet assistance, the fourth largest standing army in the world. The skills and confidence of the Indian armed forces have been sharpened and expanded through recent trials by combat. Moreover, Indian attitudes toward China have been shaped by intense regional rivalry and conflict over disputed border areas.

In terms of location, land area, population, and general development, India represents to the Soviet Union an Asian counterweight to China--a means of containing the projection of Chinese power and influence into South Asia. By exploiting genuine Indian fears of China, hostility toward Pakistan, and through arms aid and technical and economic assistance, the Soviet Union has caused India to become increasingly dependent upon the

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1/ See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Soviet Policy Toward the Third World in the 1970s," Orbis, Vol. XV, No. 1, Spring 1971, p. 111.

2/ Ibid.

USSR. At present, India is the most important and strongest link in the chain of encirclement which the Soviet Union is attempting to draw around China.

The Indian-Soviet relationship also provides the Soviet Union a potential base for the further southward expansion of its own power and influence. While the Soviet Union presently finds it necessary to balance its influence in India against that of the United States and China in Pakistan, should there be a dramatic improvement of relations between India and Pakistan under the auspices of the Soviet Union at some future date, Moscow might then begin to realize the old dream of a land route linking Soviet Central Asia to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such a route would serve the dual purpose of eliminating the inconveniences and expenses incurred by the closing of the Suez Canal and greatly increase the prospects for the further penetration and consolidation of the advantages offered the Soviet Union on the Indian subcontinent.[1/]

The advantages of the Indian-Soviet relationship are both real and potential. Not only does the relationship aid the Soviet Union in consolidating its interests on the subcontinent, it also enhances Soviet interests throughout Asia and Africa. As a littoral state, India can provide the Soviet Union with access to the Indian Ocean and with facilities which would increase the effectiveness of Soviet vessels and aircraft operating in the area. Given the political role of the navy in Soviet diplomacy, this opportunity could be used to expand the existing Soviet presence in the Persian Gulf, East Africa, and the Indian Ocean.[2/]

As in the Mediterranean, the deployment of a strong Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean could limit, or at least raise the cost of, American options for intervention in the area. Further, it could serve to bolster

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1/ Ibid.

2/ Yuan-li Wu, "The Impact of Nuclear Proliferation by India and/or Japan on the Soviet Union," unpublished working paper, June 15, 1972.

the confidence of vacillating client states and stiffen the resolve of anti-Western elites to pursue radical courses--courses from which they might ordinarily have been deterred had Western interest and power been predominant in the area.

Although the projection of Soviet sea power into the Indian Ocean and the surrounding region may be viewed--and is, in current Western assessments--as primarily a support to India in countering a growing Chinese influence in both Africa and Asia, its potential utility in counterbalancing and challenging Western power and influence cannot easily be ignored. Indeed, should the Suez Canal be opened, the ability of the Soviets to link the Indian Ocean fleet with the more formidable force operating in the Mediterranean would make it possible for the Soviet Union to challenge the naval power of any nation in both areas. The political implications of this achievement would not be dismissed in the considerations of nations in either area. Obviously, the Soviet Union's skillful use of naval power as an extension of diplomacy could result in shoring up and encouraging emerging nonalignment and anti-Western propensities in governments throughout the region. India, by providing facilities for Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean, could become the key element in a development which would represent an ambition dating back to the time of the Tsars.[1/]

India is also a potential Soviet gateway to the troubled world of Southeast Asia--the "arc of crises." The strategic location of these countries and their relatively unexploited rich natural resources have in the past made them bones of contention among the Western powers and Japan. In the postwar era, their struggles for independence have been compounded by enormous internal difficulties, the lingering influence of former colonial ties, and the vicissitudes of major power diplomacy in Asia. Governmental and economic instability, popular discontent, revolutionary insurgency, and war have marked their entrance into the modern world.

1/ Alfred T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia and Its Effects Upon International Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Brown, 1905), p. 71.

The Southeast Asian quest for security has been made even more uncertain in the recent past. China's emergence as a strong regional power with marked ideological and strategic objectives in Asia, the British withdrawal east of Suez, Japan's position of economic dominance in the region, and attendant memories and fears of its military tradition, the ambiguous nature of the United States' new role in Asia, and a new, strong Soviet interest in the area represent kaleidoscopic changes which will require major readjustments of policy on the part of the nations of Southeast Asia.

Attentive to the increased uncertainties of Southeast Asian nations, Soviet leaders began in December 1969 to promote the concept of a collective security pact in Asia under Moscow's benign guardianship. Considering the timing of the announcement and the fact that China was not mentioned in connection with it, the Soviet proposal has been generally interpreted as a further move to contain Chinese influence in Asia. However, it could, and should, be viewed in an alternate light, that is, in terms of its effectiveness in intruding a strong Soviet commitment into Southeast Asian security affairs, one which would inevitably increase the Soviet presence and enlarge the scope of Soviet influence and activity. Given the British withdrawal east of Suez and the diminution of American involvement in Asia, the concept of a Southeast Asian power vacuum is certainly suggested, as is a Soviet movement toward filling it.

India's relationship with the Soviet Union may do much to recommend, by example, the establishment of similar relations to the security conscious nations of Southeast Asia. Although the Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security system has, on the whole, met with little positive response in Asia, a similar proposal inspired by the Soviet Union but advanced by India might elicit a different, more serious response. In this connection and in others, the Soviet Union may find it much to its advantage to encourage India to seek a larger and more active role in Southeast Asian diplomacy, one which would in effect provide a noncommunist, "non-aligned" mask for Soviet Asian policy. Such Indian sponsorship of Soviet foreign policy might well serve to bring the USSR into closer security arrangements with Southeast Asian nations. And although the

Soviet Union might forego apparent leadership in such arrangements, it would in fact be in a position to guide their development--both through Soviet influence on India and the dependence of any resulting security arrangements upon the military might of the Soviet Union.

In summary, then, it can be seen that Soviet interest in India has been based more on geopolitical than ideological considerations. India provides the Soviet Union with an Asian counterweight to the People's Republic of China and a base from which the USSR's power and influence in the Indian Ocean, East Africa, and Southeast Asia might be expanded. India also provides a noncommunist, "nonaligned" sanction to Soviet policy which may prove useful, especially in Southeast Asia.

IV INDIA AND THE BOMB

An Indian decision to develop a nuclear weapons program would have an adverse effect upon Soviet Asian interests and, consequently, upon its interests in Europe and elsewhere. Such a decision would introduce a note of further destabilization in Asia and presage still another period of international readjustment to changing power factors in the Far East.

Despite India's present high degree of dependence on the Soviet Union for economic, technical, and military assistance, despite Indian dependence upon Soviet security assurances relative to China, and despite much needed and welcomed Soviet diplomatic and moral support in subcontinental and international affairs, an Indian decision to acquire nuclear weapons would emphatically underscore India's will to an independent role in Asia and the world. Its relations with the Soviet Union would be overshadowed by a new order of priorities and its present relations with other nations, including China and the United States, would be subject to a whole new spectrum of possibilities.

The USSR could not gain by these changes. The jeopardies to its Far Eastern interests would be pronounced despite possible Indian assurances to the contrary. The Gordian knot of dependency which the Soviet Union has so patiently fashioned to tie India securely to Soviet policy would be cut through at a single stroke.

The apparent advantage the Soviets would seem to enjoy in the Sino-Soviet dispute through flanking its enemy with a nuclear ally is illusory. India and China have their own bone to pick, and a strong Soviet commitment to a nuclear enemy in the face of a nuclear China might be more disadvantageous than not. Chinese apprehension at Indo-Soviet "nuclear collusion" could have the immediate effect of exacerbating Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian relations, including escalating tensions along the Sino-Soviet border and the Indian-Chinese border, and the long range effect of cementing Sino-American relations. In an already unstable Asia, such developments could hardly be attractive to the USSR.

An alternate development might be an apparently passive or approving Chinese acceptance of an Indian decision to acquire nuclear weapons. However, such an attitude on the part of the People's Republic would be pregnant with the possibility of a Chinese diplomatic offensive designed to reduce tensions between India and China through the peaceful, independent settlement of mutual differences, including, perhaps, a no-first-use and other agreements aimed at limiting or prohibiting nuclear arms use between the two countries. While both nations would undoubtedly be sincere in moving toward such agreements, their effect would also be to bolster Indian independence from the Soviet Union in security matters and to confirm its larger role in Asian power relations. At the same time, the Chinese would be presented with a clear "wedge-driving" opportunity to further separate the security interests of India from those of the USSR. In the context of both the Sino-Soviet conflict and Soviet-Asian policy elsewhere, this alternative or some variation of it would be no more attractive to the Soviet Union than the first.

An Indian nuclear weapons development program would probably be predicated on the more fundamental decision to seek a wider role for India in regional and international affairs. Such a decision may well alter India's perception of the Soviet Union. Its present support for Soviet objectives in Asia may be transformed to opposition and the Soviet Union viewed more in the light of rival than ally. Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the East African states may be an inhibiting factor to the expansion of Indian influence in the same areas. The possibility of India's providing facilities for Soviet naval and air operations on the subcontinent would evaporate. Nor would India be disposed towards encouraging Soviet influence in Southeast Asia.

In such circumstance, India would find itself in competition with the USSR rather than in accord. It would scarcely be content to serve as sponsor or mask to Soviet policy. Neither would India be willing to subordinate its options for action to Soviet designs by supporting a Soviet-fostered collective security system in Asia. Rather, India would probably seek its own way, becoming at once more independent from the

Soviet Union and more tractable in its dealings with the United States and/or China. In either or both cases, Soviet interests would not be a central concern to India.

The Soviet need to stabilize its global relations with the United States, its need to reach meaningful and advantageous arms control agreements with the United States, its need to offset possible regional and international disadvantages resulting from the threat of a Sino-American detente, and its need to find order in the tangled and potentially dangerous complexities of Far Eastern politics have been in large part responsible for the Soviet Union's willingness to seek accord in the West. The focus of history is shifting from West to East, and the Soviet Union is well aware of the change. An Indian decision to develop nuclear weapons not only would make the Far Eastern search for order more difficult, it would compound Soviet problems in the West.

If India were to become a nuclear power, the Soviet Union would necessarily be required to reevaluate and modify its Asian, African, and Middle Eastern policies in light of new Indian foreign policy options. Moreover, Indian-European, Indian-American, and Indian-Chinese relations would assume a new and more critical importance. In short, the Soviet Union would have to contend with India as a destabilizing factor in the world nuclear balance.

To summarize, an Indian decision to acquire nuclear weapons would be decidedly disadvantageous to the Soviet Union. The results of such a decision would probably lead to a lessening of Soviet influence in India. India would no longer be an effective counterweight to China; its usefulness in the Sino-Soviet dispute would diminish and might present dangers to the Soviet Union.

India would likely assume a more independent stance vis-à-vis the USSR and seek a wider role in Asian and international affairs. Indian perceptions of the Soviet Union and its policy objectives in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, East Africa, and Southeast Asia may alter radically. The Soviet Union could become more a rival than an ally as India moves toward new regional and international priorities.

Under such circumstances India would not sponsor or subscribe to a Soviet dominated Asian collective security system. Neither would it serve as an Asian sponsor to Soviet foreign policy. Finally, the Soviet Union would be required to contend with India as a destabilizing factor in the world nuclear balance.

V SOVIET POLICY REACTIONS

An Indian decision to acquire nuclear weapons would cause deep concern in Moscow. Presumably, it would represent the failure of prior Soviet efforts to dissuade India from embarking upon such a course. It would also be a harbinger of changing relations between the two nations with the expectation that Soviet influence upon India would diminish in time. It could make a restructuring of Soviet Far Eastern policy necessary.

The Soviet Union could attempt to persuade India, through inducements, that it should reconsider, postpone indefinitely, or abandon its decision entirely. In return for this course of action, the Soviet Union might offer India absolute security guarantees in the form of a security pact designed specifically to offset conceivable Chinese, Pakistani, and Western acts of aggression on the subcontinent. It might also undertake dramatically expanded assistance programs to India with the object of providing modern conventional military equipment and training to the Indian armed forces and broad economic and advisory assistance in an effort to shore up India's precarious economy. In addition, the Soviet Union might couple these programs to an intensive diplomatic effort aimed at supporting Indian desires to play a greater role in Asia and at the international level. Joint Soviet-Indian initiatives in regional and world politics to solve security problems in Asia could be undertaken. An expanded role for India in the United Nations, including Soviet support for an Indian seat on the Security Council, might also be pursued.

However, assuming that India is sincere in initiating a nuclear weapons program and is not using it simply as a means for expanding the Soviet support base, the liabilities of a major Soviet commitment to India are apparent. The very fact of the Indian decision would indicate a fundamental victory for that element within the Indian elite which has been urging its government to seek a wider, more influential role in regional and international affairs. The strong nationalist position which underlies these ideas would not augur well for the Soviet Union in a long range relationship with India. On the contrary, their general acceptance would be sign and signal to the Soviet Union that India would, in time, seek its own way in international affairs.

Under such circumstance, the Soviet Union probably would not reckon its position and influence in India to be sufficiently strong to warrant the broad commitments suggested above. The political foundations for the great costs involved in providing India absolute security guarantees, shoring up its economy, further training and equipping its military, and supporting India in an expanded regional and international diplomatic role would simply not be strong enough to insure the huge investment required. The lessons of Egypt and Indonesia are too plain, the risks too great. Short of an absolute Indian agreement to not produce nuclear weapons, the Soviets would not find this option attractive.

Another option open to the Soviet Union concerns that nation's current importance to India in economic, technical, and military assistance terms. Given the high degree of Indian dependence upon the Soviet Union in all three areas, it is apparent that the Soviets could exert considerable pressure upon India should they choose to do so. Soviet threats to cut back or curtail economic aid and military and technical assistance if India persisted in a nuclear weapons development program would surely give India's leadership pause. However, such a turn in events would presumably fall well within the parameters of Indian expectations of Soviet behaviour and the risk judged to be one with which the Indian leadership could cope. For its part, the Soviet Union would have to steer a subtle course--one which would discomfit the Indians but not estrange them. Should Soviet pressures become too severe, the effect might well be to drive India into the arms of the West. That is, India might seek to compensate for the loss or serious cut-back in Soviet aid by turning to the West for assistance. And the West might well be tempted to respond positively, especially if aid extended would guarantee a diminution of the Soviet position in India.

These limitations upon Soviet influence in India are also apparent at the international level. Should the Soviet Union attempt to dissuade India from developing a nuclear weapons program by creating and bringing to bear the pressures of adverse world opinion, it could become vulnerable to stinging ideological and propaganda attacks by the People's Republic

of China. The Chinese could, and probably would, use the Soviet position and attitude toward Indian proliferation to illustrate the validity of their charges of USSR-U.S. "nuclear monopoly." They could also be expected to champion India's "right" to develop nuclear weapons and denounce Soviet attempts to prevent India from acquiring nuclear weapons as "infringements" upon the national sovereignty of India. Such a course would present the Chinese with a dual opportunity. They would have a ready made platform from which to criticize the Soviet Union for infringing upon the sovereignty of another country--a criticism to which the Soviet Union is particularly sensitive, especially in Eastern Europe. The Chinese could also portray the USSR as a reactionary force determined to preserve the nuclear status quo. More importantly, the Chinese could help create an anti-Soviet climate of opinion in India which might be conducive to Sino-Indian cooperation on the basis of a shared antagonism toward the Soviet Union. Finally, should the Soviet Union attempt to organize international sentiment against Indian proliferation, the Chinese would react strongly in defense of their own nuclear programs and read into any criticism of India a Soviet sponsored criticism and implicit threat to their own nuclear interests. The result would be further exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The Soviet Union, in the face of a firm Indian commitment to develop nuclear weapons, might be tempted to move in the direction of effecting agreements with the United States which would be designed to prohibit the great powers from extending conventional aid and assistance programs to nations engaged in proliferation. Even aside from the question mark of U.S. attitudes toward such a proposal, the Soviet Union would encounter the rising resentment and hostility of Indian nationalists and the possibility of Sino-Indian cooperation, intensified ideological and propaganda attacks, and an unshoring of its close ties with India.

In the last analysis, whether in bilateral relations or at the international level, the stumbling block for the Soviet Union in its relationship with India is Indian nationalism. That factor made possible the expanded relationship between the two nations, and it is Indian nationalism which could terminate the relationship.

It is possible that the Soviet Union's efforts to dissuade India from the nuclear path could take the form of moral, economic, and military-strategic arguments. But should those arguments become strident or be transformed into identifiable pressures upon India, the limitations of Soviet influence would be quickly brought to light by Indian response. For India is not without leverage in the relationship. The Soviet Union must be well aware that the estrangement of India, with the consequent loss of potential influence throughout Asia, and the loss of a foothold on the subcontinent with its geopolitical advantages would represent a major set-back to Soviet interests in the Far East. It is this consideration which limits the Soviet ability to prevent India from developing nuclear weapons.

Thus, to summarize, Soviet policy reactions to nuclear proliferation by India are limited in both bilateral and international terms. Soviet leaders will likely consider an Indian decision to develop nuclear weapons as an indicator of India's will to seek its own way in internatonal affairs. Indian nationalism will be the most serious obstacle to Soviet attempts to halt Indian proliferation. Undue pressure by the Soviets could result in turning India to the West or providing a basis for Sino-Indian cooperation. India's importance to the Soviet Union's Far Eastern interests coupled with the sensitivity of Indian nationalists limits Soviet policy reactions to Indian proliferation.

VI IMPLICATIONS OF INDIAN PROLIFERATION FOR SOVIET EUROPEAN INTERESTS

The Soviet Union's Far Eastern commitments are joined with its commitments in Europe. The primary policy objective of the Soviet Union is to create a stable, advantageous world order in which the security of the Soviet Union is assured. The USSR has placed special emphasis upon securing areas immediately adjacent to Soviet territory. In Europe, the Soviet Union has acted by force and diplomacy to secure its frontiers and to provide for defensive buffer zones through control of the Eastern European states. The new, conciliatory attitudes of the Soviet Union toward Western Europe are directly linked to the instability of the border areas on its eastern flank and the active hostility of the People's Republic of China.

Nuclear proliferation by India would interject a factor of further instability in Asia and be a cause of deep Soviet concern. Assuming that Sino-Soviet relations remain essentially what they are today, the effect of an Indian decision to develop nuclear weapons would likely result in further modifying the Soviet position in Europe. That is, the Soviet Union's European response would be to become even more conciliatory in its relations with the West. Special emphasis may be placed upon gaining assurances for a continuation and expansion of European stability. In its relations with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union may permit, even encourage, broader Eastern-Western European contacts, and ease the political and economic restraints by which the USSR has maintained its dominance in Eastern Europe.

Such policies would have the obvious purpose of relieving pressures on the western flank in order to provide a wide latitude of response to pressures generated in the East. Eastern Europe would remain a primary area of Soviet concern, and it can be expected that the USSR would exact a high degree of ideological conformity from those nations in return for the relaxation of political and economic contraints heretofore in effect. The lessons of Hungary and Czechoslovakia would be stressed to offset possible "decompression" effects in Eastern Europe, i.e., to contain a rapid growth of nationalism and insistent demands for autonomous development.

VIII SOVIET REACTIONS

There is little the Soviet Union can do to prevent Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons. It could withdraw offers to the Japanese to participate in the joint exploitation of the Soviet Far East. It could refuse to negotiate on the issue of the northern islands territorial dispute. The Japanese Communist Party (Soviet-oriented portion) might be prompted into vigorous, even violent, anti-proliferation activity. But the most probable result in any case would be to create a strong anti-Soviet bias in Japan while failing to stop Japan from going nuclear. Even worse, from the Soviet point of view, the failure would operate to deprive the USSR of the possibility of detente with Japan and, in consequence, destroy the hope that Japan would eventually play active roles in developing the Soviet Far East, containing China, and isolating the U.S. in Asia.

The primary problem the Soviet Union would face would be that of appropriate response to a Japanese fait accompli. Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons would have a destabilizing effect on the world nuclear power balance and would represent one more nuclear power with which the Soviet Union must deal. More ominously, for the USSR, it would mean an increment in power by a nation in a region where Soviet interests are high but security is low.

Soviet apprehensions about a nuclear armed Japan would probably be translated into critical propaganda attacks against Japan for the consumption of the communist bloc nations and the world movement. But verbal attacks would likely be more than balanced by a steady progress toward the normalization and expansion of Soviet-Japanese relations and the conclusion of agreements related to the massive joint development of the Soviet Far East. The Soviets might also move toward a settlement regarding the disputed northern islands, with the Soviets gradually giving ground, willing to trade territory for goodwill and the creation of an atmosphere conducive to Soviet-Japanese detente.

The reasons for a continued Soviet courtship of Japan--even a Japan armed with nuclear weapons--are basic. The presence of a friendly Japan in an otherwise hostile or suspicious East and Southeast Asia is of critical

importance to the Soviet Union. In terms of the Far Eastern balance of power, the Soviet Union must move toward Japan to achieve a political equilibrium suitable to Soviet interests.

The Soviets cannot dominate Far Eastern affairs without the cooperation of Japan. The ingrained and active antagonism of China toward a larger Soviet role in Asia shows no sign of diminishing. Rather, that nation has performed a diplomatic volte face in its relations with the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia to counter what it perceives as a growing Soviet influence in Asian power relations. The latent conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union, both in Asia and worldwide, have been partially obscured by the present detente between those two countries, but neither nation is unaware of the high potential for discord and danger in the relationship.

Given the high degree of Chinese intolerance of the USSR in Asia and the underlying suspicion and distrust between the two superpowers, Japan-Soviet cooperation is the most likely alternative open to the Soviet Union in establishing a favorable balance of power in Asia. The combination of the USSR, India, and Japan working in close collaboration would place the Soviets in a very solid position vis-à-vis in the United States, China, and Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union without Japan would be in virtual isolation in East Asia. It is this consideration which must impel the USSR toward Japan and soften its attitude toward that nation even if Japan acquires nuclear weapons.

To summarize, the Soviet Union's interests in Japan are based on a wide spectrum of interfused economic and geopolitical considerations. The primary means by which the Soviet Union is seeking closer, cooperative relations with Japan is economic. However, very real political and geopolitical corollaries are implicit in the prospective relationship.

The Soviets consider Japan to be of signal importance in the development of the Soviet Far Eastern provinces, in strengthening the Russian presence throughout Asia, the containment of China, the isolation or counter-balancing of the U.S. in Asia, and in aiding the establishment of a Far Eastern power balance favorable to the USSR.

The Soviet Union's need of Japanese cooperation and friendship in the Asian balance of power is crucial given the presence of a hostile China, a wary U.S., and a Southeast Asia suspicious of the Soviet designs in Asia. Close Soviet-Japanese relations could greatly enhance increased Soviet activity and influence throughout East and Southeast Asia. In combination with a friendly and supportive India in South Asia, the Soviets could exert great pressure upon China, the U.S., and Southeast Asia. Without Japan, Soviet influence in Asia will be modified, and the real danger of China and the potential dangers posed by the U.S. and Japan increased.

Soviet leverage on Japan in the matter of preventing that nation from developing nuclear weapons is not great. Soviet attempts to prevent Japanese proliferation probably would not only fail but would induce strong anti-Soviet sentiments in Japan. In consequence, Soviet interests and ambitions in Asia would be jeopardized. Soviet reactions to Japanese proliferation would probably be slight, centering upon propagandistic criticism but not involving concrete actions which might arouse anti-Soviet sentiments among the Japanese people or in the government. In short, the Soviet Union would accept Japanese proliferation and intensify its efforts to build a strong and friendly relationship with that nation.

IX SEQUENTIAL PROLIFERATION

Indian and/or Japanese nuclear proliferation obviously would be charged with serious implications for the Soviet Union and its designs in the Far East. However, the sequence of proliferation by Japan or India would not be a crucial element in shaping Soviet policy reactions toward either nation. The Soviet Union, unable to stop the development of nuclear weapons systems in either nation, would be placed in circumstances requiring reaction and adaptation. But the permutations of policy resulting from those reactions and adaptations would not be grossly affected by the sequence of proliferation in Asia.

INPUT SUBSTUDY D

JAPAN:
INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TOWARD NUCLEAR ARMAMENT

By: H. W. Rood

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CONTENTS

I INTRODUCTION

By any technical criterion, Japan is a threshold nation in respect to nuclear weapons. In 1968, fuel discharged from the Japan Research Reactor-3 was reprocessed, and 18 grams of plutonium of a 95% purity were reclaimed in a plant furnished entirely with Japanese manufactured equipment. A larger fuel reprocessing plant to handle discharged fuel from the Tokai Mura reactor has been projected since 1968 utilizing technical assistance from the French firm, Saint Gobain Techniques Nouvelles.[1/]

It seems clear that Japan has had plutonium available for research since at least 1966. The option to develop nuclear weapons utilizing plutonium as the weapons material, therefore, is open to the Japanese government.

> Technically speaking, if it is a plutonium bomb, we will be able to obtain 240 kg. of plutonium a year, good enough to manufacture 20 to 25 A-bombs, by changing the way to operate reactor No. 1 of the Japan Atomic Power Company in Tokai village, that is, by using 300 tons of natural uranium instead of the present 60 tons a year, a five-time increase. According to technicians, it will not take us three years; within two and a half years or sooner than that, we may be able to manufacture [an atomic bomb].[2/]

1/ "SGN Assistance for Atomic Fuel," Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Vol. 3, No. 152 (23 November 1965), p. 3; Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 23 February, 1 and 7 March 1966, p. 149, details the early negotiations with Saint Gobain and the work on plutonium respectively. "Japan has joined the Plutonium Club..." Nuclear Engineering, Vol. 13, No. 145 (June 1968), tells of the extraction of 18 grams of plutonium from reprocessing fuel from the Japan Research Reactor and the promise of a second month's production of 100 grams in June 1968; "Construction of Japan's First Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant..." Nuclear Engineering International, Vol. 15, No. 171 (September 1970); report of the commercial operation of the first commercial power reactor, Tokai Mura, is in "Japanese N-Reactor Being Commercial Power Generation," Japan Report, Vol. 11, No. 22 (30 November 1965), p. 9.

2/ "On Japan's Nuclear Armament: Talk between Shintaro Ishihara, Liberal Democratic Party Member of the House of Councillors, and Hajime Doba of the Yomiuri International Situation Research Council," in Kokubo, November 1969.

The decision to acquire nuclear weapons and a nuclear force, therefore, is a political one, unconstrained by any technical considerations.

A complex set of incentives and disincentives forms the basis upon which the Japanese decision to become a nuclear power or to continue to eschew nuclear weapons will be made.[1/]

The incentives and disincentives that incline or disincline Japan toward nuclear weapons arise from the circumstances in which Japan finds itself, from political and other forces at work within Japan, and from the nature of relationships among the countries within whose spheres of influence Japan exists.

Japan's Drive toward Modernization

Japan is one of the most industrialized nations in the world. This is especially remarkable in two important respects: Japan was the first non-Western nation to become highly industrialized; and industrialization occurred over a very short period of time. Industrialization in Western Europe occurred over a period of several hundred years, was not uniform in its development from country to country, and left some countries virtually untouched until the twentieth century. On the other hand, Japan, with no European contacts of any consequence until the middle of the 19th Century and a culture and administrative structure that was uniquely Japanese and ill-disposed toward foreign influences, converted itself from a predominantly feudal society into one which was, by 1900, well on the way to industrialization and modernization. This occurred between 1868--the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate--and the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. The intensive industrialization of Japan coincided with a period of imperial expansion that reached its high point in the first years of the Second World War. Despite the immense burden of war (1937-1945), the impact of defeat,

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1/ It cannot be ruled out that the implicit or explicit decision to acquire nuclear weapons may already have been made within the Japanese government or outside it with the government's blessing.

surrender, seven years of military occupation, and extensive war damage, Japan has, if anything, intensified its modernization and industrialization. Where, before the War, modern technology was barely available to most Japanese--and that chiefly in industrial, commercial, and military enterprises--in the twenty-five years since the War, modern technology has become generally available to the Japanese consumer in the form of motor cars, electrical appliances, electronic and photographic equipment, and other items generally available to consumers in modern industrial nations like the United States. For example, in 1964, Japan produced 579,660 passenger automobiles and 5.2 million television sets. In 1971, 3,715,185 passenger cars and 12 million 250 thousand television sets were produced.[1/] Where, at the close of World War II, animal and human power remained as an important motive force in agriculture and provincial transport, by 1965, there were over five million tractors and mechanical threshers in operation on Japanese farms, while the farm population itself had fallen from 37.8 million in 1950 to 11.5 million in 1965.[2/]

The revolution in Japanese society is nowhere better illustrated than in the statistics of energy demand. Wood and charcoal were the principal energy sources for domestic heating and cooking at the close of World War II. In 1954, firewood, for example, provided nearly a tenth of the total energy requirements (44.3×10^{12} kilo calories out of a total of 497.7×10^{12} kilo calories). Fifteen years later, in 1969, firewood furnished only 19.4×10^{12} kilo calories or less than eight tenths of one percent (19.4 out of a total of $2,501.3 \times 10^{12}$ kilo calories) of the energy supply.[3/] In 1960, Japan consumed 5 million 860 thousand kiloliters of gasoline; in 1969, the figure was 18 million 577 thousand kiloliters.[4/]

1/ "Economic Indicators," Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Vol. 3, No. 155 (14 December 1965), p. 19; and "Economic Indicators," The Japan Economic Journal, Vol. 10, No. 506 (5 September 1972), p. 19.

2/ The Statemen's Yearbook, 1970-71 (London: Macmillan and Company, 1971), p. 1096.

3/ The Petroleum Industry in Japan 1970, The Japanese National Committee of the World Petroleum Congress (October 1970), p. 1.

4/ Yearbook and Monthly Bulletin of Petroleum Statistics, 1969, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, cited in The Petroleum Industry of Japan, p. 24.

The shift in the nature of energy sources and the immense increase in the consumption of, and demand for, fuel not only are indicative of the social revolution in Japan but also mark how extremely sensitive Japan would be to any threat to its fuel supply. Less than twenty per cent of Japan's total energy supply in 1969 came from indigonous sources.

The vigor of the drive toward expansion of industry and exploitation of modern technology has been reflected in Japan's expanding gross national product as well as in the variety and sophistication of the goods made available to Japanese consumers. The continued expansion of industrial production and domestic consumption in company with the modernization of Japanese society has directly affected Japanese inclinations toward developing nuclear energy. The drive to modernize and the willingness to exploit new technology combine with the pressures on Japanese fuel supplies to render development of nuclear technology both urgent and attractive.

Japanese development of nuclear energy began shortly after the restoration of Japanese sovereignty with the implementation of the Peace Treaty in 1952. The first Japanese reactor to be reported was JRR-1 (Japanese Research Reactor No. 1), a 50 KW(t) reactor, which went into full-power operation in November 1957.[1/] The first power reactor to go into operation was the JPDR, a pressurized water reactor, at Tokai Mura in August 1963, while the first power reactor for the commercial production of electricity became critical in May 1965.[2/] By the end of fiscal year 1971, 1.3 million KW out of a total of 66.2 million KW generating capacity of the electric utility industry of Japan came from nuclear power plants. An additional 17 reactors installed in nine central stations will be

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1/ Directory of Nuclear Reactors, Vol. III (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1960), pp. 193-4; and Ninth Annual Report, 1964-1965 (Tokyo: Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, 1965), p. 92.

2/ Ninth Annual Report, 1964-1965, p. 94.

constructed between 1972 and 1977 with an installed capacity of 13 million 597 thousand kilowatts.[1/]

It is expected that by 1982 the demand for electric power will have increased by four or five times the present demand, 60 million KW of nuclear power capacity will be required by 1985, while 100 million KW are projected as the requirement for 1990.[2/]

Since August 1969, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission has undertaken research and development in the field of uranium enrichment by both the gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge method in order to ensure a supply of enriched fuel from both foreign and domestic facilities by the 1980s. Research on nuclear fusion has been underway in Japan at least since 1968, and an experimental torus of the Tokomak type was completed in 1972.[3/]

The increasing use of nuclear power in Japan, the effort to develop assured supplies of enriched uranium, and the continuing development of advanced nuclear technology increase the opportunity for Japan to develop nuclear weapons. The tendency to seek greater knowledge about, and command of, nuclear technology, improvement in existing technology, and innovations in the application of nuclear energy all provide a kind of impetus toward nuclear weapons. The research and development that is inevitably stimulated by civilian nuclear programs cannot be expected to halt at the boundary between civilian technology and military applications.[4/]

1/ 40th Semi-Annual Electric Power Survey, April 1972 (Tokyo: Japan Electric Power Survey Committee, June 1972), pp. 7 and 38.

2/ "Problem Area in JAEC's (Japan Atomic Energy Commission) New Long-Range Program," Asahi (Tokyo), 2 June 1972; see also, "Summary of New Long-Range Program on Development of Atomic Energy," Nikkan Kogyo (Tokyo), 2 June 1972.

3/ "Introduction" and "Nuclear Fusion," in Interim Report of Uranium Enrichment Technical Development Council, Japan Atomic Energy Commission, 11 August 1972.

4/ "According to technicians, it will not take us three years; within two and a half years or sooner than that, we may be able to manufacture [an atomic bomb]. Technicians are eager to manufacture one. In short, they want to know the limit to their capability." "On Japan's Nuclear Armament..." loc. cit.

For over one hundred years, despite the immediate background of feudal organization, Japan has demonstrated versatility in exploiting modern technology to meet problems at home and abroad. Japanese society has shown its adaptability to the demands of modernization and has demonstrated resilience as well as flexibility under the impact of imperial war, defeat, surrender, occupation, and independence under a Western imposed constitution. It cannot be thought that Japan is unable to accommodate to the demands of a world where nuclear weapons have become almost a commonplace.

The factors that would appear the most influential in determining whether Japan will acquire nuclear weapons are the following:

1. The relationship among the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the United States.
2. Japan's relations with the three great powers.
3. The degree of freedom with which the ruling party in Japan can configure the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to comply with Japan's security requirements.
4. The extent to which nuclear weapons are seen to fulfill Japan's military requirements as against the extent to which acquisition of such weapons appears to increase the threat to Japan.

A review of the circumstances in which Japan finds itself helps to define the choices that are open to Japan in its foreign policy as well as in its defense policy.

II CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING JAPAN'S POLICY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A. External Influences in Internal Politics

Since the beginning of the Occupation, the course of Japan's relations with the great powers has impinged significantly on its internal politics. The surrender in 1945 set Japanese-U.S. relations in a particular pattern. Subsequent Japanese policy has aimed at altering that pattern to gain ever greater freedom of action. U.S. Occupation policy, implemented in the name of the Allied powers, included the goals of decartelization, demilitarization, and democratization.[1/]

The occupation of Japan by U.S. forces after the Empire's dramatic defeat imposed a subservient position on Japan in respect to the international community in general and the United States in particular. The United States compelled the Japanese government to submit to a Constitution that was not of Japanese origin, subjected the business and industrial community to the strictures of a decartelization program intended to decentralize economic power, and, for seven years, oversaw Japanese foreign relations. Beyond that, the pervasive American presence in Japan helped to work a social revolution in the traditional Japanese class and family relationships, particularly in respect to the status of women. While Japanese industry managed to avoid the worst effects of decartelization, the success of the democratization program remains problematical, and the program of demilitarization, though a constitutional requirement, fell victim to the exigencies of the East-West conflict.

The United Nations intervention in Korea converted Japan to the principal U.S. military base in the Far East and levied upon it the requirement to develop some manner of military force. In a memorandum issued by General Headquarters, Supreme Command Allied Powers, on 8 July 1950, Prime Minister

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1/ "American Responsibilities in the Far East: The Occupation of Japan," in John C. Campbell, et al., The United States in World Affairs, 1945-1947 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1947), pp. 254-273; and T. A. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954).

Shigeru Yoshida was directed to establish a National Police Reserve of 75,000 men and to increase the Maritime Safety Agency by 8,000 men.[1/]

The coming into effect of the Treaty of Peace and U.S.-Japan Security Treaty on 28 April 1952 signalled the beginning of the conversion of the Police Reserve into the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force and the Maritime Guards into the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, eventuated in the Defense Agency Establishment Law of June 1954. To the Japanese government, the establishment of the Police Reserve was a necessity dictated by the transfer of U.S. Occupation forces to combat duty Korea. The purpose of the Police Reserve, according to the Cabinet Order No. 260 (promulgated 10 August 1950), was "to maintain peace and order within the country and to guarantee the public welfare."[2/]

The political issue raised by the creation of a military establishment in Japan turned on whether the Japanese Government had the right, under the Constitution, to raise and maintain such an establishment. While successive governments have avoided the constitutional issue as far as possible, the right-wing parties have insisted that the armed forces should be legalized through constitutional revision, while the left-wing organizations have insisted on their abolition.[3/]

Japanese rearmament is a critical domestic issue as well as a crucial factor in Japan's relations with the great powers. Internally, rearmament has aroused vigorous opposition at the same time that general public support for it seemed uncertain. In 1951, 70 percent of the respondents in a public opinion poll favored "building of armed forces." Yet between 1952 and 1954, the support expressed in polls was never more than 41 percent while a majority of respondents were either undecided, opposed, or thought

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1/ Ten Years' History of Self-Defense Forces (Tokyo: Self-Defense Agency, 1961), p. 16.

2/ Ibid, p. 29-30.

3/ See Roy J. Oshima, Japan's Postwar Rearmament: Progress and Problems, Unpublished Dissertation (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1971), p. 37; and Shuzo Hayashi and Kikuo Nakimura, Jieitai to Kempo no Kaishaku (Self-Defense Forces and Interpretation of the Constitution) (Tokyo: Yushindo, 1967).

rearmament to be acceptable only under certain conditions.[1] In a 1956 survey, 32 percent of the respondents thought it better to have Self-Defense Forces in Japan; 26 percent thought it all right to have them, but 12 percent could go either way, while 13 percent thought it either better or all right not to have armed forces; the remaining 12 percent did not wish to express an opinion. In 1965, 57 percent thought it better to have armed forces, 21 percent thought it all right, 7 percent could have gone either way, while 8 percent did not favor armed forces, and 7 percent did not know.[2]

In a September 1968 poll conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun, 82 per cent of the respondents thought Self-Defense Forces to be necessary, while 15 percent thought them unnecessary. A Sankei Shimbun poll conducted in June 1970 posed the question "The Government states that the defense of Japan will be provided mainly by our own power with inadequacy covered by the security treaty. What do you think we should do with the Self-Defense Forces now?" Of the respondents, 20.6 percent replied that the Self-Defense Forces ought to be strengthened; 59.8 percent thought they were "All right the way it is," while 15.4 percent thought they ought to be reduced or abolished.[3]

The constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces and the question of whether the Constitution ought to be revised in order to formalize the existence of armed forces seemed to divide opinion sharply among those who thought armed forces to be allowable for self-defense and those who thought armed forces to be unconstitutional, with a large minority remaining uncertain. The significant manifestation has been the increase in the percentage of respondents who thought the existence of the armed forces to be unconstitutional, rising from 17 percent in 1962 to 30.8 percent in 1967.[4]

1/ Asahi Shimbun surveys in Nippon no Jieiryoku (Japan's Defense Power) (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1967), p. 204.

2/ Jieitai Ron (An Essay on the Self-Defense Forces) (Tokyo: Hara Shobe, 1969).

3/ Sankei Shimbun poll appears in Roy J. Oshima, op. cit., p. 43.

4/ Jieitai Ron, pp. 220; Nippon no Jieiryoku, p. 210.

Against the uncertainty of public support for the Self-Defense Forces must be placed the pressures on Japan to rearm brought about by the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan and, more recently, by the Nixon Doctrine that seems to force Japan further toward the development of its own defense capabilities. Thus, between 1952 and 1966, when U.S. forces in Japan fell from 260,000 to 44,700, Japanese Self-Defense Forces rose from 117,590 to 248,222.[1/]

U.S. military operations in Indo-China have impinged on Japanese internal politics because of the Security Treaty and because of the presence on Japanese soil of American forces. The Japanese government's reluctant association with U.S. operations in Vietnam has made it vulnerable to the charges of left-wing and pacifist groups within Japan as well as the object of criticism on the part of the Soviet Union and China. Added to that is Tokyo's sensitivity to the charge that militarism in Japan is growing once again, nurtured by the government's stand on rearmament.[2/]

Japanese efforts to improve relations with North Korea have also been the subject of criticism on the part of the People's Republic of China,[3/] while both China and the Soviet Union have, until recently, made a point of criticizing U.S.-Japanese relations as a threat to the peace and security of Asia and Japanese rearmament as a resurgence of militarism.[4/]

Since such criticism is echoed within Japan by the Japan Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party, as well as other groups, the Japanese government cannot afford to ignore the issues that are raised

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1/ Nippon no Jieiryoku, p. 90.

2/ "Militarism Label Draws Japan Denial," Chicago Sun, 28 April 1970, p. A 2; "Japan Rearms Gingerly," Washington Post, 8 March 1970, p. D 1; "Congressmen Report Militarism in Japan," United Press International, 23 April 1970; and "Many Asians Fear Japanese Plan a Military Buildup," New York Times, 18 December 1969, p. 4.

3/ "China Rips Japan in Wooing N. Korea," Washington Post, 9 April 1970, p. A 29.

4/ "Japanese Militarism Seeks Atomic Arms, Expansionism," English Language Broadcast, Peking NCNA International Service of an article by Tung Ping, "Guarantee or a Deceitful Smoke-screen," 18 March 1971, p. 1, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume XXIII, No. 27, 3 August 1971, p. 21.

internally and yet is not free to deal with them in a manner befitting a nation disposed to independence in its foreign policy. While adherence to the Security Treaty with the United States is a requisite for Japanese security, the fact that the government continues to support that treaty at a time when the U.S. has achieved a detente of sorts with both China and the Soviet Union, the threat from which countries the Security Treaty was aimed to contain, now places the Japanese government under the obligation to explain why, with Sino-Japanese relations normalized, the Security Treaty should remain important at all.[1/]

There is nowhere a better illustration of impact of great power relationships on Japanese internal politics than in the rapprochement between China and the U.S. The retirement of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato from the government reflected the frustration of Japanese policy toward China and in the United Nations and sharpened the Japanese awareness of the true state of U.S.-Japanese relations. Where Japan might have once considered itself an equal, if less powerful, partner to the United States, Washington made it clear that U.S.-Japan relations would not be permitted to hinder an American accommodation of China and the Soviet Union or stand in the way of measures aimed at improving the U.S. domestic economy, even at the expense of Japanese trade.

It was Sato's retirement and his replacement by Kakuei Tanaka that permitted Japanese accommodation with China--at the price of fracturing relations with Taiwan. In the contest for the Liberal Democratic Party presidency in late June and early July 1972, the Taiwan issue played an important role in distinguishing those party factions that would support Tanaka's candidature. Fukuda, a member of the Sato faction supported by the Ishii and Sonada factions, was defeated by a coalition of the Ohira, Miki, and Tanaka factions supported by the Shiina, Mizuta, Funada, and Nakasone factions.[2/]

1/ See discussion of this and similar issues in Shigeto Tsuru, President of Hitotsubashi University, "Re-Examination of Security Treaty Urged," Sekai, July 1972.

2/ See, "Possibility of Tanaka Election Strong..." Asahi, 3 July 1972; "Tanaka, Ohira, and Miki Confirm Anti-Fukuda Alliance," Mainichi, 3 July, 1972; and stories in Sankei, Tokyo Shimbun, and Yomiuri for same dates.

The Tanaka policy of normalizing relations with China left a division within the Liberal Democratic Party over what policy Japan ought to adopt toward Taiwan. While a strong internal consensus supported improvement of relations with China, the faction led by former Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda maintained that Taiwan ought not to be sacrificed in order to purchase better relations with the People's Republic.[1/]

Foreign policy and foreign relations are normally issues in partisan politics in parliamentary governments. Japan is not exceptional in this respect. What has been exceptional has been the intrusion of foreign influences within Japanese society and their reflection in party politics.

The most persistent source of irritation within Japanese politics has been the presence of U.S. forces on Japanese soil. They have been a constant reminder of Japanese defeat and surrender; they have been the vector by which revolutionary socia' behavior has been introduced into Japan; and they have raised, in Japanese eyes, the constant threat that Japan would be a target in any war the cause of which lay in the conflict of interests between the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union or China on the other.

The presence of U.S. forces in the Japanese home islands and Okinawa limited Japanese freedom of action in dealing with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. It has been the principal issue to which the Soviet Union and China would point when consideration was being given to improvement of Sino-Japanese or Russo-Japanese relations. When the Sino-Japanese rapprochement did occur, it was more the consequence of a shift in Chinese policy toward the United States than the fruit of any long-term Japanese policy. Indeed, it appeared that Japan had done no more than follow the lead of the United States in the matter.

1/ "LDP OKs Principles on Peking Ties," Mainichi Daily News, 9 September 1972, p. 1; "LDP Delegation to China Thursday," ibid.; "LDP Arrives at China Consensus," The Daily Yomiuri, 8 September 1972, p. 1; "Fukuda Criticizes Tanaka's Policy," ibid.; "Japan Should Not Dump Taiwan, Fukuda Says," The Japan Times, September 6, 1972, p.1; "Discussion at LDP Japan-China Relations Normalization Council Meeting on August 31; Pro-Taiwan Faction calls Calls Chairman 'Traitor'," Asahi, 11 September 1972.

In domestic politics, the use of Japanese soil for American military purposes conflicted with the domestic demand for land to be used for housing and industrial development in a country where space for such activities is already scarce. Those who favored limitations on U.S. bases because they constituted a threat to Japanese security or who wished for the removal of U.S. forces from Japan because they were more sympathetic to the Soviet Union or China than to the United States were ready allies with those who, because of nationalist sentiments, were offended by the presence of foreign forces on Japanese soil or who wished to see the land held by U.S. forces employed for purposes of development.1/

Of more importance has been the government's difficulty in presenting a rational program for national defense, for the American bases, associated as they have been in the eyes of some Japanese with the war in Vietnam, have been an issue with which to render the government vulnerable on questions of rearmament and the status of the Self-Defenses Forces.2/

The recurring issue of U.S. bases in Japan has taxed the government as a partisan issue as well as an intra-party one. Recent incidents which concerned the movement of U.S. armored equipment in Kanagawa Prefecture and a U.S. Marine amphibious exercise off Okinawa illustrate several circumstances. The movement of the armored equipment from a repair base to a port of embarkation aroused a violent protest. In part, it was a manifestation of the conflict between the central government on one hand and prefectural and local authorities on the other. It provided a means

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1/ See, for example, "Sunakawa Affair and its Effects on Anti-Base Drives," Yomiuri, 7 November 1956, concerning the extension of runways at Niigata and other facilities at Kaminoike and Hyakurigahara. In the Niigata case, 80 percent of the inhabitants were said to be opposed to the extension of the runways and were supported by communists and and industrial groups. Professor Kaoru Yasui, "Re-Examination of Administrative Agreement Urged," Asahi, 27 November 1956, in which the expansion of Tachikawa base is criticized. "Chiba Prefecture to Reclaim Foreshore to Move U.S. Base," Nihon Keizai, 28 February 1962.

2/ Haraki Wada, Professor, Tokyo University, "SDF and Citizens Movement--Reality Seen from 'Oizumi Citizens Assembly'--Seeking Human Confrontation Against Base," Economist (Tokyo), 31 March 1970; Osamu Nagaki, "U.S. Bases in Japan Directly Connected with Vietnam War", Shakaito (Japan Socialist Party Organ), August 1972.

for the local authorities to bring pressure on the central government concerning issues that may have had little relation to the actual movement of the armored equipment. It also gave the central government an opportunity to lay the foundations for future revision of the Security Treaty and associated Administrative Agreement as the causes of the demonstration of popular opposition to U.S. bases, while the central government's restraint in handling the situation conveyed the impression that it was prepared to leave such matters in the hands of local authorities as far as possible.1/

While the problem of moving armored equipment was ostensibly a matter concerning the violation of certain highway-use laws and of the relation between local authorities and the central government (and therefore caught the central government between Japanese domestic law and the operation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty), the outcome of the confrontation was to demonstrate that the central government was responsive to popular feeling and also lent the image that Japan under Tanaka was beginning to enter an era in which its relationship with the United States had changed from that of ward to that of equal.2/

In effect, the government, when faced with the choice between the Security Treaty and the sensitivities of local political leaders, has seemed to accede to the local political leaders. Thus the anti-base sentiment has become an overt policy of the Japanese government and may be seen to be consistent with the drive toward extracting Japan from the invidious position of not being master in its own house.3/

1/ "Tackle the Adjustment of U.S. Military Bases in Japan," Asahi, 4 September 1972; "Armored Personnel Carriers: U.S. Forces Studying Transportation by Rail," Asahi Evening News, 13 September 1972, p. 3; "Kokuro Threatens Picketing" (re: shipment of U.S. A.P.C. 113 by rail) The Japan Times, 9 September 1972, p. 2; "Kanagawa (Prefectural) Government Wants U.S. Army Depot Closed," The Japan Times, 9 September p. 2; "Halt or Relocate Tank Works: Governor S. Tsuda," Asahi Evening News, 11 September 1972, p. 3; see also, "Protesters Delay U.S. Landing Drill," Mainichi Daily, 10 September 1972, p. 1.

2/ The outcome was that the United States agreed to reduce the activity at the base: "U.S. Plans to Reduce Sagami Depot Facilities," Mainichi Daily News, 11 September 1972, p. 1; and, "Municipalities to Let U.S. Armor Pass," Mainichi Daily News, 10 September 1972, p. 1.

3/ See, for example, "Government for Return of Miti (U.S.) Firing Range," The Daily Yomiuri, 9 September 1972, p. 1.

It is apparent that the pressure to liquidate U.S. bases in Japan will continue to exercise the government until those bases have been reduced to a minimum consistent with the government's concept of Japanese security.[1/]

It is also clear that the Japanese government is willing to use anti-American sentiment as well as anti-Vietnam war sentiment to hasten the removal of all U.S. forces which are not considered essential to Japan's security. Thus Premier Tanaka proposed to President Nixon at the Hawaiian Summit Conference on 3 September 1972, that the United States reduce the number of U.S. bases in Japan "in order to improve its image in the homeland."[2/]

On 8 September 1972, Governor Bungo Tsuda of Kanagawa Prefecture urged the Japanese government to negotiate the closing of the Sagami Supply and Maintenance Depot in Sagamihara, Kanagawa Prefecture.[3/] The same day, Foreign Minister Ohira, replying to interpollation in the Japanese House of Representatives, said that the repair of Vietnam-bound and NATO tanks was a violation of the Security Treaty.[4/] Yet according to press reports, it was Socialist Party Secretary-General Masashi Ishibashi who, in a visit to Chief Cabinet Secretary Susuma Nikkaido on the 11th of September 1972, persuaded the government to agree to have the United States close the facility.[5/]

1/ See "Confusion Unavoidable? U.S. Tank Transport to be Resumed; JSP and JCP to Mobilize 20,000 to Block Passage; Police Also Asking Mobilization Setup for Three Nights," Asahi (Shonen Edition), 8 November 1972; "U.S. Psyop Group in Okinawa Possesses Counterfeit Paper Money Bound for North Vietnam; Repacked within Base; Report by 'Ryuku Shimpo'," Akahata, 5 November 1972; "Sagami Supply Depot and Trust in Politics: The Government announced the contents of the argument between Japan and the U.S. on the retrenching of the functions of the Sagami Supply Depot. However in regard to this question the people cannot feel like trusting the government...must prove itself by its deeds..." Tokyo Shimbun, 3 November 1972; "LST Goes Straight to South Vietnam from North Pier," Tokyo Shimbun, 2 November 1972.

2/ "Tanaka Suggests Base Reduction," Mainichi Daily News, 3 September 1972, p. 1.

3/ "Halt Urged to Sagami Tank Activity," Mainichi Daily News, 9 September 1972, p. 1.

4/ "NATO Tank Repairs 'Violate' Treaty," The Daily Yomiuri, 9 September 1972, p. 1.

5/ Osama Shima, Diplomatic Beat: "The Sagami Quandary," The Daily Yomuiri, 15 September 1972, p. 1.

If it has been objectionable to have American intrusion in the internal life of Japan through the presence of U.S. forces, it cannot be less so to have the other great powers intrude by way of Japanese political parties. For the big power conflict and competition is reflected even within the confines of the Japan Communist Party and between that party and the other Japanese parties, despite the obvious efforts of the Japan Communist Party to represent itself as a purely independent national party. It is clear that the Soviet Union has sought, occasionally with marked success, to use the Japan Communist Party as a medium for propagation of the Soviet viewpoint on issues crucial to Japanese interests, and that the Japanese Communist Party has, through its organizational ties with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a special relationship with Soviet foreign policy.[1/]

The strain upon the Japan Communist Party imposed by the Soviet-Chinese split is an additional case in point with which to suggest the internal impact of the behavior of the great powers. In the event, it appears that the Japan Communist Party has been forced to choose between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and has therefore become vulnerable to the suspicion that it is less an independent party than an instrument of Soviet policy.[2/]

The role that the Japan Socialist Party seems to have played in Sagami Depot affair, for example, delineates Japanese policy toward China and the

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1/ "On Negotiations Between Delegations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Japanese Communist Party," Pravda, 28 September 1971, p. 1; and "JCP and 'China-Soviet Confrontation'," Tokyo Shimbun, 5 March 1962, in which report of pro-Soviet position assumed by JCP delegates to Stockholm World Peace Council Meeting is reported. Richard F. Starr (ed.), Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1971 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), for example, outlines the efforts of the JSP to "present an image" as an "independent democratic party." (p. 598.)

2/ See "China Said to Split Japan's Communists: Delegation of Schismatics in Peking," Pravda, 4 September 1971, p. 4; and "Akahata on the C.P.C. Leadership Policy," ibid., both in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume XXIII, No. 37, 12 October 1971, p. 11; and see also, "Should Not Interfere in Personnel Affairs: Japan-Soviet Friendship Association to Express its Attitude Towards JCP," Mainichi, May 10, 1971. For a more recent view, see, "Intelligence," Far Eastern Economic Review, Volume 79, No. 7, 19 February 1973, p. 5: "The Japanese and Chinese communist parties parted way...in 1966..."

Soviet Union at the same time that it suggests the vector for Soviet and Chinese influence on Japanese internal politics, demonstrating the difficulty Japan has in pursuing "autonomous diplomacy" or isolating purely internal matters from the play of great power politics.

It cannot have escaped the attention of the Japanese government and of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party that the Japan Communist Party, the Left Communist Party of Japan, and, perhaps, even the Japan Socialist Party, as well as other groups, function not just as conventional political opposition in the Diet and in the country at large, but are also the channels through which the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China at times hope to shape Japanese foreign policy.

The evidence that suggests this is the reflection within the Japan Communist and Japan Socialist Parties of the difficulties between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The Japan Communist Party appears pro-Soviet in its view of Japanese foreign policy, while the Japan Socialist Party appears to be pro-Peking. Whether the respective inclinations of the two parties are managed by the country that each professes support for, or are merely influenced, is not clear. It does seem unlikely, however, that either party is a constantly responsive instrument of the policies of the Soviet Union or China on all issues. Rather, it appears more probable that pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese inclinations reflected elsewhere within the Japanese nation tend to focus within the respective parties and are reinforced by those members of each party whose loyalties are in fact to Soviet or Chinese ideology.

The Sino-Soviet conflict has been reflected within the Japan Communist Party at least since 1966, when "four more Peking-aligned members" were expelled.[1/] Those so-called "schismatics" from the Japan Communist Party, styled as the Left Communist Party of Japan, have been charged by the Japan Communist Party with aiming at undermining that party having had the support of "Chinese individuals engaged in great

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1/ "The Japan Communist Party announced the expulsion of four more Peking-aligned members..." in "News of the Day," Los Angeles Times, 10 October 1966, p. 2.

power interference." These charges were printed first in Akahata (Tokyo), the Japanese Communist Party organ, and echoed in Pravda (Moscow).[1/]

The Japan Socialist Party, on the other hand, was prominent in working for the rapprochement between Japan and the People's Republic of China. While the Japan Communist Party has direct ideological ties, and probably organizational ones, as well, to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Japan Socialist Party appears to have no such ties to either Peking or Moscow. The Socialist Party, along with the Japan Communist Party, has been at the heart of opposition to American bases in Japan and, like the Communist Party, has supported "unarmed neutrality" for Japan.

> Targets of our struggles are not necessarily limited to U.S. military bases, but will also be expanded to the SDF (Self-Defense Forces) bases. Ultimately, we will force the TANAKA Cabinet to stop formulating the 4th Defense Plan which is aimed at increasing Japan's military strength, and shift its policy to anti-war and peace purposes.

There have been some attempts on the part of the Soviet Union to sway the Japan Socialist Party toward a pro-Soviet view of Japanese foreign policy through encouraging cooperation between the Japan Communist Party and the Socialist Party on issues of mutual interest such as the closing of U.S. bases and the neutralization of Japan, and through entertainment of Party "activists" in the Soviet Union.[3/]

1/ See, "Delegation of Schismatics in Peking," Pravda, p. 4; Izvestia, 12 September 1972, p. 2; "Akahata on the C.P.C. Leadership Policy," Pravda, 12 September 1972, p. 4; and, "Akahata on Peking's Schismatic Role," Pravda, 22 September 1972, p. 5; all under heading, "China Said to Split Japan's Communists," in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume XIII, No. 37, 12 October 1972, pp. 11, 27-28.

2/ "JSP to Confront TANAKA Cabinet in Showdown over "Bases"; To Clarify Security Treaty Contradictions with Domestic Laws..." Yomiuri, 16 August 1972; "unarmed neutrality" is especially mentioned as a JSP policy in "DSP Secretary General SASAKI Proposes Supra-Partisan Talks on 'Diplomacy,' Japan-China Problem' Held as Common Ground:" "...unarmed neutrality, which the JSP has always been demanding...," in Sankei, 30 August 1972; and, "At the same time, they (Soviet newspapers and other media) supported the JSP's assertions.

3/ See, for example, "On the Stay in the USSR by a Delegation of Activists from the Socialist Party of Japan," Pravda, 30 September 1971, p. 4, in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume XXIII, No. 39, 26 October 1971, p. 19.

The Diet elections in December 1972 left the Japan Socialist Party as the principal opposition party in the Diet with the Japan Communist Party as second.[1/]

While the Socialist and Communist Parties have cooperated in the "anti-base struggle" and against the "militarization" of Japan, the Japan Communist Party was an apparently unwilling adherent to the government's policy of rapprochement with China while the Socialist Party was in the forefront of the Opposition parties in supporting improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. Efforts of the Japan Communist Party to form a united front with the Socialist party in opposition to the Government have been strongly opposed by the Japan Socialist Party on the grounds of the latter's anticommunist policy.[2/]

The Socialist Party's support for Japan's policy toward Peking clearly places it at odds with the Japan Communist Party. This difference is emphasized further by the competition between the two parties for the role of the principal opposition party in the Diet and the country at large. The acceptance of the Japan Socialist Party by the Government as a legitimate opposition party with whom accommodation can be effected--an acceptance confirmed by the Government's accommodation with the Socialist Party on the Sagami affair--tends to isolate the Japan Communist Party from the Socialists at the same time that the application of Anti-Subversive Activities Law to the Japan Communist Party by the Justice Ministry puts in question that party's position as a legitimate opposition party.[3/]

1/ The Liberal Democratic Party lost 25 seats, leaving a total of 271; the Japan Socialist Party gained 31 seats for a total of 118; the Japan Communist Party gained 24 seats for a total of 38. The gains by the Communist and Socialist Parties were made chiefly at the expense of the Komei Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, both of which lost heavily. See "Analysis of Election Results; Opposition Parties Combined Secure over 200 Seats," Tokyo Shimbun, 12 December 1972.

2/ "Will Absolutely Not Take 'JSP-JCP Axis' Policy; JSP Secretary General Emphasizes in Connection with Joint Struggles," Asahi, 27 December 1972; and, "Anti-Communist Policy Line Stands in Way of Joint Struggles; JCP Chairman MIYAMOTO Strongly Criticizes JSP's General Principles," Tokyo Shimbun, 31 December 1972. See also "Meaning of the Party's Advance and Tasks for Political Renovation," Akahata (JCP Organ), 1 January 1972.

3/ "No Intention to Remove JCP from Objects Under Anti-Subversive Activities Law: Justice Ministry," Yomiuri, 14 January 1973.

At the same time, the pro-Peking view of the Japan Socialist Party places it in the position of supporting the government on China policy while remaining in opposition on the issue of U.S. bases in Japan, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and the Fourth Defense Plan. It is not to be ruled out, however, that Premier Chou En-lai's statements "China welcomes the reinforcement of Japanese military strength as a potential counterweight to Soviet aggression" and, "Such a situation as that Chinese forces will come to help Japan if the USSR launches an attack on Japan is also conceivable" will place the Japan Socialist Party in the position of having to abandon its opposition to militarization and even to the location of U.S. strategic bases in Japan.[1/]

In effect, the changes in policy of the People's Republic of China and the seemingly implacable pursuit of an anti-China policy by the Soviet Union have a direct impact on the behavior and policies of the principal political parties in Japan and render nearly impossible the pursuit of "autonomous diplomacy."

B. Constraints on Japanese Freedom of Action in International Politics

The defeat, surrender, and occupation of Japan left it under the wardship of the United States. While it provided a period of external security and accelerated internal development, the hiatus in Japan's political role in the international community forced by its defeat in the War cannot be considered something that the Japanese people wish to continue. The desire to enjoy an independent foreign policy free of restraints imposed by foreign nations, however well intentioned, has been present in Japan since the end of the War.

Thus, in an editorial, Tokyo Shimbun (2 November 1956) defined what has come to be called autonomous diplomacy for Japan:

1. Cooperate with Free World, even after resumption of relations with the USSR.

1/ "China and Japan's Defense Plan," Asahi, 16 Decmember 1972; and, "Chou is Said to Have Given Japan Military Assurances," New York Times, 14 December 1972, p. 14.

2. Negotiate with the U.S. for revision of Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement, since some circumstances will arise which can no longer be coped with by an "American First Policy."

3. Closer relations with the Afro-Asian group of nations.

4. After complete independence from the United States has been achieved, Japanese foreign policy will have to be on a multilateral basis with the Free World, the neutralists, and the communist world.

5. A fixed determination to become a "bridge between the East and the West" is needed to carry out autonomous diplomacy.1/

Japan's freedom of action in diplomacy--diplomatic autonomy--has been an issue within Japan since the 1950s. That it should be so is partly a manifestation of Japanese nationalism but largely the consequence of the existence of Japanese interests which diverge from, or have in the past been considered subordinate to, those of the United States. Criticism of Japanese foreign policy from within Japan has been based chiefly on the subordinate role that Japan has had to play in international politics because of its relationship with the United States. The criticism, although it has a variety of tenor depending on whether it comes from the right or left in Japanese politics, focuses on Japan's lack of independence.

> What then, is the present state of Japan under the "U.S.-Japan Security Treaty setup"? It is totally incompatible with the Japanese people's true security, in the point that the basic premise for security, that is, the independence and sovereignty of Japan is being infringed upon by a foreign country...2/

> We are not merely criticizing the Sato Government's foreign policy for the sake of criticizing. We merely regret that the diplomacy conducted by the Sato Government, thinking that it is for the benefit

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1/ "What Autonomous Diplomacy Should Be," Tokyo Shimbun, November 2, 1956, translated in Political Section American Embassy, Tokyo, and published as Daily Summary of Japanese Press, 3-5 November 1956, p. 1.

2/ "Japan Communist Party's Security Policy--For Smashing Japan-U.S. Military Alliance and Realization of Reversion of Okinawa to the Fatherland--Toward an Independent, Peaceful and Neutral Japan--," Akahata (Japan Communist Party Organ), 8 January 1968.

of Japan's national interests and for Asian peace, has lost freedom of action, for its being bound with the framework of the Dulles days...1/

In the past, the fear that Japan might become involved in a U.S.-China war because of the Japanese alliance with the United States, as well as doubts about the credibility of U.S. intentions to defend Japan against attack, have encouraged the notion of "autonomous diplomacy," an unfettered foreign policy: "Voices are becoming audible among the people, demanding more independence from the United States Asia policy, for fear that the nation's fate would be at the mercy of American decisions if things are left as they are."2/

Tokyo newspaper editorials marking the 27th anniversary of Japan's surrender in World War II, echoed similar sentiments: "the coming normalization of Japan-China relations as an occasion to develop its own independent diplomacy" instead of "diplomatically hiding itself behind the U.S..."; "the necessity for Japan to grasp its international environment accurately and establish its own diplomatic goals..."; "the normalization of Japan-China relations will be the starting point for independent Japanese diplomacy..."3/

1/ Shunichi Matsumoto, former Ambassador to Britain, "Asian Peace and Japanese Diplomacy," Sekai (Tokyo), August 1970. Other views of Japanese diplomatic autonomy may be seen: Kinhide Mushakoji, President of the Sophia University International Problems Research Institute, "Choice of Japanese Foreign Policy," Chuo Koron, July 1970; Nabutoshi Hagiwara, "What is Essential for Diplomacy--Autonomous judgement and sensibility--in Bungei Shunju, April 1972; "Dismiss Incompetent Ambassadors: Now is the time to weed out--the Foreign Ministry elite who cannot adapt themselves to changing international politics and to blow away the mood of stagnancy..." in Bungei Shunju, February 1972; "Rogers Statement; Uneasiness over 'Japan-China Relations'; Should Counter with Autonomous Diplomacy Argument," Yomiuri (Tokyo), 13 August 1972; "Japan Capable of Walking Independently Hoped For " (Editorial: emphasizes necessity for Japan to grasp its international environment accurately and establish its own diplomatic goals.) Sankei (Tokyo), 15 August 1972; Yonosuka Nagai, Professor of Politics at the Tokyo Institute of Technology, "Trap of Alliance Diplomacy," Chuo Koron, January 1972.

2/ Quoted from Mainichi in "Japan Examining Military Postion," New York Times, 10 April 1966, p. 11.

3/ "On August 15," Asahi, 15 August 1972; "Japan Capable of Walking Independently Hoped For," Sankei, 15 August 1972; "Japan's Selection 27 Years after the War's End," Yomiuri, 15 August 1972; all in Japanese Morning Press Highlights, American Embassy, Political Section, Tokyo, 15 August 1972.

In his statement to the Liberal Democratic Party Kochikai Association, the new foreign minister, Mr. Ohira, emphasized the necessity of breaking the past pattern of U.S.-Japan relations: "U.S.-Japan cooperation must not be a mere extension of the force of habit. ...In order to put politics firmly on the track leading to a bright future, it is necessary to change our way of thinking and to develop our originality and creativity further."[1/] On his return from a visit to the USSR, the Japanese foreign minister related a conversation with the Soviet Foreign Minister in which he told Mr. Gromyko that "each nation conducts diplomacy at its own independent discretion, whether it is Japan and the U.S. in U.S.-Japan relations, or whether it is Japan and the Soviet Union in Japan-Soviet relations, and Japan and China are not planning to do something, collaborating with each other."[2/]

That Japan should have had as its central policy the amelioration of the harsher consequences of its defeat appears to be a natural response, which can be expected after any country's defeat in a war. France's reaction after the defeats of 1814, 1871, and 1940, and Germany's response after the defeats of 1918 and 1945 seem classical examples of this. While the consequences of the Japanese defeat in World War II might have been far harsher for Japan had the Soviet Union or China been the occupying authority, the conditions laid upon Japan by the victorious powers did nothing to temper the humiliation of defeat and surrender. The U.S. occupation may have been both moderate and humane in comparison to the fate meted out to Western Europe, Poland, and Czechoslovakia under the German occupation or to Poland, East Germany, and the other Eastern European countries under Soviet occupation, but the comparison was not within the ken of the Japanese. The fact is that Japan lost territory that had been Japanese by right of treaty award as well as territory that it had won by right of conquest. The reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control, for example, may have seemed to Americans to be an act of U.S. generosity and restraint; however, to the Japanese, it was no more than the return

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1/ "To Eliminate Force of Habit in U.S.-Japan Relations: Speech by Foreign Minister Ohira: Firm Basis for Friendship; Multilateral Cooperation with Both China and USSR," Yomiuri, 28 August 1972.

2/ "Soviet Union Eager for Peace Treaty; Statement by Foreign Minister Ohira on Return Home; Various Nations Watching Future of Japan-China Relations," Nihon Keizai, 23 October 1972.

of territory that was rightly theirs. Just as the restoration of France to French control after its liberation by the United States and the United Kingdom emphasized France's humiliation, so did Okinawa reversion serve to emphasize Tokyo's dependence on American goodwill as well as its impotence within the international community. That legitimate Japanese territory could only revert to Japan because of the goodwill of a powerful benefactor served to emphasize how little real independence Japan exercised over its own destiny. However shocking defeat, surrender, and occupation may have been, there is no evidence that the experience altered fundamental Japanese nationalism or destroyed that country's will to independence. This is especially poignant when it is clear that Japan's vital interests at present rest not in Japanese hands but are disposable at the pleasure of its powerful neighbors and may even be subject to the whims of lesser powers.1/

The conflict with the Soviet Union over fishing grounds is a case in point. Fish has been Japan's chief source of protein. In 1955, the Soviet Union began a survey of mackerel-pike resources off the coast of Hokkaido, and by 1960, a large Soviet fishing fleet was harvesting fish in the area. In negotiations with the Soviet Union, Japan was forced to accept prohibition of Japanese fishing north of 45 degrees north (the northern tip of Hokkaido). While Japan was forced to tolerate the appearance of Soviet patrol vessels off its eastern coast and in the Sea of Japan, the Soviet Union also threatened to extend the area prohibited to Japanese fishing south from the negotiated limit. The Japanese government was thus forced to impose "voluntary" restrictions on Japanese fishing in the area.2/

1/ See, for example of latter, Japan's concern about the Indonesian-Malaysian declaration that the Malacca Strait is "territorial waters." "Malaysian Law aimed at Foreign Warships," Palo Alto Times, 12 May 1972, p. 33; "Pressure Across the Kra," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 April 1972, p. 72; and "A Pipe-Line for Japan's Oil," To the Point (Johannesburg), Vol. I, No. 10, 20 May 1972,, p. 16.

2/ "Japan-Soviet Fisheries Talks," Mainichi, 1 March 1962: "We might tolerate Soviet patrol boats in the Japan Sea or off the eastern coast of Northern Japan, but the situation will be unbearable if a no-fishing area were to be established. Voluntary restrictions should be strictly observed."; and, "Japan-Soviet Fishery Talks Agenda Adopted--Soviets Attempting to Restrict Drift-Net Fishing South of 45 Degrees North, Mainichi, 1 March 1962; "Government to Intensify Voluntary Restrictions on Salmon-Trout Fishing," Yomiuri, 8 March 1962 (only counter to Soviet attempt to widen restricted area).

The issue of fishing rights in waters traditionally fished by Japan remains painful. In 1971, attempts to negotiate the question with the Soviet Union appeared futile, while more recently Soviet fishing fleets have appeared off Chiba Prefecture and within fifty miles of Cape Erimo--the southeastern tip of Hokkaido, well south of the parallel 45 degrees North. Collisions with Japanese fishing boats and other forcing measures by Soviet fishing fleets were unrequited by the Soviet Union, so that the Japanese government has been forced to warn 20,000 mackerel-pike and mackerel fishing vessels to avoid trouble wherever possible in the region from Hokkaiddo to Shizuoka.[1/] The helplessness of the Japanese government in the face of threats to the livelihood of its own citizens, to protect Japanese fishermen fishing in Japanese waters, is a measure of the impotence of the Japanese government in dealing with the Soviet Union. Moscow's unwillingness to consider seriously the return of territories seized from Japan at the close of World War II, despite the return of Okinawa by the United States, has also been a point of major frustration in Japanese foreign policy.

Japan's relative helplessness within the international community was further emphasized by events of the past year. In early 1971, Japan appeared to face a confident future based on a vigorous economy and secure relations with the United States which provided a shelter from the worst exigencies of Soviet and Chinese policies. For some within Japan, it seemed merely a matter of time and patience before the nation would emerge as a major world power, a position based almost exclusively on Japan's economic vigor and industrial capacity.[2/]

1/ "Negotiations with USSR Cannot Hope for Better Development; Sea-Tangle and Safe Fishing Operation: Foreign Ministry and Fisheries Agency Officials Answer," Yomiuri, 24 May 1971; and "Japan and USSR to Hold Consultations in Tokyo Next Month on Restricting Indiscriminate Fish Catches by Soviet Fishing Vessels," Yomiuri, 28 October 1972.

2/ See Professor Yoshikazu Sakamoto (University of Tokyo), "Le Japon Nouveau 'Grand' Sur La Scene Mondial," Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1971, p. 2.

That such confidence was ill-founded became apparent within a year. U.S. pressures and unilateral actions in respect to the unfavorable trade balance with Japan, the humiliating set-back suffered by the Japanese government over the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, and the visits of President Nixon to the Soviet Union and China all served to acquaint Japan with the relative inferiority of its position in respect to the other powers in the region.

The China issue was a particularly vexing one to Japan. Japan's position had been "to continue contacts, including trade on the private level, with Communist China on the basis of the principle of the separation of politics and economics," to continue diplomatic relations with Nationalist China, and to conform to the provisions of the Japan-Nationalist China Peace Treaty of 1952 in respect to the recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic of China over the people and the territory they inhabited (Formosa and the Pescadores).[1/]

The U.S.-China rapprochement and China's admission to the United Nations, along with the expulsion of Taiwan from that organization, increased the uncertainty of Japan's position vis-à-vis its powerful neighbors at the same time that Japan's confidence in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was undermined by the apparent application of the Nixon Doctrine and the reduction of U.S. forces in the Far East.[2/]

1/ For text of treaties and notes exchanged by Japanese and Nationalist Chinese Plenipotentiaries, see China Handbook, 1952-53 (Taiwan: China Publishing House, 1953), pp. 155-158; for review of 1967 White Paper setting forth Japanese policy toward China, see Hirokazu Hatno, "Sino-Japanese Relations," Japan Quarterly (Tokyo) July-September 1968; see also, George P. Jan, "Party Politics and Japan's Policy Toward Communist China," Orbis, Vol. XIV, No. 4 (Winter 1971), pp. 973-991.

2/ See, for example, Kojo Nakamura, "Old Pillars Fallen," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LXXIII, No. 32, pp 49-51: "The confidence with which Japan faced the world a year ago has been badly shaken by the U.S.-China rapprochement. Its search for new policies could either lead towards recognition of Peking--or to a new, and possible nuclear stance."

Changes in Japan's policy were a manifestation of Tokyo's powerlessness to control events whose outcome were vital to its interests. They indicated not an independent Japanese foreign policy but an effort to accommodate to circumstances over which Japan could exercise little control. At the same time, internal political pressure to normalize relations with China combined with external events to force Tokyo to recognize the People's Republic more on China's terms than on Japan's.[1/] Thus, it was Japan that had to repent its war on China, Japan that had, in effect, to renounce its relationship with Taiwan, raising Nationalist hostility and threatening Japan's commercial position in Taiwan, while it was China's premier that indicated that China might forgive the Japanese war but would not forget it.[2/]

Even Japan-North Korea relations seem subject more to the demands of North Korea, a minor power, than to the desires of the Japanese government. Thus North Korea has demanded, as its price for expansion of trade with Japan, that Japan abolish restrictions on trade that are "part of the economic blockade by American imperialism."[3/]

1/ See report of Dietmen's League for Restoration of Sino-Japanese Relations with 379 members of which 90 were from Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's Liberal Democratic Party, supported restoration of Sino-Japanese relations, as did three of the principal Japanese newspapers, Asahi, Mainichi, and Yomiuri. The Komeito, the political arm of the Soka Gakkai, also supported the move. See, "Press Campaign: Pro-Peking Pressure in Japan," San Francisco Chronicle, 24 February 1971, p. 12.

2/ "Tanaka Extends Apology, Vows Future Ties with China," Washington Post, 26 September 1972, p. 1, 12, and 20; "Japanese, Chinese Set Ties," ibid., 29 September 1972, p. 1; "Japan-China Pact: Lesson in Compromise Diplomacy," ibid., 30 September 1972, p. A1; and, "Japan Seeks to Retain Its Economic Links With Taiwan Despite Tokyo-Peking Accord," Wall Street Journal, 3 October 1972, p. 52.

3/ "Leader of North Korean Business Delegation Reveals Conditions for Expansion of Japan-Korea Trade: Restrictions on Personnel Exchange, Trade Credits and Export and Import Items Must be Abolished First of All; Development of Trade Is Possible Even Before Establishment of Diplomatic Relations," Yomiuri, 26 October 1972.

C. External Influences on Domestic Welfare

The measure of a country's independence in international relations is its ability to insulate domestic partisan politics from the play of politics within the international community. Nations having parliamentary constitutions can rarely enforce domestic political conformity or exclude the influences of foreign partisanship from domestic politics. Present United States policy in Vietnam has been shaped by Americans who were more responsive to North Vietnam's plight than they were to the security of the United States and by those who were willing to exploit for their own political advantage the inevitable ambiguities of a war that to some appeared a civil one and to others appeared international. If a minor war in Indochina could badly divide a nation as well-integrated as the United States, the major power conflict on the edge of which Japan is located can hardly be expected to leave its internal political situation unperturbed. Unlike the United States, which can live on its own if faced with the necessity to do so, Japan is dependent on the successful conduct of foreign relations in order merely to survive. That is so because Japan depends on foreign sources for supplies of raw materials and foreign sales of its manufactured goods for the money with which to purchase the raw materials.[1/]

Iron ore, copper, and other minerals are absolutely crucial to the maintenance of Japan's export trade. Crude oil, coal, and uranium are essential not merely to the survival of Japan's foreign trade but to the livelihood, the comfort, and, indeed, the survival of the Japanese people. Austerity measures the Japanese government might induce the people to endure would be insufficient to permit Japan to continue its existence as

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1/ Japan has to import the following:
100% of its nickel ore, bauxite, rock phosphate, and raw cotton
97% of its crude oil and iron ore
97% of its soy beans
95% of its copper ore
91% of its wheat
87% of its salt
79% of its coal.
Source: Unpublished LDP paper.

a modern industrial nation if any of its important imports are stopped. Any lowering of the standard of living in Japan would affect not only the vitality of the nation but expose it to the blandishments of the extremist groups of left and right, who, in seeking power, would exploit the government's inability to preserve the standard of living the Japanese people have come to expect. Whether or not the government in power was in fact responsible for the state of affairs, it would indeed be held responsible by the Japanese people.

It seems, therefore, that internal stability in Japan depends not merely on good management at home but on the course of events abroad. If the Japanese Communist Party can be split as a consequence of events transpiring in Moscow and Peking; if the Japan Socialist Party can be subjected to internal pressures by statements made by the Chinese Premier on Japanese defense matters; if the ruling Liberal Democratic Party can be brought to abandon Taiwan by a vote in the United Nations and an American trip to Peking; and if the Japanese people can, as reported, be shaken by an act of terrorism in distant Israel, then Japan cannot be said to be close to controlling its own fate.

Instability in the Middle East affects Japan's oil supply, but Japan has virtually no influence over events in the Middle East, although there is little prospect at present that Japan will become less dependent on Middle Eastern oil. It is now computed in Japan that by 1985, the amount of oil required annually from the Middle East will have increased from the present 200 million tons to 700 million tons. At that time, it is expected that there will have to be one 200,000 ton tanker every 3 kilometers plying between Japan and the Persian Gulf. An increase in oil imports from the United States, under present circumstances, is unlikely to occur because the United States itself is facing a petroleum shortage. Oil from China or the Soviet Union obtained under some kind of barter or bilateral understanding places Japan at the mercy of either of those countries, both of which are prepared to use oil or any other commodity as a weapon with which to coerce compliance from whatever country can be made dependent on them.

There are significant circumstances in Japanese society which represent forces the impact of which cannot be entirely predicted. These include:

1. The impulse toward modernization and continued industrialization.
2. The enthusiasm for consumer goods of every kind that seems to indicate an unfettered drive on the part of the Japanese to acquire the greatest possible benefit and pleasure from Japanese industrialization.
3. The revolution in the structure of the family brought about by the liberation of women from their traditional subservience to men in Japanese society.
4. The pursuit of consensus in politics that seems a major attribute of the two principal political parties.
5. The apparent commitment to democratization that may be liberal or totalitarian in tone, but which clearly represents a drive for the fullest possible public participation in politics.
6. The sensitivity of internal politics and economic conditions to changes in external circumstances over which Japan may have little control.

Such circumstances as these provide no promise that Japan can preserve internal stability even with the most astute leaders and the best statesmanship. The impulse to modernization seems deeply imbedded in Japanese society, yet it is a force that has rendered Japan dependent on foreign trade, making its preservation crucial to Japanese survival. The enthusiasm for consumer goods, a by-product of modernization and industrialization, has put the welfare and prosperity of a large segment of the Japanese population at the mercy of the caprice of international politics. Unidentifiable pressures accompanying modernization have conspired to concentrate population, industry, and commercial enterprise in narrow geographical areas in a country that is small to begin with. Thus has Japan been made vulnerable not just to dislocation in international trading patterns and interruption in sea communication, but also its industry and population concentration have made it especially vulnerable to nuclear warfare. Thus, even as modernization has placed nuclear weapons in easy reach of Japan, so has it made Japan extremely vulnerable to them.

Circumstances in the international community and their reflection in Japanese politics place Japan in a delicate position in respect to the

great powers, while the drive for autonomous diplomacy and autonomous defense runs contrary to the Japanese dependence on the United States for strategic nuclear support. Japan's survival as an independent power depends on the goodwill of the U.S., USSR, and the People's Republic of China, or on the convictions on the part of each of the three powers that the continued existence of an independent Japan serves some important interest.

Neither China nor the Soviet Union is notable for manifesting goodwill toward powers weaker then themselves, especially when such powers defer more to their own interests than they do to those of either of the two communist powers. Furthermore, goodwill toward Japan is a perishable commodity in the face of Sino-Soviet competition and the eagerness of the United States to evade any relationships that may force it to oppose Soviet or Chinese policy.

Japan's fate cannot be said to rest in its own hands so long as its internal politics reflect shifts in the relationships among the great powers. Japan must have assured access to foreign markets in order to sell its exports to acquire the raw materials with which to manufacture those exports and to maintain and improve the standard of living of its people.

While the reduction of the U.S. military presence in Japan and the apparent improvement in U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese relations seem to reduce the chances that Japan will be the innocent victim of U.S.-Soviet or U.S.-Chinese conflict, the withdrawal of American military power from the Far East has weakened Japan in its relations with the Soviet Union and China. The reduction in U.S. tutelage has not increased Japan's freedom of action in international relations. To the contrary, Japan must now thread a cautious path through the interstices of Sino-Soviet rivalry. If Washington attempts to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet contest, for example, Japan cannot expect the United States to take its interest to heart if Tokyo chooses to exploit the rivalry. At the same time, since the dimension or outcome of the Sino-Soviet contest is not predictable, Japan must avoid a commitment to one side or the other so long as it is vulnerable to both.

A Sino-Soviet settlement without war would leave Japan exposed to a threat from both powers, neither of which has any particular reason for, or interest in, preserving Japanese security. Indeed, to some Japanese, both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China appear to pose a direct and palpable threat.

Whether Japanese incentives to acquire nuclear weapons outweigh the disincentives is only one measure of the inclination to acquire nuclear weapons. Whether Japan can acquire nuclear weapons even if the incentives outweigh the disincentives is a measure of internal Japanese political unity. The Liberal Democratic Party has maintained a public position in opposition to Japanese nuclear weapons. Yet some expert opinion on security matters within the Party sees nuclear weapons as the only possible approach to the intractable problem of Japanese security. The position of the Japan Socialist Party on the Self-Defense Forces and on U.S. bases in Japan is one that would be inconsistent with the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Yet the anticommunist position of the Socialist Party clearly places it in the position of opposing Soviet domination of Japan as vigorously as it has opposed U.S. military ties to Tokyo. Whether the Socialist Party would firmly oppose close defense ties to China on the basis of its opposition to communism is not clear. It does appear that the Japan Socialist Party is a nationalist party, even if it has, in the past, opposed strong self-defense forces.

The Japan Communist Party seems clearly oriented in sympathy and doctrine toward the Soviet Union, although much of its support may be based merely on Japanese Marxists and Socialists whose sympathy for the Soviet Union would evaporate were that country to threaten Japan.

Both the Japan Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party might distrust the defense forces less if they themselves were to become the government party, for the possibility that the Self-Defense Forces might play a political role within Japan, to suppress the parties of the left, is a fear implicit in both Communist and Socialist rhetoric opposing the Self-Defense Forces. Both parties have strong pacifist and antimilitarist elements among their supporters. Under the impact of a severe and obvious

external threat to Japan's independence, doubtless most Japanese of whatever party would support the government in its resistance to such a threat. But indirect threats, those that manifest themselves internally rather than externally, are susceptible to ambiguousness in interpretation and exploitable by opposition parties who do not have to formulate or implement unambiguous policies to meet threats that are ambiguous in origin or indirect in effect.

The government party in Japan has been responsible and accommodating in its behavior toward opposition parties and opposition viewpoints. Whether that has become a fundamental constitutional principle to which all parties feel committed is not clear; it is not even clear that the present government would feel compelled to behave constitutionally and democratically if it were not for the fear of popular condemnation if it behaved otherwise. For it seems patent that the presence of American forces in Japan and Japanese dependence on the guarantees in the Security Treaty have facilitated the continuance of democratic forms within Japanese politics. It is not at all certain that democratic principles of government are so deeply-rooted in Japan that a palpable external crisis or a strong threat of internal subversion could not uproot such principles.

Japanese security therefore is both an internal and external matter, but one in which the two facets of security cannot easily be isolated from one another. Reflection within Japan of conflicts that are external to it is a measure of Japan's vulnerability and is an important limit on Japanese freedom of action. Of greater importance is the impact internally of conflicts and instabilities that affect Japan's foreign trade. On the one hand, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party must attempt to increase its freedom of action in foreign relations to avoid, as far as possible, the jeopardy inherent in the Sino-Soviet conflict and the conflict between East and West. On the other hand, it faces the constitutional necessity of attempting to accommodate the opposition, the Japan Socialist Party. While the government enjoys an absolute majority in the Diet, it cannot ignore, or run rough-shod over, prefectural governors and legislatures or other local officials who are popularly elected and who are often members or supporters of the opposition party in the national Diet.

The danger is that if the Japan Socialist Party appears to have been coopted by the government, it may drive Socialist Party adherents further to the left, strengthening the Japan Communist Party, and thereby further polarize politics in Japan. On the other hand, if the present majority of the Liberal Democratic Party appears unassailable to the opposition parties, that may drive the Socialists to the left in order to pick up support from the adherents of the Japan Communist Party or create a united front of the opposition parties.[1/]

While the Japan Socialist and Japan Communist Parties conceive autonomy in diplomacy as the way out of the odious connection between the United States and Japan under the Security Treaty, they deprecate any external threat to Japan from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. If there is a threat to Japan internally, they assert, it is from the forces of the right attempting to remilitarize the country while suppressing dissent and obstructing the social changes dreamt of by the parties of the left. To these parties and their adherents, the notion of nuclear weapons for Japan appears to be anathema.

To the far right as well as to elements within the Liberal Democratic Party, nuclear weapons are associated with both autonomous diplomacy and autonomous defense, while autonomous defense is not seen to be inconsistent with a U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee to Japan. For example, the All-Japan Council of Patriotic Organizations (Zen Nihon Akokusha Dantai Kagai) at its 16th National Convention (November 1972) took the government to task for failing to revise the Constitution, criticized defense policy because it was exclusively defensive and because it adhered to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and appealed for establishment of an autonomous defense structure, including the possession of nuclear weapons.[2/]

1/ See, for example, communist charges that "to demand a government decision on the limit to defense build-up is contradictory to the Socialist Party's past disapproval of possession of defense force itself...The Socialist Party is lending support to the government's military buildup." in "Political Scene: Target Figures for Defense Buildup," The Japan Economic Journal, Volume 11, No. 529, 13 February 1973, p. 2. See also, "JSP Was Careless in Handling Defense Power Limitation Issue, Logic Preceded by Diet Tactics. Asahi, 13 February, 1973.

2/ "16th National Convention of All-Japan Council of Patriotic Organizations Held," Kokn Joho, November 1972.

While the Zenai Kagai, as it is called, does not appear to be a politically significant organization within Japanese politics, its views seem to resemble to some degree views expressed within the Liberal Democratic Party. At the same time, the organization has undertaken demonstrations in the streets in opposition to activities of the Japan Teachers Union in Akita and elsewhere and to a JCP seminar in Mie, while working to promote the reversion of the Northern Territories and for patriotic observances in the public schools. Showa Restoration, revision of the Constitution (to make it a Japanese instrument rather than one imposed by the Americans), and establishment of autonomous national defense are the general goals of the organization. The argument is made that

> The normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations has changed the balance of power in Asia in disfavor of Japan. The time may come when our security cannot be guaranteed by U.S. military strength. Therefore, it is necessary to enhance the people's awareness of national defense and have them understand that the possession of military power is to maintain peace and order, and not to wage war...it is natural that Japan should possess nuclear weapons.
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> The Soviet Union has come to possess nuclear deterrent power against the U.S....Communist China will possess nuclear deterrent power against the U.S. This means that the nuclear security given by the U.S. to the free nations in the Pacific and the Asian areas will become powerless. ...In case the expected age comes when the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will become powerless, it will enable any country to attack Japan with no worry of its homeland being counter-attacked.[1/]

While the foregoing views appear to be extremist, there is some evidence that such views are represented within the Liberal Democratic Party. The assumption upon which the views are based is that Japan is a strategically important obstacle to the Soviet Union and Communist China and a major strategic target that the two powers hope to occupy.

1/ "Questions and Answers Concerning the Action Policy for 1973" (Zenai Kagai), ibid.

The Zenai Kagai bases its activity on the belief that the Japanese people are ill-informed and confused about matters of defense and that the confusion is connected in part to the existence of the revolutionary forces within Japanese society. Whether Zenai Kagai and the Liberal Democratic Party factions that support a strong defense for Japan are as one on all matters is unimportant.

It may be supposed that the views of Zenai Kagai on Japanese defense are closer to the government's than are the views of the Japan Socialist Party; the latter's views have been summarized:

> The JSP demands of the Government again the cancellation of the Fourth Defense Plan, immediate abrogation of the Security Treaty, normalization of diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and development of new Asia diplomacy based on the Five Peace Principles.[1/]

Similar sentiments in respect to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, as well as demands that the U.S. withdraw entirely from the Far East, were expressed by the JCP and the Komeito while the Democratic Socialist Party expressed the hope that the Sino-U.S. agreement would contribute to world peace. On the other hand, the Tokyo Shimbun correspondent in Washington pointed out that the Sino-U.S. agreement is the means "for psychological checking of Japan, which does not move at the beck and call of the U.S. as regards economic questions"; and that aid to North Vietnam would no longer be "clamps between China and the Soviet Union" but that "the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations after the end of the Korean War may be repeated again [with the ending of the war in Vietnam]."[2/]

While the government, within its inner circles, may be considering the ramifications of the apparent tensions between the Soviet Union and

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1/ "Opposition Parties' Statements on Sino-U.S. Joint Communique," Statement by JSP International Bureau Chief Kawasako, Mainichi, 24 February 1973.

2/ "Substantial Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between U.S. and China; Aim of Checking Japan Too," Tokyo Shimbun, 23 February 1973.

China, these have not been publicized. Yet the possibilities of a heightened Sino-Soviet conflict have been considered gravely in some quarters. Thus the president of Kobe Gakuin University has said that "Compromise between China and the Soviet Union is held difficult because of their historical aggressor-victim relations."[1/]

Nobuyuki Takagi of the Mainichi Foreign Press News Section observed that the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore are seen tightening their cooperation and moving toward stricter internal control to cope with a cataclysmic change in Asian international politics after the Vietnam War,[2/] while Japan is warned in an article by a Tokyo University professor and a member of the Asahi research room that it should "maintain equidistance toward China and the Soviet Union and not to commit itself to either of them."[3/]

It is evident that Japanese relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are a cause for serious and immediate concern within Japan:

> In view of the complicated relations among the three poles, that is, the U.S., China, and the USSR; the Sino-Soviet confrontation; and the post Vietnam situation in Asia, this seems to be a good opportunity for pushing Japan-Soviet negotiations. Needless to say, we are not saying that tricky diplomacy should be conducted, taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet confrontation.[4/]

The issue of the return of the Northern Territories to Japan and the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty seems to be tied to Japanese

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1/ Masao Onoe, "No Compromise between China and USSR: Its Background," Jiyu, March 1973.

2/ Nobuyuki Takagi, "Cataclysmic Change in Asia and ASEAN," Sekai, March 1973.

3/ "Don't Be Involved in Sino-Soviet Confrontation," dialogue between Shinkichi Eto and Akio Kimura (former Asahi correspondent in Tokyo) in Chuo Koron, March 1973.

4/ "For Development of Japan-Soviet Relations," Tokyo Shimbun, 8 March 1973.

cooperation for the economic development of Soviet Siberia.[1] The Japanese position is a weak one in respect to such negotiations. The Soviet Union seems unwilling even to consider return of the Northern Territories, while the prospect of obtaining oil from Siberia for Japanese industry is an attractive one to Japan, since the Middle Eastern oil supply is vulnerable to the great instability in that area and the maritime routes between Japan and the Middle East are not within Japan's power to defend. It is therefore a matter for concern in some quarters that the Japanese government will be forced to give way on the question of the Northern Territories in order to achieve economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.[2]

The feeling is apparent, and there is some evidence to support that feeling, that Japan is being caught between the Soviet Union and China in their conflict and that such a position is a dangerous one for Japan. Thus,

> Both China and the Soviet Union have now come to show positive postures toward Japan, unexpectedly. This is a golden opportunity for settling many pending issues, but there is a danger that unless we firmly maintain "principles," we will be involved in the Sino-Soviet confrontation and be led to a situation where we cannot move an inch.[3]

That Japan could become a pawn in Soviet-Chinese relations seems confirmed in Japanese eyes:

> China and the Soviet Union have started developing their respective diplomacy toward Asia after Vietnam, narrowing down their diplomatic targets to Japan, an "economic big power." ...the People's Daily [China]

1/ "Road to Complete Normalization of Japan-Soviet Relations," Nihon Keizai, 8 March 1973.

2/ "The Japan-Soviet negotiations will be a good opportunity for securing consistency between the development of relations between the two countries and the stability of Asia. However, we must not bring about such an easy-going settlement as to trade the northern territories for economic cooperation..." "For Development of Japanese-Soviet Relations," Tokyo Shimbun, 8 March 1973.

3/ "Diplomacy toward China and USSR in Multi-Polar Era," Tokyo Shimbun, 9 March 1973.

> has started to strengthen the denunciation of the Soviet Union, taking up such questions as the northern territory issue, opposing the denunciation of China, which the Soviet Union is conducting almost every day. China has launched into complete expansion of Japan-China relations, with the intention of concluding a friendship and cooperation treaty ahead of the Soviet Union.[1/]

The Chairman of the China's China-Japan Friendship Association, in an interview with a Japanese newspaperman, lent credence to Japanese concerns by saying,

> Despite the Vietnam ceasefire, tension in the international situation has not relaxed at all. Especially for China, the most dangerous enemy is the Soviet Union. It deploys armed forces of 1.3 million men along the border and is preparing to make a surprise attack.[2/]

The interview carried a barely veiled warning to the Japanese about the Tyumen oil project:

> China does not oppose Japan's having friendly relations with other countries. For a country like Japan, the resources questions is an important question, and we can understand its endeavoring to secure resources at advantageous terms. We think that the Tyumen Oil Fields question also arose from such a need. However, what I wish to add here is that if the pipeline is laid to Nakhodka, it will also mean that the Soviet Union will supply fuel to its tanks and aircraft, invading into China, at various places...If Japan materially helps the Soviet Union in this, I must say that our feelings will be more than a "divorce question." Even if we understand, I ask you to keep in mind firmly that we will harbor "bittler feelings."[3/]

1/ "Vying for Approaching Japan; China Rivalling Soviet Moves," Sankei, 8 March 1973.

2/ "Yomiuri Correspondents' Interview with Liao Cheng-chih; Japan-China Friendship Based on Joint Communique Spirit; Should Show Sincerity for Aviation Agreement; Military Utilization of Tyumen Development Should Not Be Permitted; U.S. Forces Should Withdraw Quickly from Taiwan," Yomiuri, 12 March 1973.

3/ "Future of Japan-China Economic Relations and Japan-Soviet Economic Cooperation," in Liao Cheng-chih interview with Yomiuri correspondent, Peking Branch Bureau, 11 March 1973, Yomiuri, 12 March 1973.

At the same time, the Chinese spokesman warned the Japanese that it would be a "very big problem" in Chinese eyes were Japan "to transport these raw materials ("200 million tons of oil") with the protection of armed forces." And, as if to emphasize the dilemma in which Japan finds itself, he also raised the subject of how uncertain the Middle Eastern oil supply might become, as, "The Middle East will probably become the center of the world's struggle to secure oil."

The Soviet Union, in response to such Chinese demarches, has suggested that the Chinese government is attempting to drive a wedge between Tokyo and Moscow before the Soviet-Japanese conference can begin.[1/]

It is significant that the issue of petroleum-supply should come up again and again. Both China and the Soviet Union are in a position to influence the supply of oil to Japan and have been using that position to bring pressure on Japan. The Soviet Union, with a dominating position in the Middle East can obstruct that source, while the Arab oil states are themselves becoming more conscious of the political power that can be exerted through their possession of oil.[2/] Oil is a strategic item to China because of the scarcity of refining facilities and production centers. While oil itself may be plentiful, the resources have not yet been fully exploited. That China would consider exporting a scarce commodity to Japan is a measure of how sensitive China feels about Japan's role in the Sino-Soviet conflict,[3/] and, considering Japan's dependence on foreign oil, reemphasizes Japan's vulnerabilities in respect to fuel.

1/ "A Peking Wedge in Tokyo-Moscow Talks?" Boris Krynow, "Behind the Scene of Events: A New Guardian?" Literaturnaya gazeta, 1 January 1973, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume XXV, No. 3, 14 February 1973, pp. 10-11.

2/ Japan's sensitivity to the Middle East situation is illustrated by its efforts to ensure long-term oil supply contracts in the Middle East through the initiation of technical and economic cooperation with the members of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). See "Plans Talks with OPEC Leaders: Government Hopes to Boost Direct Oil Purchase by Economic Cooperation," The Japan Economic Journal, Volume 11, No. 532, p. 6; and, "Exchange with Oil-Producting Countries Active; Local Leaders to Visit Japan One after Another," Sankei, 20 January 1973.

3/ "Four Oil Companies to Import Crude Oil from China; Negotiations Mission to be Sent Around 10th," Nihon Keizai, 1 January 1973.

The Soviet Union has also been supplying some oil to Japan from Soviet fields in Sakhalin and arrangements for the purchase of that oil have had to be made on a yearly basis leaving Japan vulnerable to shifts in Soviet policy.[1/]

Even the war in Vietnam placed some strain on Japan's fuel supply when the United States mined the approaches and the harbor at Haiphong, because it interrupted the supply of North Vietnam's coking coal to Japanese industry.[2/] Clearly it is possible for North Vietnamese coals to be shut off by Soviet or Chinese policy so long as North Vietnam is within the orbit of either or both of the communist powers.

The danger in Japan in the Sino-Soviet conflict is suggested by a Tokyo Shimbun editorial:

> ...as long as China and the Soviet Union are sharply confronted with each other and as long as they both are conscious of incorporating Japan into their diplomatic strategy for the multi-polar era... There is danger of the shadow of the Sino-Soviet confrontation being cast even on the problems inherent to Japan-China and Japan-Soviet relations. For example, as to the northern territories problem... With China's showing sympathetic support for this, however, it will be led to be linked with the Sino-Soviet border problem... if we err in coping with them, we will fall into the chasm of the big-power diplomacy of China, the Soviet Union and even the United States, where we cannot move an inch.[3/]

1/ "Asia Oil President Hasegawa to Visit Soviet Union for Purchasing Crude Oil," Nihon Keizai, 4 January 1973.

2/ "Hon Gai Coal," report of the resumption of exports of North Vietnamese coal from the Hon Gai mines, to follow the clearing of the mines by U.S. forces, in The Japan Economic Journal, Volume 11, No. 531, 27 February 1973, p. 12; but see also, "Vietnam Ceasefire May Ease Tense Supply-Demand Relations of Middle East Crude Oil: Oil Industry's Observation," Nihon Kogyo, 22 January 1973.

3/ "Diplomacy toward China and USSR in Multi-Polar Era," (Editorial) Tokyo Shimbun, 9 March 1973.

As a consequence partly of the delicate diplomatic position as well as the doctrinaire differences among Japanese, political parties' views on security and the self-defense forces vary not only between parties but within parties as well. Within the Liberal Democratic Party, the views on defense run from those who wish a vigorous policy to those who prefer no defense at all. The Japan Socialist Party contains views that embrace the notion of autonomous defense--i.e., defense without the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty--all the way to unarmed neutrality. The Democratic Socialist Party contains a similar range of views, while the Japan Communist Party seems to embrace the notion of a "self-defense" army, a kind of militia with which to replace present Self-Defense Forces.[1/]

Thus within the Liberal Democratic Party, one extreme view is that Japan should declare that it will abolish all armaments and have no armaments in the future.[2/]

A more extreme view is that Japan ought to be prepared for defending the nation against both a Soviet and Chinese attack.[3/]

There is a consensus in Japan that Japanese policy ought to be freed from the fetters that close attachment to the United States has imposed. The correct attitude of the Japanese government in respect to U.S. military action in Vietnam was consistent with a desire to avoid the fall-out from great power conflicts fought in peripheral areas like Indo-China. There may have been sympathy for the United States and a recognition of the importance of U.S. action to Japanese security, but there was no apparent

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1/ "On Autonomous Defense: People's Cuts to their Own Country," Kokubo, October 1969: Talk between Kiichi Arita, Director General of the Defense Agency, and Hajima Doba, Yomiuri International Situation Research Council.

2/ "Defense Discussion: Machine Gun or Kitchen Knife," talks between Shigeru Sahashi (former administrative vice minister of International Trade and Industry) and Osamu Kaihara (former Secretary General of the National Defense Council), Bungei Shunji, March 1973.

3/ "Defense Officials Deny 'Military Doctrine' Story," Daily Yomiuri (English), 5 March 1973.

inclination to have Japan involved in the conflict or associated with U.S. involvement. That course of action was dictated as much by the internal political situation as by Japanese commercial interests in respect to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. It was a tenable policy only because the United States did not choose to make it otherwise. U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, rapprochement with China, and the Soviet-U.S. detente in Europe have made the continued U.S. presence in the Far East, particularly in Japan, a more tenuous one, while the prospect of reunification of Korea is destroying the basis for a continued U.S. presence in that country.

Greater diplomatic autonomy is within reach of the Japanese government. From the viewpoint of the government presently in power, it means redefinition of the terms of the Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement according to Japanese security requirements rather than U.S. strategic interests. To the opposition parties, it means an opportunity to disengage Japan from the Soviet-U.S. and China-U.S. confrontations. Clearly, autonomous diplomacy means also autonomous defense. Autonomous defense, from the viewpoint of the Liberal Democratic Party, means dependence on the United States only for those things not permitted by the Constitution to Japan: "We will go within the scope permitted by the Constitution and other things. If there is anything that is not permitted, we will cooperate with the U.S. and will take joint defense by relying on so-called collective power."[1/]

Impeding the policy aiming at autonomous defense is the sensitivity of the Japanese government to the charge that militarism is reviving in Japan, a charge that is leveled from abroad and often echoed from within the opposition parties.[2/]

1/ Kiichi Arita, Director of the Self Defense Agency, "On Autonomous Defense," Kokubo, October 1969.

2/ "Don't Call Pact (U.S.-Japan Security Treaty) Curb on Arms," Los Angeles Times, 2 March 1972, p. 31.

In the view of some Japanese, the desire for autonomy in defense to match autonomy in diplomacy can, and may very well, lead to Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons.

> ...I think autonomous defense is a very dangerous direction in a sense. This is because it appears to have a strong aspect of appealing to nationalism. The JSP and other leftists insist on autonomy in the sense of becoming rid of the United States. The DSP (Democratic Socialist Party) emphasized autonomous defense too. One...wonders if it is not due to the JCP's policy of recognizing a self-defense army that its polling score has increased lately.
>
> As a result, our distance from the United States will be gradually increased, and it will become impossible to rule out the possibility of our nuclear armament. ...Japan has economic and technological power and that this will be coupled with an appeal to nationalism. I think it possible that the right and left in Japan will shake hands and will lead Japan to nuclear armament. ...the expression 'autonomous defense' has a dangerous factor.[1/]

Japan is caught between the dangers of involvement in wars not of its own choosing and the danger that it will become so isolated from those who might help it that it will have no ally were it to be attacked. Its internal political situation--in the view of the Japanese themselves--is so uncertain as to make it impotent in the international arena.[2/]

Japan is at present incapable of defense against missile attack, and can provide no more than a nominal air defense and some limited defense against an attack on Hokkaido. Its capability to defend its maritime routes is limited to a radius extending no further than Taiwan, and it has been warned

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1/ Hajime Doba, Yomiuri International Situation Research Council, in "On Autonomous Defense," Kokubo, October 1969.

2/ "Diplomatic bargaining will be possible only when a country has real ability to endorse it, a definite national policy, and a firm domestic structure with which it can cope with such bargaining... Under the present situation where internal public opinion and the political structure are split to pieces, such an attempt will only commit the folly of ruining oneself by trying to ape ones better." "Diplomacy toward China and USSR in Multi-Polar Era," Tokyo Shimbun, 9 March 1973.

by China that if Japan were "to transport these raw materials [oil], with the protection of armed forces, it would be a very big problem."[1/]

The reassurance once provided by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty that Japan would be protected from a direct Soviet or Chinese attack is languishing under the Nixon Doctrine, internal pressure to remove U.S. bases from Japan, the new U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese "detente," and serious doubts within Japanese minds about whether the United States even has parity in nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union.[2/]

1/ "Yomiuri Correspondent's Interview with Liao Cheng-chih..." (cited previously), Yomiuri, 12 March 1973.

2/ The view presently exists within the Japanese Government that if parity does exist it is dependent on U.S. technological superiority. If that superiority is lost to the Soviet Union, than the Soviet Union will have superiority in strategic nuclear forces.

III INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES FOR PROLIFERATION

The revolution that has taken place in Japanese society over the last hundred years and particularly since the end of the Second World War cannot be assessed easily in terms of its ramifications for foreign relations and military policy. It is not possible to estimate accurately whether those forces that led Japan into war with Russia at the beginning of the century, with China in 1931, and, finally, with the United States and Great Britain in 1941 have been extinguished or even modified. With such reservations in mind, it is possible to define the circumstances in which Japan finds itself at present.

The social forces that have led to the industrialization and continuing modernization of Japan appear still to be at work. At the same time, those forces appear to be beyond more than a nominal or superficial control by the Japanese government or even by Japanese society. The migration of population to the great cities and industrial centers continues despite the fact that the overall population of Japan is increasing at a very modest rate. More and more Japanese seem subject to the drives of consumerism: the emphasis within an industrial society on the production of goods and services for the widest possible market within the community. Consumerism seems to be intensified by the migration to the cities and in turn strengthens the growth of industry and the drive toward technical and administrative modernization.

Industrialization and urbanization, in their turn, have created political constituencies that reflect the issues and problems that are characteristic of an industrial society, but also reflect the ideological divisions within the world beyond Japan. These political constituencies cannot be ignored under the present Japanese constitution nor can their ideological commitments be excluded in the consideration of national policies.

Industrialization and consumerism have increased the prosperity of Japan by granting to a wide segment of Japanese society relatively easy access to the products of Japanese and foreign industry. That is a contrast to pre-War Japanese society, where industrial output aimed chiefly at

capital accummulation, foreign trade, and government consumption. While industrialization since the War has increased the prosperity of the Japanese people in a direct and obvious way, it has also made that society more vulnerable to the exigencies of foreign trade and the international crises that might interrupt that trade. Thus, before the War when few Japanese had cars, cooked with petroleum gas, or possessed numerous electrical appliances, a crisis in oil supply, for example, could be adjusted to, as it was during the War years. Now the wide ownership and use of motor vehicles, the increased industrial and service employment, and the accessibility of consumer goods leaves a large proportion of Japanese society susceptible to unemployment, immobilization, and deprivation if for any reason the pattern of foreign trade is disrupted. In short, if the dependence on foreign oil supplies was so acute in 1941 as to drive Japan to seize the Netherlands East Indies, despite the dangers that entailed, how much more desperate would Japan be today under similar pressures, when the Japanese people have become accustomed to such a rich diet of merchandise. Oil shortages imposed austerity on Japan in 1941 and after, but the effect filtered down through an industrial structure that was not yet ubiquitous and it could be mitigated to the extent that the bulk of the population could depend on the fruits of rural enterprise. That is no longer possible. A shortage of fuel in Japan today means a truncation of electrical supply not just to industry, where it would affect employment, but to the ordinary citizen who lights his house with electricity; a shortage of fuel affects directly the motorists and transport truck drivers and others who are dependent directly on a supply of gasoline to carry out their own enterprises.

Any Japanese government has therefore little choice but to ensure to Japan the certain delivery of commodities like fuel and in turn must also ensure that Japanese products get abroad in order to acquire all of the materials that are essential for continuing industrial production as well as supplying the demands of the consumer society.

While Japanese prosperity depends on reasonably good order within the international community, Japan is faced by a Soviet Union in possession of its Northern Teritories which seems careless of Japanese interests except

where those interests can be exploited to Soviet advantage. On the mainland, the burgeoning People's Republic of China, itself threatened by the Soviet presence on its borders, is attempting to exploit Japan's insecurity as a weapon against the Soviet Union. There is danger that Japan will, whether or not she chooses, become involved in whatever struggle the Soviet Union and China find themselves in. Against that is the dependence of Japan on U.S. strategic nuclear support at a time when that support is growing less credible, at a time when the United States defines its role in the Far East in terms of the Nixon Doctrine, while within Japan itself, there is strong reluctance to have American bases located on Japanese soil. Beyond that is the fact that Japan can exercise little control over events in the Middle East, which supplies its oil, and may even be unable to protect its maritime routes to ensure its supply of raw materials or its access to markets for its manufactured goods.

Japanese political parties are divided over the policies appropriate to the country's position, while Japanese politics itself is the playground for intrigue between some political groups and their ideological opposite numbers abroad. There is no considerable consensus on defense matters or even on the nature of the threat to Japan.

It is on the basis of the foregoing that the incentives and disincentives for acquiring nuclear weapons have to be computed.

Incentives to acquire nuclear weapons derive from the following circumstances:

- The desire for autonomy in defense and diplomacy, a desire that is held by all political parties in Japan, however each may visualize such autonomy, and nuclear weapons might grant a feeling of such autonomy.
- The conflict between those in Japan who wish to cling to the U.S.-Japan security treaty and those who wish to be rid of U.S. forces and bases in Japan gives rise to the possibility of a political accommodation in which Japan foregoes attachment to the U.S. in favor of a nominal nuclear force designed for tactical deterrence.

- The hostility of the Soviet Union toward Japanese rearmament and support for unarmed neutrality,[1] the intransigence of the Soviet Union on the issue of the return of the Northern Territories, the intrusion of Soviet aircraft into Japanese air space,[2] the Soviet Union's hard line approach to joint development in Siberia, and Soviet intrusion into Japanese fishing grounds have all tended to force Japan into an anti-Soviet line. This, at the same time, is to be contrasted with the growth in trade with mainland China, Chinese support for the Japanese defense program, and the obvious reduction of U.S. forces in the Far East. The Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Socialist Party are as one in terms of policy toward China and in terms of reservations about the Soviet Union. It is not to be ruled out, therefore, that nuclear weapons, coupled with a policy of armed neutrality and friendship with China, would bridge the differences between the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Socialist Party on issues of defense. It is particularly so if the Japan Socialist Party should see expulsion of U.S. bases from Japan and friendship with China as a trade-off for nuclear weapons for tactical deterrence within the present Self-Defense Forces. In addition, any threat to Japan's trade routes that implied serious economic damage to Japan, involving unemployment or reduction in the standard of living, would be expected to mobilize Japanese trade unions, with the exception of those controlled by the Japan Communist Party, in support of Japan's defense and the strengthening of the Self-Defense Forces.

- The carelessness with which Japanese interests have been treated by the United States in the yen crisis; by the Soviet Union in the fisheries dispute, the Northern Territories question, and the matter of air intrusions, and the admission of China to the U.N. have contributed to the feeling of impotence on the part of the Japanese government. Japan has, in the eyes of some Japanese, been excluded from the councils of the great powers in matters like the settlement of the Vietnam War. There is a feeling that

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1/ See "Attention Paid to Advances Made by JSP and JCP: Repercussions Created in Foreign Countries," Tokyo Shimbun, 11 December 1972.

2/ See, for example, "Japanese fighter planes took to the air 14 times last Wednesday to intercept flights of Soviet bombers on reaching northern Japan..." News in Brief in Los Angeles Times, 21 January 1973, p. 2.

Japan, as a major industrial power, ought to be "more positively invited to participate in international conferences."[1]

There is also the fear that the United Nations has become a kind of nuclear club in which only those powers that have nuclear weapons will be the permanent and therefore the decisive members of the Security Council. Despite the fact that Japan is a powerful nation economically, it is said, Japanese representation on the Security Council is not yet permitted.[2]

The denial, in Japanese eyes, of a world role for Japan is a measure of Japan's impotence to look after its interests abroad and bears directly on immediate questions of fuel supply, maritime trade, and currency matters directly affecting Japanese international trade.

Perhaps the greatest incentive of all is the conviction within the present government that Japan is directly threatened by both the Soviet Union and China, both in terms of internal subversion and direct invasion. There is no safety, it is said, in unarmed neutrality, because no one will respect such neutrality. There is no safety in adhering to the Soviet Union or to China, because either way, Japan will become the victim of the fortunes of war. Neutrality, if it is possible, can only be ensured by some means of tactical deterrence that would discourage, if not prevent, a direct attack on the Japanese homeland.

The disincentives to acquire nuclear weapons include the internal fear of the restoration of militarism, the doctrinaire pacifism manifested within all parties, and the possibility that Japanese politics might become so polarized as to force Japan to the right, create great internal disorder, or invite Soviet intervention in Hokkaido. A softening of the Soviet attitude on the Northern Territories might well be sufficient quid pro

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1/ "Japanese Assails the Big Powers: Party Leader Says Nation is Excluded from Major International Councils," New York Times, 27 February 1973, p. 1.

2/ "Tokyo Scholar Fears 'Nuclear Club' in U.N.," Los Angeles Times, 6 October 1971, p. 21. See also, "Japan Denied World Role, Official Says," Los Angeles Times, 28 February 1973, p. 15.

quo for Japan to eschew nuclear weapons. Any reduction in Chinese power through internal disorder or because of a Soviet attack, or reduction in the ambiguity of U.S. guarantees to Japan's security would also be a disincentive. Further, rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union would leave Japan in the position where acquisition of nuclear weapons would be an unwarranted risk.

Within all of this is the uncertainty of whether a revived Japanese nationalism will in any case lead to Japan's attempting to restore its position as an important Far Eastern power or merely lead to a doctrinaire attachment to unarmed neutrality as the best defense of Japan.

INPUT SUBSTUDY E

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OF JAPANESE AND/OR INDIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

By: S. E. Young

CONTENTS

I INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to examine the national interests of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as they relate to potential Japanese and/or Indian decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. In order to achieve this, the author will first project what appears at present to be China's probable foreign policy during the decade of the 1970s. Secondly, China's historical attitude toward nuclear proliferation and arms control will be examined in an effort to discern general Chinese attitudes toward the problem under consideration. Following these investigations into generalized PRC attitudes, the author will make a closer examination of specific Chinese interests in, and attitudes and recent policies toward, the countries concerned in order to formulate a number of alternate response options open to China should Japan and/or India decide to develop nuclear weapons. In conclusion, the special problems posed by sequential or simultaneous nuclear proliferation by the two states will be considered.

II BASIC CHINESE INTERESTS ABROAD

Certain areas of Chinese foreign policy are apt to remain stable for the foreseeable future, irrespective of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by either Japan or India. The PRC is expected to pursue policies designed to preserve and protect its territorial and administrative integrity. Likewise, it will continue to interest itself in the nations along its periphery with the dominant purpose of encouraging the establishment of regimes pliable to the will of Peking. China is not expected to abandon policies aimed at the reclamation of so-called "lost" territories, e.g., Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Tiaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, and certain of the disputed border regions in North and Central Asia. Finally, the People's Republic will continue to seek hegemony in the world communist movement and to present itself as the true ideological leader of the "revolutionary peoples" of the world.

In late 1971, the PRC made two major foreign policy statements which furnish a useful guide to Chinese international thinking. The first statement was issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China on 29 October, in response to its successful bid for admission to the U.N. and the expulsion of the Republic of China (ROC) from the world body.[1/] The second major policy statement was delivered by Chiao Kuan-hua, deputy foreign minister and chairman of the PRC delegation to the U.N., as his first speech in that forum (15 November).[2/] Both statements contain the same basic points, although the latter is more detailed than the former.

Consistent with China's historical stand, both statements declared Taiwan an inalienable part of China's territory and condemned any efforts to create from it an independent entity.

1/ For text, see Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 45, 5 November 1971, p.6.

2/ For text, see Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 47, 19 November 1971, pp. 5-9.

A theme which has received considerable repetition in Chinese pronouncements was dealt with at length in the government statement.

> All countries, big or small, should be equal; the affairs of a country must be handled by its own people; the affairs of the world must be handled by all the countries of the world...

In this context, China claimed that "one or two superpowers are losing ground daily in engaging in truculent acts of imposing their will on other countries." China, in contrast, the statement declared, "will never be a superpower bullying other countries."

Chiao Kuan-hua's speech elaborated upon this theme:

> The Chinese people...have consistently opposed the imperialist policies of agression and war and supported all the oppressed peoples and nations in their just struggles to win freedom and liberation, oppose foreign interference and become masters of their own destiny.

Specific instances mentioned included the situations in Indochina and the Middle East, the continued division of the Koreas, "anticolonialist" struggles in Africa,[1/] and efforts at economic development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. According to Chiao, China, which is still admittedly economically backward, belongs to the "third world" and supports the struggles of its members as its "bounden duty." To this end, Peking provides economic aid to friendly countries and military assistance to those fighting aggression. However, Chiao stated, China is still economically weak and therefore provides mainly "political and moral support."

International relations should be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panch Sheel).[2/] Each state should decide upon its internal social system for itself and should enjoy the right to protect its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, while no country has

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1/ Specifically in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea (Bissau) Azania, Zimbabwe, and Namibia.

2/ Territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs of others, equality, and peaceful coexistence.

the right to engage in the "aggression, subversion, control, interference or bullying" of another state which characterize "superpower" actions.

Both the Chinese Government in its 29 October statement and Chiao Kuan-hua in his speech refrained from mentioning the Soviet Union by name or its Chinese designation of "social imperialism." However, the derogatory references to "one or more superpowers" did not leave much room for speculation as to their identity.

It will be useful at this point to summarize the PRC foreign policy position by listing the main points made by Peking's representatives at the U.N.

1. Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.
2. All countries, irrespective of size, are equal.
3. The PRC opposes all alleged "superpower" (U.S. and USSR) and "imperialist" efforts to dominate the world.
4. China will never become a "superpower"; it has aligned itself with the "small and medium-sized nations."
5. Interstate relations should be conducted on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
6. The PRC opposes external interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states--except in support of "just" struggles.
7. International problems should be settled by all those concerned, not by a select few.

The formulators of Chinese foreign policy are Marxist-Leninist-Maoists and as such perceive China's national interests in highly ideological terms. Ideologically speaking, the ultimate goal of Chinese foreign policy is to bring about world revolution as a step toward the realization of the communist utopian vision. In Maoist terms, this is to be achieved through application of the "theory of contradictions"; viz., contradictions exist in all things at all times. Nevertheless, there is only one principal contradiction at any given stage. One must identify and deal with this "contradiction," compromising on the "minor contradictions" if this should

appear pragmatically advantageous. After the specific "principal contradiction" has been successfully resolved, a new "principal contradiction" will emerge from among previously "minor contradictions." Contradictions can further be classified as "antagonistic" and "nonantagonistic," although "nonantagonistic contradictions" may transmute themselves into "antagonistic contradictions" over time. "Antagonistic contradictions" must be actively and resolutely dealt with, whereas "nonantagonistic contradictions" may be permitted to continue to exist.

As the "theory of contradictions" was applied in foreign policy until the last few years, the PRC identified the U.S. as the "principal antagonistic contradiction" facing it in the international sphere.[1/] In the late 1960s, the U.S. was eclipsed in this position by the actively threatening role assumed by the USSR in the context of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. It now appears that China may have decided upon a composite "superpower" principal contradiction against which it must direct its efforts. Thus Peking can, without compromising ideologically, ally itself temporarily with a variety of states, which present "minor" and "nonantagonistic" contradictions at this historical stage. China's repeated statements, in the U.N. and outside, condemning the "superpowers" and championing the apparently unified position of the "small and medium-sized nations" are therefore expressions of an ideologically grounded interpretation of the balance of power in the world today.

Chinese pronouncements indicate that in order to realize Peking's objective of isolating and overcoming the "superpowers," the PRC must befriend all states which oppose the U.S. and the USSR, irrespective of the internal governmental systems of those states. Thus China's present foreign policy is aimed at creating an anti-superpower united front. To this end, the PRC will assist and support the independent "small and medium-sized nations" in their development, grant military assistance to countries which are resisting "superpower aggression," and, instead of availing itself of the revolutionary opportunities inherent in interregional strife, promote regional unity in opposition to the "superpowers."

1/ In conventional terminology, this means that Peking perceives the U.S. (or the USSR) as threatening its national interests.

III CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Historically, the People's Republic of China has evinced ambiguous attitudes toward nuclear proliferation while it has been outspoken in its condemnation of the "superpower nuclear monopoly." Government spokesmen, by and large, have indicated that nuclear proliferation serves to thwart the "nuclear monopoly." Since its inception, Peking has consistently denounced the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a hoax designed to perpetuate U.S.-USSR nuclear superiority. In 1965, PRC Foreign Minister Chen Yi expressed the hope that "Afro-Asian countries will be able to make atom bombs for themselves," adding, "It would be better for a greater number of countries to come into possession of atom bombs."[1/] At the same time, he expressed Chinese willingness to extend assistance in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, he added that it was "not realistic" to consider China's assisting other countries to manufacture nuclear weapons. Later PRC statements referred to the "right" of nonnuclear countries to develop nuclear weapons to resist "U.S.-Soviet nuclear threats."[2/] Despite such assertions, however, as far as is known, the People's Republic has not assisted any nation in developing nuclear weapons. Thus, it appears that while the Chinese offer explicit encouragement for proliferation of nuclear weapons, in actuality they pursue a policy implicitly designed to discourage that phenomenon.

The PRC has consistently belittled the usefulness of nuclear weapons. As early as 1946, Mao Tse-tung dubbed atomic bombs "paper tigers" which

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1/ Chen Yi, "China Is Determined to Make All Necessary Sacrifices for the Defeat of U.S. Imperialism," Peking Review, Vol. 8, No. 41, 8 October 1965, p. 8.

2/ Commentator, "Nuclear Hoax Cannot Save U.S. Imperialism and Soviet Revisionism," Peking Review, Vol. 11, No. 36, 8 September 1967, p. 34; and Chen Chu's 9 December 1971 speech in the U.N. General Assembly, New China News Agency (NCNA), 10 December 1971, in English.

"look terrible" but actually are not.[1/] Man, according to Chinese ideology, not weapons, is the decisive factor in a combat situation. Nevertheless, Peking recognizes that nuclear weapons are "weapons of mass slaughter," although they "in no way change the true nature of imperialism as a paper tiger. Nor will they be able to daunt the revolutionary peoples throughout the world."[2/] China has repeatedly asserted that its own nuclear weapons program is solely defensive in nature, while simultaneously serving "the people of the world" by challenging the "superpower nuclear monopoly," and encouraging "all the revolutionary peoples of the world who are now engaged in heroic struggles..."[3/]

In recent years, Peking has enunciated a relatively stable attitude toward the control of nuclear weapons. As expressed by Chiao Kuan-hua in the November 1971 U.N. disarmament debate,[4/] "China has always been in favor of disarmament...[But] the idea that all countries must adopt measures for disarmament without distinguishing the aggressors from the victims of aggression and those who threaten others from those who are threatened can only lead the question of disarmament onto the wrong path and benefit imperialism." Thus the right to arm is based, in Peking's opinion, on the political orientation of the country in question. Countries are justified in arming themselves to resist the forces of "imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism."

Citing the 1963 Chinese Government Statement advocating the "complete, thorough, total and resolute prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons," Chiao Kuan-hua claimed that Peking's posture regarding arms control of nuclear weapons had received support from many countries.

1/ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 4 (Peking: International Languages Press, 1961), p. 100.

2/ NCNA, 8 February 1971, domestic serv co, in Chinese.

3/ Peking Review, Vol. 9, No. 44, 28 October 1966, Press Communiqué, p. iii.

4/ "Chiao Kuan-hua Explains Chinese Government's Principled Stand," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 49, 3 December 1971, pp. 14-16.

He continued:

> Regretably, however, the two nuclear powers have thus far failed to make a positive response. Instead [they] have concocted the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, etc. These agreements...are in essence a camouflage for their own nuclear arms expansion in the name of nuclear disarmament, a means for consolidating the nuclear monopoly ...In the absence of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, it is impossible to expect the other countries, which are subjected to the threat of the two nuclear powers, not to develop nuclear weapons for the purpose of self-defense. 1/

Thus it can be seen that China expects--or at least allows for the possibility of--further nuclear proliferation. Chiao Kuan-hua declared it "unreasonable" to deny nuclear weapons development to "Asian, African and Latin American, as well as other medium and small countries." In a 9 December speech in the U.N. General Assembly, Chen Chu went a step further and declared that "other countries [have] just rights to develop nuclear weapons and resist nuclear threats posed by the superpowers." 2/ Since these countries are supposed to be resisting "superpower aggression," they would be de facto allies of China in its resistance to the "superpowers."

This attitude notwithstanding, China's main thrust is to advocate nuclear arms control, not proliferation. As a first step toward the final goal of "complete prohibition and thorough destruction" of nuclear weapons, the PRC called upon those countries which possess nuclear weapons "to undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other, and particularly undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or nuclear-free zones." This is the "no-first-use" declaration, which China itself made after it detonated its first atomic device in October 1964 and which it has consistently urged upon the other nuclear weapons states. In connection with a pledge to eschew first use of nuclear weapons, the PRC also advocated the dismantling of

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1/ Emphasis added.

2/ Chen Chu, NCNA, op. cit. (Emphasis added.)

nuclear bases abroad and the withdrawl of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems from overseas.

Finally, since nuclear arms control is a matter of concern affecting the peace and security of all nations of the world, the Chinese government called for the convening of a world conference to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In this conference, all nations, regardless of size, power, or nuclear status, were to have equal voice in the decisions. China would never agree to participate in nuclear arms control discussions "behind the backs of the nonnuclear countries."

In his address, Chiao Kuan-hua elaborated upon the sequence of events the PRC envisages for achieving nuclear arms control by demanding specifically that the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which, he stated, possess large nuclear stockpiles, issue joint or unilateral statements of no-first-use and withdraw all nuclear weapons, means of delivery, and bases abroad. This demand, too, has subsequently been repeated.

The PRC has, upon a number of occasions since, reaffirmed its stand advocating that all nuclear-armed countries undertake a no-first-use statement and calling for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.[1/] In addition, it has endorsed resolutions presented in the U.N. calling for a nuclear-free zone in Latin America and a "peace zone" in the Indian Ocean, as well as "in various [other] parts of the world..." [2/]

1/ It has, however, condemned Soviet arms control initiatives as discriminating against the nonnuclear countries.

2/ Chen Chu, NCNA, op. cit.

IV PRC INTERESTS IN JAPAN

There are a number of basic issues affecting relations between the PRC and Japan. As far as Peking is concerned, China and Japan have never terminated the state of war which World War II entailed.[1/] This may appear, at first instance, to be a minor point, but Chinese memories of Japanese occupation are bitter, as illustrated by the following quotation from Peking Review:

> One can clearly remember that Japanese militarism, like a viper, brought catastrophe to the Chinese people . . . for more than half a century before the defeat of the Japanese aggressors.[2/]

In 1952, Tokyo concluded a peace treaty with the ROC government on Taiwan. Naturally, this has been condemned by Peking as yet another hostile move by Japan, for the PRC does not regard Chiang Kai-shek's government as in any way representing China, although it was the government in power at the time of World War II. Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka stated that his journey to the PRC in the fall of 1972 would de facto end the state of war, but Peking has yet to indicate its stand on the issue.

Closely related to the problem of terminating the prevailing state of war which obtains between China and Japan is the issue of restoring diplomatic relations. This, in turn, is closely linked with Tokyo's current recognition of the ROC government on Taiwan as the government of China. Japan's posture regarding Taiwan, however, has become increasingly flexible. As late as October 1971, Japan echoed the U.S. stand in the U.N., cosponsoring the American resolution to retain Taiwan's membership in the world body as a separate entity from the PRC.

1/ The point was settled during Tanaka's September 1972 visit to Peking.

2/ Tao Ti-wen, "Expose Sato Government's Cannon-Fodder Recruitment Fraud," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 35, 27 August 1971, p.21.

However, President Nixon's visit to Peking and the joint communiqué issued between the United States President and the PRC Premier--to the effect that Taiwan is an integral part of China and that its status is an internal problem to be solved by the Chinese people--encouraged Japan to adopt a new China policy. It was this issue, more than any other, which caused Prime Minister Sato's government to fall, bringing Mr. Tanaka to power.

Recent statements of the Tanaka government indicate radical revision of Tokyo's attitude toward the People's Republic. Although previous Japanese statements indicated an overriding interest in Taiwan's continued viability based on the pivotal role of the Taiwan Strait in Japan's vital foreign trade, Tokyo now appears ready to trust that some arrangement can be reached with Peking which would meet Japan's needs. Thus, Tokyo has abandoned its role as champion of Chiang Kai-shek's government in favor of rapprochement with the PRC. Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi, for example, stated that Japan's relations with the PRC and the ROC could not be dealt with separately, and that it is "inconceivable" that the ROC peace treaty would exist when relations with Peking are normalized. At the same time, the Foreign Minister declared, "The government is determined to cope with the normalization of Japan-China relations."[1/]

The Prime Minister is equally eager to establish state relations with the PRC. Peking has issued a set of "three principles" which Japan must fulfill if it wishes to exchange diplomatic recognition with the People's Republic.[2/] Although acceptance of those conditions would have been unthinkable to previous Japanese governments, Tanaka has declared it "rational" for Tokyo to recognize them. "High government sources" in

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1/ KYODO, 7 July 1972, in English.

2/ These principles are: (1) The government of the People's Republic of China is the sole and legitimate government of China; (2) Taiwan is an inseparable part of the Chinese territory; (3) In light of the previous points, the peace treaty between Japan and the Nationalist government is illegal and should be abrogated.

Tokyo are quoted as stating that Japan is ready to recognize Peking's territorial claims to Taiwan.[1/]

The Chinese media have published without comment excerpts of speeches by Prime Minister Tanaka and various other Japanese spokesmen indicating Tokyo's readiness to normalize relations with its massive neighbor. Peking has responded promptly and positively to the Prime Minister's initiatives. On 5 July, Tanaka told a press conference, "The time is ripe for Japan to tackle the task of normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China." [2/] By 22 July, Tokyo had reached an agreement with a representative of the PRC "to exert full-fledged efforts for normalization of relations between the two countries at the earliest possible date." [3/]

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai has expressed eagerness to improve relations with Tokyo on several occasions. On 20 August, he is quoted as having stated that China hopes to strengthen the relations between

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1/ KYODO, 11 August 1972, in English. In the 29 September 1972 China-Japan Joint Communique, Japan recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. In addition, it stated that it "fully understands and respects" the PRC's stand that Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory. However, the statement went on to declare that the Japanese government adheres to Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, which stipulated that all the territories "stolen" from China by Japan during the War be restored to the Republic of China. For text, see New York Times, 30 September 1972, p.2.

2/ NCNA, 8 July 1972, in English. The Chinese news report of Tanaka's 5 July statement went on to quote him as saying, "Friendship with the United States is the primary task in diplomacy." It also quoted Foreign Minister Ohira as stating on 7 July, "Japan's relations with the United States, China, and the Soviet Union are all related... The days are over for Japan to follow in the footsteps of the United States."

3/ KYODO, 22 July 1972, in English. This agreement was hailed in Tokyo as the first government-to-government contact between the two countries relating to the normalization of relations, but Peking denied that it had that status.

the two nations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.[1] Chou told a visiting Liberal Democratic Party[2] Dietman the following day that he would visit Japan if Sino-Japanese relations are normalized.[3] A week later, the Chinese Premier declared, "Normalizing relations is the common desire of the Japanese and Chinese peoples."[4] The expression of such favorable sentiments makes it appear that the exchange of diplomatic recognition by Tokyo and Peking is simply a matter of time.[5]

When the U.S. and Japan negotiated the reversion of Okinawa in 1971, the territorial conflict between Japan and the PRC over the Tiaoyu (Senkaku) Islands was exacerbated. These islands, according to Peking, were "within China's sea defense areas" already in the Ming Dynasty, but were "stolen" from China in the Sino-Japanese War and the ensuing Treaty of Shimonoseki as "islands appertaining to Taiwan."[6] The U.S. transfer of administration of these islands to Japan, in the words of a PRC government statement, was "utterly illegal," not altering China's sovereignty "over her territory of the Tiaoyu and other islands[7] appertaining to Taiwan."[8] According to Peking, the correct historical boundary

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1/ KYODO, 21 August 1972, in English.

2/ The ruling Japanese political party.

3/ KYODO, 22 August 1972, in English.

4/ Japan Times, 31 August 1972, in English.

5/ The Japan-China Joint Communique terminated the "abnormal state of affairs" between the two nations. At the same time, Japan stated that it recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. The two governments established diplomatic relations as of the date of the communique. For text, see New York Times, 30 September 1972, p. 2.

6/ "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China," Peking Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, 7 January 1972, p. 12.

7/ The PRC has listed these as including Huang-wei, Chih-wei, Nan-hsiao, Pei-hsiao, and other islands in the East China Sea. "Sato Government Tries to Annex China's Tiaoyu and Other Islands," Peking Review, Vol. 15, No. 14, 7 April 1972, p. 18.

8/ "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China," op. cit.

between the Chinese islands and the Ryukyus lies between Chihwei and Kume Islands.

The Peking government has been adamant in its claim to the Tiaoyu Islands as traditionally Chinese. A report carried by NCNA in late 1971 (6 November) revealed an additional reason for China's interest in the small, scattered islands. In October, the Japan Oil Company had allegedly begun exploitation of petroleum resources in the seabed and subsoil of the East China Sea near Tiaoyu Island. China obviously wishes to retain control of such critical resources as oil supplies, while Japan's economic and security position would be improved immeasurably if it had domestic oil resources.

As a result of the friendly relations enjoyed by Washington and Tokyo in the post-World War II era, epitomized in the Mutual Security Treaty, Peking has long regarded Japan as a tool of "U.S. imperialism." The close alignment of Japan with China's principal enemy of the 1950s and early 1960s would have determined China's open hostility toward Tokyo, even if the PRC had decided to take cognizance of the post-War peace orientation and revulsion with war expressed by the Japanese government. Japan, as an outpost of American power on China's periphery, posed a constant threat to Chinese security in Peking's perception. The U.S. bases there could be used for an attack on the Chinese mainland as easily as they were used to inject U.S. troops under U.N. auspices into the Korean War (where they fought Chinese "volunteers"). Thus the reversion of Okinawa is derided in Peking's pronouncements as a "fraud" which is "an attempt to 'legalize' the permanent occupation of Okinawa by U.S. imperialism, accelerate 'Okinawanization' of Japan proper and further strengthen Japan-U.S. military collusion."[1/] Demonstrations against U.S. bases in Japan, including Okinawa, have been played up in the Chinese media in an effort to force the U.S. to close out its bases

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1/ "U.S.-Japanese Reactionaries' Okinawa 'Reversion' Fraud," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 19, 7 May 1971, p. 15.

in the island nation. In an unusually explicit statement, People's Daily (18 September 1971) outlined the policy it would like to see Japan follow.

> What Japan should do is take another road, the road of independence, democracy, peace and neutrality. That is to say, Japan must free herself from U.S. imperialist control, dismantle the U.S. military bases and achieve genuine independence; she must renounce fascist dictatorship and let the people enjoy democratic rights; she must stop tailing after U.S. imperialism's policies of aggression and war, cease to be a U.S. tool for aggression and live on an equal footing and at peace with all countries; and she must abrogate the U.S.-Japan military alliance, and neither organize nor participate in military blocs...

Since this statement was issued, the PRC has indicated an interesting modification of its stand vis-à-vis Japan. In late August 1972, Chou En-lai is quoted as having announced that China does not necessarily demand abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and the clause referring to Taiwan in the 1969 Sato-Nixon joint communique,[1/] both of which had triggered continual Chinese invective. At the same time, the Chinese Premier implied that the PRC may forego its claim to war reparations payments from Japan when establishing diplomatic relations. This switch in Chinese demands demonstrates Peking's eagerness to normalize its relations with Tokyo.

Chinese propaganda in 1971 attributed Japan's strength to collusion with, and rivalry between, the U.S. and the USSR. In the wake of the mid-1971 "Nixon shocks," People's Daily (18 September 1971) explained:

> U.S. imperialism has no wish to see an independent, prosperous and strong Japan in Asia. While calling Japan a "close partner," it is actually ready to betray her at any time...The "new economic policy enforced recently by the Nixon government...has dealt Japan's economy a telling blow...

1/ The Japanese government has already declared that this clause, which linked Japan's and Taiwan's security, need no longer be enforced.

Japan subsequently has assumed growing importance as an arena for Sino-Soviet rivalry. As the U.S. appeared to abandon its position of preeminence in Japan, the Soviet Union prepared--in Peking's view--to fill the vacuum thus created.[1/] To this end, Moscow offered the "economic bait" of Soviet-Japanese cooperation in such projects as the exploitation of the Tyumen Oil Field. Peking Review analyzed Soviet motives as follows:

> The Soviet Union urgently needs to promote economic cooperation with Japan because it wants to get out of its domestic economic difficulties and solve the problem of its shortage of capital and backward technique and because it wants to further Japan economically and impede Japanese-U.S. relations by seizing the opportunity when the economic and trade contradictions between Japan and the United States have sharpened and when Japan is eager to find a way out abroad for her trade.[2/]

For its part, the PRC has also made economic overtures to Japan. Despite repeated condemnation of the zaibatsu,[3/] Peking has, over the past year, entered into a number of important trade agreements with the large Japanese companies, which it has termed "the mainstay of Japanese militarism."[4/] Japanese products which have evoked Chinese interest include steel, fertilizers, and industrial plants. Premier Chou En-lai has expressed a wish to expand trade between the two countries on the basis--contrary to that hitherto endorsed by Japan--of "nonseparation of economic matters from politics"[5/] to "mutually supply each others needs."[6/] In order to facilitate the exchange of goods,

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1/ "What is Behind Gromyko's Tokyo Visit," Peking Review, Vol. 15, No. 6, 11 February 1972, pp. 19-20.

2/ Ibid., p. 20.

3/ See, for example, "Zaibatsu Stage Comeback," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, 22 January 1971, pp. 11-13.

4/ Ibid., p. 11.

5/ KYODO, 31 August 1972, in English.

6/ Mainichi Shimbun, evening edition, 31 August 1972, in Japanese.

the PRC and Japan have worked out a formula for yuan-yen currency exchange.[1/]

Of signal importance to Tokyo, China has indicated willingness to supply crude oil to Japan.[2/] In addition, it has expressed interest in exporting agricultural produce to the island nation. Both commodities are crucial in assuring continued Japanese viability. Japan, as a highly industrialized nation with an extremely dense population, has long had difficulty in feeding its populace, as well as in supplying fuel to its industries. Thus China could fill a vital Japanese need while acquiring commodities which it requires. Nevertheless, despite the long-range terms proposed for the agreements, Chou En-lai has made it clear that China's aim remains self-sufficiency.

With food and fuel assured, Japanese officials may be reinforced in their new hands-off policy toward Taiwan. If Japan has a reliable, proximate oil supply, this would greatly facilitate its position as well as cut the cost of the vital supplies incurred in long-distance transport. From Peking's point of view, a PRC oil agreement with Tokyo may reduce the allure of Soviet "economic bait." Furthermore, with oil supplies assured, the economic importance of the Tiaoyu Islands to Japan would be somewhat reduced, perhaps permitting a peaceful solution to the potential territorial conflict between the two nations.

1/ Japan Economic Journal, Vol. 10, No. 504, 22 August 1972, pp. 1,4.

2/ Japan Times, 29 August 1972, in English.

V CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD JAPAN

China has long expressed apprehension of a militarily strong Japan. This fear may not be based upon actual Japanese conditions but rather upon remembered experiences of Japanese military might[1/] and upon current ideological preoccupations.[2/] The fear, however, is real.[3/] The following quotation from People's Daily (18 September 1971) is typical of Chinese pronouncements concerning Japan.

> Look at the past of Japanese militarism and you can tell its present; look at its past and present, and you can tell its future. The prewar history of Japanese militarism is a blood-smeared history of aggression and war. Japanese militarism had risen through the seizure of colonies by force.

In one article, People's Daily (16 June 1972) argued that soon Japan's defense perimeter will include not only Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indochina, but also the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf. Peking opposes any extension of Japanese influence as a threat to the other nations of Asia, including China itself.

In the late 1950s, when relations between China and the Soviet Union deteriorated, China's fear of Japan became manifest. Peking charged the Japanese government with sponsoring a revival of militarism and "attempting to realize the dream of a Greater East Asian Coprosperity

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1/ See, for example, Tao Ti-wen, "Expose Sato Government's Cannon-Fodder Recruitment Fraud," op. cit., pp. 20-24.

2/ Chinese broadcasts quote Lenin, "Modern militarism is the result of capitalism" with reference to Japan. Japan's "expansionism" is linked to its industrialization and need for markets and raw materials. See, for example, People's Liberation Army (PLA) Fukien Front Radio, 31 August 1971, to Taiwan in Mandarin.

3/ For example, as recently as April 1972, NCNA charged, "The Japanese ruling clique is intensifying its armament build-up and war preparations and stepping up its expansion abroad." NCNA, 6 April 1972, in English.

Sphere."[1] This accusation became louder and more persistent through the 1960s and has extended into the present decade.[2]

Throughout 1971, the PRC remained apprehensive and continued to charge Japan with the revival of militarism. In March, NCNA carried an article which gave clear expression to China's interpretation of Japanese intentions.[3] Concerning Japan's "peace constitution" it declared, ". . .the reactionary Japanese ruling classes . . . can 'interpret' the constitution with sophistry and even renounce or revise it finally. In effect, the stipulation . . . on the renunciation of war and nonmaintenance of war potentials is only of paper value." Claiming that the Japanese are revising their constitution, it stated, ". . . under the new constitution, the emperor system will be restored and Japan may possess war potentials and send troops overseas. This is one of the important steps of Japanese militarism for unleashing an aggressive war . . ."

The fourth five-year defense plan, NCNA claimed, "gives priority to the increase of offensive power of the navy and air force." Tokyo's "three-point nonnuclear principle"[4] was termed "nothing but a smoke-screen for the nuclear armament carried out by the Japanese reactionaries who are doing their utmost to develop nuclear industry." The Japanese military, according to the article, was developing sea and air nuclear delivery systems. It contended that the "Defense White Paper," published in October 1970, had prepared Japanese public opinion to accept nuclear armament by declaring it constitutionally legal.

1/ Peking Radio, 31 August 1971, to Taiwan in Mandarin.

2/ For example, Mao Tse-tung's widely hailed statement, "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs!" issued on 20 May 1970 in response to the widening of the war in Southeast Asia, noted the "revival of Japanese militarism." See Peking Review, Vol. 13, Special Issue, 23 May 1970, pp. 8-9.

3/ Tung Ping, "Guarantee or Deceitful Smokescreen," NCNA, 18 March 1971, in English.

4/ Not to possess, produce, or introduce nuclear weapons.

The Japanese "Defense White Paper" had already triggered a barrage of Chinese criticism. People's Daily, in a "Commentator" editorial, reasoned that "reactionary Japanese ruling circles who imagine that they have reached their goal of an 'economic power' are now eager to turn Japan into a 'military power' to carry out further expansion and aggression overseas."[1/] Noting that the "White Paper" claimed that the constitution permitted Japan to possess nuclear weapons,[2/] he alleged that in fact the "Japanese reactionaries have [for some time] accelerated their preparations for nuclear armament." Citing the U.S.-Japan agreement on joint production of enriched uranium, "Commentator" claimed that Japan could "easily" make nuclear weapons secretly, and "it is crystal clear that Japanese militarism fervently desires to acquire nuclear weapons."[3/]

Other PRC pronouncements have echoed the same theme, citing "collusion" between "Japanese munition monopoly capitalists" and the military to develop a well-stocked, modern arsenal complete with rockets, missiles, and atomic weapons.[4/] Commenting on the Japanese state budget for fiscal year 1972, Peking alleged that a major portion of the generous allotment for the science and technology agency was to be used for developing missiles, nuclear weapons, and "other military purposes."[5/]

1/ People's Daily Commentator, "Iron-Clad Evidence of Revival of Japanese Militarism," Peking Review, Vol. 13, No. 45, 6 November 1970, p. 12.

2/ The "White Paper" itself (Part II, Section 3, "Limits of Defense Power") states:

> If small-size nuclear weapons are within the scale of real power needed for the minimum necessary limit for self-defense, and if they are such as will not be a threat of aggression toward other nations, it is possible to say that possession thereof is possible, in legal theory. However, the Government adopts the policy of not having nuclear equipment, as its policy, even if this is possible from the standpoint of the Constitution.

3/ People's Daily Commentator, op. cit.

4/ "Zaibatsu Stage Comeback," op. cit., p. 12.

5/ NCNA, 5 April 1972, in English.

Strangely, however, PRC accusations of Japanese nuclear weapons development are not accompanied by threats or dire predictions of eventual defeat.

Chinese statements, often citing Tokyo's declared interest in the Malacca Strait as "Japan's life line" and in Korea and Taiwan as within Japan's defense perimeter, consistently reflect Chinese apprehensions of Japanese intentions in Asia. Korea and "Taiwan Province," as well as the entire Southeast Asian region, are viewed by the Chinese as areas coveted by the Japanese for the establishment of a colonial sphere of influence.[1/] The reversion of Okinawa to Japanese jurisdiction in spring 1972 strengthened Chinese suspicions of Tokyo's territorial aspirations. Japanese intentions toward the Korean peninsula are also considered suspect. A Peking Review article published in December 1971 declared that Japan intends "to occupy [South Korea] by force and turn it into a military base for aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China and other Asian countries."[2/] One-sixth of the joint communiqué issued at the close of Chou En-lai's visit to North Korea in April 1970 was devoted to denouncing "Japanese militarism," which, it claimed, had "become a dangerous force of aggression in Asia."[3/] Expressed succinctly, Japan is allegedly using an "economic force to prepare the way and armed force as the prop" for the purpose of "controlling economic arteries of South Korea, and annexing it"; it is "stepping into the shoes of U.S. imperialism in committing aggression" while "regarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as the enemy."[4/]

1/ "Japanese Economic Expansion in Southeast Asia," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 20, 14 May 1971, p. 15.

2/ "Japanese Reactionaries' Aggression and Expansion in South Korea," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 50, 10 December 1971, p. 25.

3/ "Joint Communique of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Peking Review, Vol. 13, No. 15, 10 April 1970, p.4.

4/ "Japanese Reactionaries' Aggression and Expansion in South Korea," op. cit., pp. 25-26.

One Chinese broadcast[1/] identified Southeast Asia as the "first target for Japanese plunder" because of the region's rich natural resources, which would be useful in producing materiel. Its markets, too, were cited as coveted by Japan to solve its economic difficulties. Tokyo, the statement declared, was determined to monopolize the Southeast Asian market. Economic expansion, it continued, would assuredly be followed by military aggression. The Chinese media identify the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, in particular, as targets of Japanese "economic imperialism," although Malaysia, Singapore, South Vietnam, and even India are also mentioned.[2/]

Taiwan has been a source of special tension between Japan and the PRC. Tokyo's support of the U.S. position calling for a continued ROC role in the U.N. even after Peking's successful bid for admission to the world body was repeatedly criticized by PRC delegates in that forum. Japan was the only country besides the United States which the government of the People's Republic criticized in its definitive 29 October 1971 foreign policy statement.

In addition to resenting Tokyo's role as Taipei's champion second only to the U.S. (until Prime Minister Tanaka's policy reorientation), Peking appeared concerned that Japan might wish to reassert the hegemony over Taiwan which it enjoyed during the first part of the century.[3/] Peking cites Japan's military seizure of the island in the Sino-Japanese War to prove the illegality and immorality of any Japanese claim to it.[4/] That Tokyo might abandon its desire to control the East China Sea seems inconceivable to the PRC in light of Japan's expressed

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1/ PLA Fukien Front Radio, 31 August 1971, to Taiwan in Mandarin.

2/ See "Japan Steps Up Exploitation in Southeast Asia," Peking Review, Vol. 15, No. 22, 2 June 1972, pp. 18-19; and "Japanese Monopoly Capital Steps Up Economic Expansion in Southeast Asia," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 41, 8 October 1971, pp. 18-19.

3/ "U.S.-Japanese Reactionaries Intensifying 'Independent Taiwan' Scheme," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 44, 29 October 1971, p. 13.

4/ See, for example, "Taiwan Has Been China's Sacred Territory Since Ancient Times," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 44, 29 October 1971, pp. 14-16.

interest in continued access to the Taiwan Strait for its vital trade with Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

On 9 June 1972, People's Daily carried an extensive analysis of an article which had appeared in the Japanese periodical Military Research (May issue). Excerpts of the critique encapsulate Peking's apprehensions concerning Japanese intentions toward Taiwan.

> [The Japanese author] asserted that "[Taiwan] has a strangle-hold on the maritime trade route which maintains Japan's life," that "the loss of Taiwan will directly endanger the fate of Japan and the Republic of Korea," and that "if the People's Republic of China is allowed to control Taiwan," the "pressure" on Japan will "suddenly increase." . . . Obviously what [the author] and his ilk want others to "bear in mind" indelibly is to try to obstruct the Chinese people from liberating their own territory Taiwan so that the Japanese reactionaries can annex it one day.
>
> The aim . . . in calling for Japan's reannexation of Taiwan is to launch aggression not only against China, but also against countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific region, using Taiwan as a springboard.

Also subject to scathing Chinese criticism is alleged Japanese support for the "Taiwan Independence League," which is part of a "premeditated plot of the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries" to "occupy Taiwan permanently and make it a base for the invasion of the mainland of China and other Asian countries."[1/] When the U.S. appeared to have become tied down in Vietnam, the PRC claimed that Japan responded by accelerating its economic penetration of Taiwan in order to assume the former U.S. role there. As evidence that "Japanese monopoly capital aims at turning Taiwan into a Japanese colony and reoccupying it,"

1/ "Taiwan Has Been China's Sacred Territory..." op. cit., p. 16.

Peking Review asserted that Japan "is going all out in increasing its investments, monopolizing markets, plundering resources and battening on the cheap labor" of Taiwan.[1/]

Tokyo apparently recognizes Peking's fear of possible renewed Japanese military expansionism. In order to counter the fear--and probably also to offset Chinese propaganda--Foreign Minister Ohira announced that the Japanese government is prepared to conclude a nonaggression pact with the PRC.[2/] In fact, Japanese officials have indicated a willingness to make a pledge that Japan will never go to war again,[3/] stating that this would not only smooth future Sino-Japanese relations but also ease tensions in Asia at large.

In summary, then, it appears that the strain and suspicion which have constantly plagued Sino-Japanese contacts are gradually being dispelled as both nations move toward a mutual understanding. Nevertheless, the spectre of "Japanese militarism" can be expected to color Chinese perceptions of Tokyo's motives in the foreseeable future, despite the almost inevitability of normalized Peking-Tokyo relations. Japan can offer the PRC commodities which it sorely needs and can, in return, be assured of a new, albeit restricted, market. With the Taiwan issue removed as a barrier and with the gradual withdrawal of the U.S. presence in Asia, Peking will be increasingly eager to reach a modus vivendi with the island nation. (For a list of Chinese interests in Japan, see Table 1.)

1/ "Japanese Reactionaries Step Up Economic Expansion in China's Taiwan Province," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 38, 17 September 1971, p. 11.

2/ KYODO, 18 August 1972, in English.

3/ Ibid. This pledge was in effect incorporated into the China-Japan Joint Communique, Article 7, which stated that neither signatory nation "should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region." (New York Times, 30 September 1972, p. 2.)

TABLE 1

Ranking of Chinese Interests in Japan

1. Prevent Japan from going nuclear and turning "militaristic."
2. Diminish U.S. and Soviet influence in Japan.
3. End the state of war; exchange diplomatic recognition with Tokyo (furthering the isolation of the ROC).
4. Regain sovereignty over the Tiaoyu Islands.
5. Establish favorable complementary trade arrangements.
6. Rivalry for markets and influence in Southeast Asia.

VI IMPLICATIONS OF JAPANESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR PRC POLICY

The Chinese government, in deciding that it will not demand abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, has opted for a course designed to lessen Japan's perceived need for a greater defense capability, including, perhaps, the development of nuclear weapons. As long as the U.S. security guarantee for Japan, including the nuclear umbrella, remains in force, the need for an indigenous nuclear capability will remain a low priority. If, however, Tokyo were to become estranged from Washington and lose the American shield, it would feel it imperative to acquire a vastly improved defense capability, possibly including development of a nuclear arsenal. Thus Peking's present relaxed attitude toward the Treaty and U.S.-Japanese amity will, if it persists, greatly reduce any Japanese perception of need for nuclear weapons.

If, however, Japan decides to embark on a nuclear weapons development program, the move would probably be interpreted in Peking as confirming previous accusations of "revitalized Japanese militarism" and aggressive ambitions. A Japanese nuclear capability would probably be considered as posing a clear and present danger to the continued existence of the PRC, particularly if accompanied by sustained friendly relations between Tokyo and Moscow.

The People's Republic, despite its declarations that nuclear proliferation is the right of all nations and will eventually lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, can be expected to assume a threatening posture toward Japan if it announces an intention to adopt the nuclear option. China claims to foresee the development of Japanese nuclear weapons and has condemned it in advance. It has attacked Japanese statements concerning the necessity to protect its shipping routes, and nuclear weapons developed specifically for this purpose would not be exempt from Peking's censure.

The PRC would assiduously modulate its stance to convey to Tokyo the message that persistence in its chosen course could only be disadvantageous to Japan. At the same time, the PRC would be careful not

to present such a threatening visage that Japan would feel confirmed in its decision and perhaps even accelerate or expand its program.

China would probably mount a virulent propaganda campaign for Korean, ROC, and Southeast Asian consumption designed to increase apprehension of renewed Japanese expansionism in those countries. "Japanese militarism" would be repeatedly analyzed in graphic terms, recalling the tortures endured as a result of occupation during World War II and drawing present day parallels. Economic penetration of Japanese products into overseas markets and the local presence of Japanese business representatives would be emphasized. The inevitability of military expansion's following economic growth expounded by Marxism would be stressed. Memories of sufferings at Japanese hands during World War II are still vivid in the region, and a Chinese campaign, for example, in the U.N., might mobilize a considerable amount of governmental and popular sentiment against the Japanese decision.

Chinese propaganda would brand a Japanes nuclear weapons program as further evidence of Japanese "collusion with U.S. imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism."[1/] In May 1971, Peking Review explained, "Japanese militarism is actually attempting to collude with the two superpowers in aggression against China, Korea and Viet Nam and suppressing the national liberation movement in Asia . . ."[2/] However, it is possible that Japanese nuclear weapons would be linked only with Soviet-Japanese collusion, leaving the U.S. more options with respect to the two Asian powers. As discussed above, statements issuing from Peking indicate that China expects a decline in U.S.-Japanese relations and a subsequent Japanese alignment with the USSR.[3/]

If the anti-Japanese feelings could be translated into economic sanctions against Japanese products, possibly orchestrated by Peking

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1/ See, for example, People's Daily, 18 September 1972; and NCNA, 5 February 1972, in English.

2/ "True Colors of Japanese Militarism Exposed," Peking Review, Vol. 4, No. 21, 21 May 1971, p. 24.

3/ "What is Behind Gromyko's Tokyo Visit," op. cit., p. 20.

or some regional grouping such as ASEAN, Tokyo may be forced to reexamine its policy. China, likewise, could threaten to close its doors to Japanese goods and to cut off the supplies of oil and agricultural produce it has been offering the island nation or to close down the vital Taiwan Strait.

Peking could also hint to Tokyo that if it persisted in developing nuclear weapons, the PRC may feel a need to station its own nuclear deterrent in North Korea. This would have to be stated with extreme delicacy, for actual implementation of this threat would probably prove more disadvantageous to China than to Japan. In addition, it is questionable whether Pyongyang would agree to Peking's stationing nuclear weapons on its soil without North Korea's gaining a degree of control over their use. Furthermore, the Soviet response to such a Chinese move may be violent and decisive.

On a more positive note, if Tokyo appeared to be developing nuclear weapons specifically to protect its vital shipping lanes, the PRC could offer to guarantee freedom of passage through the Taiwan Strait to nonmilitary Japanese transport. It could also, as it in fact appears to be doing, offer Japan a share in developing China's oil resources, which would provide Japan with a proximate oil supply.

If the anti-Japanese propaganda campaign and economic sanctions failed to deter Tokyo from pursuing its decision to develop nuclear weapons, the PRC would be compelled to change its tone. If it persisted in overt hostility, Japan might be forced to reach some kind of a security understanding with the USSR which would signal the realization of the feared encirclement of China. Peking may well prefer a truly independent Japanese nuclear capability to a "treaty of friendship" between Tokyo and Moscow modeled after the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation (signed in August 1971), which contains a provision for mutual military assistance.

China would find it in its interests to maintain cordial relations with a nuclear Japan in order to retain its freedom to concentrate on the confrontation with the Soviet Union. To this end, the PRC, after

the original hostile reaction described above, can be expected to continue its present (fall 1972) course of diplomatic detente and mutually advantageous economic overtures coupled with "people's diplomacy." At the same time, it would probably quietly increase its support to opposition elements in the Japanese body politic in an effort eventually to facilitate a change of government in Japan. Peking has long cultivated the friendship of leaders of the Japan Socialist Party, Komeito, the Democratic Socialist Party, and the opposition wing of the Liberal Democratic Party. The PRC would also surreptitiously encourage ultra-radical groups to agitate against the development of Japanese nuclear weapons and perhaps even engage in sabotage against nuclear installations--if possible--to delay the program. A maximum degree of internal dissent, erupting in massive popular demonstrations, might cause the Japanese leaders to reevaluate their nuclear venture. Peking would as a minimum give full play in its propaganda to such an upheaval; as a maximum, it may attempt to manipulate and regulate the popular movement through Japanese proxies. Chinese moral support for antiwar and antinuclear weapons elements in the Japanese populace can be assumed to remain enthusiastic.

To cope with the threat posed by a Japanese nuclear capability, the PRC may attempt to strengthen friendly ties with the U.S. Concessions which Peking could offer Washington include the cessation or reduction of anti-U.S. propaganda campaigns, denial of direct assistance and encouragement to certain guerrilla groups, support for the repatriation of American prisoners of war, or the return of additional possible hostages which China may be holding. If Peking and Washington were to enter into some sort of mutual security arrangement--unlikely as that may seem at present--Japan would find itself isolated in the midst of the Pacific, flanked by two powerful nations, which concurred in disapproval of Japan's nuclear decision. In such a case, Tokyo may be forced to abandon its nuclear program as totally inadequate for dealing

with the reality of the situation, having found that it created more problems than it solved. However, it appears more likely that Japan would make diplomatic overtures to Moscow with the eventual object of forging a Russo-Japanese alliance to balance the Sino-American arrangement. This would definitely endanger China, which may eventually decide to accept a nuclear-armed and independent Japan as a counter to the Soviet thrust into Asia.

Peking may attempt to convince Washington to invoke its former (assuming that Japan embarked on a nuclear weapons program because of loosening ties with the U.S.) close relationship with Japan to influence the Japanese government to change its course. In such a case, Peking may finally agree to a token Japanese nuclear force which would accord Tokyo the status accrued through nuclear weapons possession while still eliminating the threat to China. Japan may, in return for "voluntarily" limiting its weapons production, be offered a joint Sino-U.S. security guarantee. In this scenario, the United States would be in a position of major importance in determining the future balance of power in the Pacific.

In any case, Japanese nuclear weapons can be counted upon to elicit a demand from Peking that Tokyo undertake a declaration never to be the first to utilize its new weapons. China would renew its calls, inside the U.N. and out, for an international conference to discuss and execute the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the PRC can be expected to accelerate its own nuclear weapons production in order to station a credible nuclear deterrent in Manchuria (an area of traditional Japanese interest) and along the East China Sea coast, not only facing Japan, but also opposite Taiwan. It would also carefully patrol the Taiwan Strait, which it would prepare to close off in the event of hostilities with Japan. The militia in the coastal provinces would probably undergo intensified training programs and certainly would be thoroughly alerted to the new danger presented by Japan.

While Japan was in the process of developing its weapons and still

unable to use them, Peking may feel it best to quietly and with great determination effect the reincorporation of Taiwan and the islands appertaining to it into the main body of the Chinese state, thus preempting the Japanese effort to control the island province which China claims to foresee. Although the U.S. stated in the Nixon-Chou En-lai joint communiqué that the problem of Taiwan was an internal matter to be settled by the Chinese people themselves, the actuality of the solution may occasion some readjustments in U.S. strategic thinking and foreign policy planning. If the PRC resorted to an armed invasion, strong resentment in large sectors of both the U.S. and the Japanese publics may be aroused. Since both countries are democracies, this eventually, improbable as it appears at present, must be considered.

Similarly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) may feel that the time is ripe for "reunification" with the South before Japan could defend its interests on the peninsula with nuclear weapons. This would certainly involve a bloody invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK), and, in addition to moral issues, place the U.S., Japan, and the U.N. in an exceedingly awkward position. China may be tempted to supply "volunteers" to Pyongyang on the pretext of a threatened ROK "invasion" of the North. This, however, is extremely unlikely in view of China's vociferous condemnation of interference in the internal affairs of others (it considers the Korean Peninsula to comprise one nation which has been illegally divided by the U.S. under the auspices of the U.N.). More probably, Peking would use its veto in the Security Council, much as the Soviet Union did during the Bangla Desh crisis, to prevent the world organization from interfering in the action or passing any censuring resolutions. DPRK control of the entire peninsula would prevent Japan from gaining a toehold on the Asian mainland there, as it did prior to the invasion of Manchuria at the start of World War II in Asia. Nevertheless, a unified communist Korea may present as many problems to the PRC as it solves. Kim Il-song's government has been careful to remain independent and will not accept Peking's suzerainty. Instead, Pyongyang has been prone to

overcompensate in friendliness to Moscow. Potential USSR backing of a "reunification" campaign may prove sufficient to move the DPRK firmly into the Soviet camp. This would mean another hostile nation on China's flank, significantly increasing China's isolation and encirclement by pro-Soviet partisans.

In summary, then, of the various contingencies described above, the most probable Chinese response to a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be an initial vigorous propaganda offensive designed to shake Japanese confidence in its nuclear decision. Peking would be careful, however, to regulate its statements so that they would not prove counterproductive, confirming the perceived need for nuclear weapons or forcing Japan into an alliance with the Soviet Union. The PRC would attempt to invoke pressure on Tokyo from other countries, including the U.S., as well as from the U.N. If Japan should prove obdurate in pursuing the nuclear option, China would probably abandon the overtly hostile posture in favor of friendly state relations which may accord Peking a channel for influence in Tokyo. The main purpose of this volte face, in any case, would be to assure that the new nuclear weapons would not be aimed at China. However, the PRC cannot be expected to abandon sub rosa encouragement to dissident Japanese groupings which could be utilized to influence the government. China would probably increase its international diplomatic offensive, paying particular attention to cultivating favorable ties with the U.S. It would accelerate its own defense program while simultaneously renewing calls for nuclear arms control arrangements on its own terms.

VII CHINESE INTERESTS IN INDIA

Until the Sino-Indian border incident of 1961-62, India, as self-proclaimed head of nonaligned Asia, had enjoyed relatively cordial relations with China. The 1965 Border War served to underscore the tensions which had surfaced between the two powers.

There are a number of basic causes for conflict between India and China. First, there is the border question: the Sino-Indian border has never been satisfactorily demarcated. When relations between the two countries become tense, armed skirmishes break out in the border regions, as happened during the recent Bangla Desh crisis.

India and China have accused each other of interfering in each other's internal affairs. Numerous Chinese statements have condemned alleged Indian support of a rebel movement in Tibet. India's acceptance of some 150,000 Tibetan refugees[1/] is cited by Peking as evidence that New Delhi wishes to challenge China's position in the Autonomous Region despite India's refusal to permit the Dalai Lama to perform political functions and its failure to recognize a Tibetan government-in-exile.

Conversely, China has lent its support to various rebel groups within India. Naga and Mizo tribesmen have received training in China for the guerrilla warfare which has plagued India's remote northeastern region, and India has accused China of furnishing arms to the rebels. Furthermore, the Chinese media have frequently carried statements enthusiastically supporting the Naxalite terrorists.[2/]

Closely related to the border and Tibetan problems is China's resentment of Indian hegemony over the Himalayan kingdoms, which India considers its traditional sphere of influence. Peking apparently would like the tiny states to form an independent buffer zone, perhaps

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1/ Sreedhar, "Bangla Desh: China's Dilemma," China Report (New Delhi), Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 1971, p. 59.

2/ The ultra-leftist China-oriented terrorist movement in India of which the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) is the largest component.

in the form of a Pan-Himalayan Federation, between the PRC and the Indian subcontinent or it may even wish to cast itself (instead of New Delhi) in the role of protector of the mountain kingdoms. Nevertheless, it has made no overt attempts to detach Bhutan or Sikkim from India; nor has it backed a violent revolutionary movement in any of the three states. To date, although China has made significant progress in eroding India's ties with Nepal, New Delhi's relations with Bhutan and Sikkim remain close and paternalistic. Chinese restraint in the case of the Himalayan states may be predicated upon the expectation that were the PRC to make an overt attempt to detach the region from India, New Delhi would either further strengthen its ties with the superpowers (the U.S. or the USSR) or embark on an accelerated military program, which could include nuclear armament aimed at China.

China's enmity toward India is also derived from a fear of India's becoming a strong rival power in Asia. Citing Nehru's book, The Discovery of India, during the recent crisis in East Pakistan, Chairman of the Chinese Delegation to the U.N. Chiao Kuan-hua charged, "For years the Indian ruling circles have never given up their ambitious attempt to become a 'superpower' or a 'semisuperpower.'"[1/] (China, in contrast, has declared that it will never become a "superpower.") Fear of New Delhi's growing power is, of course, exacerbated by the developing Soviet position of preeminence in India.

The primary factor in Sino-Indian relations in recent years has been the Sino-Soviet split and the accompanying drive by both the PRC and the USSR to secure for themselves strategic spheres of influence or to establish friendly regimes in their border regions. India, a potentially powerful developing nation which has aspired to the role of leader of noncommunist Asia, shares a rugged, mountainous border with

1/ Chiao Kuan-hua, "Condemning Soviet-Supported Indian Aggression Against Pakistan," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 51, 17 December 1971, p. 11.

China. During the 1950s, India received considerable aid from the U.S., and since 1955, from the USSR. At the same time, New Delhi enjoyed the friendly relations with China epitomized in the joint enunciation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence by Chou En-lai and Nehru at the Bandung Conference in 1955. (Chinese friendship during this period was probably based on Nehru's opposition to the U.S. in the name of anticolonialism.) The border conflict between the two nations was, however, already developing.

With the unfolding of the Sino-Soviet split, China allowed its relations with India to cool. In 1959, the Soviet news agency TASS published a declaration of neutrality in the Sino-Indian border dispute, and in 1961-62 the first major border incident took place. At the same time, the Soviet Union began extending military aid to India. The Soviet and Indian governments agreed on one major point: that China must be prevented from gaining a foothold in South Asia. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has not supported India in all conflicts pertaining to China; Soviet maps of the disputed Sino-Indian border region continue to conform largely with Chinese territorial claims. India, for its part, categorically supported the Soviet Union in its 1969 border clashes with China.

Recent Chinese statements referring to India indicate that PRC hostility toward New Delhi is shaped by the Soviet-Indian relationship. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union has been the chief source of aid to India. Peking fears that the USSR is attempting to isolate it by surrounding the People's Republic with hostile regimes. The Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, signed by India and the Soviet Union in August 1971, in effect confirmed this impression. Article 9 of the Treaty stipulates:[1/]

> Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other Party.

1/ India News (Washington, D. C.), Vol. X, No. 20, 13 August 1971, p. 2.

> In the event of either Party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such a threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries.

The military implications for China are obvious and serious. During the Bangla Desh crisis, Huang Hua, Chinese permanent representative to the U.N., declared the Soviet aim in South Asia to be "to gain control of the subcontinent, encircle China, and strengthen [the Soviet] position in contending with the other superpower for world hegemony. What the Soviet leaders of today are frantically seeking is the establishment of . . . a great empire controlling the whole Eurasian continent."[1/] Such a Soviet empire would pose a distinct threat to China's continued existence.

The Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and Soviet moves to form an Asia Collective Security Pact aimed at containing the PRC have not gone unnoticed in Peking, which regards them as yet another face of the Soviet Union's attempt to encircle the People's Republic.

A further irritant to Peking in the context of the Soviet-Indian relationship is the view, expressed by some Indian scholars,[2/] that the Moscow-New Delhi detente exemplifies a successful application of the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence. Although no Chinese statements to this effect have been published, this appears to be a reasonable assumption. In fact, China may also resent the peaceful transition to socialism which seems to be occurring under the Congress Party. The Communist Party of India, which is Moscow-oriented, and the Communist Party of India (Marxist), which is "nonaligned," are legal political parties and have successfully contested a number of state and local elections. (China, as mentioned above, endorses the clandestine Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), which has suffered a

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1/ NCNA, 8 December 1971, in English. (Emphasis added.)

2/ See, for example, Manoranjan Mohanty, "Bangladesh and Sino-Indian relations" [sic], China Report (New Delhi), Vol. VII, No. 6, November-December 1971, p. 46.

series of serious setbacks at the hands of the Indian Army in recent months.)

The PRC attitude toward Pakistan first rose above the diplomatic routine in 1961-62, as Chinese relations with India--and, significantly, with the Soviet Union--deteriorated markedly. It is pertinent to remember that at the time Peking was forging its ties with Karachi, there appeared to be no possibility of a Sino-American thaw. Thus, with India receiving considerable aid from the U.S. as well as the USSR, New Delhi appeared to Peking to be little better than a tool of the superpowers. Chinese policy toward the subcontinent was largely shaped by its antipathy to those powers. In 1964, Peking claimed the Indian government was pursuing a "policy of double alignment under the cover of nonalignment."1/

The detente between China and Pakistan was based on convenience, not on ideological affinity. Pakistan provided China with a counterweight to growing Soviet influence in New Delhi, and Karachi backed Peking in its clashes with India, branding India the aggressor. China opposed India on the Kashmir issue, claiming that a solution could only be reached by the Kashmir people themselves. It also furnished material and arms aid to assist Pakistan in its conflicts with India.

In summary, then, it can be said that the PRC's major interest pertaining to India is maintenance of China's territorial integrity and national security by opposing Soviet inroads in the subcontinent. Thus, the primary Chinese interest in South Asia is predicated more on Peking's attitude toward Moscow than on its attitude toward, and interests in, either India or Pakistan. (For ranking of interests, see Table 2.)

Nevertheless, there are a number of independent factors that must be considered as well. These include: Chinese fear of a strong rival Asian power in India, border demarcation, displeasure with Indian hegemony over the Himalayan kingdoms, apprehension about the role

1/ Quoted in Manoranjan Mohanty, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

TABLE 2

Ranking of Chinese Interests in India

1. Undermining Soviet influence in the subcontinent and thwarting encirclement.
2. Prevention of Soviet-American guarantee of Indian security.
3. Dissuasion of India from exercising the nuclear option.
4. Fear of India's becoming strong rival in Asia.
5. Border demarcation, acceptance of Tibetan status quo, and neutralization of the Himalayan kingdoms.
6. Support for rebel groups in India aimed ultimately at creating a socialist revolution in India.

to be played by Tibetan refugees in India, and a desire to influence Indian internal developments through various guerrilla groups. Although not explicitly cited in Chinese propaganda, two additional major interests must be mentioned: (1) a desire to prevent the emergence of a joint U.S.-USSR arrangement for Indian defense and (2) a desire to prevent India from pursuing a nuclear weapons program, particularly if India remains allied with the Soviet Union.

VIII. RECENT PRC ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS TOWARD INDIA

On New Year's Day 1969, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi initiated a new phase in Sino-Indian relations by informing a press conference that India would be willing to hold talks with China without any preconditions. (Previously, the Indian government had called for a Chinese withdrawal from occupied territory to the "line of actual control" as of 8 September 1962 as a precondition to negotiations.) Since 1964, China had expressed willingness to negotiate with India at any time and in any place. Peking, however, appeared to ignore Mrs. Gandhi's initiative until 1 May 1970. On that date, Mao Tse-tung, in a brief comment to Indian Charge d'Affairs to Peking Brajesh Mishra, stated that the PRC and India should normalize their relations and become friendly. This move was followed by a number of diplomatic contacts between Chinese and Indian representatives abroad. With a brief hiatus in spring 1971, Chinese statements critical of India tapered off and ceased to appear between October 1970 and November 1971. When the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation was signed in August 1971, the Chinese media observed a noncommittal silence, although the military implications of the Treaty for the People's Republic were obvious.

Despite the rapidly deteriorating situation in East Bengal, portents hopeful of a Sino-Indian thaw continued to occur. India supported China in its successful bid for entry to the United Nations on 25 October 1971. When Madame Gandhi sent China a message (27 October) congratulating it upon its acceptance into the world body, Chou En-lai sent a friendly response. In early November, an Indian ping-pong team participated in an Afro-Asian tournament in the People's Republic.

In his first major policy speech at the U.N. on 15 November, leader of the Chinese Delegation Chiao Kuan-hua avoided referring

to the increasingly tense conditions on the subcontinent.[1] Sino-Indian relations appeared so favorable that on 18 November, Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh declared that "either country could take the first step" in upgrading their respective diplomatic missions.[2] He also invited China to attend the Third Asian Trade Fair, which was to be held in Delhi the following November. Further, he indicated that the Indian government was considering participating in the upcoming Canton Fair.

The PRC's careful treatment of India, outlined above, was probably part of the overall foreign policy redirection decided upon at the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The new policy entailed a drive to increase friendly contacts throughout the world. It seemed that Sino-Indian tensions had relaxed to the point that the various issues of conflict could be dealt with peacefully.

However, the brief interval of critical comment on India which was carried in the Chinese press in the middle of spring 1971 foreshadowed the deeper conflict which was to come at the end of the year. When West Pakistan introduced troops into the East to put down the revolt (25 March 1971), the Chinese press carried some Pakistani reports of the events citing "Indian interference" as well as publishing all of the Pakistani protest notes to India during this period. The Chinese Embassy in New Delhi issued a "strong protest" on 6 April accusing the Indian government of having "connived at" a hostile demonstration at the Chinese mission on 29 March. The protest also accused India of "flagrantly interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan."[3] Shortly thereafter (11 April), People's Daily carried a "Commentator" article outlining Peking's stand on the developments in East Bengal. The article accused India of interference in Pakistan's internal affairs and claimed that the "Indian expansionists" were seriously threatening Pakistan's security by massing

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1/ For text, see Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 47, 19 November 1971, pp. 5-9.

2/ Quoted in Manoranjan Mohanty, op. cit., p.48.

3/ Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 16, 16 April 1971, p. 3.

troops along the border. Charging that India was closely cooperating with the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, in carrying out its interference, the article promised resolute support to the "Pakistan Government and people."

On 12 April, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai sent Pakistani President Yahya Khan a message stating that a united Pakistan was essential to that country's prosperity and calling for consultations to resolve the conflict between the two sections.

On 19 November, Chinese Delegate Fu Hao delivered his first speech in the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee of the United Nations, which was currently considering the Bangla Desh refugee problem.[1/] In his address, he accused "a certain country" of exploiting the East Pakistani refugee issue to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs. Although Fu Hao refrained from naming India, his speech marked the beginning of renewed Chinese castigation of that state.

Chiao Kuan-hua's denunciation of the Soviet-Indian Treaty during a Soviet-sponsored debate on disarmament in the U.N. General Assembly on 26 November gave clear expression to Peking's attitude toward the developing crisis on the subcontinent. Terming the Treaty a "military alliance," the Chinese delegate charged that the Soviets were using it to encourage "a neighbor of China's" to "launch barefaced armed aggression against Pakistan."[2/] Again, India was not called by name, but the reference was unmistakeable. Indian military action in Bangla Desh was imminent by this time; a tank battle, later cited by Peking as the start of the war, had taken place between Indian and Pakistani forces on 21 November. (This battle was not reported in the Chinese media until 4 December, one day after India's invasion of East Bengal.

1/ See Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 48, 26 November 1971, p. 20.

2/ "Chiao Kuan-hua Refutes Soviet Representative Malik's Attack on China," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 49, 3 December 1971, p. 17.

By that time it had become obvious that New Delhi was determined to carry out the "liberation" of Bangla Desh.)

During the two weeks of the war, China made strong statements supporting Pakistan, as well as voted in its favor at the U.N. But even in the world body, Chinese hostility to the Soviet Union seemed to be decisive in determining its actions. On 5 December, China voted for a resolution calling for a ceasefire on the subcontinent (vetoed by the USSR) but the following day was the only country to vote against a Soviet resolution calling for a political settlement in East Bengal, which would have brought about an automatic ceasefire. China (5 December) submitted a draft resolution condemning India for its role in the South Asian conflict and calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal to the borders as they existed on 21 November preparatory to a peaceful settlement.[1/]

China's statements in the United Nations during the crisis in East Bengal, too, seemed to be designed more to isolate and condemn the Soviet Union than to actually assist Pakistan.[2/] The USSR was constantly identified as the real source of conflict on the subcontinent.[3/] Chinese delegates made it plain that, in their opinion, India was able to intervene because it had Moscow's support in the matter.

China's stance at the U.N. during this period provides an important key to Peking's attitude toward the subcontinent. The basic points expounded by PRC delegates to the world forum include:[4/]

1/ For text, see Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 50, 10 December 1971, p. 10.

2/ See, for example, NCNA, 8 December 1971, in English.

3/ Prior to the Bangla Desh crisis, the "Indian reactionaries" were often linked with the U.S. as well as the USSR in Chinese propaganda.

4/ See, for example, Chiao Kuan-hua, "Condemning Soviet-Supported Indian Aggression Against Pakistan," op. cit., pp. 11-13; "Huang Hua Denounces Indian Government for Its Aggression," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 50, 10 December 1971, pp. 7-8; "Huang Hua Condemns Soviet Union for Supporting Indian Agression," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 50, 10 December 1971, pp. 8-10.

1. India was the aggressor.

2. The Soviet Union was behind the "Indian aggression."

3. The East Bengali refugees did not constitute a threat to India, nor did their presence in India justify Indian intervention.

4. The crisis in East Bengal was Pakistan's internal affair.

5. Bangla Desh was the creation of India in collaboration with the Soviet Union.

6. The U.N. must not tacitly encourage international aggression by permitting India to occupy East Bengal and establish Bangla Desh.

Statements concerning the India-Pakistan War in the Chinese media during December 1971 indicate that the PRC views India as an expansionist power which could have territorial designs on China's southwestern border regions. Chou En-lai himself accused New Delhi of cherishing a "wild ambition to annex Pakistan and bring about a Greater Indian Empire."[1/]

The PRC, however, was more concerned with the special relationship between India and the Soviet Union than with Indian expansionist aspirations.[2/] Chinese statements invariably ascribed to India the role of a tool of Moscow, which was regarded as the real power behind the military conflict in the subcontinent. Again in the words of Chou En-lai, "The whole world knows that it is solely because of the bolstering by social-imperialism that the Indian reactionaries have dared to launch a war of aggression . . ."[3/] Moscow was doing so, according to People's Daily (7 December 1971), in order to "further control India and expand its sphere of influence in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean."

Many Chinese statements regarding India during this period are marked by a degree of restraint as well as equivocation. As pointed

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1/ "Speech by Premier Chou En-lai," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 52 24 December 1971, p. 8.

2/ For example, on 8 December 1971, NCNA quoted Chiao Kuan-hua as stating, "The Indian expansionists usually do not have much guts." (English original.)

3/ Ibid.

out above, fault for the situation was laid squarely at Soviet feet by Peking. It is interesting to note that the PRC did not issue a protest regarding a Sino-Sikkim border violation on 10 December until the day Dacca fell (16 December). Even then, it used restrained language, terming the incursion a "reconnaissance mission."[1/] Clearly, China did not wish to become involved actively in the hostilities. This could be due to a variety of factors: (1) the Soviet-Indian Treaty which encouraged the USSR to create a diversionary action to pin down China should it threaten to intervene; (2) Chinese policy, as enunciated in Lin Piao's 1965 essay, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War"; (3) inability to move a sufficient number of troops through the snow-blocked Himalayan passes; or (4) reluctance to lose the diplomatic mileage Peking had gained in New Delhi. Although the others may also have contributed to Chinese restraint during the crisis, the first, i.e., fear of Soviet action against China itself, seems the most probable explanation in light of the following quote from Chiao Kuan-hua's 7 December speech at the U.N.[2/]

> On December 5, TASS published a statement which... clamours that the tension between India and Pakistan has threatened the so-called interests of security of the Soviet Union and that it cannot remain indifferent. This is blackmail and is a menace to China as well as all the neighboring countries of India and Pakistan.

An important aspect of China's backing of Pakistan during the crisis can be found in PRC pronouncements that India was interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. A "Commentator" article in People's Daily (6 December) explained China's interpretation of the way in which India's example could be generalized if it were allowed to succeed.

1/ NCNA, 16 December 1971, in English.

2/ Chiao Kuan-hua, "Condemning Soviet-Supported Aggression Against Pakistan," op. cit., p. 11.

> Every country of the world has its neighbors as well as its internal affairs. If [the] logic of the Indian expansionists can be maintained, then does it not mean that every country may create pretexts at will to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbors and may send troops to invade them?

Preoccupied as the PRC is with the threat posed to its continued existence, "Commentator" must have had the possiblity of Soviet intervention first and foremost in his mind.

Statements likening the Indian action to that of the Japanese in Manchukuo, of (allegedly) India in Tibet, and of the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia are significant in the light of Peking's fears that Moscow will invoke the Brezhnev Doctrine to sanction future Soviet military intervention in China. Further, the PRC stated repeatedly that the presence of the East Bengali refugees in India was insufficient cause, in fact was merely an excuse, for the Indian invasion. Chinese statements disclose apprehension of a similar Indian invasion of Tibet rationalized by the presence of Tibetan refugees in India.[1/] More to the point, however, might be fear of a similar Soviet invasion of Sinkiang based on the presence in the USSR of refugees from Chinese Central Asia or a declaration of independence or separation by Taiwan, perhaps with Soviet, American, or Japanese backing.[2/] Peking concludes, "If this type of gangster behavior is not stopped, how can there be any security or state sovereignty?"[3/]

1/ Ibid.

2/ In the Security Council on 5 December, PRC Permanent Representative Huang Hua declared,

> In order to dismember Pakistan and realize their scheme of so-called independence of East Pakistan, the Soviet representative came out with the argument based on population statistics...This reminds one of the fact that in order to split China and engineer the so-called Taiwan independence, the representative of another superpower put forward...a similar argument that China's Taiwan Province has over 10 million population...This is a true "duet!"

"Huang Hua Condemns Soviet Union for Supporting Indian Aggression," op. cit., p. 8.

3/ NCNA, 7 December 1971, domestic service, in Chinese.

Another theme in Chinese statements regarding Bangla Desh is that the East Bengali crisis was a "nationality" problem.

> . . . Nationality problems, which need to be solved properly and reasonably in conformity with the desire and interests of the people, . . . are the internal affairs of the respective countries, which can be solved only by their own governments and people, and in which no foreign country has the right to interfere. 1/

The PRC, too, has experienced such "nationality" problems (as has the Soviet Union), with most minority ethnic groups being largely concentrated in China's peripheral areas. Peking fears that the USSR may adopt a course similar to India's intervention in East Bengal. A Soviet-sponsored Uighur separatist movement in Central Asia or an Inner-Outer Mongolia reunification movement under Soviet domination would seriously threaten Chinese territorial integrity. As mentioned, China has already indicated apprehension of Tibet's following the Bangla Desh example. Less threatening at present but nevertheless troublesome would be a rising, militant ethnic consciousness among any of the numerous minority peoples in the China-Indochina border region.

After Pakistan government forces in Bangla Desh surrendered, the Chinese media continued to carry articles condemning the Indian government as well as demanding withdrawal of Indian forces from East Bengal and decrying alleged atrocities committed by the Indian forces in former East Pakistan. Toward the end of December, however, a new theme became apparent in the Chinese press. Foreshadowed in earlier statements, the line the PRC now expounded claimed, "the U.S. and the Soviet Union are stepping up their manoeuvers in their scramble for the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean." 2/ This stance conveniently explained away the U.S. government's opposition to India's recent invasion of East Bengal (a point which went unnoted in Chinese statements) as well as the PRC's failure to cite Soviet "collaboration" with the U.S. in this instance.

1/ "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, December 16, 1971," Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 51, 17 December 1971, insert.

2/ NCNA, 9 January 1972, in English.

During the first part of 1972, statements concerning India in the Chinese press rapidly decreased in number, although governmental concern with the subcontinent did not die out. From 31 January to 2 February, Pakistan President Z. A. Bhutto paid a state visit to the PRC. At its termination, he and Premier Chou En-lai signed a joint communique[1/] which again strongly condemned the "naked aggression committed by India against Pakistan." Both Pakistan and China called upon India to comply with the Geneva Conventions and proceed immediately with the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war. China also announced that it was extending further economic aid to its ally. The communique closed with the conventional declarations of "friendship and understanding" and a Chinese affirmation of firm support to the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their "just struggle for the right of self-determination." Thus, it can be seen that China's explicit policy toward South Asia had not shifted perceptibly.

China's recent activities toward the subcontinent have been directed toward preventing the admission of Bangla Desh to the U.N. A People's Daily editorial (28 August 1972) made it clear that China's veto of the Bangla Desh application for membership in the world body was based on opposition to the Soviet thrust into South Asia, although it also cited failure of the parties concerned to implement U.N. resolutions calling for troop withdrawals, observation of the Geneva Conventions, and release and repatriation of the Pakistani prisoners of war (also allegedly at the instigation of the Soviet Union). China had again successfully combined anti-Soviet/Indian and ostensibly pro-Pakistani action while at the same time managing to maintain a proper and reasonable posture in the United Nations.

1/ For text, see Peking Review, Vol. 15, No. 5, 4 February 1972, pp. 7-8.

IX IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINESE POLICY OF INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACQUISITION

To date, the Chinese media have apparently made no mention of the possibility of Indian nuclear weapons, although the Indian Atomic Energy Commission's plan for the decade of the 1970s calls for the explosion of a peaceful nuclear device. Nevertheless, during the Bangla Desh crisis, Peking accused New Delhi of aspiring to "superpower" or "semisuperpower" status. A nuclear weapons capability is usually associated with "superpower" status, and it seems unlikely that China would expect India to be an exception.

The very fact that the PRC has chosen not to mention the possibility of Indian nuclear weapons may indicate the most probable Chinese response to nuclear proliferation in nonfraternal states. India appears to be much closer to adopting the nuclear option than is Japan, and it may be for this reason that Peking refrains from pelting New Delhi with invective as it does Tokyo. In other words, as India nears a nuclear capability, the PRC may have decided that its optimal response is no response at all--that it is best to ignore the entire issue.

There are a number of reasons why China may have chosen such a response. For one thing, to adopt too strong and actively hostile a posture toward the Indian nuclear program could well be counterproductive for China. Such a stance would in all likelihood simply harden Indian resolve to develop nuclear weapons and might, in fact, cause the program to accelerate. An openly hostile stance would also have the adverse effect of forcing India to rely even more on Soviet goodwill and military assistance. It would also serve to unify the normally fragmented Indian body politic, as did the Bangla Desh episode.

On the other hand, China may have decided that Indian nuclear weapons cannot pose any new threat not already implicitly posed by Soviet nuclear weapons under the provisions of the Soviet-Indian Treaty. In this case, Peking may be willing to gamble that an India possessing

a nuclear weapons capability would feel free to act more independently of the Soviet Union and therefore, while the PRC has not encouraged India to develop nuclear weapons, it has not attempted to prevent it from doing so, either.

Acquiescence in an Indian nuclear capability is not the only response option open to the PRC. If Indian nuclear proliferation is deemed inimical to Chinese interests, Peking may prefer to mount a propaganda campaign against the Indian nuclear program in an attempt to dissuade New Delhi from pursuing this course. The PRC may adopt a policy of weakening and embarrassing the Indian government. Chinese accusations of "Soviet-Indian collusion," "Indian expansionist aspirations," and "Indian militarism"[1/] would be calculated to isolate India from the rest of the developing world. Should such a Chinese effort succeed, New Delhi may find itself in a weaker, as well as less prestigeful, position than before undertaking the nuclear program. Peking would then hope for India to abandon its nuclear aspirations as self-defeating. This reasoning, however, has two obvious weaknesses.

First, India has shown itself to be a consummate politician in the arena of world affairs through its successful presentation of the Bangla Desh problem in 1971, which thoroughly obscured Pakistan's position as a nation torn by civil war and then invaded by a powerful and hostile neighbor. India could be expected to be just as skillful in presenting and defending a decision to adopt nuclear weapons. Secondly, as pointed out above, if Peking's stance were too overtly threatening, it could cause Indian resolve to develop nuclear weapons to harden, while assuring that one of the potential targets would be China.

Should the Chinese propaganda offensive fail, Peking could be expected to alter its course and significantly soften its stance toward India in order not to antagonize its increasingly powerful neighbor. At this point, China may make a generous gesture toward a peaceful border settlement; it could drop all mention of Tibet and the refugees it claims India forced into exile; it could abandon propaganda support and training of the Naxalites, Mizos, and Nagas; or it could make a

1/ The Chinese media have not applied this term to India in the past few years.

diplomatic gesture toward acceptance or recognition of Bangla Desh in order to change Peking's image in India.

Conversely, the PRC may greet an Indian announcement of intention to develop nuclear weapons by intimating that such Indian activities could cause Peking to regard favorably an Islamabad request for nuclear assistance to help defend Pakistan against the new Indian menace. However, the wording of such a veiled threat would be left purposefully vague in order to permit the PRC not to follow through. The maximum that Peking could be expected to do to aid Pakistan against an Indian nuclear threat would be to station Chinese nuclear weapons, under Chinese control, on Pakistani soil. Even this is unlikely, however, because it could furnish justification for Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons in India, should New Delhi agree to it. Furthermore, at present China cannot afford to dilute its defenses by stationing weapons and the necessary armed forces personnel and weapons technicians in credible numbers abroad.[1/] If New Delhi failed to respond to Peking's "nuclear blackmail," China would be compelled to retreat to a more tractable posture.

In December 1971, the U.N. adopted a resolution sponsored by Ceylon and 12 other countries declaring the Indian Ocean to be a "peace zone." China has repeatedly expressed its support for the concept, while declaring that the resolution needs to be more explicit, particularly concerning the conduct of the USSR, the U.S., Great Britain, and India in the area. If India announces its intentions to embark on a nuclear weapons program, China can be expected to strengthen its support for the implementation of the Indian Ocean "peace zone" and may even advocate a widening of its scope to include all the waterways of South and Southeast Asia and possibly also the island nations of the area. It might even try to extend the concept to apply to the Indian subcontinent with some sort of a security guarantee to be provided by the U.N.

1/ There are Chinese troops in Laos "guarding" construction of the strategically important road from Yunnan into that country.

In concrete terms, were India to announce its intentions to develop nuclear weapons, China can be expected to accelerate its own nuclear weapons production. Peking would take pains to ensure that the acceleration of the Chinese program was known in India, giving New Delhi notice that while it may develop nuclear weapons, it could not hope to catch up with the Chinese arsenal. This approach could be underscored by additional nuclear tests, particularly the test firing of an IRBM which would overfly India to land in the Indian Ocean.[1/] The objective of this approach, which could be profitably combined with any of the previously described options, would be twofold: (1) China would be preparing itself in military terms to deal with the additional threat posed by Indian nuclear weapons while at the same time (2) it could hope to dissuade India from pursuing the nuclear option by showing the Indian effort to be useless in the face of China's head start. Should this approach fail and India persist in the nuclear path, China would probably hush up its subsequent preparations to meet the new threat. While it would continue to conduct and announce politically timed nuclear tests, the production of weapons, their numbers, and their deployment would be veiled in silence.

The PRC may wish to give the impression of an undefined nuclear might which would cause India to weigh heavily any action it might take. In this case, Peking could occasionally "leak" some strategic information to Indian channels. It could, and probably would, also add to the force of 16-25 medium range missiles now deployed in Tibet.[2/] On the other hand, should the PRC wish to downgrade the potential threat it poses to India, it could project a "low profile" toward the subcontinent by first of all reducing the number of missiles deployed in Tibet, or at least withdrawing them deeper into the interior.

1/ The tracking station the PRC is constructing in Tanzania means China will soon be ready to profit in practical terms from such test firings.

2/ Ashok Kapur, "Is Mao also a Paper Tiger?" China Report (New Delhi), Vol. VII, No. 2, March-April 1971, p. 19.

Concomitant with the accelerated nuclear program would be a shift in troop deployment and renewed militia training in the Indian border area. If China wished to project a threatening image, the troop movements and militia maneuvers could be conducted in force near the border. Otherwise, such preparations could be made deeper inside China and on a more dispersed level. The PRC may also wish to improve its transportation, communications, and surveillance systems in the area. To facilitate troop movements, it may undertake additional road-building projects, such as the highway presently under construction in Nepal.

An Indian decision to adopt nuclear weapons would heighten the importance of the Himalayan kingdoms as a buffer zone. The maintenance of cordial relations with these states would gain a higher priority than previously in Peking, particularly should China wish to be able to gain access through them to India. Nevertheless, any Chinese initiative in this area of traditional Indian hegemony would be duly noted in New Delhi and may thus be counterproductive. If China displayed too overt an interest in the area, India would take steps to reinforce its own position in the state in question. Once India had nuclear weapons, it might station them in the Himalayan states unless China succeeds in neutralizing the area. The latter condition could be achieved by creating a "nuclear free zone" in the region along the lines of the proposed "peace zone" in the Indian Ocean, although such zones have yet to be actually established.

In order to demonstrate the futility of using nuclear weapons against China--thereby causing India to abstain from developing such weapons--China may, shortly after a nuclear decision had been announced, create a series of border incidents involving close combat. This could be effectively coupled with terrorism by the guerrilla groups inside India, active insurgency in the disaffected northeastern tribal states, and anti-India agitation by the China-supported Azad Kashmir in that disputed area. By creating a series of internal disasters and sabotage, Peking could serve notice upon New Delhi that it did not intend to tolerate an Indian nuclear capability.

This last response, however, is fraught with dangers for the PRC. Should China create the border incidents, it could expect Soviet retaliation in kind under the provisions of the Soviet-India Treaty. Internal subversion in India could be answered by Soviet subversion, again under the treaty provisions, in Chinese Inner Asia. India itself could also respond by lifting the ban on political activity among the Tibetan refugees, particularly the Dalai Lama. In any case, should China perceive its campaign to be fruitless, it would abandon this pursuit in order to mend its southwestern fences. It may then attempt to gain a modicum of influence in Indian internal affairs by increased people-to-people diplomacy and support of the already extant "China lobby" in India. At this point, the PRC may instruct its adherents in South Asia to adopt a "united front" policy, strengthening the unity of all socialist elements in India and establishing a community of interest with other "progressive forces" in the region in a bid to gain power and influence from within.

The PRC may also try to demonstrate its strength to India through a diplomatic offensive aimed at detaching Bangla Desh from India's sphere of influence.[1/] China could extend diplomatic recognition, followed by economic and technical aid, in an attempt to lure Bangla Desh into adopting a neutral stance regarding Sino-Indian conflicts. Both such an offensive and its success appear, at present, to be highly unlikely. Nevertheless, Peking may wish to reconstruct its former position of impinging on both sides of India as it existed before East Bengal seceded from China's ally, Pakistan.

Further afield, Peking may feel constrained to create an additional buffer zone under its tutelage by increasing its influence in Burma. At present, Ne Win's Revolutionary Government enjoys relatively friendly relations with both the U.S. and the USSR. A Chinese diplomatic offensive in Rangoon would alter the strategic balance in South Asia and call for a U.S. response. Washington would have to decide whether

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1/ This scenario was suggested, in a different context, by J. A. Naik, writing for Hindustan Times, 28 December 1971.

such a development was in its interests and whether, in fact, it wished itself to be paramount in Burma or was willing to see either Moscow or Peking in ascendancy, or if perhaps a balance between the three great powers might be effected in Rangoon. Again, China may find it counter-productive to establish too great an influence in Burma, as this may be perceived in New Delhi as directly threatening, or even, possibly, as encroaching on, a traditional, albeit latent, sphere of Indian influence.

Were India to pursue its nuclear option, the PRC can be expected to attempt to ascertain the U.S. attitude toward the development. If American and Chinese interests appeared to coincide, Peking can be expected to be receptive to U.S. initiatives for closer relations between the two powers and may even make some gestures in this direction itself. The situation thus created could be delicate for the U.S., which would in effect be interfering in the Sino-Soviet rivalry in South Asia.

In each of these scenarios considering Chinese response to an Indian decision to acquire nuclear weapons, if India fails to be deterred from its chosen course, China is seen as abandoning a policy of either indifference or active hostility in an attempt to forge friendlier ties with the emerging nuclear power. This is, in fact, one of the arguments favoring Indian development of nuclear weapons. As set forth by K. Subrahmanyam, director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses:

> . . . if the Chinese in spite of their hatred for the Soviet leadership are still compelled to resort to negotiations one could perceive the influence of nuclear weapons in all these events. China is prepared to negotiate with Soviet Union and also with U.S. but China is not prepared to negotiate with India. Obviously the reason underlying the Chinese posture is that the only form of struggle or conflict they could rationally engage in with a nuclear power is at the conference table.1/

However, this argument can work two ways, for as China softens its stance toward India, possibly while simultaneously deemphasizing

1/ K. Subrahmanyam, "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in International Relations," The Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses Journal (New Delhi), Vol. 3, No. 1, July 1970, p. 5.

Sino-Pakistan amity, India's perception of a threat posed by China will correspondingly decrease, making the actual deployment of a credible nuclear force appear less urgent to New Delhi's security.

As long as China remains embroiled in its multifaceted controversy with the Soviet Union, it will hardly be willing to face yet another powerful, hostile state on its periphery. Yet as long as New Delhi remains firmly aligned with Moscow, it must be perceived by Peking as hostile toward the PRC. This does not mean, however, that China will refrain from attempting to wean India away from the Soviet sphere by coming to terms with New Delhi. Indian dependence on Soviet assistance and goodwill can be seen as a direct result of the hostility prevailing between New Delhi and Peking--and the cordiality between Islamabad and Peking. Indian nuclear weapons may cause Peking to abandon its categorical opposition to New Delhi, thereby reducing Indian dependence on the USSR, thus, in turn, allowing for a lessening of tensions in South Asia and a concommitant drop in the level of hostility between Peking and New Delhi.

Peking and New Delhi have recently, with the exception of the Bangla Desh problems, experienced a lessening of tensions on both sides. They have also found some community of interest. For while China branded the Indian action as hypocritical, both nations voted in the U.N. to support the resolution calling for a "peace zone" in the Indian Ocean. Both also supported a resolution in the General Assembly calling for the convening of a world disarmament conference. India and China share similar views on such issues as South Africa, Rhodesia, disarmament, U.S. "imperialism," and the international monetary system.

Should Peking and Washington find that their interests in the subcontinent agree, there may be a role for the U.S. to play in this scenario. America could endeavor to mend its badly battered diplomatic fences in New Delhi--and Dacca--thus attempting slowly to wean India away from the Soviet orbit by causing a greater perception of security in New Delhi. Washington must be careful, however, not to appear

overly eager or aggressive, or India may suspect "neocolonialist" motives and cling more tenaciously to its Soviet alliance. With a loosening of New Delhi-Moscow ties, Peking could more easily embark on a new era of peaceful coexistence with India. The price the PRC may have to pay for a reduction of Sino-Indian tension may be abandonment, or, at a minimum, reduction of support for Islamabad. However, this price may be considered negligible, since Pakistan's very viability is in question following its recent dismemberment.[1/] Further, if India and Pakistan were to come to terms, as appears possible, it would be wise for the U.S. and the PRC to be prepared for such a development rather than being forced to respond to a fait accompli.

1/ The internal tensions and separatist movements inside West Pakistan make its continued existence a matter of conjecture.

X IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINESE POLICY OF SIMULTANEOUS OR SEQUENTIAL ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In the event that both India and Japan acquire nuclear weapons, either simultaneously or sequentially, China's perception of external threat to its very existence will undoubtedly be heightened. Peking would see in such an occurrence the realization of the Soviet objective of surrounding the People's Republic with powerful and hostile neighbors. It is assumed that China's response would be the same whether it was India or Japan which initiated the proliferation sequence. Despite the apparent detente Peking is in the process of effecting with Tokyo, were Japan to announce a decision to develop nuclear weapons, China would perceive a power seizure by "Japanese militarists" which would endanger the PRC. India, in its alliance with the Soviet Union, would probably be viewed as developing nuclear weapons for use against China. Thus, the view from Peking would be the same irrespective of the order in which proliferation occurred.

Although the PRC could be expected to adopt an initially hostile attitude in an effort to intimidate the first Nth country in a sequence from embarking on the nuclear weapons path, lack of success (implicit in the concept of sequential proliferation) would deprive a similar response to a second Nth country of credibility. Thus while the policy implications for the first nation of a proliferation series would be essentially the same as discussed in the individual country sections above, the response to subsequent proliferation within, say, a decade, would necessarily skip the stage of China's attempting to threaten the Nth country. This is not to imply that China would not issue vague statements condemning "militarism." It might, in fact, launch an all out peace propaganda offensive aimed at isolating those powers which were demonstrating an interest in future wars by developing nuclear weapons. Because of the previously enunciated PRC attitude toward proliferation, the emphasis would not be on the nuclear weapons programs but on the attitudes they epitomized. China, it would be

stressed, had itself developed atomic weapons in order to break the "U.S.-Soviet nuclear monopoly" and to discredit their "nuclear blackmail." The new proliferation would therefore be termed unnecessary by Peking.

Having failed to deter proliferation in the case of the first country--and presumably having already reversed its policy to that of peaceful accommodation[1/] --the People's Republic could not hope to make much headway by isolating the Nth countries from world approval. Peking would have to be careful not to force the two Nth countries into protective alliances with the Soviet Union (discussed above). In addition, it would wish to prevent India and Japan from forging a mutual defense arrangement based on a common interest in protecting their fledgling nuclear arsenals. A nuclear Japan-India alliance could pose a formidable threat to China's eastern and southwestern flanks.

It is therefore reasonable to assume that China would extend the accommodating policy already in effect toward the first Nth country to encompass the second as well. It might, in fact, try to reach an understanding with India and Japan concerning a nuclear guarantee for Southeast and South Asia in order to head off the Soviet attempt to fashion an Asian security pact aimed at containing the PRC.

Fearing the extension of Soviet influence through the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan and India, China would probably pursue its present diplomatic offensive with even greater zeal in order to increase the number of its allies. It would continue to stress detente with the states of Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe in an effort to outflank the USSR in the ever-expanding sphere of Sino-Soviet rivalry. At the same time, it would hasten to strengthen its ties with the U.S., perhaps even expressing willingness to enter into a mutual defense pact, for if Japan as well as India were to come under Soviet tutelage, China would be surrounded on three sides by hostile nuclear powers. If the U.S. responded favorably, it might help to offset China's

1/ Otherwise the events could be considered close enough together to constitute simultaneous proliferation.

extreme insecurity. At the same time, however, it would have the effect of again dividing the world into two opposing camps, albeit along new lines.

The People's Republic would place great stress on its own nuclear weapons program, accelerating and expanding weapons production. It would probably make some highly publicized, politically timed tests designed to show how advanced and invincible its nuclear arsenal had become. The purpose of the tests would be to impress upon the minds of decision-makers and military leaders in Tokyo and New Delhi the folly of even attempting to offset or challenge Chinese strategic or tactical superiority. The PRC has had a considerable head start in developing nuclear weapons. How then can any new nuclear state hope to acquire credible nuclear weapons when Chinese technology is continually advancing? While still emphasizing preparations for war with the Soviet Union, China would also produce and visibly deploy a number of tactical nuclear weapons and IRBMs to demonstrate to New Delhi and Tokyo the inevitable costliness of imprudence.

In the U.N., and in the world at large, Peking's spokesmen would become even more outspoken and insistent advocates of nuclear arms control. India and Japan would be called upon to pledge that they would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. Faced with dual nuclear proliferation, China may become more flexible in accepting the arms control proposals of other nations. It could, for instance, encourage a neutral or "third world" country to put forth a compromise arms control proposal in which Peking could acquiesce on the condition that it was also accepted by the other nuclear and near-nuclear nations.

In the event of simultaneous Japan-India nuclear weapons acquisition, China's threat perception would be extremely acute. It would probably view the development as a sure sign of collusion with the Soviet Union, if not also with the U.S., on the parts of Tokyo and New Delhi. Peking's anxiety would probably manifest itself in a cautious policy of accommodation toward the two new nuclear weapons states accompanied by attempts to deescalate somewhat the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Peking would attempt to ascertain Washington's attitude toward the proliferation and, if it perceived it to be sufficiently disapproving of the development, would probably indicate a desire to enter into a mutual defense understanding, possibly on an informal basis so that it would not be politically cumbersome to either of the contracting parties.

Alternatively, the PRC could mount a propaganda campaign designed not only to isolate the two new nuclear weapons powers from the rest of the world but also from each other. It would expound upon the theme that each was being used, through the medium of an unpopular government, to serve the Soviet Union, a course which would ultimately destroy those countries. Such a propaganda campaign could be coupled with the encouragement of internal subversion and calls for revolt. China could try to gain the support of world opinion in its attempt to eliminate the threat of further proliferation.

This latter course, however, seems as unlikely as it is unwise. China would run the risk of forcing the formation of the very Soviet-Indian-Japanese alliance it fears while almost certainly failing to prevent the impending nuclear proliferation. The U.S. could be expected to refuse to have anything to do with China's actions, and world opinion may well condemn the PRC for interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

Whether China decided to accommodate or openly oppose simultaneous Indo-Japanese nuclear proliferation, Peking would definitely strengthen its calls for nuclear arms control. As in the case of single or sequential proliferation, it would call upon the newly nuclear states to issue no-first-use statements. Peking would also evince a greater degree of flexibility in considering non-Chinese arms control proposals than heretofore.

While China agitated for conclusion of a nuclear arms control agreement, it would also accelerate its own nuclear weapons program, perhaps at the cost of retarding other areas of development. The entire country would be subjected to military preparedness campaigns, and political education would be reemphasized to sharpen the alertness of the citizenry.

It is unlikely even in the extreme instance of simultaneous nuclear proliferation that China would consider assisting some ally in gaining nuclear weapons status to offset the hostile balance of power, not only because it has not done so in the past but, more importantly, because it does not have any wholly trusted allies. Further, the entire Chinese nuclear arsenal will probably, in Peking's estimation, be required to defend the homeland, ruling out the stationing of Chinese nuclear weapons in allied countries even if a willing ally could be found.

In summary, then, the most probable Chinese response to simultaneous or sequential acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Japan would be an increased willingness in Peking to accommodate those countries. While the PRC would attempt to accelerate the development of its own nuclear arsenal, it would also display a new inclination toward flexibility in accepting nuclear arms control measures sponsored by other nations. Finally, should China feel that the U.S. disapproved of the nuclear proliferation, Peking may wish to strengthen its ties with Washington by reaching some sort of mutual defense agreement.