SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

An Analysis

Morton H. Halperin

Volume I

Report to the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency

East Asian Research Center
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University

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FOREWORD

This study by Morton H. Halperin of Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control is the focal point of a project undertaken jointly by the Center for International Affairs and the East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, under contract with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The study benefits from work on a similar project in 1964-1965 which culminated in a book by Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control (Cambridge: Harvard University and New York: Praeger, 1965) and an earlier conference in 1963 which led to the publication of a report written by Alexander Dallin and others, The Soviet Union, Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Columbia University and Praeger, 1964). It also reflects and distills ideas and studies by those who participated in two conferences sponsored by the project. The first of these was a six-day conference (August 30-September 4, 1965) at Airlie House in Warrenton, Virginia; the second was a two-day conference held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on March 18 and 19, 1966, at which the first draft of this study was reviewed and discussed and its analysis and conclusions assessed. (For participants in these conferences, see the appendix). This study is, however, the work of the author, both in form and content; it is not a group report.

The turbulent course of the dispute and conflict which seems to have modified, if not torn apart, the Sino-Soviet alliance has had major impact on international affairs. This report seeks

to assess some of the implications of this development for United States security policies in general and specifically for present and future arms control measures and prospects.

Volume II of this report contains 8 papers prepared for the Airlie House Conference of 1965. Some of these papers will be included in a volume to be published by the MIT Press. Another paper prepared for this conference has since been expanded by its author, William Griffith, into a separate book length study, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (Cambridge: M.I.T., 1966).

As an additional feature of this project a series of meetings were held in Tokyo and Kyoto, Japan between April 5 and 11, 1966, at which eight American specialists met with about fifty Japanese scholars, journalists and government officials. The American participants in these meetings were jointly sponsored by the two Centers at Harvard and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In Japan Shigeharu Matsumoto, Chairman of the Board of The International House of Japan, and Michio Royama, Program Director of International House served with admirable tact and courtesy as the conveners of the meetings, and in a few cases facilitators.

Without the help of those who prepared for the Airlie House Conference and the participants who gave depth and pertinence to our discussions of Sino-Soviet relations and arms control the project could not have gone foreword. It likewise benefited from the invaluable help of Kent K. Parrot, the liaison officer

of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, whose constant understanding facilitated the work on each part of the project. However, credit for the work performed under this project belongs primarily to Morton H. Halperin, Assistant Professor of Government and Research Associate at the Harvard University Center for International Affairs. In addition to providing intellectual leadership and assuming responsibility for preparing the study and the other papers for the project, he also handled the day-to-day administration and organization of the project with the able assistance of Mrs. Ann Mostoller. Both at Harvard and in the broader field of security and arms control studies we are indebted to Morton H. Halperin for helping to bring Chinese and Asian problems to attention and focus.

John M.H. Lindbeck, Chairman
Project on Sino-Soviet Relations
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CHAPTER I

APPROACHES TO ARMS CONTROL

Most studies of arms control and disarmament in the postwar period have focused on the military and political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between the NATO powers and the Warsaw Pact countries. However, events of the last few years have made it increasingly clear that if arms control is going to continue to be relevant, it will be necessary to develop an approach which takes account of the fact that the West is no longer confronted with a monolithic Communist bloc. This Chapter presents such an approach to arms control which is applied in the remainder of this report and which might be useful in future analysis of arms control problems.

THE SOVIET APPROACH[1]

In attempting to specify the Soviet approach to arms control, it is useful to consider the Soviet approach prior to 1956 and then the approach of Khrushchev and his successors.

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[1] For a more extended discussion see Alexander Dallin and others, The Soviet Union, Arms Control and Disarmament, (New York: Columbia University, 1964), cited as "Soviet Attitudes Study"; and Lincoln Bloomfield, et.al., Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T., February 1, 1965), C/65-1.

In the earlier period, particularly under Stalin, the emphasis appeared to be on the attainment of objectives without expecting or even necessarily desiring any formal arms control agreements.[2] The objectives most consistently pursued in this period were specific political objectives and specific unilateral military objectives vis-à-vis the West concerned primarily with preventing the cohesion and strengthening of the NATO alliance. In particular the Soviets tried for example to prevent the establishment of American bases in Europe and the rearmament of Germany. The Soviets appear also to have been to some extent concerned with their political posture vis-à-vis other countries.

In the period since 1956 Soviet arms control objectives appear to have undergone a major change. For one thing the Soviets have become interested in the signing of arms control agreements. Moreover their objectives have become more diversified. During the periods when the Soviet leadership has been seeking détente with the West their arms control policy

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[2] As with all periodizations certain exceptions must be noted. The change in Soviet policy may have begun as early as 1954.

has been subordinated to this objective and focused on reducing the level of tension. The Kremlin has continued to be concerned with specific political objectives, particularly concerned with weakening the NATO alliance and also with specific military objectives concerned with preventing the transfer of nuclear weapons to Germany. However an interest in short run military cooperation, as reflected in hot line and the banning of weapons in space, has not been absent nor has a concern with the impact of arms control negotiations and agreements on third countries both Communist and non-Communist.

THE CHINESE APPROACH[3]

Prior to 1956, as the Chinese have stated, Soviet and Chinese arms control objectives appear to have been quite similar. Since then the Soviet approach has, as noted, changed with a broadening of objectives and also an increased interest in the signing of formal agreements. The Chinese on the other hand continued with a posture similar to that of the Soviet Union in the early postwar period. That is, they have not been interested in the signing of formal agreements (with the exception of a no-first-use agreement) and have focused on their political posture vis-à-vis third parties and specific political and unilateral military objectives designed to reduce the

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[3] For more extensive discussion see Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1965), cited as "Chinese Attitudes Study."

American presence in Asia and to reduce the likelihood that the United States would use nuclear weapons against China. The Chinese assert that efforts for disarmament should be subordinated to the promotion of wars of liberation. However, as will be indicated below, the Chinese apparently were prepared to accept a test ban treaty in the period 1957-59.

THE "ARMS CONTROL" APPROACH

Around the turn of the decade a number of strategic analysts who had not previously concerned themselves with problems of disarmament began to take an interest in what they chose to call "arms control."[4] The approach taken by these analysts emphasized the short run military implications of arms control and disarmament agreements as well as unilateral measures. The emphasis on short run military implications, on arms control pursuing the same objectives as those of unilateral military policy, took three forms. The first and most modest argued simply that the short run military implications of any arms control proposals had frequently been drawn up in a vacuum independent of the real military situation and that unless short run military implications of an agreement were taken into account, such agreements were

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[4] See for example Donald G. Brennan, Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, (New York: Braziller, 1961); Hedley Bull Control of the Arms Race (New York: Praeger, 1961); Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, (New York: 20th Century Fund, 1961); Lewis Henkin, ed. Arms Control Issues for the Public (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1961).

unlikely to win support within a government and might be detrimental if actually negotiated.

Those taking the second approach argued that short run military goals could be obtained via formal or informal arms control arrangements. They suggested that military considerations should not only be used as a check to indicate whether an agreement was satisfactory or not, but that military goals should provide the impetus for at least some arms control arrangements. This approach suggested that the military should be interested in arms control as a means of fulfilling their narrow objectives.

The final and most encompassing approach argued that short run military goals which embodied cooperative interests between the major protagonists should be the dominant aim of arms control agreements. This approach emphasized the cooperative aspects of the strategic arms race and suggested that from those aspects could come a new approach to arms control which should emphasize short run military objectives.

The short run military approach to arms control made two assumptions which need to be re-examined. The first was that it would be possible for the United States to focus on short run military objectives in drafting its arms control proposals and to actually sign arms control agreements which emphasize such objectives. The second assumption was that there were some short run military goals which could be, or

in a more extreme form, had to be, satisfied by tacit or formal arms control arrangements. There was something about the nature of the political, strategic and technological situation, it was argued, which produced critical goals which could only be satisfied by cooperation of a formal or tacit sort.

There were a number of special factors in the late 1950's and early 1960's which stimulated development of the strategic approach to arms control and made such an approach seem particularly relevant and urgent.

The strategic arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union appeared to most analysts to be at a particularly dangerous technological point at around the turn of the decade. A number of events in the late 1950's, including the Soviet launching of Sputnik and their testing of an ICBM as well as a number of technical studies of the problem of defending strategic forces, had produced what might be termed the vulnerability revolution in the approach to strategic questions. This attitude, epitomized by Albert Wohlstetter's article, "The Delicate Balance of Terror,"[5] led to widespread acceptance of the belief that the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union was inherently unstable. Hard work

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[5] From Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2 (January, 1959), 211-34.

on both sides (or at least on one side) was necessary to prevent a situation in which one side or both could carry out a successful first strike which would destroy most if not all of the strategic forces of one's opponent. This concern with preventing the balance of terror from leading to a nuclear war reflected itself not only in efforts to change the unilateral military policy of the United States to reflect greater concern with problems of vulnerability, but also spilled over into analyses of arms control problems. The 1957 Experts Conference on surprise attack brought a number of strategic analysts, including Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas Schelling and Henry Rowen face to face with arms control problems perhaps for the first time. A concern about the strategic balance led these analysts and others to ask what contributions formal or tacit arms control arrangements could make to reducing the vulnerability of the forces on both sides to surprise attack and hence contribute to the stability of the strategic balance.

From the perspective of a concern with strategic stability and the vulnerability of forces, the period of the early 1960's appeared from a technological point of view to be an extremely dangerous one. During the early sixties both sides could be expected to have a force which included some missiles but a large number of airplanes. In such a situation the missiles of each side could be targeted at the air bases of the other,

producing a situation in which there would be a strong incentive to pre-emption since the damage done in a first strike would be much greater than that done in retaliation. The recognition of this technological instability which could yield great incentive to first strike, gave greater urgency to the effort to find international arms control arrangements which could undo the evils of technology.

Moreover, there was a growing feeling on the part of analysts outside the government that the United States had very badly handled its unilateral military policy. Those responsible for the shape and size of the American strategic force did not appear, at least from the outside, to be paying adequate attention to the need to design forces which could survive a first strike. "Arms control" was viewed as another possible way in which to influence government decisions, either by forcing policymakers to take account of "arms control" considerations or by accomplishing through formal international agreements what one could not accomplish unilaterally because decision-makers concerned with unilateral defense policy were not sensitive to or were not prepared to spend the money to deal with problems posed by the vulnerability of strategic forces.

Finally there was a widely held belief at this time that the Soviet Union was about to establish a substantial lead in the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The

missile gap controversy stimulated interest in arms control in several ways. It muted objections to arms control which would come from those who believed that the United States should not agree by international treaty to anything which resembled parity of strategic forces. If the Russians were expected to be superior this argument would not carry great weight. Moreover the danger that the Soviets would be in a position to carry on a successful preemptive first strike increased incentives to try to deal with the problem by any possible means. Formal arms control agreements could provide an answer without necessitating substantial increases in spending for strategic forces.

All these factors combined to produce increased interest in the short run military role of formal and tacit arms control arrangements. It focused arms control discussions on the strategic problem, on the need and prospects for dealing with the dangers of the vulnerability of strategic forces and the incentives to a first strike.

Since 1960 a number of changes have occurred which make the short run military approach to formal arms control appear less relevant and less necessary. Despite the belief of some that the problems posed by the vulnerability of strategic forces could not be solved by unilateral action, it became clear during the 1960's that the problems which were seen to require action in the arms control field could be dealt with

unilaterally. Part of the problem disappeared when it became clear that there would not be a missile gap--that the United States would continue to have preponderance of strategic nuclear power as far ahead into the future as one could see. In addition, a number of unilateral steps were taken by the United States to reduce the vulnerability of its strategic forces and the incentive to the Soviet Union to strike first. Emphasis was placed on forces, such as Minuteman, which were hardened below ground and the Polaris which obtained its relative invulnerability by mobility beneath the seas. Moreover emphasis was put on development of command and control systems which would insure the survival of the capability of political leaders to control and communicate with strategic forces. These steps went a long way to reducing the possibility that an accident would trigger a general nuclear war or that war would be started because of a spiraling fear of surprise attack.

If the need for arms control agreements to deal with short run military issues seemed to fade in the 1960's, so did the prospect that arms control agreements with military motivations could in fact be negotiated and signed. For many reasons the early 1960's was from a short run military perspective as ideal a period for negotiation of arms control agreements as is likely to occur. The intellectual homework for this position had been done by a number of strategic analysts,

many of whom entered the Government committed to an interest in arms control and a search for ways in which arms control agreements could be made relevant to strategic problems. Moreover, as was indicated above, the situation was in a position of maximum technological instability, which seemed to lend itself to formal agreements to contribute to the stability of the balance. The technological basis for strategic arms control and the intellectual preparations were complimented, at least after the Cuban missile crisis, by favorable political conditions, i.e., the beginnings of a détente in which it seemed possible to conceive of negotiations leading to arms control agreements. Khrushchev seemed to be committed to seeking agreements for their own sake and seemed to believe that substantial disarmament was desirable and possible. In fact this was the period in which the test ban, the hot line, and the agreement banning nuclear weapons in space were successfully negotiated. However no formal arms control agreements contributing directly to the stability of the strategic military balance were negotiated during this period.[6]

This suggests that the United States and the Soviet Union are unwilling, or unable to sign agreements whose primary motivations are short run military interests. There is a strong incentive in the United States to try to handle these problems on a unilateral basis--including unilateral or reciprocal arms control--and not to have the security of the

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[6]The partial test ban treaty could be considered to have made a contribution to the stability of the military balance insofar as the preventing of the testing of certain types of weapons made such a contribution.

United States appear to depend on negotiations with the Soviet Union. Moreover the complexities of the issues, problems of inspection and verification, problems of determining what in fact is a "reasonable" solution, all suggest that in the absence of very substantial changes in the international political climate, we are unlikely to see the negotiation of arms control agreements substantially affecting the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

If bilateral strategic arms control has appeared less urgent and less feasible, other changes in the international situation have produced a continued interest in arms control and disarmament measures but for different purposes and with a different emphasis. The interest on both sides in improving political relations has led to an interest in arms control for its contribution to improving the climate of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. This has led to attention to the symbolic rather than to the strategic significance of possible agreements. Moreover the Sino-Soviet dispute itself has increased the range of posssible arms control arrangements.

A Political Effects--Security Approach

Events of the past five years would seem to suggest that the military aspect of possible formal arms control agreements has been greatly over-emphasized. In fact it is clear that short run security problems can be dealt with by unilateral

means or tacit arrangements and that this is the way that the superpowers prefer to deal with such problems. This does not mean that one should stop trying to assess the short run security implications of any agreement. On the contrary it is clear that those concerned with security problems must and will continue to exercise a veto over any proposed arrangement. Thus, agreements must at best have a neutral impact on the stability of the strategic balance and should where possible make a positive contribution resting on the mutual interest of both sides in avoiding accidental war or reducing destruction if war occurs. One needs to recognize, however, that those concerned with such problems are unlikely to be the leading proponents of particular strategic measures and that in fact the pressure for arms control agreements--pressures which make the negotiation, signing, and ratification of such agreements possible--will come from a wide variety of sources with differing political and strategic motivations. Nevertheless it would appear that the focus of arms control agreements should be on the political effects of the negotiation and the agreement in terms of the relation of the United States with the Soviet Union and Communist China, the relations of the United Stater with its allies and with countries of the third world, and finally the impact of possible agreements on the evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

This approach suggests that the agreements we should desire are those which contribute to fostering the kind of political relationships we want with potential enemies, allies, and neutral nations. It suggests that agreements will continue to be possible only if they are in tune with the political desires of the signatories. It suggests that even agreements which, like the test ban, appear to be primarily concerned with relatively narrow technical issues, in fact, have their greatest impact in the political sphere. It becomes possible to negotiate and ratify such agreements only when the governments concerned are strongly motivated for political rather than strategic reasons. Such an approach would concentrate on the impact of agreements on enemies, friends and neutrals who have divergent political objectives and attitudes. It would recognize that arms control agreements have their greatest impact on political relations between countries rather than on narrow military relations. In short, this approach suggests looking for arms control arrangements which will contribute to desired political objectives and focusing on likely political implications in evaluating any potential agreement. The context of this study suggests the importance of assessing the likely impact of any arms control agreement on the Sino-Soviet dispute and suggests that the possibility of negotiating any particular arrangement with either the Soviet Union or Communist China will depend in part on that country's evaluation of the effect of the agreement on its relations with the other Communist power.

CHAPTER II

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL 1957-1966

Since 1957 there has been a continuing interaction between the progressive worsening of Sino-Soviet relations and the arms control policies of the two countries, particularly those of the Soviet Union. This interaction has been manifest over a number of issues. In this Chapter, we consider in general the interaction between Sino-Soviet relations and arms control up to the present; the following Chapter examines the interaction between the test ban and Sino-Soviet nuclear relations. This Chapter first examines the extent to which arms control issues have been a real source of disagreement between Communist China and the Soviet Union. Next the role of differences about arms control in Sino-Soviet polemics in public statements and at international front meetings is examined. Finally the impact of Sino-Soviet relations on the disarmament policy of the Soviet Union and Communist China is considered.

Since this Chapter focuses on the interaction between arms control and the Sino-Soviet dispute, it may imply a greater causal relation between the two sets of events than in fact exists. It is, therefore, worth emphasizing that differences about arms control matters are only one of a very large number of factors which have exacerbated

Sino-Soviet relations over the years, and are not the most important. It is equally the case that the Sino-Soviet dispute has been only one of many factors determining Soviet and Chinese policy on disarmament issues. Nevertheless it does appear to be the case that the Soviet Union has taken its dispute with China into account in determining its arms control policy. As will be indicated in the Chapter, at certain times the Soviet Union has been reluctant to conclude agreements or take positions which might come under attack by China, at other times it has sought agreements despite Chinese opposition and has on several of these occasions used the agreements in its political competition with China. The Chinese arms control position has in turn been influenced by their political struggle with the Soviet Union. It will also be suggested here that arms control, and in particular the nuclear test ban, have served to exacerbate Sino-Soviet relations. Thus, while it is necessary to put the interaction of the test ban and the Sino-Soviet dispute in the perspective of the broader and deeper causes of Sino-Soviet conflict and of the disarmament policy of the two countries, the interactions are real and worth exploring.

ARMS CONTROL AS AN ISSUE IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

It is possible to distinguish three different issues in relation to the desirability and the feasibility of formal arms control agreements which have plagued Sino-Soviet

relations. First of all the two countries have clashed on the desirability of specific agreements, primarily the test ban but also others including a non-proliferation treaty. Second they have disagreed about the value of agreements for their own sake with the Soviets tending to believe that even modest agreements, such as the ban on weapons in orbit and the simultaneous announcements of cutback in fissionable material production, are per se desirable. Finally, there has been disagreement about General and Complete Disarmament. Each of these will be examined briefly in turn.

As will be indicated in Chapter III, the test ban has been the most important specific arms control agreement on which the Soviet Union and Communist China have presented differing positions. However, particularly in the period since the signing of the test ban treaty, the value of a non-proliferation agreement has become the focus of Sino-Soviet disagreement about the desirability of particular measures.

The first Soviet proposal for non-proliferation came in a Soviet memorandum to the United National General Assembly in September of 1957. The substance of the Soviet proposal suggests that Soviet concerns at that time were very similar to their present interests. The Soviet draft line of partial measures includes the following:

> The Soviet Government draws attention to the fact that the handing over of atomic weapons to States which do not manufacture such weapons at the present time and the stationing of foreign atomic military units in various parts of the world are intensifying the threat of atomic war and creating an atmosphere which is dangerous to the cause of peace. Such actions may provoke measures of retaliation on the part of the States whose security is thus threatened. The Soviet Government therefore considers it necessary for States possessing nuclear weapons to assume the obligation, under an appropriate agreement, not to allow the installation of any atomic military units or any types of atomic or hydrogen weapons beyond their national frontiers and not to place these weapons at the disposal of any other States or commands of military blocs.[7]

The Soviets have continued to propose various measures to deal with the proliferation problem, but up until 1963 they appeared to have given emphasis to the test ban as a means of dealing with the spread of nuclear weapons. Since 1963 the Soviets have tended to focus on a comprehensive test ban and on a non-transfer non-acquisition treaty as the most important next steps in the disarmament area. However, proliferation for the Russians has always meant Germany more than countries in the third world or the neutral nations of Europe. The Russians appear to continue to be interested in non-proliferation because of the value it would have in preventing the Federal Republic of Germany from obtaining nuclear weapons. For this reason the Russians have linked non-transfer agreements with

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[7] Memorandum by the Soviet Government on Partial Measures in the Field of Disarmament, September 20, 1957, in Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), Vol. II, 1957-1959, p. 878. (Hereafter cited as Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959.)

agreements aimed at barring the stationing of nuclear weapons on foreign territory or the sharing of nuclear weapons through alliances.

The Russians' expectation of the impact on the Chinese of their proposing or signing a proliferation agreement appears to have differed over time. Perhaps as late as 1959 the Chinese were apparently persuaded that the Russian efforts were directed at the Federal Republic of Germany and were not going to be a threat to the Chinese nuclear program. This would be so either because a proliferation agreement would not be signed or because the Russians would aid the Chinese program despite the agreement. However, beginning in late 1959 during his trip to Peking Khrushchev began to try to convince the Chinese that they should forego development of nuclear weapons and depend on the Soviet nuclear umbrella.[8] From that time forward, proliferation has for the Chinese come to mean an agreement aimed at them and not necessarily at Germany. The Chinese now attack the proposed non-proliferation as being part of the Soviet-American effort to dominate the world and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other anti-imperialist countries.

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[8] "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government," August 15, 1963, in William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 35, 1-52.

Thus whatever its effects on halting the spread of nuclear weapons, a non-proliferation treaty would exacerbate Sino-Soviet relations, unless the Chinese in the meantime change their view of the treaty.

In the past the Chinese may have been unhappy about Soviet proposals for conventional disarmament. Various schemes for disarmament presented by the Western powers and the Soviet Union during the 1950's included limits on the manpower of Communist China; the tacit assumption seemed to be that the Soviets were authorized to negotiate for China. The Soviet treaty for General and Complete Disarmament, presented in 1959, included a limit on the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China of 1.7 million men. This proposal in particular must have annoyed the Chinese since Peking had just made it unmistakably clear to Moscow that it would not permit the Soviets to negotiate for them. The Chinese may have been even more unhappy about the Soviet proposal for a nuclear umbrella in the various stages on the way to General and Complete Disarmament. The Soviet proposal

presented in September of 1962 indicated that the United States and the Soviet Union might keep small nuclear forces for deterrence purposes while all of the conventional and nuclear power of all the other countries of the world were being dismantled. This proposal calling for the dismantling of any existing Chinese nuclear force while the United States and the Soviet Union maintained some capability could only have been viewed with disapproval by Peking.

The extent to which the Chinese were upset about the Soviets proposals in the conventional weapons field and in relation to the nuclear umbrella depends on the degree to which they believed that Khrushchev looked upon his proposals for General and Complete Disarmament as more than mere propaganda activities. It appears extremely doubtful that Khrushchev ever expected to negotiate an agreement leading to General and Complete Disarmament. However, it is possible that he did not rule out extensive disarmament measures. Moreover, it appears likely that the Chinese were ultimately led to the conclusion that Khrushchev did believe in GCD.[9] Thus at least from the Chinese perspective, the value of an agreement on General and Complete Disarmament appears to have

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[9]The Soviet Attitudes Study comes to the conclusion that the Chinese did become convinced that Khrushchev was really seeking a GCD agreement.

been a real issue between the two countries. Moreover the Chinese have indicated their opposition to any form of conventional disarmament. Khrushchev may well have concluded that in terms of his polemics with the Chinese it would be useful to expose them as being against GCD while the Soviets were for it. For the Chinese the dispute apparently went beyond that to the belief that Khrushchev was really trying to negotiate such an agreement which, if forced on the Chinese, would have serious consequences for China's security.

Apart from the disagreement about the political and security implications of particular agreements, Peking and Moscow have clashed over the extent to which agreements were desirable for their own sake. The Soviet Union, particularly in the last years of Khrushchev's dominance, sought the form if not the substance of détente with the United States. As part of this the Soviets became interested in disarmament agreements as a means of demonstrating the possibility of agreements with the West and thereby reinforcing the sense of détente. The Soviet leadership may well have looked upon the hot line agreement, the agreement not to station nuclear weapons in space, and the parallel statements on cutback in the production of fissionable material, as primarily valuable because they demonstrated the possibility of peaceful coexistence.

The Chinese viewed these agreements and others proposed by the Russians as undesirable for precisely these reasons. The Chinese view détente between the United States and the Soviet Union as an effort by the two superpowers to dominate the world, and see this as the most dangerous trend on the current international scene. For this reason they have opposed any arms control agreements which seem to solidify the possibilities for Soviet-American cooperation.

ARMS CONTROL IN THE SINO-SOVIET POLEMICS

Issues of war and peace have played a major role in the public polemics between the Soviet Union and Communist China and have also been a very important part of the debate at Communist front organization meetings. To try to trace the debates over such questions as the inevitability of war, the danger of local wars escalating into general wars, and the impact of nuclear weapons in international politics would require a discussion of the entire Sino-Soviet dispute and would carry far beyond the subject of this report.[10] We can treat here only the issues specifically concerned with the role

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[10] The more recent events in the Sino-Soviet dispute are detailed in a paper by William E. Griffith, originally prepared for the Conference on Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, and to be published in the January-March issue of the China Quarterly, and re-published with the relevant documents as Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-65 (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966). See also Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, (Cambridge M.I.T. Press, 1964), and the bibliography cited therein for previous discussions of the issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

of arms control and disarmament. Moreover, the increasing separation of the Chinese from Soviet arms control positions has been traced in some detail in the China Attitude Study and that also will not be repeated here.[11] The discussion here will be restricted to the role of arms control in the polemics and in speeches at Communist front meetings.[12]

The first clear indication of fundamental differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China on matters of arms control and disarmament in public statements came in late 1959 when Khrushchev visited the United States and China. The comments on the visit in the Soviet and Chinese press made clear that the two countries had very different views of the possibility and desirability of major arms control agreements with the United States. The disagreement was sharpened in a speech by the Chinese observer to the Warsaw Treaty Organization, K'ang Sheng, who at the February 1960 meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization dismissed any progress made in arms control negotiations as being purely on "procedural matters" and attributed even this to the increased military power of the Warsaw bloc countries.

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[11] China Attitudes Study, pp. 132-40.

[12] A documentary chronology of the polemics is provided in the Soviet Attitudes Study, pp. 237-76. The discussion of front meetings is drawn from the description in Karl F. Spielmann, Jr., "Front Meetings and Sino-Soviet Dispute on Disarmament and Nuclear Weapons," prepared for the Conference on Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, in Vol. II.

Unlike Khrushchev who had seen possibilities for disarmament in the near future, K'ang charged that arms control could come only after a long hard struggle with American imperialism.

The spring of 1960 marked the publication of the first major Chinese Communist polemic "Long Live Leninism!" and the first clash between the Soviet Union and Communist China at a front meeting. In "Long Live Leninism!", the Chinese declared that the strategy of peace and the efforts for disarmament should be used only to expose the warlike intentions of the imperialists and warned of the danger of subordinating the efforts to promote wars of national liberation to the desire to negotiate disarmament agreements.

The Soviet reply came in April of 1960 in the report of a speech by Kuusinen in which he declared that the main task in the current era was to bring about disarmament and it was for this reason that the Soviet Union had put forward proposals for General and Complete Disarmament.[13]

The first overt Sino-Soviet clash at a front meeting came at a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking in June of 1960. The Chinese delegate to the conference declared that China supported the disarmament proposals of the Soviet Union only on the understanding that they were

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[13] English translation in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), 12, No. 17 (May 25, 1960), 10, quoted from Soviet Attitudes Study, p. 247.

put forward to unmask the war preparations and aggressive intentions of the imperialists. But he warned "there are people who believe that such proposals can be realized when imperialism still exists and that 'the danger of war can be eliminated' by relying on such proposals. This is an unrealistic illusion."[14] The Soviets countered by arguing that given the favorable balance of power it was possible to force the imperialists to enter into serious negotiations leading to General and Complete Disarmament. Through the summer of 1960, Soviet statements attacked "dogmatism" on the disarmament issue and in particular the view that the struggle for disarmament was a departure from a Marxist-Leninist position. The Soviets argued that disarmament had become an urgent need.

The Soviets continued their campaign against the Chinese position at the 6th Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held in Tokyo in August 1960. Khrushchev's message of greeting to the conference stressed that "the problem of disarmament is the most important problem of the time."[15]

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[14] "On the Question of War and Peace," Liu Chang-sheng, Peking Review (June 14, 1960), p. 14.

[15] Pravda, August 3, 1960, p. 1, quoted from Spielmann, p. 19.

The Chinese delegate emphasized that the United States was unwilling to carry out disarmament agreements. He reiterated China's support for Soviet proposals but declared that they could be successfully negotiated only after the people had been strengthened.

The issue of disarmament was apparently a major point of centroversy at the Moscow meeting of 81 Communist Parties in November, 1960, as it had been at the Bucharest meeting of ruling Communist parties in June of the same year. However the only public statement to emerge from these two meetings was the statement of the 81 Parties which called ambiguously for a struggle to bring about disarmament.

In their interpretations of the Moscow statement the Chinese and the Russians made clear their continuing differences. Khrushchev went out of his way in his famous speech of January 6, 1961, to emphasize that disarmament was the only way to prevent war. He denied that disarmament should only be used as a tactical means to expose the warlike intentions of the West and asserted "we sincerely want disarmament."[16] The Chinese in their comments on the statement denied that disarmament was necessary for world peace or even that world peace could be obtained through disarmament agreements, rather

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[16] Quoted from Soviet Attitudes Study, p. 254.

they stressed that the solidarity of the socialist camp and of the international Communist movement was the most important guarantee of "Victory in the struggle of all people's for world peace, national liberation, democracy, and socialism."[17] A meeting of the WFTU in Moscow in December, 1961, saw another Sino-Soviet clash on disarmament matters. The Chinese delegate attacked the Soviet position on at least two counts, arguing that the superpowers could not be left to themselves to settle disarmament matters, and again criticizing the Russians for giving priority to disarmament over wars of national liberation. In February 1962 the Russians accused the Albanians and by implication the Chinese of not sincerely believing in the possibilities of disarmament and of falsifying the Soviet disarmament position to make it appear that the Soviet Union was advocating unilateral disarmament.

At the World Peace Council Meeting in Moscow in July, 1962, Khrushchev stressed a recent addition to the range of Soviet arguments for disarmament, namely that it would release funds for support of economic development in the third world. The Chinese delayed an all-out response to this Soviet argument at this time, but the Chinese delegate did warn that the

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17 "Resolution of the 9th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," NCNA, January 20, 1961, in G.F. Hudson, et.al., The Sino-Soviet Dispute. (New York. Praeger, 1961), pp. 221-24.

struggle for the underdeveloped countries was closely related to the struggle against imperialism.

In August, 1962, at the 8th World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, the Sino-Soviet disagreement continued with the Chinese beginning to demonstrate the dominance which was to lead them to take over this organization a year later. The conference identified imperialism as the chief enemy of peace and the root cause of war. The Chinese at the conference closely linked the test ban to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and declared that the testing of nuclear weapons by socialist countries could only be of value as it would force the imperialists to prohibit nuclear weapons.

In February, 1963, at the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference the Chinese sought to undercut the Soviet appeal to the third world by arguing that violence would have to be used to free the area from imperialism. During the next month, in their major polemical statement, "More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us," the Chinese attacked the view that wars of national liberation would be easier after General and Complete Disarmament. They declared that this was putting the cart before the horse and that liberation of the oppressed nations would have to come before disarmament would be possible.

In their "Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement" in June of 1963, the

Chinese continued to attack the Soviet position, without identifying it as such, by declaring that, "certain persons" believe it is possible to bring about a world without weapons through General and Complete Disarmament while the system of imperialism still exists. This the Chinese said is "sheer illusion." The Chinese statement continued:

> If one regards General and Complete Disarmament as the fundamental road to world peace, spreads the illusion that imperialism will automatically lay down its arms, and tries to liquidate the revolutionary struggles of oppressed peoples and nations on the pretext of disarmament, then this is deliberately to deceive the people of the world and help the imperialists in their policies of aggression and war.[18]

Ten days later at the World Congress of Democratic Women held in Moscow, the Soviets were able to launch a counterattack. Very little effort was made at this meeting to hide the differences between the two countries, and the Chinese openly attacked the Soviet inspired theme of the conference which was the struggle for disarmament and peaceful coexistence as the primary task of the Women's movement. The Soviet statements stressed the horrors of war, the need for disarmament, and the benefits which would accrue to the underdeveloped countries. The conference appeal, passed at Soviet urging, declared that

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[18] "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement: The Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963," June 14, 1963: English translation in Peking Review, (July 26, 1963), p. 18, quoted from Soviet Attitudes Study, p. 265.

disarmament would make possible the struggle for real equalities among people and that the cause of disarmament was inseparable from the cause of people struggling for national independence. The Chinese in turn accused the Russians of subordinating the national liberation struggle to their desire for disarmament.

July, 1963, saw initialing of the Three-Environment Test-Ban Treaty and the explicit naming of Russia and China by each other in their public polemics. The Governments of the two countries exchanged a series of notes in which the Chinese attacked the test ban and the Russians supported it.[19]

This dispute over the test ban was at the center of attention at the 9th World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, held in Hiroshima in August of 1963. The Chinese attacked the test ban at the conference and the Soviets defended it. The same pattern followed at the World Peace Council Meeting in Warsaw in November and December of 1963. Following the test ban polemics the Chinese issued a series of statements commenting on the "Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," and in the fifth of these statements, on "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace," the Chinese discussed in

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[19] These are described in detail in the Chinese Attitudes Study.

detail their opposition to Soviet disarmament policy and to the nuclear Test Ban Treaty. However they added no significant new points to their analysis. The main Soviet reply came in a lengthy statement by Suslov in a report to the Soviet Central Committee on February 14, 1964, which was not published until April of that year. Again no new points were made but both statements bitterly and explicitly attacked the views of the other.

The 10th World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs resulted in the first public splitting of a front organization on disarmament issues. The Soviets ended up holding their own conference in Tokyo. The Hiroshima conference, dominated by the Chinese denounced the test ban, and the Soviet-supported conference hailed it.

Since mid-1964 the Russians have refrained from all-out open polemics with the Chinese. The Chinese in their attacks on the Russians have, in their discussions of disarmament, focused on the willingness of the Soviet Union to negotiate disarmament agreements with the West while the war in Vietnam was being fought. The Chinese have also continued to attack the test ban and to warn publicly of the dangers of a non-proliferation agreement. The disputes at front meetings have grown increasingly bitter.

Following the fall of Khrushchev there was a slight pause in Chinese polemics followed by a bitter attack on the new regime, coming to focus more more and more on the Vietnam issue.

The absence of any attempts by the Russians to force the Chinese into disarmament agreements combined with the absence of additional arms control measures in 1964 and 1965 may have served to turn the Chinese attention to more burning issues, in particular Vietnam. The Chinese have continued to denounce the test ban and the general Soviet disarmament posture but in less strident terms, and the Russians have refrained from attacking the Chinese nuclear tests. However, if arms control agreements come to the center of the stage again, the Chinese can be expected to resume their attacks on Soviet disarmament policy.

Disarmament has been a theme in the Sino-Soviet polemics right from the start, occupied the center of the stage during the greatest intensity of the polemics in 1963, and now continues to be stressed. Why is this the case?

One reason has already been suggested, namely that there are real differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China over the desirability of particular arms control measures. The Soviets have sought to justify their adherence to the test ban and their efforts to negotiate other agreements, while the Chinese have attacked the Soviet willingness to sign these agreements. More general issues of war and peace, such as how to react to the threat of American attack as seen from Moscow and Peking, are also reflected in debates about disarmament. Disarmament is only feasible, the Russians concede, because nuclear weapons have brought about a fundamental change

in the nature of international politics and because there are "reasonable" men in the West who recognize the strength of the Soviet Union and therefore with whom one can negotiate. Precisely because they reject these two hypotheses the Chinese reject the notion that disarmament agreements are possible. More generally, some of the basic issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute are reflected in debates about desirability of disarmament. At the heart of much of the disagreement is the question of how to treat the United States. Khrushchev and his successors have argued that American leaders, aware of the reality of the changing balance of power, can be brought to the conference table for successful negotiations, not only on disarmament but on more fundamental political matters. The Chinese, in turn, argue that the Americans will yield only to pressure and not to efforts for negotiations. The Soviets state that because of the development of nuclear weapons which can destroy much of the world, it is necessary to make every effort at peaceful settlement of disputes and avoid actions which might provoke a nuclear war. The Chinese, in turn, have argued that this position has led the Soviets to refuse to support wars of national liberation and thereby to abandon their obligations as a Communist power. All of these fundamental issues are reflected in the disarmament disagreements. Hence the disarmament debates are carried out not only for their own sake, but also as a way of arguing more fundamental issues about the nature of the historical epoch and the nature of the enemy.

Finally at different times in the period of the polemics, the Russians and the Chinese have each felt that their disarmament position could win wide support in the rest of the Communist movement and in the third world and hence should be stressed. Whatever motivations Khrushchev may have had for putting forward proposals for General and Complete Disarmament he quickly realized that Chinese opposition to the proposals, based partly on grounds that they believed that the Russians took them seriously, could be turned against the Chinese effectively in the third world and in Communist countries. Khrushchev could use the Chinese unwillingness to subscribe to GCD as "proof" of the fact that the Chinese really wanted a nuclear war and did not understand the destructive power of nuclear weapons. Similarly the Chinese opposition to the test ban, heralded by almost every other country as a step toward world peace, could be used by the Russians to show the warlike intentions of the Peking leadership. In both of these instances the Chinese felt themselves on the defensive and were forced to try to explain why their positions were not incompatible with a desire for world peace. With the heating up of the Vietnamese war in 1965 the tables were somewhat turned and the Russians were forced into the position of trying to explain why they were willing to talk about disarmament with the United States while it was engaging in military actions against the North Vietnamese Communist regime. The

Russians for a time played down the desirability of agreements with the West and stressed the need to use disarmament conferences as a forum for attacking the American position in Vietnam. More recently they have returned to Geneva with the argument that precisely because of the tensions it was necessary to carry on disarmament discussions. Both sides have discovered that there are gains and losses to be had in attacking or supporting the disarmament positions of the other side. These political uses combined with the genuine disagreements lying behind the disarmament positions of the two countries suggest that disarmament will continue to play a major role in the polemics of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

THE CHINESE FACTOR IN SOVIET DISARMAMENT POLICY

Another way of asking the question of what impact the Sino-Soviet dispute has had on prospects for arms control and disarmament is to consider the degree to which the Soviet position on disarmament questions has been influenced by their perception of the likely Chinese reaction and the effect on their relations with Peking.[20] It is possible to examine the impact of the Chinese factor on Soviet disarmament policy in terms of Soviet conference tactics, Soviet disarmament

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[20] One could ask this question in reverse about China, but there is much less to say since the Chinese have not been seriously interested in exploring disarmament questions. The Chinese have been forced by Russian adherence to the Test Ban Treaty to make much more explicit their attitudes and views on disarmament questions, and to put forward specific proposals. This is discussed in detail in the Chinese Attitudes Study.

proposals, and, finally, serious Soviet interest in negotiating disarmament agreements.[21]

It is necessary to begin with a caveat introduced by a number of the participants in the Sino-Soviet Arms Control Conference, namely that Soviet positions on arms control matters are determined by a number of factors of which the "Chinese factor" is only one and not necessarily always an important one. Nevertheless it may be possible to isolate certain instances in which the Chinese factor appeared significant. In relation to the test ban, it will be argued below that the Soviet desire for a test ban treaty, beginning in late 1957, contributed to their willingness to engage in nuclear sharing with the Chinese and the gradual decrease in Soviet interest in the test ban negotiations beginning from late 1959 or early 1960 will be related to the fact that the Chinese began to oppose the agreement. Moreover it appears likely that the convening of the three-power Moscow talks, which led to the signing of the Test Ban Treaty, were deliberately timed by Khrushchev to coincide with Soviet-Chinese negotiations which broke down in disagreement and the beginning of open polemics.

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[21] The framework used in this section and many of the points made are drawn from the discussion of this question at the Conference on Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control.

Three other Soviet tactical maneuvers in terms of conference tactics might be related to Sino-Soviet relations. The first such move took place in September, 1957, when the Soviets, perhaps at least in part because of the upcoming Moscow conference proposed an end to the London disarmaments talks. The second occurred in June of 1960 when the Soviets declined to set a date for a next meeting of the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference. The Soviet pull-out, coming on the eve of Western proposals for which the Soviets had been pressing for some time, might have been in part at least the result of the upcoming Bucharest Meeting. Khrushchev apparently made some effort to try to come to a compromise agreement with the Chinese and may have preferred not to have arms control negotiations with the West going on at the same time. This may have seemed particularly important since during the negotiations the Russians, in discussing proposals for world wide conventional disarmament, would be ignoring the Chinese assertion that they would not be committed to any agreement which they did not negotiate and sign.

The Soviet call for a meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1965, and their attempt to have the meetings of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission held up in the meantime, could also be attributed in part to Chinese pressure, in this case attacks on the Russians for their willingness to participate in disarmament negotiations while the Vietnam war was going on.

If any general conclusion emerges from this brief discussion of conference tactics, it is that at least in the past the Soviets have at least in part for this reason suspended arms control negotiations when, as in 1957, 1960 and immediately after the fall of Khrushchev, they were trying to improve their relations with the Chinese. When they have abandoned the efforts to improve Sino-Soviet relations, as occurred in 1963 and in 1966, the Russians no longer felt any constraint from Sino-Soviet issues from engaging in negotiations on arms control matters.

The Soviet record in presenting formal arms control proposals shows both that the Soviets are willing to take positions even when they know they will be attacked by the Chinese, and also that the Soviets frequently put forward proposals designed to undercut Chinese propaganda positions. A number of proposals already discussed, including the nuclear umbrella proposal of September, 1962, and the Test Ban Treaty, were clearly items on which the Soviets expected and were willing to accept strong Chinese criticism. Moreover, the Chinese have claimed that beginning in August, 1962, the Russians carried on private negotiations with the United States on proliferation, negotiations about which they informed the Chinese and were advised that the Chinese had serious objection.[22] Since then the Soviets have publicly supported proliferation agreements and, in fact, presented a formal proliferation treaty to the United Nations General

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[22] "Statement of the Chinese Government," August 15, 1963, in Griffith, p. 351.

Assembly in the fall of 1965. They did so knowing full well that these proposals would come under Chinese attack.

The most notable use by the Russians of a disarmament proposal to undercut the public posture of the Chinese was Soviet manipulation of their proposed GCD treaty. As was indicated above, this proposed agreement was used since 1960 to try to demonstrate that the Chinese were not interested in peace. The Soviets have also reacted to the Chinese attempt to claim credit for the proposal to ban the first use of nuclear weapons. They have pointed out that this was a long standing Russian proposal and began to push it themselves,[23] most recently in the alternate form of an agreement not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

Finally, in considering the Chinese factor in Soviet policy, there is the question of the influence of this factor on the willingness of the Russians to engage in serious negotiations leading to agreement. Here the major item is, of course, the Test Ban Treaty and the evidence is that the Russians are prepared to go ahead when other factors seem to warrant such action even though they expected Chinese disapproval, and even to use an agreement to undercut the Chinese position. Moreover, the existence of the Sino-Soviet dispute may lead the Russians to seek agreements in order to demonstrate the

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[23] See Chinese Attitudes Study, pp. 125-27.

validity of the general Russian line of the effectiveness of peaceful coexistence and cooperation with the United States. The Sino-Soviet dispute gives the countries of Eastern Europe greater influence over Soviet policy which may lead the Soviets to press more vigorously for those agreements which appear to be in the interest of their East European allies, and by the same token to stay away from agreements to which the East Europeans would object.

CHAPTER III

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

This Chapter will examine Sino-Soviet relations and the attitude of the two countries toward the test ban in the context of their deteriorating relations from 1957-1959.

Prior to 1956 there was no disagreement between the Soviet Union and Communist China on proposals to control the spread of nuclear weapons. The two countries had agreed on a propaganda position which emphasized the need to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely, and which advocated a ban on the use of such weapons. Neither China nor Russia seems to have expected that these proposals would lead to any agreements with the West, nor did they particularly desire any agreements except perhaps a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. By late 1956, the Soviet Union seems to have become interested in a cessation of nuclear testing, either by tacit agreement or by a formal treaty banning such tests.[24] The first possible divergence in the outlooks of Peking and Moscow toward the suspension of nuclear testing came at this time when Khrushchev, in the words of the Chinese, "divorced the cessation of nuclear tests from the question of disarmament."[25]

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[24] Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Franklin Griffith, Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1954-64 (Cambridge, MIT, 1966), pp. 93-97.

[25] Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government of August 15, 1963. Text in William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: MIT, 1964), p. 352.

The Chinese claim that from then on they supported Khrushchev when he was right and opposed him when he was wrong. However it appears that only in retrospect did the Chinese become uneasy about the 1956 Soviet move. Soviet motives in seeking a test ban treaty at this time were probably varied; among them were the belief that because of the growing concern with fallout, this was a useful symbol for their long standing effort to reduce the political value of Western nuclear forces and their hope that a test ban might prevent the Federal Republic of Germany from gaining nuclear weapons. Beginning in 1954, NATO had adopted a strategy based on the use of tactical nuclear weapons which was to lead to the introduction of American nuclear weapons into Europe. In 1957 the United States negotiated with some of its NATO allies for the stationing of American missiles on their soil. The Soviets bitterly attacked these moves, and may have viewed a test ban treaty as a means to block any German national nuclear program.

On January 14, 1957 the Soviet Union introduced a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly calling for a separate ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.[26] At the London Disarmament Conference the Soviets began to press for a separate treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons and stressed the value of this measure, not only on humanitarian

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[26] Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, Vol. II, 1957-1959, pp. 736-37. The Soviets had proposed such a ban in November 1955 in an amendment to a Western power resolution but did not press the question. (Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations [Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1961], pp. 4-5.)

(-health) grounds but also as a means to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. For example, the Soviet delegate to the Conference, Zorin, described the value of a test ban as follows:

> The situation will be complicated by any increase in the number of states in possession of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Clearly this complication will likewise affect the United States of America.
>
> If atomic and hydrogen weapons' tests are prohibited, the result will be that, even if a country not now in possession of atomic or hydrogen weapons learns the secret of their manufacture and has access to the necessary materials, it will be unable to test these weapons effectively. Hence the prohibition of tests will seriously hinder the production and stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen bombs in other states. Obviously the security of all states, including the United States of America, will gain from this.[27]

On the following day, the Soviets publicly announced that they would be willing to accept a temporary suspension of nuclear tests.[28] On June 1st a Chinese spokesman on disarmament matters, Kuo Mo-jo, announced Chinese support for Soviet efforts to negotiate an international pact to end nuclear weapons tests.[29]

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[27] United Nations Disarmament Commission, Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission, Verbatim Record No. 91, March 25-26, 1957.

[28] Ciro E. Zoppo, The Test Ban: A Study in Arms Control Negotiations, Doctoral thesis, Columbia University, 1963, mimeographed, p. 431.

[29] Kuo Mo-jo at Peking rally, June 1, 1957, as reported by New China News Agency (NCNA), English, Peking, June 12, 1957, reprinted in Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP), (U.S. Consulate General Hong Kong), 1544, p. 30. (NCNA English language dispatches datelined Peking are cited as "NCNA, date, in SCMP." Any deviation such as a different dateline is noted.)

On June 14, 1957, the Soviets submitted to the London Disarmament Conference a formal proposal for an "immediate cessation of all atomic and hydrogen weapon tests if only for a period of two or three years."[30] At the same time the Soviets in a major concession to the Western position accepted the principle of international control over a possible test ban agreement. On July 11th the People's Daily supported a temporary ban on nuclear tests as a first step toward universal disarmament and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. It condemned the United States' attempts to link the test ban with other issues as "hopelessly complicating the question."[31]

Several days later at the London Disarmament Conference in commenting on American questioning as to whether other "essential states" would in fact join the test ban treaty, Zorin specifically stated that China would adhere to such a treaty. He told the London Meeting that he had checked a map and:

> I found a great country--The People's Republic of China; and a great Asian power--India. I reflected whether there was any real reason why these two great countries, which in truth are among the "essential states in the world," should not accede to a treaty which halted atomic weapon tests for two or three years.

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30 Documents on Disarmament 1949-1959, p. 791.

31 People's Daily Commentary, NCNA, July 1, 1957, in SCMP, 1571, p. 40.

> I do not think anyone, even our opponents, could have any grounds for such an assertion. Neither have I. For the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India have repeatedly proclaimed their whole-hearted support for a suspension of atomic and hydrogen tests. . . What reason is there, then, to think that these two states would not accede to the agreement? I am aware of none. If Mr. Stassen has any in mind I should like to hear what they are.[32]

By mid-July, 1957, the Soviets had taken a number of steps toward an agreement with the West for a treaty banning nuclear tests. They had accepted the need for international controls of a test suspension and had limited their demands to a moratorium of several years. In fact they had succeeded in convincing even the usually skeptical American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that they seemed to be desirous of arriving at an agreement.[33] China was publicly supporting Soviet initiatives in this period and Zorin, with only minimal probing from the American delegate, Harold Stassen, had assured the London Disarmament Conference that China would sign a test ban agreement. The Chinese made no move as they were to do in 1960 to disabuse the West of this belief.

Mid-1957 was also to see extensive Sino-Soviet discussions about nuclear weapons. The Chinese officer corps had

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[32] United Nations Disarmament Commission, Records of the London Disarmament Conference, Verbatim Transcript, July 12, 1957, p. 16, as quoted in Zoppo, p. 62.

[33] See comments by Dulles in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1957, p. 101, as quoted in Zoppo, p. 62.

focused, at least since 1955, on the importance of Soviet aid in the modernization of the Chinese army and in particular in the development of nuclear weapons and modern delivery systems.[34] In early 1957 the Chinese apparently pressed the Soviets for an increase in Soviet assistance to the indigenous Chinese nuclear weapons program which apparently started in 1955. According to the account of the Chinese Communists which has been indirectly confirmed by the Soviets on October 15, 1957, the two countries signed an agreement for sharing new technology for defense.[35] Neither government has made clear the precise Soviet commitments under this agreement nor what aid the Soviets actually gave to the Chinese. Judging from the current state of Chinese weapons capability it appears that the agreement led to Soviet assistance in development of an indigenous Chinese weapons production capability and was related to Soviet aid to an indigenous Chinese capability for the production of missiles as well perhaps of submarines and other delivery systems. Despite a number of disagreements during the rest of the decade, Soviet aid to the Chinese nuclear program appears to have continued until mid-1960 and resulted in substantial assistance to the construction of a gaseous

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[34] Malcolm Mackintosh, "Sino-Soviet Relations in a U.S.-China Crisis: The Soviet Attitude," infra; See also Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps 1949-1964 (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1965).

[35] "Chinese Government Statement of August 15, 1963," in Griffith, p. 351. "Soviet Government Statement of August 21, 1963, in Griffith, p. 365.

diffusion plant and several reactors, as well as the beginning of a missile production capability.[36]

There is very little mystery about Peking's motivations in seeking increased Soviet assistance in the Chinese effort to develop an indigenous nuclear weapons production capability. The Chinese had reached an industrial and scientific level where they could contemplate an acceleration of their nuclear production program, particularly if they could count on substantial Soviet assistance. Moreover, the Chinese were on the verge of launching their Great Leap Forward and were already in a mood to develop ambitious plans for industry, technology and science. Given their long-standing desire to make China a great power, the Chinese leaders were anxious to press ahead as quickly as possible in developing nuclear weapons and, hence, would have welcomed substantial Soviet aid provided it did not involve Soviet controls. Khrushchev's motives in yielding at least partially to these demands and stepping up Soviet assistance to the Chinese program are much more obscure. In general the Soviet leadership was probably not happy about giving China the independent capability to launch a nuclear war. However there were at least six factors which may have combined to lead Khrushchev to feel that it was desirable for him to acquiesce in Chinese demands for aid to their nuclear program :

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[36] Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 78-82.

1. Khrushchev was faced with a situation in which the Chinese were determined to go ahead with the development of nuclear weapons, whether or not they received extensive Soviet assistance. Hence Khrushchev's choice was not between a China equipped with nuclear weapons or a China dependent on the Soviet Union for nuclear deterrence. Rather it was between a Chinese nuclear program carried out in defiance, or at least without the aid of the Soviet Union, or a nuclear program carried out in cooperation with the Russians. In the latter case Soviet technicians would be involved in the program, giving the Russians considerable information about what the Chinese were doing and some degree of control over the evolution of the Chinese weapons development program.

2. During 1957, Khrushchev was engaged in a power struggle for the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party which was to see him purge first the anti-Party group in June and then Marshal Zhukov in October. Khrushchev undoubtedly was interested in securing at least the neutrality, and if possible the support, of the Chinese Communist Party in his effort to deal with opposition in the Soviet Union. His willingness to grant nuclear aid to China might have been part of his effort to insure Chinese neutrality and possibly to convince the Peking leadership that their own security would be enhanced if Khrushchev emerged the dominant figure in the Soviet heirarchy.

3. The Chinese had played a critical role during the latter part of 1956 and in early 1957 in helping to resolidify Soviet influence in Eastern Europe following the events in Hungary and in Poland. Nuclear aid might have been in part a repayment for Chinese favors and support.

4. The Sino-Soviet agreement on advanced technology for defense was signed on the eve of the Moscow Conference, at which the Soviets hoped to have a manifesto approved which would form the basis for the unity of the international Communist movement. It was clear that there were some issues on which the Chinese and the Russians disagreed and the Chinese had made it clear that they were prepared to argue for their own position. Stepped-up nuclear aid could have been part of the price which Khrushchev paid to the Chinese to secure at least their partial cooperation at the November conference and their willingness to compromise on key issues in dispute.

5. Khrushchev was, during this period, seeking closer military cooperation with Communist China and was to propose in 1958 various kinds of joint military arrangements, including, it will be suggested just below, perhaps an agreement to station Soviet nuclear weapons on Chinese territory. It is possible that he viewed the granting of aid to the Chinese nuclear weapons production program as a useful backdrop with which to negotiate closer military cooperation with Peking.

6. Although there was a hiatus in negotiating forums in October, 1957, Khrushchev had already taken the first steps

toward a nuclear test ban agreement with the United States, and was to make further steps in 1958. A test ban at this time required the active participation of China. Khrushchev must have recognized the fact that the Chinese would be suspicious of his effort to negotiate a test ban treaty if it appeared to preclude Chinese nuclear tests. He may have concluded that the most effective way to secure Chinese public and private support for the test ban treaty was to make such support a precondition for the granting of nuclear assistance.

Each of the considerations presented above probably contributed to Khrushchev's decision to yield to Chinese pressure and to accelerate aid to the Chinese nuclear weapons production program. It is possible that even at the time the agreement was signed, in October of 1957, the Chinese had doubts about how much aid Khrushchev would really be willing to give to them. They may have known that his decision to grant this aid was taken reluctantly and because of the pressures discussed above rather than because of any Soviet desire for an independent Chinese nuclear capability. The Chinese may, however, have had an interest of their own in a compromise at the November conference, and had decided that public support for the test ban treaty was a reasonable price to pay for Soviet nuclear assistance.

There remained a dilemma of relating the Chinese determination to get nuclear weapons and hence the need for them to carry out nuclear tests with the Soviet desire to negotiate a suspension of nuclear tests to which China would be expected to adhere. It is possible to speculate that, as a result of discussion of this issue between the Russians and the Chinese, a "test ban clause" was inserted into the Sino-Soviet nuclear agreement. The clause might have involved some specific further commitments by the Russians in case the Chinese were precluded from testing by an international agreement. More likely, it may have simply been an understanding that the Soviet Union would render such assistance as would be necessary to permit the Chinese to accept the test ban agreement.[37]

With substantial Soviet assistance, the Chinese could now look forward to the detonation of their first nuclear device, perhaps in 1960, and the development of an operational capability during the following years. This left the question, which was to be intensely debated in China during late 1957 and early 1958, of whether or not it would be desirable to have an interim arrangement under which Soviet nuclear

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[37] It will be argued below that the Chinese demands for increased assistance in June of 1959 were related to the possibility of an impending test ban treaty. This argument lends some plausibility to the notion that there was a test ban clause in the 1957 agreement. Moreover, the existence of such a clause would be one way of making compatible the Chinese launching of a stepped-up nuclear weapons program with Soviet aid in 1957 concurrent with the support of both countries for a test ban treaty. However, one had the further problem of reconciling whatever understandings were reached with the Soviet proposal for an agreement which would ban the transfer of weapons which was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in September of 1957. (See Chapter II--p. 3).

weapons might be stationed on Chinese territory, presumably under joint Soviet-Chinese control. Such an agreement appears to have had the support of the Chinese military and to have at least been acquiesed to by Soviet Premier Khrushchev. The events surrounding this proposal, which will be discussed below, leave it unclear as to whether this was a Soviet initiative acquiesced in by the Chinese military, or an initiative of the Chinese military accepted by the Soviet leadership. Mackintosh has suggested that Khrushchev sought closer military cooperation with China during this period and may have himself proposed the sharing of nuclear weapons under joint control.[38] The Chinese military, for its part, may have been uneasy about the hiatus in nuclear protection until China had its own operational capability and sought to enhance the Soviet commitment by having Soviet weapons actually stationed in China. Whatever the origin of the proposal, it appears to have been discussed between the two countries and intensively with China leading to a debate between the Army leadership and the Party. Given this overview we turn to a detailed consideration of these events.

In October, 1957, three Chinese delegations were in Moscow. Most publicized was the attendance by Mao Tse-tung and other

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[38] Mackintosh, pp. 12-20.

Chinese leaders at the celebration of the Soviet Revolution and at the meeting of the ruling Communist parties. A Chinese military delegation led by P'eng Teh-huai was present with Mao and remained after Mao's departure for a series of meetings.[39] A scienfitic delegation led by Kuo Mo-jo, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, carried on negotiations from October 18, 1957 to January 19, 1958 on scientific cooperation.[40] It is possible that the scientific groups concentrated on discussions of the implementation of the agreement on Soviet aid to the indigenous Chinese nuclear program and also other aspects of Sino-Soviet scientific cooperation. But there seems to be little doubt that Mao himself and particularly the military delegation discussed various nuclear sharing arrangements including, perhaps, the stationing of Soviet-made nuclear systems on Chinese territory, presumably under some form of joint control.

Public statements by Chinese military leaders calling for drawing on Soviet technology began in late October, 1957, just prior to departure of the military delegation to Moscow on November 6.[41] On October 31, 1957, the People's Daily

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[39] NCNA, November 28, 1957, in SCMP, 1663, pp. 48-49.

[40] NCNA, Moscow, January 18, 1958, in SCMP, 1696, pp. 34-35.

[41] Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 170.

published an article by Marshal Liu Po-ch'eng, Vice Chairman of the National Defense Council. The article entitled "The Soviet Army is the Example for the People's Armies of the World" touched on both aspects of what the Chinese PLA might learn from the Soviet Union: political control and advanced technology. The question of whether the Soviet army should provide an example for improved political control of the army (presumably advocated by Mao and his political associates) or whether it could also provide the basis for a quick improvement in Chinese military capability, (as advocated by the professional army) was to be the major thread in the conflict which was to evolve over the next six months. Marshall Liu came down on the side of learning from both aspects of Soviet accomplishments and stressed the up-to-date nature of Soviet armed forces including its development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. He declared that the Chinese army would learn from "all Soviet advanced experience."[42] The nature of the conflict within China at the time was demonstrated by a statement by Ch'ien San-ch'iang perhaps China's most distinguished nuclear physicist, who on the same day, according

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[42] Marshal Liu Po-sheng, "The Soviet Army is the Example for the People's Armies of the World," People's Daily, October 31, 1957, NCNA, October 31, 1957, in SCMP, 1647, pp. 26-30. Italics added.

to NCNA, discussed Soviet nuclear accomplishments. He pointed out that the Soviet Union had been the first to produce a hydrogen bomb that could be delivered, the first to launch an ICBM and an earth satellite and declared that the Soviet Union was leading the United States by a large margin. However, Chien argued not that China could borrow wholesale Soviet technology as the army was suggesting, but rather that China itself must build up its own scientific capability, following the pattern of Soviet scientific development. He declared that:

> We must follow the Soviet pattern with scientific development and strive to build a scientific and technical force of the working class equipped with Marxism-Leninism, and to catch up with the advanced world levels in a period of two or three five year plans, helped by the Soviet Union.[43]

P'eng Teh-huai, the Chinese Defense Minister, who was apparently the leader of the group urging the acceptances of finished Soviet weapons came out explicitly for borrowing Soviet technology. He too reviewed Soviet military, scientific and technological accomplishments and declared that the Soviets were now the world leaders. But from this he drew the conclusion that the Soviet armed forces could be the great example for the modernization of Chinese armed forces and, "a modernization

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[43] NCNA, October 31, 1957, in SCMP, 1645, pp. 27-28.

of our army may thus be accomplished with a reduction of roundabout ways."[44]

On the following day, two domestic radio broadcasts stressed the fact that the Chinese army would not be able to progress as fast as it had without Soviet help and without learning from Soviet experience. One of the broadcasts quoting from an article by Marshall Ho Lung in Red Star pointed out that Soviet experience would save the Chinese army time and effort in modernizing.[45] The same theme was reflected in a speech by Marshall Chu Teh on November 7th when he pointed out that the Soviet Union had done its utmost to render assistance to other socialist countries.[46] On November 30 the military delegation lead by P'eng Teh-huai left the Soviet

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[44] Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, "Learn from the Heroic Soviet Army," NCNA, November 4, 1957, in SCMP, 1649, pp. 28-30. See also Harold P. Ford, "Nuclear Weapons in the Sino-Soviet Enstrangement," The China Quarterly, No. 18, (April-June 1964), 160-173; and Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962). This interpretation while differing in important respects from both of these studies, draws extensively on their research.

[45] Ho Lung, "The Great Friendship and Shining Example," Red Star, broadcast on Chinese Home Service, Peking, November 5, 1957; Hsia Hua, "Long Live Solidarity Between the Armed Forces of the Chinese and Soviet Peoples," Chinese Home Service, Peking, November 5, 1957.

[46] Speech at Soviet Embassy banquet, Peking, NCNA, November 7, 1957, in SCMP, 1651, cited from Ford, p. 161.

Union and declared that:

> The Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung had constantly told us to learn from the Soviet armed forces and learn all their advanced experiences. This aspiration of ours is being realized step by step through the selfless aid of the Soviet people and the Soviet army.

What appears to be the last indication in the Chinese press of the possibility that China would soon get finished nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, came on January 16 1958, when the Chinese Liberation Army Daily published a report indicating that a new training program had been distributed to the troops and would finally be approved in June of 1958. The draft, according to the newspaper report, incorporated Soviet advance experience and prepared the army for training under "the modern conditions of atomic bombs, chemical warfare, and guided missiles."[48] It is possible that the training was related to enemy nuclear weapons, but in any case, the program was apparently dropped.

The decision to reject nuclear sharing arrangements seems to have been taken by early February of 1958 when the Chinese line began to change to one which, while it continued to stress learning from the Soviet army, emphasized the learning

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[47] NCNA, Moscow, November 30, 1957, in SCMP, 1664, p. 51.

[48] "New Training Program Promulgated by General Department of Supervision of Training," Liberation Army Daily, January 16, 1958, in SCMP, 1786, quoted in Ford, p. 162, and Hsieh, p. 110

of political control. At the same time the Chinese press began to stress the need to build modernized Chinese weaponry based on Chinese industrial development. These changes reflected the settlement of a general Party-Army dispute of which the nuclear weapons issue was only one facet.

On February 3, 1958, the first clear sign of the switch in emphasis came in a People's Daily article which, reflecting the growing Great Leap Forward, declared that national construction at top speed was necessary if China's security was to be guaranteed. It declared that the building of modern industry would be a "prerequisite for modernizing our national defense" and it attacked the notion of depending on other people.[49] On February 14, Liu Ning-yi, Vice President of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, while stressing the importance of learning from the Soviet Union declared that in the not too remote future China would be an advanced, prosperous, powerful, industrialized nation. This would be necessary he said before military modernization could take place.[50]

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[49] People's Daily, February 3, 1958, cited from SCMP in Ford, p. 166.

[50] NCNA, February 14, 1958, in SCMP, 1716, p. 18.

On February 27, 1958, P'eng, speaking at a rally celebrating the fortieth anniversary of Soviet Army Day in Peking, signaled the retreat of the professional army group under his leadership from the effort to have the Chinese Government agree to accept Soviet nuclear weapons. His speech made a passing reference to the up-to-date nature of the Soviet army and its modern military equipment, and indicated that the Chinese army must learn from the Soviet army. However what it was that China could learn had changed dramatically from the statements by P'eng and his associates in the fall of 1957. Now he stressed that what was to be learned from the Soviets was their experience "in solving questions related to the building of the armed forces by means of Marxist-Leninist theories," and he went on to point specifically to Soviet experience in the relationship between the army and the party, the army and the masses, and relationships within the army. P'eng made no mention in the statement of borrowing Soviet technology or advanced weapons equipment. In fact, he now also emphasized the need to first build up Chinese industry. Thus he concluded:

> We are convinced that in coordination with the new leap forward in our national economy we will certainly build our army faster than ever into a modernized revolutionary army as excellent as the Soviet army.[51]

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[51] NCNA, February 22, 1958, in SCMP, 1717, pp. 26-30.

Three weeks later Kuo Mo-jo in a major speech on strengthening Sino-Soviet cooperation in science, stressed the need for China to make active progress of her own in the newest branches of science and technology including the atomic field.[52] On the following day an academy of military science of the PLA was set up to guide the army's study of military science. Marshal Yeh Chien-ying declared that the academy would make full use of the latest scientific and technical developments and carry our research in a planned way. He declared that the academy would combine the advanced Soviet military science with a study of the concrete situation in China.[53]

With the new line clearly established, the Chinese press began to carry discussions of what apparently was at the heart of the issue of whether or not to accept Soviet nuclear weapons, namely the question of how to deter an American attack on China before China had her own nuclear weapons capability. The campaign was to reach a climax with the publication of the collection of Mao's articles entitled

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[52] Kuo Mo-jo "A Realization of a Big Leap Forward in Science," in SCMP, 1714, pp. 5-14.

[53] NCNA, March 16, 1958, in SCMP, 1736, p. 2.

"Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers" and the establishment-of-the-militia campaign in August 1958.

The Liberation Army Daily on March 16, 1958 pointed out that Mao had drawn a basic conclusion in his writings that to defeat a better equipped army with inferior weapons depends on the reliance on revolutionary warfare. The article continued:

> In case "a motherland-defense" war were to break out in the future, the equipment of our armed forces would be inferior to that of the imperialist forces within a certain period. The principle of defeating a better equipped army with inferior weapons, therefore, would still apply to future war which would utilize atomic bombs, missiles and chemical weapons.[54]

On March 30, apparently attacking the position which he had until very recently held, P'eng declared that China must systematically arm itself with new technical equipment but that "in the light of our industrial capacity we can do so only gradually." P'eng pointed out "that some comrades presumably including himself had "failed to appreciate that the modernization of our army must be established on the basis of our national industrialization, thus tending to expect too much of our modernization too soon."[55]

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[54] Joint Publications Research Service, (Hereafter cited as JPRS). Translation Study No. 1687 (June 9, 1959), quoted from Ford, p. 163.

[55] P'eng Teh-huai, "Build Our Army into an Excellant Modernized Revolutionary Force," Chien-Sang-Chu Pao, March 30, 1958, JPRS, translation No. 764-D, quoted from Hsieh, p. 110.

Thus by March the notion of a quick modernization of the Chinese army by accepting equipment from the Soviet Union had been firmly rejected by the Peking leadership. There is, as was indicated above, uncertainty as to what triggered the discussion by the PLA leadership of the possibility of quick modernization and whether their hopes were dashed by Peking or by Moscow.[56] The weight of the evidence would suggest that it was Mao who rejected the proposals being espoused by P'eng and his colleagues and by Khrushchev. There is considerable evidence that Khrushchev proposed various kinds of cooperative schemes with China including a joint naval command and a joint radar network, reaching a peak in April of 1958 after the Chinese rejection had been made clear, at least in their public statements.[57] It is these overtures, perhaps pressed as Chinese rejection became more likely, which the Chinese declared that they firmly rejected:

> In 1958 the leadership of the CPSU put forward unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control. These unreasonable demands were rightly and firmly rejected by the Chinese Government.[58]

Beginning in May 1958, presumably after the final firm rejection of Khrushchev's various proposals to join commands

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[56] Ford, for example, suggests that the Soviet Union was unwilling to give the kind of aid that the Chinese leaders had hoped for.

[57] For a discussion of the evidence emphasizing the Khrushchevian initiative reaching a climax in April of 1958 see Mackintosh.

[58] "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves--Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU," September 6, 1963, reprinted in Griffith, p. 399.

and the decision not to accept nuclear weapons under joint control, the Chinese press published several articles which for the first time publicly announced China's intentions to manufacture nuclear weapons, but at the same time condemned those who had urged too great a reliance on foreign techniques and on copying the Soviet Union. The statements emphasized that industrial development would have to precede modernization of the armed forces.[59]

The willingness of the leadership to publicly commit itself to the development of atomic weapons and missiles might have resulted from its confidence that Khrushchev would continue his assistance to the indigenous Chinese nuclear program despite the rejection of his "unreasonable" demands. By May of 1958 the Soviet aid may have been sufficiently advanced to give Peking this confidence. The message that the political leadership was giving to the army and to the Chinese people, as well as to the Soviets was that China would depend on cautious action, the umbrella of Soviet nuclear power, and its own capability for revolutionary war to deter or defeat an American attack until China could develop its own indigenous nuclear capability. This capability would be developed as quickly as possible utilizing as much Soviet assistance as was available.

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[59] These statements are summarized in Ford and Hsieh.

On May 22, the military committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party convened for a session which was to last through July 22. This meeting, according to the official communiqué, "reviewed the over-all strengthening of the PLA since the founding of the People's Republic, and defined the lines of policy for the future. At the same time, taking cognisance of the present world situation, it discussed the country's national defence and made decisions accordingly."[60] The conference apparently discussed and formally ratified the decisions of the top leadership which were then expressed in a major statement on "People's Army, People's War" by Chu Teh released on July 31, 1958. The article accepted that emphasis must be given to modern technological equipment, but reminded its readers that China was not an advocate of the sole importance of arms. It declared that there are some people, presumably those around P'eng Teh-huai, who advocate an exclusive military viewpoint and who pay attention only to national defense and not to the significance of economic construction to national defense. Chu Teh declared that China must base its military development on its own military experience and situation.[61] On the next day, in the guise of

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[60] Peking Review, (July 29, 1958), quoted from John Gittings, "China's Militia," China Quarterly, No. 18 (April-June, 1964), 100-117, at p. 105.

[61] Chu Teh, "People's Army, People's War," NCNA, July 31, 1958, in Current Background, No. 514 (August 6, 1958), 1-4. The article was reprinted in Pravda, August 3, 1958. (See Current Digest of the Soviet Press /hereafter cited as CDSP/, X, No. 31, weekly index, p. 61.).

discussing causes of the failure of the Nanchang uprising of 1927, Marshal Ho Lung expressed the error of the military professionals:

> We tried to solve our problem purely from the military point of view, and hoped for outside aid instead of relying on mobilisation of the masses.[62]

The shift in policy was also reflected in the promotion of Lin Piao to a position as a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo on May 25, 1958.[63] It is possible that it began to direct the PLA at this time, replacing P'eng Teh-huai who was dismissed in September 1959. An editorial in the Liberation Army Daily on August 1, 1958, declared that some comrades had neglected the revolutionary nature of the people's army. It continued:

> Based on the principle of military operations, they onesidedly stress the part of atomic weapons nad modern military techniques and neglected the role of the people. Instead of proceeding from the actual conditions of the enemy and our own side, and studying strategy and tactics suited to the peculiarities of our country, they followed the book formulas. They encouraged mechanical and stereotyped movements and rigid applications and looked upon flexibility with disfavor. In their attitude towards technology, they stood for mechanical application of foreign experience and looked upon with disfavor the combination of study with intricate and selective study.[64]

Through August and into the fall, the Chinese press contained stories attacking those comrades who had overemphasized the possibilities of borrowing from the Soviet Union. Reflecting

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[62] People's Daily, reprinted in Current Background, No. 514; quoted with this implication of the meaning of the remark from Ford, p. 136.

[63] Current Background, No. 519, p. 9.

[64] Liberation Army Daily, in SCMP, 1881, pp. 1-3.

the general spirit of the Great Leap, increased emphasis was put on the revolutionary tradition of the army, including the need to rely on the masses, as for example when the Liberation Army Daily on September 20 declared that; "If only we can rely on the masses and base everything on reality, we will surely work out something which is suitable for our own forces."[65] In August 1958, the Chinese proclaimed the "everyone a soldier" movement vastly expanding the People's Militia.[66] In an NCNA statement discussing an "Important statement by Chairman Mao" following a provincial tour, Mao was reported to have linked the militia to preventing an invasion of China or defeating such an invasion if it should occur.[67]

Thus in less than a year the Chinese had come full circle and returned to relying in the short run on the People's Army reinforced by an expanded militia. The proposals for joint nuclear arrangements with the Soviet Union had been firmly rejected. Nevertheless China had, with confidence, publicly committed herself to a nuclear weapons program and was in the process of receiving large scale assistance from the Soviet Union.

The inference that Soviet nuclear aid to China continued during this period and was the basis of Chinese support for

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[65] JPRS, No. 1357 (March 16, 1959), quoted from Ford, p. 164.

[66] Gittings, p. 103.

[67] NCNA, October 1, 1958, quoted in Gittings, p. 105.

the test ban is reinforced by the fact that Chinese public support for Soviet efforts to negotiate a test ban treaty were not shaken by the events of 1958. The Chinese did have other reasons to support a test ban including its popularity in Japan but they are unlikely to have given public support if they saw the test ban as an anti-Chinese measure. As will be indicated below the Chinese did back away from the test ban as such in 1959 and 1960 while continuing to emphasize nuclear disarmament.

In early September 1957 the London Disarmament Conference came to an end as a result of Soviet pressure[68] but on September 20, 1957, the Soviet Union introduced to the General Assembly a resolution which called for a discontinuance of nuclear tests for two or three years as of January 1, 1958. The draft resolution first called upon nuclear powers not to carry out any tests during this period and then called on "other states" to accede to the agreement.[69] Four days later the People's Daily reported that the Chinese Government supported the Soviet proposal.[70] During the remainder of 1957 and into 1958, the Chinese continued to support, within four or five days time, Soviet statements

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[68] New York Times, September 7, 1957, p. 1.

[69] Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, pp. 884-85.

[70] People's Daily, September 24, 1957, reported by NCNA, September 24, 1957, in SCMP, 1619, p. 50.

calling for a suspension of nuclear tests. The Soviets in turn reprinted some of these Chinese statements.[71]

On March 31, 1958, the Soviet Union announced that it was unilaterally suspending nuclear tests and that it would not test again unless the United States and the United Kingdom continued testing. On the next day the People's Daily supported the Soviet unilateral suspension of nuclear testing. At the same time it did note that the United States was willing to equip German armed forces with nuclear weapons and declared, as had the Soviet note, that if the United States and the United Kingdom did not stop testing the Soviet Union would have to resume its tests.[72] The Soviet move was reported to have gotten wide support in Communist China.[73] Perhaps Peking was pointing out to Moscow that Washington did not view a test suspension as incompatible with nuclear sharing. On April 4, 1958 Khrushchev dispatched notes to a number of heads of government including U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai. In these notes he

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[71] For example Izvestia on January 17, 1958 reprinted a People's Daily article calling for the ending of nuclear tests; cited in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, X, No. 3, weekly index, p. 40.

[72] People's Daily, April 1, 1958, reported by NCNA, April 1, 1958, in SCMP, 1746, pp. 37-38.

[73] NCNA, April 1, 1958, in SCMP, 1746.

pointed out that the Soviet Union has unilaterally renounced testing and urged agreement quickly since:

> Generally only three powers--the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and Great Britain--possess nuclear weapons; therefore agreement on the discontinuation of nuclear weapons tests can be achieved relatively easily. If the tests are not stopped now, within a certain time other countries may have nuclear weapons, and in such a situation it would, of course, be much more difficult to obtain an agreement.[74]

Ford has pointed out that Peking did not send a formal response to the Soviet note until ten days later and draws from this the conclusion that Peking may not have been happy about Soviet efforts to negotiate a test ban. However, the total Chinese rejection to the Soviet note suggests a different interpretation. On April 7, a People's Daily editorial supported the Soviet proposal and paraphrasing it declared that:

> In fact, an agreement can be reached with relative ease on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, as at present only the Soviet Union and the United States and Britain possess atomic weapons.[75]

On April 9, NCNA reported Chou En-lai as saying that the Chinese Government had been informed of the Soviet decision to suspend nuclear tests and that the Chinese people gave it their

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[74] Message from Nikita S. Khrushchev to Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 4, 1958, printed in Pravda, April 6, 1958, p. 1; translated in CDSP, X, No. 14, pp. 26-27.

[75] People's Daily editorial, April 7, 1958, in NCNA, April 7, 1958, in SCMP, 1749, 43-44.

enthusiastic support. And on April 10 the Chinese attacked the United States for rejecting the Soviet proposal to suspend tests.[76]

The formal Chinese response dated April 13 in response to Khrushchev's letter of April 4, declared that the Chinese Government:

> Fully supports the decision of the Soviet Government to first discontinue the test of all kinds of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the proposals concerning this question made by the Soviet Government to the governments of the United States and Britain.
>
> The Chinese Government supported the Soviet proposal as leading to "a general discontinuation of nuclear weapons tests" and ultimately "ridding mankind of the danger of a destructive atomic war."[77]

Even in April, 1958, at the time of the Chinese rejection of Khrushchev's proposals for nuclear sharing, Khrushchev was sufficiently confident of a Chinese positive response to publicly dispatch a letter to the Chinese Government asking its views on the nuclear test suspension. In fact, the Chinese support for Soviet proposals in the test ban area, and Soviet confidence that China would support efforts to end nuclear weapons tests were to continue into 1959.

On May 9, 1958, Khrushchev took a major step toward a test ban when in a letter to Eisenhower he accepted the Western

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[76] Reported in NCNA, April 10, 1958, in SCMP, 1751, p. 36.

[77] NCNA, April 14, 1958, in SCMP, 1753, pp. 43-46.

proposal for a conference of experts to examine the feasibility of a controlled system for the detection of nuclear weapons tests.[78] In taking this step Khrushchev must have known that a treaty and even a control system would be unacceptable unless China participated and the control system included Chinese territory. In fact Khrushchev's letter reflected his confidence that China would participate. In a follow-up letter on May 30 Khrushchev agreed to an American proposal that scientists from Great Britain and France participate in the Experts Conference and indicated that Czech and Polish scientists would also participate. The letter went on to state:

> Nor does the Soviet Government consider that the work of the experts should be confined to this group of countries. Therefore it seems advisable to invite experts from India also, and possibly from certain other countries, to participate in the conference.[79]

The American Government apparently took Khrushchev's letter, and perhaps informal Soviet indications of what other countries they had in mind, to mean that the Soviets were planning to propose the inclusion of Chinese scientists at the Experts Conference. According to one press report, Washington's at least tentative decision was to accept the presence of Chinese

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[78] Letter from the Soviet Premier to President Eisenhower, May 9, 1958, in Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, p. 1038.

[79] Letter from the Soviet Premier to President Eisenhower, May 30, 1958, in Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, pp. 1050-51. Italics added.

scientists.[80] Whether in fact such a proposal was actually made and rejected by the American Government is not clear from the public record.

Chinese support for the Experts Conference was indicated on June 27, 1958, on the eve of the conference when NCNA noted that the experts talks should help facilitate an agreement on cessation of nuclear weapons tests. However, it warned that the United States would use the talks to cover up its ambitions for a nuclear arms race.[81] While Chinese statements during the Experts Conference continued to point to American preparation for nuclear war, they did give support to the conference. The Chinese statements also pointed out that the United States was on the verge of increasing its exchange of nuclear weapons information with Great Britain and apparently with France in order to gain their adherence to the test ban. These comments as well as those cited above in regard to Germany, may have been intended as a reminder by Peking to Moscow that nuclear sharing was also being accelerated by the United States and hence was presumably looked upon by both countries as compatible with and even apparently necessary for gaining the

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[80] New York Herald Tribune, June 5, 1958.

[81] NCNA, June 27, 1958, in SCMP, 1803, p. 49.

concurrence of its principle allies in negotiating a test ban treaty.[82]

At the Experts Conference the Communist delegates made no effort to resist proposals for a controlled network covering the entire world including China. In fact, on the second day of the conference, the Czechoslovakian delegate spoke of a controlled network "spread out over the whole world."[83] The report of the Experts Conference proposed a control network which included 8 stations in mainland China.

On August 31, 1958, NCNA declared that the United States and the United Kingdom should suspend all tests since "the experts at Geneva have found detection possible" and it declared that an "agreement must be negotiated for a permanent ban on the testing of all atomic and hydrogen weapons by all powers."[84]

With the opening of the political conference to draft a nuclear test ban treaty, the Soviets continued to act as if the Chinese would certainly adhere to such an agreement. Thus,

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[82] See for example, People's Daily, July 5, 1958, reported in NCNA, July 5, 1958, in SCMP, 1807, p. 50; and People's Daily, July 5, 1958, in SCMP, 1811, pp. 36-40.

[83] Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on a Suspension of Nuclear Tests, Verbatim Records, Second Meeting, July 2, 1958, p. 22.

[84] NCNA, August 31, 1958, in SCMP, 1846, p. 3.

at the opening session of the conference on August 31, 1958, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin, while proposing that the original agreement signed only by the three nuclear powers declared that:

> It stands to reason that if the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom cease nuclear weapons tests on the basis of such an agreement /i.e. an agreement on control posts in the three countries/ and any other countries did the opposite, that is to say, worked on the production of nuclear weapons and began testing them, that would undoubtedly frustrate the idea of agreement on the universal discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. In order to prevent this from happening, the draft agreement should contain a provision to the effect that the governments of the three powers, i.e. the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, undertake to promote the assumption by all other states in the world of an undertaking not to carry out tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any type.[85]

And the Soviet draft agreement included an article which declared that:

> The three governments undertake to promote the assumption by all other states in the world of an undertaking not to carry out tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any type.[86]

On the next day, the People's Daily indicated China's support for the permanent suspension of nuclear tests, and

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85 Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Verbatim Transcript, First Plenary Meeting, October 31, 1961, p. 25.

86 Ibid., p. 26.

at the same time supported the Soviet position to resume testing in light of the refusal of the Western powers to accept a temporary moratorium.[87] Through the end of 1958 the Chinese continued to support the Soviet position at the Geneva Conference. Tsarapkin in Geneva resisted what he took to be Western proposals to have the test ban treaty negotiated by all of the countries in the world. He declared that asking every country to sign the initial treaty would "liberate a genie from a bottle" and that various countries would propose various changes and reservations, etc. However, on other occasions he reiterated his belief that all other countries would adhere to the treaty once it had been signed and ratified by the three nuclear powers.[88]

During the first half of 1959, while Sino-Soviet relations were worsening on a number of counts, the Soviets pushed ahead toward negotiation of a test ban treaty, apparently still acting on the assumption that China could be brought into the agreement. For example, the Soviet proposal for membership on the ruling commission governing the disarmament control organization, proposed that "three seats be allcted to the

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[87] People's Daily, November 1, 1958, NCNA, November 1, 1958, in SCMP. 1889, pp. 44-45.

[88] See for example Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Verbatim Transcripts, Eleventh Session, November 23, 1958, pp. 21-22, Twelfth Session, November 24, 1958, pp. 9-12.

Soviet Union and states friendly or allied with the Soviet Union,[89] and the preamble to the treaty accepted by all three powers on April 17, 1959, expressed the hope that "all other countries would also join in undertaking not to carry out nuclear weapons tests and to insure the satisfactory operation" of the international control organizations.[90]

In February, 1959, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan journeyed to Moscow where in talks with Soviet Premier Khrushchev he proposed a compromise on what then appeared to be the major stumbling block to a test ban treaty. Macmillan suggested that the number of on-site inspections to examine possible violations of the test ban treaty be negotiated politically between the three powers and that they settle on some specified number of annual inspections which would be veto free. On April 23, in letters to Eisenhower and Macmillan, Khrushchev alluded to and accepted the Macmillan proposal.[91]

On May 12, 1959, Harold Macmillan told the House of Commons that on the basis of his agreement with Khrushchev in Moscow, he expected a nuclear test ban treaty to be signed within several months. In a letter to Eisenhower on May 14, Khrushchev noted with satisfaction the willingness of the United States to study what was now in effect a joint British-Soviet proposal for a politically agreed number of veto-free inspections and

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[89] Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Verbatim Transcript, Fifty-Second Session, February 11, 1959. Italics added.

[90] Zoppo, p. 318.

[91] Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, pp. 1396-1400.

declared that:

> We continue to be of the opinion that this proposal constitutes a good basis for a solution of the most difficult problem--the problem of sending inspection teams for investigations on the spot. Obtaining agreement on this proposal would open the way to the conclusion of an accord on the cessation of all types of tests.[92]

On June 9, a New York Times report from Geneva indicated that the Soviets appeared to be moving toward acceptance of the notion of international staffing of control posts in the Soviet Union.[93]

Thus by early June of 1959 it must have appeared from Peking as if the Soviet Union was close to signing a test ban treaty with the United States and Great Britain. At the same time Khrushchev appeared to be aiming at a general improvement of his relations with the United States; the Chinese must have known, as the Western powers did, that he was seeking an invitation to visit the United States. In this context of increased suspicion of Soviet motives and with a test ban treaty perhaps becoming imminent, it would be quite natural for the Chinese to reopen discussions with the Soviets about the price that the Russians were prepared to pay

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[92] "Letter from the Soviet Premier (Khrushchev) to President Eisenhower Regarding Nuclear Test Suspension, May 14, 1959," in Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, p. 1409.

[93] New York Times, June 10, 1959.

to insure Chinese adherence to the test ban treaty. The Chinese report that on June 20, 1959, the Soviet Union refused the Chinese request for "a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture."[94] The Chinese statement declared that the Soviets rejected the Chinese request and "unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defense," as a "presentation gift" at the time the Soviet leader went to the United States for talks with Eisenhower in September."[95] This explanation, even if accepted, would not explain why the Chinese made these demands but only the reason for the Soviet rejection. Moreover, according to Eisenhower's Memiors, the invitation to Khrushchev to come to the United States was not given until July, 1959, and then only as a result of a misunderstanding between Eisenhower and Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy.[96]

A possible explanation for the Chinese making these demands at this time was their belief that a test ban was about to be signed. The Chinese may have stated their conditions for adhering to the test ban treaty. The particular items that the Chinese say they requested in June of 1959, are "a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture."

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[94]"Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government, August 15, 1963," in Griffith, p. 351.

[95]Ibid.

[96]Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 405-408.

It is at least plausible that these demands would be made as the price for the Chinese refraining from nuclear testing. Alternately the Chinese may have demanded a bomb which they could not test before a test ban treaty went into effect. Unless they believed that a test ban was imminent they would not have any reason to make these particular demands at this time. The state of the public literature on bomb design and the Chinese confidence in their nuclear physicists would have led the Chinese to view a sample bomb (whatever that may be) as less important than, for example, stepped up help to their own production facilities or perhaps advice on methods of handling weapons-grade plutonium. The Chinese themselves relate their demands to the nuclear test ban but in a negative way. They say that "as far back as June 20, 1959, when there was not yet the slightest sign of a treaty on stopping nuclear tests," the Soviets refused their demands. This Chinese description of the situation in June 1959 is not accurate. In fact there were in June 1959 expectations that a test ban treaty would shortly be signed. Both the Soviet Government and the British Government had made statements indicating that they thought a test ban treaty might be signed shortly and stories out of Geneva indicated that compromises were about to be made on a number of the major issues.[97] It is

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[97] There were of course a number of remaining differences between the parties but the situation was not one which could be described as there being "not the slightest sign" of a treaty.

not impossible that the Chinese statement should be read as saying: as far back as June, 1959, when on a previous occasion a test ban treaty appeared imminent the Russians refused to pay our price for signing. The Chinese themselves have offered no explanation for why they made these demands at this time, nor has any been offered thus far in the public literature.

The deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in 1959 may explain both the Chinese pressure for increased aid to their nuclear program before they became committed to a test ban treaty and the Soviets reluctance to grant the aid. Moreover Khrushchev's motivation for turning down the Chinese request may simply have involved his feeling that there was not yet sufficient certainty of a test ban treaty to make a formal commitment as to the price the Russians would pay to bring the Chinese in. Khrushchev was undoubtedly becoming increasingly disturbed about the unwillingness of the Chinese to go along with his efforts to improve relations with the United States. He was at this time hoping for an invitation to visit Washington and may have concluded that transfering nuclear weapons to China, particularly if the Chinese tested the weapons, would reduce the chances of his being able to arrange a visit to the United States. The charge by the Chinese that Khrushchev intended this as a present to the United States during his visit is contradicted by the information that he had not yet received an invitation. Moreover, there is

nothing to suggest that he told American leaders about either the nuclear aid agreement or the fact that it had been broken.

After turning down the Chinese request for increased nuclear aid in June 1959, Khrushchev was faced with the fact that from here on the signing of a test ban treaty would mean a break with China. There were divergent trends in Soviet policy following June, 1959, which may indicate some ambivalence as to whether or not Russia should proceed with the test ban in the face of likely Chinese opposition and perhaps increased pressure from the Soviet military to tests. The test ban negotiations did continue and at least for several months the Soviets appeared to be presenting serious proposals and negotiating in an effort to arrive at an agreement. At the same time Khrushchev, during his visit to the United States in the fall of 1959, intorduced a major new element into the disarmament negotiations; namely, the Soviet proposal for General and Complete Disarmament. While he stated that the test ban could still be separately negotiated, the emphasis in Soviet policy from September, 1959, was on the efforts to promote General and Complete disarmament. In January of 1960, the Chinese in a public statement made clear what they must have indicated to the Russians probably before that:

> any international agreement concerning disarmament, without the formal participation of the People's Republic of China and the

> signature of its delegate, cannot of course have any binding force on her.[98]

Soviet aid to the Chinese nuclear program appears to have continued at least at a modest level until mid-1960, when all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from China.[99]

The events since 1960 have been reported elsewhere in some detail and need only be recapitulated here to complete the discussion of the impact of the test ban on Sino-Soviet relations.[100] The Chinese have described the events of the period since 1959 as follows:

> First the Soviet Government tried to subdue China and curry favour with U.S. imperialism by discontinuing assistance to China. Then it put forward all sorts of untenable arguments in an attempt to induce China to abandon its solemn stand. Failing in all this, it has brazenly ganged up with the imperialist bandits in exerting pressure on China.[101]

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[98] Resolution of the National People's Congress, January 21, 1960, reported in NCNA, January 21, 1960, in SCMP, 2185, p. 4.

[99] Cf. Speech by President Lyndon Johnson in New York Times, October 19, 1964, p. 14.

[100] See in particular, Walter Clemens, "The Test Ban and Sino-Soviet Relations," paper prepared for the conference on Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, in Vol. II.

[101] Griffith, pp. 351-52.

By July, 1960, the test ban negotiations in Geneva had reached a complete deadlock with the Soviets apparently no longer negotiating seriously.[102] This move might have been influenced not only by the change in the Chinese attitude toward the test ban, but also by the U-2 incident, by pressure from the Soviet military to test, and by the general change in Khrushchev's orientation which led to an emphasis in GCD.

In August, 1962, the United States sought to reactivate serious negotiations for a test ban by proposing a ban on all tests except those underground without any on-site inspections. The Soviets accepted this proposal but with the proviso that there be a moratorium on underground tests.[103] On September 12, 1962, the Chinese commented on the American proposal and the Soviet reaction to it declaring that it was simply an effort on the part of Washington to prevent China from developing nuclear weapons. While still giving support to a discontinuance of nuclear tests, the Chinese reverted to the earlier Soviet position and declared that only a ban on nuclear weapons and their complete destruction could prevent a nuclear war. Zoppo has pointed out that this statement culminated a series of Chinese declarations in which their support for nuclear test cessation was gradually made more dependent on the banning of nuclear weapons.[104] Despite the Western initiative

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[102] Zoppo, p. 236.

[103] Clemens, p. 6.

[104] Zoppo, p. 385.

and the apparently interested Soviet response, test ban negotiations made no further progress until after early May, 1963, when, with the sudden illness of Kozlov, Khrushchev seems to have obtained a firm majority in the Praesidium which enabled him to proceed on a number of policy issues, including Yugoslavia as well as the nuclear test ban.[105] Soon thereafter, the Soviets apparently informed the American Government of a willingness to begin new negotiations of a treaty and this led quickly to the July talks at which the three environment test ban treaty was initialed. The Chinese responded vigorously to these events describing the test ban treaty as part of a Soviet-American effort to manacle China and to prevent her from getting nuclear weapons. The Russians in their responses declared that Peking was opposed to the test ban because of its desire to get nuclear weapons and was angry at Russia for refusing to supply such weapons.[106] Khrushchev could have had little doubt that the Chinese would bitterly denounce the test ban treaty; private exchanges between the two governments had made the Chinese position abundantly clear. However, Sino-Soviet relations had been deteriorating for a number of other reasons and Khrushchev apparently decided that the value that he would

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[105] Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 115-117.

[106] See for example, Pravda, August 21, 1963, cited in Clemens, p. 15.

get from the test ban in terms of his relations with the West would out weigh the cost vis-à-vis the Chinese. In fact, he seems to have gone out of his way to emphasize that the signing of the test ban marked a Soviet willingness to accept the intense disfavor of the Chinese. The Harriman mission to Moscow which negotiated the test ban treaty arrived during the course of Soviet-Chinese party negotiations and Khrushchev reacted in a much more friendly way to the British-American mission than to the Chinese delegation. The impact of the signing of the treaty on Sino-Soviet relations was immediate. It deepened the intensity of the public polemics and the private differences. Moreover it forced various Communist parties to choose between the Soviet interpretation of the treaty as a step toward world peace, and the Chinese interpretation of it as part of a Soviet-American effort to control the world. At least initially a number of parties, including those in Japan, Indonesia, North Vietnam and North Korea which had tried to remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, were forced to choose sides and came down in support of the Chinese. The test ban also accelerated the disagreements between the Russians and Chinese on disarmament questions at international Communist front meetings.[107]

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[107] Chinese Attitudes Study, pp. 168-72.

The Soviet and Chinese leaderships have both been aware since 1957 of the close connection between the state of Sino-Soviet relations, in particular the extent of Soviet nuclear assistance to China, and the test ban treaty. In 1957 the desire to negotiate a test ban treaty as well as the other factors discussed above led Khrushchev to initiate nuclear assistance to China. In 1959 disagreement about the terms under which China might come into the test ban treaty precipitated a dispute about the extent of Soviet assistance to China although it appears that this nuclear assistance did continue until 1960.[108] Faced with Chinese opposition and military pressure to test, the Russians moved away from an interest in the test ban until 1963 (or perhaps by 1962) when Khrushchev with a firm Praesidium majority, reduced military pressure to test, and a willingness to take on the Chinese on a number of issue was ready to sign a test ban and to use the test ban tr as a major issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Sino-Soviet relations clearly had a major impact on Soviet attitudes toward the test ban and in turn the Soviet willingness to sign a test ban treaty accelerated the Sino-Soviet split. In fact, the Chinese describe the Soviet signing of the treaty as the most "glaring" act of treachery of the Khrushchevian

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[108] See, for example, the statement by President Lyndon Johnson on October 18, 1964, reported in the New York Times, October 19, 1964, p. 14.

revisionists at least since they had published their "Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement" in June of 1963.[109]

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[109] "Carrying the Struggle Against Khrushchev Revisionism Through to the End," Peking Review (June 18, 1965), p. 6.

CHAPTER IV

THE FUTURE IMPACT OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

In this Chapter we turn to the future and consider the ways in which the Sino-Soviet dispute might affect the attitudes toward and interest in arms control of the Soviet Union and Communist China. As elsewhere in the report, no attempt is made to deal comprehensively with the sources of Soviet and Chinese attitudes and behavior.

This Chapter is written on the assumption that Sino-Soviet relations continue for the next several years in approximately the same pattern as they are now; that is, that Sino-Soviet relations will not substantially worsen, but also that there will not be a healing of the breach. Greatly worsened relations would change the perceptions of the two countries about the extent to which their relations and competition with each other should influence their arms control policy. On the other hand a rapprochement would have different implications depending on whose terms were accepted.

THE IMPACT ON SOVIET ATTITUDES

The sharp conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China does not necessarily lead the Kremlin either to seek arms control agreements with the West or to shy away from such agreements. Rather the dispute has in the past, and will very likely continue in the future continue to produce pressures

in both directions, and it must be emphasized that many other factors shape Soviet disarmament policy.

Particularly during the early period of American bombings of North Vietnam, the Soviet leadership has been sensitive to the charge made by the Chinese that they are willing to deal with the American Government while it was attacking another Communist state. The Chinese consistently charge the Russians with seeking détente with the West at the expense of the interests of the international Communist movement. The Russians in the future are likely to be responsive to this charge in periods when the conflict between the United States and a particular Communist state or party appears to be extremely acute.

The Soviets have consistently denied the Chinese charge that they subordinate their support for national liberation to their desire to get disarmament and other agreements with the West. In fact, as it was indicated above, the Russians tend to argue that disarmament would create conditions in which Communist revolutions would become more and not less likely. For reasons other than Chinese pressure, the current Soviet leadership appears to be committed to continuing to give support to revolutionary movements and hence it is unlikely that the Soviets will subscribe to agreements which seem specifically to rule out support for wars of national liberation. However, the Russians may become more interested in agreements which they can argue contribute to the possibility of revolutionary war.

If the Chinese charge of collaboration with the West and of ignoring the need to support wars of national liberation will tend to act as a brake on Soviet interest in arms control, other aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute tend to reinforce Soviet interest in arms control arrangements with the West. The Soviets may in the future, as in the past, be interested in agreements to demonstrate the feasibility of agreements which advance international Communist interests and demonstrate the war-like nature of the Peking regime. The Soviets may become interested in agreements which underline Chinese hostility to the world community and Chinese interference with the efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons or to prevent their spread. For example, if China refused to sign a non-proliferation treaty, the Chinese might be isolated as they were on the test ban issue, and would have to justify more explicitly than they have thus far the desire to see nuclear weapons spread. The Soviets might well expect to get significant gains from forcing the Chinese into this position.

Finally, if Sino-Soviet relations continue to deteriorate, the Russians are likely to be increasingly less restrained than they have been in the past by the desire not to sign agreements which could be directed against the Chinese. For example, they may have a positive interest in such things as arms embargoes which could be implemented against Chinese

efforts to support Chinese Communist parties in underdeveloped areas, or they may become interested in agreements on border arrangements in order to reinforce their political position on their own borders with China.[110]

As was indicated in Chapter II the Sino-Soviet dispute has tended to increase the influence of the East European countries. For this reason the Soviets are likely to be particularly interested in arms control measures which reinforce their alliance with Eastern Europe, particularly vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists, and less interested in agreements which may weaken their position in Eastern Europe. Agreements directed at reducing the likelihood that force would be used in the world are likely to be seen by the East Europeans as valuable in constraining the Federal Republic of Germany while they are seen as undesirable by China because they restrain China and revolutionary groups.

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[110] Some commentators have interpreted Khrushchev's proposal for an agreement against the use of violence to change international borders, made on December 31, 1964, as just such a measure.

THE IMPACT ON CHINESE ATTITUDES

Communist China has shown little if any serious interest in negotiating arms control measures and hence the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on her arms control policy has been much more limited than the impact on Soviet decisions.

The exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet dispute since 1963 and with it the decline in the credibility of the Soviet deterrent against an American attack on China has reinforced the already strong desires on the part of the Peking leadership to develop an independent Chinese nuclear capability, one that would be an effective deterrent against the West and at least in form would appear to be on a par with the strategic forces of the Soviet Union and the United States. As long as China has such desires she will be unwilling to accept any agreements which require her to halt her production of nuclear weapons or the associated delivery systems. Once China develops what her leaders view as an adequate deterrent, China's views on arms control may change.

The only way in which the Sino-Soviet dispute may increase Chinese interest in arms control measures is to increase her desire to deal bilaterally with the United States. As was indicated in the Chinese Attitude Study, Peking has indicated interest in a bilateral agreement banning the first use of nuclear weapons. The dispute with the Soviet Union has given Peking the freedom to deal directly with the United States

and perhaps increased her perceived need to do so in order to reduce the likelihood that the United States would launch an attack against China. However Peking has taken a militantly anti-American stance which would make it difficult for her to accept any agreements with the United States.

VARIETIES OF ARMS CONTROL

Both the Soviet and Chinese Attitudes Studies discuss the current attitude of the two countries toward arms control measures under the heading "Varieties of Arms Control."[111] This section will 1) summarize the positions presented there, 2) bring them up to date where necessary, and 3) indicate the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the attitudes of the two countries toward the particular measures being discussed.

1. Preventive Measures

These are moves designed to prevent the deployment of weapons systems not yet existing or deployed. Included in this category are measures to limit research and development, measures to prohibit the deployment of new systems, preventive measures to reduce the risk of war, and finally, measures to prevent the spread of weapons and delivery systems. As

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[111] Soviet Attitudes Study, pp. 127-141; Chinese Attitudes Study, pp. 136-140.

the Soviet Study indicated, measures to limit research and development are very difficult to state in acceptable terms in a formal agreement and however defined would require very extensive inspection. Moreover, the Soviets still appear to be hoping for a technological breakthrough which would enable them to alter the strategic balance of power. Chinese opposition to research and development limitations would be even more firmly rooted in the Chinese need to carry out programs to develop refined nuclear weapons and delivery systems. The Sino-Soviet split has substantially increased the Chinese need for research and development activities. While the Chinese have been committed at least since 1957 to the production of their own nuclear weapons and delivery systems, they have shown a great willingness to copy Soviet models and in fact all the weapons systems that they now have, including apparently their prototype missiles and G-class submarine, are direct copies of Soviet models, all presumably obtained prior to 1960. Thus had Soviet aid continued, the Chinese might have been willing to accept limitations on their own research and development activities. In fact, it was suggested that the Soviets hoped to bring the Chinese into the test ban by eliminating the need for Chinese testing. However, since 1960 the Chinese have increasingly stressed self-reliance, presumably now extending to military R&D and are unlikely to accept any limitations on this until and unless they believe that they

have caught up to the United States and the Soviet Union. Over the long run, the Chinese may come to accept an "adequate" defense which is not equal to Soviet or American forces.

The Sino-Soviet split may also make it increasingly unlikely that either the Soviet Union or the United States would accept limitations on research and development that otherwise might appear desirable. For example, discussions in the United States about ballistic missile defenses have recently focused increasingly on systems which might be effective against Communist China. It is particularly because the United States sees China as an enemy apart from the Soviet Union, and therefore believes that Chinese missiles might be directed at the United States without Soviet missiles also being fired, that a defense against Chinese systems becomes conceivable. The Soviets may find analogous situations with ballistic missile systems or other systems. Thus the possibility of having systems particularly effective against China may make research and development programs appear more attractive to the two superpowers than they would be if they were only confronting each other. Moreover the Soviet Union may feel compelled to develop strategic forces which appear far superior to those of Communist China. If the Soviets were to agree to a freeze on the size and characteristics of strategic forces, they might make it

easier for the Chinese to catch up to them and to claim to be an equally powerful Communist military power. The Soviets must recognize that their substantially greater GNP will enable them to stay far ahead of Communist China as long as they continue vigorous R&D programs. Hence, the Sino-Soviet dispute would appear to reduce the already low probability of agreements to limit research and development.

For reasons already suggested, the dispute also may make less likely agreements designed to prevent the deployment of new strategic systems. Here again the ballistic missile defense is the most important item. Soviet willingness to accept even an agreement not to deploy ballistic missile defenses seems to be very low since the Soviets continue to treat defenses as obviously desirable and to treat the introduction of ballistic missile defenses as a logical extension of their existing air defense forces. The Soviets do not appear to take seriously any of the arguments against ballistic missile defenses on arms control grounds discussed in the West. Here again the Sino-Soviet dispute reduces whatever probabilities there might be for a tacit agreement banning the deployment of ballistic missile defenses. The United States may become less interested in such an agreement because of the alleged attractiveness of a limited system against Communist China. The Russians may become less interested in banning the deployment of ballistic missile defenses partly because

such systems would be valuable for them against the possibility of a Chinese missile attack, but also because of a desire for prestige reasons to stay far ahead of the Chinese in the strategic arms race.

The preventive measures category as defined in the Soviet Attitude Study also includes efforts to reduce the risk of war. Both the United States and the Soviet Union appear to be coming increasingly to the conclusion that measures to reduce the danger of war by accident or miscalculation can best be carried out unilaterally. The hot line agreement, attacked by the Chinese as an indication of Soviet-American cooperation, was symbolic of the intention of the two countries to remain in contact despite any conflict between them and to avoid a war which arose without either side wanting it. The only recent Soviet proposal in this area came following the temporary loss of an American nuclear weapon following an air collision over Spain. The Soviets proposed a ban on flights of planes carrying nuclear weapons. They appear to be well aware of the American efforts to increase control over U.S. strategic forces and in other ways to reduce the possibility of accident or miscalculation. The Soviets appear to be taking similar steps and to share with the West the belief that whatever possibilities for accidental war were inherent in the strategic forces of the late 1950's and early 1960's are rapidly being eliminated by unilateral moves. The Chinese have been much more concerned with deliberate American

attack than they have been with war by accident or miscalculation and there is nothing to suggest that the Sino-Soviet split has increased Chinese interest in measures to reduce the risk of war. However, as was indicated in the Chinese Attitudes Study, as the Chinese strategic force develops, there may arise problems of vulnerability between Chinese and American forces in the Far East.

Finally in this category is the question of the interest of the Soviet Union and Communist China in measures designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. With reference to this question, the Soviet Attitude Study concluded as follows:

> The major impediment to agreement here is the Soviet position on the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF). Whatever the balance of considerations for and against it in the West, there is no reason to question the fact that Soviet statements on the MLF reflect actual concern about its anticipated effects and prospects--including the eventual acquisition of independent nuclear capability by West Germany. At the same time, the Soviet Union may be prepared to pay a substantial price for effective prevention of proliferation.[112]

Whether or not the Soviets are in fact fearful that the MLF will lead to German control over nuclear weapons, they have continued to argue that a non-proliferation treaty was incompatible with any sort of NATO nuclear force or even with German participation in NATO nuclear planning.

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[112] Soviet Attitude Study, p. 129.

Since 1957 the Soviet concern with non-proliferation has focused largely on the question of preventing Germany from getting nuclear weapons. Although the Soviets are concerned with the growth of Chinese nuclear power, they are unlikely to believe that any non-proliferation agreement would have an influence on the Chinese program. Even if the Soviets share the view, widely held in the West, that the spread of nuclear weapons would increase instability in the world and be detrimental to their interests, it is unlikely that the Soviets will be prepared to pay any substantial price for such an agreement.

The impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on Soviet desire for a proliferation treaty appears somewhat ambiguous. The dispute does increase Soviet concern about a Chinese nuclear capability, but as was indicated, this is not directly relevant to the issue of a non-proliferation agreement. A non-proliferation treaty might well appear to the Soviets as an agreement on which they would get the support of almost all the countries of the world and thus leave the Chinese isolated as they were in the case of the test ban. The Chinese have not found much support for their view that nuclear weapons should spread to all anti-imperialist countries and the Russians may well be happy with a formal agreement which underlines Chinese isolation. However, other implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute may lead the Russians to be somewhat

hesitant about concluding a proliferation agreement. Most immediately there is the question of whether the Russians would sign a formal treaty with the West while the United States was carrying on military operations against the Communist regime in North Vietnam. Beyond that the post-Khrushchevian leadership in the Soviet Union has been determined to check the expansion of Chinese influence in the third world and to seek to counter Chinese moves wherever possible. The Soviets may regret putting themselves in a position where they cannot compete with the Chinese in offering to share nuclear technology. Finally, the perception by China's neighbors of increased Chinese hostility may affect Soviet calculations about the desirability of non-proliferation. If the Soviets reach the conclusion that the alternatives for India are close alliance with the West, a Soviet-American nuclear guarantee, or the development of an Indian nuclear capability, they may conclude that the last named alternative is the best. Unless the Sino-Soviet dispute deteriorates much further than it has, the Soviets are likely to continue to be reluctant to enter into anything which looks like a military alliance against Communist China. For this reason, joint American-Soviet guarantees may appear undesirable. An Indian-American alliance, even one ostensibly directed primarily at China, would be viewed with alarm by the Soviet Union which has staked much on friendly relations with India.

Thus, the Russians might come ultimately to the conclusion that an indigenous Indian program was desirable and want to be in a position of offering the kind of support for it that the United States is likely to be unwilling to supply even in the absence of a non-proliferation agreement.

The public Chinese position on proliferation remains that the spread of nuclear weapons to other anti-imperialist states is good and that "non-proliferation" is used by the two superpowers as a device for increasing their influence in the world.[113] The Sino-Soviet rift probably reinforces Chinese views about the desirability of the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. Countries which develop their own nuclear capability, as in the case of France and China, are likely to do so at least in part because they resist the efforts of the two superpowers to dominate their alliances and the world. Moreover, as seen from Peking, these tendencies to challenge the superpowers are likely to be reinforced by the decision of a country to develop nuclear weapons, a decision

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[113] The Chinese attitude is discussed in detail in a paper by Oran R. Young, "Chinese Views on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," prepared for the conference on Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, in Vol. II. Young concludes in general that the Chinese attitude toward the spread of nuclear weapons is ambiguous and in a state of flux. The view that the Chinese are concerned about further proliferation is presented by Alice Hsieh "Implications of the Chinese Nuclear Detonations," RAND P-3152; the view that the Chinese are really in favor of proliferation is presented in Morton H. Halperin, "China and Nuclear Proliferation," forthcoming.

presumably taken in the face of the opposition of the Soviet Union and the United States. Peking has been seeking to form an alliance of anti-status quo powers, and has taken the view that each of these countries should develop their own nuclear capability. While it is true that development of nuclear weapons by countries such as Japan might lead them ultimately to be able to challenge China for leadership of the third bloc, there is no sign that the Chinese are particularly concerned by this problem. Peking may one day become concerned about a Japanese or Indian nuclear program. If this occurs after China has conducted a number of nuclear tests, the Chinese may become interested in a comprehensive test ban and other measures which might prevent an Indian or Japanese nuclear program. It is not impossible that the Chinese support for a no-first-use agreement is aimed at reducing the pressures in Japan for nuclear weapons.

Peking has been engaged in attempting to challenge the Soviet Union for support of countries in the third world. In these efforts the Chinese have searched for areas of support in which they had a comparative advantage over the Soviet Union. Thus, the Chinese have in some cases been willing to recognize revolutionary regimes when the Soviets could not do so because of other interests that they had, and they have been willing to train revolutionaries when the Soviets were concerned about their relations with the government of the country involved.

The Chinese may find that their willingness to share nuclear weapons information with countries such as Egypt gives them an advantage in dealing with these countries over the Soviet Union which may be unwilling to provide such information. Hence competition with the Soviet Union may increase Chinese unwillingness to be tied down to a non-proliferation agreement, but paradoxically may increase Chinese interest in Soviet adherence to a non-proliferation agreement.

2. War Control

As the Soviet and Chinese Attitudes Studies pointed out, neither Russia nor China have had any interest in measures designed to limit general nuclear war. The effect of the Sino-Soviet dispute on these attitudes would appear to be rather minimal but two connections might be noted. The Russians and the Chinese have engaged in a debate about whether or not general nuclear war would necessarily mean the destruction of civilization or simply the destruction of capitalist society. The Russians have taken the position in these public debates that general nuclear war would result in great destruction of all countries.[114] This position might reinforce their already strong tendencies to reject the notion that nuclear war might be controlled, and hence, survival possible.

The Chinese have even different reasons to deny that limited strategic war might be possible. Such a war would most likely be directed against them rather than against the

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[114]See for example, "Open Letter From The CPSU Central Committee to Party Organizations and All Communists of the Soviet Union, July 14, 1963," in William Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 297-301.

Soviet Union and their own interest is in stressing that an attack would certainly be launched back against the United States. Moreover, any deterrent which the Chinese have in the next several decades, whether directed against the United States or against Asia, will not be able to destroy a significant portion of enemy strategic forces and hence will be essentially an anti-city force. This will reinforce the Chinese desire to deny that strategic war might be fought without attacks on cities.

3. Strategic Force Reductions

As was noted in the Soviet and Chinese Attitudes Studies, neither Russia nor China has shown any interest in agreements of this kind. Sino-Soviet competition makes it even less likely that the Soviets would accept a freeze which might enable the Chinese to catch up with them. Equally the Chinese would not sign any agreement before they have what they view as an adequate strategic deterrent against the United States and the Soviet Union.

4. Limited Stabilizing Measures

The Soviet Attitudes Study suggested that the Soviets have an interest in a variety of different measures designed to increase the stability of the strategic balance. While this remains the case, as is indicated in Chapter I, it appears increasingly unlikely that this interest, shared between the United States and the Soviet Union, will actually

lead to any formal arms control agreements. Both sides seem to be moving unilaterally to stabilize the balance. The Chinese do not yet appear to have become concerned about the problems of an unstable strategic balance, and whether they will do so in the future remains an open question.

5. Confidence Building and Symbolic Measures

There is perhaps no area of greater Sino-Soviet disagreement than on the value of confidence building and symbolic measures between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets, particularly under Khrushchev, but apparently as well under the new leadership, have been interested in such agreements as a symbol of the viability of the policy of peaceful coexistence and also as possibly leading to more substantial arms control or political agreements with the West. The Chinese have condemned such moves on the part of the Russians as simply an attempt to establish a duopoly of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Chinese are not, at least at the present time, interested in increasing confidence between the United States and China nor in measures which symbolize shared relations between the two. Rather they are interested in stressing that the United States is the main enemy of revolution with whom agreement is at this stage impossible.

6. Conventional Force Limitation

The Soviet Union continues to give at least lip service to conventional force limitations as part of proposals for General and Complete Disarmament. The Chinese on the other hand continue to omit any limitations on conventional forces or weapons in proposals which they present for nuclear disarmament and state their opposition to conventional-weapons disarmament.

The Soviets may be more concerned now than they were in the past with the problems of negotiating force levels which include force limitations for the People's Republic of China. The West would not assume, as it had in the 1950's, that China would somehow be brought into such an agreement by the Soviet Union. Since the China issue almost certainly would get raised explicitly by the West, the Soviets may now prefer not to talk about conventional force limitation agreements. In addition it is not inconceivable that the Soviets will find at some point that they wish to have forces large enough to station additional troops on the Sino-Soviet border while keeping up their strength in Central Europe.

The Chinese lack of interest in conventional force limitations may have been reinforced by their uneasiness about having the Soviets negotiate such issues for them in the late 1950's, and particularly after 1959 when they began to believe that Khrushchev was serious about disarmament.

7. Internationalization

There is important disagreement between the West and the Soviet Union about a world of General and Complete Disarmament. The United States has argued that such a world must include international police forces to prevent international violence. The Soviets on the other hand have argued that there would be no need for an international police force in a disarmed world. The Chinese condemn the whole notion of GCD by arguing that it would be impossible until the elimination of capitalism.

There is, however, substantial Sino-Soviet disagreement about international police forces to deal with military conflicts in the current world. The Soviet position has been a somewhat ambiguous one. They have supported some international peacekeeping operations, for example those in Cyprus and the Middle East, and they have taken the consistent position that the United Nations Security Council in which they have a veto, has the right to set up international peacekeeping operations and should on occasion do so. Recently the Soviets have given some support to efforts to develop permanent peacekeeping machinery provided it was under the jurisdiction of the Security Council. However, the Soviets have not given complete support to peacekeeping operations. They have objected to specific operations including the Congo operation after its first phase. In general Soviet opposition has been to peacekeeping forces set up without the approval of, and not under the jurisdiction of, the Security Council.

The Chinese position has been one of complete opposition to international peacekeeping operations. They have accused the Soviets of supporting such operations as part of their efforts to establish a Soviet-American duopoly in the world and have indicated that such forces are in fact a tool of American imperialism. This view will reinforce other pressures which made it extremely unlikely that the Chinese would accept any form of international observation or control as part of a Taiwan settlement.

If the Soviets become increasingly concerned about Chinese efforts to expand their influence by force in South and Southeast Asia, they may become more attracted to peacekeeping forces as a means of countering these Chinese moves without forcing the Soviets to actively oppose China. International force operations may provide a substitute for either Soviet intervention against China, which the Russians do not appear ready for, or unilateral American intervention.

8. Regional Measures

Until fairly recently both the Soviet Union and Communist China gave support to nuclear free zone arrangements, particularly in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. However, since their nuclear detonation, the Chinese have withdrawn their support for a nuclear free zone in the Far East. The Chinese now argue that the first nuclear disarmament step must be a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons. They state that other steps might come afterwards but even nuclear free zones

in Africa and Latin America should be preceded by a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. The Chinese argue that unless there is such a ban, various countries should develop their own nuclear capabilities.

As was indicated above, the Soviets have attempted to convince the Chinese of the desirability of a nuclear free zone in the Far East as a substitute for a Chinese nuclear capability. Thus in the Chinese mind nuclear free zones has probably become particularly associated with the Soviet effort to prevent them from getting nuclear weapons.

CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT POLICY

This Chapter will examine the implications for American arms control and disarmament policy of the Sino-Soviet dispute. No attempt will be made to provide a comprehensive discussion[115] of American arms control policy vis-à-vis Russia or China. Rather the focus here will be on opportunities and problems for arms control negotiations and agreements with China and Russia created by the Sino-Soviet rift.

ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT CHINA[116]

It is frequently asserted that the detonation of a nuclear device by China makes clear what should have been obvious all along, namely that the People's Republic of China should be included in more arms control discussions since her adherence would be necessary for any arms control arrangement. However, this assumption needs to be questioned. In fact, almost any conceivable Soviet-American or multilateral arms control arrangemen

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[115] Some of these issues are dealt with in the Soviet and Chinese Attitudes Study.

[116] This subject is discussed at greater length in Jeremy J. Stone, "Arms Control: Can China Be Ignored?," prepared for the conference on Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, in Vol. II.

is possible without Chinese cooperation. This assertion does not apply to proposals for General and Complete Disarmament, but neither is it clear that such arrangements were possible even without the obstruction of China. It does apply to substantial strategic disarmament although not in the current context to substantial conventional disarmament.

Certainly the events of the last several years demonstrate that various limited steps are possible without the participation of China. The test ban would have been even more valuable to the United States if China had adhered to it, but it is clear that it was wise to reverse the position that the United States seemed to be taking in the late fifties, namely that the test ban was unacceptable unless China was part of it. Similarly the hot line agreement, the banning of weapons in orbit, and various tacit arms control steps taken by the United States and the Soviet Union, including the simultaneous announcement of cutbacks in the production of fissionable material, were all possible without the Chinese. It seems desirable for the United States to continue to pursue such arrangements with the Soviet Union and with other countries, recognizing that China is unlikely to adhere. In fact, as will be argued below, the presence of China at negotiations might well lead to insurmountable obstacles to agreements which would

otherwise be possible. We can, if we choose to, make Chinese adherence a precondition of any additional arms control measures; however, if we choose not to, there are clearly a large number of possible measures between the United States and the Soviet Union which do not require Chinese adherence. The same presumably would be true for measures involving arms control in Central Europe.

The belief that Chinese participation is necessary usually focuses on the prospects for reductions of the major strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. Within the last year or two such agreements seemed to have faded from the center of the arms control stage, partly for reasons discussed in Chapter 1, partly also because of the increased attention given to proliferation problems. Nevertheless, it may be useful to consider the extent to which Chinese adherence is in fact necessary for the American freeze proposal to be in the American security and political interest.

As Stone has argued, there is no strategic reason why the freeze should be unacceptable to the United States if the Chinese do not adhere to it.[117] The freeze proposal would call for a halt to changes in the number and design of Soviet and

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[117] Ibid., pp. 2-4.

American strategic systems. This means that for the period for which the freeze ran, the United States would have to rely on its existing strategic forces to accomplish whatever strategic objectives it wished to vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Communist China. This would have to be done in an environment in which the Soviets were not making any changes in their strategic forces but in which the Chinese were building up their strategic forces as rapidly as possible. The calculations involved in determining the extent to which American capabilities vis-à-vis China or Russia would be downgraded in such a situation, as compared to the prospects without an agreement or an agreement to which the Chinese also adhered, are exceedingly complex and involve a number of uncertainties. One minor but critical one would be the precise number of Minuteman II's that have been introduced into the strategic force prior to the freeze. Questions would also have to be raised about whether the United States sought to continue to have some damage-limiting capability as well as an assured destruction capability against the Soviet Union, and whether it wished to add some damage-limiting capability against the developing Chinese strategic force. However, we can simplify the discussion by considering the worst case--namely one in which the United States chooses to try to maintain substantial damage-limiting capabilities against both the Soviet Union and Communist China.

According to plans released by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in his statement to Congress on the Fiscal '67 budget, the United States does not intend to increase the number of strategic offensive missiles beyond those currently programmed of which almost all are now in place. Under current plans, the number of strategic bombers would decline very substantially. However, a freeze proposal would not require this phasing out and one way of handling the Chinese strategic targets would simply be to maintain a much larger part of the bomber force and have it aimed at Chinese population and strategic targets. The substantially less elaborate Chinese air defense capability would enable the bombers to perform in this role, even if they could not effectively penetrate Soviet defenses.

However, it is not even necessary to take the possible use of these bombers into account. While the United States does plan substantial improvements in the design of its strategic force over the next several years, these improvements appear to be designed either to enable the force to penetrate against possible Soviet ballistic missile defenses or to improve in accuracy to be able to attack hardened Soviet missiles. However, the freeze would presumably prevent either of these Soviet improvements and also any increase in strategic forces which the Soviets may be planning within the next several years. Even without a freeze the United States has refrained from committing itself to any particular

level of damage-limiting capability against the Soviet Union and has asserted that it has ample reserves in the needed capacity for assured destruction. According to the most recent testimony, the United States already has from its current arsenal sufficient forces to carry out the assured destruction role against Communist China. Thus, the only additional forces which might be necessary would be those to target the Chinese strategic forces. The size of the Chinese strategic force over the next ten or fifteen years is highly uncertain, but it appears extremely unlikely that the Chinese would have more than a very small number of strategic forces capable of reaching the United States. These missiles could easily be targeted with American missiles freed from the need to target additional Soviet strategic forces. Even if the United States wanted to target Chinese MRBM's and IRBM's, this would not appear to put an insurmountable burden on American strategic force capability (certainly not if one allows bombers to be used in this role or in the counterpopulation role, freeing missiles for damage-limiting). Any threat that the Chinese pose with submarines could be attacked more effectively with increases in ASW capabilities not limited under the freeze proposal. Moreover, it is not clear that the United States would be interested in maintaining high damage-limiting capabilities against the Soviet Union if it had succeeded in negotiating a freeze proposal with the country.

Thus, in regard to the need for Chinese adherence to a freeze, it is possible tc conclude as follows: (1) over the next 5 years before China has any strategic delivery systems, China will not pose any strategic threat at all to a freeze agreement; (2) any Chinese submarine capability can better be handled with enhanced American ASW forces, not limited under a freeze; (3) as Chinese medium range and ICBM forces begin to be deployed in the 1970's and 1980's, these could be targeted without difficulty from already existing American missile and bomber forces; (4) if the United States and the Soviet Union have successfully maintained a freeze proposal for ten or more years, it is doubtful that the United States will feel the need to maintain even as large a force as it now has for assured destruction or damage-limiting against the Soviet Union; (5) in fact, technological and strategic changes are likely to force a revision of any freeze agreement negotiated now, long before the pressure of Chinese strategic forces would require changes in the treaty.

The same kind of argument could be developed at some length in relation to substantial reductions in strategic forces--for example, the 30% reduction proposed by the United States as the first stage of a CCD treaty.

The question of strategic defensive forces pose some separate problems in relation to a strategic arms control agreement without the Chinese. While the conclusion remains

the same, namely that such agreements are technically and strategically feasible without China, some additional analysis may be in order.

In his 1966 posture statement, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made clear that serious attention is being given within the American Government to the desirability of a ballistic defense system against Communist China. Since the current American freeze proposal bars any new defensive systems, including an ABM system, one would either have to propose a rewriting of the freeze arrangement or accept the fact that ballistic missile defenses even against China are foreclosed. However, the freeze would not affect attempts to use anti-submarine warfare activities to eliminate any threat that might be posed by Chinese submarines, nor would the freeze affect the existing American air defense capability which would pose a substantial barrier to any Chinese aircraft. Nor is the United States likely to be interested in deploying a ballistic missile defense to cover the targets which might come under attack of a Chinese medium range missile capability. Thus, the remaining issue is a Chinese ICBM force. No public estimates suggest that China is likely to have such a force any time earlier than the mid-1970's. Thus, even assuming a lead time of 3 or 4 years in deploying an American ballistic missile defensive system, a freeze could be in operation for perhaps 5 years before it would confront the problem of putting a brake on the deployment of a ballistic missile defense needed against China. Even this estimate is very uncertain.

There is no sign of a Chinese ICBM program, at least no sign which the United States or China have chosen to make public. Moreover the Chinese may be deterred from developing an ICBM by the American assertion that it would build a ballistic missile defense which could effectively counter it. Assuming that China proceeds with developing an ICBM force, the United States would, in the early 1970's, be confronted with the problem of foregoing the construction of a ballistic missile defense to counter China's ICBM's or renouncing the freeze or proposing a revision of the freeze agreement. Even if one leaves aside the possible pressure to design around the limits of a freeze proposal in dealing with the Chinese, it is not at all clear that the most effective answer is a ballistic missile defense.

As Mr. McNamara has emphasized repeatedly in relation to the Russians, the most effective deterrent against Soviet attack is the development of a well protected American strategic force which can credibly threaten to do extensive damage to the Soviet Union in the event of a Soviet attack. The United States will without doubt have such a capability against China for the foreseeable future, even assuming a freeze or even a substantial reduction in the American strategic force. Thus it needs to be emphasized that the primary means which the United States relies on to deter Soviet attack will operate effectively against China even without an American ABM. Moreover, as Mr. McNamara has also emphasized, efforts at damage-limiting must be seen as involving not only active

defense but also strategic offensive forces which could destroy the enemy forces on the ground. Any Chinese ICBM capability in the 1975 period would be extremely vulnerable to a first strike by American strategic forces, even the forces we would maintain under a freeze. This would be the most effective means of damage-limiting. There would, it is true, be a residual value to ballistic missile defenses, particularly if one took seriously the possibility that the Chinese would launch a first strike while recognizing the retaliation which would occur. However this possibility appears to be extremely low, much lower than risks the United States has been prepared to run vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, even in the absence of arms control arrangements. Thus, without attempting to come to any conclusions about the overall desirability of a ballistic missile defense against China in the absence of a freeze or other strategic arms control arrangement, it is possible to conclude that even this issue poses no problems during the 1960's, and even in the 1970's is capable of adjustment without renouncing a freeze arrangement.

It has been argued thus far that China need not threaten various limited measures between the United States and the Soviet Union or with other countries, and that she also need not pose any threat to a freeze or other strategic arms control arrangement. There remains the question of whether tactic and informal arms control agreements will continue to be possible without the adherence of Communist China.

Stone has suggested that the Chinese may, if they choose to, find ways of disrupting existing tacit agreements. For example, the important understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union that neither would interfere with the orbiting strategic reconnaisance system of the other, could be upset if another country, China (or perhaps even France), decided to try to shoot down satellites which passed over her territory. Other informal arrangements could also presumably be undermined by the Chinese. For example, insofar as there is a tacit understanding about the different quality of nuclear weapons, and hence the likelihood that they would be used in various conflicts, the Chinese could disrupt this by using a nuclear weapon or simply by acting as if they intend to. Actually the Chinese have strong interests of their own in reinforcing the qualitative difference of nuclear weapons partly because it fit into Mao's doctrine, but more important because they are trying to deter American use of nuclear weapons against China. In fact, the Chinese have renounced the first use of nuclear weapons and have written a number of articles stating--whatever they may believe--that the United States would not be able to use nuclear weapons in a war against China.

Beyond suggesting that the United States be alert to the threat that China would pose to an existing or future tacit arms control understanding, it is impossible to specify any general policy recommendations. It would appear that many

tacit arrangements could survive even with substantial Chinese efforts to undermine them, and that the Chinese may have reasons of their own to try to reinforce some tacit understandings, such as those involved with the special quality of nuclear weapons. Our understanding of the likely Chinese approach to existing future tacit arrangements is sufficiently uncertain that it is doubtful that the United States should upset any existing arrangements or shy away from possible new ones because of a belief that the Chinese might seek to undermine them. China might try to act in this way, but even if she does there may be ways to counteract it, and we cannot be sure of how the Chinese will perceive their interests.

A special question concerns whether China can be ignored in arms control arrangements involving treaties for which we would like to have the adherence not only of the superpowers but also of other countries. Most important in this category are of course agreements involving nuclear testing or the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by additional countries. There appears to be little doubt that until the Chinese mood changes, they will make every effort to convince other countries not to subscribe to arms control agreements. However it should be noted that the Chinese efforts in this direction in regard to the test ban were almost entirely a failure, and in fact rebounded to the political advantage of the United States. China succeeded in persuading only North Vietnam, North Korea,

Cuba and Cambodia to refrain from signing the Test Ban Treaty. That is to say, no country which is capable of making nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future refrained from joining the Test Ban Treaty either because China urged her not to do so or because she decided not to do so in light of the Chinese determination to continue testing. The critical question for agreements such as a total test ban treaty or a treaty on non-acquisition of nuclear weapons is whether countries which feel themselves actually or potentially threatened by China, such as Japan, India, Australia, perhaps Indonesia, will be willing to sign a treaty in the absence of a Chinese willingness to forego the development of nuclear weapons.

Chinese non-adherence to a non-proliferation pact would raise the question of whether China was going to be prepared to share nuclear weapons technology with other countries. Much of the danger in this direction could be foreclosed if the potential recipients of Chinese aid could be persuaded to sign a non-acquisition agreement. The signing of such a treaty would probably put a substantial damper on any tendency of various countries to consider accepting Chinese help, and might provide the basis for American interference to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons or

weapons technology. Thus, while the United States obviously would prefer China to adhere to a non-proliferation agreement and agree not to spread nuclear weapons and, in the best of all possible worlds, agree to abandon her own program, there is little reason to believe that this would occur. On the other hand, this does not provide any reason to abandon the effort to negotiate a non-proliferation treaty.

It is thus concluded that while China may make arms control agreements politically more difficult to negotiate, there is no strategic or military reason why agreements which are desirable with the adherence of China are not also desirable without that adherence.[118] There is the further question of whether the Sino-Soviet dispute enhances the prospects, or can be manipulated to enhance the prospects, of other arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

If China engages in efforts to disrupt tacit or informal arms control arrangements, this could have the effect of backfiring and stimulating more explicit formal Soviet-American cooperation to protect existing agreements against Chinese usurpation. For example, if both the United States and the Soviet Union find it in their interest not to have countries interfere in orbiting earth satellites then any Chinese

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[118] There may be some particular exceptions such as substantial conventional disarmament, but these also appear unlikely for other reasons.

attempt to shoot down such satellites may provoke a formal agreement between the two countries and other countries on acceptable orbiting systems in order, hopefully, to deter further Chinese interference or perhaps lay the groundwork for a reaction to it. In general, depending on the evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Soviet Union may find it desirable at times to seek agreements with the West because of Chinese opposition. It would appear that the United States should be alert to this possibility and ready to approach the Soviet Union when and if it appears necessary to seek to formalize particular agreements in face of Chinese efforts to disrupt them.

Moreover arms control agreements between the United States and Soviet Union may become more explicitly directed at dealing with Chinese behavior or behavior of other countries or groups supported by China. For example, a. was suggested above, Soviet interest in peace-keeping operations of various kinds could conceivably increase if the Soviets come to believe that this is a way of checking Chinese influence in Southeast Asia without the Russians doing it themselves or allowing the United States to do it. Soviet proposals for international peace-keeping to deal with problems of this kind will confront the United States with the dilemma of whether it prefers the international arrangements or unilateral action by the United States and its allies. However if we do seek more

peace-keeping arrangements, we may find them easier to negotiate in light of Chinese behavior. If the Sino-Soviet dispute becomes much more exacerbated, it cannot be excluded that the Soviets would be prepared to consider arms control agreements which laid the groundwork for action against China or which were designed to check Chinese moves. For example, the Soviets could conceivably reach the stage where they were prepared to negotiate agreements banning support of various kinds for guerilla and insurgent movements that the Chinese were seeking to aid.

It was emphasized above that Soviet interest in arms control and the Soviet willingness to sign arrangements, such as the Test Ban Treaty, have substantially exacerbated the Sino-Soviet dispute. In developing its arms control policy for the future, the United States has the choice of trying to use its arms control proposals and the agreements it is prepared to sign to exacerbate the Sino-Soviet dispute. For example, if this was a high priority of American arms control policy, the United States might be willing to accept agreements such as a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Such agreements have been pushed by the Russians for a long time and would be condemned by the Chinese and looked upon by them as a further sign of Soviet sell-out to the United States. An underground test ban would fall into

the same category as would agreements for the setting up of international peace-keeping forces, even if under a Security Council veto. The non-proliferation treaty would also incur the wrath of the Chinese as would any number of so-called confidence-building measures.

It is extremely doubtful that the United States should deliberately seek to exacerbate the Sino-Soviet dispute in the formulation and execution of its arms control policy. The dispute is already quite intense and it is not completely clear that it is in the American interest to see the relation reach a rupture. Moreover, our ability to influence the dispute is limited. The problems and difficulties in negotiating arms control with the Soviet Union and Soviet suspicion of American motivations are already so high that it is doubtful that one should risk further complicating problems by explicitly seeking to manipulate arms control and disarmament to exacerbate the Soviet dispute with China. The Kremlin is well aware of the cost to its relation to China which it incurs in the signing of arms control agreements and even in conducting arms control negotiations. If we genuinely value arms control, it might be well for us to avoid any attempt to manipulate arms control discussions and agreements in order to exacerbate the Sino-Soviet dispute. Nevertheless, we should recognize that any proposals we put forward and any agreements that the Soviets accept do have implications

for the relations between Communist China and the Soviet Union. It was suggested above that the effect on this relation may turn out to be the most important consequence of a nuclear test ban treaty, and similar results might develop from other agreements. In the present context it is likely that any arms control agreements which appeal to the Russians will adversely affect Sino-Soviet relations.

It should be emphasized, particularly at this point in the discussion of American policy, that this Chapter is restricted to a consideration of the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on American arms control policy. Thus the implication presented here, that confidence-building measures are valuable in that they contribute to exacerbating Sino-Soviet relations, should not be taken as a recommendation for pursuing confidence measures. Obviously there are a number of other issues which arise in the evaluation of such measures, issues which go far beyond the scope of this report.

ARMS CONTROL WITH CHINA

Any discussion of desirable kinds of arms control arrangements with Communist China must be put in the context of the general overall American policy toward China and the

objectives which we are seeking to accomplish. The assumption made here is that the United States should not and is not seeking to isolate China. Rather while effectively checking any attempts by the Chinese to use military force to expand, the United States should seek to draw China into the world Community and try to make her a responsible and participating member. We must recognize that this will be a slow and difficult process. At the moment the Chinese are in an extremely hostile mood particularly toward the United States and hence are unlikely to respond to any of our overtures in the disarmament field or elsewhere. Nevertheless it is necessary for the United States to begin to probe the Chinese Communusts position at a number of different points since we cannot be certain where progress can first be made.

The Sino-Soviet rift means that the United States can and must deal with China as a separate strategic opponent. The posture statement by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara makes it clear than in its unilateral strategic analysis and force level planning, the United States now treats Communist China as a separate enemy posing distinct threats from those posed by the Soviet Union. For the same reasons that we now have a separate military policy vis-à-vis Communist China, the United States needs to develop a separate arms control policy.

Perhaps the first question we need to consider is whether or not the United States should want to open arms control

negotiations with Peking. This study and the Chinese Attitudes Study emphasized that it is extremely unlikely that the United States and Communist China will be able to sign any formal arms control agreements with each other in the next several years. Therefore, one might ask why negotiate, given the state of tensions in the Far East? Is it not hypocritical for the United States to seek the opening of arms control negotiations?

The answer would seem to be clearly no. One way of the United States underlining its belief that its relations with China, as with the Soviet Union, are a combination of conflict and overlapping interests would be for the United States to actively seek to begin arms control negotiations precisely in this period of acute tensions. Moreover, despite the fact that we should not expect agreements in the short run, there may be important reasons to try to start a dialogue on arms control matters at this time. The Chinese attitude toward the problems of the control of nuclear weapons is apparently in a state of flux, following Peking's entrance into the nuclear club. The Chinese are now having to face a series of procurement and research and development decisions, and to consider questions of trade offs between numbers and quality of weapons, and other questions which have confronted the United States and the Soviet Union over the past twenty years. If we want to influence these decisions in ways that appear to us desirable in contributing to the stability of evolving balance between the

United States and Communist China, then it may be important to inject into Peking's calculations a clear understanding of strategic doctrine as evolved in the United States and of the fact that Chinese and American strategic decisions will begin to interact with each other. As the Chinese develop strategic forces, it will become more and more important to us that Peking have a clear understanding of American strategic doctrine and of the quality of American forces. Thus, the sooner the dialogue begins, the better. In addition, the act of negotiating with Peking about arms control matters may force the United States to take a more careful look at its military and security posture in the Far East than it has thus far taken. The need to develop a position for an arms control conference with China can have a stimulating effect on the analysis of unilateral strategic issues in the Far East, much in the way that arms control negotiations with the Soviets have helped the United States develop a more efficient military establishment vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union is unlikely to be happy about Sino-American arms control talks since the Soviet leaders may view them as an effort by China to complicate Soviet efforts to negotiate with the West. However the Soviet objection is unlikely to be very strenuous or to influence Chinese behavior. Certainly Soviet displeasure should not lead the United States to eschew discussions with China.

If negotiations with China are desirable, the question arises of an appropriate and possible forum for these negotiations. While it is possible to conclude that one negotiating forum is better than another, the essential point is that we should probably accept any reasonable forum which proves feasible.

If the United States is really interested in beginning arms control negotiations with Communist China and not just

scoring propaganda points by demonstrating the lack of Chinese interest in such negotiations, then we need to consider not only what negotiating forums are desirable for the United States but also which forums are likely to prove acceptable to Peking and to other Asian nations. Fortunately, it would appear that one forum which Peking seems to desire, U.S.-Chinese bilateral talks, is also the forum that would seem to most effectively advance American interest because it is the one in which serious non-polemical negotiations are most likely.

It has been suggested that Peking should be invited to the Eighteen Nation Geneva Conference. In fact, as a result of some confused statements issued in Washington shortly after the Chinese nuclear detonation, the Chinese assume that they have been invited to the Conference by the United States, and have made it very clear that they do not intend to come. The Chinese look upon the Eighteen Nation Conference as part of the United Nations and refuse to have anything to do with any organ of the United Nations before they are voted into, and Taipei expelled from, all of the organs of the U.N. (China might well take a seat at Geneva if she joins the U.N.) Moreover, it does not appear to be in the American interest to have China join the Eighteen Nation Conference. Much of the pressure for Chinese participation in the Geneva Conference stems from the belief that Peking's adherence is necessary for the successful functioning of the agreements being negotiated at Geneva. However, it was argued above that such is not the case, that these agreements can go forward without Peking's participation. Moreover, it is clear that China

objects fundamentally to the agreements being discussed at Geneva, in particular to the non-proliferation treaty. A Chinese delegate at Geneva would find it necessary to launch long attacks not only on the position of the United States, but also that of the Soviet Union. While it might be instructive, and in some ways entertaining to have the Soviets try to meet these attacks, it does not appear to be in the interests of more arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union to turn the Geneva Conference table into another forum for Sino-Soviet polemics. The Soviets have shown some sensitivity to the Chinese criticisms of their position and may be less willing to negotiate seriously at Geneva if they need to do so in front of Peking. To sum up this point, Peking has no interest in coming to Geneva and we should not encourage her to do so. On the other hand we should not oppose China's participation if others advocate it, and it should be noted that many students of these problems would favor Chinese participation in a multilateral forum such as ENDC.

Following their first nuclear detonation, the Chinese proposed the convening of a world conference of the heads of government of all the countries to discuss various arms control matters and in particular a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. A world disarmament conference had been proposed by a number of other countries and organizations frequently as a device to bring China into arms control negotiations. The U N. General Assembly has endorsed such a conference and preliminary

discussions looking toward convening such a conference are now apparently under way. The Chinese reaction to the U.N. Resolution, while hesitant, was apparently unenthusiastic and in line with the general Chinese position that it will not participate in activities sponsored by or called into being by the United Nations. Nevertheless, it may be that some way can be found around this dilemma and a world disarmament conference convened to which both the United States and Communist China would be invited and to which China would be prepared to go. The United States should be willing to attend such a conference, but it should be under no illusion as to the value of the conference for arms control purposes. As American officials have pointed out, it would be very difficult to carry on any serious negotiations at such a conference and it would in fact turn into a propaganda fest in which each country put forward its well-known position on disarmament matters. This could only reinforce whatever tendencies already exist between Peking and Washington to treat disarmament strictly as a propaganda and political issue without any real military or strategic content.

Despite the fact that they have painted the United States as the leading opponent of world revolution and have argued that the basis for judging any country or party is it's opposition to the United States, the Chinese have indicated an interest in a bilateral arms control agreement banning the

first use of nuclear weapons. There appear to have been some discussions of arms control and nuclear matters at the Sino-American Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, but it is impossible from information publicly available to judge to what extent these have been genuine negotiations or even discussions rather than the reading out of formal positions. Regardless of what has taken place at the Warsaw talks, it would appear desirable to seek the initiation of a separate and continuing Chinese-American arms control negotiating forum. The United States might propose such meetings at the Warsaw talks and perhaps later make a public proposal. It is unlikely that such talks could begin until the Vietnam war quieted down. These discussions, hopefully kept at least as private and as unpublicized as the Warsaw talks on more general political matters, should be a place in which the United States seeks to begin the process of having an arms control dialogue with Communist China.

What would be discussed at such a conference, given the lack of possible agreements which appear to the United States and Communist China to be in their interest? It is perhaps worth pointing out that the absence of the possibility of agreement, did not prevent the holding of a number of conferences with the Soviet Union; conferences which appear on balance to have been desirable in laying the groundwork for recent agreements, and also in improving the strategic dialogue

between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover as was suggested above, the pressures from the holding of conferences may lead both the United States and China to develop serious proposals that might be of interest to the two countries.

Part of an agenda for a Sino-American arms control conference would, of course, be supplied by Peking. It is possible to anticipate from various Chinese statements what items would be on their agenda. First of all, of course, would be the Chinese proposal for a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons, specifically their proposal that the United States and China each agree first on the basis of unilateral statements not to use nuclear weapons against each other and then sign a formal bilateral treaty in anticipation of a general international agreement. Second, the Chinese would undoubtedly propose American withdrawal from Taiwan as an arms control measure. Third, they might propose various kinds of Asian nuclear free zones. Fourth they might demand withdrawal of American forces from overseas bases.

In reacting to these Chinese proposals and in formulating its own position for a disarmament conference, the United States might well want to think in terms of topics to be proposed for discussion along the line of the East-West Surprise Attack Conference in 1958 rather than specific agreements to be negotiated. Among the topics that we might propose talking about would be the following:

(1) Non-Proliferation. The United States might want to table a paper which pointed to the capability of various countries, particularly around the Chinese periphery, to develop nuclear weapons and discuss the dangers as we can see them for the further spread of such weapons. The United States might seek Peking's reaction to the Soviet and American draft treaties on halting the spread of nuclear weapons and discuss the role of other measures such as a complete test ban and nuclear free zones in halting proliferation. The United States might ask about the arrangements which Peking proposes to establish in whatever peaceful nuclear assistance programs it might institute. As was indicated above the Chinese have not yet shown any signs of concern about the spread of nuclear weapons. However the United States certainly has an interest in trying to get the Chinese to consider the dangers to them of the further spread of nuclear weapons.

(2) Problems of War by Accident of Miscalculation. Recent events on the Indochinese peninsula demonstrate that the United States and Communist China are increasingly likely to confront problems of both technical and political accident and miscalculation. A number of American planes have flown in the vicinity of the Chinese borders raising issues about accidental over-flights and unauthorized encounters between the air forces of the two countries. Moreover, the uncertainties about the political intentions of China and the United States raise the general issue of war by political miscalculation. Without necessarily getting involved in a discussion of the specifics of the Vietnam situation, the United States might want to explore the possibility of more general

discussions with Peking on the problems of war by accident or miscalculation. Soviet-American discussions on this range of problems led to the hot line and also to a better understanding on both sides of what unilateral steps would reduce the danger of war by accident or miscalculation. As the Chinese nuclear capability grows it will be useful to have such discussions with Peking.

(3) Strategic Force Interaction. Under this rubic the United States might want to call Peking's attention specifically to the likely interaction between the size and shape of the American strategic force and Peking's evolving strategic delivery systems. Statements indicating that the United States might well build a ballistic missile defense to counter any Chinese efforts in the ICBM area might be put on the table and Peking's reaction solicited. More generally, the United States might want to make Peking aware of the way in which the strategic forces of the two sides will interact. We should decide if we prefer a somewhat larger Chinese strategic force, which is very soft and not very well controlled, or a somewhat smaller strategic force (assuming a fixed budget) which is relatively well protected and under tight control. Our ability to influence Peking's decisions on these matters is probably very small, but it would be useful to determine what our preferences are and to see whether arms control negotiations cannot be used to influence these decisions. Here, as elsewhere, the start of negotiations may force the United States Government to come to grips with problems and issues that it has thus far avoided.

(4) Renouncing the Use of Force. The United States has long been pressing Peking to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Straits. More recently China has been pressing the United States for an agreement denouncing the first use of nuclear weapons. The United States might suggest to Peking the possibility of exploring a broader package of renunciation of force between the two countries. Is there, for example, any possibility of trade-off between Peking renouncing force in the Taiwan Straits and the United States renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons against China? Without advocating this particular agreement, it is possible to suggest that it is the kind of package which we might want to consider and to provoke Peking into discussing.

(5) Test Ban and No First Use. Recent press reports indicate that the United States raised at Warsaw a possible link between Chinese adherence to the Test Ban Treaty and American acceptance of a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons. Given the Chinese statements on the Test Ban Treaty it is very unlikely that Peking would find such a proposal interesting. Moreover the American interest in accepting a ban on first use simply to force the Chinese to test underground remains to be clarified. However this package illustrates the kind of proposal which might be discussed during Sino-American arms control talks.

We should not expect bilateral arms control negotiations with Peking to accomplish very much in a short time nor to have any particular impact on the Sino-Soviet dispute. However, if Peking is carrying on such negotiations with the United States, the Chinese Communists will find it more difficult to maintain that their position is one of total hostility to the United States while the Soviets are seeking cooperation with the West and

thereby selling out revolutionary interests. The Soviets may feel that the bilateral Chinese-American negotiations reduces their cost in negotiating arms control agreements with the West. The Chinese with their security concerns vis-à-vis the United States are likely to be willing to enter such a negotiation despite these costs. The fact that we are carrying on separate discussions with Peking and Moscow can only serve to increase the tensions and distrust between the two Communist countries and hence, to exacerbate the Sino-Soviet dispute. Moreover, in the long run with the change in leadership in Peking and other changes in the international climate, we should not exclude the possibility that we may someday want to consider Sino-American cooperation, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

It is perhaps worth reiterating in conclusion that this Chapter has focused on the implications of Sino-Soviet relations for the arms control policy of the United States. The proposals presented here and the arguments advanced have been purely from that perspective and would obviously have to be considered with other American objectives in order to frame an arms control policy for the United States.

APPENDIX