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A REPORT TO CONGRESS

SECURITY OF U.S. FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Prepared by:
Office of the Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

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SECURITY OF US FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

(U) INTRODUCTION

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


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


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
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(U) INTERNAL THREAT TO BASES AND US PERSONNEL

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
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(U) FOREIGN THREAT - THE SOVIET UNION

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(U) FOREIGN THREAT - INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

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(U) THREAT SUMMARY

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(U) BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES


(U) The 1979 amendment of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947 governs the division of security responsibilities at Clark and Subic Bay. The 1979 amendment granted full sovereignty over the bases to the Government of the Philippines, and assigned the following duties, authority, and responsibilities relating to base security:

-- Philippine commanders shall have responsibility for security of the bases and the United States commanders shall have responsibility for security of United States facilities.

-- Philippine and United States commanders shall formulate joint plans and policies on security, administration, maintenance of order and related matters.

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(U) USFAC Subic Bay: The Commander, Subic Command (SUBCOM) and the Commander, US Facility (USFAC) have entered into a series of agreements which establish a system for conducting physical security and law enforcement activities at Subic Naval Base.

These agreements concern the following:

- Mission, areas of operations, communications and coordinating procedures, apprehension functions of the security forces, and land patrols of the respective commands.

- Procedures for joint control of the base accesses.


-- Procedures for joint operation of the base identification, pass, and vehicle registration systems.

-- Operations and coordination procedures for joint patrolling of Subic Bay waters and Grande Island.

-- Establishment of the Joint Security Operations Center which serves as the joint command post for all SUBCOM/USFAC security forces during increased security conditions.

-- Procedures and methods for the sharing of intelligence and information affecting the security of SUBCOM and USFAC.


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


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
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
(U) PHILIPPINE BASE SECURITY PLANNING

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(U) SECURITY UPGRADE AT US FACILITIES


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
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


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(U) SUMMARY

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ANNEX 1

The Philippine bases on which U.S. facilities are located include Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base and satellite facilities. The 1979 U.S.-Philippines review of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement provided for a redefinition of boundary lines and status of the bases. The bases were placed under the command of the Philippine armed forces and U.S. "facilities" were delineated within each base, commanded by a U.S. military officer. The two bases and their "extensions" encompass essentially all U.S. military facilities in the Philippines.

Clark Air Base includes the following U.S. facilities:

	<u>Total Land Area</u>	<u>U.S. Facility Land Area</u>
Clark Air Base Proper	129,705 acres	63,440 acres
Wallace Air Station	492 acres	454 acres
John Hay Air Station	1,330 acres	645 acres

The Crow Valley Weapons Range is reserved for joint use by U.S. and Philippine armed forces. U.S. State Department regional communications relay facilities and a Voice of America installation at Wallace Air Station, though not a part of the U.S. Armed Forces, also became tenant activities of Clark Air Base.

Subic Naval Base encompasses the following U.S. facilities:

- Subic Naval Station and Ship Repair Facility
- Supply Depot, Navy Magazine and Public Works Center
- Cubi Point Naval Air Station and Naval Hospital
- Naval Communication Station at San Miguel

The land area of this complex is 30,380 acres. Not included in this area is the watershed or the extensive training areas associated with the base and still a part of it. These are now the responsibility of the Philippine Base Commander.

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A REPORT TO CONGRESS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR
RELOCATION OF U.S. FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Excised Under the Provisions of (The
Freedom of Information Act) 5USC552
(b) 1

Prepared by:
Office of the Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

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INTRODUCTION

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IMPORTANCE OF THE FACILITIES

(U) The critical importance of the facilities argues against any implication that we intend to withdraw from the Philippines. No other location in the Western Pacific is better suited to support U.S. commitments in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region. Other places, if they could provide the full range of services, might be better suited to meet needs of U.S. Forces in one or another of these theaters.

But none are as well located to meet all. Moreover, few locations are more capable of controlling the vital sea lanes that link Persian Gulf or Southeast Asian oil with the industrial capacities of Japan and the Republic of Korea. Over 4,000 merchant ships ply these waters each month. By contrast, USN ships operating from

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facilities in Guam and the Northern Marianas would require an additional four days of steaming time to reach these sea lanes.

(U) The strategic value of the facilities as an offset to the Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay has increased with the expansion of the Soviet forces there. Moscow has invested heavily in new and improved airfield and port facilities, indicating that the Soviets intend a long-term presence. Approximately 30 naval units operate daily in the South China Sea, including surface combatants, conventional and nuclear powered submarines, and naval auxiliaries. Soviet long-range TU-95 BEAR reconnaissance aircraft maintain a constant presence at Cam Ranh and are frequently detected operating over sea lanes in the South China and Philippine Seas. Their range could allow, at Soviet option, operations over much more distant areas. Last year, the Soviets increased their TU-16 BADGER strike aircraft at Cam Ranh Bay and added a squadron of MIG-23 FLOGGER fighter aircraft. Soviet signal intelligence facilities in Vietnam, combined with reconnaissance aircraft operating from Cam Ranh, provide Soviet forces with significant capabilities to monitor U.S. military activities throughout the region. Port facilities in Vietnam also enhance Soviet capabilities to deploy forces in the Indian Ocean. Operating from their bases in Vietnam, Soviet air and naval forces could strike U.S. military units and facilities in the Pacific as well as interdict sea lanes of communication in the South China Sea and between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. They provide a kind of umbrella for the activities of Vietnam's army, the world's third largest.

but in fact they have strategically reduced the size of the squadron.

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(U) Despite this impressive buildup, the net political advantage to the Soviets has been minimal. The reason is that the U.S. is still perceived, correctly, to be capable of projecting superior forces into the area, if needed, and to demonstrate, by maintaining forward deployed forces in the region, that it is willing to do so if its vital interests are threatened. Take away the U.S. presence in the Philippines, however, and move it north, or east to Guam and the Northern Marianas, and this equation would change remarkably, with potentially disastrous consequences for U.S. interests in Southeast Asia.


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


POLITICO-MILITARY FACTORS

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
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(U) There is little doubt that a victory by the communist insurgents would result in a U.S. withdrawal from the facilities. To forestall that outcome, DoD has energetically supported both reforms and appropriate levels of security assistance for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). We have thus stressed the direct linkage between our continued access to the bases and security assistance to the Philippines. The remarkable political developments of the past several weeks, coupled with appropriate reforms and the extension of adequate military aid, has the potential to diminish considerably the prospects for a communist victory and a concomitant relocation of our facilities.

(U) Although the communist insurgents have thus far avoided attacking the facilities, DoD has taken prudent measures to increase security. These precautions -- as described in a separate report to the Congress -- will remain in effect as long as the communist insurgency poses a potential threat.



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
ASSUMPTIONS

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
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Summary of Costs

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
Relocation Costs

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
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
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Costs of Increased Operational Assets


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ANNEXES

- I Principal Air and Naval Units at Clark and Subic
- II Personnel Strength at the Facilities
- III Distances and Transit times from Clark and Subic
- IV Map of the Philippines with Facilities
- V Map of East Asia with Facilities
- VI Military Base Agreement -- Information Paper

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PRINCIPAL AIR AND NAVAL UNITS TRANSITING
CLARK AIR BASE AND SUBIC BAY NAVAL COMPLEX

CLARK AIR BASE

Headquarters - 13th Air Force

The 374th Tactical Airlift Wing - 16 C-130s

The 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing - 36 F-4Es, 12 F-4Gs, 11 F-5Es

The 1961st Communications Group

Air Medical Evacuation Squadron - 3 C-9s

SUBIC BAY NAVAL BASE

Subic is the major support facility for the 7th Fleet which averages 67 ships including:

2-3 Aircraft carriers (plus air wings)

5 Cruisers

Destroyers, frigates

Auxiliary units

Amphibious units

Units permanently at Subic are:

A detachment of P-3s (deployed but not homeported)

A training aircraft squadron (VC-5)

A transport aircraft squadron (VRC-50)

Cruiser - USS STERETT (CG-31)

ANNEX I

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PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR THE PHILIPPINE BASES

		<u>US MILITARY</u>	<u>US CIVILIAN</u>	<u>US DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>PHILIPPINE NATIONALS</u>
<u>CLARK</u>	(Navy)	160			
	(Air)	9,098	309	12,220	2,454
	(Marines)	<u>2</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
		9,260	309	12,220	2,454
<u>SUBIC</u>	(Navy)	4,338	615	6,081	9,581
	(Air)	0			
	(Marines)	<u>678</u>	<u> </u>	<u>802</u>	<u> </u>
		5,016	615	6,883	9,581
<u>OTHER</u>	(Navy)	436			
	(Air)	618	523	2,527	159
	(Marines)	<u>47</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
		1,101	523	2,527	159
<u>TOTALS:</u>		<u>15,377</u>	<u>1,447</u>	<u>21,630</u>	<u>12,294</u>

Totals as of 20 February 1986

ANNEX II

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DISTANCES AND TRANSIT TIMES FROM CLARK AND SUBIC BAY TO SELECTED POINTS

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MILEAGE *</u>	<u>SEA DAYS **</u>	<u>AIR HOURS ***</u>
PUSAN/SEOUL, KOREA	1,310	3.6	5.8
YOKOHAMA/TOKYO, JAPAN	1,600	4.6	5.9
KAOSIUNG/TAIPEI, TAIWAN	485	1.5	2.2
HAIPHONG/HANOI, VIETNAM	775	2.4	3.3
SINGAPORE	1,275	3.5	5.9
DIEGO GARCIA, INDIAN OCEAN	3,195	6.2	12.7 †
DARWIN, AUSTRALIA	1,715	4.8	6.5
GUAM	1,340	3.9	4.6
HONOLULU, HAWAII	4,580	12.4	17.3 †
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	6,410	17.2	25.5 †

* STRAIGHT LINE


** NON-STOP AT 16 KNOTS

*** NON-STOP AT 280 KNOTS


† FLIGHTS OVER 8 HOURS REQUIRE REFUELLING

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US FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

118	120	124	PHILIPPINES
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DISTANCES (in nautical miles) FROM CLARK AND SUBIC BAY TO SELECTED POINTS

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The Philippine Military Bases Agreement (MBA)

(U) The Philippine MBA was signed in Manila in March, 1947, one year after independence. It granted the U.S. the right to retain the use of certain bases in the Philippines and set out the terms and conditions under which they could be operated. It also established a framework governing the status of U.S. personnel in the Philippines. Like many base agreements of that era, its initial term was 99 years, until 2046.

(U) There have been many amendments to the MBA since 1947. Most of these amendments returned bases no longer needed by the U.S. Others dealt with criminal jurisdiction and related status of forces matters.

(U) On September 16, 1966, it was agreed that the initial term of the MBA should be reduced from 99 to 25 years, after which time, unless extended by mutual agreement, it becomes subject to termination by either side on one year's notice. This provision is quite similar to those in our security treaties with NATO, Japan and Korea. It is therefore not true, as often asserted, that the MBA automatically terminates in 1991.

(U) Probably the most substantial change to the MBA came in 1979, when, after lengthy negotiations the U.S. agreed that its bases would become Philippine bases under a Philippine Base Commander, with the U.S. retaining the right to maintain U.S. Facilities thereon. The U.S. Facilities Commander is responsible for

security of the facility, while the Philippine Commander is responsible for security of the Base, including its external perimeter.

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(U) An initial five-year review of the MBA called for in the 1979 amendment occurred in 1983. It consisted primarily of "fine-tuning" an agreement that was working well in practice. The next review is expected to begin in 1988.

ANNEX VI

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