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QUARTERLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY 4TH QUARTER FY 65 EAGE - UNCLASSIFIED

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HARRY A STRULA Colonel, GS ACors, GL Wall

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HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96301

QUARTERLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G1

April - June 1965

1. ANNEX A




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
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Section	
A	Education Division 1. KATUSA English Training 2. GED Achievements During 4th Quarter
В	Safety Division 1. Accomplishments 2. Accident and Injury Rates
C	Manpower and Personnel Division Implementation of the New Army Authorization Document System (NAADS)
מ	Personnel Services Division 1. Personnel General 2. KATUSA's a. Disciplinary Authority b. ROKA Study of KATUSA Program 3. Support of Foreign Troops 4. Decorations and Awards 5. Exchanges a. Fidelity Losses b. Travel Funds 6. Nonappropriated Funds 7. Termination of Amusement Machine Contracts
E	Plans and Programs Division 1. Analysis of Cost and Performance 2. Cost Reduction Program
F	Adjutant General Appointment of Officers
G	Provost Marshal Arrival and Departure of Officers
H	Special Services 1. Library 2. Service Clubs 3. Crafts 4. Sports 5. Entertainment

PART I

NARRATIVE

A. EDUCATION DIVISION



90

1. KATUSA English Training

Following are available statistics on the program up to 30 June 1965:

Approximate number of KATUSA personnel completing 45 hour course at 38th Rep En since Sep 64		
Approximate number of textbooks distributed to units for follow-up instruction since Jan 65 9,300		
Approximate number of battalion and company size		

2. GED Achievements During 4th Quarter

units conducting scheduled classes.....

a. Participation in educational priority areas:

Area	Participation Percentages	Eighth Army Goals
Comm Off below baccalaureate degree WO below 2 year college equivalency EM below HS or GT score below 90 EM compl 12th gr but below 4 yr coll Foreign lang trng officers Foreign lang trng EM	45% 41% 36% 12% 12% 3.2% 12%	45% 25% 25% 7% 10% 2.0% 6%
All mil per MOS-related trng Total mil per participating	25%	20%

The above Eighth Army goals are similar to those of USARPAC excepting that for the Comm Off below baccalaureate degree which for USARPAC is 20%. It might be noted that this quarter marks the fourth quarter of the year that Eighth Army has achieved all goals - Eighth Army as well as USARPAC. This is the first time that this has been accomplished by this command, and, as far as is known, by any USARPAC command.

b. Educational level advancements

	52
Completion of 8th grade Completion of high school Completion of 1 year college DA 2 year college evaluation Receiving baccalaureate degree Receiving graduate degree	208 78 6 4 0

B. SAFETY DIVISION

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1. Accomplishments

- a. Command directives were issued calling commanders attention to the hazards to be expected during the summer rainy season in Korea. Directives specifically emphasized the dangers of flash floods and swollen streams along with landslides and highway washouts.
- b. Emphasis was placed on the prevention of hot weather injuries, summer sporting injuries, and the dangers involved in swimming in unauthorized areas.
- c. A continuous review and analysis of accident data was conducted with particular attention being given to those areas in which the data indicated a rising trend in accidents, mainly: military and other personnel injuries; motor vehicle and aircraft accidents.

2. Accident and Injury Rates


	4th Qtr FY 65	4th Qtr FY 64
Mil Inj Rate Other Persnl Inj Rate Mtr Veh Acdt Rate Mtr Veh Fatality Rate Aircft Acdt Rate Per Capita Costs Total Costs	3.28 2.06 0.94 72.07 38.58 \$9.17 \$1,072,384.00	3.0 1.0 0.7 113.6 12.7 \$5.88 \$676,183.00

C. MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL DIVISION

Implementation of the New Army Authorization Document System (NAADS)

Representatives of Manpower and Personnel Division, OACofS, G-1, participated in a DA sponsored USARPAC conference on implementation of NAADS. NAADS is an entirely new authorization document system which reduces the current three basic documents (TOE, TD and TA) to two. These are to be known as TOE and TDA (Table of Distribution and Allowances). It further refines the system of changing and implementing these basic documents by reducing the complexity and number of change documents to two. Planning was initiated for implementation of this system in Eighth Army.

D. PERSONNEL SERVICES DIVISION



1. Personnel-General

Orientation and Character Guidance. Following Eighth Army regulations were published during this period: Eighth Army Reg 600-511 and Eighth Army Reg 600-302.

2. KATUSA's

- a. Disciplinary Authority. Senior ROKA liaison officers have been appointed as acting commander over KATUSA personnel for disciplinary matters only. This is to further promote complete integration of the KATUSA into the US Army unit of assignment.
- b. ROKA Study of KATUSA Program. ROKA requested permission to visit Eighth Army unit during June 1965 to study the KATUSA program. Visit was conducted during the period 21 25 June 1965. Results not obtained as of 30 June 1965.

3. Support of Foreign Troops

ROKA ROTC Summer Camp. US Army support to be provided ROKA ROTC Summer Camp has been finalized and coordinated with ROKA.

4. Decorations and Awards

CINCUSARPAC Leadership Award. CINCUSARPAC Leadership Award for lst quarter CY 1965 was awarded to Captain David H. Hufnagel, Commanding Officer, Battery C, 6th Missile Battalion, 44th Artillery, by Mr. Stanley R. Resor, Under Secretary of the Army, on 4 June 1965.

5. Exchanges

- a. Fidelity Losses. Due to Exchange monthly inventories, unannounced inventories and closer management supervision, the number of cases of fidelity losses within the Exchanges in Korea has been reduced from that of previous quarters.
- b. Travel Funds. On 14 April 1965 a letter was received from Hq, Fifth Air Force stating that the past policy of Fifth Air Force providing travel funds for all military personnel assigned to FEES was in error. In accordance with USARPAC General Order No. 204/PACAF Special Order No. G-128,

3. Para 4, SO 93, Hq Eighth US Army, 11 May 65.

4. DF, EAGP-A, to C/S, subj: Support of ROKA ROTC Summer Camp

^{1. 8}th Army Reg 600-51, 28 Apr 65, subj: Personnel - General, Conduct of Personnel. w/Change 1.

^{2. 8}th Army Reg 600-30, 26 Apr 65, subj: Personnel - General, Character Guidance Program.

3 November 1964, administrative travel and TDY funds for military personnel will be provided by the parent service. Eighth Army concurred and delegated authority to Hq, Far East Exchange Service to issue travel orders with the stipulation that a monthly request would be submitted to Eighth Army for this authority.

6. Nonappropriated Funds

Procedures. The following Eighth Army NAF regulations were revised and published during this period: EA Reg 230-17 and EA Reg 230-120.

7. Termination of Amusement Machine Contracts

Final payment to E. Carlan is almost completed. Invoices totaling \$243,134.11 were submitted to C-1 by the open messes requesting approval to effect final payment. \$1,712.68 remains outstanding due to discrepancies between open mess and E. Garlan records.

E. PLANS AND PROGRAMS DIVISION


1. Analysis of 4th Quarter FY 65 Cost and Performance

Acct Codes	Description	Annual Program	Costs	Percent <u>Utilized</u>
2020.2200	Hq 8th US Army	\$3,508,000	\$3,515,802	1.00
2500	Army-wide Activities	584,525	581,301	99
9010	Local Hqs Activities	6,452,000	6,291,099	98
9020	Local Welfare Services	2,680,000	2,570,468	96

In the Gl cost areas, costs were as programed except as follows: 2020.2200. Cumulative costs of \$3,515,802 exceeded the programed total of \$3,508,000 by \$7,802. This was due to the increase of contractual costs over programed amount by \$16,064. These excess costs were partially offset by personnel costs being \$3,307 less than programed and supply costs \$4,955 less than the programed amount. Contractual costs exceeded the programed funds primarily due to the increased shipping and storage costs created by personnel placing household goods in storage pending results of the current international situation. Unprogramed travel within the UN Command Group of liaison personnel also affected programed funds.

^{5. 8}th Army Reg 230-1, 24 Jun 65, subj: Nonappropriated Funds and Related Activities; Local National Hire Sundry Funds, Private Association Funds and Personal Hire Employees.

^{6. 8}th Army Reg 230-12, 21 Jun 65, subj: Nonappropriated Funds and Related Activities; Nonappropriated Welfare Funds and Nonappropriated Funds Facilities and Activities.



2. Cost Reduction Program

- a. The overall cost reduction program for FY 55 in the "Local Headquarters Command Administration and Welfare Services" area, for which G1 is the program monitor, exceeded the established goal of \$350,000 by \$15,500.
- b. The GI participating activities with assigned goals and FY 65 reported savings are as shown:

Activity	FY 65 Goal	FY 65 Savings	+ Over <u>- Short</u>
Gl Educ	\$9,000	\$4,200	-\$4, 300
F&AO	7,000	2,100	- 4,900
PM	27,000	226,300	+199,300
Chaplain	2,000	800	- 1,200
SSO	40,000	30,000	-10,000
OCPD	27,000	22,100	- 4,900
IO	38,000	-0-	-38,000
EASCOM	195,000	75,7CO	-119,300
Sp Trps	5,000	4,000	- 1,000

F. ADJUTANT GENERAL

Appointment of Officers

- a. Colonel Bernard E. Babcock was appointed and assumed the duties of Adjutant General, United Nations Command, United States Forces Korea, and Eighth United States Army, on 19 June 1965.
- b. Colonel Wilfred Arnold, Jr. was appointed and assumed the duties of Deputy Adjutant General, United Nations Command, United States Forces Korea, and Eighth United States Army, on 19 June 1965.

G. PROVOST MARSHAL

Arrival and Departure of Officers

- a. Departure of Colonel George A. Bieri, 040298, Provost Marshal, Eighth United States Army, to CCNUS, 30 June 1965.
- b. Arrival of Colonel John A. Alley, Jr., 052203, Provost Marshal, Eighth United States Army.

H. SPECIAL SERVICES

1. Library

a. Library service was extended to two additional sites of the 38th Artillery Brigade. Service being provided includes one clothbound book deposit collection and one paperbound book library.

b. A grant in the amount of \$10,000 was approved by the Command Welfare Fund for purchase of books published in Korean. The books will be placed in Libraries serving 25 or more KATUSA personnel.

2. Service Clubs

The 5th Service Club Enlisted Men's Advisory Council (SCHMC) Congress sponsored by Eighth U.S. Army Special Services, was held on 21 May 1965 at the Hourglass Service Club, 7th Infantry Division. Representatives from all service clubs in Korea attended.

3. Crafts

- a. Participation in crafts, when compared with the same period in FY 64, shows a decrease of 76,004 manhours. Sales to participants during the same reporting period shows a decrease of 36,840.75 and a decrease of 2,329 in the number of sales. Recent heavier emphasis placed on field training and unusually hot and dry weather has not been conducive to crafts participation in shops that are mostly of the quenset type lacking air conditioner units. Field personnel continue to improve the facilities and encourage greater participation.
- b. Coordination with the Korean community continues through the exchange of exhibits and demonstrations.
- c. The 1965 Army Arts and Crafts Week was conducted during this period. The week featured a wide variety of crafts exhibits, demonstrations, contests and other special programming throughout the entire command.

4. Sports

- a. The Eighth US Army Conference Level Basketball Tournament was conducted at Hanson Field House, Camp Casey, during the period 3 11 April 1965. The host 7th Infantry Division "Bayonets" won top honors and the Eighth US Army Support Command finished in the runner-up position.
- b. Eighth US Army Support Command hosted the Eighth US Army Softball Coaches and Umpires Clinic at Collier Field House 12 14 April 1965. Mr. Douglas H. Ballard and Mr. Ferris Reid were instructors for the clinic. A total of 8 US personnel attended the coaches clinic and 58 US and 6 Korean personnel attended the umpires clinic.
- c. The Eighth US Army Interservice International Baseball League comprised of 4 US Army and 2 Korean military teams, commenced play on 8 May 1965. League standings as of 30 June 1965 are as follows:

TEAM	MON	<u>lost</u>
7th Infantry Division EASCOM	10 10	6 6
2d Infantry Division ROK Marine Corps	9 7	7
ROK Army I US Corps (Gp)	7 5	9 11

- d. Yongsan District Command hosted the Eighth US Army Company Level Volleyball Tournament at Collier Field House during the period 21 - 22 May 1965. The Eighth US Army Support Command team won the team championship and I US Corps (Gp) finished in second place.
- e. The Eighth US Army Tennis Tournament was conducted at Yongsan District Command 24-27 June 1965 with Eighth US Army Support Command serving as host. The team championships in both the Open and Senior Divisions were won by the Eighth US Army Support Command. Runner—up team honors in the Open Division were won by the 7th Infantry Division and by I US Corps (Gp) in the Senior Division.

5. Entertainment


Eighth US Army hosted the 1965 USARPAC Entertainment Contest held at Yongsan Theater #2 at 2000 hours, 19 June 1965. The program consisted of 19 acts which included representation: from US Army Japan, US Army Ryukyu Islands, US Army Hawaii, and Eighth US Army. Of the six possible first place awards, five were won by Eighth US Army and one by US Army Hawaii. The entire contest and awards ceremony was broadcast by AFKN radio.

AUTHENTICATION:

HARRY A. STELLA Colonel, GS ACofS, GL

PART II

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS



PART I - NARRATIVE

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a. Incoming

		<u> TS</u>	SEGREGI	CCMF	THICL
	April	ó	320	750	3,225
	Say	4	375	300	3 , 620
	June	10	900	350	9,100
5.	Outgoing				
	April	4	975	575	7,000
	May	3	300	600	6,000
	June	6	1,200	600	7,200

c. Total number of Secret and Top Secret documents processed.

	DESTROYED	DOWNGRADED	FOSTFED
April	350	0	15
May	638	0	9
Juno	275	0	5

7. (U) Recapitulation of personnel strength at the end of the 4th Quarter FY 65 was as follows:

	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED
Officers	19	20
Enlisted Men	33	33
Civilians (DAC's)	13	13

- 8. (U) Program and Budget
 - a. Annual Funding Program. FY 65

During 4th Quarter FY 65, the BP 2800 rate of obligations accelerated; however, annual programmed levels here not reached largely as a result of three factors:

(1) Limitation Fund ,017

As the preparatory phase of intelligence projects for which funding had been programmed from the beginning of FY 65 was not completed until 3rd Quarter FY 65, lack of utilization of funding was not offset by increased expenditures during 3rd and 4th Quarter FY 65. Consequently, excess of funding in the amount of \$45,000 was announced as available for withdrawal, thereby reducing the annual funding in this area from \$191,000 to \$146,000.

(2) Supplies

Outstanding requisitions totalled approximately \$90,000 at mid-4th Quarter FY 65. As a result of inability to fill the requisitions, and subsequent cancellations of requisitions, an amount of \$45,000 was announced as available for withdrawal. An additional amount of \$18,000 was reported to Comptroller, Eighth US Army, as excess funding; however, as a result of a requirement for \$17,000 to absorb, in part, command undistributed costs, the excess was not withdrawn.

(3) Contracts

Excess funding in the contracts area (translation service) in an amount of \$2,000 was reported as available for withdrawal. Total withdrawal of funds from BP 2800 in the amount of \$92,000 was confirmed by USARPAC, thereby reducing the AFP for FY 65 from \$791,000 to \$699,000.

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b. Annual Funding Program, DP 2800 - FY 36:

Funding for TY 36 remains at the SCE guidance level of 2771,000. TY 56 unfinanced requirements, totalling \$133,000, have not yet been approved.

- (2) The following reports and projects were prepared and published during the period 1 April 30 June 1965.
 - Nine (9) Immediate Reports
 One (1) Mosaic
- (3) In addition to the reports listed above, one (1)
 Immediate Report was completed and is awaiting staffing and publication.



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III. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Personnel Security Branch

1. (FOUO) The following security clearance actions were processed during the quarter:

	CASES CLOSED
National Agency Checks	691
National Agency Checks with writt inquiries	en O
Expanded National Agency Checks	3
Background Investigation	245
U.S. Personnel	146
Korean Nationals	- 69
CRF Inquiries	1,633
Request for investigation from other commands (Lead Sheets)	510
Limited Investigation	143
Supplementary Investigation	21
Expanded Background Investigation	6 A.
Record check (Korean National)	4,100

2. (FOUO) The average investigative time for Background Investigation increased from 103 days to 122.4 days (maximum USARPAC time goal is 120 days). The increase is possibly due to the fact that all requests for investigations in CONUS are being forwarded to the newly established U. S. Army Intelligence Corps Command instead of directly to the

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PART II - SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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INCL.

PART I

NARRATIVE

a. Although called cavalry, the First has been essentially an infantry division for nearly a quarter of a century. More than 20,000 men who were the yellow and black shoulder patch became casualties—killed or wounded—in World War II and Korea. In these campaigns, the division first saw combat in the Admiralty Islands in early 1944, beating off a banzai charge by Japanese Marines. Later the 1st Cav was in the spearhead of the American return to the Philippines and led the way into Manila. After the Japanese surrendered, the honor of entering Tokyo first fell to men of the 1st Cav. Barely five years later the division was rushed from Japan to Korea to bolster the line against on-rushing North Korean invaders. The division was taken out of action in late 1951 after battling the Chinese Communists. For the past eight years the 1st Cavalry—along with the U.S. 7th Infantry Division—has manned the truce line in Korea, on guard against any Communist moves.

b. The new airmobile division inherits a proud tradition dating back to the horse soldiers of Robert E. Lee and George Armstrong Custer. Indeed, back in 1855, command of what was to become the 5th Cavalry Regiment, was vested in one Lt Colonel Robert E. Lee. The regiment compiled a distinguished record in the Indian Wars and in those days the nation's Indian border was 8,000 miles and there were some 40,000 hostile braves. The 5th Cavalry Regiment became a part of the 1st Cavalry Division in September 1921, which makes it the oldest regiment in the division. It has been a long road from 1855 to 1965—a century of valor.

2d Infantry Division--"Second To None"

- the "Indianhead Division" which inherits the 1st Cavalry Division's mission along Korea's "Freedom's Frontier." The 2d Infantry Division's return to the Eighth Army recalls a battle record of special significance. The division came to Korea in July 1950, during those desperate days when U.N. Forces were trying to stop the drive of the North Korean Army. It held the Naktong River line in August of 1950 and helped prevent the collapse of the Pusan perimeter. In November it bore the brunt of the initial onelaught of the Chinese Communists along the Chongchon River in North Korea. Through all ten campaigns of the Korean War, the 2d Infantry fought hard and skillfully. It probably saw more hard fighting in Korea than any other American division. The names of some of the war's fiercest battles immediately recall the 2d Infantry; Bunker Hill, Old Baldy and the 38th Infantry...
- a. When the 2d Infantry Division was first activated at Bourmount, France, on 26 October 1917, it was comprised of infantry and marine units and was commanded by a U.S. Marine Corps Brigadier General, Charles A. Doyen. Its name will be linked forever with such battles as St Mihiel and the Meuse Argonne. The 2d deployed to the United States after World War II at which time its marine units reverted to naval status. In World War II, the 2d fought from Omaha Beach and St Lo through France to Central Europe. Present units include the original 8th, 9th and 23d Infantry Regiments and the 38th Regiment.

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AIDE MEMOIRE

(<u>Historian's Note</u>: It is customary in this command for a departing commanding general or chief of a general staff section to prepare an Aide Memoire for his successor. The majority of these end of tour reports are internal "eyes only" documents which include privileged information on personalities and are either unobtainable or inappropriate for the historical record. An exception to the norm was the 9 April 1965 review of G3 activities prepared by Brigadier General Ralph L. Foster at the completion of his two-year assignment as ACofS, G3, Hq Eighth Army.)

14. (U) The purpose of General Foster's end of tour report was to point out major problems affecting the operations and functions of the G3 Section, solutions to some of those problems, and areas still requiring attention. His report was organized into the broad functional areas of G3: plans; artillery matters; training, organization; operations; and nuclear-chemical. Each of these areas was discussed separately. See End of Tour Report, 9 April 1965, with six (6) inclosures (S-NF), included in Part II of this annex.

CHANGES IN COMMAND

(<u>Historian's Note</u>: There are an average of 24 U.S. Army general officers serving in Korea at any given time. However, there is no average tour of duty. For the majority of the UNC/USFK/EUSA generals, who may be accompanied, the length of tour is normally two years. (An exception, is the six month tour for the Senior Member, UNCMAC.) For most of the unaccompanied general officers at the major subordinate commands the tour is usually one year. All general officers are subject to reassignment by DA before tour's-end—a not infrequent occurrence. Normally, arrivals and departures are reported by the unit or agency concerned. During the 4th Quarter, FY 65, however, there were actual or announced transitions involving the highest ranking U.S. military officers in Korea. A chronological account of these changes in command follows.)

Chief of Staff, UNC/USFK

15. (U) It General Edwin B. Broadhurst, USAF, died 4 April 1965 of a heart attack at his quarters in Seoul. The 49-year old veteran of 28 years military service had served as CofS, UNC/USFK since 1 August 1963. A memorial ceremony was held at UNC Headquarters on the same day the general was buried in Smithfield, N.C., his home town. General Howze, CINCUNC, paid final tribute with these words, "It is hard to bid goodbye to a man whose every action was guided by the profoundest sense of honor and duty, who sought only the wisest and strongest, and yet, somehow, the most considerate and gentlest solution to every problem that confronted him. The United Nations Command and U.S. Forces Korea have lost a superb champion of the cause of peace we all serve. The flag of the United States, flying now over this field and thousands of others around the globe, has lost a gallant defender."

16. (U) Lt General Benjamin O. Davis, Jrr, USAF, arrived in Korea on 13 May 1965 as General Broadhurst's replacement. Davis, who came from an assignment as ACofS for Programs and Requirements at Air Force headquarters in Washington, served in Korea before having commanded the 51st Fighter-Interceptor Wing at Suwon in 1953-54. General Davis, who received his third star concurrent with his assignment as UNC/USFK Chief of Staff, is the highest ranking Negro officer in the U.S. Forces.

CINCUNC/CG, USFK-EUSA

17. (U) General Hamilton H. Howze left Korea on 15 June 1965 for the United States and retirement on 30 June. Prior to his departure he was presented with the ROK Order of Service First Class by President PARK Chung Hee. He was cited for meritorious service as UNC Commanderin-Chief and Commanding General USFK/EUSA from 1 August 1963 to 15 June 1965 and praised for "strengthening the bonds of cooperation and friendship between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea." Following a long round of farewell honors, Howze told a large assemblage: "... The UNC and the Eighth Army are today forces of enormous power. We know it, and Pyongyang, Peking, and Moscow knows it; it is important that they do... Those who man the defenses of Korea, often at considerable personal sacrifice, have every right to self-satisfaction and pride. It is with much gratification that I turn my functions over to a most capable and distinguished soldier, General Dwight E. Beach. He is worthy of you; you are worthy of him. So now I bid you goodbye. You may believe that my heart overflows with the pride of having been your commander."

18. (U) General Dwight E. Beach, who arrived in Korea 11 June 1965, came from an assignment as Commander of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command at Fort Belvoir, Va. Beach succeeded Howze once before when he took command of the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N.C., a post he held in 1959-61. Other posts Beach has held include Chief of R&D, DA; Dir, S/W Development, CONARC; and Dir of Guided Missiles, DA. He served in Korea in 1955 as Chief of Staff, Eighth Army Forward, a command later dissolved. The 1932 West Point graduate, in taking over the top military post in Korea, said, "General Howze leaves a powerful, well-trained fighting force which stands as a warning to any Communist aggressor. I look forward with pride to my duty as its next commander." General Beach is the UNC's 11th commander, the Eighth Army's 16th.

DCG, Eighth Army

19. (U) It General Theodore J. Conway, after serving since April
1963 as Deputy Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army left Korea 30 June 26 wo
1965 for Washington, D.C., where he has been assigned to the OACofS for
Force Development. Before he departed, Conway was honored by many of the
units and men he worked with since his arrival. Conway, who previously
served in Korea from March of 1959 to June 1960 as Senior Advisor to FROKA,
was cited by the ROK for his active interest in ROKA, Korean scouting, and
local training in electronics.

20. (U) Lt General Charles W. G. Rich, formerly CG of the Third U.S. Army at Fort McPherson, Ga., was scheduled to arrive in Korea 6 July 1965 to replace General Conway. Rich was last assigned to Korea in 1953-54 as

CO, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division, and Deputy Chief of Staff, IX Corps. Between Korea tours his posts included command of the 101st Airborne at Fort Campbell, Ky., and Commandant of Cadets at West Point. Prior to taking the Third Army post, he was CG of the U.S. Army Infantry Center and Commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga. He is a 1935 graduate of the Military Academy.

CG, I Corps (Group)

21. (U) Lt General Edgar C. Doleman, who only became I Corps (Group) commander in February 1965, is scheduled to depart Korea in mid-July to become Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Pacific. The much decorated Doleman, a 1933 graduate of the Military Academy, was formerly ACofS for Intelligence, DA. He will be succeeded by Major General John A. Heintges, presently Commandant of the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga. Heintges, who has been nominated for his third star, is not due in Korea until mid-August. Lt General Rich, 8th Army DCG, will command I Corps (Group) for the period between Doleman's departure and the arrival of Heintges.

Chief of Staff, Eighth Army

22. (U) Major General Francis M. McGoldrick, Eighth Army Chief of Staff since September 1963 is scheduled to leave Korea 3 August 1965 to serve for the third time with the Army Air Defense Command. The general will command the 5th Region Air Defense Command at Fort Sheridan, Ill. The new Eighth Army Chief of Staff will be Major General Lawrence E. Schlanser who is expected in Korea by mid-August. Schlanser is presently DCG, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.

CG, 2d Inf Div

- 23. (U) Major General Hugh M. Exton, who arrived in Korea in October 1964 and commanded the 1st Cavalry Division until its redesignation as the 2d Infantry Division on 1 July, has been reassigned to Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe. He is scheduled to leave Korea for Germany on 4 August 1965.
- 24. (U) General Exton's successor will be Major General John H. Chiles who commanded the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia, from October 1964 until it became the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Chiles, whose more recent prior assignments included tours as Army Attache to Mexico and as Chief of the U.S. Army mission in Argentina, is expected in Korea by mid-August.

THE KOREAN WAR AND VIETNAM

(Historian's Note: As American commitment in Vietnam grows deeper, more and more comment is appearing in print to the effect that there is no similarity between the Korean Conflict and the present struggle in Vietnam. This opinion, from diverse official and non-official sources, is generally shared by the nation's press. Typical of editorial comment is this recent sampling from the New York Herald Tribune "...The war in Vietnam may be a harder war than the one fought in Korea. There is no use making it even more difficult by strained comparisons. The goals and the methods in the Vietnamese fight have to be judged on their own--and this involves choices that are difficult enough." This is true to some extent. However, as in Korea, the war in Vietnam pits Americans and Free Asians against Communist Asians, in the interest of enabling America's allies in Asia to preserve their independence. Wars are wars despite differences in proponents, weapons, terrain, weather, or tactics. Lessons are learned from each campaign -- lessons that are all the more valuable when the enemy is essentially the same. In these respects there is, indeed, a parallel between Korea and Vietnam. The following concepts, based on past experiences, highlight for the historical record, two views of the major lessons learned from the Korea War as they apply to Vietnam.)

Keep Bombing, Shun Jungle War

(This account is by General Mark Clark, who led the United Nations Forces in Korea from May 1952 to October 1953. He expressed his views in a June 1965, interview by the Associated Press following a speaking engagement in Chicago.)

- 47. (U) "The way to win is to hit hard and to use all our Air Force and Naval Aviation powers. The great lesson learned in the Korean War was that we must not fight the Communists in a manpower war.
- a. "The Communists are too willing to sacrifice their men. Full use of air and sea power will do the most damage to the Communists with minimum friendly losses and improve the bargaining position of the United

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States. I have had lots of experience with militant communism and I know the Communists respect force and stop, look, and listen when they see it.

But when they find weakness they exploit it and despise it.

- b. "When I was asked to sign the Korean Armistice, it was accompanied by a declaration that if there should be any further aggression of its kind, it would not be fought on a limited basis. In other words, our hands were not going to be tied.
- c. "That was how World War II was fought. The campaigns in that war were not limited to any given area...Commanders were given a mission and did it. The enemy was hit in places where he reserved his power and the strength to attack us.
- d. "I must admit that in these modern complicated days of warfare, political considerations must be given weight and must be balanced
 by military consideration. But as far as Vietnam is concerned it must be
 hit just as hard as we can. The more remunerative targets we destroy in
 North Vietnam the better off we will be. To avoid another manpower war
 with the Communists—to avoid another Korea—we must continue bombing
 North Vietnam and do all the damage possible. That way we are more apt
 to get satisfactory conditions for peace talks."

Korea Tactics for Vietnam?

(In a recent report from Washington, D.C., Ray Cromley, a noted columnist and military commentator, drew a sharp analysis between the Korean War and the fighting in Vietnam. His report, which was widely published by the world's free press, points up other strategic and tactical lessons learned in Korea.)

- 48. (U) Viet Cong mainline troops are winning battles in Vietnam because we do not apply the lessons learned in Korea.
- a. The VC show in exaggerated form one major exploitable weakness MAO Tse-tung's Red Chinese demonstrated in the Korean fighting. They spend weeks (perhaps 60 to 90 days or more) preparing for a series of quick engagements. During this preparation time they are extremely vulnerable.
- b. After a battle, or a short hard-fought series, they duck away to patch their wounded, bury their dead, replenish their ammunition and weapon supplies, fill their thinned ranks, restock their food, and rest and recuperate.
- c. During this period also they are extremely vulnerable. Their weakest period, of course, is immediately after a series of sharp battles in which there are hundreds of casualties on both sides.
- d. The lesson learned in Korea was that the Red Chinese had to be hit precisely when their steam ran out. They'd build up for a battle, bring in their supplies, arms, and fresh troops. They'd push ahead full blast until suddenly their logistics and communications would be too far extended. Their supplies and ammunition would run low. They'd be out of steam.
- e. If U.S.-ROK-United Nations forces waited until the Reds built another head of steam, the Chinese were hard to stop. But once Allied forces caught on to the trick of hitting the Reds just as a drive collapsed, the story was different: the Communists asked for negotiations.
- f. The same lesson holds in Vietnam. VC prisoners asked their captors wonderingly why U.S.-Vietnamese forces don't track down and attack

major Red training and reorganization encampments after major battles when the Communists are weak and unsteady for fighting.


- g. Instead of doing this, we appear to be meeting the VC on their own terms, when they are rested and ready. This is deadly. The Viet Cong are good fighters, but not supermen. They have proved as vulnerable to ambush as government troops.
- h. There is some tracking after battle. Vietnamese forces which have taken the offensive against the Reds have done exceedingly well. But most reports say contact was lost and the VC disappeared. It is impossible for a group of three mainline Communist battalions with 400 or more casualties to "disappear." They are not guerrillas. Villagers have reported Reds coming through their hamlets after a major battle with cartloads of dead and wounded. These troops are tied down. They are certainly easier to track than the American Indians of frontier days and we had scouts who could do this.
- i. There are indications that a share of the Viet Cong are demoralized after such major battles, even though they win. In recent bloody engagements, the rate at which the VC desert or are captured is double that of last fall's battles.
- j. If Korea is any example, battle-weary Red battalions attacked in force by coordinated ground-air units are suckers for well-laid ambushes --if the government troops keep scouts out to prevent being ambushed them-selves.

ANNIVERSARY OF THE EIGHTH U.S. ARMY

- 49. (U) In commemoration of the 21st anniversary of the Eighth United States Army (10 June 1944-1965), Miss Sunny B. Murphy, long time Chief Librarian of the Command (Yongsan) Special Services Library, prepared and issued a special brochure which will long serve as a compendium of Eighth Army historical facts.
- 50. (U) This commendable effort covers the Eighth Army in War and Peace with sections on Chronology, Commanders, Shoulder Insignia, and Command Structure in Korea. The author, a trained and meticulous researcher, used no less than 43 reference works. The bibliography alone is of great value to historians, scholars, writers, and other researchers.
- 51. (U) The booklet, a copy of which is attached to the annex, was produced and disseminated in 1,000 copies. Stocks are currently in short supply but copies for historical offices will be made available upon request to the Staff Historian, EAGO-MH, G3, Headquarters Eighth Army, APO 96301.

DROUGHT RELIEF

- 52. (U) The U.S. Army and its sister services, along with Korean servicemen, Republic of Korea government officials and farmers, mounted the biggest and most effective drought relief program in the history of the ROK to insure the success of this year's rice crop.
- 53. (U) The worst drought in 60 years hit the Korean peninsula during this reporting period, wreaking havoc on farm lands and threatening the



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nation's economy. The northwestern part of the country bore the brunt of the drought. With rainfall during April, May, June as much as 76 per cent less than the 30 year average, rice paddies baked and cracked while rivers and wells dried up. As the dry spell worsened, strict water rationing went into effect across the nation to save dwindling supplies. Every citizen, whether residing in the countryside or in the cities, felt the effects of the rainless weeks. But the gravest concern was for the rice crops. Transplanting of rice seedlings depends on enough rainfall to flood the paddies. Rice production is the economic base of Korea and a crop failure or poor harvest would be a damaging blow to the nation and its people.

54. (U) With these factors present and with no relief in sight, the Eighth U.S. Army organized its resources to provide effective drought assistance. Aided by 75,000 ROKA troops, and thousands of local nationals from all walks of life, U.S. servicemen from virtually every Army unit in Korea joined the fight to save the crops. Bulldozers dug trenches to divert water to the fields. Fire department pumpers and hoses worked round-the-clock in many areas to bring in water. Army units delivered potable water to their Korean neighbors and to outlying areas. In one of the most extensive and active community relations program of its kind each level of command took effective steps to offset the drought effects. In addition to heavy equipment, aid included the use of gas, oil and diesel fuel, and construction materials made available by AFAK. Army equipment was used for more than 43,500 hours and more than 145,000 gallons of petroleum products were expended in relief efforts. U.S. servicemen throughout the

ROK provided 49,769 hours of labor for drought assistance through the end of June, with the major portion of the U.S. Army effort coming from I Corps (Group) whose area was most devastated by the drought.

- 55. (U) The Eighth Army water assistance project was gratefully received. Military efforts received praise on both official and unofficial levels. In a letter to General Dwight E. Beach, UNC/USFK/Eighth Army Commander, ROK Minister of National Defense KIM Sung Eun wrote, "This assistance is a true example of the comradeship existing between our two peoples and our armed forces." An AFAK spokesman stated, "This people-to-people program of drought relief has increased the prestige of the American soldier..." And a U.S. Army sergeant, working shoulder-to-shoulder in the fields with Korean soldiers and civilians, summed it all up when he said proudly, "This massive relief effort really demonstrated what the U.S. Army can do when people need our help."
- by U.S. military relief programs which eased the suffering of the Korean people and saved an estimated half of the rice crop. The vagaries of nature will take care of the rest. When the traditional rainy season sets in, urgently needed rain will erase the hardships of the arid spring. The monsoon season in Korea starts in early summer and for a two-month period Korea receives as much rain as the American midwest gets in a full year. Korea's annual rainfall average for July is 15 inches, for August 10.5 inches. Some idea of the intensity (and destructive potential) of this vast quantity of water can be had when one considers that a single inch of rain covering just one acre fills more than 5,400 five gallon cans and weighs over 113 tons.

57. (U) The dry spell of 1965 was another chapter—longer than usual—in Korea's timeless battle with the elements. The next chapter may well be the swift havor of floods. The Eighth Army, from its war and peacetime experience, is fully prepared for such an eventuality. When the torrential rains come, troops throughout the nation—who just days before had devoted all out efforts to drought relief—will find themselves coming to the aid of flood victims.

ARMED FORCES DAY

- 58. (U) "Power for Peace," the theme of the U.S. Armed Forces Day (15 May) observances is a responsibility as well as a slogan. To meet that responsibility the U.S. Army has an active strength of about 960,000 men. Of this number 4 out of 10 American soldiers are serving overseas. If recruits and men in the U.S. are excluded, 60 per cent of the U.S. Army is serving in foreign countries around the world.
- 59. (U) In the Far East, the forward force is the Eighth U.S. Army and its subordinate elements. The theme for Armed Forces Day in this part of the world is more aptly "Partners for Peace," as the Army units here use the holiday to emphasize the common goals of the U.S. and the ROK and to further the friendship and solidarity that has long linked the two countries.
- 60. (U) A typical example of "Partners for Peace" was furnished by the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division in the Paju-gun area. Men of the 1st Cav units have long extended a helping hand to the 170,000 people of Paju-gun and together they have rebuilt a war devastated area—an area now well

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defended against any future Communist aggression. It has been a partner-ship that has been richly beneficial to both. On Armed Forces Day, units of the 1st Cavalry Division hosted local citizens in a day full of interest and enjoyment highlighted by training demonstrations, displays of military hardware and varied social functions. More importantly, it was a day to renew old friendships and to make new ones.

61. (U) In a number of assistance and self-help programs, including AFAK activities, the men of the 1st Cavalry Division and the people of Paju-gun have cooperated toward development of the district which encompasses most of the division's area. As in all other areas of the Republic, when mutual problems arose they were resolved by CRAC meetings. (CRAC is an effective system of Community Relations Advisory Councils in which representatives from the U.S. military commands and local officials meet to iron out differences and to promote cooperation.) This year, the Armed Forces Day activities throughout the ROK were organized through the CRAC's. "Power for Peace," or "Partners for Peace," it was a good day for all concerned.

EIGHTH ARMY'S SUGGESTION CAMPAIGN

62. (U) An estimated savings of \$679,046 resulted from Operation Teammate, an Eighth Army special suggestion campaign to obtain money saving ideas to reduce costs and improve management. The drive encouraged all military and civilian personnel to submit suggestions and was directly tied in with the Eighth Army's cost reduction objectives for FI 65.

Wellsame

- a. Operation Teammate, conducted from 15 March to 30 June 1965, was credited with 7,109 entries of the 8,457 suggestions submitted during FI 65. During the drive, 5,242 proposals were made by U.S. Army personnel, 575 by U.S. civilians, and 1,292 came from Korean employees. In addition to special honorary awards, such as letters of appreciation and commendation, each awards totalling \$9,600 were paid out.
- b. Some 350 entries have already been adopted, constituting a considerable savings for the first year. Many other suggestions are still under consideration and subsequent acceptance is expected to raise savings far beyond the presently estimated amount. Suggestion campaigns are periodic within Eighth Army. In terms of response and first year savings, Operation Teammate has been one of the most successful.

THE RELEASE

KOREAN WAR ANNIVERSARY SUPPLEMENT

This reporting period covered the anniversary of one of the most important dates in Korea's long and turbulent history—25 June 1950—the sunny Sunday when thousands of North Koreans swarmed across the 38th Parallel to invade the newly founded Republic of Korea.

The unprovoked and brutal attack touched off a devastating war which made the Korean Peninsula a bloody battleground. Sixteen nations, led by the United States, came to the aid of the ROK and formed a United Nations Command against the Communists, the North Koreans and Red Chinese, backed by the Soviets. The fighting lasted for three years, one month, and two days and exacted a total of over 2.4 million casualties.

The Free World press took note of the fifteenth anniversary of that infamous date with a series of special articles and features on Korea. The following is a reprint of a few excellent treatments selected for their historical and informative content.

KOREA AT WAR

(The material that follows appeared in a Special Supplement of the Pacific Stars and Stripes of 22 June 1965. Unless otherwise indicated it was written by Stars and Stripes staff writer Hal Drake who served with the 7th Infantry Division during the Korean War and has done much research on the battles since that time. He has drawn upon his own experiences, scores of interviews, and extensive reading in writing these special articles.)


War Came on a Quiet Sunday

It was Sunday morning, and the day began like a typical Sunday on any small and well-swept military post.

The weather was sunny. Everything was calm and relaxed. SSgt James B. Harrington, and a few hundred other men in the Korean Military Advisory Group, lived in their own insular world, on a hilltop coupound above the gray-tiled rooftops of Seoul.

They lived, warmly and comfortably, in neatly-aligned, green-painted quonset huts. There was a concrete headquarters building, a club, a theater, everything they needed or wanted. The latest of many comforts was an ornately-tiled swimming pool.

This was the day to sleep in, skip breakfast, go to church, and spend a lazy afternoon at the club; to forget for a day the drudgery of training the ROK Army, a lightly armed constabulary that patrolled the 38th Parallel, the foggy, mountainous frontier that separated the newly founded Republic of Korea from her communist neighbor.





The north Koreans had reportedly thrown much of their powerful, Soviettrained army along the political boundary, only 20 miles above Seoul, but few in Seoul worried or cared about that. They lived the good life with all the rear area luxuries; and Sunday was just the day to enjoy them.

Harrington, now with the U.S. Army Transportation Command, Japan, has sharply vivid memories of Sunday, June 25, 1950.

It was about 10 a.m.; church had just let out, and Harrington and two or three friends were walking back to the headquarters building, where he planned to catch up on some paperwork. They heard a swirling drone overhead, and looked up to see a small green speck peel off and swoop down gracefully, "like a plane in an air show." It vanished into the low hills that border Seoul. Before the plane came up again, Harrington heard a sharp clatter—unmistakably the sound of machine—gun fire.

The lone aircraft circled carefully, like a searching hawk, and then dropped behind the mountainous horizon again. There was a shattering roar and a fan-like gush of dirt and fume.

Again and again, the plane rose, circled, dropped. With each pass, it got lower and closer to the KMAG compound. Nobody there moved; they stood rigidly and stared in dumbfounded fascination, as the sun flashed off the approaching craft's side.

Harrington saw the wing guns flash; there were spurts of dirt as a strafing burst ripped across a nearby road. Then a bomb blast split the edge of the compound's well-cropped lawn. Harrington remembers that he ran

through a shower of dirt; several people flattened; and everybody sprawled for cover.


For some mysterious and providential reason, the north Korean Yak 9 flew off without strafing the crowded, wide open compound. "He could have wiped out every man in it," Harrington recalls.

"I dashed toward the headquarters building," he relates, " and was almost knocked over by this radio operator who came rushing down the front steps. He threw up his hands and yelled, 'we're at war, we're at war.' Then he caught hold of himself and calmed down."

Just before the bomb fell, the operator had been contacted by two American advisers with a ROK infantry company on the remote Ongjun Peninsula. They were under attack. "Get us out of here," a frantic voice pleaded. Their radio shack was made of corrugated steel; Harrington could hear bullets pinging off it. Explosions sounded like blasts of static. An L-19 light plane was rushed up; the two officers were rescued just before the ROKs were engulfed.

"We were at war," Harrington says, "but I can't think of a man in that outfit, including myself, who was physically, mentally or psychologically prepared to go to war. We took it calmly . . . well, no, you might say in a kind of daze."

It had taken the war six hours to reach a few hundred Americans. At 4 a.m., before Harrington and the others had stirred from their bunks, north Korean troops — carrying Soviet weapons and riding Russian-made medium



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tanks—crushed through ROK border defenses and rolled easily over the poorly armed constabulary garrisons. The ROKs had nothing but rifles and carbines; no heavy artillery or anti-tank weapons.

Kaesong fell within minutes, Munsan-ni in a few hours. It was disaster and retreat, all along the 200-mile front. And now, only now, a few hundred ill-prepared and psychologically disarmed Americans knew about it.

The war came home, very literally, to the men with families. There were hasty farewells and tearful goodbys, as wives and children were packed into "anything with four wheels" and rushed to nearby Kimpo airport. They were flown to Japan the next day.

Things happened rapidly, Harrington recalls. As supply sergeant for KMAG, he was also in charge of the arms room, and was ordered to open it and issue every man a rifle. Few had fired one since basic training.

They didn't have to. Harrington collected the weapons two hours later and locked them back in the gun racks. There had been a puzzling lull up front. North Korean skirmishers had reached the outskirts of Uijongbu, only 15 miles away, but the advance itself had stopped all along the front.

Hopeful optimists said it was "just a raid" and predicted the north Koreans would pull back. No, said the more gloomy and truthful ones; they had only stopped for reinforcements and supplies, and were bracing for a drive on Seoul and a headlong dash down the Korean peninsula. This proved true.

While the peace had been shattered, it was hard to shake off the peacetime routine. "The club even opened that night," Harrington recalls, "and everyone was there for one last fling." But there was no gaiety, only frankly expressed feelings of futility.

"We all wondered how and why it had happened and why we weren't prepared and warned," Harrington relates. "And I'm sure a lot of people told them-selves it wasn't happening."

Few of the KMAG soldiers slept that night. They stood outside the barracks and listened to crashing rumbles in the distance. A haggard, red-eyed
American artillery adviser, just back from the front, rushed into Harrington's
supply room. "We've got to stop those damned tanks," he puffed. "What have
you got?" Harrington had some 2.36 bazookas of World War II vintage. These
were pulled from cosmoline, hastily washed and assembled, and rushed up front.

For two more days, the KMAG men "slept leaning on their rifles." Harrington remembers "a skinny little staff sergeant" mining the Han River Bridge
into the city. Two hours later, skirmisher's rifles were cracking on the opposite bank. There was a deafening roar and the bridge dropped, girder and
span, into the river.

The morning of June 28, the headquarters garrison stripped their buildings and barracks, threw their duffle bags on trucks, and made a melancholy journey to Kimpo airport. There were already enemy patrols on the northern end of the field, and sniper's rifles cracked and pinged at the KMAG soldiers as they boarded a plane and took off—to land a few hours later at Itazuke Air Base in southern Japan.

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But there wasn't even time to unpack and relax. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was conferring at Beppu with Major General William F. Dean, whose troops were to fight the first action between American and communist forces. Meanwhile, the beleaguered ROKs still needed help (President Truman by this time had ordered they be given air and sea support) and advisers were hard to come by. The KMAG men were flown right back to Korea.

On June 30, Truman ordered American ground troops into the struggle.

KMAG soldiers first went into the field as a fighting unit at Taejon, where
the first man was killed and buried on a mountain over the city. A change
came over the other soldiers, as more men were lost; the feeling of bewilderment changed to one of anger and purpose.

Harrington was made first sergeant of KMAG's forward command post, and was with the ROK units that participated in the Pusan Perimeter breakout and the dash north to the Yalu. On the way, they passed through Seoul and over what had been the KMAG compound. "Had been" was literal. The lawn had been uprooted and churned under by tank treads; the headquarters building was a burned out shell; and the swimming pool was a puddle of mud, shattered tile and pulverized concrete.

"It made a lot of us pretty sad" recalls Harrington, "but it also made us realize that then was then and now was now."

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One Bitter Defeat Followed Another in War's Early Days

The hopeless defense of Chonan, a straw-roofed village below Suwon, lasted all day and ended at nightfall in confused and tragic retreat.

It had started early in the morning, when a phalanx of clive-painted north Korean tanks tore through a tissue-like fog and churned to the edge of a railroad embankment that protected the clay hamlet like an embrasure.

There were sharp, deafening blasts as the tank guns sheared off rooftops in the village. A thin handful of Americans, who had burrowed foxholes into the embankment's reverse slope, were pinned down by a blistering fire.

Lt Col Robert R. Martin—called "Fighting Bob" by his men—jumped from his hole with an outmoded, World War II bazooka that had already proven useless in other battles. "Come on," he shouted, "I'll show you how to stop those !"

Sgt Gerard E. Schaffer watched Martin disappear, alone, behind a cluster of houses.

Waves of tough, efficient north Korean infantrymen—not the "bandits and partisans" the Americans had expected—advanced behind the tanks and "seemed to multiply as fast as we cut them down." After dark, as invaders swarmed the town's streets and alleys, the defenders were ordered to pull out.

Schaffer moved down the embankment and pulled at limp bodies, filling his shirt with as many dog tags and wallets as he could recover. It was his job to collect personal effects of casualties. He was chief clerk of Sl in 34th Infantry Regimental headquarters.



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He walked cautiously into the street and behind the houses where he had last seen Martin.

"I almost stumbled over something, and looked down," he recalls. "It was the lower half of a man."

Fighting Bob Martin had been chopped in two by a tank shell; a sickened Schaffer did his duty and collected his commanding officer's blood-spattered belongings.

"I can't remember how many of us got out," Schaffer relates, "but it was damned fewer than came in. We walked down the road, many miles, to Waeg-wan. It was the next place they'd hit, but what could we do? There was nowhere else to go."

Enemy snipers had moved onto the hilltops over the road. Schaffer has never forgotten how, again and again, there would be a sharp crack, followed by a piercing snap. Someone "only a few feet away" would stiffen, stare blankly and drop limply to the dirt.

What was he doing here, Schaffer asked himself. A week before, he had been at Camp Mower, which sprawled down a rocky bluff on the west coast of southern Japan and looked more like a mountain resort than a military post. He had been pulled out of a soft tour of occupation duty, and was told he and the others were going to Korea for what would amount to a brisk little field maneuver.

"They told my outfit," adds SFC Lindy Radcliff, "that we were just going over to tell the (north Koreans) to get the hell back over the 38th Parallel and stay there."

That illusion was shattered by the barrage that ripped into a battery of the 63rd Field Arty to demolish a gun and kill most of its crew. Four days later, every gun in the battery was wrecked and dead cannoneers, sprawled along the banks of the Kum River, were being stripped of the boots and uniforms that were highly prized by the poorly-dressed north Koreans.


The loss of Chonan, on July 8, 1950, was the third time the tragedy of defeat had followed the shock of communist aggression. And it was only the beginning of the dark days between July 5 and September 15, and aptly termed by one historian, "the most terrible summer in American military history."

Why? Schaffer and Radcliff, now stationed at the U.S. Army Depot Japan, outside metropolitan Tokyo, give the verdict of experience. The fighting posture of one of the most distinguished outfits in World War II had slumped badly because of good living and soft training during the post peacetime years.

Radcliff recalls how his battery moved into position along the Kum River, after being pushed out of many small villages with strange names. Behind the battery, as it dug in, was another village. It was just as small, just as ruined, just as nameless as the others. Now it served as a rest stop for a southbound exodus of refugees who moved right by the guns.

The artillerymen had been told that the passersby who wore white baggy clothes were not to be worried about—they were elders and aristocrats.

It was these who carefully watched every movement the cannoncers made for two days—and who ended their masquerade on the third day by tearing off the robes of yangban to reveal enemy uniforms.



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"They were on top of us before we knew what was happening." Radcliff wildly emptied his rifle, "at everything and nothing," and then pulled himself and a deliriously babbling casualty out of the formole. They and a few others—a very few others—managed to limp away from the carnage, as a flock of Air Force jets swooped down to blast the battery and destroy anything that might be intact and useful. Radcliff and his party got back to Taejon, looking more like ragged vagrants than soldiers. A few others in the battery—a very few—had stumbled back by a different route. For all intents and purposes, the decimated, weaponless battery had ceased to exist.

It was here Radcliff might have met Schaffer, who was back behind a desk in a schoolhouse that served as headquarters, after Maegwan had fallen.

Taejon held out for six days. Radcliff's battery had only two guns that had been rushed up from Pusan and tried to make two do the work of six. They did their best to make the last north Korean victory a costly one.

As the withdrawal began, Schaffer ran after a column of trucks that were pulling cannon. He rushed for one and grabbed at it. His sleeve caught on the tailgate and he was dragged for 20 yards before hands reached down and pulled him aboard. He had survived three battles without a scratch—to fall on his rifle and break two ribs as he tumbled into the truck. This gave him a two-day respite in Japan; then he was rushed back to a front that was becoming tight and solid.

Both Schaffer and Radcliff were on the "stand or die" line on the Naktong River—the one that held until the Inchon landing, when the breakout started and the Americans came out of their holes to attack the enemy.



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"We were good," recalls Radeliff, "after we got the hell clammed out of us and we knew what the score was. There was no stopping us then."

"We were," agrees Schaffer, "but we had to learn the hard way in a tough school. That's why I'm for tough training, particularly in actual fighting units."

Inchon: A Bold Master Stroke That Turned The Red Tide

"Inchon will not fail," General of the Army Douglas MacArthur declared, definitely and finally. "Inchon will succeed. And it will save 100,000 lives."

Nobody agreed. Everybody objected.

"If every possible geographical and naval handicap were listed," said Admiral Forrest Sherman, then chief of Naval Operations, "Inchon has them all."

There were many other influential protests. General Cmar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that amphibious invasions were far out of date.

MacArthur's staff in Tokyo and his superiors in Washington carefully studied his grandiose plan to reverse the desperate situation on the Korean front. To a man, they shook their heads. Sherman and General J. Lawton Collins, Army chief of staff, came to Tokyo to personally discuss MacArthur's scheme with him—"to dissuade rather than to discuss," MacArthur recalled in his autobiography, "Reminiscences."

UNCLASSIFIED

To MacArthur, to take Inchon would be to twist the key in the lock of the enemy defenses. It was only 26 miles from Seoul and the strategic airfield at Kimpo. From Inchon, an allied advance could spread in all directions. United Nations troops could take Seoul and set themselves for the dash north to Pyongyang—and they could relieve the battered and fatigued Eighth U.S. Army, gamely keeping a toehold on the Pusan Perimeter.

All well and good. But Inchon was still a tough lock to crack.

It was a shabby, tin-roofed port town on the northwestern coast of southern Korea. A high, sturdy seawall protected it like the battlements of a fortress. Seawalls are steep and tricky to climb; they offer no cover.

To scale the wall, an invasion force would first have to cross Inchon Harbor. Harbor? It was actually nothing but an artificial channel, dredged by an engineer who should have definitely chosen another trade. He could not have picked a worse place for a harbor. Inchon's tides were the second strongest in the world; a helmsman on an incoming ship, even if he had four tugs assisting him, still fought a wrestling match with his wheel. Many a ship was gripped by a strong current and dashed into Inchon's well-battered seawall.

This was not the worst thing about the tides. The way they shifted was a puzzle to the most accomplished oceanographers.

At 6:59 a.m., September 15—MacArthur's target date for invasion—the tide would rise to a maximum of 34 feet. Then, slowly and insidiously, it would seep out. Two hours after high tide, the harbor would be a vast, flotsam—littered mud flat.



And at 7:19 p.m., just after sunset, the same thing would happen again.


To these natural hazards were added man-made ones. The 1,000-yard long island of Wolmi-do lay in the center of the harbor; and the north Koreans were reportedly hauling heavy 175mm howitzers over a causeway that linked the island with the mainland. These could raise costly hell with a landing force.

One thing more. The only good approach to the harbor was Flying Fish Channel, which was full of rapid, shifting currents. "Not only did it make a perfect location for enemy mines," MacArthur related, "but any ship sunk at a particularly vulnerable point could block the channel to all other ships."

In the face of all of this, MacArthur was still the imperturbable optimist. He saw Wolmi-do, not as a stumbling block, but as a stepping stone. It would be reduced by naval gunfire and seized by U.S. Marines in the morning, before the first tidal shift—and held by them until the late afternoon, when the water would be high enough to float landing craft.

MacArthur was opposed, argued with, offered alternate plans, and told his whole scheme was impossible and ruinous. Only his determination and elequence won out for him. Washington gave him the go-ahead for an amphibious strike at the enemy—and the place was Inchon.

The old warrior was gambling everything; thousands of men, tons of equipment, and his own personal reputation. Had Inchon failed, MacArthur would not have been remembered as the gallant defender and bold tactician of World War II; he would have gone down in history as the worst blunderer since Lord Lucan, the man who ordered the Charge of the Light Brigade.



He needed troops, many troops, and he grasped them up from anywhere and everywhere. The U.S. 7th Inf Div, which had occupied Korea in postwar years but was now stationed in Japan, was told to saddle up and stand by. So were the best of the ROK troops and several thousand Marine reservists who had been called up only a few weeks before.

For more seasoned and blooded troops, MacArthur pulled the 1st Marine Brigade off the Eighth Army's flank and ordered them "afloat and ready to move."


(This led to a flurry of bitter words with Lt Gen Walton H. Walker, Eighth Army commander, who had to stretch his perilously thin perimeter even farther to fill a sudden gap in his lines.)

The 7th and the 1st Marine Division, which absorbed the brigade from Korea, were placed under the newly founded X Corps, commanded by Major General Edward N. Almond, a logistical mastermind who was responsible for much of the brilliant planning behind the operation.

On September 12, the invasion force embarked from four different ports. According to MacArthur, it numbered 40,000 men who "would act boldly, in the hope that 100,000 others manning the thin defense lines in South Korea would not die."

The invasion force materialized in the fog off Inchon; and the north Korean garrison was jarred awake by the sharp thunder of naval gunfire.

For the defenders of Wolmi-do, it was no contest. They were blasted with high explosive, seared by white phosphorous and incinerated by napalm.





At 8 a.m., 3d Bn, 5th Marines, stormed the island. Thirty minutes later,

MacArthur, aboard the amphibious force flagship Mount McKinley, breathed a prayerful sigh of relief and admiration when he received the Marine casualty report; 17 wounded, none killed.

The tide flowed out, as the Marines sat tight on Wolmi-do and ships outside the harbor battered north Korean coastal defense and threw hammer blows at the seawall. At 5 p.m. the water began to rise again, and the landing craft left wakes like paint strokes as they steamed toward the shoreline.

At the seawall, they fought like medieval footmen, using scaling ladders to storm enemy battlements. A landing on two beaches enabled them to encircle the city.

At 1:30 p.m., September 16, Inchon, harbor and city, belonged to the United Nations Command. The Eighth U.S. Army had already begun to break out and push north; and the Marines and the 7th Div infantrymen were already advancing toward Kimpo and Seoul. Within a week, they had them both.

Inchon was hardly a walkover. The north Koreans, for the brief fight they did put up, gave as good as they got.

But Inchon was certainly one of the least costly and most decisive and masterful operations in military history.

From China, Red Hordes Came of harden

"The Chinese people will not stand idly by," warned Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, "while imperialists wantonly invade the territory of their neighbor."

This was a clear and ominous threat, but was little regarded at UNC headquarters in Tokyo and almost totally ignored in Washington.


On October 1, 1950, when Chou made plain his government's intentions in Korea, no one could foresee disaster at the moment of triumph.

In a few months, the north Korean Army had been smashed and routed, and totally swept from the Republic of Korea. The enemy capital, Pyongyang, was almost in United Nations hands.

It did not appear, in early October of 1950, that the north Koreans had anything left but a stubborn unwillingness to surrender. They made it tought and costly for the advancing X Corps and Eighth U.S. Army, but they were still pushed back and erased, squad by squad, company by company, battalion by battalion, regiment by regiment.

Naval gunfire pulverized the enemy's ports and coastal defenses; and the U.S. Fifth Air Force, which had shot the outmoded north Korean air force out of the sky in a few days, went about its unobstructed business of blasting troop concentrations, rail lines and industrial centers—whatever might be left of them after three and a half months of clockwork bombing.

On October 26, seven days after the U.S. 1st Cav Div had spearheaded an almost effortless seizure of Pyongyang, troops of the ROK 6th Div shouldered aside a north Korean rear guard and reached the banks of the Yalu River.



Disaster was only five days away.

The Nationalist Chinese, whose offers to commit troops in the Korean fighting had been rejected, reported that 12 Chinese divisions had crossed the Yalu and five more were camped on the Manchurian side of the river.

The first blow fell on the Koreans. The regiment that had reached the Yalu was mangled so badly by a sudden attack that only a few soldiers got back. They had, they said, been attacked by Chinese.

October 31 was Halloween, and a night of horror for troops of the 8th Cav Regt, dug in along a range of low hills at Unsan. There were confused accounts of how the attack started. Some reported hearing the trill of a bugle, others a burst of thunder that turned out to be hoofbeats.

The first wave of attackers were Mongolian cavalrymen who trampled the flatland outposts. The Chinese infantrymen hit the hill positions.

Drowsy soldiers were bayoneted in their sleeping bags. Others got off a few shots at "shapes and flashes" but were quickly engulfed.


Survivors were surrounded and trapped.

But at dawn, the Chinese did a puzzling thing, much like what they were to do in India 12 years later, they pulled back.

Chinese prisoners were taken, and were talkative. Few of them were youngsters; they were tough, experienced soldiers of the Fourth Chinese Field Army, veterans of the civil war with Chiang Kai-shek.

Peking's explanation was bland and predictable. These were not regular "People's Liberation Army" troops, but "Chinese People's Volunteers," in Korea to check "American aggression."





On November 2, Eighth Army troops were hit by regrouped north Korean forces, fleshed out by Chinese, north of the Chongchon River. The Eighth pulled out in good order; reorganized for counterattack.

There were patrol actions, fire fights, but little movement for the next three weeks. The enemy seemed wary and timid. On November 24, MacArthur pushed the Eighth Army out for a sweeping "end the war" offensive. They marched for weary, footsore miles, and found no trace of the enemy.

Then the Chinese struck.


The first Chinese hammer blows were thrown at the U.S. 2nd Inf Div and the ROK II Corps, on the right flank of the Eighth Army at Kunu-ri. The ROKs were crushed; the flank fissured open. But American infantrymen, along with the 27th British Brigade and the newly-arrived Turkish Brigade, fought tigerishly and held the Chinese until units west of them were safely out.

Then they slugged their way through a trap infiltrating Chinese had laid in the mountains. The Chinese did manage to box the Turks in, only to discover they had a lion by the tail. The Turks, although they suffered heavy casualties, coolly broke waves of lunging Chinese with automatic weapons fire. When their ammunition ran out, they fixed their bayonets, matched blade against bullet.

The Americans and British were separated, but both made it back to friendly forces.

The Eighth Army was shoved back; it fought back. Pyongyang, under crushing Chinese pressure, was abandoned December 5. By December 15, the Eighth was





below the 38th Parallel but still above Seoul. General Walton H. Walker was cautious; a Chinese breakthrough could cut off large parts of his army, and the nightmare of Unsan and Chongchon could be repeated.

On November 29, the 1st Marine Div and two battalions of the U.S. 7th Inf Div, then under X Corps, were pocketed in the Chosin Reservoir. They carved their way out, foot by foot; they took a 10-mile long convoy 60 miles, over icy mountain roads as slick as glass, through man-killing cold. They fought all the way.

The X Corps marched to Hungnam, on the northeast coast of Korea. Naval gunfire, air cover, and a reinforced Army-Marine perimeter, including troops from the U.S. 3rd Inf Div, stopped the pursuing Chinese cold. On Christmas Eve, the whole force was aboard 193 ships. The Chinese had conquered a burned and blasted wilderness, and had let their quarry escape.

Things got worse before they got better. Seoul was lost. Walker was killed in a jeep accident on Christmas Eve--and was quickly and capably replaced by Lt Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, a leathery paratrooper who had jumped over Normandy on D-Day.

But the Eighth Army and X Corps had suffered crippling losses, and had to recover strength and spirit.

Pork Chop Hill-War's Violent Closing Chapter

The war had settled down. The 151-mile battlefront was quiet. A hand-ful of American infantrymen were living peaceably in a community of bunkers

on Pork Chop Hill, a low, treeless rock formation on the west central sector of the weaving battleline.

The silence was a hopeful sign of things to come. In the distance, shafts of light marked off Panmunjom, where UNC and communist negotiators had agreed to exchange sick and wounded prisoners—something that made a truce a realistic hope instead of a cynical joke.

"It's almost over. They're going to sign," said the younger soldiers on April 16, 1953, encouraged by both the good news and the continued quiet along the front. The older ones nodded but remained watchful. There was good reason to do so. Pork Chop Hill was almost completely ringed by taller peaks and longer ridgelines—and they were all occupied by Chinese. The frowning promontory of Old Baldy gave the communists a fish bowl view of Pork Chop—so named because, on the topographical map, it resembled a choice cut.

The Chinese could have taken Pork Chop Hill or left it alone. They chose to take it—or to try to take it—to force the United Nations hand at the conference table, and perhaps win important concessions at the 11th hour.

The Americans faced everything—crushing firepower, overwhelming odds, lack of food, water and ammunition. The blow fell on troops of the U.S. 7th Inf Div—and the battle was the Hourglass Division's shining hour.

The Chinese assault was swift-moving and well planned; they first struck at three outposts. Erie and Arsenal were battered by artillery fire and attacked by a powerful wave of Chinese. They somehow held. Heedless of heavy losses, waves of Chinese stumbled over their own dead to engulf Dale Outpost.



This gave the Chinese the pivotal point they needed for a strike at Pork Chop.

A flock of shells whirled in and crashed against Pork Chop's defenses.

A screaming horde of communists jumped from Dale Outpost and poured off the other heights. A good third of Harrold's mem were mangled in their foxholes by the barrage. The others stuck to their positions. When the Chinese became visible in a swirl of smoke and dust, rifles, BARs and light machine-guns opened up with a ripping fire.

And, as always, the Chinese were experts at stealthy infiltration. A large body of them had crept onto Pork Chop before the attack started or the Americans opened fire. It was these who suddenly tumbled into the trenches and foxholes. The Americans grappled with them in savage hand-to-hand fighting remindful of the trench warfare of World War I. With bayonets, rifle butts, entrenching tools and even fists.

The Chinese took Pork Chop—and yet didn't take it. First Lt Thomas V. Harrold pulled his decimated defenders into bunkers, where they barricaded everything but the firing slits.

Chinese reinforcements were closer and more numerous. They packed every trench, foxhole and bunker with them, and dug feverishly to make the defenses wider and deeper. These faced K Co, 31st Inf Regt, which was ordered to advance up the rear slope of Pork Chop while two platoons of L Co attacked diagonally from the right.

Things were confused. No one on the rear knew what was happening on Pork Chop. Neither outfit in the relief force thought they were going to do anything more than reinforce a successful defense. They encountered an entrenched swarm of Chinese—and the fight turned into a rifleman's slugging match again.

K Co, commanded by 2nd Lt Joe Clemons, faced a hard fight after a steep, exhausting climb. The Chinese could not dislodge them. Nor could Clemons advance a foot. He waited anxiously for the two L Co platoons to link up with his force, hoping they could give him the strength and firepower to tear a hole in the tight Chinese defenses. The other Americans finally joined Clemons—all 10 who had survived a fierce and costly fire fight.

Clemons' situation was desperate. He had only 57 men, counting 12 survivors of Harrold's force. He hurriedly dispatched a runner to regiment and battalion, begging for help. His message was misunderstood. A reply told him to leave his freshest troops on the hill and send the others back. Clemons wrung his fists to his temple. Again, clearly and patiently, he said he needed help or he couldn't hope to hold the hill.

Clemons finally discovered what the bottleneck was. In none of his desperate pleas had he stated just what his losses were. He finally did. At last, his plight was fully known and appreciated. But there were still no reinforcements on the way.

Nobody wanted to take responsibility for committing more men on Pork Chop Hill-which was now threatening to become another killing ground like

THE CALIFFE

Heartbreak Ridge or Old Baldy. Why lose men when the truce was so near?

Battalion bucked it up to regiment, who referred it to division—it kept accelerating, through Corps and Army, until it reached Far East Command headquarters in Tokyo.

Clemons men were counting their last bullets—some were praying—when the rest of L Co broke through to bolster his thin, battered line. Reinforcements—two fresh, strong rifle companies followed. Clemons and the dazed survivors of his force--all 16 of them—stumbled down the hill.

The Chinese counted their dead and took stock of their limited gains.

Then they abruptly gave up Pork Chop as a bad job. In a few hours, the only

Chinese left on the height were the dead.

They were to try again, on July 6, and again made Pork Chop Hill an alter of human sacrifice for their dead.

The UNC peaceably abandoned the battered height in the last days of the war, after deciding that it was tactically worthless. Pork Chop Hill fell within the Red sector of the DMZ—and they have been called several times by the UNC Military Armistice Commission for illegally fortifying it.

10 p.m., July 27, 1953, The Shooting Stops

By June 23, 1951, the town-by-town, hill-by-hill battle for the Korean Peninsula had become a military debacle for the Chinese-north Korean forces and a frustrating stalemate for the United Nations Command.

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While the UNC's position was not the best, it was perhaps all that could be hoped for in a limited war. Communist forces had been driven from all but a few miles of Republic of Korea territory; and in bloodily repulsing two Chinese offensives, Lt Cen James A. Van Fleet's Eighth J.S. Army had driven a jazged wedge into Red territory far above the parallel.

Van Fleet, with an eye toward extending the crippled communist forces even further, proposed landings at the north Koroan port of Wonsan. Washington quickly answered no. This, again, might risk chain-reaction escalation that could expand the struggle into an all-out war-precisely defeating the purpose of both the United States and the United Nations.

The decision, for both sides, was logical and timely-a truce.

President Truman ordered General Matthew B. Ridgway, UNC commander-inchief, to contact his enemy counterpart and feel him out. Accordingly, on June 29, Ridgway radioed a stiffly worded message. He said he was prepared to negotiate with the Reds on the Danish hospital ship Jutlandia in Wonsan Harbor, and would dispatch representatives if and when they said they wanted a meeting.

The communist answer crackled back the next night. They agreed to negotiate, but not aboard the Jutlandia. Their proposed "neutral site" was Kaesong, a south Korean city they had seized in the first hours of the war.

With misgivings, Ridgway gave in-and was to regret it.

The communists suddenly broke off the talks, charging that a UNC plane had bombed the conference site. This gave Ridgway the lever he needed to




demand the talks be moved to a "truly neutral site"—the tiny village of Carlos of Panmunjom, in the dead center of No Man's Land.


The "brains" of the Red task force, although he did not sit in the center of the table, was Chinese Maj Gen Haich Fang; and the strangest character of all was chief negotiator General Nam II, who was Korean by ancestry but perhaps not by citizenship. Pawel Monat, a Polish political officer who served in Pyongyang and later defected to the U.S., has joined many others in identifying Nam II as a Siberian-born Soviet citizen—and as a Red Army officer who was decorated for gallantry at Stalingrad, where a brigade of Siberian Koreans had distinguished themselves.

First off, the communists demanded that the first point of discussion should be "the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea." Joy replied, very candidly, that this was a "political matter," to be settled at a peace conference following the armistice.

Very clear and logical—but it took eight knockdown, dragout sessions before the communists gave up on that demand and advanced another, just as impossible. They offered a four-point agenda, the first being an immediate agreement on a truce line—which had to be the 38th Parallel. Joy shrugged that off, and instead offered a truce along the existing battleline—following Ridgway's firm, Washington-backed statement that he would not give up the hard-won ground his men had gained in the summer counterattack.

Panmunjom had been niched in history books before, but only for Oriental scholars. Emissaries of Chinese kings had stopped there on their way to extract tribute from Korean kings in Seoul.





And it was at Panmunjom, many centuries later, that the Red Chinese demanded another tribute, of flesh and blood, as the price of peace. They wanted back 45,000 Chinese and north Korean prisoners who had declared they did not want to be repatriated back to communism. The UNC refused; and it was this, along with other sharp clashes on the disposition and return of prisoners, that dragged the war on.


The UNC wanted to know why the communist list of 11,559 Allied prisoners was so small—and why the names of prisoners that communists themselves had identified as captured were now missing.

Where were 50,000 other UNC prisoners that communists claimed to have taken?

The brutal, shocking facts about communist maltreatment of captives did not come until, several weeks before the truce, sick and wounded prisoners were exchanged in Operation Little Switch. Allied returnees told of how they were forced to march hundreds of miles after their capture—and how sick and wounded stragglers were shot or bayoneted. Survivors were herded into crowded and filthy prison camps, where untold numbers died of dysentery and starvation.

And the communist technique of weakening a man's body and spirit, then capturing his mind, gave the world a grim new phrase-brainwashing.

The UNC insisted that a truce zone could only be established along the battleline—and they literally and figuratively stuck to their guns. This was agreed upon, finally, but a 4,000 meter Demilitarized Zone required both sides to give up valuable high ground.



AMIN ASSIFIED

On July 27, 1953, two years and 17 days after Joy and the first party of delegates drove into Kaesong, Nam II and Chief UNC Negotiator Lt Gen Willian K. Harrison sat down in a communist built "Peace Pagoda" and signed 18 English, Chinese and Korean language copies of the Armistice Agreement. Twelve hours later, the shooting stopped.

As a dramatic anti-climax, 12,763 Allied prisoners—3,313 of them Americans—were exchanged for the rest of the 132,000 Chinese and north Korean prisoners the UNC still held. Operation Big Switch made headlines, brushing aside the abortive Korean peace talks—which bogged down in a slough of impossible communist proposals and never got beyond the preliminary meeting stage.


Technically, because no peace treaty has ever been signed, the 15-year old Korean War is still on.

United in Principle

It was an event cynical historians and political scientists said would never happen.

Sixteen nations sent armed young men into a poor and rugged land—not to gain territory, increase their wealth or extend their sphere of influence, but only to uphold a principle.

Fight for Korea? What was it worth? The United States, which had given the Republic of Korea millions of dollars in aid, had found it more of a burden than a boon.



Still, it was sovereign territory ruled by a lawful government -- and it was baldly invaded, in what was a challenge to the United Nations as well as an attempted landgrab.

The major powers that invested their young manhood in the Korean War had signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco not quite five years before; and in one provision they resolved, "to insure, by acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force will not be used, save in the common interest."


The communists knew full well that resolve was there. They chose to test it. Would the U.N. act, militarily or otherwise?

The Reds got a quick and discouraging answer.

Within two weeks, there was a United Nations Command, headed by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. American air, sea and ground forces had been committed. Australian planes flashed over the heads of the American ground forces as they fought a desperate and costly delaying action. Dive bombers and fighters buzzed off the Valley Forge and off a British carrier, HMS Triumph . Jack St. Merrian

A few weeks later, the Argyll and Sutherland Regt, and the Middlesex Regt, rushed in from Hong Kong.

The Philippines, though a new country and a novice in world affairs, sent a 5,000-man regimental combat team. Thailand, though a shuttered and mysterious land only 100 years before, now chose to join it in a united resolve to save another country. France was already fighting a war in Asiabut she still sent an infantry battalion to Korea.




DEAD, WOUNDED AND MISSING IN KOREAN WAR

			Missing (and unrepatriated as of	
Country	Dead	Wounded	Dec 23, '53)	Total
Republic of Korea (military and civilian)	415,001	428,568		••
United States	29,550	103,492	3,486	136,528
United Kingdom	670	2,574	118	3,362
Turkey	717	2,246	167	3,130
Canada	309	1,203	32	1,544
Australia	265	1,351	36	1,351
France	288	818	18	1,124
Thailand	114	794	5	913
Greece	169	543	2	714
Netherlands	111	589	4	704
Colombia	140	452	65	657
Ethiopia	120	536	0	656
~	97	350	5	452
Belgium-Luxembourg	·		57	448
Philippines	92	299	44	
New Zealand	31	78	0	109
South Africa	20	0	16	36
Totals	447,697	543,893	4,011	151,728

Communist China-900,000 dead and wounded estimated by U.S. Def Dept.

North Korea-520,000 dead and wounded estimated by U.S. Def Dept. estimate of civilian casualties.



The tiny principality of Luxembourg had only a 1,000 man army—but she sent a 200-man company of volunteers.

Canadians, Turks, Australians, Greeks, New Zealanders, Hollanders, Colombians, Belgians, Ethiopians and South Africans filled the ranks of a polyglot army with a determined purpose. They joined the valiant ROKs' who suffered staggering losses, particularly in the early days of the war, but rallied to help repulse the invasion of their young republic—and to show the communists that when they resorted to armed aggression, they picked a bad hand.

KOREA TODAY

(NOTE: In the same supplement Hal Drake wrote an article on the USAF "Air Power Made it Possible to Beat Reds on the Ground;" and another on the USN "Navy Was Master of the Seas Off Korea." The ISO, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, contributed an article on the USMC "Marines Went Through Hell on Road to Haguru." The following finale—the only other article to appear in the supplement—was written by SSgt Edward G. Cannata of the Stars and Stripes Korea Bureau in Seoul.)

The Watchword is Still Vigilance

In the 15 years since the communist Korean troops moved at dawn in a surprise push south across the 38th parallel, men, time and events have moved the cold war contest between freedom and communism from the scarred battle-field to the smooth, green felt conference table at Panmunjom.

United Nations forces in the Republic of Korea today preserve the spirit of the men who took up the challenge hurled down by the 117,000 Red soldiers who dashed south at 4 a.m. that June Sunday in 1950.

In that war of more than a thousand days, little land ultimately changed hands and the boundaries are nearly as they were when the hostilities began.

For the U.N. forces, the signing of the armistice ended the shooting war but not the ideological war. This war goes on at Panmunjom in exchanges of accusations, rebuttals, charges, counter-charges and denials.

A combat veteran in Korea on his second tour observed, "Korea now is as it was then—the war we could not win, could not lose, and could not quit."

INA ARELI

Combat veterans such as he often recall the words of former president Eisenhower as the Panmunjom negotiators reached agreement, "We have won an armistice on a single battleground but not peace in the world. We may not now relax our guard nor cease our quest for freedom."

U.S. Army soldiers of the 1st Cav Div, 7th Inf Div, U.S. I Corps (Group), pilots, aircraft and airmen of the 314th Air Division and brigades and detachments of U.N. forces are still posed and ready in Korea.

These Free World men "stand to arms" 24 hours a day in battle positions across the western half of the Demilitarized Zone.

In their foxholes and bunkers the words "truce" and "peace" are not confused.

They know and realize there can be no real peace so long as they face an enemy whose repeated treachery has proved that he is restrained only by the physical presence and superiority of Free World men and arms—and not by the solemn agreement he signed at Panmunjom.

Through field and command post exercises, the U.N. forces are kept combat-ready. They learn the art of cover and concealment, alertness to air, ground and chemical-biological-radiological attacks and security. They have the spirit to win.

Emphasis is placed on proficiency in the phases of attack, counterattack, defense and delaying actions.

According to Lt Gen Theodore J. Conway, deputy commanding general of the Eighth U.S. Army, "my tour of duty here has given me the unparalleled

UNO CONTROL

opportunity to see on a daily basis what our units could achieve and what they actually did achieve...The U.S. soldier in the Republic of Korea is a hard-working individual who undergoes a year of tough, hard training and does a good job."

Conway was also favorably impressed with the ROK soldier, saying, "I have great admiration for him. I am particularly impressed with his stamina and endurance...and the 24-hour day he puts in on the line."


The U.N. soldier today in Korea daily contributes to the strengthening of the defensive posture and improvements in training, in logistical systems and procedures, in roads and communications and in mobilization planning.


The Korea of wartime has taught many lessons to the Korea of today.

It has shown the Korean people and the Free World that the communist adversary will use every means at his command to gain a political and military advantage; that he is willing to expend life indiscriminately in order to off-set superior fire power. And that the enemy, though powerful, is not invulnerable.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur observed that the Korean War made clear that democracy and freedom are not mere words but a concept of government and a way of life.

This is the Korea of today.





(Fifteen years after the war began, North and South still) confront each other across the Demilitarized Zone. During this period of armed truce—the longest armistice in history—the ROK, with extensive U.S. military and economic aid began the long climb back. This objective focus on contemporary Korea appeared in the June 20, 1965, issue of The Asia Magazine and is credited to the Weekend Telegraph, London.)

Rebuilding Land of the Morning Calm

Its armed shield buys South Korea time to rebuild, and to grow. Notable economic progress has been made, partly because of unstinted American aid but largely because of the hard work for which the Korean people seem to have an almost limitless capacity. Devastated during the war, during which it changed hands four times, Seoul is today a mixture of serene temples and modern buildings. Universities and colleges proliferate in a country bursting with the young thirst for knowledge. Many problems remain; the economy is harshly uneven and there is grave unemployment in the cities. Though remote, the attraction of reunification is strong. But President Park, who has made the transition from junta strongman to elected president, seems confident he can keep things moving ahead.

Another Asian Parallel occupies the anxious attention of the world today. Unlike the Seventeenth — which separates the halves of war-torn Vietnam — the Thirty-eighth is tensely quiet. Yet all along the 151 miles of frontier cutting across the Korean peninsula from the Yellow Sea to the Sea of Japan, the battle lines are fully manned. Twelve years after Panmunjom, 600,000 young South Koreans remain in the armed forces. Ten full divi-



HECLASSIFIED

sions, still formally under the United Nations Command, are deployed all along the demilitarized zone. Four kilometres away, across dense minefields, are eight North Korean divisions. Occasionally, this electric atmosphere flares into violence. Prowling patrols savage each other. But the bulk of soldier-duty along the Parallel is dreary waiting for the truce to turn to peace — or renewed fighting.

South of the historic Imjin river, beyond the shelter of nuclear missiles, Seoul has been rebuilt. Like all Asian centres, its population has been swelled by migrants from the stagnant villages. As elsewhere, slums are a major problem. Shanties grow like ugly mushrooms in the shade of Buddhist temples and concrete blocks. The cities and towns with the other famous names — Inchon, Pusan, Taegu — show the same mixture of hardship and vitality. The traveller marks the timeless old men in their white robes, peaked faces and conical black hats. Children too are everywhere. Their gaiety makes more awful the void of so many young men dead.

South Korea's students, of whom the world hears so much, are of the generation too young to have known the war. Compared to other new countries, South Korea has a high rate (85 percent) of literacy; and many pupils go on to universities and colleges. (Seoul alone has 16 'universities'.) The pangs suffered by the 'educated unemployed' are thus much more severe than elsewhere. Youthful idealism is frustrated not only by the harsh lack of employment but by the patriotic yearnings for unification, which draws both sides of the opposite Korean poles.

AND ASSISTED

The plus side of the picture is impressive. Notable economic progress has been made in the last few years, thanks to unstinted American economic aid (US \$3,640 million since 1947, not counting military assistance), but largely, also, to the ungrudging hard work for which the Korean people seem to have an almost limitless capacity. Substantial investments in basic plants and equipment, and in light industry, yielded a relatively high growth rate (nearly six percent) in 1963. Rice crops, too, have been coming through handsomely. The 1964 season brought a heavy bumper harvest. Exports, valued at US \$47.6 million three years ago, are expected to reach \$126 million for 1965. The growing list of exports includes textiles, plywood, tinned and frozen fish, tungsten concentrates, even radios and sewing machines.

But with the ration divided, South Korea has been forced to spend heavily on industry. Under the Japanese, the North — with its abundant hydroelectric power, iron ore, anthracite and other resources — was the industrial base. Now the South generates its own power, but not enough for all the straw-thatched farmhouses.

A new refinery, in which an American company has a one-quarter interest, now produces enough petrol and diesel oil for civilian needs, and soon will be expanded to provide fuel for the armed forces. Chemical fertilizer production is rapidly being expanded, and the South makes its own cement.

Relations with Japan, the old colonial masters, continue to attract an ambiguous passion. After centuries of deliberate isolation, Korea had been invaded by Japan in 1904, although the Korean Emperor had proclaimed the peninsula's neutrality in the Russo-Japanese war. Korea became a protectorate a year later; and was formally annexed in 1910. After Japan's defeat in World War II, Korea was divided into two sealed-off states by Russia and America. Less than five years later came the Korean war — a Big Power struggle in its most naked, brutal form. In April, the government took the first measure to 'normalize' relations with Tokyo. This might seem long-overdue. After all, negotiations have been going on and off for 12 years. But it was a bold step nevertheless, taken against fanatical resistance from student-militants crying 'sell-out' and 'treason.'

Most intelligent South Koreans agree their nation would benefit from closer ties with Japan, which would bring in Japanese capital and technical know-how. But almost invariably this agreement is negated by the observation:

"We see your point, of course, but the Japanese still haven't apologized for the way they treated us in our own country."

President Park's bold effort to negotiate reparations, Japanese fishing rights and the status of Korean residents of Japan brought the students out on the streets in Seoul and the other main cities. The passionate hatred of the Japanese is palpable to the casual traveller. But Japan too is looked up to as the cultural mother-country and the frontier of opportunity.

What makes Korean students run? Heightened expectations confronted with stark economic realities, and idealistic frustrations, are an element of young unrest all over the new countries. In addition, patriotism is

especially intense among the young generation of Koreans, who are still living with their history books, which teach them that Korea has long been the hapless victim of outside events. It was student-militants who brought down the regime of the old strong-man, Syngman Rhee, in April 1960 and the ineffectual civilian caretaker government that followed him. This April, as many as 10,000 youths at one time turned out in Seoul to protest the government's agreement with Japan on many of the outstanding issues between the two countries. Yet the demonstrators failed to develop enough heave to bring down the government.

The fact is President Park Chung Hee has finally been able to bring about a measure of stability in South Korea's volatile politics. An enigma when he seized power in May, 1961, Park made the transition from ruling general to president in three years, now maintains a balance between the young militants and the ultra-conservative farmers of still-primitive villages.

Government policy is that Korea's two parts should be united on the basis of free elections held under United Nations supervision, on a population basis — population in the South is some 25 million against 11 million in the North. Tentative negotiations toward reconciliation have so far failed; attempts to send only one team to the Tokyo Olympics (the compromise arrived at by the East and the West Germans) collapsed at the very first try. Despite the subsurface sentiment, re-unification is unlikely, if only for international reasons, for the foreseeable future.

KOREA TOMORROW

(Despite the suspended state of hostilities, despite two political upheavals that rocked the nation, despite obstacles and difficulties that would discourage a less hardy people, South Korea is full of promise. Its political and economic well being is irrevocably tied to its military strength and, therefore, to the posture of the U.S. Army establishment in Korea. Major problems still exist in all areas but the plus side of the picture is impressive as described in the following piece written by Robert Eunson of the Associated Press. This article, a model of statistical research and reporting, appeared in the Stars and Stripes edition of 28 June, 1965.)

Fate Finally Smiles on the ROK

Tomorrow is almost here, in the Land of the Morning Calm.


After nearly 40 years of occupation by Japan, five years of fighting off a communist invasion and a decade of scrambling up out of the rubble, the Korean people are beginning to live. Children play in the streets. Fretty girls look up at the sun and smile.

"I feel our economy now is in the take-off stage," says President Chung Hee Park.

"Korea is now being reborn, taking its place in the modern world," said U.S. aid director Joel Bernstein.

"Don't look around you and say this is Korea today," grinned Deputy
Prime Minister Chang Key Young. "This is Korea tomorrow."

Chang, like so many other Korean leaders, has seen his country occupied, invaded and bloodied so many times that he admits to being a little amazed as well as happy about the sudden change in economic atmosphere.



Indicators of progress, over the past 10 years, are these:

The gross national product is up 62 percent.

Industrial production, up 251 percent.

Electric power hydro up 46 percent; thermal, up 1,341 percent.

Exports, up 391 percent.

Nation's budget, up 431 percent.

National wholesale price index up 491 percent.

In matters directly affecting the man in the street, there are now 5,243 hospitals compared to 2,585 in 1955—up 103 percent; 5,929,000 students to 3,386,000 in 1955—up 75 percent, and 6,984 schools compared to 5,425 in 1955, up 29 percent.

Oh yes, there are 179,574 telephones to answer now, or a 454 percent more change of getting the wrong number than in 1955, when there were only 1,989.

And you have to dodge 5,474 taxis now on the streets of Seoul, instead of the mere 1,989 they had in 1955, or 175 percent more taxi drivers zipping past you on a rainy night.

Park, whose government has recently signed a treaty with Japan normalizing relations between the two for the first time in 60 years, told the Associated Press:

"Korea has not only recovered from the war damage amounting to about \$3 billion, but also the Korean economy is showing a remarkable progress in many aspects, mainly owing to the generous aid provided by the United States and other friendly nations."

INC SECURE

United States aid to Korea in the past 15 years totals about \$4.5 bil-

Korea was divided along the 38th parallel at the end of World War II, with the communists getting the north.

Not much had been accomplished towards an economy when, on a June morning in 1950, north Korea divisions smashed across the border.

During the next three years the country was a battleground between the communists, Chinese and north Koreans backed by Russia on one side and the United Nations, led by the United States, on the other.

When the armistice was signed 12 years ago, ending the fighting, but not the war, President Syngman Rhee's government tried to revitalize the nation's economy with U.S. help. The major problem was that the factories and electrical power plants along the Yalu were all in the hands of the communists.

Consequently, unrest and weariness overcame the populace. A student revolution overthrew Rhee in 1960, charging the last elections had been a fraud.

The student revolution was followed a year later by a coup which brought a military junta to power.

General Park emerged as the "strong man," a title he has since outgrown.

Two years ago Park ran for office and his party was brought to power legally.

Though there is still and undercurrent of desire for unification with north Korea, Park is confident his country must succeed alone.

Park will not agree to reunification unless it is done on the basis of free elections, supervised by the United Nations. The communists won't buy this because they only have 11 million residents in the north against 25 million in South Korea.

Park will face his biggest political test this summer when the treaty with Japan comes up for ratification in the National Assembly.

Park's leading opponent is Mrs. Soon Chun Park, head of the Minjoong (Popular) Party. She commands 62 votes in the National Assembly against Park's 110.

The Minjoong Party says they will quit the assembly rather than vote on a treaty with Japan.

WELLSSEE

PART I

NARRATIVE

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INPLACES.

PART II
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS


- 1. Troop List (U), Redesignation of 1st Cavalry Division/24 Infantry Division Units(U)
- 2. Aide Memoire (S-NF), General Foster's End of Tour Report with six inclosures, 9 April 1965(B)
- 3. Photographs (6) of arriving and departing general officers, with captions on reverse side (U).
- 4. Booklet, 21st Anniversary of Eighth U.S. Army (U).


REDESIGNATION OF UNITS

Mile society

(U) The following troop list reflects (1) the organic units of the 1st Cavalry Division as it was structured in Korea, and (2) the initial structure of the 2d Infantry Division under Eighth Army. Since the 1 July 1965 transfer of the two divisions was an "in place" name change with no military space transfer involved, the personnel assigned to left column units became members of the corresponding right column units.

1st Cav Div (Korea)	becomes	2d Inf Div (Korea)
1 Cav Div HHC	11	2 Inf Div HHC
545 MP Co	n	2 MP Co
15 Avn Bn	11	2 Avn Bn
13 Sig Bn	tt.	122 Sig Bn
8 Engr Bn	Ħ	2 Engr Bn
1 Bde HHC	# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	1 Bde HHC
2 Bde HHC	n de la companya de l	2 Bde HHC
3 Bde HHC	H	3 Bde HHC
1/9 Cav Sqdn	n	4/7 Cav Sqdn
1 Cav Div Arty HHB	n	2 Div Arty HHB
2/19 Arty	n	1/15 Arty
1/21 Arty	11	5/38 Arty
1/77 Arty	11	7/17 Arty
5/82 Arty	II .	6/37 Arty
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	the second secon





2/20 Arty	UNCLESSED	becomes	1/12 Arty
1 Spt Cound HBD		11	2 Spt Comd HBD
15 Adm Co		tt	2 Adm Co
15 Med Bn		II.	2 Med Bn
15 S&T Bn		n	2 S&T Bn
27 Maint Bn		Ħ	702 Maint Bn
1/15 Armd Bn		tt .	1/72 Armd Bn
2/15 Armd Bn		II	2/72 Armd Bn
1/5 Cav		11	1/9 Inf
2/5 Cav		10	1/23 Inf
1/7 Cav (M)		19	2/9 Inf (M)
2/7 Cav	. •	n	3/23 Inf
1/8 Cav (M)		n	2/23 Inf (M)
2/8 Cav		11	1/38 Inf
1/12 Cav		'n	2/38 Inf

Copies of Document #2 (Aide Memoire (S-NF)

General Foster's End of Tour Report with six

inclosures, 9 April 1965 (S)) are on file in

both EAGO and EAGO-A.

INCLAST

Additional prints of Document #3 (arriving and departing general officers) are available within EAIO-NF.

A copy of Document #4 (Booklet, 21st Anniversary of Eighth U.S. Army (U)) is filed in the 8th Army Historical Folder, EAGO-MH

OFFICE SYMBOL OR FILE REFERENCE

SUBJECT

EAGL-PA

Quarterly Historical Summary, 4th Qtr, FY-65

TO GO-MH

DATE 1 9 AUG 1965

Attached is Quarterly Historical Summary for ACofS, G4 for inclusion in the 8th Army compilation.

GL-PA

Maynard c. Ravey coe

1 Incl as (dupe)

Brigadier General, GS Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

GO-H-67-0022

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED COMPONENTS OF THIS CORRESPONDENCE AND/OR INCLOSURE(S)

G3-65-1343 H- 204-65

SECRET

EAGL-PA

GO-MH

Quarterly Historical Summary, 4th Qtr, FY-65 GL-PA

19 AUG 1965

Attached is Quarterly Historical Summary for ACofS, G4 for inclusion in the 8th Army compilation.

l Incl as (dupe) FRANK D. MILLER Brigadier General, GS Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED COMPONENTS OF THIS CORRESPONDENCE AND/OR INCLOSURE(S)

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PART I

NARRATIVE

CONSTRUCTION FROGRAM

(FOUO)

DA Approved FY-67 MCA Projects and

Installation Planning Review Board Meeting

This headquarters was advised by USARPAC Message GPIO-EN 11128 to proceed with preliminary design of three line items (L/I) in the FY-67 MCA Program. These are L/I 329, Division Potable Water Systems at 2d Infantry Division, \$803,000; L/I 359, Artillery Operations Facilities at Camp Ori, \$1,270,000; and L/I 444, Commercial Power at Seven Tactical Sites, \$1,171,000.

Minutes of the 8th Army Installation Planning Review Board which established priorities for items in the FY-67 Minor MCA Program for improvement of Troop Facilities were distributed. Further action is pending at the end of this period.

(FOUO)

FY-65 OMA Projects Program-Status

All projects in the FY-65 OHA Projects Program were submitted to US Army Korea Procurement Agency (USAKPA) in sufficient time for contractual action by 30 Jun 65. By the end of the 4th Quarter USAKPA has awarded all but 34 of the projects valued at about \$300,000. Award of these projects was deferred pending availability of FY-66 OMA funds. Further action on these projects is pending at the end of this report.

^{8.} Msg (FOUO), GLPO-EN 11128, 8 Jun 65, Subj: FY-67 MCA Program (Docu 4).

^{9.} Ltr (FOUO), 8th Army GL-ISIM to major subordinate commanders, 16 Jun 65, Subj: Minutes of Installation Planning Review Board (Docu 5).

(FOUO)

Automatic Data-Processing Center (ADPC)-

Status of Construction Project

Contract ENG 1060 for a Minor MCA Project for construction of a building to house an electronic digital computer (IBM 7010/1460) at Camp Walker, Taegu, Korea was awarded by USAEDFE on 1 May 65. Contract amount is \$51,320 and estimated value of Government Furnished Material (GFM) is \$36,795. Total estimated cost of this project including design and related costs is \$96,168. Contractor is Sam Whan Enterprises Company, Ltd. The building is scheduled for completion on 10 Nov 65. Further action is pending at the end of this period.

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING

(Unclassified) Automatic Data Processing Installation

The Yongsan Data Processing Installation (YDPI-N372) located in building 2474 became operational with partial staffing on 8 Feb 65. The mission of the installation is to provide automatic data processing (ADP) support to Headquarters, Eighth US Army with an initial mission for limited processing of the 8th Army maintenance management reports (TAERS) under provisions of TM 38-750 and TM 38-750-1.

Information presently provided and used by commanders to manage resources is as follows:

Report Title	Report No.	Frequency
Equipment Density	T001	Monthly
Nonavailable Equipment	T002	Monthly
Unit Equipment Profile	T 003	Monthly



•	Report Title	•	Report No.	Frequency
UKCLASSIFIED	Equipment Shortage		T005	Monthly
	Unit Identification C	odes	T 006	Quarterly
	TA 80-10		T015	Monthly
	Supply Account Codes	p.	TO16	Quarterly

PROPERTY DISPOSAL

Disposal of Useable Property (Unclassified)

The US Army Property Disposal Agency, Korea, at the end of this quarter disposed of \$76,450,000 of useable property and will begin the fiscal year with \$20,160,000.

PROCUREMEN!

(Unclassified)

Staff Visits

Col Gerald Johnson, Jr and 2d Lt Leonard W. Pierce, US Army Korea Procurement Agency, made a visit to the Commanding General, Eighth US Army Depot Command/Eighth US Army Rear. The purpose of the visit was to establish liaison regarding General Howze's desire that the US Forces make maximum utilization of Korea as a source of fresh fruit and vegetables. The Depot Commander, General Iollis, wassvery enthusiastic about the program and gave assurance that the Depot Command would cooperate to its utmost to aid in the success of the program. Depot Command has approved a project manager for fresh produce to provide maximum coordination among the responsible activities.

(Unclassified)

Procurement Inspection


The Inspector General, Headquarters, US Army Japan (Head of Procuring Activity) conducted a procurement inspection of the US Army Korea Procurement Agency (USAKPA) on 1 Jun 65. An overall rating of "Satisfactory" was received based upon a rating system of Satisfactory-Unsatisfactory. No major or significant irregularities were noted. The Inspector did take note, however, of the inadequate officer grade structure currently authorized and recommended that G1 take the necessary action to adjust the structure in relation to the caliber and complexity of procurement activities in Korea. Also, the IG made some very complimentary remarks pertaining to the organization and procurement procedures used by USAKPA. He was particularly impressed with the amount of procurement being performed in proportion to the number of personnel assigned to the agency.

(Unclassified)

Military Supply Promotion

US-ROK Joint Meeting for Military Supply Promotion, 24th Meeting, 10 was held on 16 Jun 65, co-chaired by Assistant Minister of Commerce and Industry, LEE Chul Seung, and Colonel Gerald Johnson, Jr., Commanding Officer, USAKPA. Conferees for the US side included representatives of the American Embassy, J4, USOM, and for the ROK side, representatives of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of National Defense. Subjects presented and discussed included the procurement of items for South Korea from Korean sources, use of Korean construction material and a request by the ROK side that the US side give positive cooperation for the local procurement of electrolyte, sulfuric acid, aluminum sulfate, grease, plastic products, and white cement.

^{10.} The ROK-US Joint Meeting for Military Supply Promotion-Minutes of the 24th Meeting, 16 Jun 65 (Docu 6).



Status of Procurement in Korea-

4th Quarter FY-65

A total of \$11,693,138 was obligated during the 4th Quarter FY-65, and when compared with the \$11,484,993 obligated during the 4th Quarter of FY-64, it represents a increase of 1.8%. The tabulated data by branches is as follows:


	4th Qtr FY-64	4th Qtr FY-65	Deviation	%
Services	\$ 5,217,588	\$ 5,691,670	+ \$474,082	+ 9.1
Construction/R&U	2,639,907	2,219,415	- 420,492	- 15.9
Subsistence	2,707,867	1,882,241	- 825,626	- 30.4
Hardgoods	919,631	1,899,812	+ 980,181	+ 106.5
	\$11,484,993	\$11,693,138	+ 208,145	+ 1.8
(Unclassified)	Contrac	t Execution		

During FY-65, the total value of all procurement actions (contracts, modifications, and delivery orders including GBL) amounted to 32.6 million dollars. Although the dollar value decreased by 2.3 million dollars from FY-64, the total number of procurement actions increased by 7,632 from 81,520 to 89,152. The decrease in dollar value is attributable to improved negotiation techniques and practices, coupled with the initiation of procedures whereby only US personnel were utilized in the actual contract execution phases.

REORGANIZATION

(Unclassified)

TD Modification



The US Army Property Disposal Agency, Korea TD has been modified through USARPAC Manpower Survey by an increase of one LN space. Military personnel have been reshuffled to strengthen the Merchandising and Cataloging Branch of the agency, which will increase its productivity by approximately 30%.

AUTHENTICATION:

FRANK D. MILLER
Brigadier General, GS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4

INCLICATION

PART II

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Mel portran

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- 1. Docu (S), Eighth US Army GL-PO, 28 Jun 55, Subj: 8th Army Logistic Policies and Procedures for ROKA for Limited and General War Planning (U)
- 2. Docu (S), EXERCISE COUNTER BLOW FY-65 8th Army Logistical Estimate (U)
- 3. DF (S), Eighth US Army GL-PO, G4 to G3, 7 Jul 65, Subj: After Action Report-CPX COUNTER BLOW FY-65 (U)
- 4. Msg (FOUO), GLPO-EN 11128, 8 Jun 65, Subj: FY-67 MCA Program
- 5. Ltr (FOUO), 8th Army GL-LSIM, to major subordinate commanders, 16 Jun 65, Subj: Minutes of Installation Planning Review Board
- 6. The ROK-US Joint Meeting for Military Supply Promotion-Minutes of the 24th Meeting, 16 Jun 65

FM CINCUSARPAC



TO RUHKJ/CG EUSA SEOUL KOREA

UNCLAS EFTO - FOUO - GPLO-EN 11128

SUBJ: FY 67 MCA PROGRAM

1. IT IS EXPECTED THAT DESIGN ANNEX TO CORPS OF ENGINEERS
OPERATING PROGRAM (CEOP) WILL BE FUBLISHED IN LATE JUNE TO AUTHORIZE
DISTRICT ENGINEERS TO PROCEED WITH PRELIMINARY DESIGN OF FOLLOWING
DA APPROVED FY 67 MCA PROGRAM ITEMS:

LINE	ITEM	TIVE	ES	T COST	(\$000)
329		DIV PORTABLE WATER SYSTEM, KOREA		8 ¢ 3	
1414		CON'L POWER, KOREA TAC SITES		1,171	
359		ARTY OFRE FACE, KOREA		1,279	-
49		2 EM EKE WITH MESS, SCHO EKE, HAWAII		3,817	
18	•	EM BES ADDN, SCHO BES, HAWAII	· ·	2,344	•
NONE	UB	ARYIS	• • •		•.
nonz	US	arj T	OTAL	9,405	7

2. REQUEST THAT DETAILED DESIGN CRITERIA AND FIRM PROJECT SITING BE PROVIDED AS REQUIRED BY DISTRICT ENGINEER



EUSA GL-ISIM

16 June 1965

SUBJECT: Minutes of Installation Planning Review Board

TO:

Commanding General, I Corps (Group), APO US Forces 96358 Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, APO US Forces 96224 Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, APO US Forces 96207 Commanding General, Eighth United States Army Support Command,

APU US Forces 96301

Deputy Commander, I Corps (Group) Rear, APO US Forces 96358

1. References:

- a. EUSA Regulations 415-36.
- b. Letter, EUSA-EN-G, subject: Submission of Minor MCA Projects for Replacement of Inadequate Troop Facilities, 22 March 1965.
- 2. The Eighth United States Army Installation Planning Review Board met on 19 May 1965 to review and establish priorities for the EUSA Minor MCA Program for improvement of inadequate troop facilities in Korea. Minutes of the meeting are forwarded for information and distribution to members of the Installation Planning Board at your command.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

l Incl

Minutes - IPRB (8 cys ea acee)

E. M. KLLEY Capt, AGC Asst AG

Copies furnished:

2 - CG USARPAC, ATTN: GPLO-EN

12 - EUSA G-4, ATTN: GL-LSIM

1 - EUSA SGS, G3, Compt, Chap, Sp Serv, Sig, Trans, Surg

2 - CO USAKPA

2 - DE USAEDFE

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MINUTES

EUSA INSTALLATION PLANNING REVIEW BOARD

9 June 1965

1. The meeting convened at 0900 hours, 19 May 1965 in building 2370, Yongsan Compound, Seoul, Korea. The following members were present:

Voting Members:

Col J. E. McDowell
Col J. J. Haley
Col S. W. Koster
Col S. W. Shaw
Col R. F. Lerg
Lt Col G. B. Richards

ADACOfS, G4, Chairman DEngr, EUSA ACOfS, G3, EUSA

DCompt, EUSA

Off of Surg, EUSA

Ch, Instl Mgmt Br, Serv Div, G4, Secretary

Alternate Members:

Lt Col J. H. Van Eaton Lt Col J. G. Moses Off ACofS, Gl, EUSA Off of Sig Officer

Nonvoting Members:

Mr. W. E. Bowers

Engr Div, USAEDFE

Observers:

Lt Col R. A. Tucker
Lt Col G. F. Gregg
Lt Col D. D. Gabe
Capt C. L. Deas
Capt F. G. Szustak
Capt P. R. Hoge
Capt E. B. St Clair, Jr.
Capt J. F. Hatch
2/Lt J. T. Wettack
Mr. S. B. Umphrey
Mr. J. H. Johnson
Mr. C. W. Solon
Mr. H. J. Belser

Dep Area Comdr, 1st Cav Div
Dep Area Comdr, 7th Inf Div
Post Engr, 7th Inf Div
Post Engr, 1st Cav Div
Construction Div, USAKPA
Engr Sec, EUSA
Post Engr, I Corps (Gp) Rear
Engr Div, EASCOM
Post Engr, 1st Cav Div
Instl Mgmt Pr, G4, EUSA
Engr Sec, EUSA
DPost Engr, I Corps (Gp) Rear
Engr Div, EASCOM

2. The Chairman opened the meeting and called attention of the members to a brochure which contained minutes of previous planning board meetings and other relevant data. He stated that the board would review the current program to provide replacement for inadequate troop barracks, BOQs, latrines and mess facilities under a Minor MCA Construction Program and that priority would be given to projects at 1st Cavalry Division. The program was initiated under provisions of Letter USARPAC, GPID-EN, subject: Submission of Projects for Replacement of Inadequate Troop Facilities, dated 15 February 1965.

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MINUTES - EUSA INSTALLATION PLANNING REVIEW BOARD

· 9 June 1965

- 5. The Board recommended that all projects be approved except the item for barracks at the ASCOM stockade which is included in the Minor MCA Program submission for replacement of troop housing and the items submitted by EASCOM for converting and altering buildings at Camps Henry, Walker, and George, Taegu District Command which are included in the normal Minor MCA Program. The Board's action in deferring the construction of barracks at the ASCOM Stockade was based on the possibility that the barracks may not be needed at this compound due to a change in mission. The Board's action in deferring the items for conversion of storage and housing facilities, and alteration to 11 buildings at Camps Henry, George, and Walker was made pending completion of a mission study by G3, EUSA.
- 6. The Board noted that the estimated cost of the program after revision amounts to \$1,543,000. as opposed to the funding guidance of \$2,000,000. It is expected that this disparity will be remedied by pricing adjustments during final preparation of project documents. If this procedure does not produce the desired results the Board suggested that additional projects be submitted.
- 7. The recommendations of the EUSA Installation Planning Review Board were approved by the CG, EUSA on 8 June 1965. The approved priority listing of the Minor MCA Program for replacement of inadequate facilities with the item for inclusion as a separate Minor MCA Project follows:

a. MINOR MCA PROGRAM (Improve Troop Facs)

Priority	Command	Project Description	Est Cost (\$000)
1	lst Cav Div	Const 23 Barracks	120
2	lst Cav Div	Const 6 Latrines	184
3	lst Cav Div	Replace 26 NCO Quarters	146
3 4	lst Cav Div	Const 28 NCO Quarters	155
	lst Cav Div	Replace 5 BOQs	160
5 6	1st Cav Div	Replace & Const 5 BCQs	121
7	1st Cav Div	Replace 5 Mess Halls	161
8	lst Cav Div	Replace 4 Mess Halls	132
9	7th Inf Div	Replace & Const 7 EM Latrines	180
10	EASCOM	Const: 6 EM Barracks	184
	(Humphreys Dist	1 EM Mess Hall	
	Comd)	2 Admin Bldgs	
		TOTAL	1,543
	b. MINOR MCA	PORECT (Separate)	•
``\			
ч .	1st Cav Div	Const Commo Bldg, Camp No. 1	34

3

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THE ROK-US JOT MILITARY SUF

Minutes of the Twenty-F:

DETING FOR PROMOTION

WILLIE !

eeting, 16 June 1965

1. Time and Place

The meeting was convened as the Conference Room of the United Agency. The meeting was co-che Assistant Minister of Commerce as Gerald Johnson, Jr., Commanding Korea Procurement Agency. Commeeting.

2. Attendees

ROK

Mr. Chul Seung Lee, Assista Industry, ROK (Conferee) Mr. Chin Shik Noh, Assistan Ministry of Commerce and I Mr. Lee Won Bok, Ministry

US.S

Colonel Gerald Johnson, Jr.,

Korea Procurement Agency
Colonel Harold E. Reichenber
WMr. Flames' R. Sartorius, US
Mr. Richard L. Goodrich, U
Lt Cdr Richard L. Johnson,
Major Hector J. Streyckmans
(Observer)
Captain Robert M. Baer, EU
Mr. Albert M. Hetrick, USA
Mr. Charles E. Coleman, FI

3. Discussion of Agenda

Mr. Noh read Item & under Agenda (Inclosure #1) and Colongreply to this item (Inclosure #2). Chairman of a special committee %

s Army Korea Procurement y Mr. Chul Seung Lee, astry, ROK, and Colonel er, United States Army hason presided at the

ister of Commerce and

, Military Supply Section, y, ROK (Conferee) ase, ROK (Conferee)

anding Officer, US Army eree)
, UNC (Conferee)
ssy (Conferee)
Conferee)
JNC (Observer)
F Proc Ofc, Osan AFB

Dist, Far East (Observer)

Observer)

siness on the ROK Side son presented the US Side Lee stated that he was eviews applications for

- Unclassified

, 2

ROK SIDE AGENDA FOR THE 24TH ROK-US JOINT MEETING FOR MILITARY SUPPLY PROMOTION

OLD BUSINESS

A. Use of Korean Construction Material



ROK side appreciates the US side comment on this problem as discussed in the last meeting of this group. However, ROK side requests that the US side make recommendation to the repartment of Defense, the United States Government for the solution of this problem, so that Korean construction materials which are acceptable in quality and price to perform the US construction contracts in Korea, can be supplied from the local sources.

NEW BUSINESS

A. Promotion of Local Procurement of Certain Items

ROK side requests the US side positive cooperation for the local procurement of the following items as they can be supplied in acceptable quality and reasonable price to satisfy the US requirements in Korea.

- a. Electrolyte, Sulfuric Acid -- for use of Automobile
 Storage Battery
- b. Aluminum Sulfate -- detergent for potable water purification
- c. Grease --- various types
- d. Plastic products --- Refer to the letter of the Association of Military Goods Suppliers in Korea, dated 22 May 1965 and addressed to USAKPA
- e. White Cement Refer to the letter of the Association of Military Goods Suppliers in Korea, dated June ε, 1965 and addressed to USAKPA



US Side Comment on ROK Side Agenda for 24th ROK-US Joint Meeting for Military Supply Promotion

OLD BUSINESS

AND LOGICIES

A. Use of Korean Construction Material

The US side has noted the ROK comments on this problem and will make these views known to the appropriate authorities in Washington.

NEW BUSINESS


1#1

A. Promotion of Local Procurement of Certain Items

The US side will be pleased to receive more details as to the exact items available and the approximate prices of these new products. Samples will be most helpful to illustrate the quality of the items. The US Army Korea Procurement Agency will pass the information to the Supply Manager for determining requirements for local procurement.

- a. In February, USAKPA found that sulfuric acid, for use in automobile storage batteries, was available in Morea, but that the containers for this item were very expensive. Preliminary negotiations were conducted, but the purchase request was cancelled by the depot due to high cost of containers and the fact that a shipment, in sufficient time to fulfill our requirement, was received from the United States.
- b. Aluminum sulfate is currently supplied from the United States in 100-lb bags. The total requirement for the two types of this item is sufficiently large to warrant our requesting submission of samples and pricing data to permit consideration for local procurement.
- c. Grease is procured by the Defense Fuel Supply Center. That agency currently has a contract with the Korea Oil Company for gasoline. It is suggested that the Korea Oil Company contact the Defense Fuel Supply Center to offer products which it can make available.
- d. With respect to the items offered by the Lucky Chemical Company, USAKPA will attempt to obtain samples and pricing data on the plastic items mentioned in the 22 May letter from the Association. We do not presently have any requirement for such





US SIDE AGENDA FOR TWENTY-FOURTH MILITARY SUPPLY PROMOTION MEETING

Procurement Support for South Vietnam from Korean Sources


By letters dated 11 June 1965, the Chief of Staff, Eighth United States Army, advised both the Ministers of Commerce and Industry and Defense that the United States Secretary of Defense had directed that Korean bidders be given equal opportunity to participate in procurements for South Vietnam. Further, the total procurements in the Western Pacific for South Vietnam since 1 July 1964 amounted to \$1,022,675. A review of these procurements reveals that contracts in the amount of \$457,000 were placed in Korea, \$498,675 in Japan and \$67,000 in Taiwan. With respect to the latest requirement for South Vietnam, Korean contractors have been afforded an opportunity to submit bids on 200,000 bags of cement and 500,000 sand bags.

The operational requirement for the remaining items was so urgent that concurrent solicitation throughout the Western Pacific was not possible and still meet the required date. With respect to the 500,000 sand bags, we have been advised that the Korean contractors were not the low bidders for this item and that the contract is being awarded by another procurement agency. Information available to the US side is that this contract is being awarded at a unit price of approximately .14¢ per bag as opposed to the .50¢ per bag quoted by the Korean contractor.

Established procedures have been reaffirmed by Head Procuring Activity for Western Pacific whereby concurrent solicitation will be made between all procuring activities in the Western Pacific for the local purchase of requirements in support of South Vietnam.



Durc#3



ROK Side Comment on the US Side Agenda for the 24th ROK-US Joint Meeting for Military Supply Promotion

Procurement Support for South Vietnam from Korean Sources

The ROK side appreciates highly the US side's cooperation rendered on procurement support for South Vietnam from Korean sources. The ROK side is encouraged to hear that the United States Secretary of Defense directed that Korean bidders be given equal opportunity to participate in the procurements for South Vietnam, and that established procedures have been reaffirmed by Head Procuring Activity for Western Pacific whereby concurrent solicitation will be made among all procuring activities in the Western Pacific for the local purchase of requirements in support of South Vietnam.

Market I

Quarterly Historical Report RCS-CSHIS-6

G-3

Comptroller

18 Aug 65 Mr. Peters/ck/2561

- 1. Subject report, in duplicate, requested in DF, EUSA GO-MH, dated 20 July 65, is attached. This report includes the (MPC) Unitary Floating Foreign Exchange System and items of historical value in the area of Automatic Data Processing (ADP).
- 2. Negative report is submitted for all other Comptroller functions as actions are reported to Hq USARPAC by specially required reporting procedures.

1 Incl

FRANCIS A. CHAMBLIN Colonel, GS Comptroller



WARRY ASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY APO San Francisco 96301

QUARTERLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
(RCS-CSHIS-6)



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

		,	Page
Implementation of Unitary Floating F	oreign Exchange	e System	1
Establishment of Automatic Data Proc (The Army Integrated Equipment Recor System)	essing Capabil: d Maintenance	ity for TAERS. - Management	2
Placement of Card Punch Machines in	DSUs.		2
Modification of Plans for USARPAC Pr	ototype Compute	er Configuration.	2



PART I

MADDATTUR

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WHILE SHEET

Truck Age 1

IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITARY FLOATING FOREIGN EXCHANGE SYSTEM

Authorized MPC holders in Korea are required by regulation 1-2 to use local currency (Won) in all financial transactions with Korean individuals or commercial concerns. As a result this command is required to buy Won from the Bank of Korea in order to provide necessary conversion points.

From 3 May 1964 thru 21 March 1965 the Won/Dollar rate as established by the BOK Government was 255 Won to one US dollar. Purchases by the U.S. Government during this period were at this rate, less a bank service charge of approximately \(\frac{1}{2} \) Won per dollar.

On 22 March 1965 the ROK Government implemented a Unitary Floating Foreign Exchange System³ which allows the Won/Dollar exchange rate to fluctuate daily in response to international market transactions involving Korean exports and imports. The first fluctuation (265.85) in this exchange rate occurred 25 March 1965. In accordance with AR 37-103, authority was requested and received from DA⁵ to revalue the Won holdings of all Disbursing Officers in the command to the new rate. Although the Bank of Korea may announce an official rate daily or as often as fluctuations occur, the rate at military installations in Korea changes only when the Righth Army Central Funding Officer replenishes his supply of Won - an operation which occurs about twice a month. Through 30 June 1965 the official Government rate fluctuated from a low of 255 Won to a light of 27 June to vin 3.5 dollar.

⁻⁻⁻ ANGENTARIES

^{1.} UNI-U-1-1 (Spanish Limiteration), exposite attended to any Pinancial Regulation leven, dated 15 dec 65 (No. 1844) (1944)

^{2.} Bighth Arm mag 37-8, Throughtleson & (Not attached).

^{3.} Join Reseased/1802 Nov 1474 200 to the first her in the State of th



ESTABLISHMENT OF AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING CAPABILITY FOR TAERS (The Army Integrated Equipment Record Maintenance Management System)

Hq USARPAC announced⁶ intent to implement provisions of TM-38-750-1, Maintenance Management-Field Command Procedures effective 1 July 1964. The Yongsan Data Processing Center was approved⁷ on 5 Dec 1964 and an equipment request⁸ was forwarded to USARPAC on that date. Initial equipment and personnel were obtained and the Yongsan Data Processing Installation (N372) was activated on 8 Feb 1965.

PLACEMENT OF CARD PUNCH MACHINES IN DSUs

The Eighth Army program to mechanize operational activities wherever feasible has moved forward another step. Twenty-three IBM type 026 card punch machines have been placed in DSUs. Fourteen additional card punch machines are scheduled for installation in DSUs during the 2d Quarter, FY 1966. This important phase of conversion from manual to mechanized operations allows use of prepunched cards (reducing manual writing and typing time), improves accuracy, speeds transmittals and expedites the requisitioning process.

drawn.


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


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SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- 1. Eighth Army Mag KA 92355 GCOFA DTG 26/0820 Z, Mar 1965.
- 2. Msg DA 708928 from COA DTG PR 27/1657 Z, Mar 1965.
- 3. USARPAC Mag, ARP 3952 (UTO 3-4294), 28 Mar 64.
- 4. DF, GL-MRMD-1, 4 Dec 64, TAERS Data Processing (TM 38-750-1) without inclosures.
- 5. Letter, EUSA GC-M, 5 Dec 64, Request for ADPE without inclosure.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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FROM: CGEUSA

新型图形。1970

0930 hours, 26 Mar 1965.

2. Won holdings currently in hands of Army, Navy and Air Force Disbursing Officers funded by CDO, EUSA (includes won repurchased from Bank of America and won in hands of all agents) at the rate of 254 won to one U.S. Dollar are:

	WON	@ 254:1
8th Army F&AO	1,107,873.50	\$ 4,361.70
8th Army CDO	18,470,606.00	72,718.92
1st Cav	4,055,167.00	15,965.22
7th Div	908,616.00	3,577.22
4th FD (D)	1,485,566.00	5,848.68
1st FS (D)	108,695.00	427.93
21st FS (D)	19,357,677.00	76,211.34
Pusan FO	1,565,502.00	6,163.39
EUSA TOTAL	47,059,702.50	\$185,274.40
Navy	9,892.00	38.94
Air Force	4,606.00	18.13
NAVY/USFK TOTAL	14,498.00	57.07
GRAND TOTALS:	47,074,200.50	\$185,331.47

3. Disbursements and sales at the new rate of 265 won to one U. S. Dollar commenced on 26 Mar 65 from purchase of new supply of won bought by CDO from BOK. CDO is funding disbursing officers at whole won rate. The gain from fractional part of won

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FROM: CGEUSA

per dollar is accounted for in the CDO and follows concept directed in reference e.

- 4. Upon revaluation of old supply of won, operations will be in accordance with reference c as approved by reference d.
- 5. No won transactions, to include accommodation transactions or won transactions for any other purpose, will be made from old won supply held at 254 won to one U. S. Dollar until receipt of instructions from Department of the Army in accordance with AR 37-103.
- 6. Request reply ASAP by priority msg to permit orderly preparations for March 31 payday won requirements.

Thin is the

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Mei Boushand

TAMC145A811ZCTPA260

PP RUAMC

MESSAGE NR: 03-5666 MESSAGE NR: 03-5666

DE RUEPDA 007A 27/1700Z

DISPATCHED: 27 Mar 65 DISPATCHED: 27 MAR 65

ZNR

THEIR REF: DA 708928 THEIR REF: DA 708928

P R 271657Z

ACTION:

COMPT

ACTION:

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FM DA

INFO:

PM IG IO INFO:

G4 G5 SGS SJA

ALL UNC STAN

TO RUAMC/CCEUSA SEOUL KOREA

G1 G2 G3

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUHLHS/CINCUSARPAC

RUAMC/COMUSKOREA

RUAMC/COMNAVFORKOREA

RUAMC/COMAFKOREA

BT

UNCIAS DA708928 FROM COA. REFERENCES: A. KA 923558 GCOFA, DTG 250920Z MAR 65; B. DA 706935 DTG 121917Z MAR 65; C. KA 91571GC DTG 110817Z MAR 65.

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO REVALUE WON HOLDINGS REPORTED BY REFERENCE A IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUIDANCE FURNISHED REFERENCE B.

BT

(Docu 2)

NNNNEAHCO17CZCPMB172ZCRPC288

RR RUAMC

NOTE:

ACTION CHANGED TO G-4 by S/A by AG MRK 30 Mar 64

DE RUHLHS 10 28/2244Z

ZNR

MESSAGE NR: UT03-4294

R 282206Z

DISPATCHED: 28 MAR 64

FM CINCUSARPAC

THEIR REF:

ARP 3952

TO RUAMC/CGEUSA SEOUL KOREA

ACTION:

G-4

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INFO:

AG MRK, COMPT

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INFO ZEN/CG 25IN DIV SCHOFIELD BKS HAWAII

BT

UNCLAS ARP 3952 FROM GPPSU-MD.


SUBJECT: USARPAC IMPLEMENTATION OF TM 38-750-1, MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT.

REFERENCES: 1.

- A. TM 38-750-1 DTD OCT 62.
- B. TM 38-750-1 (DRAFT) JAN 64.
- C. TM 38-750-1 DATED JAN 64.
- DISCUSSIONS WITH EUSA, USARJ, USARYIS BY LT COL SCARBROUGH, THIS HQ, DURING VISIT 5-17 MAR 64.
- THIS HQ PLANS TO IMPLEMENT REF BRAVO ON OR ABOUT 1 JUL 64. PRESENT PLANS CALL FOR:
- ACTION ADDRESSEES TO KEY FUNCH AND PROCESS DA FORM 2406, MATERIEL READINESS REPORT. ONE DECK OF CARDS PROVIDED THIS HQ AND ONE DECK DIRECT TO MAINT DATA PROCESSING CENTER, LEXINGTON, KY.

(Docu 3)

THE MOTION





- B. VIA SERVICE CONTRACT IN HAWAII, KEY PUNCH DATA FROM

 DA FORMS 2407, 2407-1, 2408-3, 2408-7 AND 2410 AND PROVIDE PUNCHED

 CARDS TO ACTION ADDRESSEES FOR THEIR LOCAL PROCESSING IN ACCORDANCE

 WITH REF BRAVO. ADDRESSEES WILL USE CARDS TO PRODUCE LISTING SHOWN

 IN CHAPTER 4, FIG 4-3.1 THROUGH 4-3.20 REF BRAVO. (INITIALLY DISREGARD

 THAT PORTION OF 4-3.18 USING DA FORM 2412 DATA.) PRINTOUTS OF LISTINGS

 4-3.8-1 THROUGH 4-3.14-1 WILL BE PROVIDED THIS HQ MONTHLY. FURTHER

 THIS HQ WILL PROVIDE PROGRAMS, OR PROGRAM GUIDANCE, FOR 1004 PCM TO

 PRODUCE THESE LISTINGS. IT HAS BEEN ASSUMED THAT DA WILL NOT PROVIDE

 ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL SPACES FOR THIS REQUIREMENT.
- 3. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE AND CONSIDERING 1004 PCM EQUIPMENT SCHEDULED FOR THIS COMMAND, REQUEST YOU DETERMINE EAM EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THIS PLAN. IF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED, LIST SPECIFIC TYPE, PERCENT UTILIZATION, AND PLANNED LOCATION. ALSO, IF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED ADVISE IF FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE AND/OR REQUIRED.
 - 4. REQUEST REPLY NLT 20 APR 64.

BT

GL-MEMD-1

SUBJECT: TARRS Data Processing (TM 38-750-1)

TO: ACSTS, CL

PRCM: Ch, Mat Readiness Div

DATE: 4 Dec 1964

Lt Col Whitley/jbk/2414 Establish capability for machine processing of TAERS Management;

2. BACKGROUND.

a. On 19 June 64, G4 requested Comptroller to provide data processing for implementation of TM 38-750-1 (Incl 1).

b. During the period June - November 1964 efforts to establish data processing produced no results. Capability to provide the service is not expected before mid-1966.

c. In November 1964 a plan was developed for G4 to establish an in-house expability to process TAERS data (Incl 2).

d. Plan provides for Comptroller to furnish necessary data processing machines, two (2) machine operators and programming assistance. G4 to furnish machine room supervisor. Machine room is planned for location in G4 building,

e. Initial management data output would be for command wide distribution. (See Incl 2.)

RECOMMENDATION:

Approve plan to establish and operate a G4 TAKRS Data Processing Center.

3 Incla

1. IF

2. Plan

3. Work Order

t/ OGENE PITIS Colonel, GS

Chief, Materiel Readiness Division Add: Note - Approved by ACofS G4 for implementation on 5 Dec 64.

/=/ P. W. L/C

Add: Note #2 .

Inclosures (voluminous) not attached. On file at Hq 8th Army OC-M, Data Bystems Branch.

> E. J. P. (Dom 4).

COPY

HEADQUARTERS KIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMI APÓ 301, US Forces

Mr. Fosnocht/3371

EUSA GC-M

5 Dec 65

SUBJECT: Request for Automatic Data Processing Equipment

TO: Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPCO
APO 958, US Forces

1. References.

a. AR 1-251, Appendix III.

ъ. тм 38-750-1.

- 2. Inclosed is justification for equipment to be leased or purchased for use within the Eighth United States Army.
- 3. Equipment requested is required to implemented the TAERS program in accordance with TN 38-750-1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl

Approved for release: /s/ Colonel Chamblin

Add: Note - Inclosures (voluminous) not attached. On file at Hq 8th Army GC-M, Data Systems Branch.

