
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PACIFIC COMMAND



MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)

1986

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

(USCINCPAC)

CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-5025

J5122 5000 Ser S250 08 April 1986

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Subj: USPACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)

Encl: (1) USPACOM Multinational Strategy

1. (U) This command's peacetime mission encompasses the full breadth of tasks to develop and maintain an adequate war-fighting capability. The USPACOM Multinational Strategy (MNS) (enclosure (1)) defines our objectives in working with each nation in this theater.

3. (U) I am pleased to forward the USPACOM Multinational Strategy. You and your staffs have contributed heavily to its formulation and I appreciate your efforts. I hope the MNS will serve as a useful road map for developing mutually supporting programs and for furthering our policy throughout the region. I recognize that because of the dynamic nature of the threat and changing goals as our relationships with our Pacific neighbors mature, we must periodically update the MNS to keep it useful. Therefore I welcome your comments and recommendations at any time.

Admiral, U. S. Wayy

Distribution: Appendix IV



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COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC COMMAND

United States Pacific Command

Multinational Strategy (U)

Information Cutoff Date: 15 February 1986

Prepared by Directorate for Plans and Policy

Second Edition

1986

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USPACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY

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APPENDICES

- I. Space Operations and Technology Transfer
- II. Extracts from the FY 1986-1990 Defense Guidance
- III. Principal Security/Defense Fora in USPACOM
- IV. Distribution

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USPACCM Multinational Strategy

Executive Summary

1. (U) GENERAL

a. (%) Purpose and Scope.

b. (U) Guidance

(1) (SANCEN. The need for a multinational strategy was expressed in the initial (1982) Lefense Guidance of President Reagan's administration and appears again in the FY 1986-1990 Defense Guidance which outlines future strategy and force capability expectations. The Defense Guidance states that the global strategy requires complementarity of U.S. and allied forces to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world.

(2) (U) Extracts from the FY 86-90 Defense Guidance are at Appendix II.

(3) (S/HOFORN)

c. (SANOTURN)

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d. (S) <u>USPACOM Objectives</u>. The major objectives which the USPACOM Multinational Strategy supports are derived from the Joint Strategic Planning Document FY 1987-94 and are as follows:

- (1) (5)
- (2) (8)
- (3) (8)
- (4) (5)
- (5) (8)
- (6) (8)
- (7) (8)
- (8) (8)
- (9) (8)
- e. (S) Space Operations.
- f. (5) Limitations.
- g. (U) Methodology
- (1) (U) Achieving carefully selected subobjectives with each country will support general national security objectives.
 - (2) (8)
 - (3) (SENOPORN)

(4) (S/NOFORN) (5) (8) (S/NOTURN) h.

1. (U) Summary charts are included at the end of each section. These charts provide detailed lists of roles, forces, and equipment, etc., in addition to summarizing the salient features in the preceding text.



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1. (U) GENERAL

- a. (U) <u>Classification</u>. Unless stated otherwise on individual pages, this entire document is SECRET, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.
 - b. (U) Purpose
 - (1) (S/LIOFORN)

It is derived from and consistent with policy guidance promulgated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and responds to direction given by the JCS to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Command.

- (2) (2)
- c. JST_Scope:
- d. (U) Basic Premises
 - (1) Let

(2) (4) Other countries obviously perceive their defense requirements differently than does the U.S. Their military force postures and programs are designed to accomplish the missions their governments judge to be most important. Therefore, efforts to effect fundamental changes in the defense policies or forces of a nation may not always be feasible and can, at times, be counter

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productive. Consequently, recommendations in this document are directed toward realistic, incremental improvements to pursue roles and missions which are at least complementary with our command programs.

(3) Les

The USPACOM Multinational Strategy is built primarily on a foundation of bilateral relationships. Larger regional coalitions, to the extent that they can exist, depend on these bilateral relationships and the interactions of the coalition members.

e. (U) Guidance

(1) (SANCORN) The need for a Multinational Strategy was recognized in the FY 1986-1990 Defense Guidance (DG) which outlined future strategy and force capability expectations. The DG states that the global strategy requires complementarity of U. S. and allied forces to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world.

- (2) (U) Verbatim extracts from the FY 86-90 DG are at Appendix II.
- (3) (SHOPORN))
- f. (U) U. S. Force Requirements and the Multinational Strategy
 - (1) (SANOPORN)

(2) (S/HOFURN)



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- (c):(S/NOFORN)
- (d) (c/veren)
- (e) (S/NOFORN)
- (f) (S/NOPORN)
- (3) (2 THEFORM)
- g. (U) Elements of Strategic Analysis.
 - (1) ien

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(2) (S/NOFORN) In this MNS a "crisis," as referred to in Table 1-1, is defined as a localized threat to peace in which U. S. force deployments are necessary to protect U. S. interests.

h. (8)

(1) (U) <u>U. S. Actions</u>.

(a) (s/)

(b) (8)

(c) (g)

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- (d) (8)
- (e) (S
- (1) (6)
- (h) (8

- (2) (5)
 - (a) (s)
 - (b) (8)
 - (c) (s)
 - (d) (8)
 - (e) (**%**)
 - (f) (**g**)

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- (g) 4
- (h)
- (1) 1
- (j) (s)
- (k) (S)
- j. (SANGFORN) Sections 3 through 28 cover all countries in the PACOM AOR,

k. (U) Summary charts are included at the end of each section. These charts provide detailed lists of roles, forces and equipment, etc., in addition to summarizing the salient points in the preceding text.

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- 2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
 - a. (U) Methodology
 - (1) (S/NOFORN)

- b. (U) Comparative Analysis
 - (1) (5)


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
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(6) (S/NOFORM)

(7) (S/NOFORN)




- c. (U) Patienal Organizations and Security Pacts. These formal structures provide a partial framework on which the MNS depends heavily for support and expansion.
- (1) (U) ANZUS. Multilateral security treaty, Australia, New Zealand, Unites State:
- (2) (U) ASEAN. Multilateral economic treaty, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand.
- (3) (U) <u>Five Power Defense Arrangement</u>. **Mul**tilateral security treaty, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom.
- (4) (U) Manila Pact. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States.
 - (5) (U) Mutual Defense Treaty. United States, Philippines.
 - (6) (U) Mutual Defense Treaty. United States, Republic of Korea.
- (7) (U) Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (MST). United States, Japan.



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
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3. AUSTRALIA

a. (U) Current Programs

(1) (U) Australian defense interests are linked to those of the U. S. through the ANZUS Mutual Security Treaty. Practically all U. S.-Australian defense relationships are based on this treaty. Much of the justification for military expenditures by the government of Australia lies in a selfacknowledged requirement to contribute adequate forces in support of the Treaty. Under normal circumstances, a number of ANZUS consultative meetings intelligence sharing and other activities ensure the viability of the ANZUS relationship. The annual ANZUS Council meeting is normally conducted at Secretary of State/Foreign Minister level. Military-oriented meetings range from the ANZUS MILREP Meeting and Staff Level Meeting through service-toservice talks to seminar and exercise planning meetings. As a result of the 4 February 1985 GNZ decision to reject a U. S. request for a port call, U. S. participation in all ANZUS meetings has been cancelled or postponed while the USG reviews its ties with NZ. U. S.-Australian policy level discussions, based on the 1973 Barnard-Schlesinger Agreement, focus on broad policy questions of U. S. national strategy and Australian national security interests. Australia is also included on the USCINCPAC warning network and both countries' military intelligence services participate in an intelligence exchange program. Additionally, Australian/U. S. staffs exchange information annually on each country's military assistance to regional ASEAN nations. At present, there is no program for coordinating these military assistance activities.



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- b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (C/MOFORN)

(2) (C/NOPORN)

- (3)
- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1)

(2) (5)

- d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
 - (1) (SANOFURN)

(2) (\$/NOFORN)

(3) (3)

- e. (U) Forces/Equipment Required
 - (1) (S.MSFURN)

- f. (U) Action Required
 - (1)
 - (2) (2)

- g. (S/NOFORN)
- h. Australia Benefits:

- i. (e) U. S. Cost:
- j. (8)
- k. (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:
 - (U) Stable economy
 - (U) Military capabilities somewhat hindered by budgetary constraints
 - (U) Need improvements in military capabilities

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relate to Uz,

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- 4. (U) BANGLADESH
 - a. (U) Current Programs

 - (2) (2)
 - (54 b.

- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1)_(S/NOFORM)

(2) (C/NOFORN)

(3) (G/NOFORN)

d. (SANOFORN)

e. (S/NOFORN)

f. (<u>G/NOFORN)</u> U. S. Benefits:

- g. (U) <u>Bangladesh Benefits</u>: The Bangladeshi armed forces' prestige and technical capability would be increased. The ability of the country to defend its interests would be improved.
- h. (U) $\underline{\text{U. S. Costs}}$: Increase in FMS and IMET would not be excessive over a number of years. However, an increase in interaction with Bangladesh could excite Indian sensitivities.

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- 5. (U) <u>BHUTAN</u>
 - a. (C/NOPOKA) Current Programs:
 - b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (est
 - (2) (51
 - c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1) sec)
 - (2)
 - d. (SANOPETE

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- 6. (U) BRUNEI
 - a. Current Programs



- b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (SAHOFORG)



c. Political Situation:

- d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions: No new roles or missions are proposed at this time.
 - e. (U) Forces Required: None
 - f. (SMOFERN) Actions Required:

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g. 🔑 U. S. Benefits: 🦓

h. Jel U. S. Costs:

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- 7. (U) SOCIALIST PEPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF BURMA
 - a. (U) Current Programs
 - (1) (2)

- (2) (U) There is no question that Burmese Officers appreciate the IMET program. Following a twelve year gap, the program was resumed during FY 80. Since its resumption, 62 officers have received training as of August 1984 in the U.S. Due to the awkward and centralized decision-making process in selecting students for U.S. training, Burma has been unable to fully use its allocation of IMET funds. Many Burmese officers are hopeful that policies will be instituted to permit greater use of the IMET opportunities. For this and broader political reasons, the U.S. Embassy strongly supports continued IMET funding at current levels.
 - (3) (2)

- b. (U) Current Capabilities/Limitations
- (1) (U) Burma has long deferred military modernization because of urgent developmental priorities and the expense of sustained military operations against insurgents and drug traffickers.
 - (2) (2)
 - (3) (8)



c. (U) Political Situation

- (1) (U) Beginning in the mid-1970s, after over a decade of doctrinaire single-party socialism and self-imposed isolation, Burma began to look cautiously outward, to seek aid and ideas from the West, and to reopen channels of international cooperation. Although this change has created important new possibilities for the West in Burma, it has been conducted at a deliberately slow pace. Burma is determined to preserve its political, economic and cultural autonomy at all costs, retain an imposed socialist economic structure, and continue the single, military-dominated party's firm control under the present leadership. Burmese policy and behavior, therefore, remain fundamentally grounded in nonalignment.
- (2) (U) The Burmese are concerned about the Soviet's aggressive international behavior. They take care not to say too much publicly but Burma-USSR relations are generally poor. Concern over China is nearer to the surface. Burma considers it essential to get along with China and relations are good. There is, however, mild displeasure over China's continuing support of the Burmese Communist Party (ECP), although Burma acknowledges that the PRC has been reducing its support to this insurgent group.
- (3) (U) Internally, much of the central government's focus and energies are devoted to operations against the various upland tribal minorities. The unwillingness of the GOB to negotiate in good faith towards reasonable compromise perpetuates the conflicts, causes suffering on all sides and perpetuates the production of narcotics to fund the ethnic insurgencies. The plight of "foreigners," most of whom are descendents of South Asian emigres, is also another source of tension in Burma. These people, who in the past provided skilled labor and managerial expertise, are denied suffrage, freedom of travel and access to jobs with a living wage. Were the BCP able to mobilize this classic downtrodden class in urban guerrilla warfare in Rangoon, Mandalay and other major cities, it would present major problems for security personnel and would derail the anti-narcotics campaign.
 - d. (S/NOFORN) Recommended Roles/Missions:
 - e. (U) Actions Required
 - (1) (S/NOFORN)

·(4)

(2) (S/NOFORN)

(3) (S/HOPURN)

- f. (U) U.S. Benefits: The U.S. maintains a high respect for the Burmese policy of nonalignment and wishes to see Burma's continued progress as an independent and stable nation. U.S. efforts in this regard may well result in a closer U.S.-Eurma relationship and open the way for a stronger Western alignment.
- g. (U) <u>Burmese Benefits</u>: Closer relationships with the U.S. and other Western countries could result in intreased access to advanced technology and development procedures. This knowledge could be employed by the Burmese to exploit their substantial natural resource wase and thus improve the individual Burmese quality of life.
- h. (U) U.S. Crit Conent L.S. military assistance programs in Burma are of minimal cost and planned future increases would not be excessive. Because of Burma's sensitivity with respect to preserving its nonaligned image abroad and its centrally-directed economic development at home, future assistance efforts rust be carefully numbured if we expect the Burmase to play an active role in fostering regional stability.
 - i. (U) Economic Impact
 - (1) [6]
 - (2) (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:
 - (U) 10+ years for economic development to materialize to be considered capable of supporting military
 - (U) Military is anti-insurgent/drug trafficking oriented
 - (U) Non-alignment policy will limit contact with Western technology

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- 8. (U) CANADA
 - a. (U) Current Programs
- (1) (U) The Governments of Canada and the United States have entered into a number of bilateral defense agreements stemming from the Canada-United States Basic Security Plan (BSP). The BSP brings together in one document the entire spectrum of Canada-United States (CANUS) regional defense at the national level. It establishes the general approach, command and responsibility frame-work, and key aspects of operational and operational support coordination essential to effective bilateral defense planning and operations. The BSP is maintained in consonance with national and allied defense plans that affect one or both countries.
- - b. (S/MOTOKIN) Current Capabilities/Limitations:

- c. (C/MOPORN) Political Situation:
- (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions: No specific recommendations are in order.



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- e. (U) Forces/Equipment Required: None.
- f. (S/NOFORN) Actions Required:

9. LCY Economic Impact:

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- 9. (U) PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
 - a. (S/NOPOKIN) Current Programs:
 - b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (C/NOFORM)
 - (2) (8)
 - (3)

- (4) (8)
- (5) (84
- (6) (8)



- c. (U) <u>Political Situation</u>
 - (1) (2)
 - (2)

(3) (%

- d. (U) Objectives and Recommended Roles/Missions
 - (1) (S/110FORN)

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oriented on Chi

- (2) Soviet planning

- (2) political, econ

- (2) wherever possib

- (2) expansionism/ag

- (d

(2) (S/NOFORK)

(3) (SAME OF MA)

(4) (S/NOPORN)

e. 🖋

f. (S/HOFORN)

- g. (U) <u>U. S. Benefits</u>: The most immediate benefit to be gained from a closer security relationship with China is the increased probability of parallel strategic actions on the part of the Chinese. By laying a sound basis within the relationship, future interactions will likely be more lasting. Additional U. S. benefits which can be achieved include the PRC's support for regional stability, a decrease in the likelihood of undesirable PRC unilateral actions in the region, and an increased risk to the Soviets and Vietnamese for aggressive
- h. (U) Chinese Benefits: By developing closer ties to the U.S., China increases the prospect of U.S. technological assistance for its modernization goals and for reducing the qualitative gap between the PLA and opposing Soviet forces on its border. Concomitantly, a comprehensive link with the U.S. bolsters Chinese access to Western technology in general. Mature, fully productive exhanges with the U.S. on defense and sucurity issues promotes Chinese appreciation of the Western strategy for East-West problems and gives Chinese views a greater audience.

i. Let U. S. Costs:

j. (U) Economic Impact

(1) (8)



- (2) (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:
 - (U) Defense industry is generally underused
 - (U) Requires selective technology from abroad to accelerate economic modernization

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(2) (S, NF)

(3) (U) It should be recognized that skilled Korean expatriate labor forces play an important role in development of improved security facilities throughout the region.

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d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions

(1) (9/NF)

e. (U) Implications

(1) (U) To suggest that the ROK have a role in the global strategy beyond the Korean peninsula requires study and a highlevel USG decision before making any overtures to the ROKG. On the other hand, improvement of ROK forces for defense of ROK is

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10. (U) <u>FIJI</u>

a. 191 Current Programs:

- (2

- (2)

- U

b. (2)

c. / Political Situation:

d. (S/NOFORK) Recommended New Roles and Missions:

e. (U) Force/Equipment/Action Required - None

f. (U) <u>U. S. Benefits</u> - Maintenance of <u>status quo</u> assures a nation friendly to the <u>U. S. and ANZUS</u> will be in position to aid in forming pro-Western opinion and to provide necessary leadership.

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g. (U) <u>Fiji Benefits</u>: Maintenance of <u>status quo</u> supports expanding U. S. trade relations.

h. 127 U. S. Costs:

i. Let Economic Impact:

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- 11. (U) FRANCE
 - a. (SANGEGRAT) Current Programs:

b. Let Current Capabilities and Limitations in PACOM Area:

c. ** Political Situation:

d. (Stycense) Recommended Roles and Missions:

e. (S/NOPORN) Requirements/Benefits/Costs:

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12. (U) INDIA

a. Current Program:

(CX Current Capabilities and Limitations:

- (U) Political Situation
 - (1) (5)

(2) (8)

(SINGERN) Recommended Roles and Missions:

e. (S/NOFORN) Forces/Equipment/Action Required:

f. LEY

g. (U) Economic Impact

(1) (2)

(2) (2)


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
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- 13. (U) INDIAN OCEAN ISLAND STATES
 - a. (U) <u>Current Programs</u>
 - (1) (SZNOPORN)

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(2) (2)

(1) (8)

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d.

e. (U) <u>Benefits/Costs/Economic Impact</u>: The Indian Ocean Island States are not politically, economically or militarily sound enough to actively support the Multinational Strategy. None of the nations can be considered prosperous. Several are numbered among the world's poorest countries and depend heavily on contributions to support their economies. The Soviet Union has been unable to meet regional economic needs. Continuing economic support by the United States and other western countries and improving military-to-military relations will enhance the U. S. position and our ability to gain access to ports and airfields when required. Country benefits include internal stability and the potential for increased foreign exchange. U. S. costs remain minimal.

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




14. (U) INDONESIA

a. (U) Current Programs

- (1) (U) The U. S. currently sells arms and equipment to Indonesia under both FMS and commercial sales. Training is provided under both FMS and a substantial IMET program. Deliveries continue under a residual military assistance program.
- (2) (U) Indonesia and the U. S. concluded an agreement in 1982 which provides for Defense Technological/Industrial Cooperation (DIC). In early 1984 the Government of Indonesia (GOI) began to explore the possibilities for cooperation with the U. S. in those defense commodity areas where the potential for co-production or technology transfer existed. Efforts in this regard continue particularly with respect to upgrading the capability of the national shipbuilding and aerospace industry. The goal in both cases is eventual independent production of naval surface vessels and aircraft needed to satisfy defense requirements for Indonesia. To date no specific DIC programs have been established, however the future looks brighter in this regard.



b. (U) Capabilities and Limitations

(1) (U) Indonesian Armed Forces have a dual function: National defense/security, and nation-building/political economic development. Pursuit of the civil functions tends to impair military readiness. Indonesian Armed Forces are primarily oriented towards internal security, though there has been a major effort in recent years to build an improved conventional defense and surveillance capability for the Navy and Air Force. Starting in late 1984 and continuing into 1985, Indonesian Armed Forces have undergone a major restructuring program aimed at eliminating unnecessary headquarters and consolidating operational units under the direct control of the armed forces commander. There is some discontent among senior officers at the upheaval generated by the reogranization, but ABRI headquarters is well in control of the situation. Although some of the changes appear to be more cosmetic than substantive, the net result of the reorganization - especially when combined with the effects of the military leadership changes - should significantly improve Indonesia's military capabilities.

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(3)

(4) (8)

(5) (5)

c. (U) Political Situation


- (1) (U) President Soeharto has led Indonesia since 1966. He has proven quite effective in promoting economic development and political stability. However, problems of population pressure and uneven economic development continue to impede progress.
- (2) (U) The most important single element in Soeharto's base of support is the armed forces. Although Indonesia does not have a military government, military officers are involved in government (as legislators, governors, regents, etc.) at every level in consonance with the doctrine of the Armed Forces' dual function.
- (3) (U) A main thrust of Indonesia's stated foreign policy is to support ASEAN, in which the GOI sees itself as the main power. The GOI values its status as a nonaligned state. At the same time, however, many of its larger interests, especially in terms of trade and development, are closely linked with those of the West. Similarly, Indonesia tacitly welcomes the role U. S. forces and bases in the Philippines play in maintaining a regional balance of power. While recognizing potential threats from the SRV and the USSR, The GOI sees the PRC as the main long-term threat to the region and has expressed its concern over increasingly close U. S.-PRC ties. This notwithstanding, relations with the U. S. have improved steadily during the present administration.
- (4) (U) In contemplating any change in its foreign policy, GOI must consider internal political factors. The population consists of many ethnic groups, some of the have exhibited separatist tendencies. There is some tension between the fundamentalist-Muslim minority and the nominal Muslim/non-Muslim majority as well as between small uncoordinated groups of Islamic fundamentalists and the government whose secular policies largely reflect the wishes of the nominal Muslim/non-Muslim majority. Although some fundamentalists may have an anti-western bias because of the Arab-Israeli conflict, their concerns primarily relate to domestic politics and the importance of Islam, rather than to international issues. However, widespread antipathy toward Indonesians of ethnic Chinese descent, as well as fear of Chinese-directed subversion, complicates any move toward a more normal relationship with the PRC.

d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions

(1) (S/HOFORN)

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h. (U) <u>Indonesian Benefits</u>: By actually assuming the recommended roles Indonesia will greatly increase its ability to exercise sovereignty in its archipelago, and will have a much improved ability to respond to internal threats.




- (2) (U) Principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:
 - (U) Large manpower base
 - (U) Needs Western techology to stimulate economy
 - (U) Potential to become an economic power in the region
 - (U) Strong military support to the government

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15. (U) JAPAN


a. (U) Current Programs

- (1) (U) The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (MST) (1960) is the cornerstone of U. S.-Japan security relations. The large contingent of U. S. forces in-country, led by Commander, U. S. Forces Japan (COMUSJAPAN), is a major element of the U. S. forward deployment strategy.
- MST support an ongoing security dialogue. These mechanisms are summarized in Appendix III. In addition to the security consultative fora, several other formal and informal programs have been established. Annual ministerial meetings of SECSTATE and SECDEF with their Japanese counterparts provide the opportunity to exchange views and promote new bilateral initiatives. The Systems and Technology Forum seeks to facilitate the transfer of military-related high technology information and foster more efficient weapons procurement. Numerous DOD-Japan Defense Agency (JDA) exchange programs are also in effect at the service and joint staff levels to promote mutual understanding of both countries' intelligence and operational systems and procedures.

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
exercises and training have greatly expanded in scope and scale. Japan Maritime Sell before participation in a multinational naval exercise, albeit under the rationale of interacting with U. S. forces only, is now officially sanctioned, as is Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) biannual participation with U. S. Army Japan (USARJ) in the command post exercise YAMA SAKURA held in Hawaii and Japan.

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(6) (U) In the security assistance area, an extensive array of the three terms exists to provide Japan with the latest in modern weapons systems ugh Foreign Military Sales (FMS), licensed production, and coproduction military. Under a reciprocal training agreement Japan is able to purchase tary training at U. S. schools under the same favorable terms extended to health Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. GOJ is only now that the same to work on such an agreement.

b. (U) Current Capabilities And Limitations



(3) (U) The current policy of limiting defense expenditures to 1% of mational product (GNP) restricts efforts to accomplish the necessary parameter Self-Defense Force modernization and enhancement programs. (When all the figure is 1.6%). Building a political sensitivities to change this policy has been slow due to historical sensitivities. The even more difficult. U. S. policy has been to urge adequate funding for the even more difficult. U. S. policy has been to urge adequate funding for the even more difficult. U. S. policy has been to urge adequate funding for the tive Year Plan which allows Japan to fulfill her roles and missions, the the than take issue with an arbitrary percentage of GNP.

c. (U) Political Situation

- (1) (U) The GGJ has proven to be extremely stable. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has remained in power since 1955.
- (2) (U) The war-renouncing clause of Japan's constitution has precluded the planning for security responsibilities outside Japan. Article IX has been legally interpreted to permit the formation and maintenance of Self Defense Forces solely for the immediate defense of Japan, but to prohibit military participation in collective security arrangements other than the MST, or the projection of power overseas. Furthermore, defense cooperation with the U.S. under the MST is restricted to defense of the territories under the administration of Japan.
- (3) [2]
 - (4) (U) A second political problem is the apprehension of other Asian countries to a greatly expanded Japanese military role outside the immediate area of Japan. Unpleasant memories of Japanese occupation prior to and during World War II remain strong. These concerns must be allayed in order to gain support for a stronger Japanese military role in the Far East. In that same vein, centuries of arimisity and distrust between the Japanese and Koreans is likely to impede progress towards their military cooperation regardless of constitutional interpretations.
 - (5) (U) A third political problem is Japan's "nuclear allergy," reflecting the Japanese experience in World War II. The most significant manifestation of this "allergy" is popular opposition to port calls by nuclear powered/capable USN ships. Organized opposition comes primarily from the Japan Socialist Party, the Japan Communist Party, leftist oriented labor unions, and ultra-leftist radical groups. The GOJ, while accommodating anti-nuclear sentiments, is not expected to change port access procedures or policy based on the three non-nuclear principles of non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction.
 - d. (S/NOFURN) Recommended New Roles And Missions:
 - e. (U) Required Equipment/Actions
 - (1) (S-NOFURN)

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TABLE 15-1.



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
(3) (S/HOFURN)

(4) (5)

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e. (U) Implications



(4) (U) Determination of the necessary JSDF force levels to perform the required missions is fundamental. The bilateral planning process is the appropriate forum in which to refine specific requirements determined by independent U. S. and JDA analytical studies.



(7) (U) Consideration of tapping Japan's tremendous shipbuilding capacity is fraught with political pitfalls. The impact of such a program on the U. S. shipbuilding industry will require extensive analysis. We can anticipate significant Congressional and labor opposition.

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(8) (S≠NOFORN)

f. (G/NOPURN)

g. (U) Economic Impact

(1) (G/NOFORM; Japan's economy is the second largest in the free world with a 1985 GNP of over \$1.5 trillion.

(2) (G/NOFORM)

(3) (C/NOFORN) The major external economic factor which affects Japan is its dependency on foreign supplies of raw materials/natural resources and on foreign markets.

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- h. (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:
 - (U) Large, diverse, well-developed and technologically advanced economy
 - (U) Lessening of reliance on foreign sources for raw materials and markets as economic base switches from heavy industry to information systems
 - (U) Internal political constraints on the growth of the military

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16. (U) KOREA

a. (U) Current Programs


(1) (U) A Mutual Security Treaty links U. S. and the ROK. There is a large U. S. in-country force led by Commander, U. S. Forces Korea. He also commands the binational Combined Forces Command which coordinates military activities for the combined/integrated defense of ROK. Additionally, the senior U. S. military officer in Korea serves as CINCUNC and as such is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Armistice. Assigned U. S. Forces effectively supplement Korea's on-going and successful effort to deter aggression. Consequently, extensive bilateral planning efforts continue to expand. Numerous in-country means exist to sustain bilateral dialogue. The principal fora are summarized in Appendix III. The annual Security Consultative Meeting, which SECDEF normally cochairs, capstones the security dialogue. There is a vast array of programs to enhance ROK and U. S. military capabilities, strengthen interpoperability and foster regional stability. Behind these programs lie years of close military cooperation and helpful ROK support of U. S. Forces in Korea.


(2) (2) The ROKG's continuing effort to deter North Korean aggression has contributed greatly to our objective of preserving stability in Northeast Asia.

(3) 48)

b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations

(1) (S/NOFORN)





e. (S/NOFORM) Forces/Equipment Required: 7

1. (U) Actions Required: We must continue dialogue with the ROKG and its military services to ensure a common understanding of prevailing requirements. ROK regional role has a significant impact on our overall strategy. There is a close connection between Kored and Japan which inextricably links the defense of these two nations to our global strategy. Loss of access, to or outright support of either country will endanger the security of the other and greatly frustrate our forward defense in the Pacific. Straits exiting the Sea of Japan, located within easy range of bases in both countries, could contain the Soviet Pacific Fleet and prevent resupply and recovery of forces already deployed. Moreover, our firm position on the Sea of Japan littoral seriously complicates any Soviet power projection and/or resupply plans in the Southwest Pacific or Indian Ocean. The viability of our alliance with the ROK will prevent the uncovering of Japan and raise the chances that both Japan and Korea will remain active allies. We need to assure continued use of these bases and make full use of their defensive capabilities along with our forward basing there to maximize the effectiveness of our deployed forces. We must also take advantage of war reserves already positioned in Korea and Japan. Cooperation of these two nations, along with our forces, provide much greater flexibility and mutual support in a war with the Soviet Union.

g. (U) Economic Impact

(1) (U) The Korean economy relies heavily on trade and is penetrating an increasing number of world markets. Korea has proven fully capable of servicing its heavy external debt, while maintaining an excellent credit rating. The ROK is seeking to expand economic ties including Communist bloc countries. Trade and technology transfer negotiations continue with Japan and other countries. Growth and development in heavy industries depend in part, on the continued recovery of the world economy. There is strong government promotion of the computer, military hardware, and telecommunications industries, especially in fiber-optics, microcircuitry, and aviation. A large portion of military production is for export, but the ROK remains dependent on the U.S., especially for state-of-the-art weaponry. Seoul hopes to achieve a modicum of self-sufficiency by the end of the decade.

(2) (U) Problems include:

- (U) Strong government control over the economy restricts its ability to respond in a timely manner to market forces
- (U) Rapid expansion of heavy industry causes a paucity of supporting industries
- (U) Heavy industry has been characterized by a low level of production technology and high operating costs



- (U) Trading partners are erecting protectionist barriers
- (U) South Korea imports large quantities of unprocessed food, most of their oil, industrial raw materials, cooking coal, and advanced technology
- (3) (U) The economy at the present time cannot meet fully the requirements of the PACOM Multinational Strategy. As the industrial base continues to expand and technological skills permit indigenous manufacture and repair of sophisticated weapons systems and naval forces, South Korea should be able to meet those requirements.

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
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- 17. (U) MALAYSIA
 - (U) Current Programs
 - (1) (C)
 - (2) US

- (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (5)

(2)



(4)

(1) (S/NOFORN)

(2) (S.HOFURN)

(U) Recommended Rales and Missions

(3) (8)

- e. (U) Forces/Equipment Required
 (S/Nerurn)
- f. (U) U. S. Benefits
 - (1) (S/NOFORH)
 - (2) (S/HOPERN)
- g. (S/NOFORM) Malaysia Benefits:

- h. Jef U. S. Costs:
- i. (U) Economic Impact
 - (1)



- (2) (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:
 - (U) Steadily developing country
 - (U) Stable government
 - (U) Maritime forces need upgrade

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18. (U) NEPAL

a. (C/NOTORN) Current Programs:

b. (U) Current Capabilities/Limitations

(1) 427

(2) (S)

c. (U) Political Situation

(1) (U) In the U!, the Non-Aligned Movement, and other international forums, Nepal has pursued an independent, neutral and moderating influence. Its concern with Indian economic imperialism is balanced by its friendship with China, but it is scrupulous in its even-handedness.

(2)

d. (S/NOFORN) Recommended Roles and Missions:

e. (S/NOFORN) Forces/Equipment/Actions Required:

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- 19. (U) NEW ZEALAND
 - a. (U) <u>Current Programs</u>



b. (8) Current Capabilities and Limitations: New Zealand military forces are very small and limited in their capabilities but, when joined in concert with allies, do contribute to demonstrating Western cohesion.

c. Political Situation: The current Labour Government of New Zealand has banned nuclear armed aircraft and nuclear powered/armed ship visits to its airfields, ports and territorial waters.

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- d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions
 - (1) (S/HOFURN)

- (2) (U) Continued active participation in FPDA should be encouraged.
- e. (C/NOFORM) Additional Forces/Equipment Required:
- f. (CANOFORN) Actions Required:
- g. (S/NOFORN) U. S. Benefits:

- h. (U) New Zealand Benefits: Cooperation in the Multinational Strategy could enhance New Zealand's regional role but such cooperation is not likely until NZ changes its port access policy.
 - i. 10 U. S. Cost:
 - j. (Economic Impact
 - (1) (GENEFORN)

- (2) (U) The principal economic aspect affecting this strategy is:
 - (U) Agriculturally based economy is severely limited and

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20. (U) OCEANIA

a. Current Programs:

b. Current Capabilities and Limitations:

c. M Political Situation:

d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions

(1) (S/NOTORIA)

(2) 187

e. (S/NOFERR) Actions Required.

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- 21. (U) PAPUA NEW GUINEA
 - a. Current Programs:
 - b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1)

(2)

- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1) (2)

(2) 40)

- d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
 - (1) 12
 - (2) (S/NOTURN)
- e. (U) Forces/Equipment/Action Required: To be capable of controlling its border, PNGDF needs to restructure and possibly expand its forces, and to improve their training, armament and transportation.
 - f. U. S. Benefits:
- g. (U) <u>PNG Benefits</u>: Controlling borders will increase security and stability. Cooperation with the U. S. military will foster U. S. trade relations.
- h. (U) <u>U. S. Costs</u>: Modest, if FMS/Expanded Relations/ Exchange programs and military-to-military contacts are increased to degree necessary to upgrade PNGDF. Small IMET program needs to be increased.
 - i. (U) Economic Impact
- (i) (U) Papua New Guinea is pro-Western and is economically and politically stable enough to support the current programs and recommended roles/missions of the PACOI Multinational Strategy. It is primarily concerned with the internal security and control of the border with Indonesia. The country should continue economic growth for the foreseeable future based on its rich natural resources, and will thus be able to support its limited military capabilities.
 - (2) (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:
 - (U) Pro-Western/economically and politically stable
 - (U) Developing economy based on rich natural resources



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22. (U) PHILIPPINES

a. (U) <u>Current Programs</u>

(1) (5) The U.S. has a Mutual Defense Treaty (MOT) with the Republic of the Philippines (RP). The MDT remains in effect indefinitely or until terminated on one year's notice by either party.

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
(4) (2)

b. Current Country Capabilities and Limitations:


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(2) (U) As previously discussed, a primary internal factor affecting the GOP's ability to modernize and upgrade its armed forces is the economic situation. If the economic situation remains stagnant or worsens, the necessary funding for the military would be difficult to obtain from the GOP. Compounding the problem is poor AFP leadership, graft and corruption in the officer corps and the political patronage system established by Marcos which allowed senior officers, who are quite often unqualified professionally for their position, to remain on active duty beyond their expected retirement dates. The current Administration is attempting to redress this problem.

d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions



(3) (8) Continued active participation of the GOP in ASEAN affairs/activities should be encouraged.



f. (SANGTORN) U. S./Philippine Benefits:

- g. U. S. Costs
 - (1) (8)
 - (2) (6)

- h. (U) Economic Impact
 - (1) (S/NOTORIL)

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- 23. (U) SINGAPORE
 - a. (U) Current Programs
 - (1) (9)

- b. (U) Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1)

(2) (8)

- (3) (8)
- (4) (8)
- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1) (S/HOFURN)

- (2) (S/NOFORK)
- (3) (8)
- d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions
 - (1) (S/NOFURN)

e. (S/NOTERN) Equipment/Forces Required:

- f. (U) Actions Required
 - (1)
 - (2) (SANOFORN)
- g. (SAMO, O.K.) U. S. Benefits:
- h. (U) <u>Singapore Benefits</u>: Economic development and enhanced security are logical outgrowths of these roles.
 - i. (3) (S/HOFORK) U. S. Costs:
 - j. (U) Economic Impact
 - (1) 487
 - (2) (U) Principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:
 - (U) Will continue to expand
 - (U) Economic leader in the region
 - (U) Military capability will expand as economy continues to grow

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- 24. (U) SRI LANKA
 - a. La Current Programs:

b. (SAMPORN) Current Capabilities and Limitations:

- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1) (8)
 - (2) (2)

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e. 4 Force Requirements/Benefits/Costs:

MOPORTY) Recommended Roles and Missions:

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- e. Equipment and Forces Required:
- f. (S/NOLORN) Action Required:
- g. (8)
- h. (U) <u>Taiwan Benefits</u>: Security assistance enables Taiwan to retain a level of military defense comensurate with the prevailing threat.
- i. (U) U. S. Costs: The United States pays a political price for sustaining Taiwan. To the extent that the PRC feels the reunification is unacceptably slowed, this assistance is an obstacle to a more useful, substantive relationship with China.
 - j. (U) Economic Impact
 - (1) (CANOFORK

- (2)
 - (2)
 - (5)

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- 26. (U) Thailand
 - a. (U) Current Programs
 - (1) (S/Nerom)

(2) (C. HOPURE)

- (3)
- (4) (C)

(5) (S/NOPOKIN)




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(6) (U) Thai Officers are regularly invited to and attend seminars and conferences, such as the Pacific Armies Management Seminar, and reciprocal high level/staff visits are conducted.

b. Capabilities and Limitations

- (1) (U) The overall military capability of Thailand continues to increase for three major reasons:
 - (U) Qualitative and quantitative improvement in weapons systems and equipment
 - (U) Increasing professionalism and technical proficiency of members of the armed forces
 - (U) General economic growth in national resources, productivity and technology



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(5) (U) The Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) is a relatively small force of less than one division, with responsibility for security along the southern Thai/Cambodian border. The RTMC rotates its nine infantry battalions by committing eight of them to border operations while the ninth conducts field and garrison training. As a result, the RTMC has a limited ability to conduct major offensive operations such as amphibious assaults and sustained land combat. Recent changes that include purchasing equipment, implementing new training programs, and restructuring the organization, have increased the RTMC's capability to conduct defensive operations.

c. (C) Political Situation

(1)

(a) 181


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(b) (b)

(2) (U) The Thai absolute monarchy gave way to a constitutional monarchy in 1932. Since then, there have been numerous changes in government, many by military coup d'etat. The current constitution was promulgated in 1978. Despite these frequent changes, the society is fundamentally stable. Although governments have changed frequently, basic institutions have not been altered, and the general thrust of relations with the U. S. has changed little, except for a brief period in 1975-77. U. S.-Thai relations are excellent and are expected to remain so.






d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions

(

(1) (U) Thailand, as the frontline state for ASEAN, is facing Soviet-supported Vietnamese expansionism as well as a lingering insurgency problem. It has defined its own primary roles and missions in terms of, strengthening its forces to cope with the primary Vietnamese threat. However, it cannot rely on military means alone. Along with its ASEAN partners, it has formulated an integrated political, diplomatic and economic strategy, of which support for the Khmer resistance is a part, to compel the Vietnamese to negotiate the future of Cambodia. While avoiding direct involvement, the U. S. has supported the ASEAN strategy, including the provision of military security assistance to Thailand. For example, in the U. N. and other international fora, we have supported the Thai/ASEAN position that settlement of the Cambodian issue must come through negotiation and Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia. In security assistance we are supporting Thai force modernization, expansion and sustainment programs to create an RTARF capable of deterring aggression and of successful defense, if necessary.



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- f. (SANOFORN)

g. (U) Thai Benefits: The Thai view their security as enhanced by: a), improved military capabilities; and b) a continued security association with the United States which bodes well for overall regional stability.

h. Ju. S. Costs:



- i. (U) Economic Impact
 - (1) 18/

- (2) (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:
 - (U) Growing economic power
 - (U) Influential member of ASEAN
 - (U) Strong military
 - (U) Diversified programming for the future

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27. (U) TONGA

- a. Current Programs:
- b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (8)
 - (2) (8)
 - (3) (8)
- c. (P) Political Situation: The Kingdom of Tonga, a British protectorate since 1930, became an independent member of the British Commonwealth on 4 June 1970. It is the second oldest independent island state in the South Pacific.


- d. Recommended Roles and Missions:
- e. (U) Force/Equipment/Action Required: None
- f. (U) <u>U. S. Benefits</u> Maintenance of <u>status quo</u> assures a nation friendly to the U. S. and ANZUS which is in a position to aid in forming pro-Western opinion and to provide necessary leadership in maintaining <u>status quo</u>.
 - g. (U) Country Benefits N/A
- h. (U) U. S. Costs Minimal, if modest IMET/expanded relations exchange programs and military-to-military contacts are maintained at current levels.

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28. (U) UNITED KINGDOM

a. (U) Current Programs



c. (U) Political Situation

- (1) (U) The United Kingdom is a signatory to the Five Power Defense Arrangement linking it to the security of Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand.
- (2) (U) The United Kingdom is also a signatory to the Manila Pact which encompasses security obligations among Thailand, the Philippines, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.
- (3) (U) In accordance with significant changes in British defense policy, however, British overseas bases east of Suez have been disestablished and most forces withdrawn. This significantly reduces the United Kingdom's ability to meet any FPDA or Manila Pact defense obligations and limits its ability to interoperate with U. S. forces in the PACOM. Britain also faces severe economic problems which limit its ability to undertake military training exercises in the Pacific theater.



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d. (CANSPORT) Recommended New Roles and Missions:

- e. Forces/Equipment/Actions Required:
- f. W. S. Benefits:
- g. UK Benefits:

h. U. S. Costs:

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APPENDIX I

SPACE OPERATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (U)

(S/NOFORN) Space Operations:

2. (U) <u>Technology Transfer</u>

- - (1) (U) The effect on OPLAN's, CONPLAN's, and general Campaign Plans.
- (2) (U) The ability of the nation to pay for initial procurement, maintenance, and sustainment.
- (3) (U) The capability to absorb, use, and maintain the equipment/technology, and to maintain an overall balanced defense improvement program.
- (4) (U) The effect acquisition of advanced systems will have on regional stability.
- (5) (U) The commitment of the recipient nation to protect the system from overt or covert transfer to third nations.
- (6) (U) The impact on U. S. force readiness, sustainability, and interoperability.
- (7) (U) The degree to which a transfer enhances or distracts from system Rationalization/Standardization/Interoperability.



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APPENDIX II

EXTRACTS FROM THE FY 1986-1990 DEFENSE GUIDANCE, 2 MARCH 1984

World Environment

Changing Character of Soviet Military Capabilities

(U) Over the past decade, the Soviets have been better equipping themselves not only to conduct military operations against NATO, but also to carry out projection of power and influence beyond the Eurasian land mass. They are pursuing a broad strategy—involving economic aid, advisors, military assistance, disinformation, propaganda offensives, subversion, and use of proxy forces—to increase their political influence, obtain base and facility use, and support and enhance worldwide Soviet military operations. Soviet capabilities to project power into crisis areas at substantial distances from Soviet borders will continue to grow.

Emerging Strategic Problems

(S/NOTGNR)

National Security Objectives

(U) Limit Soviet military advantages by strengthening U.S. and allied military capabilities, by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, and by preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies and resources to the Soviet Union.

Defense Policy


(U) A component of the world wide military posture the U.S. seeks to achieve and maintain: In conjunction with our Allies, the ability to generate land, air and maritime forces so as to make aggression highly uncertain and costly; continued forward deployed forces in NATO Europe, Western Pacific and SWA/Indian Ocean; rapidly projectable central reserves; intelligence capabilities adequate to prevent surprise; a responsive industrial and mobilization base; and exploitation of superior technology for military use.

CLASSIFIED DE: MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFI ON: OADR

Conventional Forces Special Operations Forces

Mobilization

(U) The primary DOD plan is the Master Mobilization Plan which must identify mobilization responsibilities and include a range of actions for implementation prior to a declaration of war or national emergency, for the different levels of mobilization, and for the resources necessary to sustain the forces. Planning must include other federal departments and agencies, as well as Host Nation Support, to ensure the availability of resources and support beyond the ability of DOD to provide. We should foster similar preparations by our allies.




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Security Assistance

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- (U) Seek Congressional authorization and appropriation of adequate levels of grant and concessional security assistance funding, as well as the availability of these funds on a multi-year basis, and removal of restrictions impeding our assistance to key regional partners in collective security programs.
- (U) Expand the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and seek reform of cost formulas for Foreign Military Sales training.
- (e) - (e)
- (U) Cooperate with our allies and friends in defense acquisition to improve military effectiveness and to provide equitable economic opportunities for all participants.
 - (0.4)





- (U) Maintain a strong security relationship with the Philippines and Thailand in the context of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and Philippines and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact).



Energy and Critical Materials Security

(U) The U.S., and more particularly our Allies', dependence on oil imports presents a potentially serious security and economic risk because of the major impact of an extended or large-scale interruption. We must develop plans and provisions for reducing the risk of, and vulnerabilities to, major oil supply disruptions.



SERVE

(U) The dependence of our allies on the Soviet Union as a major supplier of natural gas is also of significant concern. In addition, the Soviet's hard currency earnings derived from energy sales adversely affect our security interests. The DOD will actively support U.S. policy of encouraging development of secure Western energy resources.



Freedoming the Seas and Transit Rights

(U) We must protect our rights and freedoms of navigation overflight, and contain unilateral coastal and archipelagic claims and encroachment which impinge upon those rights and freedoms. the national program for asserting navigation and overflight rights in the face of excessive maritime claims must be vigorously pursued. We must also recognize that there is an economic and strategic interest in preserving access rights to minerals of the deep seabed.





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PRINCIPAL
111:
APPENDIX

United States Members or Participants Host Country Purpose Forum Country

U) Japan

U. S. Ambassador to Japan, Commander of the U. S. Pacific commander of U.S. Forces in Japan, Command (proxy: and others)

Minister of Foreign Affairs Director General of the Defense Agency, and oth to the strengthening of in the area of security are related to security Japanese and US govern-Study of matters which cooperative relations basis of security and would promote understanding between the ments and contribute and which forms the Consultative Committee Security

ally in Hawaii between working-level officials of the two governments such as officials correspond-Participants not specified (meetings held annuing in rank to vice minister or undersecretary

Exchange of view on

security issues of common concern to

Subcommittee

Security

U) Japan

Japan and the U. S.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General of Defense Director General of North American Affairs Bureau, Facilities Administration Igency, and others

tation of Status of

Forces Agreement

cerning implemen-Consultation con-

Japan-U. S.

U) Japan

Committee

Joint

Chief of Staff of U. S. Forces, Japan, U. S. Embassy, and Counsellor at the others

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FNDIX III: PRINCIPAL SECURITY/DEFENSE FORA IN USPACOM (U) (cont.)

Forum

intry

intry	Forum	Purpose	Members or Participants	oants
			Host Country	United States
Republic of Korea	Security Consultative Meeting (SCM)	Consult on defense and security matters	MND, CJCS, Ambass ador	SECDEF, ASD/ISA, CJCS Ambassador, CINCPAC, COMUSK
Australia- New Zealand	ANZUS Council	Discuss topics of mutual interest	Ministers of Foreign Affairs	SECSTATE, CINCPAC
Philippines	Mutual Defense Board (MDB	Consultations on military matters of mutual concern. (Four	CofS, NAFP	CINCPAC (normally by CINCPACREP Phil)
		standing committees meet monthly: Plans, Metes & Bounds, Intel, Legal)		



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USPACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY, 1986

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
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PACIFIC COMMAND

MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (1)



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


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY

1. (U) GENERAL



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c. (U) PACOM Objectives

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
- d. Relationship to US Forces Needs:
- e. (U) Project Analysis
 - (1) (C/NF) Contribution Potential:

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
- f. (U) Methodology. Assessments of potential allied and friendly PACOM contributions were developed from qualitative evaluations of individual country orientations and relationships with the United States, current and projected military capabilities and deficiencies, JCS/OSD guidance, force availability assumptions in US contingency plans, existing security arrangements, geostrategic position, and economic strength.
- g. (U) Space Operations and Release of Advanced Weapon Systems to PACOM Area Nations
 - (1) (U) Space Operations
- (a) (a)
 - (2) (U) Release of Advanced Weapon Systems to PACOM Area Nations
- (a) (8)

2. (U) COUNTRY ANALYSIS

a. (U) The following pages summarize the bilateral strategy for each country in the PACOM area and identify potential roles and missions that offer mutual benefits for the US, US allies, and other friendly nations.




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
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
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
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PACIFIC COMMAND MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY

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	to PACOM Strategic Concept and
	PACOM Operational Concept
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	APPENDICES
	I. Extracts from the FY 1985-1989 Defense Guidance
	Defense Guidance

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1. (U) GENERAL

a. (U) <u>Classification</u>. Unless stated otherwise on individual pages, this entire document is SECRET, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

b. (U) Purpose

(1) (U) The PACOM Multinational Strategy is a planning guideline to promote and integrate the active and potential contributions of nations in the PACOM Area of Responsibility to US security objectives. It is consistent with policy guidance promulgated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and fulfills taskings given by the JCS to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific. Its purpose is to determine how each country in the PACOM area (as well as China and Western allies with forces/defense commitments in the area) could best support US security objectives and strengthen our combined capabilities, if it were willing and able to do so. It seeks to expand to the extent possible those military roles and missions of other nations which can complement US objectives and actions. However, it is recognized that political sensitivities are such that for some countries the most we can realistically expect is indirect support.

(2) (3)

- c. (U) Scope
 - (1) (**k**)

- d. (U) Basic Premises
 - (1)

(2) (U) Other countries obviously perceive their defense requirements differently than the US does. Their forces are

designed to accomplish the missions their governments perceive to be most important. Efforts to bring about fundamental changes in the policies or forces of the nations may often times not be feasible. Recommendations made in this study are directed toward realistic improvements to accomplish mutually beneficial roles and missions.

- (3)
 - e. (U) Relevant Guidance
 - (1) (1) (E)

(2) (5 NF)

- (3) (U) For reader convenience, detailed extracts from the FY 85-89 DG are in Appendix I.
 - f. (U) PACOM Objectives
 - (1)

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
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(3) (U) Conclusions regarding bilateral strategy and the direction of US-Allied/friendly improvements for accomplishing mutually beneficial roles and missions are covered in Chapters 3 thru 24.

g. (U) Relationship of the Multinational Strategy to US Force Needs



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
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h. (U) Relationship of the Multinational Strategy to the PACOM Strategic Concept and the PACOM Operational Concept

(2).

i. (U) The Elements of the Multinational Strategy

(1) (2)



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- 2. (U) PROJECT ANALYSIS
 - a. (U) Contribution Potential
 - (1) (S NF)


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(4) (U) Countries placed in the center area of the chart in figure 2-1 are classified as having moderate potential to contribute. Their moderate contribution capabilities are matched by a moderate propensity for defense cooperation. The capabilities of these countries are accompanied by significant political inhibitions.



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(7) S/AF)

(8) (U) There is no need to establish a bipolar context in order to address the potential contributions of various countries. The categorization above allows examination of potential contributions while considering political conditions. The diversity of alignments is recognized and taken into account. Some countries' contributions are potentially significant; others are modest. In some cases, a full-open strategic dialogue is suggested. In others, unilateral US plans are the best we can achieve.


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b. (U) Methodology. Assessments of potential allied and friendly PACOM contributions were developed from qualitative evaluations of individual country orientations and relationships with the United States, current and projected military capabilities and deficiencies, JCS/OSD guidance, force availability assumptions in US contingency plans, existing security arrangements, geostrategic position, and economic strength.

3. (U) JAPAN

a. (U) Current Programs


- (1) (U) The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (MST) is the cornerstone of U.S. Japan security relations. The large contingent of U.S. forces in-country, led by Commander, U.S. Forces Japan (COMUSJAPAN), is an integral part of the U.S. forward deployment strategy.
- (2) (U) Several formal consultative mechanisms established under the MST support an ongoing security dialogue. These mechanisms are summarized at Table 3-1. In addition to the security consultative fora, several other formal and informal programs have been established. Annual ministerial meetings of SECSTATE and SECDEF with their Japanese counterparts provide the opportunity to exchange views and promote new bilateral initiatives. The Systems and Technology Forum seeks to facilitate the transfer of military-related high technology information and foster more efficient weapons procurement. Numerous DOD-Japan Defense Agency (JDA) exchange programs are also in effect at the service and joint staff levels to promote mutual understanding of both countries' intelligence and operational systems and procedures.
- (3) (3)



(6) (U) In the security assistance area, an extensive array of programs exists to provide Japan with the latest in modern weapons systems through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), licensed production, and coproduction agreements. Japan now is able to purchase military training at U.S. schools under the

same favorable terms extended to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries.

b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations



(3) (U) The current policy of limiting defense expenditures to less than 1% of gross national product (GNP)

restricts efforts to accomplish the necessary Japanese SelfDefense Force modernization and enhancement programs. Building a political consensus to change this policy will not be easy, due to historical factors. Current economic considerations causing Government of Japan (GOJ) budgetary constraints will make the task even more difficult.

c. (U) Political Situation

- (1) (U) The GOJ has proven to be extremely stable as evidenced by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) remaining in power since 1955. Despite this fact and the close association with the U.S. under the MST, significant portions of the political and public elements in Japan would vigorously oppose participation in a military coalition involving countries other than the U.S.
- (2) (U) The war-renouncing clause of Japan's constitution provides the foundation for that opposition. Article IX has been legally interpreted to permit the formation and maintenance of Self Defense Forces solely for the immediate defense of Japan, but to prohibit military participation in collective security arrangements other than the MST, or the projection of power overseas. Furthermore, defense cooperation with the U.S. under the MST is restricted to defense of the territories under the administration of Japan.

- (4) (U) A second political problem would be the negative reaction by other Asian countries to a greatly expanded Japanese military role outside the immediate area of Japan. Unpleasant memories of Japanese occupation prior to and during WWII remain strong. These concerns would have to be allayed in order to gain support for a stonger Japanese military role in the Far East. In that same vein, centuries of animosity and distrust between the Japanese and Koreans will impede progress towards active regional military cooperation regardless of constitutional interpretations.
 - d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
- (1) (9/NF)

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
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
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e. (U) <u>Implications</u>



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


(7) (U) Consideration of tapping Japan's tremendous shipbuilding capacity is fraught with political pitfalls. The impact of such a program on the U.S. shipbuilding industry will require extensive analysis. Significant congressional and labor opposition could be expected.

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(8) (U) Every effort must be made to maintain and improve military-to-military relations, with the Japan Self Defense Forces. We need to stay in touch with the military leadership, particularly the generation that will be the service leadership of the 1990's and should improve contacts with the Ground Defense Force. We should pursue expanded participation of U.S. and Japanese officers in our respective senior training schools and war colleges. At this time all available training slots are being utilized and quota limitations exist for the U.S. schools.




f. (U) Summary. See Table 3-3.

SCPLT RELEASINE TO FO EIGN NATIONALS

4. (U) KOREA

a. (U) Current Programs

(1) (U) A Mutual Security Treaty links our two countries. There is a large US force in-country led by Commander, US Forces Korea. He also commands a bilateral Combined Forces Command which coordinates military activities for the combined/integrated defense of ROK. Additionally, the senior US military officer in Korea serves as CINCUNC and as such is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Armistice. extensive bilateral planning effort is in operation. Numerous in-country means exist to sustain bilateral dialogue. annual Security Consultative Meeting, which SECDEF normally attends, capstones the security dialogue. There is a vast array of programs to enhance ROK and US military capabilities, strengthen interoperability and foster regional stability. Behind these many programs lie years of close military cooperation and helpful ROK support of US Forces in Korea.



SECRAT 4-1
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

(3) (1)

- b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (C.NF)


(2)

- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1)

on-going and their increasing capability for self-defense contributes to strategic regional security.



f. (U) Summary. See Table 4-1.



- 5. (U) PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
 - a. (U) Current Programs
 - (1) (S/NF)

- b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (C/)

(2) (S-NF)


(3).

(4)

NOT RELEASANCE TO FOREIG NATIONALS

c. (U) Political Situation

(1) (U) A common concern for security in the face of the Soviet Union's drive for military superiority is the underpinning of US-PRC security cooperation and provides its political rationale. In this regard, the US views China as an important contributor to the global balance, primarily by occupying Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border, but also by helping to maintain regional stability by dampening DPRK aggressiveness and inhibiting SRV adventurism.



SECONT 5-3
NO RELEASY LE TO F REIGN N TIONALS

SECRET NOT RELEASA LE TO FOR IGN NATIONALS

(3)

d. (U) US Interests and Objectives

(1) (S/2)

SECRET 5-4 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FORE ON NATIONALS

(2) (S ME)

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SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

- e. (U) Action Required
 - (1) (S (F)

f. (U) US Benefits

(1) (U) The most immediate benefit to be gained from a closer security relationship with China is the increased probability of more favorable parallel actions on the part of the Chinese. Additionally, by laying a sound basis within the relationship, future interactions will likely be more lasting.

g. (U) Chinese Benefits

(1) (U) By developing closer ties to the US, China is in a position to receive considerable assistance in achieving its modernization goals by the end of this century. Concomitantly, technological assistance in the area of defense will assist in retarding and possibly reducing the qualitative gap between the PLA and Soviet forces opposing each other along the Sino-Soviet border.

h. (U) US Costs

SECKET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN MATIONALS



i. (U) Summary. See Table 5-1.

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

6. (U) TAIWAN

a. (U) Current Programs

- (1) (U) US security assistance to Taiwan is governed by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) enacted by Congress in April 1979 to provide a mechanism for maintaining substantive relations with the people on Taiwan. The TRA commits the United States to "provide such defense articles and services" needed by Taiwan, as determined by the President and Congress, and reviewed by US military authorities. The People's Republic of China (PRC) Taiwan's principal adversary, exerts considerable political pressure on the United States to limit or curtail US security assistance to Taiwan. On 17 August 1982, the United States and the PRC issued a Joint Communique addressing the issue of US security assistance to Taiwan. Joint Communique states "the United States . . . does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative forms, the level of those supplied in recent years . . . and that it (the US) intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.
- (2) (U) Taiwan purchases arms and services through FMS and commercially. Based on the 17 August 1982 Joint


SECRET
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SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOR IGN NATIONALS

Communique, the total dollar value of Taiwan's purchases, including deliveries and license approvals, will diminish from its present level of approximately \$1.2 billion in FY 84 dollars.

(3) (U) All US military and official representatives were withdrawn from Taiwan in April 1978. US government contractors and civilians working for the US instrument, the American Institute in Taiwan, maintain close ties with the Taiwan Ministry of Defense and its Services. Official military-to-military contact is prohibited.

b. (U) Current Capabilities/Limitations



SECRET NOT RELEASEBLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

c. (U) Political Situation

- (1) (U) Maintaining substantive relations with the PRC and Taiwan simultaneously has been a major political victory, however demanding. Because of the unique sensitivities involved, it is imperative that the United States downplay the "form" of its relations with Taiwan, while continuing to fulfill its substantive commitments as outlined in the TRA. Downplaying "form" will also alleviate PRC political pressures and rhetoric, thereby enhancing Taiwan's security.
 - d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions. Not applicable.
 - e. (U) Action Required
 - (1) 🔏

- f. (U) US Benefits
 - (1) (5)

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

g. (U) Benefits to Taiwan

(1) (U) Whatever form the resolution of the Chinese civil war assumes will largely depend on Taiwan's ability to resist PRC political and military pressure. Taiwan views continuing US support as essential to its political survival. Security assistance enables Taiwan to deal with the PRC from a relatively strong and secure position.

h. (U) US Costs

- (1) (U) The United States pays a high political price for helping sustain Taiwan, particularly vis-a-vis the PRC.
 - i. (U) Summary. See Table 6-1.

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

7. (U) PHILLIPINES

- a. (U) Current Programs
- (1) A Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) exists between our two countries. The MDT remains in effect indefinitely or until terminated on one year's notice by either party. The commitment of the US to the defense of the Philippines is further defined by the letter from Secretary of State Vance to Foreign Minister Romulo of 7 Jan 1979.

SECREMOT RELEASABLE TO FORLIGN NATIONALS

(2)

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(3)


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SECRIT NO RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations

SECRET 7-4 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS SECREMENOT RELEASABLE TO FOREI N NATIONALS



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SECRET 7-5 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS SECRET NOT RELEASABLE O FORETA NA CNALS

- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1)

SECRET
NOT RELEASABLE TO PEREIGN NATIONALS

- (2) (U) As previously discussed, the primary internal political factor affecting the GOP's ability to modernize and upgrade its armed forces is the economic situation. If the economic situation remains stagnant or worsens, the necessary funding for the military would be difficult to obtain.
 - d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions

SECRET 7-7 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOLEIGN NATIONALS

(2) (S/AF)

(3) (U) Continued active participation of the GOP in ASEAN affairs should be encouraged.

e. (U) Implications

(1)

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(2) (S/NF)

(3)

SECRET
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
f. (U) Summary. See Table 7-1.

SECRET NOT RELEASTBLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

- 8. (U) SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF BURMA
 - a. (U) Current Programs
- - (2) (U) There is no question that Burma appreciates the IMET program. Following a twelve year gap, the program was resumed during FY 80. Three officers were trained in FY 80 and six in FY 81. The FY 82 level of funding has allowed twenty six Burmese military students to receive US training.
 - (3) (2)

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

- b. (U) Current Capabilities/Limitations
- (1) (U) Military modernization has long been deferred because of urgent developmental priorities and the expense of sustained military operations against insurgents and drug traffickers.



SECRET
NOT RELEASABLE TO FORDIGN NATIONALS

c. (U) Political Situation

- (1) (U) Beginning in the mid 1970s, after over a decade of doctrinaire single-party socialism and self-imposed isolation, Burma began to look cautiously outward again, to seek aid and ideas from the West, and reopen channels of international cooperation. Although this change has opened important new possibilities for the West in Burma, it has been conducted at a deliberately slow pace. Burma is determined to preserve its political, economic and cultural autonomy at all costs, retain an imposed socialist economic structure, and continue the single, military-dominated party's firm control under the present leadership. Burmese policy and behavior, therefore, remain fundamentally grounded in nonalignment.
- (2) (U) There is concern about Soviet aggressive behavior internationally, but care is taken not to say too much publicly. Concern over China is nearer to the surface, including a fear that the United States may regard the China connection as so important that we will overlook China's

SECRET 8-3 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS SECOLT NO RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN MATIONALS.

continued support for communist insurgents in Southeast Asia.

This Burmese sensitivity should be kept in mind as it could impact significantly on future relations with the US. There is considerable displeasure over China's continuing support of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP).

d. (U) Action Required

(1)

(2)

SECRET 8-4 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS RELEASABLE TO

e. (U) US Benefits


(1) (U) The US maintains a high respect for the Burmese policy of nonalignment and wishes to see Burma's continued progress as an independent and stable nation. US efforts in this regard may well result in a closer US-Burmese relationship and open the way for a more Western tilting Burma.

SECRET 8-5 NOT RELEASIBLE TO FORE ON NATIONALS SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONAL

f. (U) Burmese Benefits

(1) (U) Closer relationships with the US and other Western countries could result in an increased access to advanced technology and development procedures. This knowledge could be employed by the Burmese to exploit their substantial natural resource base and thus improve the individual Burmese quality of life.

g. (U) US Costs




h. (U) Summary. See Table 8-1.

SECRET OT RELEASABLE TO FORTIGN NATIONALS

9. (U) THAILAND

a. (U) Current Programs



SECRET 9-1 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONAL



- (5) (U) US-Thai combined exercises serve to improve Thailand's defense posture through additional exposure to US doctrine and techniques, and fit the pattern of our other exercises with friends and allies in the region.
 - b. (U) Current Capabilities/Limitations
- (1) (U) The overall military capability of Thailand continues to increase for three major reasons:
 - Qualitative and quantitative improvement in weapons systems and equipment.
 - Increasing professionalism and technical proficiency.
 - Continued steady economic growth in resources, productivity and technology.

SECRET 9-2 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NETIONALS

- (2) (U) Despite its improving military capability,

 Thailand is not capable of unilaterally repulsing a determined,

 coordinated attack.
- (3) M
 - (4) (U) The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) is capable of conducting routine peacetime and limited wartime missions. Naval forces suffer from unreliable, older ships and equipment, lack of qualified personnel, shortage of repair facilities and spare parts, limited opportunities for realistic training, and funding constraints.
 - (5) (U) The Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) can conduct offensive air operations against forces of equal size and close air support for current counterinsurgency operations. The capability to conduct sustained all-weather, combat operations is marginal. Limited air-ground coordination, poor resource management procedures, and over-centralization of command and control retard effective employment of air forces.

SECRET 9-3 NOT RELEASABLE TO OREIGN NATIONALS SECULT NO RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

c. (U) Political Situation


- (1) (U) Thailand has been a close ally of the US throughout the post-WWII period and sees the Manila Pact of 1954 as an important element of its national security. Thailand relies on the US as the main source of major weapon purchases and bases the RTARF organization on US models. This commonality and our common interests form the basis for the high degree of US-Thai military cooperation. Additionally, the Thai have a pro-Western orientation and are moving toward a more democratic system.
- (2) (U) Although the Thai government has frequently changed, the country is fundamentally stable without widespread dissidence. US-Thai relations are excellent and expected to remain so.
- (3) (U) An area of major concern to both Thailand and the US is the resolution of the Kampuchean issue. The Thai properly assess the SRV threat as very severe, and they are determined to keep SRV forces deployed in Kampuchea and Laos from occupying Thai territory. In this regard, the Thai have turned to the US for material support, but have no desire to see the return of US military presence in Thailand. The Thai are also acutely aware of the potential long-term threats presented by both the Soviet Union and the PRC.

SECRET 9-4 NO RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN MATIONALS

SECRES NOT KELEASABLE TO FOREIGN ATTIONALS

d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions

(1) (U) Thailand, as a front line state for ASEAN, is facing Soviet-supported Vietnamese expansionism, and has defined its own primary roles and missions in terms of strengthening its forces to cope with the Vietnamese threat. However, it cannot rely on military means alone, and along with its ASEAN partners engages in active diplomatic efforts to impel the Vietnamese to withdraw from Kampuchea. While avoiding direct US military involvement, we have supported the Thai in both military and diplomatic efforts.



e. (U) Action Required

(1) (8/NF)

SECRETOR SELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOR IGN NATIONALS

(2)

SECRET 9-6 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (3)

f. (U) US Benefits

(1) (S/NF)

g. (U) Thai Benefits

(1) (U) The Thai see their security as being enhanced by:
a) improved military capabilities; and b) a continuing security
association with the United States which bodes well for
regional stability.

- h. (U) US Costs
 - (1)

i. (U) Summary. See Table 9-1.

- 10. (U) SINGAPORE
 - a. (U) Current Programs
 - (1)

- b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (2)

SECRET 10-1 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (2)

(3) (6)

(4) (S)

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1) (SA)

(2) (S/11)

(3)

- d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions
 - (1) (S,NF)

SECRET 10-4 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

(2)


- e. (U) Implications
 - (1) (U) Forces Required.
 - (a) (NF)

- (2) (U) US Potential Benefits.
 - (a) (°, NF)

(3) (U) US Costs.

(a) (C) NF)

f. (U) Summary. See Table 10-1.





11. (U) INDONESIA

a. (U) Current Programs

- (1) (U) The US currently sells arms and equipment to Indonesia under both FMS and commercial sales. Training is provided under both FMS and a very substantial IMET program. Funds are still being expended under a residual Military Assistance Program. Indonesia and the United States have recently established a Defense Technological Industrial Cooperation Program in which GOI has been very interested.
- (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) NF)
 - b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (U) The Indonesian armed forces have a dual function: national defense/security and nation-building/political-economic development. Involvement with the civil function does

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tend to impair military readiness. The armed forces are primarily oriented towards internal security although there has been a major effort in recent years to build an improved conventional defense and surveillance capability.


(2) (U) The Army is capable of maintaining internal security (as well as participating in international peacekeeping operations) and, in conjunction with the other services, could repel a minor military incursion; however, it could not repel a large-scale invasion.



SECRIT 11-2 NOT RELEASUBLE TO PEREIGN ATIONALS

c. (U) Political Situation

- (1) (U) Suharto has ruled Indonesia as president since 1966. He has led the country with a quiet effectiveness; however, problems of population pressure and uneven economic developement continue to impede progress.
- (2) (U) The most important single element in Suharto's base of support is the armed forces. Although Indonesia does not have a military government, military officers are involved in government (as legislators, governors, regents, etc) at every level in consonance with the doctrine of the armed forces' dual function.



- (4) (U) In contemplating any change in its foreign policy, GOI must consider the delicate internal political balance. The population consists of many ethnic groups, some of which have exhibited separatist tendencies. There is some tension between the fundamentalist-Muslim minority (30%) and the nominal Muslim majority/non-Muslims. Islamic fundamentalists tend to exhibit an anti-Western bias because of a conflict of values. This is exacerbated by their pro-Arab view of the Middle East conflict.
 - d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions



BLE TO FOLEIGN NATIONALS

mines. Indonesian control of shipping lanes passing through the important straits in the archipelago also requires improved ASW and MCM capability to detect and counter potential chokepoint interdiction by submarines using torpedoes, missiles, or mines.

- e. (U) <u>Implications</u>
 - (1) Forces Required.
- (b) (§ (2) (U) Potential Benefits (a)

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(b) (S/Hr)

(3) (U) Country Benefits.

(a) (c)

SECRET 11-6 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

(4) (U) US Costs.

(a) (S NF)

f. (U) Summary. See Table 11-1.

SECRET 11-7 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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12. (U) MALAYSIA

- a. (U) Current Programs
 - (1)

- b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1)

SECRET 12-1 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONAL

(2)

SECRET 12-2 NOT RELEASABLE TO ESREIGN NATIONALS (3)

(4)

- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1) (S, NF)

(2) (U) Any change GOM would like to make in its traditional foreign policy would have to take into account the delicate internal political balance of ethnic and religious groups. Moreover, existing racial tensions could be exacerbated by the growth of Islamic fundamentalism among Malays. The identification of militant Muslims with the Arab

cause and their somewhat anti-Western bias complicates any move

SECRET 12-4
NOT MLEASABLE O FOREIGN NATIONAL

GOM may wish to make towards the US.

(3)

(4)

(5) (C/NE)

d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions

(1) (S/NF)

(2) (SARE)

(3) 121

- e. (U) Implications
 - (1) (U) Forces Required.


(SANE)

- (2) (U) US Potential Benefits.
 - (a) (S (F)

(b) (c (F)

- (3) (U) Country Benefits.
 - (S ME)

(4) (U) US Costs.



f. (U) Summary. See Table 12-1.

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- 13. (U) OCEANIA AND INDIAN OCEAN ISLAND STATES
 - 13A. (U) OCEANIA
 - a. (U) Current Programs
 - (1)

SECRETONO RELEASAR TO FORE ON NATIONALS

- b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (C)
- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1)

- d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions
 - (1)

SECRET 13-2 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

- e. (U) <u>Implications</u>
 - (1) (9)

f. (U) Summary: See Table 13-1.

- 13B. (U) INDIAN OCEAN ISLAND STATES
- a. (U) Current Programs
 - (1) (S, NF)

- b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) 191

- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1)

SECRET 13-5 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions

(a)

(1)

(b) (91

(e) (g

e. (U) Implications

- (1) (U) Force Required--None.
- (2) (9)

- (3) (U) Country Benefits. Increased foreign exchange, potential for creating jobs, and maintenance of status quo.
- (4) (U) <u>US Costs</u>. Minimal if modest IMET program for Maldives is funded and military-to-military contacts are maintained at present levels.
- f. (U) Summary: See Table 13-1.

- 14. (U) PAPUA NEW GUINEA
 - a. (U) Current Programs
 - (1)

- b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (1)

SECRET 14-1 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

(2) (7)

- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1) (91)

SECRE NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

(2) (21)

- d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
 - (1) (2)

(2) (S/M)

e. (U) Implications

- (1) (U) Forces Required To be capable of controlling its border, PNGDF needs to restructure and possibly expand its forces and improve their training armament and transportation.
 - (2)

- (3) (U) Country Benefits Increased security and stability resulting from ability to control its borders; continuing to enjoy expanding US trade relations.
- (4) (U) US Costs Modest, if FMS/Expanded Relations/ Exchange programs and military-to-military contacts are increased to degree necessary to upgrade PNGDF. Small IMET program needs to be increased.
 - f. (U) Summary. See Table 14-1.


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- 15. (U) FIJI
 - a. (U) Current Programs
 - (1) (9

- b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (S)



- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1) (C)

- d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
 - (1)

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

e. (U) Implications

- (U) Force Required None.
- (U) <u>US Potential Benefits</u> Maintenance of status quo assures a nation friendly to the US and ANZUS will be in position to aid in forming pro-Western opinion and to provide necessary leadership in maintaining status quo.
- (U) Country Benefits Maintenance of status quo and continuing to enjoy expanding US trade relations.
- (U) <u>US Costs</u> Minimal if modest FMS/IMET/Expanded Relations/Exchange programs and military to military contracts are maintained at present levels.
- f. (U) Summary. See Table 15-1.

SECRETAIN TO FOREIGN PATIONALS

TABLE 15-1

SECRET NOT RELEASELE TO FOREL IN NATIONALS

SECRET NOT DELEASABLE TO COREIGN NATIONALS

16. (U) NEPAL

a. (C/NF)

b. (C.NF)

SECRET 16-1 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGY NATIONALS

RELEASABLE TO FOREIGH WATIONALS

SECRE NO RE

- 17. (U) <u>INDIA</u>
 - a. (U) Current Programs
 - (1)

- b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1)

- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1)

- d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
 - (1) (9)

e. (U) Implications

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

f. (U) Summary. See Table 17-1.

SECRET 17-3 NO. RELEASABLE TO FOREI N NATIONAL

SECRET NOT KELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS SECRET NOT LELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NALPONALS

- 18. (U) SRI LANKA
 - a. (U) Current Programs
 - (1) (c)

- b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1) (C)

- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1)

SECRET 18-1 NOT RELEASUBLE TO FORLIGN MATIONALS d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions

(1) (2/VF)

e. (U) Implications

(1) (9)

r. (U) Summary. See Table 18-1.

SECRET 18-2 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS SECRET NOT DELEASABLE TO OREIGN NATIONALS

19. (U) BANGLADESH

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TO FOREIGN

20. (U) AUSTRALIA

a. (U) Current Programs

(1) (U) Australian defense interests are linked to those of the US through the ANZUS Mutual Security Treaty. Practically all defense relationships are based on this treaty; in fact, much of the justification for military expenditures by the government of Australia lies in a self-perceived requirement to be able to contribute adequate forces in support of the Treaty. Various ANZUS consultative meetings ensure the viability of the ANZUS relationship. The annual ANZUS Council meeting is conducted at Secretary of State/Foreign Minister level. Military-oriented meetings range from the ANZUS MILREP Meeting and Staff Level Meeting through Service-to-Service Talks down to seminar and exercise planning meetings. US-Australian policy level discussions, based on the 1973 Barnard-Schlesinger Agreement, focus on broad policy questions of US national strategy and Australian national security interests. Australia is also included on the CINCPAC warning network and both countries' military intelligence services participate in an intelligence exchange program. Additionally, Australian/US staffs exchange information annually on each country's military assistance to regional nations. At present, there is no program for coordinating these military assistance programs.

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b. (U) Current Country Capabilities

(1) (C)

(2) (2)

SECRED 20-3
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c. (U) Political Situation

(1) In March 1983 the Liberal Party-National Country
Party Coalition which was supportive of US defense activities
was defeated in a national election by the Australian Labour
Party (ALP) which has been critical of US activities.

SECRET 20-4 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOR IGN NATIONALS

- d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
 - (1) (S/HF)

(3)

- e. (U) Additional Forces Required
 - (1) (S. NF)

SECRET 20-6
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- f. (U) Action Required
 - (1)

(2) 4

- g. (U) <u>US Benefits</u>
 - (1) (S/V)

- h. (U) Country Benefits
 - (1)

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i. (U) US Cost

(1)

j. (U) Summary. See Table 20-1.

SECTAT OREIGN WATIOLALS

- 21. (U) NEW ZEALAND
 - a. (U) Current Programs
- (1)

SECRET 21-1 NOT RELEASABLE TO ECREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET
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- b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations
 - (1)

- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1)

- d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
 - (1) (c)

(2) (U) Continued active participation in FPDA should be encouraged.

SECRETORISE TO SEEIGN NA SNALS

- e. (U) Additional Forces Required
 - (1)

- f. (U) Actions Required
 - (1) (C)

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

- g. (U) <u>US Benefits</u>
 - $(1) \quad (S/NF)$

h. (U) Country Benefits

- (1) (U) A coordinated multinational strategy could enhance New Zealand's regional role and develop a deployable force. It would also give credibility to New Zealand's contribution to the ANZUS alliance.
 - i. (U) US Cost
 - (1)

j. (U) Summary. See Table 21-1.

SECRE.
NO RELEASABLE TO FOREIGNATIONALS

22. (U) FRANCE

- a. (U) Current Programs .
- (1) (S,NF) Many of the agreements the US has with France in the Indian Ocean are verbal agreements.

- b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations in PACOM Area
 - (1)

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREICA NATIONALS

- c. (U) Political Situation
 - (1)

- d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions
 - (1) (S/12)

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- (U) Implications
 - (1) (S,NF)

(U) Summary. See Table 22-1.

22-3 ASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONAL

SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN MATIONALS

- 23. (U) UNITED KINGDOM
 - a. (U) Current Programs
 - (1)

(2)

- b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations in PACOM Area
 - (1).

SECRE FOREIC NATIONALS

(2)

c. (U) Political Situation

- (1) (U) The United Kingdom is a signatory to the Five Power Defence Arrangement linking it to the security of Singapore and Malaysia, as well as Australia and New Zealand.
- (2) (U) The United Kingdom is also a signatory to the Manila Pact which encompasses security obligations among Thailand, the Philippines, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.
- (3) (U) In accordance with significant changes in British defense policy, however, British overseas bases east of Suez have been disestablished and most forces withdrawn. significantly reduces the United Kingdom's ability to meet any FPDA or Manila Pact defense obligations and limits her ability to interoperate with US forces in the PACOM. Britain also faces severe economic problems which limit her ability to undertake military training exercises in the Pacific theater.
 - d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions

SECRET

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(2) (S/NE)

- e. (U) <u>Implications</u>
 - (1) (U) Actions Required.

(a)

- (2) (U) US Potential Benefits.
 - (a)

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
(3) (U) Country Benefits.

(a) /(a)

(4) (U) US Costs.

(a) 191

r. (U) Summary. See Table 23-1.




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24. (U) CANADA

a. (U) Current Programs

(1) (U) The Governments of Canada and the United States have entered into a number of bilateral defense agreements stemming from the Canada-United States Basic Security Plan (BSP). The BSP brings together in one document the entire spectrum of Canada-United States (CANUS) regional defense at the national level. It establishes the general approach, command and responsibility framework, and key aspects of operational and operational support coordination essential to effective bilateral defense planning and operations. The BSP is maintained in consonance with national and allied defense plans that affect one or both countries.



- b. (U) Current Country Capabilities/Limitations
 - (1) (S/W)

c. (ONF) Political Outlook

(1) (U) The Liberal Party government of the Canadian Prime Minister will retain its parliamentary majority for at least the next year. Leadership problems in the major opposition party, the Progressive Conservatives, continue to hamper their efforts to mount a strong challenge to the Liberal Party's majority. Canada continues to be a strong ally of the United States; however, there has been significant public opposition to the Canadian Government's decision to enter into the United States-Canada Weapons Testing Agreement (February 1983). Under this agreement, the United States has requested permission to test the Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for night, and will request permission to test the air-launched cruise missile and other weapon systems in Canada.


d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions

(1) (U) No specific recommendations are in order other than to maintain and foster the close United States-Canada defense relationships already in existence. The unique

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
geographic proximity of the United States and Canada requires that these relationships continue in order to provide a credible defense for the North American Continent and its approaches. The United States should encourage the Canadians to fully implement their maritime force modernization programs, especially the Canadian Patrol Frigate program. These programs are essential if the Canadians are to achieve a credible maritime capability.



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25. (U) SPACE OPERATIONS AND RELEASE OF ADVANCED WEAPON SYSTEMS TO PACOM AREA NATIONS

a. (U) Space Operations




b. (U) Release of Advanced Weapon Systems to PACOM Area

(1)



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APPENDIX I

EXTRACTS FROM THE FY 1985-1989 DEFENSE GUIDANCE, 1 MARCH 1983

World Environment

P2

Changing Character of Soviet Military Capabilities

P2 (U) Over the past decade, the Soviets have been better equipping themselves not only to conduct military operations against NATO, but also to carry out projection of power and influence beyond the Eurasian land mass. They are pursuing a broad strategy -- involving economic aid, advisors, military assistance, misinformation, propaganda offensives, subversion, and use of proxy forces -- to increase their political influence, obtain base and facility use, and support and enhance worldwide Soviet military operations. Soviet capabilities to project power into crisis areas at substantial distances from Soviet borders will continue to grow.

Emerging Strategic Problems

P3

National Security Objectives

(U) Limit Soviet military advantages by strengthening U.S. P5 and allied military capabilities, by pursuing equitable and

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Defense Policy

- P5 (U) An indispensable component of the worldwide military posture the U.S. seeks to achieve and maintain is:
 - -- In conjunction with our Allies, the ability to generate land force superiority in theaters of choice, maritime superiority in key ocean areas, air superiority in key combat areas, continued deployments in NATO Europe, Western Pacific and SWA/Indian Ocean, rapidly projectable central reserves, intelligence capabilities adequate to prevent surprise, a responsive industrial and mobilization base, and exploitation of superior technology for military use.


Conventional Forces




Special Operations Forces

P8 (S)
Mobilization

(U) Mobilization plans must include a range of actions for implementation prior to a declaration of war or national emergency, for the different levels of mobilization, and for the resources necessary to sustain the forces. Planning must include the other federal departments and agencies, as well as Host Nation Support, to ensure the availability of resources and support beyond the ability of DOD to provide. We should foster similar preparations by our Allies.






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Engergy and Critical Materials Security

Pl8 (U) The U.S., and more particularly our Allies', dependence on oil imports presents a potentially serious security and

SECRET I-5 NOT RELEASABLE TO FORE AN NATIONAL economic risk because of the major impact of an extended or large-scale interruption. We must develop plans and provisions for reducing the risk of, and vulnerabilities to, major oil supply disruptions.

(U) The dependence of our Allies on the Soviet Union as a major supplier of natural gas is also of significant concern. In addition, the Soviets' hard currency earnings derived from energy sales adversely affect our security interests. The DOD will activively support U.S. policy of encouraging development. of secure Western energy resources.



Freedom of the Seas and Transit Rights


P20 (U) We must protect our rights and freedoms of navigation overflight, and contain unilateral coastal and archipelagic

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claims and encroachments which impinge upon those rights and freedoms. The national program for asserting navigation and overflight rights in the face of excessive maritime claims must be vigorously pursued. We must also recognize that there is an economic and strategic interest in preserving access rights to minerals of the deep seabed.

Forward Deployment



- -- (U) Overseas facilities and HNS arrangements will be needed to support forward deployments and reinforcements in Allied countries.
- -- (U) The U.S. will seek agreements that permit U.S. overflights and access to airfields and ports. To permit effective use of deployed forces, the U.S. will encourage improvement of selected Allied and friendly facilities.
- -- (U) The U.S. will supplement strategic airlift and sealift capabilities by pre-positioning of material ashore and at sea for U.S. forces for rapid response and reinforcement.

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(c) (c)

(a)

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