## PACIFIC COMMAND



# MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY $_{\text {(U) }}$ <br> 1986 



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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS COMMANDER IN CHIEF. U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
(USCINCPAC)
CAMP H.M. SMITH. HAWAII 96861.5025
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Ser S250
08 April 1986
SECRET-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
Subj: USPACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY (U)
Encl: (1) USPACOM Multinational Strategy

1. (U) This command's peacetime mission encompasses the full breadth of tasks to develop and maintain an adequate war-fighting capability. The USPACOM Multinational Strategy (MNS) (enclosure (1)) defines our objectives in working with each nation in this theater.
2. (simpronif)
3. (U) I am pleased to forward the USPACOM Multinational Strategy. You and your staffs have contributed heavily to its formulation and I appreciate your efforts. I hope the l:MS will serve as a useful road map for developing mutually supporting programs and for furthering our policy throughout the region. i recognize that because of the dynamic nature of the threat and changing goals as our relationships with our Pacific neighbors mature, we must periodically update the mis to keep it useful. Therefore I welcome jour comments and recommenatioris at any time.


Sistribution: Appendix IV

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# COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

United States Pacific Command
Multinational Strategy (U)

Information Cutoff Date: 15 February 1986

Prepared by<br>Dire:さorate for Plans and Policy

## Second Edition <br> 1986

(This page UNCLASSIFIED)
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USPACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY

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1. Space Operations and Technology Transfer
II. Extracts from the FY 1986-1990 Defense Guidance
III. Principal Security/Defense Fora in USPACOM
IV. Distribution
2. (U) GENERAL

b. (U) Guidance
(1) (syon? ris reed for a multinational strategy was expressed in the initial (1982) Jeieise Gudance of Presiuent joagan's administration and appears again in the $F ; 1986-1990$ Jefense Guidance which outlines future strategy and force capability expectations. The Eefense Guidance states that the global strajegy requires complementarity of U. S. and allied forces to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world. $\gamma$
(2) (U) Extracts from the FY 86-90 Defense Guidance are at Appendix II.
(3) (SMETURN)
c. (SHOTORN)

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d. (S) USPACOM Objectives. The major objectives which the USPACOM Multinational Strategy supports are derived from the Joint Strategic Planning Document FY 1987-94 and are as follows:
(1) $(5)$
(2) 15
(3) (8)
(4) (8)
(5) (\$0)
(6) (8)
(7) 81
(8) (8)
(9) $(\$)$
e. (SX Space Operations.
f. (5) Limitations.
9. (U) Methodology
(1) (U) Achieving carefully selected subobjectives with each country will support general national security objectives.
(2) $(8)$
(3) (SAterURN)


## (5) 58

h. (SAMPURNT)


1. (U) GENERAL
a. (U) Classification. Unless stated otherwise on individual pages, this entire document is SECRET, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.
b. (U) Purpose


It is derived from and consistent with policy guidance promulgated by the Office. of the Secretary of Defense and responds to direction given by the JCS to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Command.

(1) fel
(2) (ل) Other countries obviously perceive their defense requirements differently than does the U. S. Their military force postures and programs are designed to accomplish the rissions their governments judge to be most important. Therefore, efforts to effect fundamental changes in the defense policies or forces of a naticn may ro: ainays be feasitle ard can, at times, be counter

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productive. Consequently, recommendations in this document are directed toward realistic, incremental improvements to pursue roles and missions which are at least complementary with our command programs.
(3) 85

The USPACOM Multinational Strategy is built primarily on a foundation of bilateral relationships. Larger regional coalitions, to the extent that they can exist, depend on these bilateral relationships and the interactions of the coalition members.
e. (U) Guidance
(1) (SAmerk) The need for a Multinational Strategy was recognized in the FY 1986-1990 Defense Guidance (DG) which outlined future strategy and force capability expectations. The DG states that the global strategy requires complementarity of U. S. and allied forces to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world.
(2) (U) Verbatim extracts from the FY 86-90 DG are at Appendix II.
(3) (samberis)
f. (U) U. S. Force Reguirements and the Multinational Strategy
(1) (SAMOPRNT)
(2) (smerURN)


g. (1) El Amorts z Stratazic Analysis.
(i) jer

1- RELEASABLE TPROREIGN NTTIONA
SECRET NOT RELSNABLE TOTOREIGN MATIONALS
(2) (SAMOFORNT In this MNS a "crisis," as referred to in Table 1-1, is defined as a localized threat to peace in which $U$. S. force deployments are necessary to protect U. S. interests.
h. 187
(1) (U) U. S. Actions.
(a) (\$)
(b) (8)
(c) $(8)$
!OT RELEAE $3 L E$ TO SOREIGN NATVNALS SLRET - NOT NELEASABLE FOREIGN NONALS
(d) 85
(c) 5
(f) 6
(h) 2
(2) (s)

(b) (s)
(c) $(s)$
(d) $(8)$
(e) $(z)$
(f) $(\not) ;$
neLEASABL - 10 FOREI IN NATIONALS
(g)

(j) (8)
(k) $(8)$

- j. (S/AOFONRI) Sections 3 through 28 cover all countries in the PACOM AOR.
k. (U) Summary charts are included at the end of each section. These charts provide detailed lists of roles, forces and equipment, etc., in addition to summarizing the salient points in the preceding text.

2. (8) PROJECT DESCRIPTION
a. (U) Methodology
(1) (SAMOPRRN)
b. (u) Comparative Analysis
(1) +5

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E
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 provide a partian menari on mien tile MNS depends heavily ior support and expansicn.
(1) (U) Aidzus. Multilateral security treaty, Australia, New Zealand, Unites State:
(2) (U) ASEAN. Multilateral economic treaty, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand.
(3) (U) Five Power Defense Arrangement. Multilateral security treaty, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom.
(4) (U) Manila Pact. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Australia, France, liew Lealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States.
(5) (1s) Mutua! Defense Treaty. United States, Philippines.

(7) (U) Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (MST). United States, Japan.


## NOT RE'LASABLE FOREIGN AATION NLS <br> LCRET-NOT LLEASABLE $T$ FOREID NATIONALS <br> 3. 88 AUSTRALIA

a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (U) Australian defense interests are linked to those of the U. S. through the ANZUS Mutual Security Treaty. Practically all U. S.-Australian defense relationships are based on this treaty. Much of the justification for military expenditures by the government of Australia lies in a selfacknowledged requirement to contribute adequate forces in support of the Treaty. Under normal circumstances, a number of ANZUS consultative meetings intelligence sharing and other activities ensure the viability of the ANZUS relationship. The annual ANZUS Council meeting is normally conducted at Secretary of State/Foreign Minister level. Military-oriented meetings range from the ANZUS MILREP Meeting and Staff Level Meeting through service-toservice talks to seminar and exercise planning meetings. As a result of the 4 February 1985 GNZ decisior to reject a U. S. request for a port call, U. S. participatior. ir all A:Z:S meetings has been cancelled or postponed while the USG reviews its ties with NiZ. U. S.-Australian policy level discussions, based on the 1973 Barnard-Schlesinger Agreement, focus on broad policy questions of $U$. S. national strategy and Australian national security interests. Australia is also included on the USCINCPAC warning network and both countries' rilitary intelligence services participate in an intelligence exchange program. Additionaily, hustraliariu. S. staffs exchange information annually on each country's military assistance to regional ASEAN nations. At preserit, there is no program for coordinating these military assistance activities.

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b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
(1) (cmerurn)
(2) (CMMOFORN)
(3) +1
c. (U) Political Situatior
(1) ( $x$
(2) 88
(3) 4

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e. (U) Forces/Equipment Required
(1) (s.anduriv)
f. (U) Action Required

## (2) (8)

g. (S/MOPORT)
h. (l) Australia Benefits:
i. (e) U. S. cost:
j. (8)
K. (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are: Ae ore purtod for

- (U) Stable economy
- (U) Military capabilities somewhat hindered by budgetary
- (U) Need improvements in military capabilities

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& \text { Nance }
\end{aligned}
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4. (U) BANGLADESH
a. (i) Current Programs
(1) sef
(2) 88
b. $(8)$
c. (U) POIti位Ei Situation
(1)
(2) (2)
d. (s/anamini)
e. (s.minean)
f. (L. S. Benefits:
g. (U) Bangladesh Benefits: The Bangladeshi armed forces' prestige and
technical capability would be increased. The ability of the country to
defend its interests would be improved.
h. (U) U. S. Costs: Increase in FMS and IMET would not be excessive
over a number of years. However, an increase in interaction with Bangladesh
could excite Indian sensitivities.


5. (U) BHUTAN
a. (Cimaporin) Current Programs:/
b. (J) Current Capabilities and Limitetions
(1) (et)
(2) (8)
c. (U) Pclitice: Eituatio:
(1) $x$
(2) $\&$
d. (SHNRM:

6. (U) BRUNEI
a. Current Prograr:s
(1)
b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
(i) (S Wrokn
(a) 81
c. (e) Politicà Situation:
d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions: No new roles or missions are proposed at this time.
e. (U) Forces Required: None
f. (Stwamontr) Actions Required:



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7. (U) SOCIALIST REPUEIIC OF THE UNION OF BURMA
a. (U) Current Proorars
(1) $\times 1$
(2) (U) There is no question that Burmese Officers appreciate the IMET program. Following a twelve year gap, the program was resumed during FY 80. Since its resumption, 62 officers have received training as of August 1984 in the U. S. Due to the awkwarc and centralized decision-making process in selecting students for U. S. training, Burme has been unable to fully use its allocation of IMET funds. Many Burmese officers are hopeful that policies will be instituted to permit greater use of the IMET opportunities. For this and broader political reasons, the U. S. Embassy strongly supports continued IMET funding at current levels.
(3) $(2)^{\prime}$
b. (U) Curreri Capabilities/Limitations
(1) (U) Burma has long deferred military modernization because of urgent developmental priorities and the expense of sustained military operations against insurgents and drug traffickers.
(2) (2)
(1) (U) Beginning in the mid-1970s, after over a decade of doctrinaire single-party socialism and self-imposed isolation, Burmia began to look cautiously outward, to seek aid and ideas from the West, and to reopen channels of international cooperation. Although this change has created important new possibilities for the West in Burma, it has been conducted at a deliberately slow pace. Burma is determined to preserve its political, economic and cultural autonomy at all costs, retain an imposed socialist economic structure, and continue the single, military-dominated party's firm control under the present leadership. Burmese policy and behavior, therefore, remain fundamentally grounded in nonalignment.
(2) (U) The Burmese are concerned about the Soviet's aggressive international behavior. They take care not to say too much publicly but Burma-USSR relations are generally poor. Concern over China is nearer to the surface. Burma considers it essential to get along with China and relations are good. There is, however, mild displeasure over China's continuing support of the Burmese Communist Party (ECP), although Burma acknowledges that the PRC has been reducing its support to this insurgent group.
(3) (U) Internally, much of the central government's focus and energies are devoted to operations against the various upland tribal minorities. The unwillingness of the GOB to negotiate in good faith towards reasonable compromise perpetuates the conflicts, causes suffering on all sides and perpetuates the production of narcotics to fund the ethnic insurgencies. The plight of "foreigners," most of whom are descendents of South Asian emigres, is also another source of tensior in Eurma. These people, who in the past provided skilled labor and manageriai expertise, are denied suffrage, freedom of travel and access to jobs with a living wage. Were the $8 C P$ able to mobilize this classic downtrodden class in urban guerrilla warfare in Rangoon, Mandalay and other major cities, it would present major problems for security perscrinel and would derail the anti-narcotics campaign.
e. (U) Actions Required
(1) (SMMOFORN)
(2) (sanompuni)

## 

f. (U) U. S. Benefits: The U. S. maintains a high respect for the Burmese policy of noratigncerit and wishes to see Burma's continued progress as an indepencent arc siatle nation. U. S. efforts ir this regard mey well result ir a close: U. S.eErra relationsrit á:d opsri the way for a stronger Western alignment.
g. (U) Burmase Beveft: Closer relationships with the L'. S. and other Western countries ccuis resuit ir ir ereased access to advanced technology anc development procedies. Tris kroniess could be employed by the Burmese to exploit their substersia" $r$ : Eurei $r \in s o u r c e$ bese and thus improve the individual Burmese qualit: of life.
 are of mirimei cos: ene piared future increases would not be excessive. Because of Burma's sersitivity with respect to preserving its nonaligned image

 an active role in fostering regionai stability.

## i. (u) Ecorroic irmest

(1) 585
(2) (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:

- (U) 10+ years for economic development to materialize to be considered capable of supporting military
- (i) Militery is arti-insurgent/drug trafficking oriented
- (U) Non-alignment poiicy will limit contact with Western technology


8. (u) CANADA
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (U) The Governments of Canada and the United States have entered into a number of bilateral defense agreements stemming from the Canada-United States Basic Security Plan (BSP). The BSP brings together in one document the entire spectrum of Canada-United States (CANUS) regional defense at the national level. It establishes the general approach, command and responsibility frame-
work, and key aspects of operational and operational support coordination essential to effective bilateral defense planning and operations. The BSP is maintained in consonance with national and allied defense plans that affect one or both countries.

## (2) (e)

b. (Squomerm) Current Capabilities/Limitations:
c. (fimeronn) Political Situation:

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e. (U) Forces/Equipment Required: None.
f. (S/MOPORN) Actions Required:
g. (o) Economic Impact:



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9. (U) PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
a. (SMomontr) Current Programs:
b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
(1) (C/Naconit)
(2)
(3)
(4) (8)
(5) (S
(6) (8)

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(7) (8)
c. (u) Political Situation
(1) $85{ }^{\circ}$
(2) $(8)$
(3) $(A)$
d. (U) Objectives and Recommended Roles/Missions
(1) (ssmoporif) ${ }^{\prime}$

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- (2)

Soviet planning

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political, econ
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(2) (S/NOFOMT,
(3) (Styn
(4) (S/MOPORN)
e. (8)
f. (SAOTURN)

9. (U) U. S. Benefits: The most immediate benefit to be gained from a closer security relationship with China is the increased probability of parallel strategic actions on the part of the Chinese. By laying a sound basis within the relationship, future interactions will likely be more lasting. Additional U. S. benefits which can be achieved include the PRC's support for regional stability, a decrease in the likelihood of undesirable PRC unilateral actions in the region, and an increased risk to the Soviets and Vietnamese for aggressive action in the region.
h. (U) Chinese Benefits: By developing closer ties to the U. S., China increases the prospect of U. S. technological assistance for its modernization goals and for reducing the qualitative gap between the PLA and opposing Soviet forces on its border. Concomitantly, a comprehensive link with the U.S. bolsters Chinese access to Western technology in general. Mature, fully productive exhanges with the U. S. on defense and sucurity issues promotes Chinese appreciation of the Western strategy for East-West problems and gives Chinese views a greater audience.
i. (L) U. S. Costs:
j. (U) Economic Impact
(1)
(2) (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:

- (U) Defense industry is generally underused
- (U) Requires selective technology from abroad to accelerate economic modernization


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d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
(1) (en $\sqrt{5}$

strategy beyond the kiorean peninsula requires study and a highlevel USG decision before making any overtures to the ROKG. On the other hand, improvement of ROR forces for defense of ROK is

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10. (U) FIJI
a. 195 Current Programs:
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- 88
- (e)
b.
d. (S/Nofonty) Recommended New Roles and Missions:
e. (U) Force/Equipment/Action Required - None
f. (U) U. S. Benefits - Maintenance of status quo assures a nation friendly to the U. S. and AlizUS will be in position to aid in forming pro-Western opinion and to provide necessary leadership.
h. LOT U. S. Costs:
i. (\&) Economic Impact:

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11. (U) FRANCE
a. (SLMn-enn) Current Programs: 7
b. Le1 Current Capabilities and Limitations in PACOM Area:
c. 牛 Political Situation:
d. Lsmamanem Recommended Roles and Missions:
e. (sfmopontr) Requirements/Benefits/Costs:


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12. (U) INDIA
a. (ET) Current Program:
b. (f) Current Capabilities and Limitations:
c. (U) Political Situation
(1) $(8)$
(2) (8)
d. (S/MOEEnT) Recommended Roles and Missions:
g. (U) Economic Impact
(1) 85
(2) ( 1
(3)
(4) 54


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13. (U) INDIAN OCEAN ISLAND STATES
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (S/MOPORN)

(1) $(8)$

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d.
e. (U) Benefits/Costs/Economic Impact: The Indian Ocean Island States are not politically, economically or militarily sound enough to actively support the Multinational Strategy. None of the nations can be considered prosperous. Several are numbered among the worid's poorest countries and depend heavily on contributions to support their economies. The Soviet Union has been unable to meet regional economic needs. Continuing economic support by the United States and other western countries and improving military-to-military relations will enhance the U. S. position and our ability to gain access to ports and airfields when required. Country benefits include internal stability and the potential for increased foreign exchange. U. S. costs remain minimal.



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14. (U) INDONESIA
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (U) The U. S. currently sells arms and equipment to Indonesia under both FMS and commercial sales. Training is provided under both FMS and a substantial IMET program. Deliveries continue under a residual military assistance program.
(2) (U) Indonesia and the U. S. concluded an agreement in 1982 which provides for Defense Technological/Industrial Cooperation.(DIC). In early 1984 the Government of Indonesia (GOI) began to explore the possibilities for cooperation with the U. S. in those defense commodity areas where the potential for co-production or technology transfer existed. Efforts in this regard continue particularly with respect to upgrading the capability of the national shipbuilding and aerospace industry. The goal in both cases is eventual independent production of riaval surface vessels and aircraft needed to satisfy defense requirements for Indonesia. To date no specific DIC programs have been established, however the future looks brighter in this regard.
(3)

(4) 88
b. (U) Caparilities and Limitations
(1) (U) Indonesian Armed Forces have a dual function: National defense/security, and nation-building/political economic development. Pursuit of the civil functions tends to impair military readiness. Indonesian Armed Forces are primarily oriented towards internal security, though there has been a major effort in recent years to build an improved conventional defense and surveillance capability for the Navy and Air Force. Starting in late 1984 and continuing into 1985, Indonesian Armed Forces have undergone a major restructuring progran aimed at eliminating unnecessary headquarters and consolidating operational units under the direct control of the armed forces commander. There is some discontent among senior officers at the upheaval generated by the reogranization, but ABRI headquarters is well in control of the situation. Although some of the changes appear to be more cosmetic than substantive, the net result of the reorganization - especially when combined with the effects of the military leadership changes - should significantly improve Indonesia's military capabilities.

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(1) (U) President Soeharto has led Indonesia since 1966. He has proven quite effective in promoting economic development and political stability. However, problems of population pressure and uneven economic development continue to impede progress.
(2) (U) The most important single element in Soeharto's base of support is the armed forces. Although Indonesia does not have a military government, military officers are involved in government (as legislators, governors, regents, etc.) at every level in consonance with the doctrine of the Armed Forces' dual functior.
(3) (U) A main thrust of Indonesia's stated foreign policy is to support ASEAN, in which the GOI sees itself as the main power. The GOI values its status as a nonaligned state. At the same time, however, many of its larger interests, especially in terms of trade and development, are closely linked with those of the West. Similarly, Indonesia tacitly welcomes the role U. S. forces and bases in the Philippines play in maintaining a regional balance of power. While recogrizing potential threats from the SRV and the USSR, The GOI sees the PRC as the mair lca-terr threat to the region and has expressed its concern over increasingly cicse !J. S.-PRC ties. This notvithstanding, relations with. the U. S. have improveu steadily during the present administration.
(4) (U) In contemplating any change in its foreign policy, GOI must consider internal political factors. The population consists of many ethnic groups, some rf :h:-h have exhibited separatist tendencies. There is some tension between the fundamentalist-Muslim minority and the nominal Muslim/non-Muslim majority as well as between small uncoordinated groups of Islamic fundamentalists and the government whose secular policies largely reflect the wishes of the nominal Muslim/non-Muslim majority. Although some fundamentalists may have an anti-western bias because of the Arab-I'sraeli conflict, their concerns primarily relate to domestic politics and the importance of Islam, rather than to international issues. However, widespread antipathy toward Indonesians of ethnic Chinese descent, as well as fear of Chinese- directed subversion, complicates any move toward a more normal relationship with the PRC.

## d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions

h. (U) Indonesian Benefits: By actually assuming the recommended roles Indonesia will greatly increase its ability to exercise sovereignty in its archipelago, and will have a much improved ability to respond to internal threats.
i. $1 / 5$ U. S. Costs:
j. (U) Economic Impact
(1)

(2) (U) Erasite: Ecoromic aspects effecting tris stratec ere:

- (U) Large manpower base
- (U) Needs Western techology to stimulate economy
- (u) Potentici to become an economic power in the regior.
- (U) Strong military support to the government

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15. (U) JAPAN
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (U) The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (MST) (1960) is the cornerstone of U. S.-Japan security relations. The large contingent of U. S. forces in-country, led by Cormander, U. S. Forces Japan (COMUSJAPAN), is a major element of the U. S. forward deployment strategy.
(2) (U) Several formal consultative mechanisms established under the MST support an ongoing security dialogue. These mechanisms are summarized in Appendix III. In addition to the security consultative fora, several other formal and informal programs have been established. Annual ministerial meetings of SECSTATE and SECDEF with their Japanese counterparts provide the opportunity to exchange views and promote new bilateral initiatives. The Systems and Technology Forum seeks to facilitate the transfer of militaryrelated high technology information and foster more efficient weapons procurement. Numerous DOU-Japan Defense Agency (JDA) exchange programs are also in effect at the service and joint staff levels to promote mutual understanding of both countries' intelligence and operational systems and procedures.

exercises and training have greatly expanded in scope ana scale. Japan Maritime Sc:- iciense Force participation in a multinational naval exercise, albeit under the rationale of interacting with $U$. S. forces only, is now officially sanctioned, as is Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) biannual participation with U. S. Army Japan (USARJ) in the command post exercise YAMA SAKURA held in Hawaii and Japan.

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(4) (samurn)
(5) (8)
(6) (U) In the security assistance area, an extensive array of
"Wurams exists to provide Japan with the latest in modern weapons systems thryiugh Foreign Military Sales (FMS), licensed production, and coproduction niwments. Under a reciprocal training agreement Japan is able to purchase Win' 4 tary training at $U$. S. schools under the same favorable terms extended to hout Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. GOJ is only now thing to work on such an agreement.
b. (U) Current Capabilities And Limitations
(1) (5)
(2) (SLMOTURTI)
(3) (U) The current policy of limiting defense expenditures to $1 \%$ of Yrimy national product (GNP) restricts efforts to accomplish the necessary Whathese Self-Defense Force modernization and enhancement programs. (When all ") Whanel costs are included, the figure is $1.6 \%$ ). Building a political \%inhensus to change this policy has been slow due to historical sensitivities. 4.a4f (Hht economic stagnation causing GOJ budgetary constraints has made the ish even more difficult. U. S. policy has been to urge adequate funding for intive Year Plan which allows Japan to fulfill her roles and missions, 'alkr than take issue with an arbitrary percentage of GNP.
c. (U) Political Situation
(1) (U) The GCu hias prover to be extremely stabie. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDF) has remained in power since 1955.
(2) (U) The war-renouncing clause of Japan's constitution has precluded the planning for security responsibilities outside Japan. Article IX has been legally interpreted to permit the formation and maintenance of Self Defense Forces solely fcr the immediate defense of Japan, but to prohibit military participation in collective security arrangements cther than the MST, or the projection of power overseas. Furthermore, defense cooperation with the U. S. under the MST is restricted to defense of the territories under the administration of Japan.
(3)
(4) (U) A second political problem is the apprehension of other Asian countries to a ereaily expanded jepanese military role outside the immediate area of Japan. Unpleasant mercries of Jeparese occupation prior to and during World Wer il remein strons. These conceris mist be eliayed ir order to gain support for a stronger japanese rilitary role in the Far East. In that same vein, centuries ct a"im: sity are detrust between trí japanese and korears is likeiy to impeae proeress towards treir military cooperation regardiess of constitutional irterfretミさions.
(5) (L) A. trird political probleni is Japan's "nuclear ailergy," reflecting the Japanese experience in World har II. The most significant manifestation of this "allergy" is popular opposition to port calls by nuclear powered/capable US: shifs. Organized opposition comes primarily from the Japan Socialist Party, tre Japar Comnunist Farty, leftist oriented labor unions, and liltra-ieftist radical groups. The GOJ, while accommodating anti-nuclear sentiments, is not expected to change port access procedures or policy based on the three non-nuclear principles of non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction.
d. (SAMFORN) Recommended New Roles And Missions:
e. (U) Required Equipment/Actions
(1) (smantirn)

TABLE 15-1
-SECRET - NORELEASNOLE TO EONLIGN MA HONALS
(2) 181
(4) (8)
(5) (8)

SECRET - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
e. (U) Implications
(1) 4
(4) (U) Determination of the necessary JSDF force levels to perform the required missions is fundamental. The bilateral planning process is the appropriate forum in which to refine specific requirements determined by independent $\mathcal{U}$. S. and JDA analytical studies.
(5) (S/NOFOMFI)
(6) 88
(7) (U) Consideration of tapping Japan's tremendous shipbuilding capacity is fraught with political pitfalls. The impact of such a program on the U. S. shipbuilding industry will require extensive analysis. We can anticipate significant Congressional and labor opposition.
g. (U) Econoric Impect
(1) (GNofonm: Jipan's econom: is the second largest in the free world with a 1985 GNP of over $\$ 1.5$ trillion.
(2) (GANFOM:
(3) (f) The major external economic factor which affects Japan is its dependency on foreign supplies of raw materials/natural resources and on foreign markets.

h. (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:

- (U) Large, diverse, well-developed and technologically advanced economy
- (U) Lessening of reliance on foreign sources for raw materials and markets as economic base switches from heavy industry to information systems
- (U) Internal political constraints on the growth of the military
ET (Thisphart EçeTMy in itintigety)

SEEKET - NOT RF_EASABLE 7 FOREXIN NAT IUNALS

## 16. (U) KOREA

a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (U) A Mutual Security Treaty links U. S. and the ROK. There is a large U. S. in-country force led by Commander, U. S. Forces Korea. He also commands the binational Combined Forces Command which coordinates military activities for the combined/integrated defense of ROK. Additionally, the senior U. S. military officer in Korea serves as CINCUNC and as such is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Armistice. Assigned U. S. Forces effectively supplement Korea's on-going and successful effort to deter aggression. Consequently, extensive bilateral planning efforts continue to expand. Numerous in-country means exist to sustain bilateral dialogue. The principal fora are summarized in Appendix III. The annual Security Consultative Meeting, which SECDEF normally cochairs, capstones the security dialogue. There is a vast array of programs to enhance ROK and U. S. military capabilities, strengthen interoperability and foster regional stability. Behind these programs lie years of close military cooperation and helpful ROK support of U. S. Forces in Korea.
(2) (6) The ROKG's continuing effort to deter North Korean aggression has contributed greatly to our objective of preserving stability in Northeast Asia.
(3) \&ol
b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations


SECRET - NOT RELLEASABLE TOKOREIGN NMIONRIS
(2) 10
c. (U) Political Situation
(1) (C) Domestic stability is strengtheneab; a hiah levei of public awareness of the ever-present North Korean threat.
(2) (ssme)
(3) (U) The shilired 슬an ex- triste ? abou force plays an impertant

d. (U) Recommended New Roles ard Missions
(1) (s/MOPRT)
e. (Sinoronit) Forces/Equipment Required:
(U) Actions Required: We must continue dialogue with the ROKG and its military services to ensure a common understanding of prevailing requirements. ROK regional role has a significant impact on our overall strategy. There is a close connection between Kortd and Japan which inextricably links the defense of these two nations to our global strategy. Loss of access, to or outright supfort of either country will endanger the security of the other and greatly frustrate our forward defense in the Pacific. Straits exiting the Sea of Japan, located within easy range of bases in both countries, could contain the Soviet Pacific Fleet and prevent resupply and recovery of forces already deployed. Noresver, our firm position on the Sea of Japan littoral seriously conplicates any Sovie: power projection and/or resufply plans in the Southwest Pacific or Indian Ocear. The viability of our alliance with the ROK will prevent the uncovering of iapan and raise the chances that buth Japan and Korea will remain active allies. We need to assure continued use of these bases and make fill use of their defensive capabilities along with our forward basing there to maximize the effectiveness of our deployed forces. We must also take advantage of war reserves already positioned in Korea and Japan. Cooperation of these two nations, along with our forces, provide much greater flexibility and mutual support in a war with the Soviet Union.

## g. (U) Economic Impact

(i) ( ( $)$ The Koreari economy relies heavily on trade and is penetratinc an increasing number of world markets. Korea has proven fully capable of servicing its heavy external debt, while maintaining an excellent credit rating. The ROU: is seeking to expand economic ties including Communist bloc countries. Trade and technology transfer negotiations continue with Japar and other countries. Growith and developmerit in heav; industries depend in part, on the continued recovery of the world economy. There is strong government promotion of the computer, military hardware, and telecommunications industries, especially in fiber-optics, microcircuitry, and aviation. A large portion of military production is for export, but the ROK remains dependent on the U. S., especially for state-of-the-art weaponry. Seoul hopes to achieve a modicum of self-sufficiency by the end of the decade.
(2) (U) Problems include:

- (U) Strong government control over the economy restricts its ability to respond in a timely manner to market forces
- (U) Rapid expansion of heavy industry causes a paucity of supporting industries
- (U) Heavy industry has been characterized by a low level of production technology and high operating costs
- (U) Trading partners are erecting protectionist barriers
- (U) South Korea imports large quantities of unprocessed food, most of their oil, iroustrial raw materiais, cooking coal, and advanced techrology
(3) (U) The economy at the present time cannot meet fully the requirements of the PACOM Multinational Strategy. As the industrial base continues to expard and technological skills permit indigenous manufacture and repair of sophisticate weapons systems and nära? forces, South Korea should be able to meet those requirements.



TH:S PAGE IMTE:GOC:
not raleasaby To E/REIGn/AatyNaLS
17. (U) MALAYSIA
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (2)
(2) (2)
b. (U) Current Capatilities and Limitations
(1) (6)
c. (U) Political Situation
(1) (SMAFORN4)
polic: would have to tate ir:2 account the delicate interria politicai balance policy would have to tale ir:s account the delicate interris political balance of ethnic ard religious grojes. Moreover, existire racia? tensions could be gaserbated by the g"outh of Muslim Extremists among Malays. The identification of : :itart Nus?irs ki:th the Arat cause ard their somewtie arti-hestern bias complicães any move GOM may wish to make towards the U. S.
(3) $\& \&$
(4) 5\%
d. (U) Recomuended filles ar.i Missions
(1) (s/maporn)

(2) (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:

- (U) Steadily developing country
- (U) Stable government
- (U) Maritime forces need upgrade




## NOT rELEASABLE TO" FOREION NATHANALS

SEGKET - yot relgorablefo egreign naibontis
18. (U) NEPAL

## -a. (GHeronn) Current Programs:

b. (U) Current Capabilities/Limitations
(1) $+\infty$
(2) (c)
c. (U) Politica? Situzaticn
(1) (U) Ir the U!., the Non-fligred Movemert, and other internationel forums, Nepal has pursuec àr independert, neutral and moderating influence. Its concerr, with irdiar economic imperialism is balanced by its frienaship with China, but it is scrupuicus in its even-handedness.
(2) 18
d. (S/Moponty) Recommended Roles and Missions:


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# NO LELEASAB 10 FOP NOV NATIONs <br> SECT - NOT RET $\operatorname{SABLE}$ TO FO sIGN NATIOn $\sim$-LS <br> 19. (U) NEW ZEALAND 

a. (U) Current Programs
(1) 85
(2) (8)
b. (8) Current Capabilities and Limitations: New Zealand military forces are very small and limited in their capabilities but, when joined in concert with allies, do contribute to demonstrating Western cohesion.
c. Le) Political Situation: The current Labour Government of New Zealand has banned nuclear armed aircraft and nuclear powered/armed ship visits to its airfields, ports and territorial waters.
d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions
(1) (SimeronN)
(2) (U) Continued active participation in FPDA should be encouraged.
e. (C/MAPOnN) Additional Forces/Equipment Required:
f. (fliofonk) Actions Required:
g. (S/Moverin) U. S. Benefits:
h. (U) New Zealand Benefits: Cooperation in the Multinational Strategy could enhance New Zealand's regional role but such cooperation is not likely until NZ changes its port access policy.
i. $\sec$ U.S. cost:
j. (5) Economic Impact
(1) (and)
(2) (U) The principal economic aspect affecting this strategy is:

- (U) Agriculturally based economy is severely limited and
handirannad bor wald and stant...tann

20. (U) OCEANIA
a. LS Current Programs:-
b. $\&$ Current Capabilities ard Limitations:
c. 4 Political Situation:
d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions
(1) (s, manors)
(2) 5
e. (S/Maronit) Actions Required.


SO NET - NOT RLEASABLE TO YREIGN NATIONALS
21. (U) PAPUA NEW GUINEA
a. (L) Current Programs:
b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
(1) (8)

c. (U) Political Situation
(1) 188
(2) +6

d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
(1)

(2) (shmorurn)
e. (U) Forces/Equipment/Acti解 Required: To be capable of controlling its border, PNGDF needs to restructure and possibly expand its forces, and to improve their training, armament and transportation.
f. $(8)$ U. S. Benefits:
22. (U) PNG Benefits: Controlling borders will increase security and stability. Cooperation with the U. S. military will foster U. S. trade relations.
h. (U) U. S. Costs: Modest, if FMS/Expanded Relations/ Exchange programs and military-to-military contacts are increased to degree necessary to upgrade PNGDF. Small IMET program needs to be increased.
i. (U) Economic Impact
(i) (U) Papua New Guinea is pro-Western and is economically and politically stable enough to support the current programs and recommended roles/missions of the PACOH Multinational Strategy. It is primarily concerned with the internal security and control of the border with Indonesia. The country should continue economic growth for the foreseeable future based on its rich natural resources, and will thus be able to support its limited military capabilities.
(2) (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:

- (U) Pro-Western/economically and politically stable
- (U) Developing economy based on rich natural resources

22. (U) PHILIPPINES
a. (U) Current Procrams
(1) 8 The U. S. has a Mutual Defense Treaty (MT) with the Republic of the Philippines (RP). The MDT remains in effect indefinitely or unti] terminated on one year's notice by either party,
(3) 185
(4) 8
b. Le) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations: SECP - NOT RLEASABLE TO OREIGN NATIONALS
(2) (U) As previously discussed, a primary internal factor affecting the GOP's ability to modernize and upgrade its armed forces is the economic situation. If the economic situation remains stagnant or worsens, the necessary funding for the military would be difficult to obtain from the GOP. Compounding the problem is poor AFP leadership, graft and corruption in the officer corps and the political patronage system established by Marcos which allowed senior officers, who are quite often unqualified professionally for their position, to remain on active duty beyond their expected retirement dates. The current Administration is attempting to redress this problem.
d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions

(2) (S/MOPOR )
(3) (U) Continued active participatior of the GOP in ASEAI: affairs/activities should be encouraged.
e. (8) Equipment/Forces/Actions Required:

g. (T) U. S. Costs (1) 85
(2) $(4)$
h. (U) Economic Impact
(1) (smerenil)
(2)



NOT NLEASAE:E FP MOT: OP!
23. (U) SINGAPORE
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) 85
b. (U) Capabilities and Limitations
(1)
(2) $(8)$
(3) 181
(4) 181
c. (U) Political Situation
(1) (S/MOTORN)

e. (s/momont) Eguipment/Forces Required:
f. (U) Actions Required
(1) 20
(2) (s.maperiv)

(2) (U) Principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:

- (U) Will continue to expand
- (U) Economic leader in the region
- (U) Military capability will expand as economy continues to grow

SF RET - MI REL SABLE 10 FORE GN NAT ONALS
24. (U) SRI LANKA
a. (e) Current Programs:
b. (s/mont) Current Capabilities and Limitations:
c. (U) Political Situation
(1) $81 /$
(2) 84
d. (chamenri) Recommended Roles and Missions:
e. (e) Force Requirements/Benefits/Costs:

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cchetanol
e. Equipment and Forces Required:
f. (S/Mofokn) Action Required:
g. 181
h. (U) Taiwan Benefits: Security assistance enables Taiwan to retain a level of military defense comensurate with the prevailing threat.
i. (U) U. S. Costs: The United States pays a political price for sustaining Taiwarn. To tre extent that the PRC feeis the reurification is unacceptably slowed, this assistance is an obstacle to a more useful, substantive relationship with China.
j. (U) Economic Impaet
(1) (S Amaroptry
26. (U) Thailand
a. (U) Current Progrars
(1) (5)
(2) (chargive)

(4) $\times$ C)
(5) (SAMOPGRT)
(6) (U) Thai Officers are regularly invited to and attend seminars and conferences, such as the Pacific Armies Management Seminar, and reciprocal high level/staff visits are conducted.
b. (C) Capabilities and Limitations
(1) (U) The overall military capability of Thailand continues to increase for three major reasons:

- (U) Qualitative and quantitative improvement in weapons systems and equipment
- (U) Increasing professionalism and technical proficiency of members of the armed forces
- (U) General economic growth in national resources, productivity and technology

SECRET NOT RELEASAD - TO OKEIGN NATIONALS
(5) (U) The Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) is a relatively small force of less than one division, with responsibility for security along the southern That/Cambodian border. The RTXC rotates its nine infantry battalions by conmitting eight of them to border operations while the ninth conducts field and garrison training. As a result, the RTMC has a limited ability to conduct major offensive operations such as amphibious assaults and sustained land combat. Recent changes that include purchasing equipment, implementing new training programs, and restructuring the organization, have increased the RTMC's capability to conduct defensive operations.


## *

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## (b) (8)

(2) (U) The Thai absolute monarchy gave way to a constitutional monarchy in 1932. Since then, there have been numerous changes in government, many by mililtary coup d'etat. The current constitution was promulgated in 1978. Despite these freauent charses, the so:ie: is fundersntally stable. Although governments have chariged freavertijy, tasic instituticrs have not been altered, and the general thrust of reietions with the U. S. has changed little, except for a brief period in 1975-77. U. S.-Thai relations are excellent and are expected ic remain so.
(3) (stamenerti:
d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions
(1) (U) Thailand, as the frontline state for ASEAN, is facing Soviet-supported Vietnamese expansionism as well as a lingering insurgency problem. It has defined its own primary roles and missions in terms of, strengthening its forces to cope with the primary Vietnamese threat. However, it cannot rely on military means alone. Along with its ASEAN partners, it has formulated an integrated political, diplomatic and economic strategy, of which support for the Khmer resistance is a part, to compel the Vietnamese to negotiate the future of Cambodia. While avoiding direct involvement, the U. S. has supported the ASEAN strategy, including the provision of military security ssistance to Thailand. For example, in the U. N. and other international fora, we have supported the Thal/ASEAN position that settlement of the Cambodian issue must come through negotiation and Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia. In security assistance we are supporting Thai force modernization, expansion and sustainment programs to create an RTARF capable of deterring aggression and of successful defense, if necessary.
(2) (sumpin)
(3) (SIMOTORIN)
e. Sy Action Required
(1) (s.merurit
S. NET - NOT RE LASABLE TO R MEIGN NATIONALS

f. (SLAOPONN)
Y. (U) Thai Benefits: The Thai view their security as enhanced by: a), improved military capabilities; and b) a continued security association with the United States which bodes well for overall regional stability.
h. Let U. S. Costs:
i. (U) Economic Impact
(1)

(2) (U) The principal economic aspects affecting this strategy are:

- (U) Growing economic power
- (U) Influential member of ASEAN
- (U) Strong rititary
- (U) Diversified programming for the future


27. (U) TONGA
a. Let Current Programs:
28. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations.
(1) 187
(2) $(80)$
(3) 86
c. (8) Political Situation: The Kingdom: of Tonga, a British protectorate since 1950, became an independent member of the British Commonwealth on 4 June 1970. It is the second oldest independent island state in the South Pacific.

## d. LeI Recommended Roles and Missions:

e. (U) Force/Equipment/Action Required: None
f. (U) U. S. Benefits - Maintenance of status quo assures a nation friendly to the $U$. S. and ANZUS which is in a position to aid in forming pro-Western opinion and to provide necessary leadership in maintaining status quo.
g. (U) Country Benefits - N/A
h. (U) U. S. Costs - Minimal, if modest IMET/expanded relations exchange programs and military-to-military contacts are maintained at current levels.
28. (U) UNITED KINGDOM
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (e)
(2) (8)
b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations in PACOM Area
(1) (8)
c. (U) Political Situation
(1) (U) The United Kingdom is a signatory to the Five Power Defense Arrangement linking it to the security of Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand.
(2) (U) The United Kingdom is also a signatory to the Manila Pact which encompasses security obligations among Thailand, the Philippines, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.
(3) (U) In accordance with significant changes in British defense policy, however, British overseas bases east of Suez have been disestablished and most forces withdrawn. This significantly reduces the United Kingdom's ability to meet any FPDA or Manila Pact defense obligations and limits its ability to interoperate with $U$. S. forces in the PACOM. Britain also faces severe economic problems which limit its ability to undertake military training exercises in the Pacific theater.



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# R <br> APPENDIX I 



SPACE OPERATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (U)

1. (SAMOFORN-Space Operations:
2. (U) Technology Transfer

## a. 85

(1) (U) The effect on OPLANi's, CONPLAN's, and general Campaign Plans.
(2) (U) The ability of the nation to pay for initial procurement, maintenance, and sustainrier:t.
(3) (U) The capability to absorb, use, and maintain the equipment/technology, and to maintain an overall balanced defense improvement program.
(4) (U) The effect acquisition of advanced systems will have on regional stability.
(5) (U) The commitment of the recipient nation to protect the system from overt or covert transfer to third nations.
(6) (U) The impact on U. S. force readiness, sustainability, and interoperability.
(7) (U) The degree to which a transfer enhances or distracts from system Rationalization/Standardization/Interoperability.


World Environment


## Changing Character of Soviet Military Capabilities

(U) Over the past decade, the Soviets have been better equipping themselves not only to conduct military operations against NATO, but also to carry out projection of power ard influence beyond the Eurasian land mass. They are pursuing a broad strategy--involving economic aid, advisors, military assistance, disinformation, propaganda offensives, subversion, and use of proxy forces--to increase their political influence, obtain base and facility use, and support and enhance worldwide Soviet military operations. Soviet capabilities to project power intc crisis areas at substantial distances from Soviet borders will continue to grow.

Emerging Strategic Protlems


National Security Objectives
(U) Limit Soviet military advantages by strengthening U.S. and allied military capabilities, by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, and by preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies and resources to the Soviet Union.

## Defense Policy

(U) A component of the world wide military posture the U.S. seeks to achieve and maintain: In conjunction with our Allies, the ability to generate land, air and maritime forces so as to make aggression highly uncertain and costly; continued forward deployed forces in NATO Europe, Western Pacific and SWA/Indian Ocean; rapidly projectable central reserves; intelligence capabilities adequate to orevent surprise; a responsive industrial and mobilization base; and exploitation of superior technology for military use.

Conventional Forces


## Mobilization

(U) The primary DOD plan is the Master Mobilization Plan which must identify mobilization responsibilities and include a range of actions for implementation prior to a declaration of war or national emergency, for the different levels of mobilization, and for the resources necessary to sustain the forces. Planning must include other federal departments and agencies, as well as Host Nation Support, to ensure the availability of resources and support beyond the ability of $D O D$ to provide. We should foster similar preparations by our allies.

Intelligence


## Alliance and Regional Cooperation

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    (smamontr)
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- (U) Seek Congressional authorization and appropriation of adequate levels of grant and concessionai security assistance funding, as well as the availability of these furds on a multi-year basis, and removal of restrictions impedirs our assistarce to $k \in y^{\prime}$ resional partners in collective security progrars.
- (2)
- (U) Expand the Iriternational Military Education and Training (IMET) program and seek reform of cost formulas for Foreign Military Sales training.
$-180$
$-(2)$
- (U) Cooperate with our allies and friends in defense acquisition to improve military effectiveness and to provide equitable economic opportunities for all participants.
- (8年)


## East Asia and the Pacific

$-(8)$


- (U) Maintain a strong security relationship with the Philippines and Thailand in the context of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and Philippines and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact).
- 
- (\$)
$-58$
- (C)


## Energy and Critical Materials Security

(U) The U.S., and more particularly our Allies', dependence on oil imports presents a potentially serious security and economic risk because of the major impact of an extended or large-scale interruption. We must develop plans and provisions for reducing the risk of, and vulnerabilities to, major oil supply disruptions.
(U) The dependence of our allies on the Soviet Union as a major supplier of natural gas is also of significant concern. In addition, the Soviet's hard currency earnings derived from energy sales adversely affect our security interests. The DOD will actively support U.S. policy of encouraging development of secure Western energy resources.

(U) We must protect our rights and freedoms of navigation overflight, and contain unilaterei coastal and archipe? agic claims and encroachment which iminasurar those rigits and freedoms. the national program for asserting nevigation and overfilight rights in the face of excessive maritime claims must be vigorously pursued. we must also recognize that there is an economic and strategic interest in preserving access rights to minerals of the deep seabed.

| Sountry | Forum | Purpose | Members or Participants |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Host Country | United States |
| U) Japan | Security Consultative Committee | Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and US governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the area of security and which forms the basis of security and are related to security | Minister of Foreign Affairs Director General of the $\%$ Defense Agency, and others | U. S. Ambassador to Japan, Commander of the U. S. Pacific Command (proxy: commander of U.S. Forces in Japan, and others) |
| U) Japan | Security <br> Subcommittee | Exchange of view on security issues of common concern to Japan and the U. S. | Participants not specified ( ally in Hawaii between worki the two governments such as ing in rank to vice minister | meetings held annu-ng-level officials of officials correspondor undersecretary |
| U) Japan | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Japan-U. S. } \\ & \text { Joint } \\ & \text { Committee } \end{aligned}$ | Consultation concerning implementation of Status of Forces Agreement | Director General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General of Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and others | Chief of Staff of U. S. Forces, Japan, Counsellor at the U. S. Embassy, and others |

ENDIX III: PRINCIPAL SECURITY/DEFENSE FORA IN USPACOM (U) (cont.)

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SEOUL KOREA ..... 2
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22 JUNE 1983
 DEGY OSIFY OM, Noi


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PACOM MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY

1. (U) GENERAL
a. (2)
b. (U) Relevant Guidance
(1) $(5 / 4 F)$




NQ RELEAS LE TQ NEIGN NA ONALS
d. (E) Relationship to US Forces Needs:
e. (U) Project Analysis
(1) (INFF) Contribution Potential:
f. (U) Methodology. Assessments of potential allied and friendly PACOM contributions were developed from qualitative evaluations of individual country orientations and relationships with the United States, current and projected military capabilities and deficiencies, JCS/OSD guidance, force availability assumptions in US contingency plans, existing security arrangements, geostrategic position, and economic strength.
g. (U) Space Operations and Release of Advanced Weapon Systems to PACOM Area Nations
(I) (U) Space Operations
(a)

(2) (U) Release of Advanced Weapon Systems to PACOM Area Nations
(a)
2. (U) COUNTRY ANALYSIS
a. (U) The following pages summarize the bilateral strategy for each country in the PACOM area and identify potential roles and missions that offer mutual benefits for the US, US allies, and other friendly nations.

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## PACIFIC COMMAND MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY

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OF ADVANCED WEAPON SYSTEMS ..... 25-1
APPENDICES
I. Extracts from the FY 1985-1989
Defense Guidance ..... I-1
a. (U) Classification. Unless stated otherwise on individual pages, this entire document is SECRET, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.
b. (U) Purpose
(1) (U) The PACOM Multinational Strategy is a planning guideline to promote and integrate the active and potential contributions of nations in the PACOM Area of Responsibility to US security objectives. It is consistent with policy guidance promulgated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and fulfills taskings given by the JCS to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific. Its purpose is to determine how each country in the PACOM area (as well as China and Western allies with forces/defense commitments in the area) could best support US security objectives and strengthen our combined capabilities, if it were willing and able to do so. It seeks to expand to the extent possible those military roles and missions of other nations which can complement US objectives and actions. However, it is recognized that political sensitivities are such that for some countries the most we can realistically expect is indirect support.
(2)

(2) (U) Other countries obviously perceive their defense requirements differently than the US does. Their forces are

designed to accomplish the missions their governments perceive to be most important. Efforts to bring about fundamental changes in the policies or forces of the nations may often times not be feasible. Recommendations made in this study are directed toward realistic improvements to accomplish mutually beneficial roles and missions.
(3)
e. (U) Relevant Guidance
(1)




(b)
$+$


(3)
(U) Conclusions regarding bilateral strategy and the direction of US-Allied/friendly improvements for accomplishing mutually beneficial roles and missions are covered in Chapters 3 thru 24.
g. (U) Relationship of the Multinational Strategy to US Force Needs
(I)

(2)


h. (U) Relationship of the Multinational Strategy to the

PACOM Strategic Concept and the PACOM Operational Concept
(1)
(2)
i. (U) The Elements of the Multinational Strategy
(1)


2. (U) PROJECT ANALYSIS
a. (U) Contribution Potential
(I) (CNAF)

(4) (U) Countries placed in the center area of the chart in figure $2-1$ are classified as having moderate potential to contribute. Their moderate contribution capabilities are matched by a moderate propensity for defense cooperation. The capabilities of these countries are accompanied by significant political inhibitions.
(5)


(8) (U) There is no need to establish a bipolar context in order to address the potential contributions of various countries. The categorization above allows examination of potential contributions while considering political conditions. The diversity of alignments is recognized and taken into account. Some countries' contributions are potentially significant; others are modest. In some cases, a full-open strategic dialogue is suggested. In others, unilateral uS plans are the best we can achieve.

b. (U) Methodology. Assessments of potential allied and friendly PACOM contributions were developed from qualitative evaluations of individual country orientations and relationships with the United States, current and projected military capabilities and deficiencies, JCS/OSD guidance, force availability assumptions in US contingency plans, existing security arrangements, geostrategic position, and economic strength.

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3. (U) JAPAN
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (U) The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (MST) is the cornerstone of U.S. - Japan security relations. The large contingent of U.S. forces in-country, led by Commander, U.S. Forces Japan (COMUSJAPAN), is an integral part of the U.S. forward deployment strategy.
(2) (U) Several formal consultative mechanisms established under the MST support an ongoing security dialogue. These mechanisms are summarized at Table 3-1. In addition to the security consultative fora, several other formal and informal programs have been established. Annual ministerial meetings of SECSTATE and SECDEF with their Japanese counterparts provide the opportunity to exchange views and promote new bilateral initiatives. The Systems and Technology Forum seeks to facilitate the transfer of military-related high technology information and foster more efficient weapons procurement. Numerous DOD-Japan Defense Agency (JDA) exchange programs are also in effect at the service and joint staff levels to promote mutual understanding of both countries' intelligence and operational systems and procedures.
(3)
$7414$


same favorable terms extended to North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) countries.
b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations
(I)

(2) (S /VF)
(3) (U) The current policy of limiting defense expenditures to less than $1 \%$ of gross national product (GNP)


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1
3-4

restricts efforts to accomplish the necessary Japanese SelfDefense Force modernization and enhancement programs. Building a political consensus to change this policy will not be easy, due to historical factors. Current economic considerations causing Government of Japan (GOJ) budgetary constraints will make the task even more difficult.
c. (U) Political Situation
(1) (U) The GOJ has proven to be extremely stable as evidenced by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) remaining in power since 1955. Despite this fact and the close association with the U.S. under the MST, significant portions of the political and public elements in Japan would vigorously oppose participation in a military coalition involving countries other than the U.S.
(2) (U) The war-renouncing clause of Japan's constitution provides the foundation for that opposition. Article IX has been legally interpreted to permit the formation and maintenance of Self Defense Forces solely for the immediate defense of Japan, but to prohibit military participation in collective security arrangements other than the MST, or the projection of power overseas. Furthermore, defense cooperation with the U.S. under the MST is restricted to defense of the territories under the administration of Japan.


reaction by other Asian countries to a greatly expanded Japanese military role outside the immediate area of Japan. Unpleasant memories of Japanese occupation prior to and during wWII remain strong. These concerns would have to be allayed in order to gain support for a stonger Japanese military role in the Far East. In that same vein, centuries of animosity and distrust between the Japanese and Koreans will impede progress towards active regional military cooperation regardless of constitutional interpretations.

## d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions

(1) ( 0NF)

(2) $5+4 \times 5$
(3) 40)
(4) (SAMr)
(5)

e. (U) Implications
(1)

(2) (sac)
(3) (9-4
(4) (U) Determination of the necessary JSDF force levels to perform the required missions is of fundamental importance. The bilateral planning process is the appropriate forum in which to refine specific requirements determined by independent U.S. and JDA analytical studies.
(5) (andiv)

(6) 5

5 (7) (U) Consideration of tapping Japan's tremendous shipbuilding capacity is fraught with political pitfalls. The impact of such a program on the U.S. shipbuilding industry will require extensive analysis. Significant congressional and labor opposition could be expected.

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(8) (U) Every effort must be made to maintain and improve military-to-military relations, with the Japan Self Defense Forces. We need to stay in touch with the military leadership, particularly the generation that will be the service leadership of the 1990's and should improve contacts with the Ground Defense Force. We should pursue expanded participation of U.S. and Japanese officers in our respective senior training schools and war colleges. At this time all available training slots are being utilized and quota limitations exist for the U.S. schools.
(9)

f. (U) Summary. See Table 3-3.


SEC KT


4. (U) KOREA
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (U) A Mutual Security Treaty links our two countries.

There is a large US force in-country led by Commander, US Forces Korea. He also commands a bilateral Combined Forces Command which coordinates military activities for the combined/integrated defense of ROK. Additionally, the senior US military officer in Korea serves as CINCUNC and as such is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Armistice. An extensive bilateral planning effort is in operation. Numerous in-country means exist to sustain bilateral dialogue. The annual Security Consultative Meeting, which SECDEF normally attends, capstones the security dialogue. There is a vast array of programs to enhance ROK and US military capabilities, strengthen interoperability and foster regional stability. Behind these many programs lie years of close military
(2)



(2)

c. (U) Political Situation
(I) sep


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on-going and their increasing capability for self-defense contributes to strategic regional security.
(2)

f. (U) Summary. See Table 4-1.

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5. (U) PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (s/ary)
b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
(I) (CAM)

(2)

(3) 107
(4) 6

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C. (U) Political Situation
(1) (U) A common concern for security in the face of the Soviet Union's drive for military superiority is the underpinning of US-PRC security cooperation and provides its political rationale. In this regard, the US views China as an important contributor to the global balance, primarily by occupying soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border, but also by helping to maintain regional stability by dampening DPRK aggressiveness and inhibiting SRV adventurism.
(2)


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e. (U) Action Required
(1) (surn

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f. (U) US Benefits
(1) (U) The most immediate benefit to be gained from a closer security relationship with China is the increased probability of more favorable parallel actions on the part of the Chinese. Additionally, by laying a sound basis within the relationship, future interactions will likely be more lasting.
g. (U) Chinese Benefits
(1) (U) By developing closer ties to the US, China is in a position to receive considerable assistance in achieving its modernization goals by the end of this century. Concomitantly, technological assistance in the area of defense will assist in retarding and possibly reducing the qualitative gap between the PLA and Soviet forces opposing each other along the Sino-Soviet border.
h. (U) US Costs
(1)



6. (U) TAIWAN
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (U) US security assistance to Taiwan is governed by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) enacted by Congress in April 1979 to provide a mechanism for maintaining substantive relations with the people on Taiwan. The TRA commits the United States to "provide such defense articles and services" needed by Taiwan, as determined by the President and Congress, and reviewed by US military authorities. The People's Republic of China (PRC) Taiwan's principal adversary, exerts considerable political pressure on the United States to limit or curtail US security assistance to Taiwan. On 17 August 1982, the United states and the PRC issued a Joint Communique addressing the issue of US security assistance to Taiwan. The Joint Communique states "the United States . . . does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative forms, the level of those supplied in recent years . . . and that it (the US) intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.
(2) (U) Taiwan purchases arms and services through FMS and commercially. Based on the 17 August 1982 Joint

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Communique, the total dollar value of Taiwan's purchases, including deliveries and license approvals, will diminish from its present level of approximately $\$ 1.2$ billion in FY 84 dollars.
(3) (U) All US military and official representatives were withdrawn from Taiwan in April 1978. US government contractors and civilians working for the US instrument, the American Institute in Taiwan, maintain close ties with the Taiwan Ministry of Defense and its Services. Official military-tomilitary contact is prohibited.
b. (U) Current Capabilities/Limitations


c. (U) Political Situation
(1) (U) Maintaining substantive relations with the PRC and Taiwan simultaneously has been a major political victory, however demanding. Because of the unique sensitivities involved, it is imperative that the United States downplay the "form" of its relations with Taiwan, while continuing to fulfill its substantive commitments as outlined in the TRA. Downplaying "form" will also alleviate PRC political pressures and rhetoric, thereby enhancing Taiwan's security.
d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions. Not applicable.
e. (U) Action Required
(1)

f. (U) US Benefits
(1)

g. (U) Benefits to Taiwan
(1) (U) Whatever form the resolution of the Chinese civil war assumes will largely depend on Taiwan's ability to resist PRC political and military pressure. Taiwan views continuing US support as essential to its political survival. Security assistance enables Taiwan to deal with the PRC from a relatively strong and secure position.
h. (U) US Costs
(I) (U) The United States pays a high political price for helping sustain Taiwan, particularly vis-a-vis the pRC.
i. (U) Summary. See Table 6-1.

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7. (U) PHILLIPINES
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) A Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) exists between our two countries. The MDT remains in effect indefinitely or until terminated on one year's notice by either party. The commitment of the US to the defense of the Philippines is further defined by the letter from Secretary of state Vance to Foreign Minister Romulo of 7 Jan 1979.

(2)


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c. (U) Political Situation
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(2) (U) As previously discussed, the primary internal political factor affecting the GOP's ability to modernize and upgrade its armed forces is the economic situation. If the economic situation remains stagnant or worsens, the necessary funding for the military would be difficult to obtain.
d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions
(1) (s


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## (2) (5/vis)

(3) (U) Continued active participation of the GOP in

ASEAN affairs should be encouraged.
e. (U) Implications
(1)


(3) L/



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8. (U) SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF BURMA
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) $\rightarrow$
(2) (U) There is no question that Burma appreciates the IMET program. Following a twelve year gap, the program was resumed during FY 80. Three officers were trained in FY 80 and six in FY 81. The FY 82 level of funding has allowed twenty six Burmese military students to receive US training.

b. (U) Current Capabilities/Limitations
(1) (U) Military modernization has long been deferred because of urgent developmental priorities and the expense of sustained military operations against insurgents and drug traffickers.
(2)

(3) 5


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C. (U) Political Situation
(1) (U) Beginning in the mid 1970s, after over a decade of doctrinaire single-party socialism and self-imposed isolation, Burma began to look cautiously outward again, to seek aid and ideas from the West, and reopen channels of international cooperation. Although this change has opened important new possibilities for the West in Burma, it has been conducted at a deliberately slow pace. Burma is determined to preserve its political, economic and cultural autonomy at all costs, retain an imposed socialist economic structure, and continue the single, military-dominated party's firm control under the present leadership. Burmese policy and behavior, therefore, remain fundamentally grounded in nonalignment.
(2) (U) There is concern about Soviet aggressive behavior internationally, but care is taken not to say too much publicly. Concern over China is nearer to the surface, including a fear that the United States may regard the China connection as so important that we will overlook China's
continued support for communist insurgents in Southeast Asia. This Burmese sensitivity should be kept in mind as it could impact significantly on future relations with the US. There is considerable displeasure over China's continuing support of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP).
(3)
d. (U) Action Required
(1)

(2)

(3) 18
(4)
(5) (S/NF)
e. (U) US Benefits
(1) (U) The US maintains a high respect for the Burmese policy of nonalignment and wishes to see Burma's continued progress as an independent and stable nation. US efforts in this regard may well result in a closer uS-Burmese relationship and open the way for a more Western tilting Burma.


f. (U) Burmese Benefits
(1) (U) Closer relationships with the US and other Western countries could result in an increased access to advanced technology and development procedures. This knowledge could be employed by the Burmese to exploit their substantial natural resource base and thus improve the individual Burmese quality of life.
g. (U) US Costs
(1)

h. (U) Summary. See Table 8-1.


9. (U) THAILAND
a. (U) Current Programs
(1)

(2)


(5) (U) US-Thai combined exercises serve to improve Thailand's defense posture through additional exposure to US doctrine and techniques, and fit the pattern of our other exercises with friends and allies in the region.
b. (U) Current Capabilities/Limitations
(I) (U) The overall military capability of Thailand continues to increase for three major reasons:

- Qualitative and quantitative improvement in weapons systems and equipment.
- Increasing professionalism and technical proficiency.
- Continued steady economic growth in resources, productivity and technology.

(2) (U) Despite its improving military capability, Thailand is not capable of unilaterally repulsing a determined, coordinated attack.
(3)

(4) (U) The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) is capable of conducting routine peacetime and limited wartime missions. Naval forces suffer from unreliable, older ships and equipment, lack of qualified personnel, shortage of repair facilities and spare parts, limited opportunities for realistic training, and funding constraints.
(5) (U) The Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) can conduct offensive air operations against forces of equal size and close air support for current counterinsurgency operations. The capability to conduct sustained all-weather, combat operations is marginal. Limited air-ground coordination, poor resource management procedures, and over-centralization of command and control retard effective employment of air forces.


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c. (U) Political Situation
(1) (U) Thailand has been a close ally of the US
throughout the post-WWII period and sees the Manila pact of 1954 as an important element of its national security. Thailand relies on the US as the main source of major weapon purchases and bases the RTARF organization on US models. This commonality and our common interests form the basis for the high degree of US-Thai military cooperation. Additionally, the Thai have a pro-Western orientation and are moving toward a more democratic system.
(2) (U) Although the Thai government has frequently changed, the country is fundamentally stable without widespread dissidence. US-Thai relations are excellent and expected to remain so.
(3) (U) An area of major concern to both Thailand and the US is the resolution of the Kampuchean issue. The Thai properly assess the SRV threat as very severe, and they are determined to keep SRV forces deployed in Kampuchea and Laos from occupying Thai territory. In this regard, the Thai have turned to the US for material support, but have no desire to see the return of US military presence in Thailand. The Thai are also acutely aware of the potential long-term threats presented by both the Soviet Union and the PRC.

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d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions
(1) (U) Thailand, as a front line state for ASEAN, is facing Soviet-supported Vietnamese expansionism, and has defined its own primary roles and missions in terms of strengthening its forces to cope with the Vietnamese threat. However, it cannot rely on military means alone, and along with its ASEAN partners engages in active diplomatic efforts to impel the Vietnamese to withdraw from Kampuchea. While avoiding direct US military involvement, we have supported the Thai in both military and diplomatic efforts.
(2)

e. (U) Action Required
(1)

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f. (U) US Benefits
(1) (s/nN $)$
g. (U) Thai Benefits
(1) (U) The Thai see their security as being enhanced by:
a) improved military capabilities; and b) a continuing security association with the United States which bodes well for regional stability.


a. (U) Current Programs
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$V^{\prime \prime} 1$ RELEAS SLE TO OREIGN NATIGNALS
(3) (6)
d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions
(1) (0nst $)$



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(3) (U) US Costs.
(a) $\left(\ln , N V^{2}\right)$

f. (U) Summary. See Table 10-1.



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11. (U) INDONESIA
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (U) The US currently sells arms and equipment to Indonesia under both FMS and commercial sales. Training is provided under both FMS and a very substantial IMET program. Funds are still being expended under a residual military Assistance Program. Indonesia and the United States have recently established a Defense Technological Industrial Cooperation Program in which GOI has been very interested.
(2)

(3)
b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
(1) (U) The Indonesian armed forces have a dual function: national defense/security and nation-building/politicaleconomic development. Involvement with the civil function does


tend to impair military readiness. The armed forces are primarily oriented towards internal security although there has been a major effort in recent years to build an improved conventional defense and surveillance capability.
(2) (U) The Army is capable of maintaining internal security (as well as participating in international peacekeeping operations) and, in conjunction with the other services, could repel a minor military incursion; however, it could not repel a large-scale invasion.
(3)

(4)
(5)

c. (U) Political Situation
(I) (U) Suharto has ruled Indonesia as president since
1966. He has led the country with a quiet effectiveness;
however, problems of population pressure and uneven economic developement continue to impede progress.
(2) (U) The most important single element in Suharto's base of support is the armed forces. Although Indonesia does not have a military government, military officers are involved in government (as legislators, governors, regents, etc) at every level in consonance with the doctrine of the armed forces' dual function.
(3)


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(4) (U) In contemplating any change in its foreign policy, GOI must consider the delicate internal political balance. The population consists of many ethnic groups, some of which have exhibited separatist tendencies. There is some tension between the fundamentalist-Muslim minority (30\%) and the nominal Muslim majority/non-Muslims. Islamic fundamentalists tend to exhibit an anti-Western bias because of a conflict of values. This is exacerbated by their pro-Arab view of the Middle East conflict.
d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
(1) (S/NF)
(2) (SANF)


mines. Indonesian control of shipping lanes passing through the important straits in the archipelago also requires improved ASW and MCM capability to detect and counter potential chokepoint interdiction by submarines using torpedoes, missiles, or mines.
e. (U) Implications
(1) Forces Required.
(a)

(b) (5/2)
(2) (U) Potential Benefits
(a) $\left(\mathrm{C}, \mathrm{F}^{\circ}\right)$

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(b) (s/anc
(3) (U) Country Benefits.
(a)


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(4) (U) US Costs.
(a)
f. (U) Summary. See Table 11-1.

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12. (U) MALAYSIA
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) $10 r$
b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations
(1) 109



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(1) (0, $\left.\mathrm{NF}^{\circ}\right)$

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NO RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN 12-3
(2) (U) Any change GOM would like to make in its traditional foreign policy would have to take into account the delicate internal political balance of ethnic and religious groups. Moreover, existing racial tensions could be exacerbated by the growth of Islamic fundamentalism among Malays. The identification of militant Muslims with the Arab cause and their somewhat anti-Western bias complicates any move GOM may wish to make towards the US.


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## (4)


d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
(1) (SMF)


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(2) (U) US Potential Benefits.
(a) $(\mathrm{e}, \mathrm{NF})^{y}$
(b) (cNa)
(3) (U) Country Benefits. (s, 1 re)


(4) (U) US Costs. 58
f. (U) Summary. See Table 12-1.

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13. (U) OCEANIA AND INDIAN OCEAN ISLAND STATES

13A. (U) OCEANIA
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) $C T$



b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations
(1) 10,


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c. (U) Political Situation
(1)


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(I) (U) Force Required--None.
(2)

(3) (U) Country Benefits. Increased foreign exchange, potential for creating jobs, and maintenance of status quo.
(4) (U) US Costs. Minimal if modest IMET program for

Maldives is funded and military-to-military contacts are maintained at present levels.
f. (U) Summary: See Table l3-1.

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14. (U) PAPUA NEW GUINEA
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) rot
b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations
(1) $\sqrt{T}$

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## (2) 4

c. (U) Political Situation
(1) 19,


(3) (U) Country Benefits - Increased security and stability resulting from ability to control its borders; continuing to enjoy expanding us trade relations.
(4) (U) US Costs - Modest, if FMS/Expanded Relations/ Exchange programs and military-to-military contacts are increased to degree necessary to upgrade PNGDF. Small IMET program needs to be increased.
f. (U) Summary. See Table 14-1.
15. (U) FIJI
a. (U) Current Programs
(1)

b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations
(1)


(1)

d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
(I) C)


## SECREO

SELEASABLD 10 FOREICN NATIONALS
e. (U) Implications

- (U) Force Required - None.
- (U) US Potential Benefits - Maintenance of status quo assures a nation friendly to the US and ANZUS will be in position to aid in forming pro-Western opinion and to provitie necessary leadership in maintaining status quo.
- (U) Country Benefits - Maintenance of status quo and continuing to enjoy expanding us trade relations.
- (U) US Costs - Minimal if modest FMS/IMET/Expanded Relations/Exchange programs and military to military contracts are maintained at present levels.
f. (U) Summary. See Table 15-1.



## SECRET

NOT DUEASABLE TO HOREIGN NATVONALS
16. (U) NEPAL
a. (0, NF $)$
b. $(0 \mathrm{NF})^{\prime}$


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OTMELEASABLE TO




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NOT LEASABLE TO TREIGN NATD-NALS
18. (U) SRI LANKA
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) C)
b. (U) Current Country Capabilities and Limitations
(1) $C$
c. (U) Political Situation
(1)


e. (U) Implications
(1)

(U) Summary. See Table 18-1.



20. (U) AUSTRALIA
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (U) Australian defense interests are linked to those of the $U S$ through the ANZUS Mutual Security Treaty. Practically all defense relationships are based on this treaty; in fact, much of the justification for military expenditures by the government of Australia lies in a self-perceived requirement to be able to contribute adequate forces in support of the Treaty. Various ANZUS consultative meetings ensure the viability of the ANZUS relationship. The annual ANZUS Council meeting is conducted at Secretary of Stare/Foreign Minister level. Military-oriented meetings range from the ANZUS MILREP Meeting and Staff Level Meeting through Service-to-Service Talks down to seminar and exercise planning meetings. USAustralian policy level discussions, based on the 1973 BarnardSchlesinger Agreement, focus on broad policy questions of US national strategy and Australian national security interests. Australia is also included on the CINCPAC warning network and both countries' military intelligence services participate in an intelligence exchañge program. Additionally, Australian/US staffs exchange information annually on each country's military assistance to regional nations. At present, there is no program for coordinating these military assistance programs.


## 


(2) 10 CH

C. (U) Political Situation
(1) (f) In March 1983 the Liberal Party-National Country

Party Coalition which was supportive of US defense activities was defeated in a national election by the Australian Labour Party (ALP) which has been critical of us activities.



f. (U) Action Required
(1) 15

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(2)

g. (U) US Benefits
(1) (S/N
h. (U) Country Benefits
(1)



SEC $\sim T$
21. (U) NEW ZEALAND
a. (U) Current Programs
(1)





SECREO
NRELEASABLE TO UREIGN NM ONALS
e. (U) Additional Forces Required (1)
f. (U) Actions Required
(1)


g. (U) US Benefits
(1) $(5 / x+5$
h. (U) Country Benefits
(1) (U) A coordinated multinational strategy could enhance New zealand's regional role and develop a deployable force. It would also give credibility to New zealand's contribution to the ANZUS alliance.
i. (U) US Cost
(1)

j. (U) Summary. See Table 21-1.


SECRO
NO RELEASABY TO FORETO NATIONALS
22. (U) FRANCE
a. (U) Current Programs.
(1) (CNF) Many of the agreements the US has with France in the Indian Ocean are verbal agreements.
b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations in PACOM Area
(1)


SECREN
NOMRELEASA TE TO FOREION NATIONN
c. (U) Political Situation
(1)
d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions
(1) (s/mery




SECPR
NI RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN MrIONALS
23. (U) UNITED KINGDOM
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) 15
(2) 5
b. (U) Current Capabilities and Limitations in PACOM Area
(1)

(2)
c. (U) Political Situation
(1) (U) The United Kingdom is a signatory to the Five Power Defence Arrangement linking it to the security of Singapore and Malaysia, as well as Australia and New Zealand.
(2) (U) The United Kingdom is also a signatory to the Manila pact which encompasses security obligations among Thailand, the Philippines, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.
(3) (U) In accordance with significant changes in British defense policy, however, British overseas bases east of Suez have been disestablished and most forces withdrawn. This significantly reduces the United Kingdom's ability to meet any FPDA or Manila Pact defense obligations and limits her ability to interoperate with US forces in the PACOM. Britain also faces severe economic problems which limit her ability to undertake military training exercises in the Pacific theater.
d. (U) Recommended New Roles and Missions
(1)




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24. (U) CANADA
a. (U) Current Programs
(1) (U) The Governments of Canada and the United States have entered into a number of bilateral defense agreements stemming from the Canada-United States Basic Security Plan (BSP). The BSP brings together in one document the entire spectrum of Canada-United States (CANUS) regional defense at the national level. It establishes the general approach, command and responsibility framework, and key aspects of operational and operational support coordination essential to effective bilateral defense planning and operations. The BSP is maintained in consonance with national and allied defense plans that affect one or both countries.
(2)


c. (G/NF) Political Outlook
(1) (U) The Liberal Party government of the Canadian Prime Minister will retain its parliamentary majority for at least the next year. Leadership problems in the major opposition party, the Progressive Conservatives, continue to hamper their efforts to mount a strong challenge to the Liberal Party's majority. Canada continues to be a strong ally of the United States; however, there has been significant public opposition to the Canadian Government's decision to enter into the United States-Canada Weapons Testing Agreement (February 1983). Under this agreement, the United States has requested permission to test the Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for night, and will request permission to test the air-launched cruise missile and other weapon systems in Canada.
d. (U) Recommended Roles and Missions
(1) (U) No specific recommendations are in order other than to maintain and foster the close United States-Canada defense relationships already in existence. The unique

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geographic proximity of the United States and Canada requires that these relationships continue in order to provide a credible defense for the North American Continent and its approaches. The United states should encourage the Canadians to fully implement their maritime force modernization programs, especially the Canadian Patrol Frigate program. These programs are essential if the Canadians are to achieve a credible maritime capability.


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NOMELEASABLE FOREIGN NONALS
25. (U) SPACE OPERATIONS AND RELEASE OF ADVANCED WEAPON

SYSTEMS TO PACOM AREA NATIONS
a. (U) Space Operations
(1)

b. (U) Release of Advanced Weapon Systems to PACOM Area

Nations
(1)




## APPENDIX I

EXTRACTS FROM THE FY 1985-1989 DEFENSE GUIDANCE, 1 MARCH 1983
World Environment


Changing Character of Soviet Military Capabilities
(U) Over the past decade, the Soviets have been better equipping themselves not only to conduct military operations against NATO, but also to carry out projection of power and influence beyond the Eurasian land mass. They are pursuing a broad strategy--involving economic aid, advisors, military assistance, misinformation, propaganda offensives, subversion, and use of proxy forces--to increase their political influence, obtain base and facility use, and support and enhance worldwide Soviet military operations. Soviet capabilities to project power into crisis areas at substantial distances from soviet borders will continue to grow.

Emerging Strategic Problems


National Security Objectives
(U) Limit Soviet military advantages by strengthening U.S. and allied military capabilities, by pursuing equitable and


verifiable arms control agreements, and by preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies and resources to the Soviet Union.

## Defense Policy

(U) An indispensable component of the worldwide military posture the U.S. seeks to achieve and maintain is:
-- In conjunction with our Allies, the ability to generate land force superiority in theaters of choice, maritime superiority in key ocean areas, air superiority in key combat areas, continued deployments in NATO Europe, Western pacific and SWA/Indian Ocean, rapidly projectable central reserves, intelligence capabilities adequate to prevent surprise, a responsive industrial and mobilization base, and exploitation of superior technology for military use.

## Conventional Forces

P 7-8

Special Operations Forces

## P8



Plo (U) Mobilization plans must include a range of actions for implementation prior to a declaration of war or national emergency, for the different levels of mobilization, and for the resources necessary to sustain the forces. Planning must include the other federal departments and agencies, as well as Host Nation Support, to ensure the availability of resources and support beyond the ability of DOD to provide. We should foster similar preparations by our Allies.



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adequate security assistance funding, as well as the availability of these funds on a multi-year basis, and removal of restrictions impeding our assistance to key regional partners in collective security programs.

-- (U) Expand military training (IMET) and seek reform of cost formulas for Foreign Military Sales training.


East Asia and the Pacific


(U) The U.S., and more particularly our Allies', dependence on oil imports presents a potentially serious security and

economic risk because of the major impact of an extended or large-scale interruption. We must develop plans and provisions for reducing the risk of, and vulnerabilities to, major'oil supply disruptions.
$(U)$ The dependence of our Allies on the Soviet Union as a major supplier of natural gas is also of significant concern. In addition, the Soviets' hard currency earnings derived from energy sales adversely affect our security interests. The DOD will activively support U.S. policy of encouraging development. of secure Western energy resources.


Freedom of the Seas and Transit Rights
P20
(U) We must protect our rights and freedoms of navigation overflight, and contain unilateral coastal and archipelagic
claims and encroachments which impinge upon those rights and freedoms. The national program for asserting navigation and overflight rights in the face of excessive maritime claims must be vigorously pursued. We must also recognize that there is an economic and strategic interest in preserving access rights to minerals of the deep seabed.

## Forward Deployment

-- (U) Overseas facilities and HNS arrangements will be needed to support forward deployments and reinforcements in Allied countries.
-- (U) The U.S. will seek agreements that permit U.S. overflights and access to airfields and ports. To permit effective use of deployed forces, the U.S. will encourage improvement of selected Allied and friendly facilities.

1 -- (U) The U.S. will supplement strategic airlift and seaift capabilities by pre-positioning of material ashore and at sea for U.S. forces for rapid response and reinforcement.


## SECRET <br> not reieasable to foreign nationals

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