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Perceptions of Regional Actors, Phase II

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Taiwan

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



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SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION (This Section is Unclassified)


1-1 OVERVIEW


Recent events in Asia, and Northeast Asia in particular, have made it increasingly clear that a major change in the geostrategic balance has been taking place along the periphery of the Soviet Union. Without question, such changes in the threat and hence the regional strategic balance, could be highly detrimental to U.S. interests, as well as those of regional allies and other regional powers such as Oman, Taiwan and the Yemen Arab Republic. The net effect of such changes is that the range of possible regional conflict scenarios suggests requirements for U.S. nuclear weapons utilization against regional targets in the event of such conflict.

In light of these changes in the balance, the perceptions of these changes, and the resulting strategic doctrines held by adversaries and allies alike, the present analysis supports the Defense Nuclear Agency in a net assessment of the PACOM area in two specific categories. First, the analysis considers the perceptions of friendly and neutral PACOM states, to the extent they can be determined, regarding U.S. nuclear employment options in Asia. Considered here are a variety of conflict scenarios involving the Soviet Union as well as Soviet proxy forces within Asia.

Second, the analysis focuses on the perceptions of PACOM states either allied with the Soviet Union or unfriendly to the U.S. Of particular concern in this analysis are the potential reactions of hostile PACOM area states to U.S. regional deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and the use of these weapons in the event of regional conflict.

¹See, for example, Avigdor Haselkorn, Northeast Asian National Security Perspectives, AAC-TR-17901/80 (Marina del Rey: Analytical Assessments Corp., June 1980).





1-2 UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN THE PACOM AREA

As indicated, it is already clear that a major change in the geostrategic balance along the Soviet periphery-from the Middle East to the Far East-is taking place, altering dramatically the threat to the U.S. and allied nations in the area. The major force working to alter the net military balance is the Soviet Union, seeking to counter what it perceives as an emerging U.S.-Japanese-Chinese axis. The counter-strategies likely to be adopted by the Soviets could adversely affect the peacetime positions of regional "allies," as evidenced in Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Due to the Sino-Pakistani alliance, this would, in turn, further damage the latter's geostrategic position, already under severe pressure because of Iran's destabilization.

A rearranged constellation of forces, involving North Korea, Afghanistan, India, and other Soviet "proxies," orchestrated at least to some degree by the Soviets, could further weaken the position of the United States and its allies in Asia. Such allies are looking increasingly to the U.S. as the threats from the Soviets, and the Soviet allied states in this critical region, become increasingly clear, both in political terms as well as in their military implications.²

1-3 STUDY OBJECTIVES

In light of this perspective, the analysis first describes the issues most important in formulating the perceptions held by national leaders of the full range of states in the PACOM area with respect to possible U.S. use of nuclear weapons in Asia. It is based on public statements and other relevant open sources emanating from the countries themselves as well as available intelligence materials.



²See, for example, Fredric S. Feer, Avigdor Haselkorn and Abraham R. Wagner, <u>Naval Strategies for the Persian Gulf</u> (Unpublished).

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There are several important points which should be stressed. First, with regard to the various states, the question inevitably arises of how "real" perceptions are separated from propaganda. For example, anti-Chinese statements are reasonably well balanced between the foreign and domestic press in the Soviet Union, and the content of each is similar, if not identical. But a definitive disparity exists between the content of anti-Soviet articles published by the Chinese for foreign consumption, and those generated for domestic audiences. "There also appears to be an increasing stridency in the Chinese propaganda efforts toward the Soviet Union that makes it difficult to accurately evaluate in terms of seriousness and meaning." 3

The problem of developing an understanding of Soviet perceptions is compounded by the apparent growth of specialized interest groups within the various Soviet bureaucracies, each with its own parochial viewpoint. In addition, the secretive nature of the decision making process in Communist countries makes it "impossible to know whether and to what degree a particular Soviet policy [for instance] is influenced by the perceptions of a dominant interest group or among those interest groups." Thus, an additional degree of uncertainty is added to any Western discussion of Soviet perceptions. 5

⁵Daniel S. Papp, "Toward an Estimate of the Soviet World View," Naval War College Review (November-December 1979), p. 61. See by comparison, Sergei Freidzon, The Soviet Defense Council and the Decision Making Process in Military Planning: A Research Note, AAC-WN-8101 (Marina del Rey: Analytical Assessments Corp., July 1980).



³Burrell H. Landes, "Sino-Soviet Relations Since the Death of Mao Zedong," <u>Naval War College Review</u> (September-October 1978), p. 35.

⁴Vernon V. Aspaturian, <u>Power and Process in Soviet Foreign Policy</u> (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1971), pp. 555-558; Ilana Kiamant-Kass, "The Soviet Military and Soviet Policy in the Middle East 1970-73," <u>Soviet Studies</u> (October 1974), pp. 510-527; and Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Military Influence on Foreign Policy," <u>Problems of Communism</u> (September-October 1973), pp. 1-12.



Second, at the other extreme, in democratic countries, one is often overwhelmed by the amount and diversity of opinions expressed or published. Thus, it often becomes equally difficult to determine the degree of prominence or the lasting nature of any of the views publicized. In order to be useful, the analysis includes an assessment of changes in military capabilities and doctrine as only one element of a series of "screening-mechanisms" which may produce more accurate estimates of the perceptions of leaders.

1-4 METHODOLOGY


The study is designed to arrive at projections of likely national behavior of both major powers and third world countries in the Southwest Asia-Far East region which would influence future U.S. policy and military deployments in the area. Secondly, it is to provide a basis for speculating on possible local reactions to U.S. theater nuclear force modernization plans.

The prime method of analysis utilized is the study of perceptions held by local foreign and defense policy-making elites using the public pronouncements. The study focuses on current perspectives, and, in most cases, an effort has been made to employ primary sources. Secondary sources were utilized where no alternative was identified.

Three stages of analysis have been covered in the report:

- (1) Elite views of its own national objectives and goals--self-perception.
- (2) Analysis of the local leaderships' perceptions of its subsystems. Since most countries in question could independently influence only their immediate geographical surroundings, their security concerns were hypothesized to be largely confined by objective constraints. Consequently, the perceived regional priorities and potential threats of local countries became a central topic.





(3) Assumed as an indirect, but powerful, determinant of international conduct, the study examines the views held by local leaders of the impact the U.S.-Soviet balance of power has on (1) and (2) above.

The issues examined in the above three categories of perceptions, were those judged most likely to influence future national behavior. They include:

Self-Image of Regional Actors

- o Identify perceptions potentially capable of causing severe dislocations in the area:
 - Irredentists claims; pronounced "dreams" and messianic tendencies; radical ideologies.
 - Changes in country's military posture since leadership has taken power.
- o Friendly powers' perception of national objectives.

Perceptions of the Subsystem

- o Regional allies versus rivals.
- o Perception of blocs and stability of local coalitions.
- o Local perception of existence of regional proxies.
- o Views about the region's future and the main dangers it may confront.

Perception of U.S.-Soviet Balance of Power

- tocal perceptions of the superpowers' positive versus negative goals.
- Perception of trends in the U.S.-Soviet balance of powers and what impact it might have on the country.
- Perception of the linkage mechanism between the particular country and the U.S.-Soviet balance:





- How sensitive is the link?
- Is it amenable to local manipulation?
- o Possible impact of U.S. force modernization on these perceptions and on the country's policies toward its neighbors, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.



SECTION 2

OMA N

(This Section is unclassified)

2-1 SELF-PERCEPTION

Three potential vulnerabilities threaten the long-term status quo in $\mbox{\it Oman:}$

- (1) The personal legitimacy of the Sultan is relatively precarious;
- (2) The regime has been out of step with ideological currents in the Arab world; and
- (3) The governmental structure has been too rudimentary to generate much system legitimacy across such a vast territory (100,000 square miles).

These vulnerabilities were crystallized by the Dhofar rebellion which broke out in 1964 and were responsible for the isolation and overthrow of Qaboos ibn Sa'id's father on 23 July 1970.

2-1.1 The Dhofar Rebellion

Sultan Qaboos began to focus on Oman's vulnerabilities in a deliberate fashion, though most of his immediate attention was with the Dhofar rebellion. After the coup, Qaboos asked the rebels to put down their arms and cooperate in developing the country. The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf and its ally, the National Democratic Front for the Occupied Arabian Gulf, were unimpressed and declined his offer. In 1972, the two nationalist liberation fronts were unified and in July 1974 they took on the name People's Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO).

The Dhofar rebels (PFLO) were supported by South Yemen which was acquiring aid from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and USSR. By May 1972, Umani forces with assistance from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Pakistan and India attacked the border areas of South Yemen. In 1973, the Sultan also utilized Iranian counter insurgency forces to maintain the road to Salala in Dhofar. While ultimately



successful, Arab nationalist circles bitterly opposed the use of Iranian troops. The rebellion was finally crushed in December 1975 partly due to Iran's military assistance and partly due to the reduction in Chinese support for the Dhofar rebels as Peking sought to improve its relations with Iran.

Saudi Arabia negotiated the cease-fire between Oman and South Yemen on 11 March 1976 and Sultan Qaboos granted amnesty to Omanis who fought for the PFLO. Since the cease-fire, reports from South Yemeni exiles suggest an increase in support for the PFLO from the Cubans, and sporadic conflicts have continued to occur (e.g., in June 1978 a party of British engineers was attacked in Dhofar and in June 1979 the Governor of Dhofar was assassinated). Though the PFLO has become largely an external force, apparently achieving little success in attracting adherents within Oman, its potential for causing problems in the future remains serious.

2-1.2 The Strait of Hormuz

Iran withdrew the bulk of its forces from Dhofar in January 1977, although a token force remained until the revolution in Iran in early 1979. The exit of the Shah from Iran had a destabilizing effect on Oman. Iran was transformed from an ally to a potential threat to the Northern Musandam Peninsula, guarding the strategic Strait of Hormuz. The entire Omani navy with a post on Goat Island (with British contract officers support) has two missile boats, four gunboats, two support ships, some landing craft and a wooden dhow to guard the strategic Strait of Hormuz, the "Western World's jugular vein." Before the Iran-Iraq war, an average

³The Military Balance 1981-1982 (London: IISS, 1981), p. 55. More than half the oil exported to the U.S., Western Europe and Japan passes through the 28 mile wide strait.



¹Michael C. Hudson, <u>Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy</u> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 208.

²The Middle East and North Africa, 1980-81 (27th Edition) (Europa Publications Limited, 1981), p. 621.



of 78 ships a day passed through the strait; with the war's onset, traffic declined to two-thirds of that average. Also since the war, "Iranian pilots have buzzed [the Musandam Peninsula] nearly every day." Recently Oman expressed its desire for advanced fighters capable of dealing with the F-14s in Iran's possession (e.g., F-16s, Mirage-2000, or Tornado).

In sum, one of the world's most strategic places remains thinly defended. Oman's 20,000-man military, trained and led by British officers, is rated one of the best in the Middle East, but it remains one of the smallest. With Iran neutralized by revolution and war, with Russian submarine pens in South Yemen and new air bases in Afghanistan, and American contractors installing "facilities" (intended for contingency use by U.S. forces) on Oman's Masirah Island, it appears that Oman has no choice but to devote significant resources (almost 38 percent of its budget) and much attention to upgrading its defense, acquiring Western military supplies, and cooperating closely with the United States. The Omanis have recently put a price tag on their cooperation with the United States. According to Youssef Alawi, Oman hopes for between \$200-250 million worth of arms as grant aid in addition to \$1 billion for improvement of its military facil-This expectation far exceeds the \$280 million the U.S. has allocated, over a three-year period, to upgrade four airports at Seeb (outside Muscat), Khasab on the Hormuz Strait, Thamarit in Dhofar, and on Masirah Island, the main staging area (because of its isolation) for the RDF.8



Interview with Navy Lieutenant Salim Abdullah Rashid in "Oman: Guardian of the Gulf," National Geographic Vol. 160, No. 3 (September 1981), p. 350.

⁵ lb id.

⁶Youssef Alawi (Omani Foreign Ministry Under Secretary) interview with Washington Post (undated). See David B. Ottaway, "Oman Expects U.S. Help for Use of Its Bases," The Washington Post (7 April 1982), pp. Al; 19.

⁷⁰ttaway, p. Al.

^{8&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. A19.



2-1.3 Modernization: A Mixed Blessing

On the one hand the Sultan needs to modernize his country to help legitimize his rule. In fact, this is what he has done. Since his take-over in 1970, he has initiated radical changes, funded by Oman's petroleum income (350,000 b/d account for about 65 percent of GNP). For example, in 1970, there were only six miles of paved road and a few dozen cars and trucks in Oman. Now there are 1,100 miles of paved road and some 80,000 motor vehicles. In 1970, there was only a small American mission hospital in Matrah and only one Omani medical doctor serving the entire country. Now the Ministry of Health runs 14 hospitals, 70 clinics and 26 mobile units with more than 235 doctors. In 1970, there were only 3 schools; now 100,000 pupils enjoy free education in 365 schools.

The effect of this rapid modernization remains unclear, but the Sultan has indicated concern about the effects of outside influences on Oman. In a recent interview Qaboos noted:

We are not ready to entertain foreign guests yet. I have seen what mass tourism can do-in Spain, for instance. We do not want to jeopardize our cultural identity. 10


2-2 PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUBSYSTEM

Saudi Arabia's position of prestige in the subsystem and assistance in the settlement of the Dhofar rebellion has had, and is likely to exert, a more significant influence on future Omani policy. The Sultan articulated this factor in a recent interview:

Oman is already cooperating fully with our brothers of Saudi Arabia and will continue to do so. This cooperation between our brother states of the Gulf is the whole motivation and purpose of the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)...[which] is a step of the highest significance not only in furthering cooperation between the states of the Gulf

George A. Nader, "Oman's Modernization and Strategic Role," Middle East Insight, Vol. II, No. 2 (January-February 1982), p. 39.

^{10 &}quot;Oman: Guardian of the Gulf," op. cit., p. 357.



in all fields, but as a positive contribution of the greatest importance to the security, peace and stability of the region. Il

The GCC is an organization composed not only of Oman and Saudi Arabia, but also includes the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait. Its creation (May 1980) was largely precipitated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war and is composed of conservative and basically pro-Western monarchies. Thus, Oman sees regional instability coming from Iran and the so-called Pact of Conspiring members (Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen) relying upon Soviet (and Cuban) support. Juxtaposed to this "conspiracy" are Oman's allies; the members of the GCC (of which three--Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain--have military ties with the United States) and Jordan and North Yemen. The Sultan openly noted the potential sources of threat to regional security:

The pact signed last August between South Yemen, Ethiopia and Libya--the Pact of Conspiracy as it has come to be called-must be regarded with grave con-For many years, South Yemen has been an active and obedient agent of Soviet policy, sending its troops on Soviet orders to fight on the side of the Ethiopians against brother Arabs, supporting the Soviet invasion of Muslim Afghanistan, the savage oppression of the Polish people, attempting to subvert brother Arab states, and handing over its territory to the Soviets to provide them with bases for the furtherance of their expansionist policies in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. Now, that regime has been joined in its activities by Gadafi with his known involvement with international terrorism and his flagrant use of his country's oil revenues against those who resist his ambitions. The result can only be regarded as ominous by all those who believe in the rule of law and the sanctity of national sovereignty. 12

^{1]}Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id interview, Middle East Insight Vol. II. No. 2 (January-February 1982), pp. 10-11.

¹²Ibid., p. 11.



Youssef Alawi (Foreign Ministry Under Secretary) recently noted that the three main threats to Omani security were: the USSR, Iran and Marxist South Yemen, adding there was "an understanding," although no formal written agreement, that the U.S. would help defend Oman. 13

The one potential wrinkle to Oman's position in the subsystem remains the Palestinian question. While Oman did support the Camp David approach to peace in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia was one of the Arab states which rejected it. Although Saudi Arabia did not join the radicals in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, it did make it clear that three principles were essential to peace:

- (1) Withdrawal of Israel from all Arab lands occupied in 1967:
- (2) Establishment of an independent Palestinian state; and
- (3) Return of Arab Jerusalem.


In early August 1981, Prince Fahd issued the so-called "Fahd Peace Plan" (which included these three principles) as an alternative to Camp David. Oman strongly supported the "Fahd Peace Plan." When queried about this apparent change in Omani policy, the Sultan claimed there was no contradiction:

There is no change in this policy. Fundamental both to my support of Camp David and the Saudi Arabian plan is my conviction that the Palestinian problem must be solved by peaceful means. Therefore, all avenues which may lead to this end must be seriously explored. 14

In summary, the increasing reliance of Oman upon Saudi Arabia and other conservative members of the GCC may create pressures, which Oman may feel unable to resist, for supporting Palestinian autonomy. This suggests that the longer the Palestine question remains unresolved and the U.S. continues to maintain its present position, the more precarious becomes

¹³ See Ottaway, op. cit., p. A19.

¹⁴Qaboos, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 12



Oman's position, utlimately either bending to subsystem pressures or alienating GCC allies. Recently, Youssef Alawi publicly noted that all Arabian Peninsula nations were "reluctant" to give the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) command the right to base itself on their territory because of U.S. support for Israel and the unresolved Palestinian issue. He then ominously warned that if the U.S. did not take steps to prevent threatened Israeli occupation of South Lebanon or formal annexation of the Left Bank, the new U.S.-Omani relationship might suffer a serious reverse. He noted:

You cannot expect Oman to be taking a step that will isolate it from the rest of the Arab countries. 15

American policy planners should take note of Oman's precarious subsystem position, and Palestine's potential for creating future tension in U.S.-Omani relations.

2-3 PERCEPTION OF U.S.-SOVIET BALANCE OF POWER

The Sultan clearly perceives the Soviet Union as a major cause of past and future troubles in Oman. Qaboos stated this quite clearly in two separate interviews:

We see the Soviet Union as a very real threat to the region. We learned that firsthand, fighting the communists in Dhofar. In the end, with help from our British and Iranian allies, we drove them from our soil. 16

Unhappily, it has been, and still is, necessary for us to allocate a substantial proportion of our national budget to defense because of the threat that exists to our country and to the area from Soviet expansionism and the hostile attitude of its satellite, South Yemen. 17



¹⁵See Ottaway, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. A19.

^{16&}quot;Oman: Guardian of the Gulf," op. cit., p. 357.

¹⁷ Sultan Qaboos, Middle East Insight, op. cit., pp. 10-11.



In a speech at the end of the first summit of the GCC in Abu Dhabi, Qaboos was quite specific in outlining the Soviet naval threat to the Gulf:

The USSR has a major fleet at the entrance to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, including the aircraft carrier Minsk, cruisers, destroyers and submarines... The puppets--set up by the Soviets and supplied with the most modern military equipment--in South Yemen, Ethiopia and Afghanistan are...advanced Soviet positions to be used when the need arises. The Soviet submarine base in Aden and the electronic control base in Socotra, as well as the Khormaksar airbase, are not there simply because of Aden's deliberate and contrived hostility toward the Sultanate.

... Mediation efforts could have succeeded in halting the conflict years ago, but this would have contradicted the Soviet strategy... Reconciliation robs the Soviets of any pretext of justifying their military presence in South Yemen and around the Gulf.

All the Soviets need are hotbeds of tension and an unstable security situation in and around the Gulf region as a pretext for interference. IB

Oman's perception of the Soviet threat should comfort American planners, as well as the level of their military cooperation with the United States. Even before the invasion of Afghanistan, Oman cooperated with U.S. efforts to buildup the American military presence in the region (e.g., they accepted the dispatch of a Pentagon team in search of access to military facilities on 17 December 1979). Ever since the Soviet invasion, that cooperation has become more pronounced. In June 1980, Oman granted the U.S. access rights to Omani military facilities. While this agreement is not in technical violation of the GCC (which is committed to not provide military "bases" to any outside nation), it has drawn criticism from the Palestinian-influenced Gulf press.

¹⁸ Muscat Domestic Service, 1320 GMT, 22 December 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (29 December 1981), pp. C2-3.



In 1981, while Oman allowed the U.S. organized Bright Star military exercises—commanded by the head of the RDF—to take place in Oman (and Egypt, the Sudan and Somalia), their sensitivity was quite apparent when they refused to allow any Western press coverage of American Marines landing on their shores. 19

Despite Omani reluctance to have Western press coverage of the Bright Star maneuvers, Youssef Alawi in a 9 November 1981 interview was quite forthright in explaining Oman's policy:

...the maneuvers cannot be interpreted as being directed against any Gulf state. The United States is a country which has transcended the stage of friendship to the point where it can be said that it is an allied state, despite the fact that there is nothing written in this respect.

...should the area be subjected to a Soviet onslaught, the Gulf states would be unable to repel this onslaught whether carried out by the agents of the Soviet Union of directly by it. In light of this situation, we must give the friend a chance to get to know the military area. Joint maneuvers are staged by all states. Has not the Soviet Union staged a maneuver with Syria recently? Despite this, nobody objected.²⁰

Though U.S.-Omani military cooperation has become close, there are limits to that cooperation and some potential clouds on the horizon. First, while it is necessary that the U.S. maintain the appearance of strength in the region (to satisfy Oman's need to feel that the U.S. will take firm action to halt Soviet expansion), the Sultan believes that the level of real U.S. military presence should be limited to assisting Oman to handle its own defense. In one recent interview he noted:

We don't want to involve ourselves in the awesome conflict between the superpowers. Oman must look to its own defense, and we are capable of doing so. But we must expand the armed forces, especially our

²⁰ Interview with Omani Foreign Ministry Under Secretary Youssef Alawi, London Ash-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic, 9 November 1981, p. 1,2, FBIS, DR, ME-A (18 November 1981), p. C5.



¹⁹See Ottaway, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. Al.



navy. We need minesweepers, better radar, antisubmarine planes. For this we count on backup from Europe and the United States. Is this not fair? Is not the strait as vital to the West as to us?21

Further limits to U.S. military presence were noted in a later interview. In discussing Oman's role in Operation Bright Star and the possibility of a larger future role for U.S.-Omani military cooperation, the Sultan noted:


...Although Oman wants to be left alone and will not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its territory, it cannot ignore the dangers posed by the Soviet puppet regime in Aden.²²

Hence, the Sultan wants U.S. military cooperation to be limited to military assistance (to enable Oman to protect the Strait); and while he permits the use of Omani facilities for U.S. exercises, he does not want permanent U.S. bases on Oman's soil.

A major cloud for the future of American-Omani military cooperation comes from the dangerous tendency of the U.S. to downgrade the pervasive nature of the Palestinian problem. Failure to recognize its potential for destabilization of regional states, its exploitations by the Soviet Union and its regional proxies for radicalization of Middle Eastern politics, and the need for settling this "core" problem between the Arab states and Israel. The Sultan's apparently contradictory policy, supporting both Camp David and the Fahd Peace Plan, reflects an accommodation to the subsystem pressures that can muddy future U.S.-Omani relations. Recently, in response to the question of whether Israel or the Soviet Union was the main threat to the Middle East, the Sultan elliptically noted:

There is no doubt that Soviet interference in the Middle East adds to the difficulty of finding a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem and,

²²Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id interview with Beirut weekly, <u>Monday Morning</u>, Muscat Domestic Service, 1300 GMT, 21 December 1981, <u>FBIS</u>, <u>DR</u>, <u>ME-A</u> (23 December 1981), p. C5.



^{21 &}quot;Oman: Guardian of the Gulf," op. cit., p. 357.



conversely, the continuance of that problem provides the Soviet Union with the opportunity to continue its interference.23

Qaboos' words clearly summarize the major long-term threat to U.S. military cooperation with Oman; and provide a clear warning to our policy planners that should be considered seriously.

²³Sultan Qaboos interview, Middle East Insight, op. cit., p. 12.



SECTION 3

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN (PDRY) (This Section (S Unclassified)

3-1 SELF-PERCEPTION

In late 1967, as the British were preparing to evacuate Aden, southern Yemen evidenced the broadest cross-section of ideological currents in the Arab world.

- (1) At one extreme were the twenty-odd sultans and shaykhs (now mostly in Saudi Arabia);
- (2) In between, there were the moderate upperand middleclass nationalists of the South Arabia League;
- (3) Then there was the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), in part an Egyptian creation, which emphasized anti-imperialism, ethnic-nationalism, state socialism and denied the idea of class struggle.
- (4) Finally, there was the National Liberation Front (NLF), which gained support from the most isolated tribes and poorest strata of the labor movement, with an increasingly strong Marxist left wing.

3-1.1 Transformationist Radical State

On 30 November 1967, Britain handed over control to the NLF led by Qahtan Al-Shaabi, who became President and Prime Minister of South Yemen. On 22 June 1969, he was forced out of office by Abd Al-Fattah Isma'il, pro-Soviet secretary general of the NLF, and Salim Robaya Ali, pro-Chinese

l During the pre-independence civil war period, Egypt sent troops to support FLOSY, and Saudi Arabia was supporting the Royalists. Hence, Saudi and Egyptian relations were negatively affected. See Alvin J. Cottrell, The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 141.



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president. Under their rule, the NLF has transformed South Yemen (renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, PDRY, in November 1970) into one of the most radical states in the Arab world (with a revolutionary ideology and civilian collectivist leadership).

The PDRY's constitution shares many similiarities with the Soviet Union's constitution of 1936. According to Article 7 of the 1970 PDRY constitution, legitimacy resides with the working class, the peasants, the intelligentsia, and the petty bourgeoisie, who according to Article 31, are to "liberate society from backward tribalism."

Agricultural reform, the downplaying of religion, and general efforts to support movements for Arab "liberation" suggest that the PDRY is clearly a transformationist radical state with Marxist-Leninist type domestic and foreign policies.

3-1.2 Irredentist Claims: Yemeni Unity

From its inception, the PDRY has sought Yemeni unity (e.g., with North Yemen, or Yemen Arab Republic, YAR). Indeed, the first sentence of the 1970 constitution begins, "Believing in the unity of the Yemen, and the unity of the destiny of the Yemeni people in the territory..." It then specifies that while the goal is a "united democratic Yemen," this unity is but a step toward "democractic Arab unity" (e.g., progressive).

Relations between the two Yemens have evidenced the polar extremes of desire for unification on the one hand and border clashes breaking into open warfare on the other. For example, at the end of 1972, serious fighting broke out on the border. After an Arab League mission mediated a cease-fire, the two Yemens agreed to establish a single state (to be the Yemeni Republic with Sana'a as its capital). Obstacles arose in 1973, and



 $^{^2}$ Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Aden: The Republic Press, September 1971), pp. 7 and 13.

^{3&}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 1.



unification was postponed. After a June 1974, pro-Saudi military coup in North Yemen, union became even more remote. During 1975, each Yemen was accusing the other of acts of sabotage.


After a cease-fire was announced in 1976, unification discussions resumed. On 17 February 1977 a bilateral council, which was to meet every six months at Aden and Sana'a, was established. In October 1977 YAR head of state Colonel Hamadi was assassinated (conservative forces opposed to unification within the YAR were allegedly responsible); and in June 1978, then-President Al-Ghashmi, his successor, was also assassinated by a suitcase bomb carried by a PDRY representative. PDRY President Rubayi Ali was discredited, ousted and executed. He was succeeded by Ali Nasser Mohammad, but the power of Isma'il seemed more secure and the PDRY was drawn more into the Soviet camp. In July 1978 tension between the PDRY and YAR rekindled, each accusing the other of military buildups and border skirmishes, and full-scale warfare erupted in February and March 1979.

Once again, in a meeting arranged by the Arab league, the PDRY and YAR decided to re-attempt unification as a premanent way of settling differences. In April 1980, Isma'il was succeeded by Ali Nasser Mohammad who became both head of state and General Secretary of the Yemen Socialist Party. In May 1980, both countries agreed to establish joint economic projects and coordinate their development plans as a step toward unification, but by the Fall of 1980 into early 1981, the two countries were once again embroiled in open warfare. Nevertheless, at the end of 1981, the two were re-seeking unity.⁴

In sum, unification appears to remain an unfulfilled aspiration. As long as the PDRY remains wed to a revolutionary transformationist (Marxist-Leninist) model and the YAR to traditional conservative Arab ideals, the two will likely remain irreconcilable and continue to be a cause of constant tension and fighting. On the other hand, the recent YAR tilt

⁴C.F. Aden, "Domestic Service in Arabic 1820 GMT," 29 November 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (4 December 1981), p. C7.






toward the USSR (see Section 4.1) could open the way for unity on terms quite detrimental to the region and the United States.

3-1.3 Military Posture

The major changes in PDRY military posture over recent years reflect developing close ties with the Soviet Union, particularly since the signing of a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 25 October 1979. When the PDRY signed the treaty it was made an "honorary" member of the Warsaw Pact and also acquired observer status in COMECON.⁵

The PDRY armed forces, which total 24,300 for a population of 1,955,000, are equipped with Soviet tanks (375 T-54/-55/-62), naval and aircraft (111 MiG-17Fs, -21 and -23 BMs). Soviet forces (1,500) are stationed in the PDRY, as are 750 Cubans and 100 East Germans. Not only have Soviet surface vessels utilized Aden as a port of call with much greater frequency, submarines are also regularly serviced there. Just as significant has been the appearance of 1,000 PDRY troops, including one MiG-17 squadron, in Ethiopia, along with Soviet, Quban and East German advisers and troops.

In sum, the PDRY is the most radical transformationist state in the Arab world. Its aspirations for Yemen's unity are likely to remain a



⁵The Economist, (3 November 1979), p. 53.

⁶The Military Balance 1981-1982 (London: IISS, 1981), p. 59.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 14, 96, and 19. The East German influence is more significant than the small number (100) suggests. East German advisers upgraded the NLF's internal security apparatus, which penetrates and monitors all the major social organizations of the country, notably the labor federation, civil service, cooperatives, and the army and internal security apparatus. See Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 362.

⁸U.S. Navy intelligence sources reported a Soviet missile carrying nuclear submarine entered Aden. New York Times (6 August 1979), p. 4.

⁹The Military Balance, op. cit., pp. 59 and 61.



cause of constant tension in the region and its close relationship with the Soviet Union a cause of potential problems in the future.

3-2 PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUBSYSTEM

Since the PDRY remains committed to an Arab liberationist ideology, its relations with its neighbors remain generally unfriendly. Noted already has been its fluctuating relationship with the YAR, which despite a desire for unification remains unlikely to be resolved unless the YAR alters its goals. Hence, this will remain a likely cause of perennial tension and conflict in the region.

Saudi Arabia is clearly an adversary as long as the PDRY remains committed to change. For example, in March 1972, in a speech in Aden, Abd al-Fattah Isma'il urged Yemenis to unite to the last man and woman "to fight world imperialism, particularly as practiced by the United States, and 'regional reaction' as exemplified by Saudi Arabia." This hard-line opposition has fluctuated, however, in recent years. Following the 1973 war, Saudi Arabia (and Egypt) offered the PDRY significant financial aid if it would reduce its ideological crusade against the monarchies of the Arabian peninsula. Although tempted, Isma'il, at the Sixth Conference of the National Front in March 1975, rejected the offer. Saudi initiatives continued, however, and in March 1976 (after the Dhofar rebellion was settled) the PDRY and Saudi Arabia established diplomatic relations.

Relations between the two again turned cool, as the PDRY's ties with the USSR became closer and while South Yemen was openly backing Ethiopia against Eritrean rebels and Somalia. After Isma'il was replaced by Ali Nasser Mohammad (April 1980), the new leader began courting Arab and Western nations. Although his official visit to Saudi Arabia in June 1980 suggested a warming in PDRY and Saudi Arabian relations, this was short

^{10&}lt;sub>Hudson</sub>, op. cit., p. 359.


lived. 11 Mohammad has subsequently drawn even closer to the USSR (and Libya and Ethiopia). In a recent speech, for example, Mohammad:

...reaffirmed that the treaty of friendship and cooperation between Democratic Yemen, Libya and Ethiopia is directed against Camp David and the imperialist, reactionary and Zionist designs...imperialist conspiracies require us to meet our responsiblity to confront these conspiracies. 12

Egypt, Oman and YAR. Basically as PDRY's relations fluctuate with the Soviet Union, they vary inversely with Saudi Arabia and other neighbors. When the PDRY modifies its liberationist demands and support, its relations warm with Saudi Arabia, YAR, Oman and Egypt. Similarly, when the PDRY takes pro-Soviet positions, relations with neighbors cool. For example, although the Dhofar rebellion had been long settled, Oman's Sultan Qaboos, on 12 January 1980, told British Foreign Security Lord Carrington that Oman still faced a threat from Soviet involvement in Southern Yemen. Similarly, Egyptian Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff, Lt. Gen. Mohammad Abu Ghazala, urged President-elect Reagan advisers to store weapons in the Middle East to match, in part, the Soviet arms buildup in South Yemen. This was also the period when fighting between the PDRY and YAR was full-scale.

In a speech on 29 November 1981, Ali Nasser Mohammad responded to U.S. support to PDRY's neighbors, by noting in reference to the recent Bright Star exercises:


¹⁴ New York Times (5 December 1980), p. 8.



¹¹New York Times (30 June 1980), p. 3.

¹²⁰man's Sultan Qaboos portrayed this treaty as a "Pact of Conspiracy." See above, Section 1.2, fn. 11. Mohammad speech, Aden Domestic Service, 1230 GMT, 19 November 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (20 November 1981), p. C4.

¹³ New York Times (13 January 1980), p. 14. More recently, during the Bright Star exercises, the PFLO (operating in South Yemen) was urging the overthrow of the Sultan. See Aden Voice of PFLO, 3 November 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (6 November 1981), p. C6.



We declare most vigorously our resolute and firm stand against all the treasonous acts being perpetrated by the reactionary regimes in Egypt, Oman, Somalia and Sudan, which have turned the territories of these countries into a scene for aggressive American maneuvers. 15

In sum, it appears that Mohammad remains a Soviet pawn. This factor will affect the PDRY's relationship with neighbors such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Oman and the YAR. While early indications suggested that Mohammad desired to balance Soviet influence (which became quite one-sided under pro-Soviet Isma'il) with support from Arab neighbors, he either failed or changed his mind. The PDRY has backed Dhofar rebels in Oman, continues to back Ethiopia against Eritrean rebels and Somalia, and more recent indications suggest much closer ties with Libya, Ethiopia and the USSR. Hence, the PDRY's potential for creating problems in the region remains quite serious.


3-3 PERCEPTION OF U.S.-SOVIET BALANCE OF POWER

Ali Nasser Mohammad possesses a Manichean view of the world: the U.S. is evil incarnate, the USSR the embodiment of good. In an interview with Al-Wahdah newspaper, published in Abu Dhabi, Mohammad said that:

All forms of U.S. military presence, both stationary and mobile, on Arab territories come under the imperialist forces' activity to restore our countries to the fold of the colonialist hegemony..[adding] the linking of these Arab armies to the United States gives the new military alliance between the U.S. and Israel great possibilities and opportunities to reinforce their hegemony over the resouces of the Arab peoples. 16

Before the Bright Star maneuvers, <u>Ath-thawri</u>, organ of the Yemen Socialist Party CC, claimed that the American Administration and its

¹⁶ Aden Domestic Service in Arabic, 1500 GMT, 24 December 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (29 December 1981), p. C9.



¹⁵ Aden Domestic Service in Arabic, 1820 GMT, 29 November 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (4 December 1981), p. C8.

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supporters, "namely the Zionists and forces of local reaction are beginning to step up their conspiracies." When the exercises commenced, the PDRY Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 10 November condemning them:

American imperialist circles, in collaboration with regimes allied to it in Egypt, Sudan, Oman and Somalia, have begun hostile military exercises...on the borders of our republic... These...constitute a direct threat to the security and safety of the peoples of the region, are an inseparable part of the imperailist-Zionist-reactionary design directed against nationalist and progressive regimes and the forces of national liberation.

...[The exercises] constitute a national extension of the treacherous Camp David policy, which has reached a dead end...Democratic Yemen...wishes to draw attention to the great dangers to which the Arab nation is being subjected as a result of these exercises...The PDRY condemns and strongly denounces these hostile exercises...18

While Mohammad has criticized all U.S. activities in the region, he has only laudatory remarks for the USSR and Soviet military presence:

...the USSR is regarded as the biggest oil producing state and has no need of military bases for protecting its interests because the USSR has no interests in Democratic Yemen. The USSR's interest is in security, stability, peace and supporting the national liberation movements in the region. 19

Relations between our country and the Soviet Union are long-standing and based on fruitful cooperation, mutual respect, firm, principled Soviet standards

¹⁹Ali Nasser Mohammad speech, Aden Domestic Service, 1230 GMT, 19 November 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (20 November 1981), p. C5.



^{17 &}quot;For the Sake of Cooperation and Peace," Ath-thawri (31 October 1981), FBIS, DR, ME-A (4 November 1981), p. C8.

¹⁸Aden Domestic Service, 1630 GMT, 11 November 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (13 November 1981), pp. C4-5.



alongside the struggle of our Yemen's people and Arab peoples and support for our causes and legitimate Arab rights. $^{20}\,$

At the same time, there have been reports of Soviet missile bases being contructed rapidly in South Yemen; apparently the aim is to have bases stretching from Al-Manovrah (outside Aden) to the border of North Yemen. Allegedly, the purpose of these bases is for protection of the Soviet, Cuban and South Yemeni headquarters against attacks from the sea. 21

It seems clear that the PDRY will remain opposed to U.S. interests in the region. Its relations with Libya and Ethiopia (the so-called Treaty of Conspiracy) will guarantee its continued role as a troublemaker, particularly for Oman and the YAR. Its very close relations with the Soviet Union (including the latter with a base for operations) should be of grave concern to the U.S. (and Saudi Arabia).

²¹London Al-Hawadith in Arabic (11 December 1981), p. 11, FBIS, DR, ME-A (11 December 1981), p. C9.



²⁰Aden Domestic Service in Arabic, 1900 GMT (24 December 1981), <u>Ibid</u>.



SECTION 4

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC (YAR) (This Section is Unclassified)

4-1 SELF-PERCEPTION

The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), with a population of about 5.3 million (60 percent Sunni Moslems; 40 percent Shiah Zaidi) occupies about 60,000 square miles with borders ringing Saudi Arabia and with seashores that could deny the eastern reaches of the Red Sea to the Soviet Union. While the YAR's geographical position renders the country strategically valuable to the superpowers, its foreign relations and domestic politics have become increasingly interwoven with regional issues and rivalries. Foremost among these is the struggle for political influence between Saudi Arabia and PDRY. Behind this regional struggle looms the rivalry between the U.S. and USSR of which the conflicts between the YAR and PDRY are but a local manifestation.


4-1.1 Yemeni Unity

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The YAR's constant conflict with the PDRY during the past decade has occurred not because both sides do not aspire to unity, but because both sides aspire to unity on different terms. (See Section 3.1 above.) Since the PDRY is a radical transformationist state and the YAR aspires to traditional Moslem values, the two appear irreconcilable.

This issue has been the catalyst for leadership instability not only in the PDRY, but in the YAR as well. Colonel Hamadi, YAR head of state, was assassinated in October 1977, allegedly by conservative forces within the YAR who were opposed to unification. In June 1978, President Al-Ghashmi was assassinated by a suitcase bomb carried by a PDRY representative. Despite these problems, his successor, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, appears intent on pursuing unification. The appearance of Ali Nasser Mohammad in the PDRY (April 1980) may have altered the dynamics and potentialities of fulfilling the aspiration of unity.

In May 1980, both countries agreed to establish joint economic projects and coordinate development plans. Although the YAR and PDRY were



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
experiencing open warfare at the end of 1980 into 1981, at the end of the year President Saleh, in reference to the May 1980 agreements, claimed that: "very important steps have been achieved between the two parts of Yemen."

Saleh, on the 19th anniversary of the 26 September Revolution (1981), stressed that:

Our country will assure perfection and strength only with unity. Ending this division is one of the most important objectives and principles of the 26 September Revolution.²

Despite Saleh's aspirations for unity (and those of the PDRY's Mohammad), relations remain fractious because the National Democratic Front (NDF), which uses bases in the PDRY and gets arms from the USSR and money from Libya, continues to operate in southern YAR. Whenever YAR forces chase the NDF into the PDRY after a raid, they risk the outbreak of war as in the Spring of 1979 and again in 1980-81. Another stumbling block to achieving unity is that the NDF insists on taking part in the Sana'a government and on establishing a Marxist ideology in both North and South Yemen. It remains unclear whether PDRY's Mohammad either wants or is unable to curb the NDF (this was the early indication after he overthrew Isma'il in April 1980). Even if he wanted to curb the NDF, which is protected by the Russian umbrella, he may fear for his life if he tried.³

In sum, despite the apparent desire of both the YAR and PDRY to achieve unity, as long as the two countries remain committed to opposing



¹President Saleh interview, San'a Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT, 6 October 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (9 October 1981), p. C7.

²President Saleh speech, San'a Domestic Service, 1835 GMT, 25 September 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (29 September 1981), p. C12.

³See <u>Al-Majallah</u> (London) in Arabic, 29 January - 5 February 1982, p. 1, <u>FBIS, DR, ME-A</u> (3 February 1982), pp. C6-7.



ideological principles (and the Soviet influence remains in the PDRY), what is likely to occur is constant tension, with sporadic outbreaks of violence which could involve regional powers (and the U.S. and USSR).

4-1.2 Military Posture

The YAR purports to a policy of non-alignment, which has been recently reiterated by President Saleh:

We will never become involved in external military alliances regardless of the circumstances surrounding us because we are against the idea of foreign military alliances.⁴

In the same speech, Saleh added, in reference to development and defense, that the:

burdens are costly and heavy [and noted the] assistance of our brothers in the Arab countries headed by Saudi Arabia, which plays a prominent role in offering us aid [which] cannot be confused with... USSR aid, which does not contradict our country's national and pan-Arab principles.⁵

If one were to date the YAR's shift toward the USSR, one might look to February 1979 (Saleh had been in power since mid-1978) when the YAR and the PDRY were experiencing heated conflict. The PDRY assault brought the San'a government close to collapse. The U.S.-Saudi response was a \$390 million military aid program under which the YAR received a squadron of F-5E fighters, 64 M-60 tanks, armored personnel carriers and an air defense system.

The arms, however, were slow in arriving. Though YAR ties with Saudi Arabia have been close (since Saudi Arabia extended formal recognition in 1970), Saudi Arabia has always been ambivalent about building up the YAR's military power. In their hour of need (Spring of 1979) when the



⁴President Saleh interview, San'a Domestic Service, 1700 GMT, 6 October 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (9 October 1981), p. C7.

⁵Ib <u>i</u>d., p. C8.



U.S.-Saudi arms were slow in arriving, the Yemenis suspected that Saudi Arabia was urging the U.S. to delay its deliveries. Saleh turned to the Soviet Union, which was more than willing to oblige.

The cynicism of the YAR was summarized by one YAR government official during this period:

We need military assistance and we will take it from whoever offers it to us and that means the Soviets, even if they are supporting our enemies in the south (the PDRY).⁶


Hence, aside from the above noted U.S. equipment, the YAR's army inventory now also includes 150 T-34 and 500 T-54/55 tanks; four of the five fighter squadrons in the YAR air force are Soviet (2 with 21 MiG-21s, 1 with 12 MiG-17Fs and 1 with 20 Su-22s); and eight of its eleven naval vessels are Soviet. Coupled with this military assistance has been the appearance of 500 Soviet troops in 1981 to assist the YAR military (there were none in 1980).

Hence, recent changes in the YAR's military posture carry a potential for greater Soviet activity and influence in country, and suggest potential problems in the future. Though Saleh may desire a balance to play off Saudi Arabia against the USSR, it is a game that requires skill and is fraught with grave dangers.

4-2 PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUBSYSTEM

The YAR is clearly under pressure from both of its strong neighbors, from conservative Saudi Arabia and from the revolutionary militants of the PDRY. During the YAR's civil war, from 1962-1969, Egyptian-supported Loyalists were pitted against Saudi-supported Royalists. After the Loyalists

⁸ Ibid., p. 14. Also see The Military Balance, 1980-81, p. 12.



⁶William Tuohy, "Yemen: A Prize in East-West Struggle," <u>Los Angeles</u> <u>Times (11 April 1980)</u>, Part 1-A, p. 2.

⁷ The Military Balance, 1981-82 (London: IISS, 1981), p. 59.

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won, a rapprochement was reached with Saudi Arabia and diplomatic relations were established in 1970.

4-2.1 Regional Allies versus Rivals

Saudi Arabia, particularly since 1970, has been the major source of assistance to the YAR. As noted above, however, Saleh's suspicions about Saudi's withholding military assistance forced him to turn to the USSR to develop a counter-pressure to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, perhaps, fear that if the PDRY and YAR ever are united, Yemen could be a formidable force and a challenge to Ṣaudi Arabia's predominant position on the peninsula. Hence, the Saudi-YAR relationship-while close-has the potential for severe strain.

Recent visits of President Saleh to Arab nations still clearly indicate his strong identification with the conservative Arab cause. On 11 October 1981, Saleh "praised relations [with] the GCC countries [adding YAR's]... complete and comprehensive coordination" with the organization. In November 1981, Saleh's visit with Saudi King Khalid was an "affirmation of the trend of cooperation among Arab leaders." And in February of 1982, the purpose of Saleh's swing through Oman and the other Arab Gulf countries was billed as to: "hold fraternal meetings to cope with the challenges and dangers threatening the [Arab] nation."


Saleh also has openly "declared...support for fraternal Iraq in its war with Iran...[adding] the Iraqi suffered from the Iranian regime particularly during the period that followed the Iraqi revolution in 1958." What Saleh did not note was the irony that, when the Saudis

⁹President Saleh, Manama Gulf News Agency, 1145 GMT, 11 October 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (15 October 1981), p. C9.

¹⁰ San'a Domestic Service, 1700 GMT, 8 November 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (13 November 1981), p. C5.

¹¹ FBIS, DR. ME-A (23 February 1982), p. C2.

¹² Nabil Ghazzawi interview with Saleh in San'a--date not given. Kuwait, <u>As-Siyasah</u>, 14 February 1982, p. 9, <u>FBIS</u>, <u>DR</u>, <u>ME-A</u> (19 February 1982), p. Cl2.



were slow in responding to the YAR against PDRY invaders in 1979, it was Iraq (and Syria) who saved the San'a government. Both warned the PDRY that they would enter the war unless the PDRY pulled its troops out of the YAR.

4-2.2 Views of the Region's Future and Main Dangers

President Saleh sees the major regional threat from the following quarters:

- o "The Palestinian question;"
- o Israel's "mounting hostile activities" (e.g., annexation of Golan Heights and activities in southern Lebanon); and
- o "The conspiratorial Camp David Accords and the separate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt [which] constituted the peak of that odious conspiracy." 13

Saleh has consistently portrayed the Palestine question as the "main issue and the cause of all Arabs." Saleh supported the Fahd peace plan and when it was rejected, the YAR President concluded:

This makes us assert the certainty of the jihad option as a basic method to restore rights and to liberate Islamic holy peace. 15

More recently, Saleh noted:


We have opened the door to volunteers from among the Yemeni people...we have made martyrdom in the Palestine trench equal to martyrdom in defense of the glorious 26 September Revolution. 16

¹³President Saleh during visit to Oman, <u>FBIS, DR, ME-A</u> (23 February 1982), p. C2-3.

¹⁴ President Saleh speech, 19th Anniversary of 26 September Revolution. San'a Domestic Service, 1835 GMT, 25 September 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (29 September 1981), p. C14.

¹⁵ Manama Gulf News Agency, 1145 GMT, 11 October 1981, FBIS, DR, ME-A (15 October 1981), p. C9.

¹⁶ Nabil Ghazzawi interview with Saleh, op. cit., p. Cll.



Saleh's strong position on this question equates Israel and Egypt as major enemies, and significantly influences the YAR's relationship with both the U.S. and the USSR.

4-3 PERCEPTION OF U.S.-SOVIET BALANCE OF POWER

As noted above, Saleh's growing suspicions of Saudi Arabia (and perhaps the U.S.) stem from the February 1979 period when assistance was slow in arriving in his hour of need. Israel, though, is the real issue that seems to be affecting the YAR's relations with the U.S. (and USSR). Saleh, in his 6 October 1981 interview, provided the justification for Soviet arms:

We will always believe that the Arab states with their own resources and various capabilities are able to confront the Zionist Israeli enemy and those supporting it... To be tied with others by agreement will never guarantee that others will return our rights to us. An Arab adage says: Your back can be scratched best by your own nails. 17

A few days later, Saleh, quite explicit about the U.S.-Israeli threat, issued a clear warning of possible retribution:

[The U.S.-Israeli] alliance is not new. It's recently announced declaration shows the Arab nation...that it has not dealt with the U.S. in such a way that the U.S. can understand the nature of its interests in the Middle East and with the Arab countries in particular. 18

Saleh's feelings about Israel, Egypt and the U.S. have probably contributed to the YAR's movement to the Soviet Union. Already noted has been the heavy dependence of the YAR upon Soviet military assistance and the appearance, in 1981, of 500 Soviet advisers in the country.

President Saleh paid an "official friendly visit" to the USSR between 26-28 October 1981. In Moscow, Saleh praised:

¹⁷FBIS, DR, ME-A (9 October 1981), p. C8.

¹⁸Manama Gulf News Agency, 1145 GMT, 11 October 1981, <u>FBIS</u>, <u>DR</u>, <u>ME-A</u> (15 October 1981), p. C9.



...the sincere, firm and principled stand of the Soviet Union on the just struggle waged by the Arab nation in confronting the Israeli aggression and in liberating their land and in regaining their legitimate rights, above all the right of the Palestinian people. 19

In February 1982, Saleh referred to his Moscow visit as:

...resulting in what can be viewed as a landmark achievement in the history of YAR-Soviet relations and their development in economic, cultural and technical fields. 20

What is of major import is the fact that (partly due to the U.S.) the YAR appears to be tilting significantly towards the USSR. For example, ever since the \$390 million assistance in 1979, the U.S. has provided only \$20-25 million annually in economic assistance and has only just started a military sales program worth \$11 million. In reference to this aid, YAR's Prime Minister Iriani noted "in private we call it peanuts." Since President Reagan came to office (January 1981), no high-ranking State Department or administration official has visited the country for talks.

In marked contrast, U.S. Congressional sources have estimated Soviet assistance to the YAR at "well in excess of \$1 billion."²² Soviet interest is also longer term. Moscow's offer of scholarships and training courses for Yemeni officers and military personnel translates to 1,500 Yemenis in the USSR (compared to about 60 total trained in the U.S. to

¹⁹President Saleh Moscow speech, 27 October 1981, <u>FBIS, DR, ME-A</u> (29 October 1981), p. C6.

²⁰ Nabil Ghazzawi interview with Saleh, op. cit., p. Clo.

²¹ David B. Ottaway, "North Yemen's War," The Washington Post (21 April 1982), p. Al9.

²² Ibid.




date). 23 These activities have led one un-named, well-informed Yemeni official to state: "If things continue as they are, North Yemen will be a Communist state within five years." 24

While this might be an exaggeration, the YAR's "coolness" to the United States was apparent during the recent Bright Star exercises. In marked contrast to Oman and PDRY (which praised and condemned the maneuvers, respectively), the YAR did not editorialize. Radio and television carried reports by various world news agencies on preparations, the arrival of U.S. troops, and highlights of the exercises themselves. All coverage avoided any comment. 25

While Saleh may believe his actions are buying independence, by attempting to balance his past dependence upon Saudi Arabia with arms from the Soviet Union, he is clearly treading on dangerous ground. More important, his increasing disdain for the U.S. (and Israel), expressions of support for jihad to restore Arab "rights," and newfound support from the USSR (political and military) suggest that the YAR is becoming a cauldron which can explode in the face of the U.S.

²⁵FBIS, DR, ME-A (18 November 1981), p. Cl.



²³ Ib id.

²⁴ Ibid.



SECTION 5 SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (SDR) (This Section is Unclassified)

5-1 SELF-PERCEPTION

Somalia, an area of 246,000 square miles, serves strategically as a bridge between the Middle East and Africa. It is unified by a homogenous culture based on a common language (Somali) and state religion (Islam). Somalia's economy remains undeveloped and extremely poor: 3.5 million people share a GNP of \$425 million (\$70 per capita).

Since achieving independence in 1960, Somalia has pursued a strongly irredentist policy and relied (until 1977) on aid from the Soviet Union and other communist countries. The constitution of 1961 was abolished by an October 1969 coup led by Maj. Gen. Mohammed Siad Barre. The military government reorganized the country along "scientific socialist" lines (e.g., nationalized foreign banks and enterprises). In 1976, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist PARTY (SRSP), led by Siad Barre, took power; and a national referendum approved a new constitution in August 1979.

5-1.1 The Dream of "Greater Somalia"

Since Somalia gained its independence from colonial rule in 1960, it has harbored aspirations for a Greater Somaliland that would embrace all ethnic Somalis within the region in a single state. It has, as a consequence, advanced territorial claims against Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya.

The Ogaden Desert, comprising about one-fifth of the Ethiopian territory, was ceded to Ethiopia in the late 19th century by colonists. The root of the Ogaden conflict lies in the Somali claim that since the desert province is inhabited mostly by ethnic Somalis, it rightfully belongs in a Somali state. Hence, Soviet and Cuban involvement in Ethiopia and Somali support of anti-Ethiopian guerrillas in the Ogaden, as well as a commitment of Somali army units to the province in 1977 in support of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), have created enormous tensions in the Horn that continue to invite outside intervention. Similar differences with Kenya resulted in mutual recriminations and counter charges that have led to constant tension along the Kenya-Somalia border.



Somalia's irredentist aims run directly counter to the long-standing policy of the Arab League--of which Somalia became the first non-Arab speaking member in 1974--against any alteration in colonial boundaries. It has also impeded U.S. willingness to aid Somalia (since 1977), because of fear that the aid would be employed in support of irredentist claims.

Siad Barre, in accommodation to these pressures (particularly after the massive Soviet and Cuban buildup in Ethiopia since 1977) has recently made an effort to temper earlier claims. In his address on the 12th anniversary of the October Revolution, Siad Barre claimed:

...the SDR is not seeking territory from Ethiopia or anyone else... However, Somalia believes in and supports the right of any nation to decide its own future. This applies equally to the rights of Namibia and to the rights of the Western Somali people, the Somali Abos and Eritreans.

5-1.2 Development Goals and Foreign Policy

Somalia is poor (e.g., \$70 annual per capita income) and its irredentist claims and resulting border clashes created a refugee problem (particularly since the 1977 Ogaden war) that further drained its already limited resources. In reference to the poor state of the economy, President Siad Barre, on 21 October 1981, noted that:

...Somalia has been affected by (the) world economic problem...it has been further affected by the lack of stability in this region; the huge number of refugees, the continuous drought, floods, poor industrial and farm production.²


At the end of 1979, reports estimated the number of Somalian refugees from the Ogaden as: 357,000 in camps and another 650,000 assimilated in towns and villages, requiring 160,000 tons of food during 1980. At

³ New York Times (19 November 1979), p. 3 and (24 May 1980), p. 22.



Mogadishu Domestic Service, 0330 GMT, 21 October 1981. FBIS, DR, ME-A (22 October 1981), p. R4.

²Ibid., p. R5.



the end of 1981, there was some dispute over the extent of the refugee problem. The Somali government was claiming that 1.3 million refugees were housed in 35 camps, while the U.N. put the number at 650,000. Whatever the actual number, for a country of 3.5 million people, the refugees constitute a real economic burden and are almost impossible to absorb socially (constituting 15 to 30 per cent of the population).

Somalia requires significant economic assistance. Its economic needs have, and will continue to influence foreign policy.' Between 1961-1977, the Soviet aid program to Somalia was meagre (a total of \$154 million). Moreover, the Soviet requirement that the Somalis pay off their military debt through the purchase of Soviet goods—which were often inferior and overpriced—upset the Somalis. When Somalia, under Saudí sponsorship, joined the Arab League, the Saudis and conservative Arab states offered Somalis \$675 million, if it broke ties with the USSR. When Somali relations with the Soviets soured over Russian policy toward Ethiopia (1977), Somalia not only took advantage of the Arab offer, it also became an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) and accepted assistance from the People's Republic of China (PRC). Economic aid will also likely loom large in Somalia's future relations with the U.S.

5-1.3 Changes in Military Posture

Even before the coup which toppled Ethiopia's Haile Selassie, the stage was set for a Somali-Ethiopian conflict. While the U.S. and USSR had armed their respective clients, they had not done so equally. In

⁶Steven David, "Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet Advantage," <u>International Security</u> (Fall 1979) Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 85.



⁴ New York Times (15 September 1981), p. 2.

⁵Joanne Gowa & Nils H. Wessell, <u>Ground Rules: Soviet and American Involvement in Regional Conflicts</u> (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1982), p. 47.

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every major category, the Soviets armed Somalia to a greater extent than the U.S. did for Ethiopia. By 1975, Somalia had 52 combat aircraft (24 MiG-21s) compared to 37 for Ethiopia; 250 tanks (T-34, T-54, T-55) versus only 62 for Ethiopia; and 300 armored personnel carriers as opposed to only 100 in Ethiopia. The only Ethiopian advantage was manpower (2:1-44,500 to 23,000) but that was illusory since the bulk of the Ethiopian troops were engaged in the Eritrean conflict.⁷

The beginning of the shift occurred in December 1976 when Ethiopia's Col. Mengistu visited Moscow and concluded a \$385 million agreement with the USSR. After the Somalis invaded the Ogaden in July 1977, TASS (in August) branded the Somalis "aggressors" and the Soviets cut off all military supplies to Somalia. Now Ethiopia embraced the Russians; and on 13 November 1977, the Somalis renounced their 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union (expelling over 1,500 Russian advisers and denying the Soviets use of their facilities in Somalia). In November 1978, when the Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Ethiopia, the patron-client swap had been completed.

By 1981, the complete reverse was reflected militarily. Now Somalia had 35 combat aircraft (9 MiG-21s and 10 ex-Chinese F-6s) compared to more than 100 (including 50 MiG-21s and 20 MiG-23s) for Ethiopia; only 190 tanks (150 T-34/-54/-55 and 40 Centurians) versus more than 750 (150 T-34s and 600 T-54/-55s) for Ethiopia. The Ethiopian manpower advantage also increased (4:1--230,000 to Somalia's 62,500) plus 11,000 Cubans, 1,300 Warsaw Pact technicians and advisers and 1,000 PDRY troops. 9

In sum, three internal factors appear to drive Somali foreign policy and will likely be the cause of continued tensions in the Horn. Somali irredentist claims have contributed to poor relations with neighboring

⁷ The Military Balance, 1975-76 (London: IISS, 1975), p. 43.

⁸See Steven David, op. cit., p. 78.

^{9&}lt;u>The Military Balance, 1981-82</u> (London: IISS, 1981), pp. 61-62; and



Ethiopia and Kenya; caused a refugee problem that undermines economic development; and contributed to a total reversal in patron-client relations in the region.

5-2 PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUBSYSTEM

Saudi Arabia sponsored Somali's entrance to the Arab League in 1974. With conservative Arab states, the Saudis offered the Somalis \$675 million if it severed its ties with the Soviet Union. During 1977, when relations with the USSR soured, Somalia took up the Saudi offer. Ever since, Saudi Arabia has played a more significant and influential role in Somalia. It has been active in mediating between Kenya and Somalia, and in acquiring financial support from conservative Arab states. This support has been reciprocated by a Somali policy increasingly sympathetic to Saudi regional interests.

Omar Arta Ghalib, Somali People's Assembly speaker and former Foreign Minister, recently noted:

...Somalia's support for the Palestinian people's struggle to achieve independence under the leader-ship of the PLO...(and called on) Arab countries and investors to invest their money in industrial, animal husbandry, fishing and agricultural projects in Somalia in order to benefit both sides.10

Similarly, Somalia "strongly condemned Israel's decision to annex the Golan Heights (calling it) a flagrant violation of international law and the UN Charter."

Egypt. While Somalia has drawn closer to Saudi Arabia, there are limits. It maintains close relations with Egypt. Only three members of the 22-member Arab League retained diplomatic relations with Egypt (Sudan,

^{10&}lt;sub>Doha QNA</sub> in Arabic, 0825 GMT (13 February 1982) <u>FBIS, DR, ME-A</u> (16 February 1982), p. R3.

llparis AFP, 0921 GMT (18 December 1981), FBIS, DR, ME-A (18 December 1981), p. R3.



Oman and Somalia) after its peace treaty with Israel. It has been reported that Sadat, a close personal friend of Siad Barre, supported Somalia with Egyptian weapons and ammunition during the Ogaden war in 1977-1978. Thus, while Siad Barre supports Saudi Arabia on the PLO and Golan issues in Middle East policy, Somalia maintains a more moderate position toward Eygpt.

Kenya. Relations with Kenya have been poor, primarily due to the SDR's claims for uniting all Somalis into a Greater Somaliland. Partly due to the increased threat to Somalis from a Soviet-armed Entiopia and the mediation efforts of Saudi Arabia (and Arab League pressures), Siad Barre apparently has decided to "resume relations, solve mutual affairs in a direct and proper way and also to stop any tension" with Kenya. 13

A recent commentary noting the many common ties between Kenya and Somalia stressed that frictions should not mar political relations. It suggested that normalization should be based on the following:

- o propagation of mutual respect and confidence;
- easing of movement (trade and people) across borders; and
- o solving the northern frontier border issue once and for all. 14

Ethiopia, the PDRY and Libya are clearly Somalia's enemies in the subsystem. After a raid by two MiG-23s in the Ogaden region on 9 September 1981, a Somali Defense Ministry statement condemned "the Mengistu regime's provocative policy against the Somali people, with the support of the unholy alliance of foreign powers." Similarly, Challe Ahmad Mahdi

¹² New York Times (4 June 1980), p. 3.

¹³ Siad Barre, 12th Anniversary of October Revolutions speech, op. cit., p. R5.

¹⁴ Mogadishu Domestic Service, 1700 GMT (9 September 1981), FBIS, DR, ME-A (10 September 1981), p. Rl.

¹⁵ Mogadishu Domestic Service, 1115 GMT (10 September 1981), FBIS, DR, ME-A (11 September 1981), p. R1.



Farah, SRSP Secretary of the Gedo region, blamed Ethiopia for bombarding the Kenyan-Somalian border to "damage the policies of the governments and peoples of Kenya and Somalia." ¹⁶

Ethiopia's links with the PDRY and Libya have been a source of increased concern in Somalia. In reference to their pact (which Sultan Qaboos calls the Pact of Conspiracy) signed at the end of August 1981, Somali Foreign Minister Abdurahman Jama Barre referred to it as an "unholy alliance." 17


Then in early 1982, when condemning a recent massacre unleashed by Ethiopia in Eritrea, the Somali Foreign Minister noted that members of the unholy alliance were behind the action:

The Abyssinian regime (in Eritrea) is using arms and troops from Libya, missiles from Russia manned by Ouban experts and others from the PDRY, and other foreign military advisers...Libya recently gave Abyssinia 20 M-20 helicopters mounted with machine guns (and) T-24 helicopters...to escort MIG aircraft to the battle zone...also...l4 C-130 Hercules troop carriers. 18

There have also been reports that Libya's Qaddafi is funding an Ethiopian-based guerrilla movement, called the Somali Salvation Front, that opposes Siad Barre. 19

Hence, Somalia perceives Ethiopia (and Libya, PDRY) as the root of all its problems. The unholy alliance is responsible for border tension between Kenya and Somalia, Eritrean massacres, tension along the Ogaden border, and sponsoring guerrilla movements to undermine Siad Barre. The long-term success of its policy remains unclear, but the present Somali

¹⁹ New York Times (21 September 1981), p. 2.



¹⁶ Mogadishue Domestic Service, 1700 GMT (28 September 1981), FBIS, DR, ME-A (29 September 1981), p. R1.

¹⁷ Mogadishu Domestic Service, 1115 GMT (17 September 1981), FBIS, DR, ME-A (18 December 1981), p. R4.

¹⁸Mogadishu Domestic Service, 1400 GMT (4 February 1982), <u>FBIS, DR, ME-A</u> (5 February 1982), p. Rl.



leadership appears clearly to be on the defensive. More than ever, they need the economic and military support of the Saudis and other conservative Arab states. To a great extent, their future depends upon the resolve of these regional allies.

5-3 PERCEPTION OF U.S.-SOVIET BALANCE OF POWER

Siad Barre now clearly perceives the Soviet Union as the major source of trouble in the Horn. In his 12th Anniversary of the October Revolution speech, the Somali President noted:

...Soviet policy in the region (is) based on the desire to see the place in a state of war. (Their) intentions are not confined to supplies of arms and foreign forces in Ethiopia. Those...have been made clear by the rapprochement of South Yemen and Abyssinia and the alliance they are forging with Libya. 20

During the Fall of 1981, Somali Foreign Minister Abdurahman Jama Barre toured the Gulf states to explain Somalia's position regarding the "unholy alliance" and to get political support for a unified stand against the Soviet Union. The Foreign Minister noted:

...this tripartite agreement constitutes a dangerous alliance serving Soviet interests and consolidating Soviet influence in the area...(and a) prelude to the creation of many new problems threatening peace in the area...(He called on the area's states) to adopt unified stands to check the dangers of this agreement.21

Two months later, the Somali Foreign Minister noted that the Soviet motive was to "establish puppet governments...(to) enhance their expansionist



²⁰Siad Barre 21 October 1981 speech, op. cit., p. R4.

^{21 (}London) Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat in Arabic (2 November 1981), p. 2, FBIS, DR, ME-A (6 November 1981), p. Rl.




policies...which aim at not only controlling the Horn...but also the oil routes in the Indian Ocean." 22

Hence, the Somali leadership now clearly perceives the USSR as an expansionist power and as a threat to their security. How the U.S. will take advantage of this situation, though, remains to be seen. Though the U.S., in the past, had reason to be sensitive to Siad Barre's potential use of military aid for satisfying irredentist ambitions, Somalia does appear more restrained now, due to the increased (moderating) influence of Saudi Arabia and the clear military superiority of Soviet-backed Ethiopia. Hence, continued U.S. vacillation could unwittingly undermine the existing leadership and unravel the rather tenuous status quo.

U.S. vacillation in contrast to Soviet will was clearly demonstrated in the comparison of Somali (and Ethiopian) military inventories when a client of the USSR and U.S. (see Section 5.1 above). Somalia, in its bid for economic assistance and military support, has traded chiefly on its geographical location at the southern tip of the Red Sea and its possession of port facilities at Berbera that became, with Soviet assistance, the most extensive in the lower Red Sea area. The facilities around Berbera include:

- (1) a deep-water port;
- (2) fuel storage facilities with an estimated capacity of 175,000 barrels;
- (3) a runway of 13-15,000 feet;
- (4) a tactical-missile and a storage-handling capacity; and
- (5) a communications facility at Kagnew. 23



²²Mogadishu Domestic Service, 1115 GMT (17 December 1981) <u>FBIS, DR, ME-A</u> (18 December 1981), p. R4.

²³f. Stephen Larrabee, "After the Break: Soviet-Somali Relations," Radio Liberty Research (2 January 1978).



Several months before the November 1977 break with Moscow, Somalia sought U.S. military assistance. In late July, the Carter Administration announced that it would provide military assistance given Somali assurances that the aid would be used for defense and not against Ethiopia in Ogaden. In late August Carter withdrew the offer when he became convinced that Somali forces were fighting in the Ogaden. Then, in early September, the U.S. conditioned its offer on a Somali withdrawal from Ogaden. Rejecting the U.S. offers, Siad Barre continued to pursue the war with aid from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Despite this effort, Somali forces were forced to withdraw from the Ogaden in May 1978.

The pattern of U.S. non-involvement remained unchanged until early 1980, when the Iranian-American hostage impasse and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impelled Carter to seek expanded military facilities in the region. Because the facilities at Berbera were the most highly developed in the area, the U.S., after protracted negotiation, agreed to furnish Somalia with about \$25 million in FY 1981 (they requested \$200 million over five years) of defensive weapons including radar and anti-aircraft guns. President Reagan raised this to \$40 million upon taking office. 25

In return for this assistance, the U.S. acquired access to airfield/port facilities in Berbera and Mogadishu as well as communications facilities at Kagnew. These were utilized during the Bright Star exercises in the Fall of 1981.

The longer term policy for the U.S. is the degree of commitment that it is willing to extend to Somalia. Whatever the final choice, the U.S.

²⁴ New York Times (21 May 1980), p. 22, and (22 August 1980), p. 10.

²⁵ New York Times (20 January 1981), p. 18.

²⁶ Jeffrey Record, The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, February 1981), p. 59.



must overcome its previous policy vaciliation. We must recognize Somalia's increased vulnerabilities (e.g., Soviet-backed Ethiopian military superiority); greater moderation due to Saudi and Arab League influence (e.g., evident in policy toward Kenya); and need to solve many of its internal problems (e.g., refugee issue). Not only does Somalia require a consistent U.S. policy; the U.S., in light of RDF requirements, requires a stable Somalia.



SECTION 6 KENYA (This Section is UNCLASSIFIED)

6-7 SELF-PERCEPTION

Kenya, an area of 225,000 square miles, is an equatorial country on the African east coast. Its population of 17,000,000 (with GNP of \$6.3 billion) is comprised of four main ethnic groups: Bantu (Kikuyu, Kamba), Nilotic (Luo), Nilo-Hamitic (Masai), and Hamitic (Somalia). Non-African minorities include European, Asians (mainly Indians and Pakistanis), and Arabs.

Since achieving independence in 1963, Kenya has been a relatively stable one-party state, with the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) dominating both the government structure and political life. Kenya's constitution of 1963 has been amended several times, mainly in the direction of increased centralization. Jomo Kenyatta, the nation's founder and first president, died in 1977 and was succeeded, in an orderly fashion, by his vice-president, Daniel Arap Moi.

6-1.1 Political Stability

Kenya has no irredentist claims that would be a cause for potential unrest, although it has been the object of such claims by Somalia (and Uganda). Futhermore, Kenya does not have significant political organizations or groups with messianic tendencies and/or radical ideologies that are likely to bring about changes in the status quo.

In the past, however, tribalism presented a problem. After World War II, independence was delayed by the Mau Mau uprising of 1952-1956, inspired primarily by Kikuyu resentment that much of Kenya's best land was controlled by Europeans. Tribal rivalries also delayed agreement on the constitution and formal independence. An election in May 1963 established the predominant position of KANU led by Jomo Kenyatta (who had been imprisoned and exiled on suspicion of leading the Mau Mau insurgency) of the Kikuyu tribe. The principal opposition party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) headed by Tom Mboya of the Luo tribe, dissolved itself





and merged with KANU in 1964. (Mooya, who was widely hailed as a successor to President Kenyatta, was assassinated in 1969).


Despite these early problems with tribalism, Kenya appears fairly stable politically. When Kenyatta died (of natural causes), Vice-President Moi's succession was smooth. Since the military is very small (14,750 total armed forces for 17 million population) and has undergone no significant change over recent years, the leadership apparently does not perceive a significant threat (internal or external) to its legitimacy.

6-1.2 National Goals

A member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Kenya has generally avoided involvement in superpower politics and has devoted its attention primarily to African affairs. In a recent speech to Parliament, President Moi stressed Kenya's African orientation:

...during my chairmanship of the OAU, Kenya has really done everything possible to promote African solutions to some typical problems affecting stability and security in the continent.²

Global economic fluctuations have hurt Kenya's economy. For example, oil price hikes in 1979 meant that 33 percent of Kenya's foreign exchange earnings (as opposed to 25 percent in 1978) were spent on oil. This deferred badly needed rural development projects, which were in the Government's development programs for 1979-1983. President Moi, in a recent Kenyatta Day speech, re-emphasized Kenya's need to "pay heed to



¹ The Military Balance: 1981-1982 (London: IISS, 1981), p. 62.

²Daniel arap Moi speech, Nairobi Domestic Service, 1210 GMT (9 March 1982), FBIS, DR, ME-A (10 March 1982), p. R4.

³New York Times (27 August 1979), p. 1.



means of conserving energy whereby we can reduce the enormous annual cost of imported fuel." 4

Kenya also believes that the road to economic independence requires a period of dependence on, and cooperation with, foreign companies and investments. Hence, the Government has attempted to create favorable conditions for private capital investment (in contrast to nationalization) to nurture economic development. Moi, in response to some apparent concern about the degree of outside influence, noted in a recent speech to Parliament that:

...Any claim that Kenya's economy has become dominated by forces of exploitation is an insult... external private capital...has contributed significantly to our overall national growth and diversification of the economy.


...our revenues and balance of payment situation have been affected by a series of unavoidable flaws. These have included drought, falling prices of our exports, rising prices of the goods we must import, very high rates of interest, inflation in the industrialized countries and the whole global climate of economic recession...our government considers the private sector as its partner in the development of our national economy...⁵

In sum, Kenya appears politically stable, makes no claim against any neighbor's territory, presents no military threat to anyone, and (despite economic vulnerabilities) encourages foreign investment and outside participation in its national development.

6-2 PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUBSYSTEM

Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya established the East African Community in 1967. However, ideological differences with Tanzania and a variety of

⁵Moi (9 March 1982) speech to Parliament, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. R4.



⁴Daniel Arap Moi speech on Kenyatta Day, Nairobi Domestic Service, 0912 GMT (20 October 1981), FBIS, DR, ME-A (22 October 1981), p. R2.



disputes with Uganda inhibited the operation of common services, and the Community was formally terminated with the breakup of the East African Airways Corporation in mid-1977.

Relations with Uganda deteriorated in February 1976, when Idi Amin laid claim to territory in Western Kenya which he asserted to have been "illegally" transferred by Britain in 1902. Although Amin later retracted his claim, relations deteriorated further following the Israeli raid on Entebbe (July 1976). Amin argued that Kenya had been acting in collusion with Israel; while Kenya accused Uganda of the massacre of several hundred Kenyans following the raid.

On 20 October 1979, in his Kenyatta Day speech, President Moi was still alluding to continuing political problems with Tanzania and Uganda. But with the overthrow of Idi Amin and Milton Obote's election as President of Uganda at the end of 1980, the political climate changed. Businessmen and industrialists in both countries were hoping to resurrect the East African Community. In his 20 October 1981 Kenyatta Day speech, Moi indicated that he was "anxious to promote and uphold programs of regional cooperation in eastern Africa."

Somalia's relations with Kenya have also exhibited similar change. During the late 1960's and 1970's, Somalia's irredentist desires for a Greater Somaliland (see Section 5.1) influenced the activities of Nomadic Hamitic tribesmen in Kenya's northeastern province. The situation worsened in mid-1977 with the outbreak of the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia, when a Kenyan official declared (on September 9, 1977) that an Ethiopian victory would be "a victory of Kenya."

⁹Arthur S. Banks (ed.), Political Handbook of the World: 1978 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1978), p. 254.



⁶New York Times (21 October 1979), p. 12.

⁷New York Times (26 December 1980), p. 13.

⁸Moi speech on Kenyatta Day (20 October 1981), op. cit., p. R2.



After the Soviets switched from backing Somalia to Ethiopia in 1977, Somalia's military position began to decline (see Section 5.1 above). Saudi Arabia began to assist Somalia and mediated with Kenya (Section 5.2 above). President Moi, in the first visit of a Kenyan Head of State, visited Saudi Arabia in September 1977. The effect of the Saudi effort was noted by Moi in a recent speech opening Parliament:

The political climate in this region is fairly calm. Indeed, at no time in the history of our independence have we witnessed so much tranquility along our borders.ll

Not only have local political relations improved greatly, but Kenya also has been acting as a regional peacemaker promoting solutions to the African problems of Chad and Namibia. Efforts to promote solutions to those vexing issues were postulated by President Moi and Kenyan Foreign Minister Dr. Robert Ouko. 12 In a speech on 18 November 1981, Ouko "reaffirm(ed) the right of Namibians to write their own constitution...for independence to be achieved before the end of 1982. 13 On 23 February 1982, in an address to the OAU, Ouko "reaffirmed U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 (as the) only acceptable framework for Namibian independence. 14

In sum, changes in the regional balance of power (between Ethiopia and Somalia) on the one hand and the overthrow of Idi Amin on the other have helped create conditions for local political stability. President

¹⁴ Nairobi Domestic Service, 0400 GMT (23 February 1982), FBIS, DR, ME-A (24 February 1982), p. Pl.



¹⁰ New York Times (9 September 1977), p. 13.

¹¹ Moi speech to Parliament (9 March 1982), op. cit., p. R4.

¹² Moi speech on Kenyatta Day (20 October 1981) op. cit., pp. R1-2.

¹³ Nairobi Doemstic Service, 1400 GMT (18 November 1981), FBIS, DR, ME-A (19 November 1981), p. R4.



Moi's predilection for being a peacemaker (within the OAU) has also contributed in creating conditions of stability in the subsystem.

6-3 PERCEPTION OF U.S.-SOVIET BALANCE OF POWER


Kenya has generally avoided involvement in superpower politics and takes its non-aligned role seriously. No media references or leadership utterances about the Soviet Union, either as a friend or enemy, were detected. Only one recent reference, uttered by President Moi, made uncritical note of the Soviet presence in Angola. On 4 September 1981, Moi said:

Angola is a sovereign state. It can invite anybody it wants, like us. It can invite any country. If we say we want Americans to come here, it is our choice. If we say we want the British or we want the Russians, it is our choice. Nobody else can choose or decide for us. 15

Though Kenyan leaders do not openly discuss the Soviet threat (as does Oman's Sultan Qaboos--Section 2.3; and Somalia's Siad Barre--Section 5.3), they do feel closer to the political ideals and economic values of the United States (and U.K.). For example, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when the U.S. began to take steps to acquire access to military facilities, the Kenyans were more forthcoming than the Somalis.


President Moi visited the U.S. in February 1980 and agreed to give U.S. forces access to military facilities (a port at Mombassa and airfields at Nairobi and Nanyuki) in return for military aid. The final accord paid \$50 million over two years to Kenya. 17

¹⁷ New York Times (22 April 1980), p. 3.



¹⁵ Nairobi Domestic Service, 0550 GMT (4 September 1981), FBIS, DR, ME-A (8 September 1981), p. R2.

¹⁶ Jeffrey Record, The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Interventions in the Persian Gulf (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analyses, February 1981), p. 59; and New York Times (12 February 1980), p. 1.



Shortly after Reagan came to office, he requested additional funds from Congress to dredge the port at Mombassa. ¹⁸ During April, U.S. Marines took part (for the first time) in exercises in Kenya, and the bases were again utilized during "Bright Star" in the fall. ¹⁹

Hence, despite the absence of rhetoric, Kenya's actions clearly indicate support for U.S. objectives in the region. Increasing domestic pressures against Kenya's U.S. tilt were indicated by President Moi in a 9 March 1982 speech to Parliament. Moi noted:

The most vital of all weapons in the economic and social battles is that of national unity...we do not want any kind of political subversion...we have no intention of abandoning our policy of nonalignment or losing any of our independence in planning and executing all our affairs...we do not want to become a kind of satellite of some foreign power. 20

It remains unclear just how significant these forces (either real or imagined) really are. Whatever the case, Moi is apparently sensitive to charges that Kenya's support of U.S. RDF endangers its non-aligned position.

On the other hand, Moi is quite clearly more comfortable with U.S. political and economic values. During his September 1981 visit to the U.S., Moi proposed the following to President Reagan:


...a partnership between America and Africa to promote the principles of Jefferson and Lincoln on the need to maintain and enhance human dignity...in promoting acceptable solutions to the prevailing problems in S. Africa...the ideals shared by Kenya and America provide one of the strong elements in the foundation for growing cooperation and understanding...21

¹⁸ New York Times (4 March 1981), p. 1.

¹⁹New York Times (19 April 1981), p. 12.


²⁰ Moi speech to Parliament (9 March 1982), op. cit., p. R3.

²¹Moi in 26 September 1981 speech in Washington, D.C., <u>FBIS, DR, ME-A</u> (28 September 1981), p. Rl.



While his proposal indicates sympathy for U.S. values, Moi (in light of his support for Namibia) clearly was pressuring the U.S. to alter its policy on South Africa.

In summary, Kenya supports the U.S. politically, economically, and militarily; but there is some obvious concern about the effect of such support on its non-aligned, independent positions. Hence, Kenya's support remains likely to continue, but without rhetorical atmospherics. Second, South Africa remains the one policy issue which could impact negatively upon U.S.-Kenyan relations. At present, however, the chance for real tension appears negligible.



SECTION 7 THAILAND (This Section is Unclassified)

7-1 SELF-PERCEPTION


Thailand, an area of 198,000 square miles, is surrounded by Burma in the West, Laos in the north and northeast, Kampuchea (formerly Cambodia) in the southeast and Malaysia in the deep south. About 75 percent of its population is of Thai stock, 15 percent is comprised of overseas Chinese, and the remaining 10 percent is comprised of Malaysian, Indian, Khmer and Vietnamese minorities. Theravada Buddhism is professed by about 95 percent of the population.

Although the King in the modern era has exercised little direct power, he remains a popular symbol of national unity in a highly centralized constitutional monarchy. This tradition derived from RAMA I, the founder of the present ruling dynasty, who drove out Burmese invaders at the end of the eighteenth century and his successors who managed through skill and diplomacy to keep Thailand the only Southeast Asian power independent of European colonial rule during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

7-1.1 Political Stability

Thailand has no irredentist claims that would be a cause for political unrest, although it sees itself surrounded by forces making attempts to undermine its independence. Khmer and Vietnamese insurgents and a Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) with Soviet and Chinese factions promote radical ideologies that challenge the status quo. In fact, according to Thailand Army Deputy Chief, Gen. Sak Buntharakun, "there are two threats to our country. The internal threat is from the CPT. The other is the external threat (Vietnam)."

Bangkok Post (11 October 1981), p. 7, FBIS, DR, Asia and Pacific Affairs (APA) (20 October 1981), p. J2.






Thailand was ruled as an absolute monarchy until 1932, when a group of military officials led by Field Marshal Plack Phibunsongkhram seized power in the first of what was to be a long series of military coups. Although there were perturbations in his rule, Phibunsongkhram played a major role in Thai politics until 1957, when he was overthrown by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. His successor, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, was overthrown in 1973. After two-and-a-half years of failed efforts to restore civilian government, in October 1976 Thanin Kraivichien formed a military-dominated government. In October 1977 he was ousted by Gen. Kirangsak Chamanon, who "legitimized" his rule through elections in April 1979. After his resignation on 29 February 1980, he was succeeded by Gen. Prem Tinsulanon, Army Commander and Defense Minister following a special election by a joint session of Parliament.

Though civilian rule has been restored, there have been numerous attempts and rumors of coups. In sum, Thai political life is likely to have the following attributes. Although there have been 11 constitutions in fifty years, the monarchy has remained the symbol of national unity and independence. Surface political instability is a fact of life. Whether or not succession will be through a Parliamentary process or coup, the military (not the CPT) will likely remain the basic institution providing real political leadership, while the monarchy will remain the symbolic unifier of Thai independence.

7-1.2 National Goals

Thailand played a leading role in the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the economic development-oriented

⁴ New York Times (3 April 1981), p. 11; and FBIS, DR, APA (30 December 1981), pp. J1-5.



²New York Times (24 April 1979), p. 8.

³ New York Times (4 March 1980), p. 5.



regional grouping composed of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. This varied coalition has drawn its limited cohesion from a combination of the economic dynamics of market-oriented states and a shared concern with the growth of Soviet military power in the region (e.g., Moscow's buildup along the Sino-Soviet frontier, the garrisoning of the northern territories—claimed by Japan—since 1978, the expansion of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the 1980 occupation of Afghanistan, and Soviet support of Vietnam's 1979 invasion of Kampuchea).

ASEAN is seen as an important political unifier, but not a military alliance. According to Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Thanat Khoman:

"it is impossible for ASEAN to become a military bloc. There is only one way for Thailand--'collective political defense'...(with) a combination of political-military support from such countries as the United States, PRC, Canada, etc."5

A month after this interview, Thanat added that "ASEAN is not under the influence of the U.S. and PRC. Laos and Vietnam have attacked us, but we are steadfast in our principles. We want to solve our problems by ourselves." Hence, while Thailand sees itself as a frontline state (within ASEAN) against Vietnamese (Soviet) expansion, it maintains (as its monarchical tradition) a fiercely independent spirit.

7-1.3 Refugees and Economic Development

Even though Thailand is straddled with a refugee problem, it has experience in dealing with refugees and hence the problem is not as severe as that, for example, in Somalia (see Section 5.1 above). In the 40 years since World War II, over 500,000 refugees (from Burma in the west, hill tribes, Lacs in the north and Chinese from Yunan) have been absorbed in

^{5&}quot;Face the Nation" interview, Bangkok Nation Review (5 October 1981), p. 5, FBIS, DR, APA (13 October 1981), p. Jl.

⁶Deputy Prime Minister Thanat Khoman interview, Siam Rat (9 November 1981), p. 5, FBIS, DR, APA (18 November 1981), p. J3.



Thailand, which has a total population of about 40 million. The immediate problem, since the 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, is dealing with 200,000 refugees in holding centers and 300,000 Kampucheans encamped along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

In reference to these problems, Prasong Sunsiri, Secretary General of the Thai NSC, recently made note of Thailand's "limited resources and draining public funds" when requesting emergency relief from the United Nations. In response, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees pledged 920 million baht (\$1 = 20.5 baht) to Thailand for relief, which Sunsiri said "will be enough to look after 200,000 refugees in camps for the entire year of 1982." Hence, the refugee problem (in contrast to Somalia's) appears to be soluble, though it is putting a drain on economic development.

During the 1970's, the Thai economy was both rapidly developing and stable because the government avoided excessive deficit financing, husbanded foreign exchange reserves and created a stable currency readily convertible at free-market rates. These efforts facilitated development, attracted foreign investment, and yielded an average annual growth rate in GNP at 8 percent. This growth rate, however, has been threatened recently by the refugee problem and recent world oil price hikes. Thailand imports 170,000 barrels/day; and increased world prices, according to deputy Army CinC Gen. Sak Buntharakun, have had a detrimental effect upon the domestic economy.


On the positive side, the Thais have been fairly successful in attracting foreign investments and trade. This resulted, in part, from

⁹FBIS. DR. APA (6 November 1981), p. J1; and Gen. Sak Buntharakun interview, Nation Review (23 November 1981), p. 5, FBIS, DR, APA (24 November 1981), p. J3.



⁷Prasong Sunsiri speech, <u>Bangkok Nation Review</u> (15 October 1981), p. 5, <u>FBIS, DR, APA</u> (22 October 1981), p. Jl.

⁸Bangkok Nation Review (24 October 1981), pp. 1, 10, <u>FBIS, DR, APA</u> (27 October 1981), p. J4.




recent successful visits to the U.S., Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand by Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon. In addition, a 1979 World Bank loan of \$107 million to finance the development of natural gas reserves in the Gulf of Thailand recently paid off when natural gas was discovered.

7-1.4 Changes in Military Posture

In addition to the refugee problem, the 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia has put pressure on Thailand by creating the need for greater military expenditures. In 1979, defense expenditures were \$940 million; \$1.28 billion was spent in 1981; and an estimate of \$1,427 billion is projected for 1982. This has led to a 10 percent increase in Thailand's total armed forces (from 216,000 to 238,100) over the past three years.


In sum, economic development impacts significantly upon Thailand's political stability. While refugee problems, higher world oil prices and greater defense expenditures undermine Thailand's economic development and hence political stability, the military institution has been strengthened. Although military coups may remain the "norm," as long as the authority of the monarch remains secure and the influence of the CPT limited, Thailand's status quo-barring unforeseen economic dislocation--is likely to remain relatively "secure."



¹⁰ See P.M. Gen. Prem Tinsulanon interviews, Bangkok Domestic Service, 0000 GMT (4 September 1981) and 1300 GMT (11 November 1981), FBIS DR, APA (8 September 1981), p. J2 and (12 November 1981), p. J1.

¹¹ New York Times (14 December 1979), p. 15; and P.M. Gen. Prem Tinsulanon, op. cit., (8 September 1981).

¹² See The Military Balance, 1979-1980 (London: IISS, 1979 and 1981), pp. 73 and 88, respectively; and Hong Kong AFP, 0455 GMT (26 September 1981), FBIS, DR, APA (28 September 1981), p. J2.



PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUBSYSTEM 7-2


According to Gen. Prasong Sunsiri, there are six factors that affect Southeast Asian regional security:

- Superpower power struggle (1)
- (2) Border disputes
- (3) Political conflict between small and big countries
- (4) The refugee problem
- (5) The Kampuchean problem
- ASEAN unity 13 (6)

7-2.1 Vietnam in Kampuchea

The refugee problem was addressed in Section 7.1 above and the superpower power struggle will be discussed in Section 7.3. To a great degree, the principal threat to Thai security (affecting all the factors noted by Sunsiri above) remains Vietnam, particularly since its 1979 invasion of Cambodia. The Thai NSC Secretary General stressed this point in a news conference. "The 200,000 Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea are using guns, not pencils...the threat to Thailand is becoming greater and greater, more than the internal threat." 14

Not only does the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea threaten Thailand directly (i.e., constant border clashes), it affects the other regional security factors noted by Sunsiri. In particular, according to Prime Minister Prem, it has "disrupted the growing cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia." 15



¹³ Matuphum (19 September 1981), p. 2, FBIS, DR, APA (23 September

¹⁴ Prasong Sunsiri news conference, Bangkok Post (3 October 1981), PP. 1, 20, FBIS, DR. APA (8 October 1981), p. J5.

¹⁵ Prime Minister Prem Speech to UNGA (5 October 1981), Bangkok Post (7 October 1981), p. 8, FBIS, DR, APA (9 October 1981), p. J3.




Thailand's priority is to attain the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops (which it sees as Soviet proxy forces) from Kampuchea. In order to achieve this goal it has attempted to forge a united front of three Kampuchean resistance groups under Sihanouk, Son Sann and "Democratic" Kampuchean leaders. The Thai plan, to create an anti-Vietnamese coalition in Cambodia, has led some ASEAN members to criticize Thailand as "tilting" toward the PRC and tension and disunity within the organization have developed. The Thai Deputy Prime Minister was quite forthright in outlining different ASEAN threat perceptions in a "Face the Nation" interview:

Malaysia and Indonesia (ASEAN) hold that China and Vietnam pose an equal threat to the region, but Thailand believes that Vietnam, backed by the Soviet Union, is the immediate threat to the region. China can be likened to a tiger in the jungle, while Vietnam is like a tiger at our doorsteps, waiting to kill our livestock. 16

Thailand's position has also led to political conflict with non-ASEAN regional powers, notably India. Gandhi accused Thailand of keeping soldiers in Kampuchea. The Thai Foreign Ministry protested this "slander," adding that quite to the contrary, there were 200,000 Vietnamese troops there, and claimed that Gandhi "only wants to please the Soviet Union, which supports India and Vietnam." 17

In sum, Thailand's perception of Vietnam as the primary threat to its security (acting as a Soviet surrogate in the invasion of Kampuchea) has contributed to ASEAN tensions, particularly with those regional members who continue to see China (PRC) as an equal threat. It has made a political rival of India and ensures constant border disputes with Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos as well as insurgency within Thailand itself.

^{17 &}quot;Prompt Action," <u>Matichon</u> (2 October 1981), p. 3, <u>FBIS, DR, APA</u> (5 October 1981), pp. J1-2.



¹⁶ Dr. Thanat Khoman, "Face the Nation Interview," Bangkok Nation Review (5 October 1981), p. 5, FBIS, DR, APA (13 October 1981), p. J5.



Unless ASEAN is successful in getting Vietnam out of Kampuchea, Thailand, in the words of one recent $\underline{Bangkok\ Post}$ editorial, will be in the "unenviable (position of) a 'frontline' state." 18

7-3 PERCEPTION OF U.S.-SOVIET BALANCE OF POWER

Thailand clearly perceives the Soviet Union as the major threat to its security. Thai leaders have consistently criticized recent Soviet actions. NSC General Secretary Prasong Sunsiri has noted that in addition to the 200,000 Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea, "more than 300 Soviet technicians... (were) sent to the Cambodian deep-water port of Kompong Som (and added) Soviet 'battleships' were using (it) and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam." Prime Minister Prem in the UNGA called for "the complete withdrawal of (Soviet) forces from Afghanistan." 20

The Thai media also cited the Soviet use of "poison gas" in its military operations. One commentary, for example, noted:

Now there is proof...poison gas or poison powder has been sprayed from planes in North Laos, West Kampuchea and Afghanistan...There is no question where the gas comes from...The Soviet Union, whether it likes the charge or not, will have to accept full responsibility. 21

Thus, the USSR not only supports Vietnam in Kampuchea, it continues to maintain technicians, air and seaport facilities there; it illegally invaded Afghanistan; and it employed "poison gas" in all theaters (Kampuchea, Afghanistan and Laos) of military operations. To balance this

^{21 &}quot;We Must Insist on Poison Gas Investigation," <u>Bangkok Nation Review</u> (16 September 1981), p. 4, <u>FBIS</u>, <u>DR</u>, <u>APA</u> (16 September 1981), p. Jl.



¹⁸Bangkok Post (30 December 1981), p. 4, FBIS, DR, APA (31 December 1981), p. J3.

¹⁹ prasong Sunsiri, Bangkok Post (3 October 1981), p. 1, FBIS, DR, APA (8 October 1981), p. J6.

²⁰prime Minister Prem speech to UNGA (5 October 1981), Bangkok Post (7 October 1981), p. 8, FBIS, DR, APA (9 October 1981), p. J3.



threat, Thailand clearly sees (and has seen) the United States as the guarantor of its security. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), now defunct, maintained its headquarters in Bangkok. During the period 1952-1972, Thailand received almost \$1.2 billion in U.S. military aid, and during the period 1946-1972, approximately \$533 million in economic assistance. During the Vietnam war, Prime Minister Thanom permitted the use of Thai air bases for U.S. military operations in Laos and South Vietnam (withdrawal was completed in mid-1976).

When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979, President Carter warned Vietnam and the USSR not to let fighting in Cambodia endanger Thai security. The U.S. sold Thailand a squadron of F-5 fighters (\$100 million) and pledged increased assistance, both military and economic for resettling refugees. 22 During 1980, Thailand placed orders for \$400 million in American arms and military supplies.²³ In mid-1980, when President Carter ordered an immediate airlift of weapons and expedited a sealift of 35 M-48 A5 tanks to help Thailand cope with incursions by Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, the Soviet TASS charged the U.S. with aggravating tensions in Southeast Asia. 24 During his visit to the United States in October 1981, Prime Minister Prem noted that Thai-U.S. relations had returned to normal (following the pro-Americanism shift in the 1960's to ant i-Americanism in the mid-1970's). Prem, making it quite clear what common ties Thailand and the U.S. shared, noted:

...concern over the expansionism of Soviet power and influence...The U.S. has supported all ASEAN moves in the United Nations...Militarily Thailand needs weapons with which it can defend itself. We do not expect, or welcome, American combat troops; we will do our own fighting for our own country...but we

²²New York Times (7 February 1979), p. 1.

²³ New York Times (6 January 1980), p. 6.

²⁴New York Times (2 July 1980), p. 5 and (6 July 1980), p. 12.




would like to know that a friendly superpower like the U.S. is ready, willing and able to keep its commitments to us. $^{\!25}$

During the visit, Prime Minister Prem asked the U.S. for FIM-43 "Redeye" AAGM's to be used by Thai frontline border soldiers against air intrusions and more M-48 A5 tanks. 26

Upon his arrival in Bangkok, Prem noted only that the U.S. talks were "very successful." Within a few weeks the Thai media was claiming the U.S. had not only agreed to sell 50 tanks plus "Redeyes" to Thailand, but also had concluded a "secret deal" whereby the U.S. would provide any assistance needed in the event Thailand were invaded. Whether or not these claims were accurate, there were signs of increased Thai-U.S. military cooperation. In mid-October, a five-day joint exercise, code-named Valiant Usher 82-1 involving two vessels of the 7th Fleet (500 U.S. Navy personnel, 800 Marines and 450 Thai Marines) was held in the Gulf of Siam. In November, the 7th Fleet and Thai Royal Navy began another five-day exercise in anti-surface and ASW off the Gulf of Thailand.

³⁰Bangkok Nation Review (3 November 1981), p. 1. FBIS, DR, APA (5 November 1981), p. J3.



²⁵Bangkok Post (1 October 1981), p. 4, FBIS, DR, APA (2 October 1981), p. Jl.

²⁶Bangkok Nation Review (2 October 1981), pp. 1, 14, FBIS, DR, APA (2 October 1981), p. J2.

²⁷Prime Minister press conference on arrival from U.S., Bangkok Domestic Service, 0000 GMT (12 October 1981), FBIS, DR, APA (15 October 1981), p. J1.

²⁸Bangkok Matichon (19 November 1981), pp. 1, 12, FBIS, DR, APA (19 November 1981), pp. J1-2.

²⁹Bangkok Domestic Service, 0000 GMT (15 October 1981), <u>FBIS, DR, APA</u> (16 October 1981), p. Jl.

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Chuaphibun noted the "need for Thailand and U.S. to increase the frequency of joint naval exercises." 31


It is quite clear that Thai leaders and the general public of Thailand perceive the Soviet Union (through Vietnam) as the major threat and the U.S. as the major guarantor of Thai security. They see the need for a strong and credible U.S. guarantee, but do not want the U.S. to reestablish bases in Thailand. One recent editorial summed up Thai views of the U.S.:

America's credibility was badly shaken when Nixon introduced his policy of 'peace with dignity' in order to pull American troops out of South Vietnam. The policy of compromise and friendship of Carter opened the way for the Soviet Union...to pursue its policy of interference and aggression. The U.S. could do nothing...Under Ronald Reagan the U.S. is once again playing the role of 'Big Brother'...its RDF can be dispatched within 48 hours anywhere when the situation warrants.


We do not mind which direction Thailand is taking so long as it is not trekking the old path by allowing the U.S. to re-establish military bases in Thailand. 32

In sum, the Thais have clearly perceived the Soviet-U.S. military balance to have tilted in the Soviets' favor since the mid-1970's. They see recent U.S. efforts to "restore" the balance as making the U.S. more credible as a military and political ally. While they want the guarantee of U.S. support, they do not want American bases in their backyard. These conditions are important if the U.S. wishes to maintain its influence in the region.

^{32&}quot;Son Thale" column, <u>Matichon</u> (28 October 1981), p. 3, <u>FBIS</u>, <u>DR</u>, APA (2 November 1981), pp. J3-4.



³¹ Bangkok Voice of Free Asia, 1100 GMT (24 November 1981), FBIS, DR, APA (2 December 1981), p. J4.



SECTION 8 INDONESIA

8-10) SELF-PERCEPTION

Indonesia, the most populous country of Southeast Asia (154 million), is an archipelago of over 13,500 islands covering a distance of 3,000 miles from the mainland of Southeast Asia to Australia. The population is predominantly (90 percent) of Malay stock and Islamic faith, and constitutes the world's largest single Muslim group. There are small minorities of Buddhists, Hindus and Christians.

8-1. MInternal Tensions: Political, Religious and Ethnic

Indonesia was colonized by the Portugese in the 16th century, conquered by the Dutch in the 17th, occupied by the Japanese in World War II and came under control of Indonesian nationalists who declared independence in August 1945. Maintaining internal unity is a difficult task for most leaderships emerging from centuries of colonial rule, but Indonesia's problems are compounded by the geography of its archipelago.

Many of Indonesia's internal problems stem from different aspirations among the inhabitants on some islands in the archipelago.

(1) East Timor: In December 1975, Indonesian troops occupied the Portugese Overseas Territory of East Timor and formally merged the territory into Indonesia on 17 July 1976. Popular resistance led to military repression with resulting charges of human rights violations.

South Moluccan Islands: Aspirations for independence were reserved by the residents of these islands when their territory was incorporated into

¹ New York Times (19 November 1979), p. 26 and (14 December 1979), p.

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
Indonesia in 1949. Sporadic resistance to Indonesian rule was suppressed, and the "president" of a self-proclaimed Republic of South Moluccas was arrested and executed in 1976. South Moluccan terrorist attacks against Indonesian property in the Netherlands occurred in 1966, 1970, 1974, 1975, and a highly publicized seizure of a train and elementary school occurred in 1977.

(3) Irian Jaya (West New Guinea): passed to Indonesian control in 1963. Resistance remains in the form of a "Free Papua Movement" (OPM) which wants the Irian province to be an independent state. In October 1981, OPM engaged in a successful attack against a prison to effect the release of political prisoners. 2

(4) Islamic Resurgence: Ever since the 1979 right wing revolution in Iran, there have been some signs of spillover in Indonesia's overwhelming Moslem population. Islamic student riots occurred in June 1979, February 1980 and April 1981. Although a centralized religious leadership does not exist to any significant extent, Islam (with student activists) poses a constant threat to domestic stability.

(5) Chinese Minorities: The Chinese minority in Indonesia has been quite successful economically, and in general their children are well educated. Social class stratification has caused resentment, and the

³See New York Times (17 June 1979), p. 3; (12 February 1980), p. 5; and (5 April 1981), p. 6.



²Hong Kong AFP, 0320 GMT (13 October 1981), <u>FBIS, DR, APA</u> (20 October 1981), p. N5.



Chinese have been subject to sporadic outbreaks of violence against Chinese-owned shops in November 1980, and October and December 1981.

In sum, Indonesia suffers from many political, religious and ethnic internal tensions that result in part from colonialism generally, and its archipelago geography specifically. This necessitates a strong military to enforce unified rule and political legitimacy.

8-1.2 Changes in Military Posture

Sukarno, one of the leaders of the nationalist struggle, served as constitutional President since 1949. In response to a series of antigovernment rebellions in 1959, he proclaimed martial law and imposed a so-called "guided-democracy" in which he exercised quasi-dictatorial powers while the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) assumed an increasingly prominent role. The PKI, by 1965, embarked on a campaign to arm its supporters and to create a "Fifth Armed Force." The Indonesian army actively resisted this move, and when the PKI attempted to purge the Army leadership (e.g., by murdering six generals), Indonesian masses assaulted Communists throughout the country. Sukarno was removed from power; and Gen. Suharto, who turned back the attempted PKI takeover, became President.

In essence, the military ensured itself as the guiding institution in Indonesian political life. About 1.5 million of the three million members of the PKI were rounded up. Over the years they were released, but they were denied the right to vote in the elections (which returned Suharto to power) in 1972 and 1977. Indications that fears of Communist subversion have waned can be seen in the fact that in the elections of May 1982, about one million former PKI members were allowed to vote for the

⁴See New York Times (27 November 1980), p. 4; Jakarta Domestic Service, 2300 GMT (30 October 1981), FBIS, DR, APA (4 November 1981), p. N2; and FBIS, DR, APA (17 December 1981), p. N2.




first time.⁵ On the other hand, Defense Minister Gen. Yusuf was still warning members of the armed forces to keep on the alert against any adverse domestic developments.⁶

President Suharto, in reference to the role of the military in Indonesian life, noted:

...the Indonesian Armed Forces will not develop into a militaristic, authoritarian or totalitarian power...(but) to help promote the growth of pancasila democracy and a constitutional life based on the constitution of 1945.7

In recent years, Indonesia's total armed forces have increased in size (239,000 in 1979 to 273,000 in 1981). The major increases have been in the Navy (from 39,000 to 52,000) and in combat aircraft (from 32 to 48). Western nations remain Indonesia's primary arms suppliers. The U.S. (and Israel) provide the basis of its air force (14 A-4s; 12 F-5Es and 4 F-5Fs). Britain, France, FRG, Australia and South Korea have been its other main sources of arms. 10

Thus, the military plays an important role in Indonesian political life. It acquired prestige when it prevented the PKI's attempted takeover and remains the one institution that ensures constitutional development and democracy. Also, it is the basic centralizing institution to maintain



⁵Hong Kong AFP, O435 GMT (13 November 1981), <u>FBIS, DR, APA</u> (24 November 1981), p. N3.

⁶Defense Minister Yusef, AFP (17 December 1981), <u>FBIS, DR, APA</u> (17 December 1981), p. N3.

⁷President Suharto Armed Forces Day address, <u>Jakarta Antara</u>, 1312 GMT (5 October 1981), <u>FBIS</u>, <u>DR</u>, <u>APA</u> (9 October 1981), p. N2.

⁸The Military Balance 1979-80; 1981-82 (London: IISS, 1979 and 1981), pp. 66, 80.

⁹Ibid.


^{10 &}lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 106, 117.

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unity (in the face of the enormous internal tension) and order throughout the archipelago. In other words, it remains a military whose function is to deal with "internal" rather than external threats.

8-2 PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUBSYSTEM


During the 1950's, Indonesia sought to play a prominent role in Asian affairs while avoiding involvement in conflicts between the major powers (e.g., Bandung Conference). In the early 1960's, President Sukarno formed close ties with the Soviet Union and China and openly opposed "imperialist" designs imputed to Western nations. This was reversed under Suharto's leadership; Indonesia has drawn closer to the West (particularly for economic assistance) and took the lead in establishing ASEAN as an instrument of regional cooperation.



¹ Richard H. Solomon, "East Asia and the Great Power Coalitions," Foreign Affairs (America and the World 1981), Vol. 60, No. 3, p. 712.







8-3 PERCEPTION OF U.S.-SOVIET BALANCE OF POWER

Indonesia may see the Soviet Union as a threat to the region, but it is perceived as a "distant" one. In contrast to Thailand, Indonesia did not condemn either the Soviet use of (sea and air) port facilities in Cambodia and Vietnam or its alleged use of "poison gas" in military operations in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. President Suharto, in reference to these activities, noted rather blandly that:

Indonesia rejects all kinds of foreign interference in the internal affairs of other countries, the more so if the interference is military. Indonesia wants also the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and Kampuchean territory. 19

¹⁹ President Suharto, Antara, 0948 GMT (20 October 1981), FBIS, DR, APA (22 October 1981), p. NI.



¹⁷ Mokhtar, Hong Kong AFP, 1513 GMT (17 December 1981), FBIS, DR, APA (30 December 1981), p. N2.

¹⁸Hong Kong AFP, 1534 GMT (16 December 1981), <u>FBIS</u>, <u>DR</u>, <u>APA</u> (17 December 1981), pp. N1-2.



SECTION 9 TAIWAN

9-1 SELF-PERCEPTION

Taiwan is a province of China controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) (established 1912), whose authority since 1949 has been limited to the island of Taiwan (Formosa), P'enghu (the Pescadores), and some offshore islands, including Quemoy and Matsu. Its 18 million population enjoys a highly developed economy (1980 GNP of \$27.8 billion) despite the strain involved in maintaining an armed force of over 450,000 men, one of the largest in the world on a per capita basis.


Since its establishment on Taiwan in 1949, the Chinese Nationalist government, under the domination of the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist Party, has continued to declare itself the government of all China. While it has devoted its main attention to ensuring its own survival by developing its economic and military potential, Taiwan continues to adhere to the objective to return eventually to the mainland.

9-1.1 The Dream of "One China"

With the passage of more than three decades since the departure of the Kuomintang from the Mainland, the prospects that the ROC would ever represent all of China appear to be very remote to most people. Despite this reality, comment on and continuation of this view can still be found in the Taiwan press. One recent editorial, for example, noted:

President Chiang said we have not given up our goal of mainland recovery and reconstruction. It is easy to say 'of course not.' Some of our people have done just that. They continue their lip service, but add that return to the Chinese mainland can no longer be considered realistic. This plays straight into the hands of those who advocate an independent Taiwan. This is impossible. Even if we accept it, the Communists would not.

^{1&}quot;President Chiang's Unity Call," The China News (Taipei), Editorial (June 10, 1980), p. 2.





At the present, however, there is no clear indication that the nationalist government is prepared to abandon its long, but increasingly outmoded objective of a return to power on the mainland.

The nationalist claim to represent "one China," coupled with the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) claim to be the sole legal government of China and stated desire (in its Constitution of 1978) "to liberate Taiwan and accomplish the great cause of unifying our motherland" are mutually irreconcilable irredentist claims. This dissention, coupled with the increasing global acceptance of the PRC's legitimacy over the decade of the 1970's, forms the basis of Taiwan's (domestic and foreign) politics.

9-1.2 Three Principles of the People

The RCC, founded in 1912 by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, is Asia's first democratic republic. Since its founding, it has been guided by Three Principles of the People, the San Min Chu I: nationalism, democracy, and the well-being of the people. Sun Yat-sen was educated in the United States (Hawaii) and Chinese commentaries tend to emphasize the similarity between U.S. and Chinese values. One recent commentary, for example, noted that "his Principles of the People was inspired by Lincoln's concept of the people, by the people and for the people."

In the same vein, RCC commentaries also stress how the Three Principles as practiced in Taiwan provide "more to offer the people of all China than the Chinese Communists," such as:

- Freedom and democracy;
- (2) Economic prosperity and a high standard of living:

³ The China News (Taiwan) (24 February 1982).



²Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "China, Russia, American Policy," International Security (Fall 1980) Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 36.

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- (3) Modernization; and
- (4) Social and political stability."4

As ide from identifying with the United States, on the one hand, and seeing itself as a viable alternative for mainland Chinese on the other, the fundamental national policy of the Republic of China consists of the following four firm and unchangeable principles:

- (1) The system of the state of the Republic of China as established under Article I of the Constitution will never be changed. Article I of the Constitution reads: "The Republic of China, founded on the Three Principles of the People, shall be a democratic republic of the people, to be governed by the people, and for the people."
- (2) The overall goals of anti-Communism and national recovery of the Republic of China will never be changed.
- (3) The Republic of China will remain always with the democratic bloc and its dedication to the upholding of righteousness and justice and safe-guarding peace and security of the world will never be changed.
- (4) The resolute stand of the Republic of China in never compromising with the Chinese Communist rebel group will never be changed.⁵

Since the RCC sees itself as an Asian outpost of democracy implacably opposed to Chinese Communism, U.S. policy changes toward the PRC (in 1972 and 1979) have had a catasrophic effect upon Taiwan's self-image. Just as important, the ROC harbors deep concerns about its future ability to defend itself since it is so dependent upon American arms.

9-1.3 Military Posture and U.S. Perceptions of ROC

During World War II, Chiang Kai-shek was America's ally against Japan and at the end of the war FDR pushed for China's permanent membership

⁵See pamphlet: <u>The Republic of China Foreign Policy</u> (Taipei, Taiwan: Kwang Hwa Publishing Co., May 1980), p. 3.



⁴ The China News (Taiwan) (2 March 1982).

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in the U.N. Security Council. After the KMT was expelled from the mainland (the PRC was formally founded on 1 October 1949), the U.S., particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War (June 1950), became the principal basis of RCC's defense. U.S. military and economic assistance coupled with a mutual defense treaty guaranteed Taiwan's security.

From RCC's perspective, two major crises have occurred in its relations with the United States since 1949. The first occurred during the early 1970's when President Nixon visited Peking and signed the Shanghai Communique which expressed a new U.S. position toward Taiwan:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The immediate effect for RCC was that it lost its seat in the United Nations (1971) and the U.S. established liaison relations with the PRC (1974).

The second crisis occurred in 1978 when President Carter announced diplomatic recognition of the PRC (effective 1 January 1979), derecognition of the Republic of China and termination of the U.S.-RCC mutual defense treaty. At the same time, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (1979). The Chinese media interpret the Taiwan Relations Act in the following way:

The United States must supply the Republic of China with defensive weapons and take a stand against aggression against Taiwan. Any settlement of the China problem must be by peaceful means. Members of the Reagan administration are well aware that this law is superior to the Shanghai communique of Richard Nixon and to the Peking recognition of Jimmy Carter. They also know that any attempt to repeal



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or water down the Taiwan Relations Act would be firmly rejected.6

The United States has been and remains the major arms supplier for ROC, and it is clear that Taiwan wants to see the relationship maintained. Over recent years, the U.S. has supplied or agreed to supply Taiwan with: 3 C-130 H transports, 12,500 MD helicopters, and co-produced 48 f 5 E/F fighters as well as 500 Maverick ASMs; \$150 million worth of howitzers and assorted SAMs (Sea Chapparral and improved HAWK), Mavarick ASMs, ASROC ASW missiles and Sidewinder AAMs. 7

A major dispute between Taiwan and Washington has recently occurred over the supply of FX fighters. Taiwan's request had been denied because, according to Alexander Haig, there is "no urgency," since Taiwan's security is not endangered. Taiwan, on the other hand, sees a need for improved fighters since the PRC is "producing aircraft equal or superior to the F-5E... Unless RCC defenses are augmented and strengthened, the likelihood of military pressure and invasion will be greatly increased."

Hence, Taiwan's major concern is that of the U.S. leaderships' changing perceptions regarding the status of "one China" and the resulting impact that this will have upon Taiwan's future ability to defend itself, since it relies so heavily upon the U.S. for arms.

9-2 PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUBSYSTEM

Taiwan's irredentist goal to "recover" the mainland and resolute stand to never compromise with the Chinese "rebel group" (Section 9.1 above) indicate that the PRC is an immutable regional rival. Although

^{9&}lt;u>The China News</u> (Taiwan) (5 March 1982).



⁶ The China News (Taiwan) (5 March 1982).

⁷ The Military Balance, 1979-1980; 1980-1981; 1981-1982 (London: IISS 1979, 1980 and 1981), pp. 107, 106 and 117 respectively.

⁸ New York Times (22 June 1981), p. 2.



Taiwan does not maintain diplomatic relations with many states in the region (e.g., Kingdom of Tonga), it has very close relations with several states.

Japan is Taiwan's second largest trading partner (following the U.S.). Economic and cultural links are maintained through the Association of East Asian Relations established in 1972 (following Japan's establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC). This unorthodox but pragmatic scheme became the model for Taiwan's continued maintenance of relations with the U.S. in 1979.

Hong Kong is Taiwan's third largest trading partner. Very close relations remain between Taiwan and South Korea. Taiwan's relations with ASEAN members (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia) are also conducted through various non-diplomatic channels. ¹⁰ Taiwan's close relations with Indonesia (which maintains a stronger anti-PRC position than Thailand) were indicated in its recent offer to supply F-5E's, M-16 assault rifles and armored cars (Section 9.2 above).

It is quite clear that Taiwan continues to see itself as defending its territorial integrity against the aggressions of Chinese Communism. Hence, there is little reference in the media or few comments from the leadership about the strategic nuclear relationship between the superpowers, Soviet-Warsaw Pact strategy in Europe, or the growth of Soviet "hegemonism" in the "arc of crisis." Taiwan's perspective is clearly regional with its eye riveted directly toward the PRC.

In January 1979 (when the U.S. and PRC established diplomatic relations), the PRC stopped its shelling of ROC's offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, which it had conducted since the crises of 1954 and 1958. On 18 October 1979; Deng Xiaoping (in return for Taiwan's acceptance of PRC sovereignty over "One China") suggested that:

¹¹ New York Times (1 January 1979), p. 1.



¹⁰ The Republic of China Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 9-12.

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Taiwan need not change its social system, that it may continue with capitalism and its present lifestyle, and that it will be allowed to maintain its armed forces, a broad range of autonomy and its own provincial government. 12

All of the PRC's overtures have been met with only suspicion by Taiwan's

Vice-Admiral Ko Tun-hwa, Strategic Adviser to ROC President, recently made the following remark:

Taiwan can be compared with Hong Kong in terms of continuous economic prosperity, but unlike Hong Kong it is not waiting to be reclaimed and repossessed. The Republic of China will play its own role in the future and decide its own destiny, aware that Taiwan occupies a very strategic position...[which he likened to an] unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific. 13

Continuing in this vein, the Vice Admiral noted Taiwan's strategic importance in (1) linking the waterways of the Indian and Pacific Oceans; and (2) within Southeast Asia. In the latter case, he noted Japan's use of Taiwan in its advance against the Philippines during World War II and the U.S. use of Taiwan in a supporting role for its military operations ouring the Vietnam war era. 14

Hence, Taiwan sees the necessity of continuing to defend itself (with U.S. military assistance) against the PRC. It has made an effort to build strong relations (even if not diplomatic) with the Western market

¹² Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong) (20 October 1979), p. 1; quoted in Yin Ching-yao, "Current Chinese Communist Strategy and Tactics Toward the Republic of China," paper presented at the Ninth Sino-American Conference on Mainland China, Taipei, Taiwan, June 9-14, 1980, p. 11.

¹³ Vice-Admiral Ko Tun-hwa, <u>Taiwan's Strategic Importance</u> (Taipei, Taiwan: Kwang Hwa Publishing Co., (February 1982), pp. 9-10.

¹⁴ <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 5-6.



oriented ASEAN states, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, etc. Taiwan continues to stress its regional strategic importance and its willingness to cooperate with Western democratic states, in the apparent hope of reversing the recent march of history.

9-3 PERCEPTION OF U.S.-SOVIET BALANCE OF POWER

Taiwan's perception of the superpower balance is that the U.S. "is still first in the world." One recent editorial stressed U.S. military and industrial stengths, and highlighted the USSR's economic shortcomings which it portrayed as the basis of Soviet military inferiority:

If there is another world war, the United States will win it on a basis of its productivity regardless of first-strike destruction. Nuclear conflict would be horrible but it would not kill everyone and wipe out everything. Know-how and the world's richest variety of resources give the United States a decisive advantage over any possible antagonist or antagonists. 16

The editorial went on to explain the U.S. failure in Vietnam in the following way:

There are extenuating circumstances that partially explain even that. The war was never really understood by the American people. It was not fought to win. The leadership of the period was flawed. The peace was dishonored. Let it always be remembered that the United States could have won the Vietnam war in hours with the use of nuclear weapons. It chose to lose the conflict rather than to do that. Such restraint is unique among nations.

In essence, Taiwan feels that the U.S. has "over-estimated" the Soviet threat. Another editorial recently noted that because Alexander Haig



¹⁵ The China News (Taipei) (26 February 1982).

¹⁶ Ib id.



"considers that the Soviet Union constitutes a grave threat...this has made him a Red China card player...[adding]":

He doesn't know or at least has not recognized that when it comes to the confrontation with the USSR, the billion people and subcontinent held by the Chinese Communists would be a liability rather than an asset. 17

On the following day, another editorial added:

...Nor is Red China going to play any card for the United States against the Soviets. What the Chinese Communists would like most of all is a hot war between the U.S. and USSR. Peking would then be left to pick up the pieces and get what it could from both of the two shattered antagonists. The Republic of China and the people of Taiwan need the arms (which are paid for in full) and the non-military support of the United States in order to keep peace in the Taiwan straits and survive. 18

In sum, it is quite clear that Taiwan continues to see its future linked to the United States, despite the absence of diplomatic relations. It not only supports U.S. military policy in the theater and around the world; Taiwan also indicates a willingness, should the need ever arise, to facilitate and promote U.S. interests in the future. Thus, it appears that no matter what the U.S. does, it can count upon Taiwan.

¹⁸ The China News (Taiwan) (6 March 1982).



¹⁷ The China News (Taiwan) (5 March 1982).



SECTION 10 NEW ZEALAND

10-1 SELF-PERCEPTION

New Zealand, an area of approximately 100,000 square miles with a population of 3.1 million, is perhaps the most physically isolated of the world's advanced nations. The majority of its population is of British extraction, but Maori descendants of the original Polynesian inhabitants constitute about eight percent of the total. Its economy is primarily based on exporting agricultural goods in return for industrial goods. The country has attained one of the world's highest standards of living (\$5,600 per capita in 1980) despite its vulnerability to fluctuations in the world market.

New Zealand makes no irredentist claims against neighbors nor are there any significant subcultures adhering to radical ideologies. The political system which is based upon the British system has no written constitution and is quite stable. Both of the main political parties support the welfare state in principle; the Labour Party was in power from 1972-1975, and the more conservative National Party was in power from 1960-1972 and returned to power in the election of 29 November 1975. National Party leader, Robert D. Muldoon, has been Prime Minister since this period, and was re-elected in the November 1981 election.

10-1.1 Energy, Trade Barriers and the Economy

While no ethnic secessionist problems nor radical subcultures threaten domestic tranquility, New Zealand's political stability is most likely to be affected by economic uncertainties in the 1980's. New Zealand's problem is twofold. Its major source of foreign income depends

The outcome gave the National Party 47 Parliamentary seats, Labour 43, and the Social Credit Party 2 in the closest election since 1957. Hong Kong AFP, 1330 GMT (9 December 1981), FBIS, DR, APA (10 December 1981), p. M2.

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upon agricultural exports which are subject to wide price fluctuations and trade barriers. And perhaps it is no accident that Prime Minister Muldoon, who is regarded by many as New Zealand's leading economist, has moved energetically on the economic front since his election in November 1975.

While global price fluctuations are uncontrollable, trade barriers are a cause of some political tension with allies. The United States Government's restrictions to limit New Zealand's agricultural exports was noted by Prime Minister Muldoon, in a 6 October 1980 speech:

We would clearly like to increase our exports of dairy products to the United States, but we are not receiving much encouragement. My problem lies... with the balance the United States strikes between domestic producers' interests on the one hand and the concerns of an efficient trading nation and allies such as New Zealand on the other... You must understand that New Zealand's ability to contribute to the maintenance of the western alliance is conditioned by economic factors. 2

The second aspect of New Zealand's economic problem lies in its dependence upon Middle Eastern crude oil, a vulnerability only recognized after the oil shock of 1973. After Muldoon's election (November 1975), the Prime Minister initiated an energy program (July 1977) which provided for state-operated onshore oil exploration and intensive exploitation of the country's energy resources—with the intended goal of reducing New Zealand's oil dependency.

The second oil shock of 1979 was a setback. The rise in New Zealand's oil bill from \$700 million in 1978 to \$1.4 billion in 1980, however, made it possible to develop alternative energy sources which had not been economically viable previously. This involves efforts to

²Prime Minister Muldoon speech to Foreign Policy Association, New York (6 October 1980), New Zealand Backgrounder, p. 7.

³<u>Ibid</u>., p. 3.

exploit New Zealand's resources of natural gas, coal, geothermal and hydroelectric power. Thus, the oil crisis has created economic dislocation, but appears to be soluble. Its political effect—the search for greater regional cooperation—was recently noted by D. K. McDowell, assistant secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Post-OPEC, we in the Pacific Basin in common with the rest of the world are more aware of interdependence than we ever were when the question of Pacific cooperation was first raised. This would appear to provide a powerful impetus towards wider regional economic dialogue.⁴

In sum, the economic problems in New Zealand appear to be soluble, although they are affecting domestic tranquility and international political relationships. The immediate transitional problem is that the long-lasting economic downturn has resulted in high unemployment, especially among non-whites (e.g., the 270,000 Maoris and 61,000 Pacific islanders). Hopefully as the economic problems are solved, social tensions will be reduced. Economic problems have also been the cause of tension (though not yet disruptive) with a traditional ally such as the United States, and also appear to be driving New Zealand into searching for greater regional cooperation.

10-1.2 Changes in Military Posture

Through the ANZUS Treaty of 1951, New Zealand is allied with the United States and Australia. While the main significance of the ANZUS Treaty is related to defense and security matters, the regular consultations which take place under its auspices provide a useful forum for discussion on a wide range of issues. The Council of ANZUS meets annually at the Foreign Minister/Secretary of State level to discuss security

⁵New York Times (4 November 1980), p. 7.



⁴D. K. McDowell, Assistant Secretary, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs speech on 17 May 1981, New Zealand Backgrounder, p. 3.

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issues in the Pacific and Asian regions. According to Prime Minister Muldoon, not only is this relationship unlikely to change, but:

We are staunch members of the Western Alliance and we believe in the practical as well as the symbolic cooperation which the ANZUS Treaty obligations impose on the three partners.


Over recent years, New Zealand's total armed forces have remained small (12,913 in 1981) and stable. According to M.J.C. Templeton, Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs:

Japan's defense budget as a percentage of GNP was reported to be 0.9 percent in 1979, as compared to 2.1 percent for New Zealand, 5.2 percent for North Korea and between 11 and 13 percent for the Soviet Union.8

New Zealand's Defense Minister, D.B.G. McLean, recognizes the unequal nature of the alliance due to the limited resources of his country and has noted that:

For the most part a smaller ally cannot expect to carry the day or to be able to exercise preponderant influence on its senior partners...[Nevertheless]... Intelligence liaison, foreign policy consultations and shared research interests as well as military collaboration and joint exercising can contribute in almost unequal measure to the success of the relationship no matter how unequal or how diverse the experiences of the members.9

⁹D.B.G. McLean, Secretary of Defense paper delivered to International Studies Association in Philadelphia on 21 March 1981, New Zealand Backgrounder, pp. 2-3.



⁶Muldoon, op. cit., p. 2

⁷ The Military Balance, 1981-82 (London: IISS, 1981), p. 85.

⁸M.J.C. Templeton, Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 16 May 1981 address to University of Otago Foreign Policy School, New Zealand Backgrounder, p. 2.



In sum, New Zealand has not evidenced any change in its small total military force in recent years, nor has it evidenced any desire to change its present membership in the ANZUS alliance.

10-2 PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUBSYSTEM

Australia is New Zealand's nearest Pacific neighbor. Its English-speaking society is similar to New Zealand's, and there is a great deal of contact and interchange of people. Each country is the other's major market for manufactured products, and the New Zealand/Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the most prominent aspect of the trading relationship. The tangible expression of their common concern for the peace and stability of the Pacific is embodied in their joint participation in the ANZUS pact.

ASEAN is basic to New Zealand's regional policy of developing cooperation with countries of Asia. According to Prime Minister Muldoon:

New Zealand, together with Australia, enjoys the closest of links with the five ASEAN countries and the island nations of the South Pacific. 10

As we have noted with Thailand and Indonesia (Sections 7.2 and 8.2 above), Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea is the major issue facing ASEAN. Thailand's aim (as a frontline state) is to exert sufficient diplomatic pressure on Vietnam to compel it to withdraw from Kampuchea and restore Cambodia to the status of a buffer state. On this issue, M.J.C. Templeton, Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, has noted:

New Zealand has supported Thailand and the other ASEAN countries in this effort, both because we regard Thailand's concern for its own security as legislmate, and because we are opposed to Vietnam's military occupation of Cambodia. In terms of the East Asian strategic balance, we see the opposition to Vietnam's conquest of Cambodia as an attempt to

¹⁰ Muldoon, op. cit., p. 2.

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spell out the limits of this new middle power's influence. $\ensuremath{\mathsf{I}}$

Templeton also sees the emergence of the Soviet military presence in the Pacific as "one of the most important developments affecting the strategic balance of the region." He also sees "the present Vietnamese dependence on Soviet assistance" as a root problem, adding that "in our perception at least, the withdrawal of the Soviet presence from Vietnam...could not but contribute to the stability and confidence of ASEAN's membership." He also sees "the present Vietnamese dependence on Soviet assistance" as a root problem, adding that "in our perception at least, the withdrawal of the Soviet presence from Vietnam...could not but contribute to the stability and confidence of ASEAN's membership."

While New Zealand shares the same security objectives as Australia and ASEAN, and sees Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea (with Soviet support) as the principal threat to the region, it has also recently altered its perception of China.

New Zealand established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972, acknowledging the position that Taiwan was an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC. There have been growing trade contacts between the two countries, and the PRC is no longer seen as a threat to regional security. Templeton openly noted:

China's support for revolutionary and insurgent movements in the ASEAN countries is now limited, whereas in the 1960's it was regarded as a serious threat. 14

In sum, New Zealand's perception of Vietnam (with Soviet backing) as the principal threat to the region and recent diplomatic activities with the PRC (and ASEAN and the Pacific Forum) suggest that they remain in total accord with U.S. regional security interests.

¹¹Tempteton, op. cit., p. 6.

^{12 &}lt;u>Ib id.</u>, p. 2.

¹³Ib id., pp. 3, 7.

¹⁴ Ib id.

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10-3 PERCEPTION OF U.S.-SOVIET BALANCE OF POWER

New Zealand's top leadership clearly perceives the USSR as the major troublemaker in the world. The Prime Minister has noted that "the steady trend of Soviet expansionism [will mean] that the world is likely to be... a more dangerous place in the coming years." The Minister of Foreign Affairs, B. E. Talboys, noted on 27 June 1981 that "the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan...was a body blow to detente." 16

M.J.C. Templeton has given his appraisal of Moscow's logic for acquiring a greater capability in the Pacific. He portrayed Moscow's motives as follows:

- (1) the interests of the USSR are global;
- (2) the USSR's main adversary, the United States, is the dominant power in the Pacific, and is presumably seen as threatening the USSR's security from that direction;
- (3) Soviet naval forces in the Pacific could be used against China in support of the land and air forces already deployed along the Sino-Soviet border;
- (4) the western Pacific forms part of the sea route between the USSR's eastern and western extremities; and
- (5) the isolation of Vietnam and the hostility of its neighbors offer the Soviet Union an opportunity it is not disposed to neglect to establish a base in South East Asia from which it can extend the range of its military operations into the Pacific. 17

¹⁷ Templeton, op. cit., pp. 2-3.



¹⁵ Muldoon, op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁶Rt. Hon. B. E. Talboys, Minister of Foreign Affairs address to the National Consultative Committee on Disarmament, 27 June 1981, New Zealand Backgrounder, p. 1.

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In sum, the Soviet Union's global expansionist activities, coupled with troublemaking activities in the region (e.g., Vietnam, Section 10.2 above and in New Zealand itself) require a strong U.S. presence to guarantee peace and stability in the Pacific. ¹⁸ In this vein, New Zealand sees the need to continue to support ANZUS as necessary and, in the words of Defense Minister McLean:


So far as there is debate in New Zealand about membership of ANZUS it seems more about a fashionable anti-Americanism than it is constructive about alternative policies for a small and isolated country of broadly Western instincts and connections. 19

There have been, however, some recent public demonstrations against a U.S. nuclear presence. In September 1980, 1,000 demonstrators marched on the U.S. Embassy in Wellington to protest the visit of U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered cruiser Truxton. Again in May 1982, the same cruiser evoked another public demonstration with support of the nation's Federation of Labor and the Opposition Labour Party. 21

Despite these public demonstrations, New Zealand's political leadership still supports U.S. security objectives. They support the current proposals to upgrade NATO's LRTNF and see it as "an attempt to redress the balance, to bring the states back into some sort of equilibrium."²²

New Zealand also supports the growing pre-occupation of the U.S. with the Persian Gulf and the creation of RDJTF. The only concern that they articulated, however, is that this preoccupation:

May prevent the United States from giving more of its attention or resources to this region. We have



¹⁸ In January 1980, Muldoon expelled Soviet Ambassador Vsevolud Sofinsky when he discovered that Moscow had transferred money to the New Zealand Communist Party, New York Times (24 January 1980) p. 13.

¹⁹McLean, <u>op</u>. <u>cit.</u>, p. 4.

²⁰ New York Times (27 September 1980), p. 4.

²¹Washington Post (28 May 1982), p. 18.

²²Talboys, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>, p. 6.

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seen already that the naval build-up in the Indian Ocean was carried out to a significant degree at the expense of the United States naval presence in the Pacific. Essentially, the seventh fleet transferred some of its ships from one ocean to the other. Increases in total United States forces that would permit simultaneous build-ups in both oceans will take some years to implement. And then there could well be manpower problems.²³

In sum, New Zealand perceives the U.S. as a necessary friend to ensure its security. Perhaps P. M. Muldoon summed up New Zealand's view best when he said:

We are not alone in looking to you [the U.S.] to exert calm leadership through the risky eighties because no country in the past has shown a more generous vision of this world's future. No other country offers the prospect of doing so now. The European Community does not have the capacity, even if it had the will, to offer world leadership. The Soviet Union and its apprentices have both the capacity and the will. I have been told this in many parts of the world. From Peking to the Gulf States should not retreat from, or lose confidence in, its global function, as the agent of peace, prosperity and individual liberty.24

²³ Templeton, op. cit., p. 4.

²⁴ Muldoon, op. cit., p. 8.

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SECTION 11 BURMA

11-1 SELF-PERCEPTION

Burma, the largest country on the Southeast Asian mainland (262,000 square miles), has a population of 35.3 million people. The dominant ethnic group is the Burman (71 percent of the inhabitants) followed by the Karen (11 percent) dispersed over southern and eastern Burma. The Shans, Kachins, Mons and Arakanese total about one million. In addition, there are about 400,000 Chinese, and 120,000 Indians and Pakistanis. About 85 percent of the population professes classical Buddhism (Theravada Buddhism).

The beginning of Burma's political development dates to its incorporation into British India in the 19th century. Burma was separated from India in 1937 and granted limited self-government. It was occupied by the Japanese during World War II and gained full independence from the British on 4 January 1948 under the leadership of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (and Prime Minister U Nu). In March 1962, Gen. Ne Win, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, mounted a coup, organized a Revolutionary Council of senior army officers to run the government, and abolished the national legislature. Finally in January 1974, the Ne Win government adopted a new constitution and revived the legislature, under one-party (Burmese Socialist Program Party, BSP) rule with the stated objective of making the country a "Socialist Republic."

11-1.1 Political Stability

White Burma has no irredentist claims or messianic dreams that would be a cause for political unrest, it does have two domestic groups who challenge the existing status quo: the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and the five insurgent groups who form the Federal National Democratic Front (FNDF).

The BCP, outlawed in 1949, is a Peking-oriented group which attempted to overthrow Ne Win in August 1967. The Party was considerably



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weakened by Maoist purges in the mid-sixties. It formally maintained a National Democratic Front with pro-Communist Karens, who deserted the Front in 1968-69 because it emulated the Chinese "Cultural Revolution."

By late 1974, some 20 battalions of the Burmese army were engaged in security operations against the BCP along the China border. In November 1975, Ne Win visited Peking in an effort to get the PRC to halt or scale down its support for the BCP. His efforts failed and Burmese Communist insurgency stepped up its level of combat. Recent U.S. estimates claim the BCP has an armed force of as many as 12,000 men, and could call on a militia of 30,000 to protect the large areas it controls in Burma's Shan plateau (the biggest center of opium cultivation in Southeast Asia). There is widespread opinion that they are probably the best organized insurgent movement in Southeast Asia.

Burma's second major challenge comes from five minority insurgent groups—the Arakan Liberation Party, the Karen National Union, the Karenni National Progressive Party, the New Mon State Party, and the Shan State Progressive Party—which formed in May 1975 the FNDF to "overthrow" Ne Win's one-party military dictatorship. During 1977, in the context of widening guerrilla warfare in northern and eastern Burma, there were indications of cooperation between the Communists and FNDF.

With government efforts at crackdown, there were reports of as many as 200,000 Burmese Moslems in refugee camps in Bangladesh escaping alleged atrocities by Burmese Buddhists. After a general amnesty was declared in 1980, there were reports of over 1,500 rebels surrendering, though Mon

⁴ New York Times (2 March 1979), p. 2.



New York Times (7 August 1980), p. 2.

²Dominick L. DiCarlo, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters, report to Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See New York Times (10 May 1982), p. 15.

³Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 March 1978.



refugees in Thailand plan to continue to challenge the Rangoon Government by carving out an independent homeland in Burma. 5

In sum, Burma's domestic tranquility continues to be threatened by the BCP and FNDF. Some estimations suggest that as much as one-third of the country, from Kachin in the north to Karenni on the eastern border with Thailand, appears to be under insurgent control. These challenges have continued to have an effect upon Burma's contacts with the outside world.

11-2 PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUBSYSTEM

In its foreign relations, Burma attaches special significance to the People's Republic of China, with which it shares a 1,200-mile border. Burma was the first non-Communist country to recognize the PRC in 1949. In 1960, the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression following settlement of a long-standing border dispute.

Relations between the two countries became frayed in the late 1960's when terrorist insurgency influenced by the Cultural Revolution became prevalent in Rangoon. This caused a severe deterioration in Sino-Burmese relations, which were not improved until 1970-1971. The continued activities of pro-Peking rebels in both the north and southeast remain the one thorn in Sino-Burmese relations; though on the official level, the two countries have resumed their traditional closeness.

Visits between Burmese and Chinese leaders have become more frequent. Ne Win visited Peking in November 1975 and twice in 1977; Chinese counterparts visited Burma in February 1977, January 1978 and January 1981. Though economic relations are not extensive, they have remained static in recent years.

⁵New York Times (18 March 1980), p. 11.

⁶Takashi Tajima, <u>China and Southeast Asia: Strategic Interests</u> and <u>Policy Prospects</u> (London: Adelphi Papers, Number 172), pp. 20-21, and <u>New York Times</u> (26 January 1981), p. 3.

⁷Tajima, op. cit., p. 26.

As ide from its relations with the PRC, Burma has consciously remained quite isolated from the rest of the world. Nonalignment has been the cornerstone of its foreign policy since 1948. Although Burma has maintained membership in the UN and several of its specialized agencies, its participation has been marginal.

Finally in 1979, Ne Win began to end Burma's 17-year period of self-imposed isolation. The Government began to seek \$400 million in foreign aid and loans from capitalist nations, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. These recent, but hesitant moves seem to be linked to Burma's unease about the USSR and Vietnam in Kampuchea. In sum, Burma has begun to recognize its common interests with ASEAN and Japan.

11-3 PERCEPTION OF U.S .- SOVIET BALANCE OF POWER

As noted in Section 11.2, Burma has only recently begun to emerge from a 17-year period of isolation. To a certain extent, this is due to Soviet activities (through Vietnam) in Kampuchea. Burma's initial moves, however, are tentative at best.

The Burmese have approached the U.S. for loans and economic assistance, but have not indicated any desire to get involved in superpower differences in the region. Hence, while the U.S. can reciprocate with economic assistance (as can Japan), it is unlikely to expect Burma's political or military support. Isolationism remains the cornerstone of Burma's foreign policy.

^{8&}lt;sub>New York Times</sub> (14 June 1981), p. 2 and <u>New York Times</u> (24 June 1981), p. 17.

⁹ New York Times (20 July 1980), p. 5.

¹⁰ New York Times (11 September 1980), p. 3

¹¹ New York Times (14 June 1979), p. 2.