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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

STRATEGIC STUDY

NEEDED CHANGES TO SENIOR DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS
IN JAPAN

by

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
STRATEGIC STUDIES REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Needed Changes to Senior Defense Organizations
in Japan

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DATE: APRIL, 1985

As Japan increases in importance to the U.S. and the Soviet Union increases its military might vis-a-vis Japan, it follows that the U.S. should increase the responsibility and capability of its military commander in Japan. Likewise, the JSDF requires reorganization to improve US/JSDF defense cooperation and effectiveness.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Commander Ludvig K. Tande, USN (B.A. Concordia College, Moorehead, Minnesota) was assigned to the staff of Commander U.S. Forces Japan as the ~~Exercise Branch Director~~ of the ~~Operations Division (J3)~~ from 1982-1984. In that capacity he worked extensively with the Japanese Self Defense Force in the coordination and development of combined US/JSDF exercises. He is a 1980 graduate of the Naval Command and Staff College, Newport, R.I. and served for two years on board the aircraft carrier USS Midway--which is homeported in Yokosuka, Japan. He has travelled extensively in Japan, South Korea, Philippines and other Asian-Pacific countries. Commander Tande is a graduate of the National War College, Class of 1985.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Japan is increasing in importance to the United States. The Soviet Union has been building its military strength in the Asian-Pacific. Both the U.S. and Japan need to do more to safeguard Japan vis-a-vis the Soviet military capability.

Prior to 1957, when Japan had far less economic and political value to the US and Asian-Pacific region than it does today, the U.S. had a senior, operational command stationed in Japan specifically, the Far East Command. Since 1957, the U.S. has in Japan Commander, U.S. Forces Japan (COMUSJAPAN)--an administrative, subunified command of USCINCPAC, with virtually no operational forces assigned for the defense of Japan. On the Japanese side, the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) has a command structure that significantly complicates U.S./JSDF defense planning and operations.

To strengthen US/JSDF defense capability, this paper recommends:

US

- o Elevate COMUSJAPAN to a more senior, operational command.
- o Make supporting changes to COMUSJAPAN's components:
 - oo establish new numbered airforce primarily for the defense of Japan.
 - oo establish new numbered Naval Task Force primarily for the defense of Japan.

oo make no changes to current U.S. Army
Japan/IX CORPS and USMC organizations.

Japan

- o elevate Japan Defense Agency to ministerial level
- o establish true joint military authority over the
JSDF. In effect, change the current horizontal
structure to a vertical, US model.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Within the last decade, the Soviet Union has substantially increased its military presence in the Asia-Pacific Region. It has done so by strengthening air, ground, naval and nuclear forces in its Far East Military District--all of which could threaten Japan, but most of which is probably directed at the PRC. Still, Soviet presence and actions have caused significant concern for many in Japan and the United States.

Under the guidelines of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty, the United States is committed to defend Japan. It is not a reciprocal agreement, i.e., Japan is not committed to the defense of the United States or U.S. Forces. Moreover, there exists in Japan substantial diffidence regarding defense treaties, or for that matter, the use of military forces in any circumstance--even in defense of itself. Japanese deep-seated aversion for things military is reflected fairly clearly in article 9 of their constitution which reads:

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as the sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces as well as other war potential will not be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

In spite of constitutional provisions prohibiting the development of "land, sea and air forces as well as other war

potential," Japan has developed a respectable Self Defense Force (SDF.) It has done so in part because of a perceived threat from the Soviet Union, but in larger part because of U.S. insistence.²

The Soviet military capability is such that neither the United States or Japan could go-it-alone. Thus, the United States talks about mutual deterrence and strongly encourages Japan to share a larger portion of the defense burden. Simply put, the U.S. means spend more and do more! To some extent, Japan has agreed to do both. It's defense budget is increasing, albeit slowly. Additionally, Japan is pursuing the capability to defend the sea lines of communication (SLOC) out to 1,000 nautical miles from its shores.

Japan's current administration and the U.S. recognize the need for a somewhat larger, more effective SDF. But increase in size and firepower are not the only improvements in the SDF needed to strengthen mutual deterrence. Credibility, which depends on how well the forces can fight together is equally important, if not more so. Recommendations to improve combined US/JSDF interoperability³ is the thrust of this paper. The recommendations are by no means all inclusive, but if adopted would improve interoperability and strengthen


mutual deterrence. Moreover, these recommendations, while politically sensitive to Japan, could be made without substantial increases in defense spending. Specifically, I recommend improvements in senior US/JSDF command relations.

CHAPTER II

UNITED STATES FORCES JAPAN

Since the close of WWII, United States Forces stationed in Japan have gone from a force of occupation to an ally, responsible to a large extent for the defense of Japan. Prior to 1957, U.S. Forces were commanded by the United States, Far East Command subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It's most prestigious commander was, at one time, General Douglas MacArthur who held five star rank. In 1957, the U.S. Far East Command was reduced in size and responsibility and designated Commander United States Forces Japan (COMUSJAPAN) and subordinated to commander-in-chief, Pacific (CINCPAC).

COMUSJAPAN's primary responsibility was for the "formulation of various plans for the defense of Japan."⁴ To support him and coordinate with counterpart JSDF services, component U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force administrative commands were established. Figure 1 depicts the U.S. Forces Japan Defense Organizations.



*Same Commander.

**Diagram extrapolated from more detailed diagram at Appendix 1.

Unlike the former Commander, U.S. Far East Command, COMUSJAPAN has virtually no operations. U.S. forces assigned solely for the defense of Japan. U.S. regional or theater forces stationed in Japan are, in the main, responsible for many contingencies and under the operational control of U.S. CINCPAC via his operational component commanders: Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), Commander-in-Chief Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF), U.S. Army Western Command (WESTCOM), and Commander Fleet Marine Forces Pacific (CFMFPAC).

In 1978, the Guideline for Japan-U.S. Defense Co-operation was developed. Inter alia, it substantially increased the responsibilities of COMUSJAPAN. In addition to the "formulation of various plans for the defense of Japan," the U.S. and Japan agreed to:

1. Japan would maintain appropriate defense capability necessary for self-defense. The U.S. would maintain a U.S. nuclear deterrent capability and some combat-ready forces (U.S. Marines)
2. The USFJ and SDF would conduct joint defense planning and common enforcement procedures relating to operations, intelligence, and logistics.
3. The USFJ and the SDF would compile and exchange information vital to the defense of Japan.
4. They would also conduct maneuvers and training jointly and establish a coordination center between the USFJ and SDF.⁵


The Guideline gives greater responsibility to COMUSJAPAN without providing any organizational changes to support it. In effect, COMUSJAPAN has a planning staff responsible to

"conduct maneuvers and training jointly" without the authority or ability to direct training and exercises. Operational authority/direction remains with USCINCPAC via his operational components--as stated before--not his subunified Commander.

Richard L. Armitage, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs states, "Japan remains the cornerstone of the United States forward defense strategy in the Asian Pacific region."⁶ If that's true, and I believe it is, it follows that the senior U.S. Defense representative in Japan should proportionately reflect Japan's economic, political and military importance to the U.S. Elevating COMUSJAPAN to a four star, operational commander with U.S. active and reserve forces earmarked for the defense of Japan would:

- demonstrate U.S. resolve to defend Japan.
- demonstrate to the Japanese in a very visible and personal way that Japan is as important to the U.S. as are the other areas--particularly Europe.
- enhance the prestige of COMUSJAPAN's JSDF counterpart, namely Chairman, Joint Staff Council/ Joint Staff Office.
- aid in the development of realistic U.S.-Japan military training and exercises.
- bottom line: it would strengthen the mutual policy of deterrence.

Figure 2 depicts the U.S. Military Organization recommended:



*existing command
 **proposed commands

The mission of COMUSJAPAN would be expanded from "planning for the defense of Japan" with some additional Guideline responsibilities, to "responsible for the defense of Japan." Likewise, component commanders would support this mission and have forces assigned, such as:

Commander, Naval Forces Japan (CNFJ): There should be established a numbered Naval Task Force under CNFJ composed of U.S. active and reserve naval units. Some of these units would be stationed in Japan and continue to support Seventh Fleet as needed.

Commander, U.S. Airforces Japan (CUSAFJ): This commander would not also have the responsibility as COMUSJAPAN--the

current arrangement. Rather, he would be an Airforce Lieutenant General assigned as CUSAFJ and the Commander of a new numbered Airforce (XX Airforce), not the existing Fifth Airforce. Fifth Airforce would be responsible for the defense of Korea. XX Airforce would be composed of active and reserve U.S. Airforce units specifically for the defense of Japan.

Commander, U.S. Army Japan (CDRUSARJ): Currently, CDRUSARJ is also the commander of IX Corps. The current U.S. Army arrangement is adequate and should not be changed. However, active and reserve Army units to support IX Corps should be identified and regularly train with the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force. It is probably not necessary to garrison conventional U.S. Army troops in Japan.

USMC: No change is recommended. The Marines are a contingency force with theater-wide responsibilities and cannot be earmarked primarily for the defense of Japan.

CHAPTER III

JAPANESE SELF DEFENSE FORCE

Benevolent in victory, the United States following WWII, concerned itself with post war reform and reconstruction of Japan. After disarming the Japanese military, as part of the reform, a 10,000 man National Police Reserve (NPR) was established to deal with internal security problems. By 1950, to replace American occupation forces who had to fight in Korea, the NPR was ordered by the U.S. occupation authority to expand to 75,000. In 1952, the NPR and Japanese Maritime Safety Force were transformed into the civilian directed, National Safety Force. Larger and more heavily armed than its predecessor, the National Safety force retained the mission of internal security. In 1954, the National Safety Force was reorganized and renamed the Defense Agency. With the addition of an air component, these forces under the civilian directed Defense Agency, became the Self Defense Force. Significantly, the mission of the SDF expanded from internal security to internal and external security. To preclude the reemergence of an insular military having virtually no civilian control as in pre-World War II Japan, several measures were taken. Specifically, the Prime Minister was made the SDF's Commander-in-Chief, the director-general of the Defense Agency made a state minister who must be a civilian and an all civilian National Defense Council advising the Prime Minister on

defense matters was established.⁷ Figure 3 (see page 13) depicts the senior JSDF organization. The dotted line separates civilian and military authority.

There are two main points I want to make referring to Figure 3. The first, there is no single joint military authority over any of the JSDF services. All of the staffs and major operational units report directly to the Director general of the Defense Agency. Not even the Ground, Maritime or Air chiefs of staff have directional authority over respective lower level units. Figure 3 depicts, for all intents and purposes, a horizontal command arrangement. It has given rise to several institutional problems. Who's the favored son? More importantly, who will command the SDF in an emergency? "The issue is clouded.... As yet, no clear position on this has been established..."⁸ The second, the JSDF command arrangement hinders combined US/JSDF coordination for planing and training. There exists considerable disconnect between the U.S. vertical/centralized chain-of-command, and the JSDF horizontal model. In effect, U.S. forces have no single authoritative point of contact. An example, US Army Japan finds it must juggle a proposal for planning or training with the GSDF chief of staff (its counterpart) as well as five GSDF-Army commanders. Moreover, given the Japanese consensus way of doing things, because each major command has voice, proposals take an inordinate length

OUTLINE OF THE SDF ORGANIZATION




Chart extrapolated from Defense of Japan 1981, Tokyo, Defense Agency/Japan Times, p. 354.

A more detailed chart can be seen in appendix 2/3

Figure 3

of time to finalize. During times of peace, lengthy coordination problems are just that--problems, and not critical. In times of crisis, however, combined coordinations must be better.

Figure 4 (see page 15) depicts a streamlined SDF organization. In concert with the U.S. organizational changes recommended in Chapter II, the Japanese Government should give serious study to increase the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council by subordinating SDF organizations and forces to him. Note also, I elevated the Director-General of the Defense Agency to the Minister of Defense--a cabinet level position; equal to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, etc. Currently, the Director-General of the Defense Agency is a state minister without a portfolio. The Agency is ranked below the ministerial levels and as such, has less clout than most other departments of government. Elevating the Director General would have the added effect of placing him on a more equal footing with the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Moreover, it would further the perception in the region and the U.S., that Japan is serious about strengthening its defense. There is little doubt that this proposal would meet considerable resistance in Japan. But, I believe it should be considered seriously by the Japanese--and presented by the U.S. in such a way as to give the appearance that it is a Japanese initiative and not solely a U.S. demand. Adopting

PROPOSED SDF ORGANIZATION




Figure 4

the recommendations of (1) elevating the Director-General of the Defense Agency to a ministerial level and (2) centralizing the JSDF chain of command would:

- demonstrate Japanese resolve to defend Japan.
- strengthen U.S./Japan deterrence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
- aid in the development of plans and training for the U.S./Japan combined defense of Japan.
- placate to some measure, U.S. insistence for Japan to share more of the defense burden.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Currently, the United States has in Japan as its senior military organization, an organization designed and established in 1957. For nearly 20 years, the region has been relatively stable, and apparently there has been no need for a change in authority and capability of that organization. But times have changed.

Since 1957, the Soviet Union has been building up its military strength in the region. Since 1957, Japan has been increasing in economic, political and military importance to the United States. The authority and capabilities of COMUSJAPAN have not increased commensurate with the threat and Japan's importance.

This is not to say that the United States hasn't done something to counter the Soviet buildup.⁹ In August 1983, Admiral Long, then USCINCPAC, stated, "... many vitally important improvements have been made in our ability to carry out our assigned missions in the Pacific Command."¹⁰ While quantitative and qualitative improvements in U.S. Forces have been made, more needs to be done--and particularly in Japan.

In my estimation, that "more" means to implement the U.S. and JSDF organizational changes recommended in Chapters II and III.


Given the Soviet threat and importance of Japan to the U.S., the COMUSJAPAN organization needs to be proportionately updated. The United States should to elevate COMUSJAPAN to four-star rank, with operational authority. Additionally, the United States should emphasize to the very highest level of Japanese leadership the need to correct long standing JSDF organizational problems.

If implemented, the above recommendations would further US strategic objectives in the Asian-Pacific region to: (1) maintain regional stability and (2) prevent increasing Soviet forces in the area from taking political/military advantage of internal theater conflicts.¹¹ The Soviet buildup threatens regional stability. The United States keeps emphasizing for Japan to build military forces to help counter the Soviet buildup thereby maintaining regional stability. But I submit, regardless of a Japanese defense buildup, both the US and Japan have to address serious organizational problems.

Diagram 25 Outline of Deployment of U.S. Forces Japan

(1) Mainland


(As of March 31, 1981)





*Okinawa not depicted


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Reference 39. Outline of Organization of Defense Agency & SDF
 (As of Mar. 31, 1961)






- Yokosuka District
- Kure District
- Sasebo District
- Mitsun District
- Omura District
- Ab Training Command
- Training Squadron
- Other units and organs



- Technical Airlift Wing
- Air Traffic Control and Weather Wing
- Air Rescue Wing
- Air Flight Wing
- Air Material Command
- Headquarters
- Technical Training Command
- Headquarters
- Other Units and Organs

Defense Facilities Administration Agency



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1. Japan's Constitution. Defense of Japan 1981, Tokyo, Defense Agency/Japan Times, 1981, p. 14.

2. Gow, I. T. M., et al. Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security, St. Martin's Press, New York 1982, pg. 5. I. T. M. Gow states, "It is possible to say that American influence created something unique because of its pervasive influence on Japanese thinking: namely that Japan's defense policy has been predicated on the behavior of its ally, not its potential enemies."

3. The term "interoperability" is used in this paper to mean the effective use of force to include not only equipment compatibility but coordination and execution of plans.

4. Defense of Japan 1981, Tokyo, Defense Agency/Japan Times, 1981, p. 235. Pages 235-245 give some history and roles of USFJ.

5. Gow, J.T.M., et al., Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security, p. 53.

6. Armitage, R.L. "Japan's Growing Commitment to Self-Defense," Defense 74, October 1974, p. 17.

7. Gow, I. T. M., et al., Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security, pp. 20-27.

8. Gow, I. T. M., et al. Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security; p. 31.

9. The U.S. has increased U.S. Forces stationed in Japan. Recently, it has deployed a U.S. Army Special Forces Battalion to Okinawa, homeported at least 2 additional Seventh Fleet ships to Kokojuka and Susecko, and is stationing two F-15 squadrons at Misawa.

10. Long, Admiral Robert L. J. (USN). "The Military Balance in the Pacific," Defense 83, August 1983, p. 17.

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