

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
WAR GAMING DEPARTMENT
REPORT
OF
COLLEGE OF NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF
JOINT MIDDLE EAST EXERCISE 1986
(JMEEX - 86)
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT**

**CDR. R. K. CHAMPNEY
GAME DIRECTOR**

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I. GAME OBJECTIVES

1. The stated purposes of joint war gaming among the four service colleges are:

a. To expose students to the capabilities, limitations, and procedures of other services.

b. To provide students opportunity to interact with their peers in other services.

c. To provide arena for joint planning in a non-lethal environment.

To these general objectives, the College of Naval Command and Staff adds two more general objectives:

d. To provide an opportunity to exercise decision-making in a tactical environment.

e. To demonstrate the selection of forces and application of tactics at the theater level.

2. Additionally, an objective of the U.S. Army's School of the Air, who funded the contract with COMSAT General for satellite links, was to further explore the feasibility of linked war gaming by satellite.

II. GAME OVERVIEW

1. Background. Conducted during the weeks 4-14 March, JMEEEX-86 was the third annual unclassified game played simultaneously by selected students from the College of Naval Command and Staff (CNC&S), Army Command and General Staff College (C&GSC), Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), and Marine Corps Staff College (MCSC). Students from MCSC played at Newport. Newport, Maxwell, and Leavenworth were linked with each other by landline and satellite for coordination and play. Whereas in JMEEEX-85, the MCSC students played at Quantico, for JMEEEX-86 they were colocated with USN students at Newport for both planning and play.

JMEEEX evolved from a meeting between ACSC and ACGSC in September 1982. In May 1983, MCSC committed to play JMEEEX-84 in March 1984; then in May 1984, CNC&S joined in planning for JMEEEX-85.

2. Scenario. The scenario focuses on an Iran in turmoil in the wake of the Ayatollah's death. Teheran is divided by several rivaling factions. One is headed by a recently elected moderate President. This faction enjoys support of the middle class, merchants and intellectuals and claims the loyalty of most elements of the armed forces. Other factions are composed of rival religious groups who, although they are at odds with one another, fear the betrayal of the Islamic fundamentalist revolution by the moderates.

Further complications result when a popular army commander declares himself ruler of Iran and announces the intention to occupy Bandar Abbas and to close the Strait of Hormuz to all shipping to or from the terminal ports of Iran and Iraq. Central government forces are committed to the continuing

Iran-Iraq war as well as the defense of the northern and eastern borders, and are thus unable to deal effectively with the new threat.

At the request of the central government of Iran, the 5th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) conducted an administrative amphibious landing at Bandar Abbas. The MAB established a lodgement with the primary missions of securing the sea lines of communications (SLOC) through the Strait of Hormuz and permitting Army entry into the area. Operations are being carried out jointly with contingents of loyal Iranian forces.

3. Timeframe. The timeframe used in the scenario is April-May 198X. The forces used are today's existing or programmed forces.

4. Forces. Appendices B, C, and D depict BLUE and ORANGE force laydowns at STARTEX.

5. BLUE Concept of Operations.

a. USCINCENT

Phase I: On D-Day at H-Hour, employ CTF 76 elements to conduct amphibious operations in the vicinity of Bandar Abbas and adjacent Straits to secure facilities to be used in the introduction of follow-on forces and conduct supporting operations with air and naval forces within the objective area.

Phase II: On approximately D+2, Army units are inserted and USMC amphibious elements withdraw to assume the mission of theater reserve.

Phase III: Beginning approximately D+5, USMC forces (CTF 76/79) conduct airborne and air assault operations in the vicinity of Chah

Bahar on major avenues of approach. Army units to Corps level continue into Bandar Abbas.

b. JTF 10

(1) When ordered by CINCENT, JTF 10 activates and with subordinate commanders employs forces to neutralize the threat capability to exert control over the Persian Gulf and all its access routes. Priority to the most immediate and serious threats and support of friendly ground operations. On arrival of HQ, USCINCENT in theater, JTF 10 is dissolved.

(2) On 28 April 198X, at 1000, US Marine units, supported by US Navy forces, will be deployed to the Bandar Abbas area in Iran. No Air Force or Army units will be assigned to this task force. After the airfield and port facilities in Bandar Abbas have been secured, COMARCENT will deploy forces to Bandar Abbas and conduct a relief-in-place with the Marine forces. On transfer of authority for the area from the Marine commander to the Army commander, the Marine forces will reembark aboard amphibious ships and revert to afloat reserve. At that time, JTF 10 will be disestablished and all US forces in theater will be responsive to USCINCENT through their respective component commanders.

6. BLUE Missions.

a. When directed, commence naval, ground and air operations in the Strait of Hormuz and Bandar Abbas areas to secure air and sea lines of communication and lodgement areas.

- b. Thereafter, conduct naval, ground and air operations in conjunction with loyal Iranian forces to protect Bandar Abbas, adjacent land areas to include the islands of Sughra, Tunb Al Kubra and Abu Musa against hostile Soviet and rebel ground, air and naval activity in order to reestablish control by the legitimate Iranian government.
- c. In conjunction with loyalist forces, conduct military operations to secure and protect the Strait of Hormuz, and to protect US and other international maritime and economic interests.

7. ORANGE Concept of Operations.

ORANGE will covertly aid the Shiraz commander in his defense against BLUE, but will not directly intervene until it is purely in ORANGES's best interest to force BLUE out of Iran. To accomplish this, Soviet naval forces will position themselves in theater awaiting orders from the TVD commander to conduct strikes on the CVBG. Ground forces position along the Afghanistan-Iran border and the northern Iranian border in preparation to invade Iran and force BLUE to withdraw.

8. ORANGE Missions.

When direct intervention is directed:

- a. Submarines establish and maintain contact on carriers in preparation for attack.
- b. Surface forces engage carrier groups.
- c. Conduct air attacks against CVBG for attrition and against ground forces in support of ORANGE forces.

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS, ISSUES AND LESSONS LEARNED

1. All JMEEEX-86 objectives were met.
2. Students gained a much better appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of the other services. This is an important feature of the JMEEEX series.
3. Voice communications should be used more often and earlier among all commanders for mutual understanding.
4. Each service should plan for more and earlier cooperative interservice support by use of each others assets.
5. Complete campaign planning must be conducted well in advance. The campaign must be thought all the way through, or commanders will become totally reactive to enemy initiatives.
6. Players must gain full appreciation that most tactics become obsolete after they have been used once. You must surprise the enemy as well as out think him.
7. Once you commit a highly mobile force such as an aircraft carrier, a MAGTF, or an airborne unit to a geographic position, you have lost much of its strength. In this game, the Naval Commander learned this lesson when he tied down his carriers in a small area for ASM defense and allowed submarines to locate and attack. } See 9
8. Air space management proved to be very important and must be effective to prevent BLUE on BLUE interactions.

9. There are some serious problems with ROE coordination between forces ashore and those at sea. Coordination at the outbreak of hostilities between sea and land forces is critical. Ashore, land forces are closing the enemy, while at sea, Navy forces are mingled with Soviet units daily. At sea, we cannot afford to grant the enemy the first shot and must be ready to use preemptive self defense.

10. Every war is one of limited objectives. These objectives must be established early on before committing troops, and the conditions, both good and bad, for withdrawing forces must be determined.

11. Doctrine can not be rigid and must not be blindly followed. Commanders have to be aware of the environment and geography in which they are operating and must maintain the willingness and flexibility to adapt to the real world.


APPENDIX A

GAME FORMAT AND PROCEDURES

1. Level of Play. The war game was played as a one-sided tactical and strategic exercise. Actions and interactions were not played below the task group level. NWGS was not employed because it could not handle the game rate and time steps played.
2. Player Requirements. BLUE commanders submitted force disposition plans to the controllers and presented their concept of operations briefs in Nott Auditorium of Sims Hall. Selected commanders from each of the satellite sites were called upon for daily "Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES)" broadcast simultaneously to all locations.
3. Control Procedures. Commanders (players) directed the movement of their forces. The control group, consisting of War Gaming Department (WGD) umpire augmentees, implemented commander directives and reported interactions to the commanders. Position of forces were maintained utilizing seminar table-top plotting procedures. Marine umpires were assisted by the Tactical Warfare Simulation Evaluation and Analysis System (TWSEAS) installed on the floor of Nott Auditorium by the Marines.
4. BLUE Higher Authority. Student officers assisted by Operations Department moderators fulfilled the role of higher authority. In this capacity, they functioned as civil and military governing bodies providing direction and responding to requests from commanders (players).

5. ORANGE Higher Authority. C&GSC moderators at Ft. Leavenworth fulfilled the role of the ORANGE Higher Authority. In this capacity, they functioned as minister of defense, general staff, and commander Western Theater providing direction and responding to requests from commanders. ORANGE naval forces were played by personnel from the NOIC Detachment at Newport.

APPENDIX B



APPENDIX C

LOCATION OF UNITS ON D-DAY

28 APRIL 198X

- o HQ, USCENTCOM Dhahran, S.A.
- o 5th MAB Embarked in TF 76
- o 7th MAB In Oman
- o Army/Air Forces Throughout Saudi Peninsula
(less 55th Mech Div) (See Service Plans)
- o 55th Mech Division In Hawaii
Personnel & Equipment Embarked in Convoy 200nm WSW of Oahu
enroute SWA
- o President Southern California
- o Vice President/
NCA/JCS/EXCOM Washington, D.C.
- o USCINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/
COMUSNAVCENT Hawaii
- o COMSEVENTHFLT/COMSUPNAVFOR In USS BLUE RIDGE (inport Yokosuka)
- o CTF 70/CTF 77 In USS CARL VINSON at Subic Bay, R.P.
- o CTG 70.1 In USS ENTERPRISE (vic 5°N/110° E)
- o CTG 75/CTG 70.3 In USS FIFE (vic 26°N/56°E)
- o CTG 70.7 In USS LASALLE at Bahrain
- o CTG 70.9 In USS AMERICA (vic 22°N/64°E)
- o TF 72 At Diego Garcia
- o TG 73.1 With/Supporting TG 70.1
- o TG 73.2 With/Supporting TG 70.9
- o TG 73.3 Vic Diego Garcia
- o TG 74 Forces with CVBGs
- o TF 76 Vicinity Bandar Abbas

LAT/LONG POSITIONS OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS

BASES/CITIES

DIEGO GARCIA	07.2S/072.4E
BANDAR ABBAS	26.9N/056.3E
BAHRAIN	26.0N/050.9E
ADEN	12.7N/044.9E
GAN ISLAND	00.4S/073.6E
DIEGO SUAREZ	12.3N/049.3E
MUSCAT	23.3N/058.8E
CAPE GUADAFUI	11.7N/051.2E
BANDAR E. BUSER	28.7N/050.9E
BANDAR E. SHAHAR	30.5N/049.1E
MAHE	05.7S/053.8E
KARACHI	24.7N/067.2E
BOMBAY	18.7N/072.9E
COLOMBO	07.0N/080.0E
SINGAPORE	01.3N/103.7E
DAHLAK ISLAND	15.5N/040.2E
RAS TANURA	26.5N/050.3E
DHAHRAN	26.0N/050.0E
CHAH BAHAR	25.3N/060.6E

APPENDIX D

LOCATION OF UNITS ON D-DAY

28 APRIL 198X

o Oscar SSGN	23-25N/065-00E
o E-II	Kiev/Kirov
o V-III	CVBG
o V-III	Kiev/Kirov
o V-III	07-12S/072-24E
o C-I	Masirah
o C-I	Gulf of Aden 12-42N/044-54E
o Sverdlov SAG 2 Amphibious	Socatra & Aden
o Kiev/Kirov SAG	21-00N/65-00W
o 31 GMRD	Afghanistan-Iran border
o 46 MRD	Afghanistan-Iran border
o 49 MRD	Afghanistan-Iran border
o 50 TD	Afghanistan-Iran border
o 7 Abn Div	Afghanistan-Iran border
o 37 Arty Regt	Afghanistan-Iran border

APPENDIX E
NWC CMC&S CONTROL AND
PLAYER BILLETS

for

JMEEX-86

NSC (President/SECDEF)	CDR Disney/CAPT Clark
JCS/JDA	COL Noll/MAJ Stout
NMCC/STAFF	CDR Disney/MAJ Lee
<u>MODULE/TABLE 1:</u> <u>USCINCPAC</u>	LCDR Rod McCurdy
CINCPACFLT	LCDR Hal Neal
CINCUSNAVCENT	MAJ Tom Kane
<u>MODULE/TABLE 2:</u> <u>COMSEVENTHFLT</u>	LCDR Dave Stone
CTF 70/CTF 77	LCDR Eric Loftquist
<u>MODULE/TABLE 3:</u> <u>CTF 72</u>	LCDR Bob Young
CTF 74	LCDR Drew Miller
<u>MODULE/TABLE 4:</u> <u>CTG 70.7</u>	LCDR Guy Purser
CTF 75	LCDR Mike Donigan
CTF 73	LCDR Marv Butcher
<u>USMC TABLE</u>	
CTF 76	LCDR Wally Gavett

MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

JMEEX-86 ROSTER

Newport, Rhode Island :

RANK	NAME	BILLET
Col	Miles Crafton	Academic Director, MCSC
LtCol	Richard S. Glenzer	Faculty
LtCol	Albert E. Shively	Faculty
Major	Mark J. Brousseau	MAB Air Staff
Major	Christian B. Cowdrey	MAB Ops.
Major	James W. Davis	MAB Gnd. Staff
Major	William R. Edwards	MAB Intell.
Major	James M. Feigley	MAB Armor
Major	Robert C. Figlock	ACE Cdr.
Major	James C. Hardee	GCE Cdr.
LCdr	Edwin S. Jankura	USN Liaison
Major	Mark P. Lennon	USAF Liaison
Major	Warren T. O'Hara	MAB Gnd. Staff
Major	Douglas A. Okland	MAB Cdr.
Major	Richard K. Reager	MAB Intell.
Major	Stephen S. Smith	USA Liaison
Major	John B. Sollis	MAB FSC
Major	Grant M. Sparks	MAB Logistics
Major	Nelson H. Stewart	MAB Air Ctrl.
Major	Steven D. Summers	MAB Air Staff
Major	Thelbert F. Taylor	CSSE Cdr.
Major	Douglas G. Wilson	MAB Commo.

APPENDIX F

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

Planning 3 - 7 March

Game Play 10 - 14 March

<u>GAME PLAY</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>CARGO DAY</u>	<u>D-DAY</u>	<u>PLANNED ACTION</u>
-	21 Apr 8X	C-Day	D-7	- USAF commences airlift to equipment to Saudi Peninsula
-	22 Apr 8X	C+1	D-6	- Continue Lift
	o	o	o	
	o	o	o	
	o	o	o	
-	28 Apr 8X	C+7	D-DAY	- Elements of 5th MAB land Bandar Abbas and secure lodgement
STARTEX				
1 (AM)	2 May 8X	C+11	D+4	- 230th armored Brigade in place at Bandar Abbas
1 (PM)	3 May 8X	C+12	D+5	- 5 MAB land Chah Bahar
2 (AM)	4 May 8X	C+13	D+6	o
				o
				o
2 (PM)	5 May 8X	C+14	D+7	o
3 (ALL DAY)	TIME STEP for PLANNING			
4 (AM)	18 May 8X	C+27	D+20	- 7th MAB is Reserve 55th Mech Div in theater
4 (PM)	19 May 8X	C+28	D+21	o
				o
				o
5 (AM)	20 May 8X	C+29	D+22	
5 (PM)	21 May 8X	C+30	D+23	ENDEX

JMEEX-86

Satellite Link

and

Briefing Schedule

(All times Eastern Standard Time Zone)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
DAY 1 - FRIDAY, 7 MARCH 1986 (2-hr. TV Time)			
1500-1508	LVN	MXF, NP	Dep Cmtt CGSC
1508-1512	NP	MXF, LVN	Pres, NavWarCol
1512-1516	NP	LVN, MXF	Director, MCCSC
1516-1520	MXF	LVN, NP	Cmtt, ACSC
1520-1540	LVN	MXF, NP	CENTCOM Campaign Strategy
1540-1555	LVN	MXF, NP	Campaign Plan ARFOR
1555-1610	MXF	LVN, NP	Campaign Plan AFFOR
1610-1625	NP	MXF, LVN	Campaign Plan MARFOR
1625-1640	NP	MXF, LVN	Campaign Plan PACFLT
1640-1700	NP	MXF, LVN	Comments from NCA/JCS
DAY 2 - MONDAY, 10 MARCH 1986 (2-hr. TV Time)			
0900-1000	LVN	MXF, NP	CENTCOM Staff Brief (Q&A)
1600-1615	LVN	MXF, LVN	Assessment Briefs of Daily Activity by Component Commanders
1615-1630	MXF	NP, LVN	" "
1630-1645	NP	MXF, LVN	" "
1645-1700	LVN	MXF, LVN	CINCCENT Comments

<u>TIME</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
DAY 3, TUESDAY, 11 MARCH 1986 (1-hr. TV Time)			
0900-1100	LVN	MXF, NP	CENTCOM Staff Morning Brief to CINCCENT
DAY 4, WEDNESDAY, 12 MARCH 1986 (2-hr. TV Time)			
0900-1100	LVN	MXF, NP	CENTCOM J Staff Giving Component Cdr's Planning Guidance
1600-1615	LVN	MXF, NP	Briefs of Planning Activity by Component Commanders
1615-1630	MXF	MXF, NP	" "
1630-1655	NP	LVN, MXF	" "
1655-1700	LVN	MXF, NP	CINCCENT Comments
DAY 5, THURSDAY, 13 MARCH 1986 (2-hr. TV Time)			
0900-1000	LVN	MXF, NP	CENT J Staff Morning Brief
1600-1615	LVN	MXF, NP	Assessment Briefs of Daily Activities by Component Commanders
1615-1630	MXF	NP, LVN	" "
1630-1655	NP	MXF, LVN	" "
1655-1700	LVN	MXF, NP	CINCCENT Comments
DAY 6, FRIDAY, 14 MARCH 1986 (2-hr. TV Time)			
1100-1120	MXF	LVN, NP	AFCENT Outbrief
1120-1210	NP	MXF, LVN	
1210-1240	LVN	MXF, NP	AFCENT/CINCCENT
1240-1300	NP	MXF, LVN	NCA/JCS Remarks

APPENDIX G

WGD LESSONS LEARNED

1. Navy and Marine Corps planning the week before game start was very beneficial to game play.

2. The Marine Corps use of the Tactical Warfare Simulation Evaluation and Analysis System (TWSEAS) was very useful and was particularly helpful in assessing the landing at Char Bahar.

3. In linking the three sites together, eleven commercial telephone lines were installed for voice communications. This was considered to be an adequate number and they were used as follows:

- 3 COMSAT Satellite Coordination
- 1 Telefax Message Traffic
- 1 Newport Control Group
- 1 Higher Authority
- 2 COMSEVENTHFLT
- 1 MAF Headquarters
- 1 Marine Air
- 1 Marine Ground Combat

4. Message traffic was typed by the WGD communications center. Copies were provided to players at Newport and copies were sent to Maxwell and Leavenworth by a high speed RAPIDCOM 120 Telefax. This system was very reliable with no backlog in sending message traffic.

5. Initial briefs, commander's estimates, and the final wrap up were all handled via a satellite television link. The satellite link proved to be reliable and provided clear transmissions except for the first day when high winds at Newport resulted in a few transmission problems.