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**THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**  
**NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE**



INDIAN OCEAN PLANNING PROBLEM

JUNE 1986

## PREFACE

### INDIAN OCEAN PLANNING PROBLEM

The scenario as stated is for problem purposes only. Resemblance to the current situation in this area of the world is intentional, but is not significant to game play of the problem. In other words, knowledge of real world capabilities, alliances, port facilities, etc. is irrelevant. Information presented in the game book and on weapons characteristics cards is the relevant information of the game. The forces used and the threat presented are the complete problem. No further BLUE forces will be introduced. The composition of the various BLUE commands, such as DESRON 24 and DESRON 26 is not necessarily representative of the forces normally assigned to that command. The platforms utilized in this problem have been selected to help familiarize the student with the various operational and logistic constraints that must be considered when employing a large naval force.

## INDIAN OCEAN PLANNING PROBLEM

### I. General Situation.

The time is June 1986. Relations between BLUE and ORANGE continue to fluctuate. The situation in Southeast Asia is stable, but the Middle East and Southwest Asia remain volatile. The 1979 occupation of Afghanistan has encouraged ORANGE to seek other areas for intervention. Many Middle East nations have cooled their relations with ORANGE. Various local problems have again forced closure of the Suez Canal, and full scale war is threatened.

ORANGE's intensified interest in the Middle East is directed at ridding the Middle East of "Imperialist" Western powers and gaining control of land near Indian Ocean seaports. This expansion southward would provide security to her southern flank, give her control over some of the rich oil fields in the Arabian Gulf area, and give her access to warm water ports.

ORANGE use of the Indian Ocean has steadily increased. On the island of Socotra ORANGE has installed a communications station and an ordnance supply depot with a capacity to replenish ships of numerous types. Additionally, airfields at Massawa, Ethiopia and Aden, PDRY have been made available to ORANGE by the local governments.

*Iran attacks them*

With the Suez Canal closed again, ORANGE's Black Sea ports have been cut off from the Indian Ocean. Consequently, ORANGE has felt increasing pressure to obtain continental warm water ports with Indian Ocean access. On 03 January, acting on behalf of various local political factions, ORANGE launched a combined air/ground assault across Iran. ORANGE forces now occupy and control many northern Arabian Gulf oil installations. ORANGE has gone to great length to justify such armed intervention and has assured the U.N. that no further military action will be necessary. ORANGE longrange reconnaissance aircraft are active in the Indian Ocean area, operating from airfields in southern ORANGE, Afghanistan and the PDRY.

In the interest of ensuring the continued flow of strategic material being shipped through the Indian Ocean, and to stabilize the Free World's position in the area, the students of the Naval Staff College have established a combined Indian Ocean Force. The United States Pacific Command, which previously exercised responsibility for the Indian Ocean through the U.S. Seventh Fleet has been committed to support this new combined force. The Indian Ocean Force, Task Force 88, with headquarters at Diego Garcia, consists of five task groups: TG 88.1, Carrier Battle Group; TG 88.2, Surface Action Group; TG 88.3, TAK Convoy Group; TG 88.4, TAK Convoy Group; TG 88.5, Air ASW and Reconnaissance Group. TG 88.1 also controls a subordinate Task Element, TG 88.1.1, Attack Submarine Element. Twenty-one ships of the NTPF MSC variety located in Diego Garcia fall under the operational control of TG 88.5.

TF 65, the Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR), consisting of the command ship LaSalle (AGF-3) and the frigate Capodanno (FF-1093), is conducting surveillance operations in the Arabian Gulf. This force remains under the operational control (OPCON) of USCINCEUR and CINCUSNAVEUR.

Allied reactions in the Western Pacific have been directed toward maintaining a strong strategic position from bases and forces afloat in order to ensure the integrity of sea lines of communications (SLOCs).

Suez Canal traffic continues to be diverted to the Cape of Good Hope route. No convoy system for Allied shipping has been established.

Pakistan, apprehensive over ORANGE's occupation of Afghanistan and recent invasion of Iran, has asked for increased aid from BLUE.

## II. Tactical Situation *MAJ*

Task Group 88.1, under command of RADM BB, departed Diego Garcia on 31 ~~December~~ to conduct fleet operational training exercises north of the SEYCHELLES.

Prior to departing Diego Garcia, RADM BB received the following message:

292330Z DECEMBER

FROM: CINCPACFLT  
TO: CINCLANTFLT  
INFO: CTF 88/CTG 88.1/CTG 88.2

SUBJ: ORANGE FORCES INTELLIGENCE

1. ORANGE FREIGHTER OBSERVED WITH DECK CARGO OF 8 OSA II CLASS MISSILE PATROL BOATS ARRIVED AT SOCOTRA ON NIGHT OF 26 ~~DECEMBER~~ *MAJ*
2. TWO NANUCHKA CLASS MISSILE CORVETTES HAVE BEEN OBSERVED OPERATING IN AND AROUND THE PORT OF ADEN, PDRY FOR THE PAST THREE WEEKS.
3. TWO BEAR D LONG-RANGE RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED TO THE AIRFIELD AT ADEN, PDRY ON 28 ~~DECEMBER~~ INTENTIONS UNKNOWN.
4. AN ORANGE TASK FORCE OF NINE SHIPS COMPOSED OF 1 KIEV (CVHG), 1 KYNDA (CG), 1 KRESTA I (CG), 2 KRESTA II (CG), 2 KASHIN (DDG), 2 KRIVAK (FFG), AND AN AUXILIARY (UNIDENTIFIED), PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN THE JAVA SEA OBSERVED MORNING 28 ~~DECEMBER~~ PASSING THROUGH SUNDA STRAIT INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN. ITINERARY UNKNOWN. *MAJ*

5. A PRIMORYE AND TWO MOMA CLASS AGI'S ARE LOCATED IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. AS OF LAST WEEK, THE PRIMORYE AND A MOMA WERE OPERATING NEAR SOCOTRA WHILE THE SECOND MOMA IS ON PATROL IN THE GULF OF OMAN.

6. AT LEAST FOUR ORANGE SUBMARINES ARE THOUGHT TO BE OPERATING IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. TYPES ARE UNCONFIRMED BUT POSSIBLY INCLUDE CHARLIE, ECHO II, AND FOXTROT.

BT

On 02 ~~January~~ <sup>JUNE</sup> CTF 88 passed the following message to CTG 88.1 and CTG 88.2:

312130Z MAY

FROM: CINCPACFLT  
TO: CTF 88

SUBJ: ESCORT OPERATIONS

1. TWO TAK CONVOYS PROCEEDING TO KARACHI, PAKISTAN.
2. CONVOYS CARRYING HIGH PRIORITY SHIPMENT OF TANKS HELICOPTERS, MISCELLANEOUS MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES FOR AUGMENTATION OF PAKISTANI FORCES.
3. DESRON 28 AND DESRON 24 DIRECTED TO CHOP TO CTF 88 AS TG 88.3 AND TG 88.4, RESPECTIVELY, FOR OPERATIONAL CONTROL ON 042200Z JUNE.

BT

~~0600Z~~

At ~~0600z~~ June, TG 88.1 and TG 88.2 were preparing to refuel in their respective operating areas (TG 88.1 at 13 N/68 E and TG 88.2 at 09 N/65 E) when the following message was received:

060430Z JUNE

FROM: CINCPACFLT  
TO: CTF 88

SUBJ: OPERATIONS

- A. CINCPACFLT 292330Z MAY
- B. CINCPACFLT 312130Z MAY

1. MY OPLAN 1-86 EFFECTIVE FOR OPERATIONS IMMEDIATELY.
2. PRESENT SITUATION INDICATES NO ADDITIONAL AUGMENTATION FROM US OR ALLIED NAVAL FORCES IN INDIAN OCEAN AREA FOR NEXT 30 DAYS. UNSUITABLE AND IMPRACTICAL TO HOLD US AND ALLIED MERSHIPS IN PORT DURING PRESENT CRISIS. INTEND REF B CONVOY PROCEED KARACHI WITHOUT DELAY. CONSIDER ORANGE FORCES IN INDIAN OCEAN A MAJOR THREAT TO MERSHIPS AND TAX CONVOY.
3. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE IN CARRYING OUT YOUR MISSION. HOWEVER, IN THE FACE OF HOSTILE INTENT, WHEN NON-FORCEFUL MEASURES CANNOT BRING THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL AND THE SITUATION REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ACTION, THE USE OF NECESSARY AND PROPORTIONATE FORCE IS AUTHORIZED. THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS NOT AUTHORIZED.
4. REQUEST ADVISE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, ADEQUACY OF CURRENT FORCES FOR ASSIGNED MISSION.

BT

At 0630Z on 6 June, CTF 88's forces were refueling when he received an urgent message from CTG 88.5 stating that a patrol aircraft from Diego Garcia had located a Kresta I class cruiser accompanied by a Kynda class CLG and a Kashin Class DDG at 060350Z at 10 N/59 E, course 270 T, speed 18 knots. TG 88.5 aircraft were continuing to track and would supply position reports every two hours.

Almost simultaneously with receipt of the above information, ships of TF 88 intercepted an SOS message on the distress frequency from a U.S. merchant ship at 12 20' N/60 E saying that it had been attacked by aircraft and had suffered extensive damage. The merchant ship has no steerageway and is requesting assistance.

At 060630Z it was estimated that TG 88.1 and TG 88.2 ships held about 50% useable fuel and would require about six hours to fuel to 95% capacity. This would reduce the cargo fuel in the AO's by 20%.

CINCPACFLT OPLAN 1-86 contains orders and authority to you, CTF 88, to act in this situation. You consider that you have ample information to undertake operations and proceed immediately with your planning.

### III. Excerpts from CINCPACFLT OPLAN 1-86

A. Para. 2: Mission. Protect allied and friendly shipping in the Indian Ocean in order to ensure the continued flow of strategic materials through this vital area.

B. Para. 3: Execution. This force will protect allied and friendly shipping in the Indian Ocean and be prepared to conduct strike operations to neutralize or destroy enemy forces in the region.

a. Carrier Battle Group and Surface Action Group. Conduct sea control and strike operations against ORANGE forces as necessary to protect allied and friendly shipping.

b. Air ASW and Reconnaissance Group. Conduct aerial reconnaissance and air antisubmarine warfare as directed. Assist surface action group in ASUW operations.

## VI. Additional Information for Solution of Problem

A. Characteristics of Ships and Aircraft. All characteristics for the problem are taken from Naval Staff College Characteristics cards. Characteristics are given for problem purposes only and do not necessarily reflect current configurations. All Spruance class destroyers, Perry class (FFG-7) and Knox class (FF-1052) frigates have operational TACTAS and LAMPS MK I systems.

### B. Logistic Considerations

(1) Endurance data (miles) for ships at various speeds.

<u>TYPE/SPEED</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>30</u>
CV 63 (Class)	10,000	9,000	3,500
CG 15 (Class)	8,500	6,500	2,700
DDG 2 (Class)	4,600	4,000	1,800
DD 963/993 (Class)	6,800	6,000	3,300
FF 1052 (Class)	6,000	4,500	3,400 (28 Kts)
FF 1040 (Class)	4,400	4,000	2,700 (28 Kts)
FFG 7 (Class)	4,900	4,500	2,000 (28 Kts)

(2) CG can receive fuel at 4,000 barrels per hour; DD and FF types at 2,800 barrels per hour, and CV 6,000 barrels per hour. These rates are well within the simultaneous port and starboard delivery capabilities of an AO.

(3) Usable (95%) DFM capacities of TF 88 ships are as follows: CV 52,000 bbls; CG 15,600 bbls; DDG 2 (Class) 5,700 bbls; DD 963 (Class) 11,100 bbls; FF 1052 (Class) 5,400 bbls; FF 1040 (Class) 4,400 bbls; FFG 7 (Class) 4,000 bbls.

(4) TF 88 has supplies for approximately 30 days.

(5) Fuel used by the AOs need not be considered in this problem.

(6) Stocks of certain weapons are extremely limited in theater. Rapid resupply of these weapons could become critical in certain scenarios.

IV. Own and Friendly Forces and Facilities

A. Allied Indian Ocean Force

1. Commander Task Force 88 (embarked CV 63) VADM AA
2. Task Group 88.1 (Carrier Battle Group)  
COMCARGRU 4 RADM BB  
KITTY HAWK (CV 63) (F) 1 CV  
COMDESRON 26 (embarked DDG 11) CAPT B-3  
SELLERS (DDG 11) (F)  
CHARLES F. ADAMS (DDG 2)  
W.S. SIMS (FF 1059)  
PATTERSON (FF 1061)  
ANTRIM (FFG 20)  
GALLERY (FFG 26)  
ALBUQUERQUE (SSN 706) 88.1.1  
JACKSONVILLE (SSN 699)  
CONCORD (AFS 5)  
CAMDEN (AOE 2)
3. Task Group 88.2 (Surface Action Group)  
COMCRUDESGRU 6 (embarked CG 16) RADM BC  
LEAHY (CG 16) (F)  
COMDESRON 22 (embarked DDG 10) CAPT B-1  
SAMPSON (DDG 10) (F)  
THORN (DD 988)  
STUMP (DD 978)  
BLAKELY (FF 1072)  
TRIPPE (FF 1075)  
TRUCKEE (AO 147)



4. Task Group 88.3.1 (TAK Convoy Group)

COMDESRON 28 (embarked DDG 993)

CAPT B-4

KIDD (DDG 993)  
WADDELL (DDG 24)  
FLETCHER (DD 992)  
BOWEN (FF 1079)  
MISSISSINewa (AO 144)  
and SIX TAK's

5. Task Group 88.3.2 (TAK Convoy Group)

COMDESRON 24 (embarked DD 991)

CAPT B-5

FIFE (DD 991)  
BYRD (DDG 23)  
PAUL (FF 1080)  
~~LESHO~~  
and SIX TAK's

6. Task Group 88.5 (Air ASW and Recce Group)

COMFAIRWING 2

CAPT B-2

PATRON 4, DIEGO GARCIA 9 P3C (HARPOON)  
PATRON 8, BERBERA 9 P3C (NO HARPOON)

CO NAVAL STATION, DIEGO GARCIA CAPT B-3  
88.5.1 LOGISTIC FORCES  
88.5.2 NAVY CONTROL OF SHIPPING ORG.  
88.5.3 AIR DEFENSE FORCES  
88.5.4 MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS

B. Middle East Force

1. COMMIDEASTFOR (embarked AGF 3)

RADM CC

LASALLE (AGF 3) (F)  
CAPODANNO (FF 1093)

C. Friendly Forces

1. Local defense forces have been established at all major ports in the area.

2. No additional allied naval forces are expected to become available in the area within the next 30 days.

French?  
July  
nbff

#### D. Logistic Support and Facilities

1. Logistic support is available as noted at the following ports:

a. Diego Garcia (06°40'S/72°30'E): General stores, provisions, fuel, tender repairs, floating drydock.

b. Fremantle 32°20'S/116°E: General stores, provisions, fuel, minor marine repairs.

c. Mauritius-Port Louis 20°S/57°40'E: Limited general stores and provisions; about 21,000 bbls bunker fuel are stored at Port Louis.

d. Seychelles-Port Victoria (4°S/56°30'E): Similar to Port Louis, including small quantity of bunker fuel.

2. There are no sea-going tugs available at any of the above bases, and U.S. ship and carrier aircraft repair parts have not been stockpiled in the area. All bases listed above have standard local defense systems and, where possible, defensive minefields. Ships hold necessary minefield information.

#### E. Allied Shipping

1. About 150 allied and friendly merchant ships are actually at sea in the Indian Ocean at any one time. They follow the shipping lanes shown in Figure 2.

2. CTG 88.5 maintains a rough plot of their positions and has communication facilities available for broadcast to all merchant vessels at sea in case diversion of ships becomes necessary.

#### F. Communications

1. Military communication facilities are available at allied military bases. Naval control of shipping communications are maintained in Bahrain and at Diego Garcia. A primary satellite (UHF) fleet broadcast has been established at Diego Garcia in Turkey and in Australia.

2. A high-frequency direction-finder net under the control of CTF 88 is in continuous operation with stations at Fremantle, Durban, Mombasa (3°S/30°50'E) and Diego Garcia.

USA.

Sta  
Africa

reside with ORANGE. It is highly likely that, should ORANGE warships call in Biera, Nacala or Maputo for fuel, they would receive it in view of recent N. Korean military training and other pro-Marxist political activities.

5. Sri Lanka appears determined to remain neutral, and the Maldiv Islands are following her lead.

6. Despite ORANGE support in her war for independence, Bangladesh has closed her port facilities to ORANGE.

7. The Malagasy Republic is expected to maintain neutrality, although informed diplomatic sources have confirmed the availability to BLUE of the airfield at Tananarive for use as a divert field only. The port facility implications of this information are unknown, but Madagascar is unofficially presumed friendly to BLUE.

B. Communications. ORANGE has communication facilities in Aden, in the Arabian Gulf area and on the island of Socotra at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden. The extent of these facilities is unknown but there is strong evidence to suggest that ORANGE does not have satellite communications capabilities. Therefore, much ORANGE C<sup>3</sup> traffic must be conducted via HF.

C. Weather. The extended forecast from Weather Station Diego Garcia indicates that weather in any possible area of operations will permit flight operations for at least a week. Seas and winds are expected to be moderate.

**FIGURE 1**





FIGURE 2



TASK GROUP 88.1 TIME - DISTANCE - FUEL - FACTORS

<u>DISTANCE/DAY</u>	<u>SPEED</u>	<u>FORCE'S FUEL % CONSUMED</u>
360	15 KTS	5.7%
480	20 KTS	9.4%
600	25 KTS	17.1%
720	30 KTS	35.8% (LESS FF's)

