



[753.4]



HISTORY OF HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES, JAPAN

Obtained under the
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by the Nautilus Institute
Nuclear Policy Project

1974

CINCPAC INST. 5000.5D

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UNITED STATES FORCES, JAPAN

COMMAND HISTORY

1974

Prepared by the Office of the
Secretary Joint Staff

Headquarters, U. S. Forces, Japan

APO San Francisco 96328

Yokota Air Base

1975

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PREFACE

(U) CINCPAC Instructions 500.5D (0425), 13 Nov 74, require the Commander, U. S. Forces, Japan, to publish an annual historical report which will provide a compact historical record of the operations of its headquarters, as a CINCPAC subordinate unified command headquarters in the PACOM.

(U) This history reviews those significant actions and events which took place within Headquarters, U. S. Forces, Japan, during calendar year 1974. It addresses the coordination, the essential task of COMUSJAPAN; administrative activities of the headquarters; and the problems and difficulties encountered. The areas are reviewed by subject, not necessarily in order of importance or magnitude. The history does not duplicate the histories of the Services, however relations between Headquarters, U. S. Forces, Japan, and other headquarters are covered when considered to be of interest.

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SECTION 1--STATUS OF THE COMMANDGENERAL

1. (U) The following changes in command relationships in Japan resulted from the disestablishment of United States Army, Pacific in 1974: Effective 7 Dec 74, COMUSJAPAN assumed operational control over JCS-assigned Army Forces in Japan, and exercises this operational control through Commander, U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ). Commander USARJ is also COMUSJAPAN's Army Component Commander in accordance with USARPAC GO 43, dated 8 February 1973 (authority to be revised when DA GO is published), as defined in, JCS Publication 2, paragraph 30234.
2. (U) COMUSJAPAN, Lieutenant General Walter T. Galligan, USAF, also performs these main functions:
 - a. (U) He is CINCPAC's representative in Japan, the senior military spokesman and a member of the Country Team;
 - b. (U) As COMUSJAPAN, he administers the Status-of-Forces Agreement between the United States and Japan; and
 - c. (U) He coordinates joint service matters between the Services' headquarters in Japan and various agencies of the Japanese Government.
3. (U) The Stars and Stripes which had flown over Fuchu Air Station, Japan for over 20 years was slowly pulled to ground 8 November 1974, together with the U.N. and Japanese National flags, while the American National anthem was played. Although the three flags continue to fly there, the ceremony marked the relocation of Hq USFJ from Fuchu to Yokota (actually occurring 1200 hours, 10 November 1974). A property transfer and formal opening ceremony of the new headquarters building occurred on Monday, 11 November 1974. Colonel John C. Reed, Commander, 475 ABW, accepted the symbolic key from Mr. Nobutaka Kuwahara, Director, Tokyo Defense Facilities Administration Bureau, who, in turn, presented the key to Lieutenant General Galligan, Commander, United States Forces, Japan. In accepting the key, General Galligan said, in part, "...Today we move our home to Yokota and this new facility, which reflects the mutual understanding and cooperation between Japan and the United States." He expressed the command's appreciation to Mr. Hiroshi Ashizawa, managing director of the company which built the new headquarters, and his people for what the General termed "dedicated efforts -- working long hours in the design, construction and final preparation of the facility." The new three-story building, which has a full basement, and a total floor space of 84,407 square feet, is located southwest of the runway.

MILITARY STRENGTHS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1974OKINAWA

	<u>MILITARY OFF/ENL</u>	<u>CIVILIAN</u>	<u>DEPENDENTS</u>	<u>LN</u>
U S ARMY	507/ 4,325	1,167	7,519	8,140
U S NAVY	237/ 1,853	106	1,529	2,054
U S MARINE CORPS	1,408/17,369	-	1,148	-
U S AIR FORCE	<u>979/ 8,253</u>	<u>921</u>	<u>8,944</u>	<u>2,950</u>
SUBTOTAL	3,131/31,800	2,194	19,140	13,144

MAINLAND

U S ARMY	324/ 1,334	591	3,712	4,302
U S NAVY	636/ 3,521	357	8,856	8,616
U S MARINE CORPS	605/ 5,958	-	783	-
U S AIR FORCE	<u>568/ 5,681</u>	<u>1,100</u>	<u>8,108</u>	<u>4,202</u>
SUBTOTAL	2,133/16,494	2,048	21,459	17,120


GRAND TOTAL	5,264/48,294	4,242	40,599	30,264
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HEADQUARTERS STRENGTH31 December 1974

		<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
ARMY	Officer	13	12
	Enlisted	<u>04</u>	<u>06</u>
	Sub-Total	17	18
NAVY	Officer	07	06
	Enlisted	<u>04</u>	<u>04</u>
	Sub-Total	11	10
AIR FORCE	Officer	12	09
	Enlisted	<u>07</u>	<u>07</u>
	Sub-Total	19	16
MARINES	Officer	07	07
	Enlisted	<u>01</u>	<u>02</u>
	Sub-Total	08	09
CIVILIANS (US)		26	23
	(MLC)	08	08
TOTAL		<u>89</u>	<u>84</u>

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
ORGANIZATION OF THE PACIFIC COMMAND



—— OP COMMAND / OP CONTROL - - - - PLANNING & COORDINATION

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HQ USFJ ORGANIZATION CHART



USFJ STAFFKEY PERSONNEL CHANGES DURING 1974COMMANDER, U. S. FORCES, JAPAN

Major General Lawrence F. Snowden, USMC, replaced Lieutenant General Robert E. Pursley, USAF, retired, as Acting Commander, on 12 Feb 74, concurrently in his assignment as Chief of Staff.

Lieutenant General Walter T. Galligan, USAF, replaced Acting Commander, Major General Lawrence F. Snowden, USMC, on 8 May 74.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J4

Colonel James W. Abraham, USMC, replaced Captain John V. Peters, USN on 21 Jun 74.

CHIEF, OKINAWA AREA FIELD OFFICE

Lieutenant Colonel John R. Andrus, USAF, replaced Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Nesbit, USMC, on 7 Jun 74.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert N. Simpson, USMC, replaced Lieutenant Colonel John S. Andrus, USAF, on 29 Oct 74.

STAFF ADVISOR, LEGAL, J73

Colonel Vincent A. Jordan, USAF, replaced Colonel John H. Leonard, USAF, on 1 Nov 74.

STAFF ADVISOR, COMPTROLLER, J76

Colonel Harry E. Brandes, USAF, replaced Colonel Lenore L. Henson, USAF, on 31 Aug 74.

STAFF ADVISOR, SAFETY, J78

Lieutenant Colonel John R. Alberts, USAF, replaced Colonel Warren J. Hunt, USAF, on 16 Oct 74.

SECTION II -- J1 (PERSONNEL/ADMINISTRATION)

1. General: The past year has seen a major turnover in J-1 personnel. In Dec 73 there were nine persons assigned, against eight in Dec 74; of the eight, six are newcomers since the last history was prepared. An overall average rate reduction was also experienced. The impact of this turnover is immeasurable, but has been significant as orientation training and normal work were accomplished simultaneously. Administrative support to the staff was satisfactory, although frequently time-late, as personnel, new to the sub-unified command environment, researched material for their or the supervisor's satisfaction. In CY 74 there were no notable problems regarding funding for support of the headquarters, including the move to Yokota AB. The only significant personnel problem was manning of the newly established Relocation Construction Branch in the J-4 Division. Service disenchantment (or non-understanding) with the requirement necessitated extra effort by many persons, but the problem was finally resolved.

2. Cost of Living Allowances (COLA) Efforts in this area can be reported as "successful," "unsuccessful" and "pending". Work begun in 1973 resulted in April 1974 the granting of a COLA allowance for all of Japan, amounts varying dependent on location. International monetary exchange rates later affected these allowances resulting in the disestablishment of the allowance in some locales. Another survey occurred in September/ October 1974 and findings of the Per Diem Committee are expected during February 1975. The Yokota AB Junior Officer's Council is obtaining data to support the claim non-accompanied and single persons should be entitled to a COLA.

3. Drug/Alcohol Abuse and Race Relations Programs in race relations, drug/alcohol abuse, and social actions/human goals are service-channel programs. Each service has different problems and different programs to solve its problems, independent of the joint-command chain. Joint meetings have been held to enable interchange of ideas and problem solutions; they will continue to be held to assist in the exchange of information between the services.

4. Customs. Significant progress has been made in this area. The full-time availability of a United States Customs Service (USCS) representative, Mr. Ralph Palmer, improved the efficacy and professionalism of the military customs inspection program. The military costs of this program, in terms of dollars and manpower, remain high. Data have been provided to permit CINCPAC to allow these costs, but it still remains for higher authority

level to apportion the costs between Department of Defense and Bureau of Customs.

5. Scout Programs. For various reasons, primarily the shortage of adult volunteer scouts in key positions and the lack of clear, firm guidance on scout program support from higher authorities, J-1 personnel continued to spend an inordinate amount of time coordinating many facets of the Far East Scouting programs. Increased costs and a decrease in non-appropriated fund support exacerbated the situation. As long as guidance and decisions regarding support of the overseas scouting programs are not forthcoming from the Washington level, it is anticipated the requirement will continue for an inordinate amount of effort required by command representatives, if the Far East Scouting programs are to continue in their present form.

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SECTION IV -- J3 (PLANS AND OPERATIONS)

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3. (U) Misawa Air Base. There were three operational issues involving operations at Misawa AB:

a. USN familization flights to Chitose resulted in criticism and protests by the Mayor. (This issue was resolved on 1 Feb 74 by RADM Donaldson when he made a courtesy call on the Mayor of Chitose.)

b. Through the Joint Committee, GOJ requested joint use of Misawa for three commercial airline flights daily by Toa Domestic Airlines, commencing 1 Nov 74. Flights would use DC-9 aircraft, too heavy for the

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runway at Hachinobe used by Toa. Hq USFJ position: civil air operations could be authorized at Misawa AB without appreciable detriment to present and future military operations providing use is under stringent limitations designed to protect USG interests and future freedom of action. USN position: such use is unacceptable because of operational commitments and increased risk to commercial aircraft. Due to these opposing views, a letter was forwarded to CINCPAC on 27 Aug 74 requesting resolution. CINCPACFLT non-concurred, and the problem was forwarded to JCS who approved the joint-use plan. Upon receiving approval from DFAA, a public announcement was made on 19 Dec 74 agreeing to permit use of Misawa AB.

4. 376th Strategic Wing (SW) Altitude Reservation (ALTRV) Problem
376th representatives contacted Hq USFJ requesting assistance in developing better procedures for RC-135 flights through Fukuoka Air Control Center (ACC) area. At a working conference on 19 Sep 74 in Fukuoka between representatives of Fukuoka ACC, 376th SW, JCAB Headquarters, and Hq USFJ new procedures were developed. Previously, ALTRV coordination through this area often required 10-15 hours and sometimes 20 hours; 376th SW advised the first flight under the new procedures was coordinated in approximately 20 minutes.

6. (U) 1952 Air Traffic Control (ATC) Agreement. US Forces operate within Japanese airspace under provisions of a 1952 ATC Agreement. Although outdated, the Agreement provides favorable accords to US flying activities. A new ATC Agreement was coordinated with the services and informally accepted by the GOJ during a meeting of the ATC Special Working Group (SWG) on 17 Sep 74. Agreement was processed through the Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee for coordination with the Ministries of Transportation and Foreign Affairs. Following their coordination, it will go to the USA/GOJ Joint Committee for approval.

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9. (U) Air Traffic Control (ATC):

a. The most significant ATC accomplishment in 1974 was transfer of the Okinawa enroute air traffic responsibility from the US to the GOJ. This transfer successfully concluded all US requirements contained in the US-Japan Okinawa Reversion Agreement. On-the-job training of JCAB air traffic controllers on a reimbursable basis in accordance with foreign military sales procedures was accomplished in the USAF-operated Okinawa Center. GOJ progress in training of controllers, construction of facilities, equipment installation and development of letters of agreements were closely monitored and the GOJ successfully met the 15 May 74 transfer date. As the Naha Area Control Center (ACC) is the only ACC in Japan which provides radar control services to enroute traffic, it serves as both a testing ground to assure the JCAB of the desirability of radar control, and as a training facility to develop a cadre of JCAB controllers experienced in radar control techniques.

b. Development of a new U.S./GOJ ATC Agreement to replace the original agreement concluded in 1952 was reached after two years of negotiations with the JCAB and submitted to the Joint Committee for approval in December.

c. Other significant ATC accomplishments were not planned or programmed, but were reactive in nature to service ATC requirements. For example;

(1) The development of a new concept of radar service for Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS). The original plan called for installation of a long-radar ground control intercept (GCI) type radar to be located on a remotely located island. Such a radar was considered undesirable because the airspace assigned Iwakuni approach control is enclosed within a radius of 65nm and long-range radar is of limited value at the short ranges of a terminal control facility. As the direct result of USFJ staff interest a new terminal radar was installed at

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Iwakuni, will be flight checked in early 1975, and at that time original USMC plans for remote radar cancelled.

(2) USF flights to the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Since US recognition of the PRC, the number of flights by USF aircraft to China during 1974 increased steadily. Early flights from Tokyo to Shanghai used ROK airspace and difficulties were encountered due to lack of communications and effective ATC coordination between adjoining airspace. In coordination with the JCAB, preferred flight routes and communication procedures were established and all US Forces agencies concerned were advised.

(3) Other major ATC accomplishments included assistance to COMNAVFORJAPAN in resolving ATC problems at Atsugi and efforts in the areas of airways revisions and altitude reservations. The USFJ ATC officer made staff assistance visits to all US Forces operated airfields in Japan and all major JCAB operated ATC facilities. This effort will be continued in 1975.

10. (U) Aircraft Noise Abatement Subcommittee (ANAS): Until 1974, there had been no ANAS meeting for over six years; the subject of US aircraft noise pollution had been a "dead" issue. In July 1974, the GOJ requested a meeting of the ANAS to address two major issues: (a) that the US install engine noise suppressors for KC-135 aircraft at Kadena, and (b) agree to comply with the provisions of Environmental Agency Notification No. 154. The second issue is still under negotiation but the first was essentially resolved by personnel of USFJ, 5AF, and the 376SW. New operational procedures were introduced to reduce the KC-135 engine runup noise at Kadena and the US position was presented at the ANAS meeting in December that KC-135 suppressors were no longer required. We have indications the GOJ will accept the US position and plans are underway to jointly develop a press release advising local people of the efforts taken in their behalf. In the meantime, there were other periodical complaints during 1974 of aircraft noise -- particularly against MIDWAY aircraft at Atsugi. We expect this problem may become a major issue during 1975.

11. (U) Training Areas: While we were successful in 1973 in converting the North Fuji Maneuver Area (NFMA) to a II4b Facility, we did not reach our prime 1974 objective for initiation of over-the-trail firing (OTTF). Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) authorities had assured us such training could be accomplished in February 74. On 24 Feb 74, JDA Director General Yamanaka reversed his position because increasing compensation paid to various communities surrounding US Forces facilities required changing laws applying to each area. This effectively blocked OTTF for the remainder of CY 74.

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13. (U) Hijacking. On 12 Mar 74 a JAL 747 with 425 persons on board was hijacked, landing at Naha, Okinawa Prefecture. The hijacker was apprehended by police some 6 hours after the plane landed. J3 Division, USFJ, was instrumental in keeping AmEmbassy and GOJ notified with up-to-the-minute information on events taking place during the hijacking.

14. (U) USFJ Command Briefings.

a. During CY 74, the USFJ command briefing was presented 46 times: 20 to US military groups, 15 to US civilians and DoD representatives, six to Japanese defense officials, and five to UNC rear-sponsored groups of third country nationals. The expanded JSDF briefing was given a total of ten times during the year.

b. In addition to command briefings presented at this Headquarters, a USFJ staff team visited all major services installations in mainland Japan and Okinawa. During these visits, the USFJ Command briefing was presented and the staff participated in useful discussions and exchanged views with service personnel. Included were visits to Misawa AB, Yokosuka, Camp Zama, NAS Atsugi, Iwakuni MCAS, Sasebo, Naha, Kadena AB, Ft Buckner, and Camp Butler:

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FOOTNOTES

1. State/DOD 100135Z Nov 73
2. CINCPAC 290401Z Nov 73
3. CINCPAC 232240Z Mar 74
4. USFJ/JSC Ltr, 6 Jun 74
5. USFJ Ltr, 28 Jun 74
6. COMUSJAPAN 050445Z Jul 74 (S)
7. COMUSJAPAN 280131Z Aug 74 (TS)
8. HQ USFJ Ltr, 13 Sep 74 (TS)
9. COMUSJAPAN 300710Z Sep 74 (S)
CINCPAC 050140Z Sep 74 (S)
10. COMUSJAPAN 100544Z Oct 74 (S)
11. COMUSJAPAN 090730Z Dec 74 (S)
12. JCS Memo. MJCS-378-74, 6 Dec 74 (S)
Joint Staff Memo, 12 Dec 74 (S)
COMUSJAPAN 222340Z Dec 74 (S)
13. FORMAL MIST Approval Document, 23 Dec 74 (TS)
14. COMUSJAPAN 270017Z Dec 74 (S)
15. FORMAL MIST Approval Document, 23 Dec 74 (TS)
16. COMUSJAPAN 270017Z Dec 74
COMUSJAPAN 160405Z Dec 74 (S)

SECTION V -- J4 (LOGISTICS)

1. (U) Facilities

a. General. Major facility actions during the year involved continuing negotiations in support of major facilities relocation plans, such as the Japanese Facilities Adjustment Program (JFAP), the Kanto Plains Consolidation Plan (KPCP) and the Okinawa Base Consolidation Plan (OBCP). In addition to these plans, facilities negotiations were concluded on other lesser plans, including Yokohama Family Housing and Camp Fuchinoke. Routine facility actions throughout the year covering such diverse items as easements, return of minor segments of land for local development and joint use of US facilities either by the JSDF or by commercial enterprises once again proved the viability of Facilities Subcommittee of the Joint Committee to conduct negotiations.

b. Standards of Construction. In other facility related matters, agreements were reached with the GOJ concerning the standards of construction to be used in relocation-related construction. Under this agreement the US reserved the right to review designs to ensure standards of safety, fire protection and maintainability. The GOJ agreed to provide air conditioning systems (less drillers) for GOJ- funded relocation construction on Okinawa.

c. Impact of Inflation. The major problem encountered by all programs was the impact of inflation. The rate of inflation was evidenced by the increased rents paid the GOJ for US facilities and areas. At the time of reversion in May 1972, the US had 192 facilities and 142,000 acres; by the end of 1974, this number had been reduced to 152 facilities and 129,000 acres. During that period, rental costs increased from \$69 million to \$117 million. The most significant impact of inflation has been program stretchout which resulted in unprogrammed US operations and maintenance (O&M) costs.

(U) 1974 was marked by significant completions of KPCP-related construction at Yokota Air Base and initiation of JFAP-related construction at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa. The US benefitted by replacement of aging, maintenance-heavy problem facilities with new construction at GOJ expense. The quality of construction has been generally excellent and the GOJ's record in honoring their commitments has been excellent.

d. (U) Management of GOJ Funded Relocation Construction. Headquarters, US Forces, Japan was provided a significant assist by Secretary of Defense approval, in August 1974, of the concept of a Single Point of Contact. Under this concept, USFJ would serve as a focal point for all GOJ- funded relocation construction and would provide for overall coordination of all such programs. Following approval by the Secretary of Defense, the military services were tasked to provide personnel support to the newly authorized Relocation Construction Branch as follows: one colonel USAF, Branch Chief; one lieutenant commander, USN, CEC, Engineering Staff Officer, one GS-12, DNC, Engineering Staff Officer,

and a GS-4, Clerk-Typist. Final action to provide personnel was approved at the JCS level in December 1974, with personnel to report during early 1975. The concept of the Single Point of Contact will ensure GOJ-funded relocation programs are fully coordinated and serve the best interests of the Department of Defense.

2. Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants (POL).

a. (U) General. The early part of 1974 was spent recovering from the impact of oil embargo. On-hand stocks of pre-positioned war reserve (PWRS), depleted in support of elements throughout the PACOM, were replenished. The support provided from Japan sources during the embargo illustrated the importance US military storage facilities in Japan play throughout PACOM.

b. (U) Motor Gasoline (Mogas) Allocations. During the oil embargo, stringent restrictions were imposed to meet CINCPAC mogas allocations. This hit heavily on exchange services since approximately fifty percent of the Mogas consumption is through exchange retail outlets. Restrictions on retail sales were gradually eased and eliminated as Mogas allocations resumed normal supply levels.

c. (U) Tankage Rehabilitation Program. Local contractor efforts to rehabilitate unserviceable storage facilities in Japan continued throughout 1974. Age and deferred maintenance represented the primary problems. About twenty percent of storage capacity is unavailable at any given time for inspection or repair. This condition is expected to continue in the future.

d. (U) Okinawa POL Pipeline. The Okinawa POL pipeline became the subject of a moderate political controversy in 1974. Local political groups and prefecture officials alleged the pipeline was unsafe and presented an immediate danger to the populace. Coincidentally, USARJ had a routinely scheduled technical inspection of the pipeline programmed at the height of the controversy. The inspection revealed no major defects and several areas of possible concern were taken under immediate repair. Japanese officials were given a full description of the evaluation which essentially preempted further political controversy. Results of the inspection thoroughly disproved local allegations and supported continued use of the pipeline.

e. (U) GOJ Laws on Pollution/Pipelines. The Government of Japan enacted newly developed laws regarding oil spill control and petroleum pipeline design criteria. Japanese concern over environmental effects of oil spills was heightened by a massive failure of a major commercial storage tank in December 1974. As a consequence of this event, the GOJ directed an immediate inspection of all storage facilities throughout Japan. Although the GOJ directive did not apply to US Forces, US Forces

voluntarily cooperated and used the same criteria. Action on this effort is expected to continue throughout the coming year.

f. (U) GOJ Restrictions on Local POL Contracts. At the height of the oil embargo, the GOJ imposed a ban on future Defense Department contracts with Japanese refinery sources. By Joint Committee action, the US Government agreed to submit monthly reports of planned receipts from Local contracts. Subsequent to the embargo, no major procurement contracts were negotiated with Japanese sources. The requirement for monthly reports was rescinded by Joint Committee action.

3. (U) Plans and Programs

a. (U) General. In 1974, the Defense Retail Interservice Logistic Support Program (DRIS). DRIS provides a more comprehensive approach to interservice support than previous programs and provides the mechanisms for control and coordination. Two significant problems affected interservice support in Japan in 1974. First, USARJ took steps to reduce the level of support provided to other services and activities. (Approximately 95% of all interservice support in Japan was provided by USARJ.) The second significant problem concerned force realignments in Japan. As a result of pressures to reduce overseas deployed forces, the services in Japan were seeking ways to reduce personnel levels and to eliminate unnecessary overhead. At the same time, a degree of uncertainty existed over the service plans for Japan-based forces. This uncertainty affected the approach of each service towards DRIS-directed studies. In several cases, the services recommended actions on studies to consolidate or transfer functions be deferred pending the outcome of service reorganization plans. While these plans were primarily service directed, certain specific actions were included in departmental actions, such as PBD-2800CR - Pacific Manpower.

b. (U) Vehicle Movement in Japan. Throughout the year, continuing discussions were held with the Ministry of Construction to gain GOJ approval for movement of US overweight/oversized vehicles throughout Japan. The Ministry of Construction would not grant blanket road clearance, but preferred to act upon specific US requests for road use. While these requests were generally honored, some instances occurred wherein US forces were required to move over longer alternative routes. Negotiations with the Ministry of Construction included the provision of US bridge drawings as well as pre-reversion bridge analyses on Okinawa. These proved instrumental in opening routes previously closed.

c. (U) Premium Power Rates. In 1974, the Tokyo Electrical Power Company imposed a premium penalty for increased energy consumptions on all users, including US forces. This headquarters, acting for US forces, appealed the decision and requested US forces be relieved of the added penalty where increased energy demands were the direct result of GOJ.

funded relocation programs. After prolonged negotiations, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry concurred in the US position and agreed to relieve US forces of such charges.

FOOTNOTES

17. SECDEF 090438Z Aug 74

SECTION VI -- J5 (CIVIL AFFAIRS)

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2. Labor Branch: (U) The following labor programs concerning local national (LN) employees were effected during CY 74:

a. 1974 General Pay Increase Hq USFJ, in coordination with the three service commands in Japan developed a USFJ 8-point proposal on a pay increase for Master Labor Contract (MLC), Indirect Hire Agreement (IHA), and Mariners' Contract (MC) employees. This USFJ proposal was presented to DFAA and subsequent USFJ-DFAA negotiations resulted in DFAA agreeing to the following: (1) Conducting a joint USFJ-DFAA study on revising the IHA by placing "specified" jobs into a separate category

and pay scale and basing IHA employment/pay practices on private industry; (2) deleting language allowance when computing seasonal allowance (summer, year-end, and term-end); (3) extending the waiting time for the longevity step increase by six months for employees in the top six steps and who are 58 years old or over; (4) terminating MLC/IHA employees who are 62 years old or over with a payoff of their accrued retirement allowance, and with option to rehire at 80% of base pay with no retirement allowances, and (5) conducting a joint USFJ-DFAA study to reduce advance age termination from 62 to 60.

b. Reduction in Force (RIF) Large RIF's were successfully implemented with a minimum of labor unrest. During CY 74, 8,689 MLC/IHA/MC employees were RIF'd.

c. Modification to the MLC/IHA/MC. After negotiations with the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA), 13 modifications were made to the MLC and IHA and 5 modifications to the MC. Additionally, 31 letters of instructions were issued by the MLC/MC Contracting Officer and IHA Administrator concerning uniform implementation of USFJ policies and practices concerning labor matters at the local operating levels.

d. Annual Leave Implementation. USFJ was able to negate the DFAA efforts to grant annual leave when it was not actually earned under the MLC/IHA.

e. USFJ Wage Survey of IHA Type Jobs in Private Industry. USFJ completed a wage survey of private companies in the local economy which showed IHA employees are more favorably treated than employees in similar jobs in private industry. This information was used as the basis for pushing for (1) changes in IHA pay adjustments in the 1974 USFJ wage negotiation and (2) to a joint USFJ-DFAA study and survey of IHA type jobs in the economy.

f. Advance Payment of 10% of Base Pay and Advance Payment of 30% of Seasonal Allowance. The GOJ made advance payment to USFJ LN employees on base pay and season allowance and were reimbursed by USFJ. These advance payments averted major labor unrest and the USFJ negotiation position on the 1974 pay increase package was not jeopardized.

g. Increased Health Insurance Premium. A detailed study of the health Insurance Society (HIS) operations, activities, finances and organization was completed during CY 74. This study showed DFAA and the HIS management, in some instances, were not emphasizing prudent fiscal management. Based upon the findings of the study, USFJ (1) was able to negate the recommendation made by DFAA/HIS management that USFJ increase its share of the premium paid in JFY 74; (2) developed justifications for holding down USFJ costs for HIS coverage in JFY 75 and (3) caused DFAA to make some improvements in management of the HIS.

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h. IHA Part-Time Employment. USFJ negotiated with DFAA the conversion or rehire of IHA employees from "permanent" to "part-time" status. This status change enables the service commands to minimize/decrease labor cost in regard to layoff of the large accrued retirement allowances.

3. (u) Government Relations.

b. (u) Sustaining the Security Dialogue. During 1974 the Security Consultative Committee (SCC and the Subcommittee of the SCC) each met once, both during January. The Security Consultative Group (SCG met a total of seven times, with the frequency of these meetings falling in recent months. External factors bearing on this issue have been cabinet reshuffles, the resignation of President Nixon, President Ford's visit to Japan, and the subsequent resignation of Prime Minister Tanaka followed by the appointment of his successor, Prime Minister Miki.

c. (u) Policy Analysis and Resources Allocation (PARA). The Japan PARA for FY 75-76 was prepared during the first quarter of 1974. J5 worked closely with the Pol/Mil Counsellor in formulating the Security Section of the PARA and also attempted to elicit participation from the services with some degree of success. The PARA input from the Country Team was reviewed and modified at successively higher levels of Go

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Government until the finished product was published in October.

d. (u) The Nuclear Problem. There were renewed allegations of the introduction of nuclear weapons by US Forces into Japan in 1974, to include the La Rocque statements, 18 the Midway incident, 19 dummy bombing practices 20 and Over-The-Horizon (OTH) radars. J5 became extensively involved with analyzing these issues and developed material for both the AmEmbassy and CINCPAC on a continuous basis during the year.

e. (u) Improving close coordination and understanding between Hq USFJ and the American Embassy The role of the Embassy in the reversion of Okinawa to Japan and the problems that followed occasioned the Embassy's involvement in many details surrounding our actions. Calendar year 1974 saw a reversal of this trend. Hq USFJ kept the Embassy well informed of actions which could create political problems for the two countries. Very close coordination was maintained and the full understanding of the Embassy to USFJ courses of action was obtained.

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FOOTNOTES

18. RADM LaRocque (USN, Ret) currently Chief US Center for Defense Information who in September 1974 touched off a hot dispute in Japan with his Congressional testimony and subsequent interviews which asserted American warships do not unload nuclear weapons when they visit foreign ports, including those in Japan.
19. At a court of Midway sailors (13 Aug 74) and at subsequent media "interviews" with Midway crewman, allegations were made of nuclear storage aboard the aircraft carrier Midway, homeported at Yokosuka.
20. In August - September 1974 Communist Party, having gained possession of a USAF training manual, alleged US Forces were carrying out mock N-bomb dropping practices at Ie Shima range in Okinawa utilizing BDU8B dummy N-bombs.

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SECTION VII -- J6 (COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS)

1. (U) Relocation of Headquarters. Headquarters USFJ and Fifth Air Force were relocated from Fuchu Air Station to Yokota Air Base with a minimum of interruption in communications service.

3. (U) Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Easements. EMI problems continued because of the encroachment of Japanese facilities in the vicinity of communications sites. One of the more unusual problems corrected was the interference emanating from a Japanese golf-driving range due to the metal poles used in construction. Learning the owner contemplated replacing the existing metal poles with a larger size, with the cooperation of the Government of Japan (GOJ) -- and the owner -- US wooden poles were offered without charge as a substitution.

4. (U) Resolution of Problems Concerning AUTOVON Access. There were problems involving AUTOVON access at Iwakuni MCAS and Atsugi NAS. Iwakuni had only one access line; this was increased to two by rearranging service to other bases. AUTOVON access to Atsugi was provided by an Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA) between Army Communications Command - Japan and Commander, Fleet Air, West Pacific.

5. (U) Management of Identification, Friend or Foe/Selective Identification Feature (IFF/SIF) Program for JSDF. JSDF personnel were trained on new identification procedures using the AKAC 284 training document. This training prepared them for conversion to new worldwide identification procedures.

6. (U) Network Outward Dialing into AUTOVON: The necessary Class A ratio to Class "C" ratio of 40/60 was attained. The system requires verification by Defense Communications Agency (DCA) and sufficient routine precedence network outdial access lines at various locations.

7. (U) Review and Update of Communications-Electronics Policy Letters. All communications-electronics policy letters were reviewed. USFJ Policy Letters 100-1, U.S. Forces Japan Telephone Directories; 100-3, Transmitter Siting on Okinawa; 100-6, General Instructions Covering the Operation of the Auxiliary Military Radio System in Japan; and 100-12, Coordination Procedures for Active ECM Training, Japan Area, were updated.

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SECTION VIII -- J72 (PROTOCOL)

1. During calendar year 1974, J72 (Protocol) attended to the following visitors:

1 Jan - 31 Mar 74: Gen Richard Stilwell, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/ Commander United States Forces Korea; Mr. Frank Fishburne, Assistant Director of Budget, United States Air Force; Mr. Rufus Crockett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Air Force (Installations and Logistics); Mr. L. Niederlehner, Acting General Counsel, Office of Secretary of Defense; Dr. Richard Walker, Institute of International Study, University of South Carolina; ADM Noel Gayler, Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces; Gen George Brown, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; Mr. William Brehem, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); Lt Gen Luis Seith, Director Joint Staff J-5; CODEL Derek J. Vander Schaaf, Subcommittee on Defense House Appropriations Committee.

1 Apr - 30 Jun 74: Gen John Vogt, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force; VADM George Steele, Commander Seventh Fleet; Lt Gen John Murphy, Chief of Staff, United States Forces Korea/United Nations Command; Dr. James Gilligan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); Lt Gen Wallace Robinson, Director Defense Security Agency; Mr. Morton Abramowitz, Political Advisor, Pacific Forces; Lt Gen Robert Patterson, Surgeon General USAF; Mr. John McLucas, Sec USAF; Mr. Jack Stempler, General Counsel USAF; Mr. William Woodruff, Assistant Secretary of Air Force (Finance & Management); Lt Gen Joseph DeLuca, Chief of Comptroller USAF; Lt Gen Lew Allen, Director National Security Agency.

1 Jul - 30 Sep 74: Gen Robert Cushman, Commandant, USMC; Mr. H. Minton Francis, Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense (EO); Lt Gen John R. Murphy, Chief of Staff, UNC; ADM Noel Gayler, CINCPAC, Gen Timothy O'Keefe, Commander, 7th Air Force; Gen Louis Wilson, CINCPACAF; Lt Gen Edmund O'Connor, Vice Commander, AFLC; Mr. Carl W. Clewlow, GS-18, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy; Gen Russell E. Dougherty, CINCSAC; Mr. Robert Jantzen, GS-18, DOD PRO; Gen Richard Stilwell, CINCUNC/COMUSK/ EUSA.

1 Oct - 31 Dec 74: President Gerald Ford, President of USA; Mr. William P. Clements, DEPSECDEF; Gen Louis L. Wilson, Jr., CINCPACAF; Lt Gen W. W. Marshall, Vice CINCPACAF; Gen Richard E. Ellis, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF; Mr. David A. Schmidt (GS-18), Director, House Appropriation Committee; Mr. Arthur I. Mendolia, ASD (I&L); Gen Paul K. Carlton, Commander MAC; VADM T. R. Weschler, Director for Logistics, JCS; Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC), Committee on AS; STAFFDEL Robert Old (GS-18E), Edward B. Kenny (GS-18E) STAFFDEL Committee on AS; Senator San Nunn (D-GA) Committee on AS; Senator William Lloyd Scott (R-VA), Committee on AS.

2. Other significant projects that Office of Protocol partook included: Tri-Service Holiday Reception; Opening and closing ceremony of Headquarters, USFJ/ 5AF at Yokota and Fuchu, respectively and receptions following the ceremony; Honor Ceremony for Gen Yoshitaka Tsunoda, Chief of Staff, JASDF.

SECTION IX -- J73 (LEGAL ADVISOR)

1. Key issues of 1974:

a. One of the major issues resulted from the flare gun shooting incident at Ie Shima on 10 July 1974. The consequential disagreement over the official duty status of the individuals and, ergo, criminal jurisdiction over the incident and individuals, is still not settled (para 2a below).

b. Another key issue involved the continuing efforts to maximize US jurisdiction and conversely minimize foreign criminal jurisdiction over US Forces personnel. Despite extensive efforts in CY 1974, Japanese Officials were unwilling to either extend or enlarge prior concessions concerning waiver of primary jurisdiction. (para 2b below)

c. Another significant and continuing problem has been the inability to reach agreement with prison officials at Naha prison concerning supplemental rations for SOFA prisoners detained there (para 2c below).

2. Major accomplishments in 1974:

a. On 10 July 1974, a relatively minor incident occurring at Ie Shima gunnery range rapidly escalated into a government-to-government confrontation at the Joint Committee level. The incident was caused by two USAF sergeants who slightly injured a local national, a trespasser on the range stealing expended brass, when one of the sergeants attempted to scare the local national by firing a flare gun to the trespasser's side. The flare struck the trespasser a glancing blow on the left hand, injuring him slightly. The incident aroused local interest and caused considerable publicity; the Japanese police investigated and, on 19 July 1974, Notice of Offense was given. On 29 July 1974, a Certificate of Official Duty was issued. Japanese authorities immediately contested the duty certificate and notified USAF authorities the issue would be submitted to the Joint Committee, which was accomplished at the 298th meeting of the Joint Committee on 30 July 1974. The matter was immediately referred to the Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee for consideration. The Subcommittee met formally eight times, and, on 8 November 1974, it was agreed that, as an impasse had been reached, the matter should be referred back to the Joint Committee for further action. The formal return of the issue to the Joint Committee is yet to be accomplished. Resolution of the Ie Shima jurisdictional issue is a major objective to be achieved in CY 75.

b. Current efforts to minimize US Forces jurisdiction and, conversely, minimize the number of cases over which the GOJ exercises

jurisdiction, will be continue and intensified.

(1) Past efforts have resulted in a limited concession of primary jurisdiction by Japan in minor drug cases on Okinawa; GOJ has agreed not to exercise its primary right in cases involving on-base possession or use of five grams or less of marijuana only on Okinawa. Attempts to expand this concession to small amounts of other drugs were rejected, and later attempts to extend the Okinawa agreement to Mainland Japan were likewise fruitless. As recent statistics demonstrate not only a rapidly escalating number of cases but also a large majority of cases over which Japan exercises criminal jurisdiction involves drugs, it is imperative efforts to pare the cases over which Japan exercises jurisdiction be intensified. To provide a fresh and unified approach, meetings will be held between the judge advocates of the various services to explore means of approaching GOJ authorities. A fresh approach to responsible Japanese officials would be more effective if based on a quid pro quo theory. For example, if a new and uniform drug rehabilitation program for all services could be presented which included disciplinary action where appropriate and prompt removal of the offender from Japan, with the rehabilitation program showing a reasonable chance of success, this could be proposed as an alternative to Japanese prosecution of many drug cases. Tentative steps toward exploring the possibilities of formulating a comprehensive program uniform throughout the US Forces in Japan were already taken in mid December 1974, when the USFJ Legal Advisor held a meeting with the Staff Judge Advocates (SJAs) of the various services in Okinawa. Plans for an early meeting of the SJAs on Mainland Japan on these matters are being worked out, and a tentative agenda is under consideration. A major foreseeable problem in formulating and agreeing on a unified program among the services is that each component service operates under its own service regulations which policies may differ considerably from service to service. For instance, regulations on curtailment of overseas tours because of involvement with foreign authorities differ both in content and in application; also, each service has its own drug rehabilitation program involving different procedures. The fact COMUSJAPAN, also the Designated Commanding Officer (DCO), does not have authority to promulgate regulations or establish policies in these matters which would override the provisions of the various service regulations in these respects will handicap attempts to achieve uniformity; if necessary, exceptions or waivers of certain regulations may have to be sought by component commanders through their own service channels. Whatever efforts are necessary to achieve a uniform position should be well worth the trouble because recent experience has demonstrated that no further concessions on jurisdiction can be expected from the Japanese unless we can present a fresh, comprehensive, and viable alternative as quid pro quo. Reaching a common ground and achieving

unanimity among the armed services for presentation to Japanese officials, and negotiating with the Japanese in an attempt to reduce the number of cases over which the GOJ exercises its primary right to jurisdiction are among the major goals to be achieved in CY 75.

(2) It is recognized, of course, the true long-term solution for minimizing foreign criminal jurisdiction cases is to reduce or eliminate the offenses committed; and, as the majority of serious cases involve narcotics, we are essentially talking about the drug problem. It would appear intensive efforts in the drug program would have the ancillary effect of greatly minimizing foreign criminal jurisdiction cases.

c. From December 1955 until the summer of 1973, US Forces personnel in Japanese prisons were incarcerated at Otsu prison in Yokosuka, where long-standing agreements enabled the US Forces to provide logistic support by way of, for example, supplemental food, health and comfort items and clothing, etc. Subsequent to reversion of Okinawa, the US Forces' prison population experienced a radical increase: from 30 in July 1972 to 151 in December 1974. As a result of this increase, US Forces personnel are now incarcerated at Otsu prison, Sasebo prison, Fuchu prison, and Tochigi women's prison on Mainland Japan, and Naha prison on Okinawa. Satisfactory arrangements similar to those at Otsu have been made for providing appropriate logistical support similar to that at Otsu for all prisons with the exception of Naha prison. Naha is used primarily for pretrial detention of US Forces personnel, including those awaiting outcome of court appeals. Sentenced prisoners from Okinawa, including those where appellate action is final, are normally incarcerated at Naha for an average two to four weeks before transfer to a Mainland prison. Past efforts at the local level to make arrangements for the provision of logistical support have been only partially successful. While logistical support by way of health and comfort items, medical care, books, and spiritual guidance has been allowed, satisfactory arrangement for the provision of supplemental rations have yet to be concluded. In recent conversations with the Naha prison warden, the USFJ Legal Advisor made a fresh request; however, it seems clear this matter has probably been pursued as far as it can at the local level. On 20 December 1974, the Legal Advisor informally discussed the subject with Mr. Kakei, Japanese Chairman of the Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee. Mr. Kakei promised to refer the question to the Director of Corrections Bureau. Depending upon the results of his demarche, GOJ authorities will be formally approached at the national level in an effort to reach agreement for the provision of supplemental rations for prisoners at Naha similar to those provided for SOFA prisoners at other SOFA prisons. This will be one of the major objectives for CY 75.

d. An ALC serving a sentence of imprisonment at Sasebo prison as a result of conviction by a Japanese court began to exhibit

emotional instability in the spring of 1974. Later, he was transferred to Fuchu prison because of Fuchu's proximity to Tachikawa AB Hospital for treatment by USAF psychiatrists at Tachikawa. Contact has been made with the Ministry of Justice officials in an attempt to secure his early release for medical evacuation, hospitalization and treatment in CONUS. We are very hopeful this matter can be successfully resolved early in CY 75.

e. As a result of findings and recommendations of the Task Force on the Administration of military justice in the Armed Forces, AFR 110-28 has been promulgated. This regulation provides for the assigning of a judge advocate to function as a personal legal counselor in all matters arising out of criminal charges pending against a person in a foreign criminal court. The role and duties of the judge advocate, denoted military legal advisor (MLA), goes far beyond the role formerly performed by judge advocates. The function of the MLA should go a long way toward helping insure the rights of an accused and keeping the accused fully informed of his rights, options, and of the possible military consequences of his civil court involvement, thereby also helping restore an accused's confidence in his parent service's concern over his welfare. The objective of formulating procedures for full and prompt implementation of the MLA program has been accomplished. In addition, wide publicity of this program has been given by way of briefings, i.e., newcomers' orientations, commander's calls, etc; it will also be included in the forthcoming military legal seminar which is designated to reach all military personnel.

f. In order to assist individuals who become involved with Japanese authorities and to help insure protection of their rights under both Japanese law and the U.S.-Japan SOFA, a 5AF/JAI pamphlet entitled: "Japanese Laws and You" has been published and widely distributed. This pamphlet synthesizes and simplifies into a readily understandable manner information concerning exactly what an individual can expect to occur should he become involved with Japanese police or judicial officials, pointing out the individual's rights and obligations at various stages of the proceedings and providing useful hints to assist the individual in protecting his rights. This basic pamphlet, simple in concept, yet with enduring and far-reaching effects, should go a long way toward informing and educating individual and consequently assist in insuring full protection of their rights. In addition to distribution, wide publicity of this program has been given by way of briefings, including newcomers' orientation and commander's calls.

G L O S S A R Y

Advisory Labor Group	ALG
Aircraft Noise Abatement Subcommittee	ANAS
Air Defense	AD
Air Self Defense Forces	ASDF
Air Staff Office	ASO
Air Traffic Control	ATC
Aircraft Control and Warning	AC&W
All Nippon Airways	ANA
All Security Forces Labor Union	ZENCHURO
Altitude Reservation	ALTRV
Amplitude Modulation	AM
Area Control center	ACC
Army-Navy/Transportable Radio Communications	AN/TRC
Automatic Digital Network	AUTODIN
Automatic Secure Voice Communications	AUTOSEVOCOM
Automatic Voice Network	AUTOVON
Auxiliary Military Radio Stations	AMRS
Balanced Force Requirement Analysis Methodlogy	BALFRAM
Center/Radar Approach Control	CERAP
Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee	CAS
Civilian Personnel Office	CPO
Command Post Exercise	CPX
Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Ryukyus	CINCPACREP
Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Japan	CNFJ

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Common User Land Transportation	CULT
Communications-Electronics	C-E
Consultative Committee	CONCOM
Contract Conciliation Panel	CCP
Counterintelligence	CI
Defense Communications Agency	DCA
Defense Facilities Administration Agency	DFAA
Defense Fuels Supply Center	DFSC
Defense Liaison Branch	DOA
Defense Retail Interservice Support	DRIS
Defense Special Security Communications Systems	DSSCS
Democratic Socialist Party	DSP
Direct Hire	DH
Director of Administrative Services, 5AF	DAS 5AF
Electromagnetic Interference	EMI
Electronic Countermeasures	ECM
Electronic Intelligence	ELINT
Equal Opportunity and Treatment	EO&T
Explosive Ordnance Disposal	EOD
Facility	FAC
Far East Network	FEN
Fixed Countermeasures Radio Receiving	FLR
Flight Information Region	FIR
Foreign Broadcast Information Service	FBIS

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Frequency Resource Record System	FRRS
Fuel System Icing Inhibitor	FSII
Government of Japan	GOJ
Government of Ryukyu Islands	GRI
Government of the Republic of China	GRC
Ground Controlled Approach	GCA
Ground Self Defense Forces	GSDF
Ground Staff Office	GSO
Health Insurance Society	HIS
High Commissioner	HICOM
Human Intelligence	HUMINT
Identification, Friend or Foe	IFF
Indirect Hire Agreement	IHA
Information Advisory Council	IAC
Inspection and Repair as Necessary	IRAN
International Ocean Exposition, Okinawa, Japan 1975	EXPO 75
Interservice Support Agreement	ISSA
Japan Air Defense Command	JADC
Japan Area Counterintelligence Advisory Committee	JACCAC
Japan Air Self Defense Force	JASDF
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau	JCAB
Japan Communist Party	JCP
Japan Defense Agency	JDA
Japan Labor Affairs Committee	JLAC

Japan National Railway	JNR
Japan Overseas Coordination Group	OCG
Japan Self Defense Forces	JSDF
Japan Socialist Party	JSP
Japanese Government Relocation Construction Program	JGRCP
Joint Chiefs of Staff	JCS
Joint Procurement Coordinating Board	JPCB
Joint Services Labor Committee	JSLC
Joint Staff Office	JSO
Joint Strategic Objectives Plans	JSOP
Kanto Plain Consolidation Plan	KPCP
Liberal Democratic Party	LDP
Local National	LN
Logistics Study Committee	LSC
Marine Corps Air Station	MCAS
Mariners' Contract	MC
Maritime Self Defense Forces	MSDF
Maritime Staff Office	MSO
Master Labor Agreement	MLA
Master Labor Contract	MLC
Military Assistance Advisory Group	MAAG
Military Defense Attache Office	MDAO
Military Representative, Okinawa Negotiating	MILRONT
Military Sealift Command	MSC
Military Transportation Authorization	MTA

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Ministry of International Trade and Industry	MITI
Motor Gasoline	MOGAS
Mutual Defense Assistance Office	MDAO
National Police Agency	NPA
National Public Service	NPS
Naval Forces Japan	NAVFORJ
Naval Supply Depot	NSD
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public	NTTP
North Fuji Maneuver Area	NFMA
Okinawa Area Coordinator	OAC
Okinawa Area Field Office	OAF0
Okinawa Coordinating Committee	OCC
Okinawa Reversion Related Construction Program	ORRCF
Operations and Maintenance	O&M
Overseas Coordination Group	OCG
Overseas Coordination Sub-Group - Utilities Services	OCSG-US
Over-the-Trail Firing	OTTF
Pacific Exchange	PACEX
Peoples' Republic of China	PRC
Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants	POL
Policy Analysis and Resources Allocation	PARA
Preparatory Committee	PREPCOM
Prepositioned War Reserve Stock	PWRS
Radio Regulatory Bureau	RRB

Republic of Korea	ROK
Search and Rescue	SAR
Secure Voice Cord Board	SECORD
Security Consultative Committee	SCC
Selective Identification Feature	SIF
Security Consultative Group	SCG
Self Defense Force	SDF
Ship Repair Facility	SRF
Special Working Group	SWG
Specific Intelligence Collection Requirement	SICR
Spintcomm Automatic Relay Center	SARC
Staff Judge Advocate(s)	SJA
Status of Forces Agreement	SOFA
Status of Forces Agreement Task Group	STG
Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Japan	SAPOJ
Surface-to-Air Missile	SAM
Technical Liaison Channel	TLC
Telecommunications-Electronics Agreement	TEA
Telecommunications Service Request	TSR
Termination of War	TOW
Tri Service Drug Abuse Coordination Group	TDCG
United States Army Base Command Okinawa	USARBCO
United States Army Japan	USARJ
United States Army, Ryukyu Islands	USARYIS
United States Civil Administrator, Ryukyus	USCAR
United States Customs Service	USCS

United States Defense Attache Office	USDAO
United States Forces	USF
United States Forces, Japan	USFJ
United States Government	USG
United States Intelligence Board	USIB
United States Secret Service	USSS
Voice of America	VOA
World Administrative Radio Conference	WARC
5th Air Force	5AF