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Defense Intelligence Reference Series



Defense Intelligence Agency

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FOREWORD

[REDACTED]

(U) Contributions to this documents were made by [REDACTED]

(U) Locations and BE numbers of bases discussed in the text are listed in Appendix A.

(U) Each classified title and heading has been marked properly; all those unmarked are unclassified.

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GENERAL

Introduction



the primary obstacle to reunifying the peninsula under their dominion and the major threat to DPRK security. ROK-US forces apparently are credited with the capability of mounting a large-scale conventional or nuclear attack across the demilitarized zone and along North Korean coasts.

Portraying the ROK-US forces as hostile and antagonistic, the DPRK maintains its military and civilian sectors at a high state of readiness. Constant propaganda is for domestic control and foreign consumption and is not a true reflection of the leaders' threat perception.

With national security the top priority, the DPRK consistently channels a large percentage of available manpower and as much as 25 percent of its gross national product into the armed forces. Self-reliance is emphasized, and domestic production of defense material is an integral part of this objective. Dedication to national security is sustained in spite of severe hardships that heavy military expenditures place on the North Korean people and economy.

Missions

The NKAF's primary mission is to provide air defense to the homeland. Secondary missions include tactical air support for the Army and Navy, offensive counterair, insertion of special operations forces, destruction of key enemy installations, reconnaissance, search and rescue, supply, and personnel evacuation.

ORGANIZATION AND DISPOSITION


Introduction



Threat Perceptions

Terrorism from internal or external sources is unlikely. The political and security apparatus is strong, domestic controls are stringent, and all foreigners are kept under close surveillance.


North Korean leaders consider the Republic of Korea (ROK) with US support as



Foreign Military Presence



A small cadre of Soviet and Chinese military advisers and technicians is stationed in North Korea in connection with military and defense industry-related assistance programs. Other foreign military personnel attend North Korean military courses.



[REDACTED]

As for logistic reserves, [REDACTED] the NKAF is attempting to fulfill Kim Il-song's directive by ordering a 6-month military materiel war reserve.

[REDACTED]

The North has a significant portion of its supplies positioned in the forward area, allowing for flexibility in offensive and defensive operations.

Production

(U) DIA defines production as manufacturing more than 50 percent of the components. Assembly is manufacturing less than 50 percent of the parts.

[REDACTED]

could be used for chemical employment, North Korean Army artillery systems (including multiple rocket launchers and surface-to-surface systems) reaching a comparable depth and covering a broader area probably would be the preferred delivery means.

Since the late 1970s, North Korea has worked to improve its CW posture at airfields. To date, a total of 14 air facilities are believed to maintain chemical units, protective equipment, training courses, or shelters. Reporting indicates that chemical decontamination chambers for personnel and vehicles are located in underground hangars. No conclusive evidence is available to ascertain North Korea's CW intent. However, North Korea's potential CW production capability, the variety of ground and air systems available for chemical delivery, and Army and Air Force training to sustain combat operations in a chemically contaminated environment indicate that allied forces should be prepared to encounter select North Korean offensive CW operations.

Chemical Warfare

North Korea is judged to have a limited offensive chemical warfare capability. If North Korea were to employ chemical weapons, the primary delivery means probably would be ground systems; however, air platforms (principally the Il-28/BEAGLE) might be used as a last resort. The limited number of this aircraft, its interdiction/offensive counterair mission, and night bombing capability of the Il-28 — the only currently deployed ground or air system capable of striking all South Korean airfields, lines of communication, and other strategic targets — probably restrict its role as a CW delivery platform. While North Korea's contingent of transports, helicopters, and MiG-23/FLOGGERS (in an air-to-ground role)