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
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
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CHAPTER I

THE STATE OF READINESS OF U. S. FORCES

Events of 1963 that had sufficient historical stature to cast noticeable shadows across the Pacific Command were reminiscent of events described in the four previous Commander in Chief Pacific Command Histories. Like these previous reports, this Command History describes CINCPAC's actions to discharge his responsibilities assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or higher authority, especially those connected with international crises, and those that were peculiar to a joint command. This account is intended to be a record of command decisions and achievements, and purposely omits detailed activities of subordinate commands or of Allied Governments in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still had the right to make a free choice. (U)

This chapter describes CINCPAC's forces and his actions to plan for their deployment, training, logistic support, and employment to carry out U. S. policies in the PACOM. Related items are included in Chapter II, which describes CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program, and in Chapter IV which deals with CINCPAC's activities connected with Laos, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam. (U)

COMMUNIST FORCE STRENGTH CHANGES

As in the past, the USSR was in the vanguard of communist forces in the Far East with the most important changes in military posture during 1963. Further reductions in personnel were in evidence although these were offset, in part, by the deployment of improved weapons and equipment.

While the construction of IRBM and MRBM sites appeared to be tapering off, the number of ICBM sites increased to give the Soviets a larger strategic missile capability in the Far East. Research and development of ICBM's was noted, with additional firings into the

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central Pacific impact area. The rate of increase of surface-to-air missile sites declined somewhat from the prodigious 1962 deployments. Probably most notable was the appearance of sites for SA-3 missiles which were estimated to have a low altitude intercept capability. The Soviets increased their air strength with additional eastward deployment of moderate numbers of new generation jet fighters plus jet and turboprop bombers. Radar sites, principally early warning, continued to mushroom in the Soviet Far East.

Changes in the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet were in part due to re-evaluation of the number of "W" class submarines, and the addition of one nuclear-powered attack submarine and two diesel-powered extended long range attack submarines. The number of submarines with a missile capability remained constant.

Although the Chinese Communist ground forces reflected a small percentage increase in personnel strength, the number of line divisions was reduced by one. The air force registered small decreases in personnel as well as reductions in aircraft, most probably due to the inability to replace aircraft lost through normal attrition. Surface-to-air missile sites, however, increased from eight to fifteen by the end of the year. A significant number of additional radars were detected during the year, the majority being early warning types.

North Korean ground force personnel strength remained constant with no significant improvement in the quality of equipment. The two "W" class submarines that appeared at Mayang-do at the end of 1962 were accepted as transfers to the North Korean Navy from the USSR. In addition, increases in personnel and motor torpedo boats were registered. While there were reductions in the number of aircraft in the North Korean Air Force, these were in part due to re-evaluated order of battle intelligence as well as to normal operational attrition. Surface-to-air missile sites appeared for the first time with two sites identified during the year.

The greatest change in the People's Army of Vietnam was the reduction in number of line divisions, or division equivalents. This was due largely to re-appraisal of intelligence concerning past

THE PACIFIC COMMAND

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1963




Fig. 1

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reorganization within the ground forces. While the strength of the regular army was reduced, the strength of the militia increased by 100 percent, resulting in an overall increase in the total number of ground force personnel. The aircraft inventory of the small air force of North Vietnam almost doubled, light piston transports being the principal additions. No change in the naval forces was noted.

A summary of principal strength figures in the Far East Communist bloc order of battle, and the 1963 changes thereto, are shown in figure two.

U. S. FORCES DURING 1963

PACOM-Wide Military Strength

Total military strength in PACOM showed an overall decline of 6,242 (1.4%) during the year. From a June high of 448,699, the number of personnel declined to a year end strength of 439,190. The military strength of all services fluctuated somewhat during the year as quarterly reports were tabulated, however, year end totals for all services except Air Force were lower at the end of the year than beginning year figures. Comparative strengths were as follows:

	<u>1 Jan 1963</u>	<u>31 Dec 1963</u>	<u>Change</u>
Army	101,273	99,985	-1,288
Navy	203,360	197,433	-5,927
Marine Corps	74,903	73,474	-1,429
Air Force	65,896	68,298	+2,402
TOTAL:	<u>445,432</u>	<u>439,190</u>	<u>-6,242</u>

Strength reductions were primarily in Component Forces. Subordinate Unified Command strengths increased 14, and MAAG personnel by 298. The Service Advisory Groups in Korea reported a reduction of 214 U. S. military personnel during the year. (C)

Military dependents in PACOM outside of CONUS continued to rise, climbing from 177,637 at the beginning of 1963 to 188,583 in December. Of the major geographical concentrations of military personnel and their dependents, only Taiwan showed a decrease in both sponsors and dependents, with reductions of 195 and 562 respectively. Major areas of military population outside of CONUS,

together with changes reflected during the year are shown in the following table:

AREA	MILITARY			DEPENDENTS	
	1/1/63	12/31/63	Change	12/31/63	1963 Change
Hawaii	62,001	61,171	-830	68,040	+2,788
Korea	59,380	53,732	-5,648	2,791	+297
Okinawa	46,357	46,751	+394	26,734	+1,350
Japan	46,162	44,545	-1,617	58,455	+4,474
Philippines	12,808	13,367	+559	13,902	+2,187
Vietnam	9,422	14,962	+5,540	573	+99
Thailand	4,353	3,896	-457	1,532	+432
Taiwan	4,097	3,902	-195	4,950	-562
TOTALS:	244,580	242,326		176,977	

Presence of dependents in large numbers in Gold Flow areas was a matter of concern to CINCPAC during the year but other than actions taken or planned to reduce permanently assigned military personnel in these countries no measures specifically aimed at reduction of dependents were initiated. (C)

Reduction to Military Headquarters Within PACOM

Proposal to Reduce Personnel Assigned to MAAGS: In addition to CINCPAC's personnel surveys aimed at adjusting the strengths of the MAAGs as fast as there was a change in their mission or functions, the JCS in March asked CINCPAC if he thought it was feasible to make further reductions in personnel or rank structure, to consolidate two or more MAAGs, or consolidate any of the MAAGs with other headquarters.¹ (For strength figures of personnel assigned to PACOM MAAGs see Fig. 7.) After receiving the opinions of the MAAG Chiefs and of the Unified Commanders, CINCPAC advised the JCS that he was not in favor of the proposals.² He explained that he had conducted extensive manpower surveys of seven subordinate headquarters to determine the minimum personnel requirements, and that the remainder of the PACOM subordinate commands were to be examined before the

1. JCS 9239 DTG 261938Z Mar 1963 (S)
2. CINCPAC 252250Z Apr 1963 (S)

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FAR EAST COMMUNIST BLOC MILITARY STRENGTH CHANGES DURING 1963

USSR		CHICOM		N. KOREA		N. VIETNAM	
	AS OF DEC 1963	CHANGES DURING YR	AS OF DEC 1963	CHANGES DURING YR	AS OF DEC 1963	CHANGES DURING YR	AS OF DEC 1963
GROUND							
PERSONNEL	265,000	-10,000	2,632,200	+9,200	358,200	0	439,950
LINE DIVISIONS*	16	-1	114	-1	20	0	12

NAVY							
PERSONNEL	411,000	-7,000	66,000	0	7,500	+500	2,500
MAJOR CRAFT:							
OCA	2	0	SS	-4	2	+2	MAJOR CRAFT:
GL	4	0	DD	4	47	+9	PATROL
SS	96	-3	DE	4	26	0	MINE
DDG	3	0					
DD	27	+1					
DE	19	0					
AIR							
PERSONNEL**	75,000	0	78,700	-2,300	16,000	0	1,000
MAJOR AIRCRAFT:**							
JET HVY BMR	55	-1	MAJOR AIRCRAFT:**				PERSONNEL
TURBO PROP	40	+17	JET MED BMR	2			MAJOR AIRCRAFT:
HVY BMR	320	+52	PIST MED BMR	15			PIST TRANS LT
JET MED BMR	114	+16	JET LT BMR	290			PIST TRANS SML
JET LT BMR	940	+83	JET FTRS	1885			PIST TRNR
STRAT RKT FORCES							
PERSONNEL	10,000	0					
MISSILE LAUNCHERS:							
ICBM	36	+26					
IRBM	6	+2					
MRBM	44	+4					
PVO							
PERSONNEL	19,500	0					

* LINE DIVISIONS INCLUDE INFANTRY (REGULAR, MOTORIZED, MECHANIZED), ARMORED (TANK), AIRBORNE (PARACHUTE), DIVISIONS.
 ** AIR STRENGTHS INCLUDE AIR FORCE AND NAVAL AIR FORCE STRENGTHS.
 *** DIVISION OR DIVISION EQUIVALENTS.

FIG 2

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AVAILABLE FORCES

CINCUSARPAC	CINCPACFLT	CINCPACAF
* ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1963		
<p>1 Army Hq</p> <p>2 Corps Hqs</p> <p>3 Inf Divs</p> <p>1 Abn Brigade (Reinf)</p> <p>1 Missile Cmd (AT)</p> <p>1 Special Forces Group</p> <p>2 Logistical Commands</p> <p>3 Nike-Hercules Bns (+)</p> <p>6 Hawk Bns</p> <p>1 Corps Arty</p> <p>1 Sergeant Bn</p> <p>2 8" How Bns</p> <p>1 Lacrosse Bn (-)</p> <p>1 Tgt Acquisition Bn</p> <p>4 Engr Bns (Const)</p> <p>1 Engr Bn (Cmbt)</p> <p>1 Little John Bn</p>	<p>2 Numbered Fleets</p> <p>9 Attack Carriers (CVA)</p> <p>4 ASW Support Carriers (CVS)</p> <p>7 Cruiser Types</p> <p>46 Submarine Types</p> <p>109 Destroyer Types</p> <p>73 Amphibious Warfare Types</p> <p>21 Patrol Ships Types</p> <p>42 Mine Warfare Ships</p> <p>8 SOSUS Stations</p> <p>102 Auxiliary Ships</p> <p>1 Fleet Marine Force (including 2 MARDIV/WING Teams)</p> <p>9 Carrier Air Groups (CVG)</p> <p>4 Carrier ASW Air Groups</p> <p>15 Patrol Squadrons (VP)</p> <p>1 AEW Sqn (VW Flt)</p> <p>1 AEW Sqn (VW Barrier)</p> <p>2 Carrier AEW Sqn (VAW)</p> <p>1 Fleet Air Recon Sqn (VQ)</p> <p>1 Photo Sqn (VAP)</p> <p>1 Photo Sqn (VFP)</p> <p>1 Helo Utility Sqn (HT)</p>	<p>2 Numbered Air Forces</p> <p>9 Tac Ftr Sqs (F-100D/F's and F-105's)</p> <p>3 Bomb Sqs (B-57's)</p> <p>5 Ftr/Intcp Sqs (F-102's)</p> <p>2 Tac Recon Sqs (2 RF-101's)</p> <p>1 Composite Recon Sqn (C-130Y's RR-57's)</p> <p>6 Troop Car Sqs (C-130's - 4 Sqs) (C-124's - 2 Sqs)</p> <p>1 Refueling Sqn (KB-50J)</p> <p>2 Tac Missile Sqs (TM-76R)</p> <p>3 TC Sqn Assault 16 C-123</p> <p>2 (-) TAC Ftr Sqs (F-100's) (TAC rotation)</p> <p>1 Air Commando Gp 18 RB-26, 6 C-47, 4 U-10B, 13 T-28</p>
IN PACOM BUT NOT ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC		
<p>USASA Units in Pacific</p> <p>Army Natl Guard Units</p> <p>1 Engr Bn</p> <p>2 Nike-Hercules Bn (-)</p> <p>1 Inf Bde (3 Bns)</p> <p>Army Reserve Units</p> <p>1 Special Fcs Gp (Abn)(-)</p> <p>1 Inf Bde</p> <p>1 CA Gp</p> <p>1 Engr Const Bn</p>	<p>16 Naval Reserve Training Ships</p> <p>8 Radar Packet Ships (AGR)</p> <p>Naval Security Group, Pacific</p>	<p>SAC Rotational Bomb Sqn, Anderson AFB, Guam (B-17)</p> <p>56th WEARCN Sqn (MATS) (17 WB-50D's, GRB-57)</p> <p>Hawaiian Air Natl Guard Intcp Sqn, Hickam AFB (F-102's)</p> <p>2 Air Transport Sqs (1 C-124 / 1 C-118) (MATS Hickam)</p> <p>6/20th Security Wing</p> <p>4 Air Rescue Sqs (MATS) SC-54, SA-16, H-10</p> <p>Air Force Communication Service Units</p>
MAJOR AUGMENTATION FORCES WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE IN EMERGENCY		
<p>CONUS Augmentation</p> <p>1 Corps Hq</p> <p>2 Inf Division w/support troops</p> <p>1 Mech Brigade</p> <p>1 Log Comd (Type C)</p>	<p>1 Air Force Command Elm.</p> <p>1 Airlift Command Elm.</p> <p>ALO/FAC Teams (Abn Qual if w/Abn Div) as required</p> <p>1 ASOC</p> <p>5 Tactical Fighter Sqdns (18 AC per Sqdn)</p> <p>1 Composite Recce Sqn + 1 PPC (8 RF-101, 6 F10-66D, 3 RB-66C; 3 WB-66D)</p> <p>20 KB-50</p> <p>3 Troop Carrier Sqdns (48 C-130 aircraft) (CT and CALSU's as required)</p> <p>Weather Support Elements</p> <p>1 Communications and Control Elm.</p>	<p>1 Air Force Command Elm.</p> <p>1 Airlift Command Elm.</p> <p>ALO/FAC Teams (Abn Qual if w/Abn Div) as required</p> <p>1 ASOC</p> <p>5 Tactical Fighter Sqdns (18 AC per Sqdn)</p> <p>1 Composite Recce Sqn + 1 PPC (8 RF-101, 6 F10-66D, 3 RB-66C; 3 WB-66D)</p> <p>20 KB-50</p> <p>3 Troop Carrier Sqdns (48 C-130 aircraft) (CT and CALSU's as required)</p> <p>Weather Support Elements</p> <p>1 Communications and Control Elm.</p>
<p>*These columns include all forces assigned. Some may be in various stages of overhaul, repair, or training and thus not available for immediate deployment.</p>		

PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL

SERVICE-CATEGORY-COUNTRY

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1963

COUNTRY	GRAND TOTAL	MILITARY						U. S. CIVILIANS						LOCAL HIRE CIVILIAN						DEPENDENTS					
		USA		USN		USMC		USA		USN		USMC		USA		USN		USMC		USA		USN		USMC	
		TOT	USAF	TOT	USAF	TOT	USAF	TOT	USAF	TOT	USAF	TOT	USAF	TOT	USAF	TOT	USAF	TOT	USAF	TOT	USAF	TOT	USAF	TOT	USAF
ALASKA (PACOM UNITS)	480	300	0	380	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
AUSTRALIA	118	51	1	15	5	30	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
BONIN ISLANDS	136	76		23		53	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
BURMA	115	46	27	4	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
CAMBODIA	54	37	31	3	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
CHINA	9823	3902	1105	707	37	2053	59	4	42	13	1012	152	536	324	4950	1039	71	2272							
HAWAII	48312	61171	18212	24996	10165	7198	1597	367	916	82	232	17504	4366	10027	451	2640	68040	11684	21411	10860	18055				
HONG KONG	102	23	9	4	6	4	6	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
INDONESIA	123	63	19	20	11	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
JAPAN	156385	44545	5418	7129	6410	24988	2949	1359	522	3	935	50536	17357	14943	439	17797	58455	9088	10937	956	37474				
JOHNSTON IS.	144	133			133	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
KOREA	77907	53732	4892	204	81	4555	1116	1027	33	56	20268	18273	202	54	1739	2791	2129	215	49	398					
LAOS	48	33	17	1	10	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
MALAYA	137	32	8	12	11	1	6	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
MARIANAS	21314	6560	70	2748	287	3455	1654		879	775	2842		2642												
MARSHALLS	361	159		143		16	17	7	10																
MIDWAY	2420	1611		1611		63	63		63																
NEW ZEALAND	11	9	4		5																				
PHILIPPINES	38200	13367	1030	3092	689	8556	698	7	315	376	10233	97	6799	843	3337	13902	584	3899	366	9053					
RYUKYUS	89589	46751	12254	2851	19442	12204	1898	1427	31	78	362	14206	9040	749	843	3574	26734	11759	1094	892	17989				
THAILAND	5173	3896	2728	280	34	854	85	1	83	1	260	1	109		150	1532	859	237	35	401					
VIETNAM	16258	14962	10160	742	481	3579	62	48	48	14	661	13	273		375	573	270	152	51	100					
7th FLEET	32498	32497		32063	428			1	1																
SUB TOTAL	600408	284036	99985	77631	38122	68298	10129	4236	2955	163	2775	117660	49369	36548	1787	29936	188583	44088	44693	13497	86305				
UNITED STATES	157728	155154		119802	35352		2574		2574																
GRAND TOTAL	758136	439190	99985	197433	73474	68298	12703	4236	5529	163	2775	117660	49369	36548	1787	29936	188583	44088	44693	13497	86305				

Fig. 4

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end of 1963. During the survey process, particular attention was given to the feasibility of consolidating functions within existing headquarters, and to the joint use of facilities within existing headquarters. Of the seven commands already surveyed - MAAG China, COMUSTDC, MAAG Japan, COMUS Japan, PROVMAAG Korea, COMUS Korea and JUSMAG Phil - CINCPAC recommended that the 2054 existing spaces be reduced by 177. He expected to make similar savings from an examination of the remaining commands. He recommended that no further reductions be made at that time.

Concerning the proposal to reduce rank structure, CINCPAC cited his past efforts to downgrade rank, and explained that he considered that the existing rank structure provided the minimum essential levels, at that time, for carrying out his assigned mission. He stressed the continuing need for some senior officer representatives to maintain effective relationships with the senior officers of the host countries.

During the first quarter of 1962, CINCPAC explored the possibilities of consolidating the MAAGs of Japan, Korea and China, as well as the feasibility of combining these and other PACOM MAAGs with other U.S. headquarters. At that time, CINCPAC concluded it was not practicable to combine the three MAAGs because of the geographical separation, differences in the communist threats, and the wide variations in the internal situations in each country. Another reason that applied to all PACOM MAAGs was the historical national antipathies among the host countries, which would create political opposition.

After considering the advantages of consolidating U.S. headquarters in Japan, China and Korea, CINCPAC advised the JCS that although some small personnel savings probably could be made, the need for new construction, the loss of close personal contact between MAAG personnel and their country counterparts, and the political and diplomatic consequences would outweigh the savings. In the RVN the MAAG Vietnam and COMUSMACV Headquarters were already consolidated as much as possible.¹ CINCPAC said the same objections to further consolidation that existed in 1962 still applied. A small saving could

1. CINCPAC 170414Z Mar 1962 (S)

be made by combining the Office Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand with JUSMAG Thailand, but CINCPAC opposed this move because it would eliminate the personnel who stood ready to return to Laos and reopen the MAAG there if it became necessary. In Cambodia, Burma and Indonesia there were no other headquarters with which the MAAGs could be combined. Accordingly, CINCPAC recommended that no consolidation of headquarters be made at that time, and that his Component Commanders and Service Headquarters continue to review operating procedures and the level of advisory effort of the Service Advisory Groups with the aim of reducing personnel requirements when possible.¹

A month later, on 23 May, the JCS asked CINCPAC to consider other means of saving manpower through consolidation of headquarters.² The JCS proposals are listed below together with CINCPAC's assessment as set forth in his response.³

1. Transfer the functions of MAAG Japan to U.S. Forces, Japan, those of MAAG China to the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, and those of PROVMAAG Korea (to include service advisory groups) to other U.S. commands in Korea.

In anticipation of decreasing MAP commitments to Japan, CINCPAC reasoned that MAAG Japan could eventually function as a Military Assistance Sales Office; and that as such, it could be absorbed by COMUS Japan, whose mission in an emergency would not involve command or coordination of combat forces. CINCPAC stipulated, however, that the reduction of MAAG Japan to the status of a Military Assistance Sales Office should be withheld until FY66 when the MAAG would have fulfilled U.S. commitments connected with NIKE-HAWK, ASW and AC&W activities. CINCPAC recommended that the political ramifications of the phase down of the MAAG be explored in Washington, and asked that he be advised of the results of this consideration.

The situation with MAAG China and PROVMAAG Korea was different, and CINCPAC did not consider further consolidation feasible in those countries. The buildings to accomodate such a consolidated

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1. CINCPAC 252250Z Apr 1963 (S)
 2. JCS 9989 DTG 232140Z May 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 310235Z May 1963 (S)

PACIFIC COMMAND ORGANIZATION

1963

COMMANDER IN CHIEF



CINCSARPAC



CINCPACFLT



U. S. G. SHARP
ADMIRAL USA
SEP 63

CINCPACAF



E. O'DONNELL, JR.
GENERAL USA
AUG 55-AUG 63

COMUS
KOREA



H. H. BUZZE
GENERAL USA
AUG 63

COMUSMAC
VIET/THAI



P. B. HARKINS
GENERAL USA
FEB 62

COM
TAIWAN DEECOM



C. L. WELSON
GENERAL USA
MAY 62

COMUS
JAPAN



STEVEN A. SWART
GENERAL USA
AUG 61-AUG 63

CINCPACREP
RYUKYUS



J. M. PRESTON
MAJOR GENERAL USA
AUG 63

CINCPACREP
PHILIPPINES



D. A. WELSH
REAR ADMIRAL USA
JUN 61-MAR 63

CINCPACREP
MARBO



T. A. CHRISTOPHER
REAR ADMIRAL USA
DEC 62

CHPOYMAAG
KOREA



W. B. EDWARDS
MAJOR GENERAL USA
JUL 62

CHMAAG
VIETNAM



C. J. TIMMES
MAJOR GENERAL USA
JUL 62

CHUSMAAG
THAILAND



T. J. CONWAY
MAJOR GENERAL USA
AUG 61-MAR 63

CHMAAG
REPUBLIC OF CHINA



K. O. SARGENT
MAJOR GENERAL USA
AUG 62

CHMAAG
JAPAN



J. W. WORTHINGTON
BRIGADIER GENERAL USA
MAY 62

CHMAAG
PHILIPPINES



A. P. TACON, JR.
MAJOR GENERAL USA
JUN 62

CHMAAG
CAMBODIA



E. C. B. SCHERRER
BRIGADIER GENERAL USA
JUL 61-MAR 63

CHMAAG
CAMBODIA



R. C. TABER
BRIGADIER GENERAL USA
AUG 62

FIGURE 5

headquarters were lacking. But more important, CINCPAC stated, would be the entangled command relations during combat operations. In China, COMUSTDC would also be the CHMAAG, and in the latter capacity would be responsive to the Ambassador/Country Team operation. This would create the same situation that the JCS avoided in the RVN by establishing COMUSMACV.

As in Taiwan, a major consideration in Korea was the command structure where COMUSK appointed a senior staff officer as Chief PROVMAAG-K and as his representative on the Country Team. Three Service Advisory Groups under their respective Component Commanders provided the advisory effort under the overall guidance and coordination of CHPROVMAAG-K, who had a relatively small headquarters. The need for these Service Advisory Groups to be close to their ROK counterparts and the unique command relationships required for these groups to operate effectively under the Component Commanders made further consolidation of the advisory effort and COMUSK impracticable.

2. Centralize the MAAG functions in a lesser number of locations. CINCPAC said that the time and distance factors would affect the goals of the MA Program, and that the few spaces saved would not offset the loss of U.S. prestige and advisory effort.

3. Have the Military attaches perform MAAG functions. CINCPAC pointed out that this had been considered and rejected as a solution when the MAAG was withdrawn from Laos, and that even in Burma and Indonesia it was impracticable for the attache to administer the MA Program.

4. Eliminate functions assigned to the MAAGs as a result of U.S. laws, or OSD or JCS directives. In answer to this item, CINCPAC first explained that his annual manpower surveys had kept manning levels as low as possible according to the responsibilities assigned. Additional manpower savings could be made by reducing requirements, such as those connected with the annual military assistance programming cycle. CINCPAC said that there was an urgent need for simplification of the system, and that this would save manpower at several levels. He recommended that OSD review its programming and planning requirements toward that end.

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Reassignment of MAAG Cambodia Personnel: There were 58 permanent U.S. military personnel assigned to MAAG Cambodia before the decision was made in December 1963 to terminate assistance to that country. (See section in Chapter II on the withdrawal of MAAG from Cambodia.) Temporary duty military personnel, civilian technical representatives, and dependents swelled the total of DOD sponsored personnel in Cambodia to 187.

On 9 December, OSD advised Chief MAAG Cambodia that he could start moving personnel who had received orders and who were not needed for the final phase-out detachment.¹ Most of these persons received their orders and moved out of Cambodia during December. A few were reassigned within PACOM but the majority went to CONUS or other areas.

Proposed Manpower Reduction of Military Assistance Agencies:

In the beginning of October the JCS advised CINCPAC that the Secretary of Defense was examining the actions necessary to make a world-wide 14 percent reduction in MAP funded personnel (U.S. military, U.S. civilian, and indigenous civilians) in MAAGs and Service Advisory Groups by the end FY64.² For PACOM the proposed reduction was a total of 1140 spaces - 765 spaces in MAAGs and 375 spaces in Korea Service Advisory Groups. The distribution of the reduction would be left to Admiral Felt's discretion, but the JCS asked him to report by the middle of the month how he proposed to distribute the total 1140 personnel reduction, together with any reductions that had already been made or were planned, and any problems or consequences, country-by-country, that might be expected. (C)

The JCS also passed on for CINCPAC's consideration opinions furnished by OSD regarding four countries. Since there were existing plans to reduce MAAG Vietnam by 167 spaces, OSD considered that no further reductions should be made by that MAAG. The Service Advisory Groups in Korea were considered relatively large and a good area in which to make reductions. OSD wanted special consideration

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1. OSD DEF 947747 DTG 092058Z Dec 1963 (C)
 2. JCS 2761 DTG 032236Z Oct 1963 (S)

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC AND STAFF

1963




FIGURE 6

given to keeping a surveillance capability in MAAG Taiwan, and didn't want the unit there reduced to the point that the U.S. would have no advance knowledge of any Chinese unilateral military actions that might be contrary to U.S. policy. The fourth country for which OSD offered suggestions was Japan, where OSD believed some reductions could be made by the end of FY64 even though there were uncompleted military assistance programs.¹

Later in October, a JCS staff member advised CINCPAC that because of the extensive world-wide reductions planned for MAP organizations for FY64, an attempt would be made to get JCS to accept these reductions in lieu of the 14% reduction.² In the meantime, CINCPAC submitted to the JCS a proposed plan showing the reductions already planned for FY64, the additional reductions that would have to be made if the 14% reduction was later imposed, and the total spaces that would have to be eliminated to make up a 14% cut. CINCPAC explained that if reductions of 14% — a total of 1140 personnel — were forced, there would be a certain loss of operational effectiveness, but that the reductions were feasible.³ The CINCPAC plan provided for a reduction of 646 spaces for MAAGs (491 planned and/or accomplished, and 155 additional) and 494 spaces for Korean Service Advisory Groups (378 planned and/or accomplished and 116 additional spaces). Within the above totals the additional reductions were to be imposed on MAAG China (50 spaces) and MAAG Japan (95 spaces); MEDT Burma and MAAG Cambodia were to be denied increases recommended by the CINCPAC Manpower Survey.^{4, 5, 6, 7}

On 29 November the JCS asked CINCPAC to provide by 4 December a plan showing a complete breakdown — by officer, enlisted, U.S. civilian and indigenous civilian — of the MAAGs and Service Advisory Groups in PACOM. Included in the JCS message were the

1. JCS 2761 DTG 032236Z Oct 1963 (S)
2. CINCPAC J1 Memo for Record, Ser 0080-63 of 17 Oct 1963 (S)
3. CINCPAC 190206Z Oct 1963 (S)
4. CINCPAC 080018Z Oct 1963 (S)
5. CINCPAC 080019Z Oct 1963 (S)
6. CINCPAC 242106Z Oct 1963 (C)
7. CINCPAC 242107Z Oct 1963 (C)

base figures for the MAAGs and Korean Service Advisory Groups on which the JCS studies were founded. After adjustment of the CINCPAC base figures to those used by JCS, it was determined that with reductions already planned (including termination of MAAG Cambodia) an additional levy of only 90 spaces would be necessary if the additional reductions were directed.^{1, 2, 3}

CINCPAC's plan proposed additional levies of 45 spaces for MAAG Japan and 45 spaces for the Korean Service Advisory Groups.⁴ Other previously planned reductions would be carried out, but the additional levy against MAAG China would not be necessary.

Reduction in Headquarters of Unified Commands: Authorized personnel strengths of PACOM subordinate unified commands increased by 112 spaces during the year. In January there was an increase of 29 spaces required to establish COMUSMACTHAI, and 132 additional spaces for COMUSMACV.^{5, 6, 7} Later these two increases, totalling 161 spaces, were partially offset by reductions made in other less critical areas by CINCPAC Manpower Survey Teams. A major reduction in the manning authorization of COMUSTDC, recommended by the Manpower Survey Team in September, 1962 was reflected in a decrease of 40 spaces in the COMUSTDC 1 July 1963 JTD approved by the JCS in February.⁸ Other reductions of four and five spaces had been recommended and approved in the staffs of COMUSJAPAN and COMUSKOREA respectively.^{9, 10}

On 25 October the JCS levied a 15% reduction in headquarters of Unified Commands in foreign countries against end FY63 strengths and directed CINCPAC to prepare a detailed reduction plan.¹¹ In PACOM

1. OSD DEF 945810 DTG 210033Z Nov 1963 (C)
2. CHMAAG Cambodia 221310Z Nov 1963 (C)
3. CINCPAC 222113Z Nov 1963 (S)
4. CINCPAC 042226Z Dec 1963 (S)
5. JCS msg DTG 171950Z Jan 1963 (C)
6. JCS msg DTG 061911Z Feb 1963 (C)
7. JCS msg DTG 131422Z Mar 1963 (C)
8. JCS 8775 DTG 252209Z Feb 1963 (C)
9. JCS 2014 DTG 091309Z Aug 1963 (C)
10. JCS 1621 DTG 122130Z Jul 1963 (C)
11. JCS 3252 DTG 252143Z Oct 1963 (S)

the reduction amounted to 115 spaces, 66 of which had already been made or were planned for FY64. In order to bring the total up to 115 CINCPAC planned an additional levy of 49. This 115 space reduction was distributed: COMUS Japan, 10; COMUS Korea, 21; COMUSTDC, 45; COMUSMACV, 37; and COMUSMACTHAI, 2 spaces. The JCS were advised of these plans and on 20 December JCS announced Secretary of Defense approval, and directed an additional four space deletion for COMUSMACV, bringing the total PACOM unified command reduction to 119.¹ All reductions were to be effective 1 February 1964 except that 15 of COMUSMACV's reductions were effective 3 December 1963.

The chart below summarizes planned and projected reductions in both U.S. military and civilian spaces in PACOM unified headquarters.

<u>HQ</u>	<u>FY63 AUTH</u>	<u>PLANNED REDUCTION</u>	<u>ADDITIONAL REDUCTION</u>	<u>PROJECTED FY64 AUTH</u>
USFJ	75	4	6	65
USF/UNC Korea	155	5	16	134
USTDC	155	40	5	110
USMACV	356	15	26	315
USMACTHAI	<u>29</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>27</u>
TOTALS:	770	66	53	651

CINCPAC Manpower Surveys: Throughout 1963 CINCPAC critically examined the manpower requirements of his own and subordinate headquarters, emphasizing the manpower survey program started in 1962.

In February a CINCPAC team surveyed COMUS Korea, PROVMAAG Korea, COMUS Japan, MAAG Japan, and JUSMAG Philippines. Reductions by this team amounted to 55 spaces out of a total of 765 surveyed, or a 7.2% saving. In July a second team surveyed JUSMAG Thailand, Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand, COMUSMACTHAI, MEDT Burma, MAAG Cambodia and the Military Planning Office SEATO. This survey resulted in a recommended 6.7% reduction of 50 spaces out of 745 surveyed; however, the

 1. JCS 4099 DTG 202019Z Dec 1963 (S)

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reduction figure submitted on the final Joint Manpower Programs was raised to 61 since some recommended increases were cancelled as a result of DOD's proposed reduction of personnel in MAP organizations. At the end of 1963 revised JTDs reflecting these recommended reductions had not been approved by JCS. (C)

A third survey scheduled for Vietnam in November was cancelled due to CINCPAC's desire not to interfere with operations in that country, and because other plans were being made to reduce overall strength there. ¹ (C)

One Thousand Man Withdrawal from Vietnam: An account of this action is found in Chapter IV under the heading "Reduction in Force of U. S. Units in RVN." (C)

ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATION

Revised JTDs

CINCPAC's proposed 1 July 1963 JTD was forwarded to the JCS in early April. ² It requested an increase of 67 spaces including 24 spaces previously requested for newly assigned intelligence functions. The intelligence spaces were later approved by the JCS and filled from PACOM component sources. ^{3, 4} This left the request at 43 spaces, increasing the JTD from 643 to 686. The proposed increase consisted of 26 spaces for expansion of war gaming and 17 spaces based on an increased workload, mostly in communications.

In July the JCS approved nine spaces for requisitioning purposes, disapproved eight others, and held in abeyance the 26 spaces requested for War Games pending a further JCS review. This increased the CINCPAC JTD to an overall 652. ⁵ The War Games requirement for personnel was a result of the proposed new Theater Battle Model. The

1. CINCPAC 192104Z Oct 1963 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00323 of 2 Apr 1963 (C)
3. CINCPAC 120353Z Apr 1963 (C)
4. JCS 9336 DTG 021501Z Apr 63 (C)
5. JCS 1490 DTG 021701Z Jul 1963 (C)

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MAP PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS

ORGANIZATION	END FY63 STRENGTH	FY64		TOTAL REDUCTION	PROPOSED FY65 MAP STRENGTH
		PLANNED REDUCTION	ADDITIONAL LEVY		
MAAG, Cambodia	115	-115	0	-115	0
MAAG, China	1128	-191	0	-191	937
MAAG, Japan	348	-72	-45	-117	231
MAAG, Vietnam	3156	-264	0	-264	2892
JUSMAG, Philippines	99	+ 1	0	+ 1	100
JUSMAG, Thailand					
DEPCH JUSMAG Thailand					
MEDT, Burma	28	+ 5	0	+ 5	33
MILTAG, Indonesia	44	+ 3	0	+ 3	47
PROVMAAG, Korea	72	- 1	0	- 1	71
Sub Total	<u>5648</u>	<u>-672</u>	<u>-45</u>	<u>-717</u>	<u>4931</u>
ARMY Adv. Group, Korea	1715	-308	-29	-337	1378
NAVY Adv. Group, Korea	444	- 30	- 8	- 38	406
AIR FORCE, Adv. Group, Korea	489	- 40	- 8	- 48	441
Sub Total	<u>2648</u>	<u>-378</u>	<u>-45</u>	<u>-423</u>	<u>2225</u>
GRAND TOTAL	8296	-1050	-90	-1140	7156

NOTE:

Table above includes all spaces chargeable to MAP, including Foreign Service Local employees.
Non-MAP JTD spaces are not included in any of the above figures.

Fig. 7

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JCS directed CINCPAC to review his organization, mission, and functions with a view toward providing compensatory spaces to JCS for those approved and also suggested that the possibility of greater utilization of civilians be explored.

Complying with the JCS directive, CINCPAC organized a Manpower Survey Team, which in August began its work of reviewing functions, tasks and personnel staffing. The team's objective was to:

1. Determine overall manpower requirements of the staff.
2. Effect consolidation wherever practicable to streamline the staff organization.
3. Identify spaces in which civilians could be utilized in lieu of military personnel.

The survey, completed in September, combined with a critical staff review of its findings, served as the basis for the preparation of a revised JTD for the 1 July 1964 submission to the JCS.

In September the JCS approved the 1 July 1963 JTD for the PACOM MAP Data Center.¹ An increase of five military and five civilian spaces was authorized to meet increased workload, bringing the authorized total to 39.

At the end of the year CINCPAC was preparing his 1 July 1964 JTD which he would send to the JCS for approval. Using JCS guidance and the findings of his manpower survey team, CINCPAC was prepared to ask for approximately 40 civilian billets and an overall increase to his staff of about 60 spaces. CINCPAC contemplated asking again for the 26 spaces to expand War Gaming. The JCS had announced the results in October of their study on War Gaming and CINCPAC felt that the additional personnel spaces would be necessary in order to effectively conduct the games as envisioned by the JCS study.² The JCS, as a result of the study, had assigned CINCPAC the responsibility of forming a program of theater gaming that would satisfy PACOM requirements and those of the JCS. (See War Gaming Operations, this chapter, for a complete account of the Theater Battle Model) Other increases that CINCPAC planned were in the areas of ADPS, communications, and Classified Material Control.

1. JCS 2520 DTG 170018Z Sep 1963 (C)
 2. JCS SM 1301-63, 28 Oct 1963 (C)

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PACOM Indications Center

Under the JCS approved Intelligence Division personnel augmentation, CINCPAC activated the PACOM Indications Center at Camp Smith on 1 September 1963 and also began performing certain other joint intelligence functions in collections/requirements and ADP programs.^{1,2} CINCPAC planned to establish other jointly manned satellite Indications Centers in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan under the control of subordinate unified commanders. The first of these centers, which were to be activated on a time phased basis, was established on 1 July 1963 under the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command.³ However, required staff personnel reductions and other PACOM force reductions made it impractical to expand the intelligence and evaluation facilities in Korea and Japan.^{4,5,6}

Growth of the CINCPAC Staff

On 1 January 1947, the forerunner of the post war Pacific Command was established as one of six geographical commands. Ten and a half years later, on 1 July 1957, the Department of Defense put all U.S. forces in the Pacific under one Commander in Chief by including Japan, Okinawa, and Korea in the Pacific Command. From that time, the CINCPAC staff gradually increased. CINCPAC's increased participation in Military Assistance, which began in 1960 partially as a result of Draper Committee recommendations, was a major cause for increases.⁷ Other increases were attributable to increased workload and scope of responsibility in a number of activities. The increases of assigned personnel to the CINCPAC Staff are summarized below for the period 31 December 1958 to 31 December 1963: (U)

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1. JCS 9336 DTG 021501Z Apr 1963 (C)
 2. CINCPAC 132050Z May 1963 (TS)
 3. CINCPAC 191855Z May 1963 (S)
 4. JCS 3252 DTG 252143Z Oct 1963 (S)
 5. JCS 2761 DTG 032236Z Oct 1963 (S)
 6. CINCPAC 160247Z Nov 1963 (S)
 7. CINCPAC 1959 Command History, p. 82-86

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>
ARMY	137	131	161	165	178	188
NAVY	182	202	189	193	199	222
MARINE CORPS	32	34	40	39	38	41
AIR FORCE	130	132	164	165	167	191
CIVILIAN	0	0	1	3	5	5
TOTAL	481	499	555	565	587	647

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Compared to 1962, when there were numerous changes in command relationships within PACOM due to the establishment of new organizations in Southeast Asia, (See CINCPAC's 1962 Command History, p. 4) there were few changes in 1963. CINCPAC clarified certain 1962 changes in command structure and Army planning responsibilities for forces involved in contingency plans for Southeast Asia; however, no significant changes involving relationships for execution of unilateral plans were made.¹

Near the end of 1962 the JCS approved an earlier CINCPAC recommendation concerning changes of SEATO Field Force Command positions.^{2,3} Accordingly, on 2 January 1963, CINCPAC, in his capacity as USMILAD, designated COMUSMACTHAI as Commander SEATO Field Forces Plan 5, and COMUSMACV as Commander SEATO Field Forces Plan 6 and Commander Central Region SEATO Field Forces Plan 4.⁴

Another change was made by CINCPAC, this one in the organization of CHJUSMAG Philippines. Prior to 1963 the CHJUSMAG Philippines had been an Army officer and, as such, was the USARPAC representative in the Philippines. In 1963, when the CHJUSMAG billet was changed to Air Force, CINCPAC designated the senior Army officer in the CHJUSMAG Philippines organization to become USARPAC

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1. CINCPAC 210305Z Apr 1963 (TS)
 2. CINCPAC 262327Z Nov 1962 (TS)
 3. JCS DTG 281532Z Dec 1962 (TS)
 4. CINCPAC 020032Z Jan 1963 (TS)

representative.¹ In response to a JCS request, CINCPAC recommended that, in order to provide service mix, the position of Chief of Staff JUSMAG Philippines be changed to Air Force upon transfer of the incumbent Army Chief of Staff.² CINCPAC recommended that the Chief JUSMAG Philippines position revert to Army after May 1965, when the incumbent's tour was due to end, and that the Air Force begin manning the Chief of Staff position as of 1 February 1965.³


In February CINCPAC received a COMUSMACTHAI instruction which indicated plans for a Navy construction battalion to be placed under operation control of the 9th Logistical Command. CINCPAC issued instructions to ensure that the construction battalion would respond to COMUSMACTHAI without operating through Army channels.⁴ CINCPAC had formerly told COMUSMACV that Marine forces would not be under Army Component Command control for OPLAN 32-63.⁵

As the result of a suggestion by Ambassador Bowles, in September the JCS asked Admiral Felt for his reaction to the recommendation that military jurisdiction for India be transferred to CINCPAC.⁶

In his response, Admiral Felt explained that he preferred not to further complicate the PACOM military assistance picture by extending activities to include India. He pointed out that PACOM was "occupied holding in check the biggest part of the Red Chinese dragon, the head of which was in Manchuria and the body in the area of the Taiwan Strait and Southeast China so that the tail in Tibet cannot lash out too violently." Claiming that CINCPAC should concentrate his efforts toward maintaining deterrents in the West Pacific and by periodic shows of force in the Bay of Bengal, he said movements of U.S. forces to help India control Red China's border violations should logically originate in Europe or in CONUS, except for a naval force that PACOM


1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0244, subj: Designation of USARPAC Representative in the Philippines, 1 Apr 1963 (C)
2. JCS 3700 DTG 261913Z Nov 1963 (C)
3. CINCPAC 062320Z Dec 1963 (C)
4. CINCPAC 060156Z Mar 1963 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 300206Z Apr 1963 (TS)
6. JCS 2429 DTG 102221Z Sep 1963 (TS)

could furnish. Since the U.S. and Great Britain were to provide equal shares of assistance to build up Indian Armed Forces, CINCPAC suggested that the necessary coordination could be done best in Washington or London.¹




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
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
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
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
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
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


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Command Center Communications Console

In February the Staff Duty Officer booth in the Camp Smith CINCPAC Command Center was prepared for a new console that would connect with both the Joint Chiefs of Staff Alert Network (JCSAN) and the PACOM Alert Net. Installation of a transceiver was completed the next month and mobile radio hand sets to contact the Command Center, and through it the JCS, were provided for J00, J01, J02, and J3 during periods when these officers were in transit and thus not available at office or home telephone sets. Although the system permitted continuous voice contact with JCS, there were some

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1. BUDOCKS ltr ser 00264, 27 Aug 1962 (S)
 2. CNO ltr OP-443D1/ngo ser 3966P44, 30 Aug 1962 (S)
 3. CNO ltr OP-443C/cs ser 03051P44, 4 Mar 1963 (S)
 4. CINCPAC 212219Z Sep 1963 (S)

blind spots on the north and windward side of Oahu.

Through the installation of a cordless switchboard and direct four wire connections to the command centers and quarters of Component Commanders, they also were brought into the JCSAN network. It was expected that direct telephone contact with WESTPAC forces would be possible through the new communications console upon completion of the Transpacific Marine Cable near the end of 1964. In the interim period, voice communication with WESTPAC forces was maintained with high frequency single sideband radio.

CINCPAC ADP System

CINCPAC formulated operational requirements for an electronic computer system in mid-1959.¹ The following May, recognizing that the design, development and installation of an ultimate ADP system was several years in the future, he requested that CNO provide an interim ADP system for Kunia, to be operational no later than 1 April 1961. In response to this request a Navy-owned IBM 704 computer was provided by the Bureau of Ships out of RDT&E OPCONCTR funds. Installation at Kunia was completed in May 1961 and the computer was in almost continuous use through 1963. A leased IBM 1401 computer was installed in March 1962 to satisfy burgeoning requirements. and, although not truly integrated, the two computers were considered to be an "Interim Phase I System." These computers, which were obtained originally for development, training and indoctrination purposes, fulfilled their intended mission and additionally provided operational support to nuclear operations, intelligence, communications, logistics and war gaming functions. Except for scheduled maintenance periods or malfunctions of short duration, they were operated continuously (24 hr/day, 7 days/week) beginning in mid-1962. Usage by CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT staffs steadily increased from the time of their installation, reaching a peak in the latter half of 1963 when less than one hour per month of available IBM 704 time was unused.

1. CINCPAC ser 000174, 2 Sep 1959 (TS)

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Even before the installation of the Interim Phase I system, CINCPAC recognized that its speed, capacity, and reliability would be inadequate for his needs. In August 1960, CINCPAC stated his need for a Phase II system of several inter-related computers, subdivided into several separate and secure subsystems capable of meeting his operational requirements and those of CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, and CINCPACAF.¹ Extensive studies were undertaken by other naval activities to determine equipment requirements for an ultimate or Phase II ADPS. In January 1961, CINCPAC restated and summarized his operational requirements, approved an operations and usage concept, approved a proposed equipment procurement plan, and set a March 1963 date for installation of an Interim Phase II system.^{2, 3} Acting on a CINCPAC request, CNO, in January 1961, requested the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to provide technical advice on the problem of tying the computers to an electronic switching network.⁴ A DDR&E Advisory Group met and recommended that at the earliest possible date at least one CDC 1604 computer or equivalent and allied equipment should be made available to CINCPAC.⁵

In March 1961, BUSHIPS designated Control Data Corporation as the prime contractor to furnish computers and peripheral equipment, and to design the integrated Phase II system.⁶ Expenditure of \$3,800,000 was initially authorized for procurement of a Phase II system consisting of four large, solid state, CDC 1604A computers and five smaller CDC 160A computers. A central control console (CCC) and a subsystem selection switch (SSSS) would enable the system to perform as an integrated system in which the computers could communicate one with another. Using the CCC and the SSSS, subsystems could be set up within milli-seconds, the subsystem configurations lasting for minutes, hours, days, or years depending on the function

1. CINCPAC ser 0624, 17 Aug 1960 (C)
2. CINCPAC ser 0007, 9 Jan 1961 (Downgraded to SECRET)
3. DTMB Secret Report G1191, Aug 1960 (S)
4. CNO ser 00110P94, 24 Jan 1961 (S)
5. DDR&E Advisory Group on COMINT/COMSEC/ELINT Report, 27 Jan 1961 (S)
6. BUSHIPS ser 1734A-047, 21 Mar 1961 (C)

to be performed. The entire system could be operated automatically from the CCC, with any one of the CDC 160A computers acting as the system management director.¹ When completely installed, Phase II computers could operate as nine independent computers, in subsystems, or as one massive system.

In December 1962 BUDOCKS allocated \$6,946,545 for technical collateral and \$3,125,000 for construction of the Phase II increment at Kunia.² The CINCPAC subsystem was installed and began operating for test purposes on 1 May 1963. Installation of the final Phase II system was scheduled to begin on 23 March 1964, and expected to be operational for test purposes by 1 June 1964 and capable of providing extensive support to the staff by 1 August 1964. The IBM 704/1401 system was scheduled for phase-out about 1 November 1964.

One CDC 1604A computer was estimated to be approximately eight times faster and more efficient than the installed IBM 704. The Phase II system capacity ultimately would be 25 times that of the existing system.

Requirements for the security of special intelligence information and other highly sensitive data were established by CINCPAC in 1960.³ The entire system was to be located in a secure area, within a facility where all access would be controlled. In order to meet the additional requirements for the handling and processing of sensitive data, selected items of equipment (one CDC 160A and peripheral devices) were to be physically isolated from the main computer room. This secure subsystem would have access to all information stored in the other computers or subsystems; however, output from this system could not pass into the main system. The Director, National Security Agency gave tentative approval to two technical proposals for a secure subsystem in January 1962 and U.S. Intelligence Board approval was also received; however, final NSA approval would not be made until installation was completed and security features evaluated.^{4,5}

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1. BUSHIPS ser 696C-545, 8 Aug 1962 (U)
 2. BUDOCKS ser 0741, 6 Dec 1962 (C)
 3. CINCPAC ser 00319, 24 Jun 1960 (S)
 4. CNO ser 01P36, 5 Jan 1962 (C)
 5. CNO ser 06P36, 6 Feb 1962 (C)

PACOM FORCE OBJECTIVES

U.S. Forces

As in previous years, the JCS asked CINCPAC to furnish to them a list of major force units for assignment to CINCPAC to accomplish the basic undertakings envisaged in JSOP-68. This request, which was received in December 1962, differed from previous requests in that the period for which CINCPAC was to predict the forces required was extended from five to seven years, and the JCS also asked CINCPAC to relate his force requirements directly to specific war plans and basic undertakings. CINCPAC's recommendation for U.S. Forces for PACOM for JSOP-68 was forwarded to the JCS on 12 January.¹ In addition, CINCPAC listed his recommendations for U.S. Forces that would be needed to support the following CINCPAC operation plans: OPLAN 1-63 (general war); OPLAN 27-63 (listed separately were forces for a non-nuclear war in Korea, and for a limited nuclear war in Korea); OPLAN 25-63 (contingency operations in defense of Taiwan); OPLAN 32-63 (limited nuclear operations in Southeast Asia); and additionally for Navy forces, OPLAN 28-61 (antisubmarine warfare and control and protection of shipping).

The U.S. Forces that CINCPAC considered necessary to support JSOP-68 were generally the same as those in his recommendations for JSOP-67. Pointing to the weakness of U.S. ground forces in Southeast Asia, CINCPAC recommended that in FY65 an infantry division be located in Southeast Asia, preferably the Philippines, as a deterrence to further communist expansion in that area. He recognized that the presence of U.S. combat troops would have to be coupled with the announced determination to resist by force any communist encroachment, and that the deployment of a fourth PACOM division would be dependent on terms acceptable to the U.S. and satisfactory to the host country. CINCPAC pointed out that of the three infantry divisions that were available to him, only the theater Army reserve division in

1. CINCPAC ltr 3121, ser 0009, 12 Jan 1963 (TS)

Hawaii could be used in Southeast Asia, since the U.S. command and control of all United Nations forces in Korea could be justified only by the presence of the two U.S. divisions.

To support the infantry division that CINCPAC wanted in the Philippines, he recommended a HAWK battalion, three field artillery battalions and two combat engineer battalions. He also recommended an additional HAWK battalion to be located on Guam and two field artillery battalions to be deployed to Korea in FY66. The two divisions in Korea were scheduled to be reorganized in FY66 as ROAD divisions, which would result in a reduction of 155 howitzer tubes from 30 to 18. CINCPAC recommended two additional battalions to provide Eighth U.S. Army with the badly needed conventional artillery firepower.

As in previous years, CINCPAC recommended substantial increases in ships, aircraft, and personnel to execute the naval missions and tasks that ranged from cold war operations through all limited war situations up to the full use of nuclear weapons in a general war. For FY65 Admiral Felt urged that his Naval force be expanded by 61 ships, including two ASW carriers, 15 destroyers, 17 submarines, three escort ships, six mine warfare ships and 18 amphibious ships. These were needed to meet simultaneously the threat of communist aggression in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, and CINCPAC considered it of paramount importance that these forces be able to frustrate aggression in both areas until the arrival of augmentation forces. For the long term, CINCPAC urged that by FY68 122 ships be added to the PACOM Naval forces. In addition to increases of ships in the categories listed above, CINCPAC recommended three additional attack carriers, two cruisers, two Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarines, and two command ships needed to maintain CINCPAC command and control facilities in the event of a nuclear exchange. The only category in which a reduction was recommended was conventional type submarines.

The principal increases recommended for the PACOM Air Force were six additional tactical fighter squadrons for FY66, two tactical

reconnaissance squadrons in FY67 and an airlift squadron in FY68.

Part VI of JSOP-68, which contained the JCS approved forces for the PACOM, was received by CINCPAC toward the end of April. Although CINCPAC had submitted to the JCS his recommendations for force requirements through FY70, Part VI of JSOP-68 listed requirements only through FY68. In general, the provisions of JSOP-68 were similar to the existing PACOM forces, and did not reflect the increases recommended by CINCPAC.

The following list of forces for the long range period compares the major units contained in Part VI of JSOP-68 with CINCPAC's recommendations:

Major Units for Fiscal Years	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
<u>Army</u>				
Infantry Divisions				
CINCPAC	3	4	4	4
JSOP-68	3	3	3	3
Brigades				
CINCPAC	1	1	1	1
JSOP-68	1	1	1	1
Missile Commands				
CINCPAC	1	1	1	1
JSOP-68	1	1	1	1
Nike Hercules Battalions				
CINCPAC	3 1/2	4 1/2	5 1/2	5 1/2
JSOP-68	3 1/2	4 1/2	5 1/2	5 1/2
Hawk Battalions				
CINCPAC	6	8	8	8
JSOP-68	6	6	6	6
Mauler Battalions				
CINCPAC	-	-	1	4
JSOP-68	-	-	-	1
Field Artillery Battalions				
CINCPAC	4	7	9	9
JSOP-68	4	4	4	4
Engineer Combat Battalions				
CINCPAC	1	3	3	3
JSOP-68	1	1	1	1
Little John Battalions				
CINCPAC	1	1	1	1
JSOP-68	1	1	1	1

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Lacrosse Battalions				
CINCPAC	1	1	1	1
JSOP-68	1	1	1	1
Sergeant Battalions				
CINCPAC	1	1	1	1
JSOP-68	1	1	1	1
Pershing Battalions				
CINCPAC	-	1	1	1
JSOP-68	-	1	1	1
Special Forces Groups				
CINCPAC	2	2	2	2
JSOP-68	2	2	2	2
Aviation Companies				
CINCPAC	10	10	7	7
JSOP-68	11	11	7	7
<u>Navy</u>				
Cruisers				
CINCPAC	8	10	10	10
JSOP-68	8	8	8	8
Command Ships				
CINCPAC	2	2	2	2
JSOP-68	-	-	-	-
Attack Carriers				
CINCPAC	9	10	11	12
JSOP-68	9	9	9	9
ASW Carriers				
CINCPAC	6	6	6	6
JSOP-68	4	4	4	4
G/M Destroyers				
CINCPAC	24	33	40	48
JSOP-68	22	24	32	38
Other Destroyers				
CINCPAC	105	105	105	102
JSOP-68	87	86	80	68
Nuclear Attack Submarines				
CINCPAC	15	20	24	27
JSOP-68	11	12	13	16
Other Attack Submarines				
CINCPAC	44	44	39	34
JSOP-68	36	32	28	26

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
FBM Submarines				
CINCPAC	-	5	6	9
JSOP-68	-	4	6	7
Escort Ships				
CINCPAC	23	25	27	30
JSOP-68	20	15	20	27
Mine Warfare Ships				
CINCPAC	47	50	50	50
JSOP-68	41	41	41	41
Amphibious Ships				
CINCPAC	90	99	99	105
JSOP-68	72	73	73	74
CVA Air Groups (VF, VA, VAH)				
CINCPAC	9	10	11	12
JSOP-68	9	9	9	9
Replacement CVA Air Groups				
CINCPAC	1	1	1	1
JSOP-68	-	-	-	-
CVS Air Groups				
CINCPAC	6	6	6	6
JSOP-68	4	4	4	4
Replacement CVS Air Groups				
CINCPAC	1	1	1	1
JSOP-68	-	-	-	-
ASW Patrol Sqs (VP)				
CINCPAC	19	21	21	21
JSOP-68	15	15	15	15
AEW Barrier Sqs (VW)				
CINCPAC	1	1	1	1
JSOP-68	1	1	1	1
Helicopter Combat Support Sq (HU)				
CINCPAC	1	1	1	1
JSOP-68	1	1	1	1
Special Mission Sqs (VQ, VFP, VAP, VAH, VFAW)				
CINCPAC	6	6	6	6
JSOP-68	6	6	6	7
Fleet Marine Force				
CINCPAC	1	1	1	1
JSOP-68	1	1	1	1
Div/Wing Teams				
CINCPAC	2	2	2	2
JSOP-68	2	2	2	2

Major Units for Fiscal Years	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
<u>Air Force</u>				
Fighter Interceptor Sqs				
CINCPAC	5	5	5	5
JSOP-68	4	4	4	4
Tactical Bomb Sqs				
CINCPAC (Converts to TFS in JSOP-68 FY66)	3	-	-	-
JSOP-68	3	-	-	-
Tactical Fighter Sqs				
CINCPAC	12	18	18	18
JSOP-68	9	12	15	15
Tactical Recce Sqs				
CINCPAC	2	2	4	4
JSOP-68	2	2	4	4
Tactical Missile Sqs				
CINCPAC	2	2	2	2
JSOP-68	2	2	2	2
Airlift Sqs (H)				
CINCPAC	2	2	2	1
JSOP-68	3	3	3	2
Airlift Sqs (M)				
CINCPAC	7	7	7	9
JSOP-68	6	4	4	4
Tactical Tanker Sq				
CINCPAC	1	1	1	1
JSOP-68	1	1	-	-
Combat Support (ECM) Sq				
CINCPAC	2	2	2	2
JSOP-68	Not listed			
Counterinsurgency Sqs				
CINCPAC	3	3	3	3
JSOP-68	Shown but not listed for assignment to PACOM			

CINCPAC Position on Disarmament Proposals

During the preparation of studies on disarmament proposals advanced by the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the JCS asked CINCPAC what effect the proposed reductions in force levels would have on existing PACOM military capabilities, The JCS wanted CINCPAC to consider reductions both with and without withdrawal from Korea, Japan and the Philippines, and his views on suggested changes

in strategy that would result from the reductions. ¹(C)

In his answer, CINCPAC emphasized that the proposed force level reductions would not change the requirement for the existing PACOM base structure, and that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, Japan and the Philippines could prove disastrous to U.S. interests in the Far East. CINCPAC recommended that the U.S. avoid any commitment to disarm in the PACIFIC until both Red China and Russia made a dependable and comparable commitment and that the vital PACOM forward strategy be maintained, with force levels and base structure substantially unchanged, in case the implementation of the first stage of any disarmament agreement would be directed. ²(C)

PACOM Area Requirement for FBM/MRBM Weapons Systems

Early in the year the JCS asked CINCPAC to comment on a JCS study to determine the need for MRBM as a weapon system for use on a world-wide basis. ³ In answer, CINCPAC said that he considered a mixture of Polaris-equipped submarines and a land-based MRBM system would be generally better than either of the two systems alone, and that his recommendations to the JCS for U.S. forces for JSOP-68 had indicated a requirement for 16 FBM submarines and three land-based MRBM squadrons. This requirement was based on an estimated 212 high-threat targets during the 1965-1970 period. These targets were missile sites, air bases and air defense headquarters for which CINCPAC wanted the short flight times of FBMs and MRBMs. Substitution of missiles for certain targeted SAC aircraft and CONUS-based missiles would permit retargeting of the SAC aircraft and missiles against targets requiring the higher-yield weapons. It would not, however, lessen the over-all requirement for manned aircraft in the PACOM since there would remain 155 non-time sensitive SIOP targets to be hit by aircraft in addition to those SIOP targets that required restrike. ⁴

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1. JCS 9111 DTG 161645Z Mar 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 151740Z Apr 1963 (TS)
 3. JCS 8309 DTG 191741Z Jan 1963 (TS)
 4. CINCPAC 262122Z Jan 1963 (TS)

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Deletion of Lacrosse Missiles

As a result of an early FY64 DA proposal to delete all Lacrosse missile units, the JCS asked CINCPAC for his reaction. After coordinating with CINCUSARPAC, CINCPAC notified the JCS that the loss of the Lacrosse battalion in Korea, the only such unit in PACOM, was acceptable as a result of force improvements that had occurred or that were scheduled.

Free World Forces

On 29 April, CINCPAC forwarded to his Component Commanders, COMUS Korea and COMUS Japan, and to his MAAG Chiefs planning guidance concerning military force objectives for PACOM countries that were either allies or potential allies of the U.S. The force objectives for the mid-range period - from 1 July 1957 to 30 June 1970 - represented those forces that CINCPAC considered desirable to support U.S. military strategy during the period, and to be reasonably attainable by the various countries.

In establishing a general strategic priority among the ten countries, CINCPAC explained that he did not consider that Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos participated sufficiently in the Free World interests to warrant the assignment of a general priority, or the establishment of military force objectives. For these four countries he listed a general existing force structure and force guidelines for planning during the mid-range period. For other PACOM countries, CINCPAC listed the existing forces as of 1 July 1962, and desired objectives for the period from July 1967 until July 1970. This list also indicated those changes that CINCPAC recommended before July 1967, and those for the following three years. The recommended changes in force strength generally were those to modernize PACOM forces by eliminating AAA battalions and replacing them with NIKE and HAWK battalions, or by converting fighter squadrons to aircraft that would satisfy the need for all weather fighter squadrons. A major recommendation for forces of the Republic of Vietnam favored

additional naval patrol craft.¹ (S)

Reductions in GRC Force Levels

During September the JCS asked CINCPAC to review the need for maintaining the GRC forces at existing levels under conditions that recognized the need for GRC forces as a strategic reserve, but did not anticipate their use elsewhere in Southeast Asia except in case of a large scale communist attack. The JCS also suggested that there would be a reduction in MAP resources between FY64 and FY69.²

CINCPAC explained that existing GRC Army force levels represented the forces required to defend Taiwan, the Penghus and other off shore islands, and were not developed for other purposes. An exception, however, was six reduced strength infantry divisions that had received MAP support since 1958 for economic and political, rather than military, considerations. In view of the anticipated decline in available MAP resources, CINCPAC recommended that MAP support be withdrawn from these six reduced strength infantry divisions, despite Chiang's objections and strong desire to retain the designation of these old units. All other ROC Army units, Admiral Felt recommended, should be kept to support the ROC, and as a strong deterrent to Red Chinese aggression.

The guide lines for GRC naval force objectives that CINCPAC set forth in April 1963 were still considered valid but, under the conditions outlined in the JCS request for a review of the GRC forces, CINCPAC recommended a decrease in destroyer objectives from 15 to 12, in LSTs from 28 to 22, and that six PT boats and a SEAL unit be deleted from the force objectives.³ However, because of the Red Chinese capability to mine the coastal waters of Taiwan, the Penghus, and approaches to the offshore islands, CINCPAC urged increasing the minesweepers force objectives from 10 to 15, and suggested that one minecraft support ship be added.

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1. CINCPAC ltr 3121 ser 00394 Apr 1963 (S)
 2. JCS 2499 DTG 132307Z Sep 1963 (TS)
 3. CINCPAC ltr 3121 ser 00394, 29 Apr 1963 (S)

As far as the GRC Air Force was concerned, Admiral Felt recommended that no change be made as long as the Communist Chinese Air Force remained a constant and genuine threat.¹

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

Five new CINCPAC Operation Plans were prepared during 1963 to meet CINCPAC's broadened and changing responsibilities. At the beginning of 1963 there were 16 effective plans; 21 were in force at the end of the year. Four of the new plans were prepared to support contingency actions in Southeast Asia. Three of these were OPLANs 34-63, 85-63, and 99-64, which are not discussed in detail in this Command History because of security reasons. Another new plan (35-63) was developed to deter aggression by Indonesia, and the fifth (64-64) was a plan to establish a training mission in Laos.

Of the remaining plans, only minor revisions were made to update the following nine plans, all of which have been described fully in previous CINCPAC Command Histories: OPLAN 1-64, General War Plan; 22-60, Support of Internal Uprisings and Revolutions; 23-64, Military Operations in Hong Kong; 26-60, Control of Maritime Traffic; 31-61, Pacific Mining Plan; 60-62, Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation Plan; 70-61, PACOM Cold War Plan; 82-62, Augmentation and Support for CARIBCOM; and the 90 series of plans that were prepared in support of operations to defend Berlin.

The PACOM program for preparing and reviewing the plans that were maintained to carry out CINCPAC's mission and tasks was set forth in an instruction that was revised and promulgated on 12 November 1963.²

- CINCPAC OPLAN 25-64: Defense of Taiwan/Penghus
- CINCPAC OPLAN 27-64: Defense of Korea

Similar changes were made to both of the above plans recognizing,

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- 1. CINCPAC 262231Z Sep 1963 (TS)
 - 2. CINCPAC Inst 003020.1F, 12 Nov 1963 (S)

in each case, that although Annex E provided target lists suitable for initial non-nuclear strike planning, there would be additional targets. The changes authorized appropriate commanders to plan for the destruction of these additional targets, which could be done without the restrictions of the target selection criteria set forth in Appendix IV to Annex E to each plan. The changes also directed appropriate commanders to be prepared to use classified munitions when authorized by CINCPAC.^{1, 2}

CINCPAC OPLAN 28-64: ASW and Control and Protection of Shipping

Mid-year changes to this plan incorporated new instructions on PACOM anti-submarine warfare readiness conditions in the Concept of Operations Annex. Additionally, these changes accurately delineated the areas of responsibility for ASW and control and protection of shipping among CINCPAC, CANCOMARPAC and the ANZAM countries, and changed the year number of the plan. (U)

CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64: Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia

This unilateral capabilities plan, revised and promulgated in September 1962, remained CINCPAC's principal plan for the defense of mainland Southeast Asia up to the point of general war. On 2 January 1963 the JCS approved the revised plan with a few changes, the most significant of which concerned CINCPAC's estimate of air and sea lift requirements set forth in Appendix 1 to Annex F. The JCS said that the estimated lift requirements indicated a significant shortage existed in U.S. controlled military and commercial passenger and cargo sealift and military airlift capability. The JCS also wanted their Joint Staff (J4) to undertake a detailed review, in coordination with CINCPAC.³ When this study was completed early in April, the JCS recommended modifications to be incorporated in transportation tables as they were revised during the year. Most of the changes had

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000295, 15 Aug 1963 (TS)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000327, 5 Sep 1963 (TS)
3. JCS SM 1448-62, 2 Jan 1963 (S)

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been completed at the end of the year. ¹ (S)

Three other modifications were also important. One of these required the development of a CBR warfare annex, which CINCPAC completed soon thereafter. In another change, the JCS deleted an armored cavalry regiment, which was unavailable, and substituted a mechanized brigade. Although aware that the armored cavalry unit was not available, CINCPAC continued to show it as a requirement in JSOP-68, and had listed it for the same reason in OPLAN 32-63, because it was more suitable for operations in Southeast Asia than the larger and heavier mechanized brigade. The other important change required by the JCS was the deletion of five airmobile companies because they were unavailable. (S)

During August CINCPAC published a change to recognize the Tactical Air Command's responsibility for providing special air warfare forces in support of the plan, and designated the Commander, 2d Air Division as the AF Component Commander for Phase IV. Previously the plan provided that the Commander 13th Air Force could be designated as the AF Component Commander. The Change also revised target lists to reflect recent intelligence. ² (S)

During October, CINCPAC worked out an agreement with CINCSTRIKE for the latter and the CG III U.S. Army Corps to coordinate planning directly with CINCUSARPAC in the development of those supporting plans for CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64 for which the CG III U.S. Army Corps was responsible. CINCPAC authorized the two headquarters to deal directly with COMUSMACV only when CINCUSARPAC determined it to be necessary, a solution that would free COMUSMACV of most planning details. ³

During the year the plan was revised to include the latest intelligence and to agree with existing capabilities, and then republished as OPLAN 32-64. Except for minor changes and less Annexes E and N, which were maintained separately, the JCS approved the

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1. JCS SM 475-63, 10 Apr 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00869, 17 Aug 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 162313Z, Oct 1963 (TS)

revised plan in November. ¹

At the end of the year, CINCPAC had completed transportation tables for planning involved in Phase II, both Laos and RVN; other transportation planning was underway. (U)

OPLAN 33-62: U.S. Military Operations against North Vietnam

The basic plan remained essentially unchanged but, during April, CINCPAC asked his Component Commanders and COMUSMACV to take a close look at their plans prepared in support of OPLAN 33-62. Admiral Felt wanted these commanders to give particular attention to tasks assigned to their subordinate commanders, and to the status of their planning for accomplishing those tasks. Specific instructions were contained in CINCPAC's message 200404Z of April 1963 (TS), but the details are not included in this history. In light of these instructions, the three Component Commanders reviewed their supporting plans, and made necessary revisions. COMUSMACV worked closely with the GVN forces coordinating the supporting plans that were being prepared by the air units and by the Special Forces Group, Vietnam.

CINCPAC OPLAN 35-63: Operations to Deter Aggression by Indonesia

The tendency on the part of the Indonesian government to extend its influence, a policy that proved successful during 1962, prompted the JCS in February 1963 to ask CINCPAC for a plan to deter or counter operations on the part of that country to expand. U.S. concern was aggravated by Indonesia's opposition to the proposed formation of the Federation of Greater Malaysia. It was considered possible that Indonesia might use overt force to dissuade Malaya, Sarawak and North Borneo from creating a federation that would challenge Indonesia's domination of the area. ²

A unilateral capabilities plan, CINCPAC OPLAN 35-63 provided only for military operations of a deterrent nature that PACOM forces

1. JCS SM 1338, 6 Nov 1963 (TS)
2. JCS 8565 DTG 091514Z, Feb 1963 (TS)

would direct against Indonesia. All operations were expected to be under conditions short of hostilities, and were planned for U. S. unilateral action which was not intended to preclude participation by other allied forces.

The courses of action, that could be used singly or in combination, included reconnaissance and surveillance operations, unilateral and bilateral exercises, harassment, intercept, and quarantine operations.¹ The JCS approved the plan in July.²

CINCPAC OPLAN 62-64: Emergency Relief to Insular Areas

This plan, formerly entitled the Disruption of Shipping Plan, was intended to insure the shipment of emergency supplies to civilian inhabitants of Pacific islands in case of a shipping strike. A revision to this plan incorporated minor changes, and the title was changed to preclude confusing it with CINCPAC's OPLAN 26-61 (Control of Maritime Shipping), and OPLAN 28-64. The basic plan remained unchanged.³ (C)

CINCPAC OPLAN 64-64: Establishment of U. S. Supply and Training Mission, Laos

During June, Admiral Felt directed his staff to prepare a plan for setting up a military advisory group in Laos, either prior to, or concurrently with the introduction of U. S. or SEATO military forces into Laos. The plan directed, on order, the movement of Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand into Laos and immediate augmentation by 15 12-man MTTs, a 20-man USAF advisory element, and advisory personnel for FAR and KL headquarters. The plan also provided that the advisory element necessary to stiffen the FAR/KL forces be furnished on a crash basis, while recognizing the possibility of assigning additional advisors for a training base, a schools complex, and a

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1. CINCPAC OPLAN No 35-63, CINCPAC ser 000182, 25 May 1963 (TS)
 2. JCS SM 959-63, 31 Jul 1963 (TS)
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 0526, 30 Jul 1963 (C)

basic logistic system. For political reasons, the U.S. advisory group in Laos would be known as the U.S. Supply and Training Mission, Laos (U.S. SATM, Laos) rather than as a MAAG.

OPLAN 99-64: Actions to Stabilize Situation in Laos

Among other emergency planning that was done during the June crisis in Laos was one concept of military actions in Southeast Asia that recognized North Vietnam as the source of the difficulties in Laos. Planning along this approach was directed by the Secretary of Defense and passed to CINCPAC by the JCS on 22 June 1963. The JCS directed preparation of a plan by which the U.S. would take the initiative to conduct punitive and crippling military operations against North Vietnam to end that country's support of aggression in Laos, or in other Southeast Asia areas. The JCS envisaged that under the new plan the U.S. would initiate hostilities when the piecemeal military advance of the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh forces reached the limit of U.S. toleration. The JCS specified that the new plan should provide for air and naval action followed by whatever other actions might be necessary later, but that initially the U.S. should avoid engaging its forces in areas other than North Vietnam.¹

The implementation of this plan would be preceded by preliminary phases of a political and military program that provided for a build-up of anti-communist forces in Laos by stretching the Geneva Agreements, and the non-combatant use of U.S. Forces that would involve certain violations of the Geneva Agreements.

As developed, the plan provided for actions, primarily by air and naval forces, of two types - threatening actions, and those of a punitive and crippling nature. The threatening actions were intended to be of a warning and harassing nature but without physical contact. The punitive and crippling actions were to be of varying scope and intensity, including such actions as air and naval gunfire strikes, aerial mining, amphibious and airborne raids, and maritime quarantine operations.

1. JCS 1353, DTG 221631Z Jun 1963 (TS)

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Actions were to be executed on a highly selective basis.

The plan considered the possibility of escalation and assumed the necessity for advance prepositioning and deployment of certain U.S. Forces, and preparations by CONUS and PACOM forces in case the operations should be expanded. Although the use of nuclear weapons was not contemplated, U.S. Forces were to be ready with nuclear weapons if the communists made a large scale invasion.¹

The JCS approved the plan in July, subject to minor changes that were subsequently incorporated therein.² A revised and refined version of the plan was issued on 6 September 1963. For additional information on this plan see the Chapter IV section entitled "Proposed Courses of Action to Stabilize the Situation in Laos."

JSOP-69

In June the Joint Chiefs of Staff commenced preparation of JSOP-69 and, at that time, asked for CINCPAC's comments on the critical planning factors, assumptions and situational analyses, in order to improve the method used to derive and justify the forces section of the JSOP.³ This was the first time that unified commanders had been asked to contribute their views for the JSOP. (U)


Besides suggesting changes in several planning factors - those connected with capabilities of Red Chinese and North Vietnamese forces, and with some U.S. forces, CINCPAC made recommendations in connection with the analysis of several situations. He suggested that Polaris missiles might be more economical than Minuteman and Hound Dog missiles against certain targets; that the JSOP should include in its Force Tabs sufficient Naval forces to extend the barrier line for early warning of the manned bomber threat from Midway to the Aleutians; that requirements for general purpose forces be based on the assumption that hostilities would commence in Southeast Asia, followed by a second contingency in another theater; that there be an

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1. CINCPAC OPLAN No. 99-64, CINCPAC Ser 000330, 6 Sep 1963 (TS)
 2. JCS SM 938-63, 29 Jul 1963 (TS)
 3. JCS 1258 DTG 142213Z, Jun 1963 (U)


analysis of general purpose forces to conduct counter-insurgency operations in Southeast Asia before overt communist aggression commenced; and that there be a detailed analysis of the theater airlift needed for contingency operations in the PACOM area. ¹


During August the JCS asked commanders of unified and specified commands to submit regional sections for Annex J, JSOP-69, for their respective areas of responsibility with recommendations for priorities, tasks and force requirements on both a regional and detailed country basis. ² After receiving recommendations from his representatives in the countries involved, and from his Component Commanders, CINCPAC submitted the requested information, including newly developed mission statements for Cambodia, Laos, New Zealand, Australia, and Malaysia. ³ (C)

In another request, the JCS asked CINCPAC to submit his views on U.S. force level requirements and rationale required to accomplish the strategy in JSOP-69, Sections I through V. ⁴ CINCPAC's response included force objectives, force expansion (general war) for PACOM M-Day of 1 July 1968, augmentation force for contingency operations in Southeast Asia, and supporting rationale. ⁵ (C)




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



"MOVEMENT
OF NUCLEAR
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Development of War Game Models: CINCPAC developed and was continuing to improve computer war game models that would serve as tools for evaluating operational plans. These models were a mathematical representation of a logical progression of events under assumed conditions of war.

Development of the following seven models had been either completed or was in progress:

Theater Battle Model - The Army developed this model for the JCS to assist in the assessment of commanders' requirements for nuclear weapons and current concepts of employment of such weapons in a representative nuclear war environment. CINCPAC's part in the development of this model was limited to suggestions for making it more adaptable to PACOM conditions, and to furnishing seven officers

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to help with a two month model test game that was conducted in Washington.¹ Certain routines from this model concerned with interaction of naval forces were used in the SIOP-64/RISOP-64 war game.


Battle Simulation Model - This CINCPAC designed model simulated the interaction of offensive and defensive forces in the air battle during the initial phases of a general war. Completed early in the year, the model was used in a test game, to verify correct operation and to train personnel in its use. These tests disclosed certain areas that required improvement, and which were subsequently corrected. Although the results of a preliminary test indicated that all errors had been corrected, a more comprehensive test was conducted


This model was being modified for use on the 1604A computer, when that system would become operational.


*Fleet Anti-Air Warfare Model - Designed to simulate air attacks against carrier task forces and the defense of the task force by planes, missiles and guns, this model was due to be completed in mid-1964.


*Submarine Detection Model - This model was due in mid-1964 to simulate the detection of transiting submarines by listening devices and search aircraft.

1. CINCPAC 220207Z May 1963 (S)









OPERATION OF U.S. FORCES

Naval Patrols Along the Communist Coasts

During 1962 U.S. Naval Forces conducted JCS approved patrols along communist shores to test the reaction of Red Chinese and Russian forces. The first patrol of 1963 was carried out by the USS SHELTON, which departed Keelung on 28 January and proceeded via the Tsushima Strait, the Sea of Japan and Gulf of Tartary between Sakhalin Island and the Russian coast. Keeping 20 miles off the Russian coast, the ship then returned to Keelung, arriving 9 February. During much of the time, the SHELTON was under surveillance by

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1. CINCPAC J35 Study Nr. 63-1, Fixed Base Force Survival Study, Jan 1963 (TS)

Soviet aircraft and surface units. In one instance, a Soviet IL-28 aircraft made repeated passes at 5,000 to 15,000 feet while opening and closing the bomb bay doors. 1, 2, 3

A second patrol, conducted by the USS BAUSELL, departed Subic Bay on 19 February to patrol Indonesian waters. As a cover for this operation, visits to Djakarta and Darwin were arranged. After visiting Djakarta, the BAUSELL departed for Darwin on 6 March by way of Java, Flores Seas, and Wetar Strait, arriving at Darwin on 11 March. The ship remained in Darwin from 11 until 14 March, returning via Banda Sea, Manipa Strait, Molucca and Celebes Seas, Sibutu Passage, Sulu Sea, Balabac Strait and Palawan Passage. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8

The third patrol was conducted by the USS WILTSIE, which departed Keelung on 17 June and proceeded via the Tsushima Strait to the Gulf of Tartary. The WILTSIE detected numerous unidentified aircraft, sighted an IL-28 and was overflown by two TU-16's which made many passes over the ship. On 25 June the WILTSIE was intercepted and taken under surveillance at close range by a Kotlin class DD. Later that day the WILTSIE was directed to terminate the patrol, and it returned to Keelung arriving on 29 June. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13

A fourth patrol involving no unusual incidents was made by the USS SOMERS, which departed Keelung on 19 August on a route east of the main Japanese Islands and the Kuriles to a position just east of Petropavlovsk. On the return run the SOMERS entered the Sea of Japan via the Tsugaru Straits, and on to Keelung via the Tsushima

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1. CTU 72.1.2 DTG 040740Z Feb 1963 (S)
 2. CTU 72.1.2 DTG 050325Z Feb 1963 (S)
 3. CTU 72.1.2 DTG 060155Z Feb 1963 (S)
 4. CINCPACFLT 092131Z Feb 1963 (TS)
 5. COMSEVENTHFLT 240530Z Feb 1963 (TS)
 6. CINCPACFLT 272157Z Feb 1963 (TS)
 7. COMSEVENTHFLT 030458Z Mar 1963 (TS)
 8. Ltr, CO USS BAUSELL (DD845), 19 Mar 1963, In CINCPAC J3 files (TS)
 9. CINCPAC 220423Z May 1963 (S)
 10. CTU 72.1.2 DTG 231100Z Jun 1963 (S)
 11. CTU 72.1.2 DTG 241150Z Jun 1963 (S)
 12. CTU 72.1.2 DTG 251236Z Jun 1963 (S)
 13. CTU 72.1.2 DTG 261140Z Jun 1963 (S)

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Straits.^{1, 2}

During the period 27 September - 7 October the USS BLUE conducted a patrol in the northern part of the Yellow Sea where it encountered five Chinese Communist naval ships including a Kaibokan II class PF, a PC, an AKL, a Kronstadt class PC and a Gorky class DD. The latter ship gave the BLUE many visual warnings and the Chinese Communist Foreign Office also issued serious warnings concerning this patrol.^{3 (S)}

On 15 December, the USS JOHN R. CRAIG conducted a surveillance patrol of the Paracel Islands. As on previous patrols of this area, flashing light warnings were observed.⁴

Efforts to Collect Intelligence of Soviet Missile Tests

The U. S. pursued its intelligence collection effort during 1963 against the Soviet long range missile tests conducted in the mid-Pacific area. The first 1963 sighting by a U. S. aircraft of Soviet Missile Range Instrumentation Ships occurred on 5 May when the SIBIR, SAKHALIN and the SUCHAN were discovered midway between the Aleutian and Hawaiian Islands, and heading for the mid-Pacific area.⁵ The JCS immediately directed CINCPAC to take appropriate actions involved in the collection effort, and CINCPAC designated the USS WILHOITE (DER 397) as the ship to be fitted for the mission of collection.⁶ Since the operations were to be conducted in the vicinity of Johnston Island, CINCPAC asked, and received from CJTF 8, Washington, D. C., permission to use the island to support the operations.⁷ The USS WILHOITE sailed on 10 May and gained contact with the Russian ships on 13 May. The same day a foreign technology division (FTD) C-54 aircraft arrived at Hickam AFB to take part in the same operation. By 14 May, all forces were in place and -----

1. CINCPACFLT 190004Z Jul 1963 (S)
2. CINCPACFLT 190226Z Jul 1963 (S)
3. USS BLUE ltr ser 001 (CPR 5003983-63), 7 Oct 1963 (S)
4. USS JOHN R. CRAIG 151020Z Dec 1963 (S)
5. CTF 93, 050931Z May 1963 (S)
6. JCS 1786-63 DTG 062249Z May 1963 (TS)
7. CJTF 8 WASH DC 081713Z May 1963 (S)

communications were established.

On 15 May, the FTD C-54 moved its base to Johnston Island, and daily surveillance flights by SP-2E aircraft from Johnston continued until the end of May. At the same time, the USS WILHOITE maintained observations and submitted daily situation reports. On 16 May the Russian ships moved to a formation indicating that a missile was expected, but nothing happened on that date. Again on 18 May the ships moved into formation and U.S. collection units in the area observed partial glow of two missile reentries at about 181532Z and 181542Z. Intelligence concerning these missiles was limited by unfavorable weather to telemetry. Another missile was observed 251542Z. All units were on station and excellent ELINT and optical information was recorded. ^{1, 2} (S)

The Russian ships departed station on 26 May, and as soon as it became apparent that the tests were completed, CINCPAC directed the return of the U.S. forces to normal operational control. (S)

The Soviet ships moved northward and by early June were in an obvious position for observation. This was confirmed with the launching of Vostok 5 and 6 on 14 and 16 June respectively and their recovery on 19 June. On 21 June, when it became evident that the Soviet ships were closing the area known as the "northern box", CINCPACFLT directed the WILHOITE to take up surveillance once again, ordered aircraft deployment to Midway, and activated standby communications. ³ On 28 June the Soviets fired an ICBM that was observed by ELINT, and by U.S. aircraft optical equipment. (S)

The Soviet Missile Range Instrumentation Ships remained in the northern box and an ICBM was fired on 8 and 9 July. U.S. collection units were on station and obtained excellent results. ^{4, 5} Late on 9 July the Soviet ships got underway toward Petropavlovsk and the next

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1. CTU 92.2.1 DTG 252010Z May 1963 (S)
 2. PACAF 260105Z May 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPACFLT 210219Z Jun 1963 (S)
 4. CTF Nine Two DTG 090843Z Jul 1963 (S)
 5. CTG Nine Two DTG 100943Z Jul 1963 (S)

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day Moscow announced through Tass that the tests were completed.¹ CINCPAC terminated U.S. operations and units returned to normal operational conditions.^{2,3}

U.S. collection efforts were again readied when on 12 November the Soviet ships were sighted at 45-30N 165-32E heading in a southeasterly direction.⁴ The ships continued to an area in the vicinity of Johnston Island where extensive rehearsal operations were conducted in the latter part of November; however, no missiles were fired.^{5,6}

Soviet official news organ, TASS, made an announcement declaring two danger areas in the mid-Pacific for the purpose of testing long range rockets during the period 2 December 1963 to 25 January 1964.⁷ Several rehearsal spreads were conducted by the Soviet Missile Range Instrumentation Ships and ICBM re-entries were observed on 11, 20, and 25 December by U.S. units (two EA3B, one P2V and one DER) involved in the collection effort.^{8,9,10}

Soviet Overflights of the USS KITTY HAWK

Twice during the early part of 1963 the USS KITTY HAWK conducted operations in the north Pacific that drew the attention of Soviet forces. From 27 January until 2 February the KITTY HAWK was in the vicinity of 40N and 150E. During the seven day period, 37 aircraft from the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet Air Force flew near the U.S. ship, although none passed directly over her. Task Group 77.6 gained considerable intelligence from the Russian flights.

Later, from 5 to 12 March, the KITTY HAWK conducted operations to test the ability of the Soviets to detect and track U.S. fleet

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1. CTF Nine Two 110621Z Jul 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 102214Z Jul 1963 (S)
 3. JCS 2774 DTG 121435Z Jul 1963 (S)
 4. CTF 93 DTG 122233Z (S)
 5. CTF 92 210831Z Nov 1963 (S)
 6. CTF 92 261035Z Nov 1963 (S)
 7. CTF 92 300713Z Nov 1963 (S)
 8. CTG 92 130223Z Dec 1963 (S)
 9. CTG 92 210755Z Dec 1963 (S)
 10. CTF 92 260653Z Dec 1963 (S)

units operating in various conditions of controlled electronic emissions. Another purpose of the operations was to determine the Soviet reaction time, once the position of the ship was discovered. On 5 March, TG 77.6, consisting of the KITTY HAWK and four destroyers, set complete electronic silence in the vicinity of 32-40N 138-24E, and then proceeded to 42N and 155E. After two days operations in that area, the KITTY HAWK transmitted on ship to shore HF radio. Five and a half hours after that transmission, the first air reconnaissance activity was noted when two TU-16s were detected at 190 miles to the north, and intercepted at 110 miles. A total of seven TU-16s were detected and intercepted. The Russian aircraft made numerous passes over the KITTY HAWK at 300 to 500 feet.¹

Ship Contacts and Other Overflights

During 1963 U.S. ships plying the Pacific Ocean and other waters in the PACOM area made many contacts with Soviet ships and aircraft. Some of these contacts are reported below.

On 15 February the USS PRINCETON while enroute to the Western Pacific was subjected to many high altitude passes by eight aircraft, and later that same day was overflown by six TU-16s (Badgers) at low altitude.²

On 16 March the USS CONSTELLATION, in the company of two destroyers, detected four Soviet TU-95s (Bears) which made five low altitude passes over the ship.³

In mid-September U.S. TG 70.4, conducting a HUK exercise in the eastern half of the Sea of Japan opposite Honshu, was overflown twice by TU-16 aircraft.⁴

On 4 August the two Soviet SIGINT trawlers DEFLECTOR and GIDROFON were sighted off the U.S. west coast. The USS WEISS and USS BERRY alternately kept the trawlers under surveillance as they proceeded in a southerly direction to locations off Point Mugu and

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- 1. CINCPAC 132133Z Mar 1963 (S)
 - 2. USS PRINCETON DTG 160234Z Feb 1963 (C)
 - 3. CTG 10.5 DTG 161052Z Mar 1963 (S)
 - 4. CTG 70.4 DTG 190844Z Sep 1963 (S)

San Diego where they remained several days. Toward the end of August the trawlers changed course and headed toward the Hawaiian Islands and from there on toward Petropavlovsk. ¹

In August, the USS STATEN ISLAND left Adak and was overflown by two Badgers at position 69-42N 172-26E. The STATEN ISLAND was later stationed in the Soviet North Sea route where it observed nine Soviet ships including two icebreakers and two new missile range instrumentation ships. During this sighting a Soviet HEN type helicopter buzzed the STATEN ISLAND's bridge in a reckless manner. ² Other icebreakers were subsequently sighted including the ADMIRAL MAKAROV, ADMIRAL LAXAREV and the MOSKVA. ^{3, 4}

During the period 8 August to 23 October 1963 the USS REHOBOTH conducted operations in waters adjacent to the Soviet Union gathering oceanographic, bathymetric, geodetic sonar reflectivity and navigational data. ⁵ While operating off Kamchatka Peninsula in August, she made many surface contacts including those with several Soviet DDs, two minesweepers and a cruiser. ^{6, 7, 8, 9} During the same period the REHOBOTH experienced some Soviet aircraft overflights among which were six passes by a TU-16. ¹⁰ In October the REHOBOTH conducted operations in the Sea of Okhotsk and again was overflown by a TU-16. ^{11, 12}

JOINT LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES

Transportation Planning to Support CINCPAC OPLANS

Three CINCPAC operation plans provided for the use of

1. CINCPAC 070042Z Aug 1963 (S)
2. STATEN ISLAND DTG 260005Z Sep 1963 (S)
3. STATEN ISLAND DTG 280225Z Sep 1963 (S)
4. STATEN ISLAND DTG 282330Z Sep 1963 (S)
5. CINCPACFLT 190226Z Jul 1963 (S)
6. REHOBOTH DTG 231315Z Aug 1963 (S)
7. REHOBOTH DTG 231545Z Aug 1963 (S)
8. REHOBOTH DTG 140930Z Sep 1963 (S)
9. REHOBOTH DTG 241045Z Aug 1963 (S)
10. REHOBOTH DTG 190830Z Aug 1963 (S)
11. CINCPAC 212251Z Oct 1963 (S)
12. CTU 73. 8. 1 DTG 140820Z Oct 1963 (S)

substantial U.S. forces to defend strategic areas bordering the Pacific. These were OPLAN 32-64, defense of Southeast Asia; OPLAN 27-63, defense of Korea; and OPLAN 25-64, the defense of Taiwan. Commencing in 1961, CINCPAC prepared detailed transportation tables to provide the logistic support for these plans. Since the plans for the defense of Korea and Taiwan have undergone few significant changes, the transportation tables have required correspondingly minor adjustments. The basic plan for Southeast Asia, however, underwent two changes in 1963 that required complete revisions to the transportation tables to meet the increase in transportation requirements for larger troop lists.

OPLAN 32-64: Revisions made during 1963 were based upon a comparison of logistic capabilities and limitations that was published in draft form and distributed to subordinate commanders late in 1962. Commencing early in 1963, CINCPAC developed typical deployment and resupply requirements for the various phases of the 32 Plan, and then related the requirements to the capabilities previously developed. This comparison revealed certain limiting factors or saturation areas for which it was necessary to compensate in the revisions to the transportation tables.¹

The status of transportation planning for OPLAN 32-64 at the end of the year was: Revised tables for 32-64 Phase II Laos were distributed on 25 September, and for Phase II Vietnam on 18 October. Tables for Phase II Thailand were nearly complete but awaiting concurrence of subordinate commanders. Draft tables for Phase III were distributed in December, and transportation tables for Phase IV were being prepared.

OPLANS 25-63 and 27-64: The elimination of requirements for U.S. logistic force augmentation to support in-country armed forces employed in CINCPAC operation plans was a CINCPAC MAP objective.² Toward this objective, U.S. logistic augmentation personnel

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1. CINCPAC Study of Logistic Support of Operations in Connection with CINCPAC OPLAN 32-63, 15 Jan 1963 (TS) In J41 files.
 2. CINCPAC Supplement to Part I, DOD Military Assistance Manual(U)

requirements to support OPLAN 25-63 were reduced from 3496 to 2313.¹

For OPLAN 27-64, transportation tables were first published at the end of July, and later revised and republished on 12 November.^{2(U)}

Transportation Planning to Support Caribbean Command OPLAN

In planning support for Caribbean Contingency Plan 2-61 during March, COMATS asked CINCPAC if he had a requirement for MATS airlift.³ The next month CINCPAC furnished to COMATS, JCS and CINCARIB the PACOM transportation requirements in support of the Caribbean Command Contingency OPLAN 2-61, and asked the JCS to approve the airlift by MATS of one BLT.⁴ After the JCS asked for reasons for moving the BLT by air, rather than by surface lift as specified in the plan, CINCPAC explained to the JCS that he had asked for airlift for a portion of his forces in order to get extra flexibility.⁵ CINCARIB agreed with CINCPAC's proposal, and the JCS approved the air delivery of one Marine BLT, and asked CINCARIB to include this change in the next revision of the plan.⁶

Other Logistic Planning to Support CINCPAC OPLANs

In the development of airlift schedules for OPLAN 32-64, Phase II Laos, MATS reported difficulties that CINCPAC undertook to resolve through a planning conference held in July.⁷ Representatives from MATS, CINCPAC, and the Component Commanders agreed that, for two units deploying from CONUS, MATS airlift support could be reduced by using organic airlift in movement of Marine Air Group units deploying from Japanese bases, and by using theater floating depot and forward depot stocks to equip air echelons of the 25th Infantry Division.

A month later, representatives from the same commands and from

1. CINCPAC 142037Z Sep 1963 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000267, 25 Jul 1963 (TS)
3. COMATS MAXWP 0303C DTG 082323Z Mar 1963 (S)
4. CINCPAC 032124Z Apr 1963 (TS)
5. CINCPAC 160136Z Apr 1963 (S)
6. JCS 9708 DTG 011724Z May 1963 (S)
7. CINCPAC 132235Z Jul 1963 (S)

CTF-79 and the 315th Air Division met and prepared detailed airlift movement schedules for all mid-Pacific deployments for Phase II Laos. At another planning conference held in November, representatives of CINCPAC, CINCSTRIKE, DA and USAF determined their capability to support the CONUS air augmentation for Phase II Laos. Because of several unresolved problems between MATS and STRICOM, CINCPAC did not expect to receive MATS' detailed support plan until early in 1964. (S)

In other logistic planning connected with OPLAN 32-64, as the result of a September JCS request, CINCPAC prepared a time-phased listing of logistic units required to augment and support U.S. assigned and augmentation forces, and allies for the CINCPAC contingency plan having the heaviest logistic demand.¹ This was OPLAN 32-64, Phases III & IV. Since the JCS had also asked that CINCSTRIKE state his capability to support this requirement, CINCPAC forwarded a copy to him. After reviewing CINCSTRIKE's report, CINCPAC advised the JCS that it indicated shortages of U.S. Army logistic units that could not be reconciled with CINCPAC's requirements. CINCPAC's list had contained Army augmentation units from the STRAC Troop List and Mobilization Troop Program of the Army. Also, based upon the Army Strategic Capabilities Plan, CINCPAC had considered as available those forces under the operational control of CINCSTRIKE and, for large scale limited war operations, STRAF (non-STRAC) and Reserve Component forces. CINCPAC also pointed out that the JSCP provided that logistic planning for limited war should assume the mobilization of up to a million ready reservists without declaration of M-day.

CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the matter of availability of Army logistic units be referred to the Army Chief of Staff for resolution, since the issue appeared to rest upon the validity of Army programming documents that CINCUSARPAC had used in preparing supporting plans to CINCPAC OPLANS. CINCPAC also recommended that the Army clarify as soon as possible what authoritative source

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000358, 2 Oct 1963 (TS)

CINCUSARPAC should use in preparing supporting plans.¹

To be certain that CHJUSMAG Thailand understood the approved air logistic concept for using airfields in Thailand as forward supply points for CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64, CINCPAC explained that he expected to discharge most personnel and equipment at forward delivery bases in Thailand and Laos on a continuing basis, with the transports then going to Don Muang or Saigon for refueling.²

An action connected with OPLANs 32-64 and 27-63 resulted from a JCS request that CINCPAC help his Component Commanders estimate Allied wartime demand for selected U.S. Army procurement of equipment and missiles, Army (PEMA) items in support of these plans. The problem was to estimate the demand beyond that provided by existing or programmed country stocks and war reserves and anticipated demand during the first 90 days of combat, data needed to revise DOD logistic guidance and for a JCS review of the FY65 budget elements.³ In answer to CINCUSARPAC, CINCPAC suggested the Army calculate demand data for the first 90 days of combat by using the Special Logistic Edition of the S2 Summary in conjunction with the listing furnished by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and apply U.S. usage rates.⁴

Logistic Feasibility Evaluation of OPLANs

During November, CINCPAC notified his Component Commanders and commanders of PACOM subordinate unified commands that they were responsible for testing, exercising, and evaluating for logistic feasibility each of their plans developed in support of CINCPAC OPLANs. This was to be done on a continuing basis. The commanders were instructed to emphasize these aspects in all exercises, maneuvers and war games, and to submit to CINCPAC annually a written evaluation of the logistic feasibility of each plan developed to support CINCPAC OPLANs.⁵ (S)

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1. CINCPAC 160048Z Nov 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 220332Z Feb 1963 (TS)
 3. JCS 3583 DTG 152210Z Nov 1963 (S)
 4. CINCPAC 192214Z Nov 1963 (S)
 5. CINCPAC 052335Z Nov 1963 (S)

Support of SEATO OPLANs

During March CINCPAC informed CINCUSARPAC that the U. S. had made firm commitments in connection with SEATO plans to move and support logistically one Pakistan infantry battalion and one infantry brigade group (minus one battalion), and several Philippine units. CINCUSARPAC was asked to incorporate provisions for logistic support of these forces in his unilateral plans in support of applicable SEATO Field Force Commander's plans, and to submit transportation requirements to CINCPAC. ¹

Annual Transportation Study

At the beginning of February the JCS asked CINCPAC to submit a study of transportation requirements and capabilities under general and limited war conditions beginning on 1 January 1964 and 1 January 1969. This was a study that CINCPAC was required to submit annually to provide a basis for a JCS study of world-wide transportation requirements and capabilities for general and limited war. CINCPAC submitted his requirements, which were limited to intra and inter theater movements of initially assigned units and medical evacuations, on EAM cards that listed the tonnage and personnel movements. ^{2, 3}

Logistic Readiness Reporting

As part of the JCS required Joint Operational Reporting Procedures, CINCPAC submitted a quarterly report on the readiness of his non-atomic forces. The third section of this report, known as the REDNON Report, described the readiness of his logistic forces. In June the JCS eliminated the third section of this report and asked CINCPAC to submit a separate report, to be called the REDLOG Report, to describe the logistic readiness and staying power of forces in the event any CINCPAC OPLAN would be implemented. CINCPAC's reports were based on the separate reports of his three Component

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1. CINCPAC 261906Z Mar 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00342, 11 Apr 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00363, 16 Apr 1963 (S)

Commanders, each of whom was required to estimate his logistic readiness to implement general war and contingency plans, the logistic factors affecting the staying power of his forces in the event any plan was implemented, and the major logistic deficiencies. ¹ (U)

Using the new format, CINCPAC submitted a special report for Exercise KEY CHAIN. ² The last REDLOG Report submitted in 1963, which covered the third quarter of the year, set forth the days of supply by class (except POL) for each Service, as follows: (U)

<u>Army</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>V</u>			
EUSA	129	66	66	103			
USARYIS	118	96	96	104			
25th Inf Div	112	67	67	85			
<u>Navy</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>IIA</u>	<u>IV</u>	<u>IVA</u>	<u>V</u>	<u>VA</u>
1st Fleet	49	49	120	90	70	100	120
7th Fleet	109	143	105	90	140	100	120
FMFPAC	82	120	90	75	75	95	70
<u>Air Force</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>II/IIA</u>		<u>IV/IVA</u>	<u>V/VA</u>		
5th AF	90	30		90	90		
13th AF	90	30		90	90		

CINCPAC stated that all logistic units assigned to the PACOM were ready to perform their assigned missions. CINCPAC listed certain limitations that affected the ability of these units to perform their missions. These included inadequate logistic facilities in Korea; poor embarkation facilities in Okinawa; inadequate LOC, ports, airfields and POL pipeline for OPLAN 32-64; insufficient field maintenance support of F-105 aircraft at Osan; shortage of some items of ROKA ammunition reserves; insufficient logistic forces assigned to USARPAC; funding shortages for the Pacific Fleet that affected allowances of materiel, munitions, equipage and spare parts; and the staying power of PACAF F-105 aircraft due to a shortage of external wing tanks and multiple ejector racks.

CINCPAC's over-all estimate was that the logistic status of

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1. Change 15 to JOPREP, JCS Pub 6 (U)
 2. CINCPAC 250217Z Jun 1963 (U)

PACOM operational forces would accomodate assigned missions of any one CINCPAC OPLAN, provided planned logistic augmentation forces (contingency plans only) were forthcoming from CONUS.

Theater Airlift

CINCPAC's ability to carry out his mission depended upon being able to move quickly troops and supplies across vast areas of the Pacific. During 1963 CINCPAC had for this purpose a total of 94 cargo aircraft under his control. These aircraft were either assigned to the 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo), or were under its operational control. Its assigned aircraft were four squadrons, each having 16 C-130s, of which three squadrons were located at Naha and one at Tachikawa. The 315th AD also exercised operational control of two MATS squadrons of C-124s at Tachikawa, each having 16 aircraft, from the 1503d ATW; and of four C-121s at Tachikawa that were assigned to Detachment A, VR-7 from Moffett Field, California. The 315th also exercised operational control of four C-54 aircraft that were assigned to the 6485th Operation Squadron. CINCPAC controlled the use of these aircraft through the Chief of the Westpac Transportation Office, who was a member of CINCPAC's J4 Staff and located in Tachikawa. He received requests for all West Pacific airlift requirements and controlled the usage of the aircraft through the assignment of mission priorities. (C)

During 1962 the requirements for airlift were so great that the 315th AD was required to overfly its programmed hours by a substantial margin and for an extended period, a condition that CINCPAC corrected toward the end of the year by adjusting priorities and by encouraging the use of MATS services. The problem of overcommitting the 315th AD capability was under control at the beginning of 1963 and throughout the year the average usage of the aircraft was a little more than 95 per cent of its capability. (C)

Proposed Reduction in Airlift Capability: During June the JCS sent to CINCPAC a list of actions that were being considered as a means

of reducing the U.S. flow of gold problem by eliminating expenditures in foreign countries. Included in this list was the proposal to return to the United States one of the C-124 squadrons based at Tachikawa, and one of the C-130 squadrons at Naha.¹ To compensate for this loss of theater airlift, the JCS proposed expanding MATS services, a solution that Admiral Felt opposed because it failed to satisfy the requirements of his contingency plans. Proposals on this subject, (which are discussed in more detail in the section on flow of gold in Chapter V of this Command History) were under consideration during much of the year. Because of the impact that any change in airlift capability had upon CINCPAC's ability to execute war plans and support cold war contingency requirements, these proposals were of vital concern to Admiral Felt. In October, when it appeared that MATS was planning to expand its routes in PACOM, CINCPAC cautioned PACAF, the CSAF, and MATS that he should be consulted before any definite action was taken on extending MATS' PACOM routes.²

At the end of the year a decision on the movement of these units was made and meetings were programmed at PACAF with MATS to determine how and where MATS would be expanded to replace the lost theater airlift capability.

Air Support of Loran-C Chains: The Secretary of Defense committed the Department of the Air Force to continue its support of the Loran station at Iwo Jima, and to assume support of the Marcus Island station.³ Support of the latter station required approximately one C-130 flight a week until the end of the year, and would require one flight every two weeks thereafter. CINCPAC directed the Chief WTO to establish and maintain transportation support as coordinated by the Commander, Far East Section, U.S. Coast Guard, Tokyo.⁴ (U)

MATS ASIF Charges for 315th AD Airlift: CINCPAC learned early in the year that air cargo handled through MATS terminals at

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1. JCS 1325 DTG 210001Z Jun 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 172213Z Oct 1963 (C)
 3. SecDef Memo, 17 Jul 1963 to SecTreas (U)
 4. CINCPAC 1st Ind 4630 ser 2122, 30 Sep 1963 on Com 14 CG Dist ltr ser 31338, 16 Sep 1963 (U)

Tachikawa, Kadena and Clark, but airlifted by non-Airlift Service Industrial Fund aircraft (315th AD planes), was being charged to PACOM shippers as if it had been airlifted in MATS aircraft. MATS confirmed that it followed this procedure.¹ CINCPAC studied the equity of the procedure, but decided that since it was the Services which were being unduly charged, any complaint should come from one of them, and that he would then back their case. No further action was taken during the year. (U)

USOM Use of SEAsia Airlift: COMUSMACV asked that he be authorized to airlift United States Operating Mission cargo and passengers on a non-interference, non-revenue basis as an exception to published CINCPAC Instructions. His reasons included the fact that requirements exceeded local USOM airlift capability, and that the administrative and billing procedures would be too costly if the shipments were handled on a revenue basis. CINCPAC approved this request, provided USOM airlift was restricted to high priority movements on a space available and non-revenue basis, and that USOM continued to use fully all other airlift resources. Existing USOM airlifted tonnage totals were not to be exceeded without further CINCPAC approval.² (U)

Approval of AirEvac Flights: CINCPAC Instruction 4600.3A required that all requests for PACOM airlift to or from areas outside of specified geographical limits had to receive prior approval of CINCPAC. Since administrative and communication delays were unacceptable for emergency aeromedical evacuation flights, CINCPAC advised the Chief WTO that the approval procedure would not apply to such flights.³

Theater Airlift of MAP Cargo: The Chief of the Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT) Burma asked to have MAP cargo moved from Tachikawa and Bangkok to Rangoon by aircraft belonging to the

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1. MATS MAOTR/P 31A96 DTG 312246Z Jan 1963 (U)
 2. CINCPAC 180330Z Jun 1963 (C)
 3. CINCPAC 290301Z May 1963 (U)

315th Air Division. This request ran counter to CINCPAC Instruction 4600.3A, which specified that the use of theater airlift resources to transport MAP cargo on other than a space available basis would be subject to prior CINCPAC approval, and would be granted only if MATS and MSTs could not satisfy the requirement. Since the airlift requirements for Korea and Burma were not then exceeding the existing airlift capability, CINCPAC advised the CSAF and the Chief WTO that airlift to those countries could be furnished as long as the requirements did not increase, and provided the tonnage and number of airframes involved were included in the WTO monthly report. Cargo destined for other countries would require prior clearance.¹ (C)

Airlift for Exercise Dhanarajata: The airlifting of troops who were deployed to Thailand during Exercise Dhanarajata in June was one of the major troop movements during 1963. The month before the deployment commenced, CINCPAC learned that six Composite Air Strike Forces C-130 aircraft were going to be assigned to the operational control of the SEATO air component commander in the exercise. CINCPAC told CINCPACAF that the 315th Air Division would assume operational control of these CASF troop carrier aircraft, an action consistent with PACAF contingency plans.² COMUSMACTHAI asked CINCPAC to reconsider this decision, stating that it would be necessary to cancel airlift agreements with other nations.³ Nevertheless, CINCPAC said the original instructions would stand, since airlift doctrine, implicit in his OPLANS, and implemented in PACAF supporting plans, required that all medium and heavy troop carrier units deployed to PACOM be under the operational control of the theater airlift manager. CINCPAC instructed COMUSMACTHAI to submit his requirements to the Chief, WTO, and said that representatives of other nations should be reminded that U.S. airlift forces would remain under U.S. control in SEATO operations and exercises.⁴

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1. CINCPAC 162124Z May 1963 (U)
 2. CINCPAC 161820Z May 1963 (S)
 3. COMUSMACTHAI E&P 25482 DTG 241031Z May 1963 (S)
 4. CINCPAC 272034Z May 1963 (S)

Prior to the June airlift, extensive coordination took place with participating commands to insure that realistic and accurate June airlift requirements were submitted to the WTO, and that all programmed flights would be used fully during the heavy period of Exercise Dhanarajata requirements.¹ (U)

PACOM Strategic Reserve of Merchant Type Shipping

More than any other U.S. commander in chief, CINCPAC depended upon this means to move personnel and supplies throughout his area of responsibility. Besides the theater airlift that was available to CINCPAC, and which he controlled directly, there were certain ships that the JCS had earmarked for CINCPAC's use to support contingency operations. These ships, known as Strategic Reserve of Merchant Type Shipping, were operated under MSTTS management as directed by CINCPAC. Some of these ships were an integral part of the MSTTS Far East fleet, others belonged to the MSTTS Pacific fleet, or were commercial ships under MSTTS charter. Those ships that the JCS had pre-allocated to CINCPAC for contingency use included 40 ships of the active reserve and 14 LSTs that belonged to the inactive reserve. The active reserve consisted of one heavy lift cargo ship (TAK), three medium cargo ships (CIMA V1), one large tanker (TAO), three small tankers (TAOG), 17 LSTs, 12 standard deep draft cargo ships (TAK) that were chartered by the Maritime Administration but under the administrative control of MSTTS Pacific, and three troop transport ships (TAP), each capable of carrying an average of 3,500 passengers. Some of these ships were manned by American crews, some by a combination of American and Japanese crewmen, and the 17 LSTs by Japanese crews. The 14 LSTs that comprised the inactive reserve were part of the MSTTS Far East nucleus fleet, were assigned to the Commander Naval Forces Japan for custody and maintenance, and were located at Sasebo, Japan. In the event of an emergency, existing plans called for COMSTTS Far East to man these LSTs with foreign personnel.²

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1. CHWTO 375 DTG 290027Z May 1963 (U)
 2. CINCPAC Inst 004000.1, 17 Jul 1963 (S)

Maintaining 17 LSTs in the Active Reserve: Late in 1962 MSTs Far East, and COMSTS in Washington, proposed that some of the 17 active LSTs be placed with the inactive reserve, a suggestion that conflicted with the existing requirement for these ships in the event of an emergency. CINCPAC asked the users to make the maximum use of these ships, and he asked his Component Commanders to review their requirements for contingency operations. These requirements, which were determined to be for 22 LSTs, were submitted to CINCPAC in February 1963, and served as a basis for CINCPAC's recommendation to CNO that all 17 operating LSTs be retained in active service.¹ Accordingly, COMSTS agreed to operate all 17 LSTs until 30 June.² In April, after studying the contingency plan requirements for 22 LSTs, COMSTS concluded that the Far East area cargo shipping requirements would support only 12 of the 17, and that the contingency requirements could not be met unless the 17 active LSTs were retained in a full operating status. He recommended that the CNO authorize a readiness billing to defray MSTs losses that resulted from operating ships that were excess to normal requirements.³

During April and May, the CNO, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV examined in detail the need for LSTs to support contingency OPLANs 32-63 and 27-63, and determined that the requirement was still valid, a conclusion sustained by representatives of all interested agencies who met in Washington on 24 May to discuss service funding for the deficit operation of five of the LSTs. These representatives concluded that DA would provide the funds and that the Navy would initiate a request to OSD for a readiness billing of \$1,500,000. In August the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the 17 LSTs be retained in operating status in the Far East. The JCS considered that 17 LSTs had to be maintained in active service in order to have the necessary 22 vessels in operation by D plus 40 days. In the meantime, an increase in peacetime use had occurred. The entire problem was

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1. CINCPAC 142341Z Feb 1963 (S)
 2. COMSTS 212221Z Feb 1963 (S)
 3. COMSTS ltr ser 0077M32, 11 Mar 1963 (S)

to be reviewed again early in 1964.¹

LSTs for RVN Operations: A partial solution to the problem of maintaining the 17 LSTs in active status without incurring an unacceptable deficit was provided by COMUSMACV who, during January, advised CINCPAC that he needed two LSTs to provide sealift support by moving supplies from Saigon to smaller ports in the northern part of the Republic of Vietnam.² As a result of CINCPAC's request for funding arrangements, COMUSMACV worked out a plan whereby the GVN agreed to finance additional commercial sealift, USOM and MAAG Vietnam budgeted for their shares of the shipping costs, and COMUSMACV's U.S. Service commanders were directed to request the necessary funds from CINCPAC's Component Commanders. COMUSMACV estimated that approximately \$50,000 additional funds would be required monthly to cover RVNAF cargo costs and, in response to his request, CINCPAC asked OASD/ISA to increase MAP funds for RVN by \$200,000 for the remainder of FY63.³ OSD granted approval for CINCPAC to use available Navy MAP funds in this amount.⁴ The two LSTs were made available to COMUSMACV by early April and a MSTS liaison officer arrived at Saigon the same month to coordinate the use of the vessels. In August COMUSMACV reported increased RVN participation in the up-country resupply program and stated the need for full time employment of a third MSTSFE LST.⁵ CINCPAC requested that OASD/ISA provide \$285,000 for requisite funding for the remainder of FY64.⁶ Funds were granted and CINCPAC authorized hire of the third ship early in September.⁷

Forward Floating Depot in Subic Bay

A forward floating depot was established in the Western Pacific

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1. JCS 1612/284-1, 29 Jul 1963 (S)
 2. COMUSMACV MAC J4 0016 DTG 020824Z Jan 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 121945Z Feb 1963 (S)
 4. OASD/ISA DEF 925026 DTG 220131Z Feb 1963 (C)
 5. COMUSMACV MAC J4 6792 DTG 190843Z Aug 1963 (S)
 6. CINCPAC 240414Z Aug 1963 (S)
 7. CINCPAC 072050Z Sep 1963 (S)

area during the summer of 1963. A proposal to store aboard ships sufficient equipment and supplies for an infantry task force was first advanced in 1961 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense who asked that the Army study the matter. CINCPAC was informed in September 1962 that the Department of the Army would set up a floating depot in Subic Bay. Originally planned to support an infantry battle group task force, it was later changed to provide for a brigade size task force.¹ Three Victory class ships (VC2-S-AP3), the last of which arrived at Subic Bay toward the end of July, comprised the floating depot. They contained equipment and supplies for the following units:

- 1 Hq & Hq Company, Inf Division Brigade
- 2 Infantry Battalions
- 1 Field Artillery Battalion
- 1 Engineer Company
- 1 Armored Cavalry Troop
- 1 Mechanized Rifle Company
- 1 Signal Platoon
- 1 Transportation Terminal Service Company

Operational control of these ships was exercised by the Commanding Officer, Military Sea Transport Service, Far East Area in accordance with the desires of CINCUSARPAC, and subject to the overall direction of CINCPAC. Upon implementation of a CINCPAC OPLAN and following the discharge of cargo in the objective area, these ships were to be used to support PACOM forces.

Interservice Supply Support Program for PACOM

The Department of Defense revised its Materiel Interservicing Manual of Procedures effective in June. The new procedures specified by DOD made CINCPAC's Component Commanders responsible for all reporting of interservice supply support agreements (except POL which remained a CINCPAC responsibility). A previous DOD instruction had given to CINCPAC a responsibility that he thought properly belonged

1. DA ltr subj: Forward Floating Depot, ser AGAM-P, 13 Feb 1963 (S)

~~SECRET~~

to the Service commanders. CINCPAC outlined his position on the matter during 1962 and the change represented DOD acceptance of his concept.¹ (U)

Proposal to Extend DSA Activities Overseas

The JCS in November asked for CINCPAC's reaction to a Secretary of Defense report that contained a recommendation that the Defense Supply Agency be extended overseas to handle the disposal of surplus property. DSA had been limited to operations in CONUS.² CINCPAC did not favor extending the DSA into the PACOM, since he considered that the existing arrangements for handling surplus property were satisfactory. However, CINCPAC did concur in the proposed establishment of consolidated sales offices on a country basis and in consolidation of related disposal functions through interservicing.³ (U)

JOINT TRAINING

During 1963 CINCPAC participated in the JCS conducted Exercise KEY CHAIN, conducted planning for the annual general war plans exercise, and conducted several small scale joint training exercises.

The purpose of KEY CHAIN, in which unified and specified commands participated, was to exercise limited war plans. Prior to the exercise the JCS directed the establishment, on an experimental basis, of a world-wide Exercise Control System and in March held a planning conference in Washington which was attended by CINCPAC representatives. After publishing CINCPAC OPLAN Exercise KEY CHAIN, CINCPAC in July held his own planning conference attended by planners representing PACOM service Component Commanders, COMUSKOREA, COMUSJAPAN, COMUSTDC, COMFIRSTFLT and COMSEVENTHFLT.⁴ During this conference, the PACOM Exercise

1. Defense Materiel Interservicing Manual of Procedures, DSAM 4140.1/AFM 67-11/AR 1-38/MCO P7020.5, Mar 1963 (U)
2. JCS 3367 DTG 012225Z Nov 1963 (U)
3. CINCPAC 152035Z Nov 1963 (U)
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 000199, 11 Jun 1963 (TS)

~~SECRET~~

Control System was developed, control scripts and scenarios were prepared, and questions pertaining to the conduct of the exercise were resolved. During the period 7-11 October 1963, all PACOM forces except COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI participated in KEY CHAIN. The JCS terminated the exercise 7 1/2 hours prior to scheduled completion and this premature termination prevented full attainment of exercise objectives by PACOM forces, since no CINCPAC contingency plan had been ordered into execution at the time of exercise completion. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that future exercises of this type be designed to permit exercising of contingency plans for a period of at least two days.

The JCS sponsored general war plans CPX High Heels III initially was scheduled for March 1964, but was rescheduled to September 1964 for execution in conjunction with FALLEX-64/Teamwork.¹ A 72 hour CPX nicknamed DICE DROP was substituted for HIGH HEELS III, which had been scheduled as a seven day exercise, to accomplish the training year 1964 requirement for a General War Plans exercise. DICE DROP was to be conducted in early February 1964.²

In March 1963 the JCS advised CINCPAC of a planned early 1964 exercise nicknamed QUICK RELEASE, which was designed to test the concept of the Department of the Army Forward Floating Depot that was to be established in Subic Bay during the summer. This depot consisted of three Victory-type merchant ships that were altered to serve as a floating depot for equipment and supplies for an infantry battle group task force scheduled for deployment under contingency operations plans.³ CINCPAC made CINCUSARPAC responsible for the exercise. It was scheduled for January 1964 and called for moving a ROAD brigade from Hawaii to Okinawa by air. Individual combat equipment and some other minimum essential equipment would accompany task force troops, but the organizational equipment and basic and prescribed loads would be withdrawn from the three depot

1. JCS 3596 DTG 161650Z Nov 1963 (S)
2. JCS 4011 DTG 141550Z Dec 1963 (S)
3. JCS 9241 DTG 262021Z Mar 1963 (S)

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ships, and used for the three day exercise. Upon completion of the FTX, equipment from the Forward Floating Depot would be returned to the ships, and the brigade troops would be redeployed to Hawaii by air.^{1,2} The primary purpose of the exercise was to test the effectiveness of military response by reducing reaction time through the airlift of task force troops and the concurrent arrival of their equipment.

On 3 June 1963 Exercise JOLLY ROGER 1-63 was conducted at Kunia to exercise the coordination and reporting of nuclear operations using the Joint Operational Reporting System. The Joint Target Intelligence Group was manned throughout the twelve hour exercise by both CINCPAC and component command staffs.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

CINCPAC's operations plans and major decisions were based upon the hard foundation of military intelligence that reflected the complex day-to-day changes within PACOM countries, or within those countries that bordered the PACOM area. The development of the plans and the revisions thereto, the formulation of policies, and often the deployment of U.S. Forces throughout the Pacific were a direct result of intelligence estimates prepared by CINCPAC's J2 Division. Since the intelligence contribution to the development of plans and the solutions to problems are discussed in other parts of this Command History, those intelligence activities are not described in this section. (C)

During 1963 CINCPAC made contributions to SEATO intelligence holdings in accordance with established U.S. and SEATO procedures. Several CINCPAC J2 staff officers represented the U.S. at the ninth meeting of the SEATO Intelligence Committee in Bangkok during November 1963.

Another major intelligence project was the publication of the CINCPAC Weekly Intelligence Digest, which was required reading by all CINCPAC Staff members, and which was distributed to superior and subordinate headquarters. No attempt is made to summarize the

1. CINCPAC 242338Z Apr 1963 (S)
2. CINCPAC 100439Z May 1963 (S)

~~SECRET~~
intelligence studies contained in this publication.

Production of Tactical Target Materials

One of CINCPAC's important intelligence responsibilities was the production of tactical target materials on potential targets. During the year, CINCPAC directed production and/or maintenance of approximately 1800 target materials. These materials included vertical and oblique photographs of the targets, and area orientation charts, information of significance to planners, other intelligence agencies, and to the aircrew that might be assigned the mission of destroying the target. CINCPAC was responsible for revising the target materials and for extending the coverage to possible new targets, but the reproduction work was done by the Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC). The production of target materials was done under the overall supervision of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In accordance with DIA instructions, CINCPAC published a semiannual catalogue that listed all completed target materials that had been produced by FICPAC and by the ~~██████████~~ with whom CINCPAC cooperated on the exchange of information on certain targets.

In addition to the printed catalogue, CINCPAC prepared a preliminary feasibility document for a PACOM Target Materials Catalogue and Production Monitor Schedule which would be used on the Kunia Operational Control Center computer. This schedule was intended to be a management tool to coordinate production of various target material producers - PACAF, PACFLT, DIA, the Aeronautical Chart & Information Center, the USN Oceanographic Office, and allied producers.

During March the Defense Intelligence Agency, as the single manager of all intelligence matters, directed that CINCPAC assemble, validate and rank by priority all PACOM target material requirements, and pass to DIA a coordinated PACOM list. This was a significant change since previously the Component Commanders were authorized to submit target material requirements to DIA through their respective service channels.¹

1. DIA DIAAP-1K1-84312 DTG 142034Z Mar 63 (S)

The 1963 production of new tactical target materials amounted to

[REDACTED]

The graphics of [REDACTED] were reproduced as the result of a special request from the [REDACTED] a request forwarded to CINCPAC by CINCUSNAVEUR.¹ In addition, 237 North Vietnam target materials were updated, and research commenced on an estimated [REDACTED]. The production schedule for 1963-64 was proposed by CINCPACFLT/FICPAC and approved by CINCPAC in March with a request that the [REDACTED] target materials be completed by the end of August to coincide with the planned effective date of the [REDACTED].² The [REDACTED] target materials were completed by 26 August; research on Burma commenced in May with production of an estimated 260 targets to be completed by mid-1964. The 1964 schedule also included planning and research for production of graphics on China and North Korea.³

In July, after surveying the needs for target materials in Southeast Asia, CINCPAC directed CINCUSARPAC to support COMUSMACV in the preparation of special forces, or unconventional warfare type, target studies for CINCPAC OPLAN 34-64.⁴ CINCPACAF was asked to furnish Unifile Photo Interpretation Reports for MACV target folders, and for use with the Area Target Planning Folders that the 13th Air Force maintained on Laos and North Vietnam.⁵ As a result of the survey, CINCPAC also recommended that COMUSMACV use Unifile Photo Interpretation Report format in processing photo coverage in order to establish an index for target and area reconnaissance coverage. Such an index would give MACV a regular machine status report on adequacy of coverage.

Release of Graphics to [REDACTED] Toward the end of the year CINCPAC asked DIA to review 52 Air Target Material Program graphics with a view toward downgrading the SECRET NOFORN

- 1. CINCPAC 140336Z May 1963 (S)
- 2. CINCPAC 140023Z Mar 1963 (S)
- 3. CINCPAC 060052Z Sep 1963 (S)
- 4. CINCPAC 302231Z Jul 1963 (S)
- 5. CINCPAC 302232Z Jul 1963 (S)

~~SECRET~~

classification so they could be released to the [REDACTED]. The graphics covered targets in the [REDACTED] and their release to these Allies was required for broad area overview as well as for use in planning or operations. In addition, CINCPAC asked DIA to instruct all producers of Air Target Material Program graphics to produce graphics of that area that could be released to the [REDACTED].

Maintenance of Target Lists: A substantial portion of CINCPAC's intelligence effort was devoted to preparing and maintaining target lists for operation plans for which he had responsibility. At the beginning of the year there were two categories of targets with which CINCPAC was concerned - SIOP targets that made up Part I of the Nuclear Annex Target List File, and non-SIOP targets that made up Part II of the file. Both files were maintained on electronic accounting machine cards. However, since several CINCPAC OPLANs provided for the use of conventional, or non-nuclear weapons against targets, in August CINCPAC expanded his target list file to include all target lists regardless of the type of weapon programmed, and added a third category that listed all targets from the non-nuclear annexes of PACOM operation plans. The name of the file was changed to the PACOM Annex Target List File. The consolidated PACOM Annex Target List File provided for standardization of target data as well as a means for comparison of target lists in various OPLANs to detect and eliminate duplication.

The target lists were maintained in a current status by the Target List Review Group, which was composed of representatives of CINCPAC and of the Component Commanders, and which met at least twice a month.

During March the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Offutt Air Force Base proposed, and asked for comments on, a system for the determination and assignment of alphabetic designators called trinomes, which were designed to replace the existing Accounting Line Number in non-SIOP OPLANs. After consulting his Component

1. CINCPAC 130430Z Dec 1963 (S)

Commanders, CINCPAC suggested to the JCS that the system lacked the desired flexibility for use with non-SIOP targets, a conclusion that the JCS also reached after studying the proposal. The following month, representatives from the JSTPS proposed a revised system that would have tied the non-SIOP trinomial system with the SIOP system on those targets included in both SIOP and contingency plans. CINCPAC did not favor this proposal either, feeling that such a procedure would limit the target category breakdown to those major categories then used in SIOP, and that it would not serve the requirements of the CINCPAC contingency plans for identifying contingency targets with minor category codes.

A new PACOM Target Priority Numbering System was approved in May and incorporated into CINCPAC publications. The new system listed enemy targets in the CINCPAC area of responsibility according to the time-sensitive threat that each target presented to U.S. Forces in CONUS and in the PACOM.

A complete revision of the target lists for CINCPAC OPLAN 27-63 (Korea) was completed and distributed in March. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On the last day of 1963, CINCPAC promulgated the Target List appendix to his [REDACTED] for OPLAN 1-64. This target list reflected the [REDACTED] changes that would be effective on 1 January 1964, and incorporated the use of the new Accounting Line Designator trinomial system. This document was unique in that, for the first time, it was published as a separate document and produced direct from master sheets prepared by automatic data processing techniques, a means of production that was expected to facilitate updating of separate pages.

Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Activities

CINCPAC's principal responsibility for mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G) was to provide management control over these activities in the PACOM, and to satisfy JCS and DIA requirements by using the resources of his Component Commanders. (P)

Toward the end of 1962 the JCS requested a review of MC&G functions of the unified commanders, with recommendations for meeting requirements of the PACOM area. CINCPAC formed a PACOM MC&G Review Group from representatives from his headquarters and the component commands, and directed this group to provide management control of MC&G activities in the PACOM. (C)

The DIA asked for CINCPAC's views on the use of the Universal Transverse Mercator grid in planning air-ground operations, and for use with target materials. CINCPAC requested that a compatible and accurate common reference system be developed for maps and charts used by ground forces and for target materials used by air forces, thus providing a means for effective coordination of joint air-ground operations.¹

One of the MC&G activities in which CINCPAC was interested was a gravity survey that the U.S. Army Map Service Far East (USAMSFE) had undertaken in North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei. During May and June, CINCUSARPAC noted that some of the proposed stations at which gravity readings were to be taken were located near the Indonesian border. Because of the Indonesia-Malaysia controversy, CINCUSARPAC requested comments on the acceptable political and personnel risk.² CINCPAC directed CINCUSARPAC to curtail the survey operations by eliminating those sites near border areas, and stated that other changes in the program would be made if necessary to avoid risk.³

A CINCPACFLT photo squadron flew photo missions during August and September to obtain mapping photography of the Thai-Malaya border. This was a project requested by DIA, but while planning the project, CINCPAC learned that between 1957 and 1960 a U. K. reconnaissance squadron had photographed much of the border area, and that copies of the photographs had been given to the USAMSFE. CINCPAC asked the Army Map Service to screen the film and determine

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1. CINCPAC 240026Z Jan 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 280252Z Jun 1963 (C)
 3. CINCPAC 062156Z Jul 1963 (C)

what additional coverage was needed.¹ When this had been determined, DIA asked CINCPAC for assistance, and CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to conduct the missions. The unclassified photographic negatives were provided to the Far East Engineer (U. K.) with positive film transparencies furnished to DIA.

During 1963, CINCPAC representatives attended two DIA conferences on Mapping, Charting and Geodesy. At the March conference, CINCPAC representatives recommended that DIA establish an adequate world-wide production priority system for maps and charts; take action to automate the MC&G requirements and production programs; consolidate map distribution centers that had overlapping functions in specific areas; and resolve and standardize existing differences between maps and charts of the same or similar scale. At a November conference, representatives from the unified and specified commands agreed that DIA should prepare production specifications and format for a standardized Tactical Target Illustration (TTI), and that the specifications should include the standardized TTI numbering system agreed upon at the conference. The specifications and format would then be reviewed by the commands and producing agencies.

CINCPAC Activities to Strengthen his Intelligence Capability

Commencing in 1962, CINCPAC stepped up efforts to strengthen his intelligence capabilities throughout the PACOM by assuming more responsibility for intelligence activities, thus eliminating some unnecessary duplications by the three Component Commanders. Toward this goal, CINCPAC formed an Intelligence Automatic Data Processing Group to examine PACOM requirements and priorities for intelligence automatic data processing (ADP) systems.² The principal objectives were to be certain that ADP equipment would be put to the best use to provide CINCPAC and his Component Commanders with the intelligence they needed, to eliminate duplication, and to establish standard intelligence ADP systems so that there could be an interchange of files,

- 1. CINCPAC 150252Z Jun 1963 (C)
2. CINCPAC 102317Z Apr 1962 (S)



programs and techniques.

Early in 1963, CINCPAC determined a list of more than 40 data files and supporting programs that could be adapted to the computer. The list encompassed all intelligence activities, including target selection and analysis, intelligence collections, threat and warning analyses, target materials production, and other general requirements.¹

To serve all PACOM commands, CINCPAC intended that the large joint-use ADP files would be operated on equipment located at the Kunia facility, and that jointly required outputs from the files would be produced in multiple copies for CINCPAC and the components. In addition, the system would be able to furnish special sorts or summaries required by any of the components. At the same time, CINCPAC expected CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT, whose staffs had considerable ADP experience and capability, to furnish file inputs that could be used on the Kunia computers.

Accomplishments during 1963 were development of data bases, and analyses concerning targets, bomb damage, effects of fallout, target selection, and a system for processing PACOM collection objectives. The long range program adapting certain PACOM intelligence functions to ADP methods was not expected to be completed for several years.

CINCPAC COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES

This section describes CINCPAC's activities to improve the speed, reliability, and security of the communications upon which he depended to exercise control of his forces. It also describes, on a country-by-country basis, CINCPAC's efforts to modernize and extend the communications facilities in allied PACOM countries. Communications activities in the Republic of Vietnam are described in the RVN section of Chapter IV. (S)

Command and Control Communications

During 1963 CINCPAC continued to press for improvement of
1. CINCPAC Instruction 005230.2, 31 Jan 1963 (S)

command and control communications throughout PACOM.

Joint voice cable requirements to satisfy the three Component Commanders were forwarded to the JCS in February. In order to reduce the number of channels required and the cost, CINCPAC advocated the use of circuit seizure/pre-emption equipment when exercising emergency actions, and the termination of required circuits on common-user Defense Communications Agency (DCA) switchboards.¹

CINCPAC presented joint teletype cable requirements to the JCS and indicated that certain necessary joint Pacific circuits supported by HF radio would be transferred to cable for increased reliability.² In response to a DOD request, during October CINCPAC presented his comments on a DCA plan to establish the most economical number of cable channels necessary to satisfy all military requirements. Again CINCPAC stressed the need for circuit seizure devices in a reduced channel environment.³ At the end of the year, further action in this area awaited JCS decisions.


Transpacific Cables

Progress during 1963 on transpacific cables, a subject first discussed in CINCPAC's 1962 Command History (see page 56), is summarized below. These cables were intended primarily for command and control use through interconnection with the PACOM joint overseas switchboards, as described in this section.

1. The second California to Hawaii cable terminating at Makaha was scheduled for completion in September 1964.
2. The submarine bypass cable from Haunama Bay to Makaha was expected to be completed by 1 April 1964.
3. UK Commonwealth cable from Australia to Hawaii was complete and opened officially for service on 3 December 1963.
4. The cable from Hawaii to Guam was expected to be operational 1 May 1964, with the north spur from Guam to Japan operational on

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0139, 26 Feb 1963 (C)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 0597, 30 Aug 1963 (C)
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 0687, 7 Oct 1963 (C)

PRECEDENCE PACOM TRAFFIC ANALYSIS 20 JANUARY 1964



NOTE: IN AUGUST THE DEFERRED PRECEDENCE WAS ELIMINATED.


CONFIDENTIAL

FIG. 8

CLASSIFICATION

PACOM TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

20 JANUARY 1964




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FIG. 9

CINCPAC COMMUNICATION CENTER MESSAGE TRAFFIC INCREASE (1961-1963)

20 JANUARY 1964



LEGEND

- TOTAL MESSAGES
- - - - MESSAGES RECEIVED
- . - . MESSAGES SENT

FIG. 10

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June. The south spur from Guam to the Philippines was to be completed by 1 November.

5. The Hawaiian land tail of the transpacific cable (an underground distribution cable extending from Makaha to the facilities of the Hawaiian Telephone Company and then to Haunama Bay) was under construction with completion scheduled for 15 April 1964. Certain segments would be completed prior to that date and would provide extension support from the Hawaiian Telephone Company Honolulu office to Makaha.

DCA Midrange Plan Task 7

✓ The DCA Midrange Plan Task 7 concerned teletype retermination of selected high priority users of the Army and Navy into the automatic Air Force relays at Hickam Air Force Base and Fuchu, Japan. This plan was described in the CINCPAC 1962 Command History. During the month of October 1963 both Hickam and Fuchu relays were reterminated, prior to the DOD imposed December 1963 deadline. At the end of the year, PACOM was operating a joint common user automatic relay environment to the extent that plant capacity would permit.¹

Joint Overseas Switchboards

The Defense Communications Agency, in response to a DOD directive, completed most of the actions necessary for the establishment of a joint voice network in PACOM. Switchboards and supporting equipment were installed in areas listed below, and were being tested in December. The following switchboards were installed and operational at the end of 1963: FOCCPAC, Kunia, Hawaii; NAVCOMSTA, Guam; Clark AFB, Philippines; Futema, Okinawa; Fuchu, Japan; Seoul, Korea; and Taipei, Taiwan.

The office of DCA Pacific issued circuit orders to terminate Defense Communication System trunks supporting command and control

1. CUBCOAC 300115Z Oct 1963 (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and common user voice circuits on the switchboards listed above. Also, at CINCPAC's direction, DCAPAC prepared joint telephone procedures that were published on 28 October 1963.¹

Frequency Control and Management

PACOM frequency coordination for MA-9, Project Mercury's final event, was initiated in December 1962.² Radio frequencies were cleared and assigned for use in PACOM and were afforded protection prior to, during, and after the 22 orbit flight. Minor interference problems encountered were resolved without difficulty. The astronaut was recovered successfully on 15 May.

CINCPAC policy guidance for the provision of frequencies for contingency radio facilities was provided PACOM commanders and Area Frequency Coordinators in June 1963.³ This action was dictated by the need to reduce reaction time in assigning frequencies in the event of natural disasters, civil disturbances, evacuations, or similar contingencies.

To support such requirements, CINCPAC and Area Frequency Coordinators established special frequency lists which were maintained current in the PACOM Frequency Allocations and Uses document (PACOM FAU) for assignment as the situation demanded.

During the period 12-16 August 1963, representatives of the State Department, CNO, CSAF, CINCPAC and COMUSJAPAN met in Tokyo with the staff of the Japanese Radio Regulatory Bureau of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. The purpose of the meeting was to negotiate U.S. military use in Japan of aeronautical mobile off-route frequencies.

Because frequencies were a sovereign resource, it was within the prerogatives of Japan to deny their use to the U.S. Should that occur, U.S. operations would be impaired seriously in Japan and throughout the PACOM. It was imperative, therefore, that an

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1. DCAPAC Inst 3320.1, 28 Oct 1963 (U)
 2. FAPUSMCEB 142213Z Dec 1962 (C)
 3. JANAFFAC 29/63 DTG 140249Z Jun 1963 (C)

acceptable agreement be worked out. The efforts of all concerned resulted in an agreement in principle being reached on 16 August 1963. The final agreement was signed by the Japanese Radio Regulatory Bureau on 7 October 1963.¹

Negotiations for Commercial Lease of Communications Facilities

During May CINCPAC announced a policy that concerned the use of leased commercial communications facilities in PACOM.² This was done in response to guidance contained in DOD directives that were intended to reduce military competition with private enterprise in providing services and commodities for the Armed Forces.

In recognition of the foregoing policy, DCA determined that an automatic voice network (AUTOVON) would be installed, operated and maintained on a lease basis by commercial communications carriers within CONUS. For the same reason, CINCPAC recommended a commercial lease for the Hawaiian AUTOVON at the Wahiawa hardened facility because it was near Kunia, and because it was the switching hub of the Hawaiian Telephone Company landtail of the transpacific cables.³ The CNO did not agree with this recommendation on the basis that better economy, control, security, and response would be attained by installing the AUTOVON switch at Kunia under U.S. Government ownership.⁴ At the end of the year, CINCPAC planned to ask the CNO to reconsider his position, and the matter remained undecided.

Improvement of Message Distribution between CINCPAC and Operational Commands

In order to improve the distribution of important message traffic between CINCPAC and operational commands, CINCPAC requested 10 AN/FGC-73 multiple address processing units for certain selected teletype relay stations within PACOM.⁵ It was expected that these

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 2357, 1 Nov 1963 (U)
 2. CINCPAC JANAFAC 16/63 DTG 110458Z May 1963 (C)
 3. CINCPAC 221742Z Dec 1963 (C)
 4. CNO 271957Z Dec 1963 (C)
 5. CINCPAC ltr ser 0802, 27 Nov 1963 (C)

units would permit substantial reduction of handling time within relay stations that handled large volumes of multiple address messages.

Automatic Digital Network

The automatic digital network (AUTODIN) was first announced to the PACOM in January 1963. This network was intended for the rapid handling of data, teletype, graphics, and digital voice (the enciphering of voice to permit classified conversations). Programmed PACOM sites were in the Philippines, in Hawaii, Japan, Guam and Okinawa. At the end of the year, all actions on this vast program had been confined to the Washington area, except for a PACOM survey during January and February 1963 to develop site construction requirements.¹ Implementation of the program was scheduled for 1967.

Automatic Voice Network

As with the AUTODIN, the automatic voice network (AUTOVON) project was announced at the beginning of the year.² This network was intended to provide high quality analog voice service to selected high priority subscribers. The telephones used with the network were to be provided with four levels of priority, of which the top level would be limited to key commanders and associated command centers. Routine voice service would continue to be handled by the existing switchboards, which would be interfaced with AUTOVON. Programmed PACOM sites were located on Hawaii, Guam, Okinawa, and Taipei, at Clark AFB, and at Itazuke and Fuchu in Japan. Western Electric and Automatic Electric (the contracting firms) and military representatives began a PACOM site survey during November. The survey was expected to continue until February 1964.³

Communications Consolidation Plans

The DCA Mid-Range Plan had as its primary objective the

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1. CINCPAC 090043Z Jan 1963 (C)
 2. CINCPAC 040230Z Jan 1963 (C)
 3. CINCPAC 012149Z Nov 1963 (C)

consolidation of the tri-service common user communications environment into one system. PACOM areas selected initially for consolidation were Guam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, and Japan. A similar plan was developed for Hawaii; however, due to the size of the systems involved, it was decided this planning would be confined to a feasibility study. CINCPAC concurred in principle in the plans as submitted except for the Hawaiian area. For Hawaii, CINCPAC recommended keeping the existing communications and, through an evolutionary process, locating key HF trunks off the island of Oahu, ultimately reducing the system to one consolidated common user system on Oahu.¹ This was envisioned to take place following the completion of the transpacific cable in late 1964. Action on consolidation planning was to continue through 1964 with CINCPAC participation.

Systems Plan for Upgrading Joint Facilities in Hawaii

CINCPAC, at the request of the JCS, developed a comprehensive plan for upgrading communications facilities in Hawaii during the period from 1964 through 1966.² The requirement for this plan was a result of the major expansion programs of the DCA (AUTOVON and AUTODIN) along with a need to renovate the existing cable plant on Oahu.

The plan was forwarded on 4 October 1963 to the JCS for approval and would result, upon provision of funds by DOD, in the commercial carrier (Hawaiian Telephone Company) participating with the military in completing the plan objectives.

Western Pacific Wide Band Communications System

A CINCPAC communications objective study of June 1961 supported the expansion of existing wide band tropospheric scatter systems and the extension of new wide band systems into other areas to provide a continuous system of high quality communications throughout the Western Pacific.³ The system, designed to interconnect Korea, Japan,

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1. CINCPAC 110432Z May 1963 (C)
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 2162, 4 Oct 1963 (U)
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00312, 1 Jun 1961 (S)

Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand, would in turn interconnect with the wide band transpacific cable system scheduled to extend from Oahu to Japan and the Philippines via Midway, Wake, and Guam.

The intra-area Western Pacific wide band communications system consisted of tropospheric scatter links between all areas except the Philippines and South Vietnam. This link was programmed for a submarine cable. At the end of the year, 60 channel tropospheric links were operational between Korea and Japan, and between Japan and Okinawa; and a 24 channel tropospheric link between Okinawa and Taiwan was in operation. Another 24 channel tropospheric link, that would connect the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa and Japan, was undergoing operational tests and was scheduled for completion during 1964. A 24 channel tropospheric link between Taiwan and the Philippines that had been completed late in 1962 had experienced technical difficulties that the Department of the Army was attempting to correct. At the end of the year, the possible solutions under consideration were to reduce the channel capacity to meet acceptable standards, re-engineer the system to provide acceptable standards for the designed 24 channels, construct a relay between the two existing terminals, or move the Philippine terminal from Clark AFB north to the Baguio area to shorten the existing 500 mile transmission path.¹ Neither the corrective action nor the estimated operational date was determined at the end of 1963.

The link between the Philippines and South Vietnam was an Air Force project that consisted of an 800 mile submarine cable from San Miguel in the Philippines to Nha Trang in the RVN.² Another part of this project was a 55 mile microwave system (with some buried cable) that would connect San Miguel with Clark AFB, and a 200 mile troposcatter link connecting Nha Trang with Saigon. The contract for this project was awarded in November 1963, with an estimated operational date a year later.

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1. DCA-PAC P500/010256 DTG 300016Z Oct 1963 (C)
 2. ESD's cite 484N SPP, 26 Oct 1963, on CINCPAC R/S #004072-63 (S)

Between Saigon and Bangkok there was a 24 channel tropospheric system that was to have been operational by August 1963. However, because of technical difficulties, it had not been accepted from the contractor at the end of the year.¹

Error Detection and Correction

One of the most serious communications problems within the PACOM was the amount of message garbling over the long haul HF radio system. This situation caused many service actions and message retransmissions that delayed traffic. The director of the National Security Agency reported a new technique that, although expensive, would detect errors and make corrections on PACOM on-line teletype systems.² CINCPAC established a requirement for the test of this equipment on the system connecting CINCPAC with COMUSMACV, and DCA began preparations to make the test.³ Later, CINCPAC learned of a less expensive development called a "proportional error protector" that would serve the same purpose. He asked that the JCS investigate this development along with other similar devices. The JCS asked DCA to take action on this CINCPAC proposal.⁴

Action to Reduce the Number of Messages to Impose MINIMIZE

Because of the large number of messages required to put MINIMIZE conditions into effect, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that a new procedure be developed on an area basis to reduce the number of messages.⁵ The recommended procedure envisioned transmission of one message to a designated area, with protection responsibility assigned to assure local dissemination to all interested agencies. In all cases, the implementing authority would be shown. The JCS accepted this recommendation and established new procedures.⁶

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1. DA 934481 DTG 282102Z Aug 1963 (C)
 2. DIRNSA T15/671 DTG 031824Z Jul 1963 (C)
 3. DCA 320/0885 DTG 261805Z Aug 1963 (C)
 4. JCS 3359 DTG 012046Z Nov 1963 (C)
 5. CINCPAC 180212Z Aug 1962 (C)
 6. JCS 222/730, 24 Sep 1963 (C)

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At the end of the year, action was proceeding to amend the allied communications publications to incorporate these procedures.

Communications Casualty Planning

As a result of the damaged communications facilities caused by typhoons Karen at Guam, and Gloria at Taiwan, CINCPAC undertook to develop a plan for actions to restore PACOM communications when important links were destroyed by similar disasters. On 21 October, CINCPAC published Instruction 03000.1 to set forth procedures to guide his J6 Staff. At the end of the year, an instruction was being prepared to serve as a guide on communications casualty planning PACOM-wide.

Pacific Command Communications Security

In order to improve the security of PACOM communications, CINCPAC established on 1 August 1963 a Pacific Command Communications Security Committee, which was to meet quarterly.¹ Members were communications security representatives from CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, and CINCPACFLT. Technical assistance would be provided by NSAPAC, DCAPAC, ASAPAC, the Pacific Security Region, and the Navy Security Group Pacific. (U)

Combined Communications Authentication System for the U.S., RVN, and Thailand

A combined U.S., RVN and Thailand Triton authentication system (KAA57) was placed in operation on 1 September.² This system was necessary to prevent unauthorized stations from entering allied radio nets, and also to ensure the validity of messages passed. Air-ground support operations were particularly vulnerable to imitative deception. This authentication system, first planned to use KAX-T2 equipment, was later changed by the [redacted] to use the KAA57 equipment because of technical problems.³

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1. CINCPAC Inst 2200.4, 13 Jul 1963 (U)
 2. [redacted] 5302/556 DTG 112033Z Jul 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 222216Z Aug 1963 (C)

Village/Hamlet Radios for the RVN and Thailand

During the first ten months of 1963, the village/hamlet radio projects in the RVN and Thailand were refined and improved. During March, USAID assumed from the 72d Signal Detachment the responsibility for the village/hamlet radio project in Vietnam. By April, most of the radios programmed for Vietnam had been delivered and, by the end of October, all radios programmed for village/hamlet use had been delivered or were in depot stocks.¹

By February 1963, 243 transceivers were installed and operating in northeastern Thailand under a six month pilot program. Initial MAP reports indicated the Thai Ministry of Interior was making effective use of the communications in connection with administration, prevention of crime, public welfare, and controlling communist activities. The program included installation of additional increments of radio networks in FY64-66.²

Communications Activities in the Philippines

During April, CINCPAC re-emphasized the need for a wide band, reliable communications system between the Philippines and the Southeast Asia mainland.³ To fill the requirement, OSD approved the installation of a 60 channel system, of which the most important link was specified as submarine cable. The task of installation was assigned to the Air Force.⁴ Predicted delivery of VHF AN/TRC-35 and AN/TRC-36 equipment was delayed until FY65, a delay that would impede seriously any effective improvement in the backbone VHF portion of the Philippines long lines system.⁵ Congressional funding action on the FY64 MAP necessitated a cut of \$1.6 million from communications facilities for the Philippines, an action that would delay programming of vital communications equipment.

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1. COMUSMACV MAC J38372 DTG 250120Z Oct 1963 (S)
 2. Format D, RTA, FY64-69 MAP Submission for Thailand (S)
 3. CINCPAC 210117Z Apr 1963 (S)
 4. DCA 422.3/00155 DTG 291630Z Apr 1963 (S)
 5. CHJUSMAG PHIL 6776A4SIG DTG 240820Z Sep 1963 (C)

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Intra-Japan Tropospheric Scatter System

The intra-Japan tropospheric scatter system was a USARJ wide band communications system designed to replace the long haul facilities being leased from commercial Japanese companies for the use of U. S. Forces in Japan. It was estimated that the cost of the system could be recovered in less than two years, and save approximately 35 million dollars in a five year period. The system was to connect at Itazuke with the troposcatter systems to Korea and Okinawa, and would provide the following facilities: 120 channels from Itazuke to Camp Zama, 60 channels from Camp Zama to Camp Drake, 60 channels from Camp Zama to Chitose, and 24 channels from Chitose to Wakkani. At the end of the year, the system was being tested for operational status in January 1964.

Communications Activities in the Republic of China

During a conference at CINCPAC Headquarters in March 1963, with representatives of DA and CHMAAG China in attendance, it was discovered that cost estimates of the wide band Military Integrated Communications System (MICS) had omitted certain expensive elements and were low.¹ (See CINCPAC 1962 Command History, p. 71) The decision was made to break the project into several increments, contract for as many of these as the \$6.0 million available in FY63 would cover, and undertake additional increments as funds became available. Requests for quotations were issued by DA in May, and the contract for MICS was awarded to Collins Radio Company on 27 June. The contract provided for \$5,275,392 for the basic system and \$875,608 for spare parts. In August, the State Department advised the Secretary of Defense of possible duplication of commercial type telecommunications systems funded under the military assistance and economic aid programs.² CINCPAC, CHMAAG China, and the U. S. Ambassador to China defended the MICS system and stated that the Commercial AID system might be used as backup. They explained that the military

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 300046Z Mar 1963 (S)

2. OSD 934351 DTG 272307Z Aug 1963 (S)

system served operation sites while the commercial system connected the heavy populated areas. Communications construction funds amounting to \$4.6 million and approximately \$6.0 million in funds for tactical communications equipment were deleted from the FY64 MA Program.¹ This action would delay the MICS and the modernization of the Chinese Army, which was critically short of modern tactical communications equipment.

Communications Activities in Indonesia

The Indonesian Fixed Communications Project continued to lag because of the failure of the Indonesian National Army (INA) to perform in accordance with the MILTAG-INA Agreement of 17 April 1961. In March 1963, INA representatives asked Chief MILTAG for construction materials to finish 12 sites that were included in two increments of the project that covered Sumatra, Java, and Bali.² CINCPAC recommended that approximately two million dollars, funded in FY63 to purchase small arms that were no longer needed in the reduced INA, be diverted to purchase the required construction materials for the first two increments, and that that part of the project for Borneo, Celebes and Ambon be deferred indefinitely.³ The Departments of State and Defense concurred in this recommendation.

A DA team met with MILTAG representatives in Indonesia to define the quantities and types of construction materials required, and to get work started on the project. Authority to deliver construction materials for the first increment of the project was granted on 11 October.⁴ Funds amounting to \$3.8 million were transferred from the FY64 MAP to the FY65 MAP so that completion of the system would not be delayed further. Two million dollars in FY64 funds for tactical communications equipment were deleted.

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1. CINCPAC 190405Z Oct 1963 (S)
 2. CHMILTAG MTAG 03/309/3 DTG 030201Z Apr 1963 (C)
 3. CINCPAC 040236Z May 1963 (C)
 4. CG USAMC 10-9232 DTG 111814Z Oct 1963 (C)

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Communications Activities in Korea

Representatives of KMAG and DA attended a conference at CINCPAC Headquarters on 21 March to reach agreement on details of the ROK Army long lines project in order that DA could proceed with contractual actions.¹ This agreement was reached, and DA was to negotiate the installation of a wideband system connecting Seoul, Wonju, Taegu and Chinhae. Although \$3.4 million was funded for this purpose, on 10 October DA halted procurement of materials required for the project until the problem of duplication of circuits could be resolved.²

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1. CINCPAC 092241Z Mar 1963 (U)
 2. DA 940140 DTG 100011Z Oct 1963 (C)

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CHAPTER II

CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS
OF ALLIED NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

CINCPAC's mission in 1963 was to defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support national policies in the Far East and Southeast Asian areas; and to assist Asian nations to defend themselves against communist aggression. Power to carry out this job came from two sources: the U. S. Armed Forces assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the armed forces of U. S. Asian allies, sustained by U. S. Military Assistance Programs. Both were needed power factors that caused the communists to abstain from rash actions.¹ This chapter is devoted to the Military Assistance Programs through which CINCPAC strove to improve the forces of allied countries. CINCPAC's principal objective in connection with administering the Military Assistance programs was improvement. CINCPAC continued to emphasize better supply and logistics systems, good management, and better maintenance and use of equipment provided by MAP. The PACOM allied armed forces had made real progress in these areas through the Military Assistance provided in previous years.

AREA WIDE ACTIVITIES

The Military Assistance Program

Formulating and executing the Military Assistance Plans and Programs was not a simple matter. A basic explanation of programming and the channels through which military assistance is approved may be found at figure 11, although it fails to illustrate the intricacies involved in either the planning or the programming. The daily changes in requirements brought on by shifting military requirements, the revisions in dollar ceilings, changes rooted in political maneuvers, and the difficulties of matching programs to computer are a few of the factors that complicated CINCPAC's 1964 Military Assistance Program.

CINCPAC's actions in the programming cycle are outlined below --

1. Statement by Adm Felt to the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
14 May 63 (U)

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actions that do not always reflect the tremendous amount of staff work required to stay abreast of changes and revisions.

Military Assistance Manual: Prior to 1963 Department of Defense Military Assistance guidance to CINCPAC and other unified commanders had been provided in two publications, a Basic Planning Document, and the Military Assistance Manual. In 1963 the Basic Planning Document was replaced by Part I, Objectives, Military Assistance Manual (MAM). Guidance formerly contained in the entire MAM was placed in Part II, Procedures, MAM. Part I and II of the MAM were published separately. The Military Assistance Manual along with CINCPAC's supplements thereto provided the basic guidance and instructions under which the PACOM FY65-69 MA Plan FY64 Program were formulated.

Part I, Objectives, MAM, effective 1 April 1963 contained policy guidance, force objectives, planning guidance related to assistance provided through the Agency for International Development, and qualitative MAP standards for weapon systems and equipment. It also contained dollar guidelines for FY65 through FY69. For the PACOM, dollar totals were: FY65 - \$701.5 million, FY66 - \$667.4 million, FY67 - \$611.4 million, FY68 - \$558.5 million, FY69 - \$550.0 million.

Part II, Procedures, MAM gave specific procedures for planning, programming, approval and funding, execution, reporting, and evaluation.

CINCPAC Supplements to the Military Assistance Manual: CINCPAC published supplements to each part of the Military Assistance Manual. These supplements augmented and amplified guidance contained in the manual.

The CINCPAC Supplement to Part I, Objectives, promulgated definitive long range military assistance planning and programming guidance applicable to the Pacific Command.¹ A section titled "Area Wide Planning Guidance" emphasized that the primary threat to Southeast Asia was one of subversion and insurgency. While the threat of external aggression was recognized, the U. S. /SEATO commitments

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0078 of 25 Jan 63 (S)

FORMULATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

PLANNING AND PROGRAM REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The annual Military Assistance Program request to Congress is derived from a five-year military assistance plan. Military assistance plans are reviewed continuously and revised whenever necessary to conform with U.S. policy or adjust to changes in the international environment. Near the beginning of each fiscal year, the plans are projected an additional year to maintain the five-year projection. The fiscal year for which an appropriation request is made to Congress is the first year of the period covered by the current plan, i.e., FY 1964 is the first year of the current military assistance plan.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION AND FIVE-YEAR PLAN

The procedures listed below are followed in the development of the Congressional Submission. These procedures implement Sections 504(b), 622 and 623 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which define responsibilities of the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense concerning military assistance.

(1) Policy objectives and order-of-magnitude dollar guidelines are transmitted to the Unified Commands by the Director of Military Assistance in Part I of the Military Assistance Manual entitled "Objectives". Procedural guidance is sent in Part II of the Military Assistance Manual entitled "Procedures".

(2) Based on this guidance and the supplementary instructions of the Unified Commands, each Military Assistance Advisory Group, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development Mission and the Embassy, provides the Unified Command with information required for development of the country sections of the Unified Command plan.

(3) The Unified Command plans are forwarded to Director of Military Assistance together with a regional summary for each Command.

(4) Upon receipt by Director of Military Assistance the Unified Command plans are reproduced and distributed to the Military Departments for review of pricing, lead time, and availabilities, and to State/Agency for International

Development, and the Bureau of the Budget for policy review and coordination.

(5) A series of formal review meetings are held under the auspices of the Director of Military Assistance, at which all interested agencies of the Government are represented.

(6) The Budget Year Program is extracted from the five-year plan and forwarded for approval by the Secretary of Defense and transmitted to the State Department for further review in connection with the FY 1964 economic assistance program and approval by the Administrator of the Agency for International Development. It is then recommended to the President as a part of the FY 1964 Foreign Assistance appropriation request. The Bureau of the Budget, as the executive office of the President, is responsible for establishing the final new obligational authority level prior to submission to Congress.

PROCEDURES SUBSEQUENT TO CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

(7) After completion of Congressional action, the Program is adjusted to conform to the actual appropriation and revised as necessary to reflect any changes in the conditions under which it was originally developed and approved. Final approval for implementation is then obtained from Department of State and necessary apportionments from the Bureau of the Budget.

(8) Director of Military Assistance then issues Military Assistance Program orders and other instructions to the Military Departments for execution, together with appropriate fund allocations.

(9) The Military Departments take supply and procurement action, effect deliveries of material to the countries, and perform necessary training of foreign personnel. Utilization of material by recipients is supervised by the Military Assistance Advisory Groups.

(10) World-wide reports of progress against plans and programs are submitted by the Military Departments to Office of Director of Military Assistance and the Unified Commands.

(11) The Director of Military Assistance receives recommendations from the Unified Commands and adjusts the five-year plan to conform with final Congressional action.

to deploy forces promptly to oppose such an attack reduced the requirements to provide Southeast Asia countries with high-cost, sophisticated material to meet external aggression. Therefore the Procedures Supplement directed that MA Plans and Programs for Southeast Asia mainland countries would feature material to support internal security. Materiel designed primarily to provide defense against external attack, such as surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, ocean going combatant ships, supersonic fighter aircraft, and heavy transport aircraft would be provided only where it was essential.

Combat planning guidance for each country was divided into three groups. Objectives were listed within these groups in order of relative priority. The groupings were established according to the individual country needs and desires, as well as U.S. requirements for collective defense of the PACOM Area as a whole. Dollar guidelines, representing planning ceilings that were not to be exceeded in any given year, were provided for the period FY64-69. The total FY64 planning ceiling for PACOM countries was \$801.4 million. CINCPAC's supplement contained guidance for the development of MAAG Country Logistics Improvement Plans to provide a coordinated program of major objectives and tasks for improving country logistic operations in Cambodia, Korea, Philippines, Republic of China, Thailand and Vietnam. The supplement also provided guidance for use in the development of MA Plans and Programs in the equipment, supplies, and construction category.

The CINCPAC Supplement to Part II, Procedures, contained instructions for developing minimum supporting data required by CINCPAC for MA Plans and Programs, and specific procedures and formats to be used in furnishing data to CINCPAC. Publication and distribution was made in increments as corresponding increments of Part II MAM were received.

FY65-69 MA Plan and FY64 Program: In June CINCPAC submitted to the OSD his completed FY64 Program and the MA Plan for FY65-69. These documents reflected Admiral Felt's assessment of the need for increased assistance in the Republic of Vietnam and in Thailand to

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counter the insurgency threat and, as expenditures in these countries increased, reductions in other countries had to be made. Plans for Korea, China, Japan, Burma, Laos, Indonesia, and Cambodia were of less dollar value than plans of the previous year. The amount of money to be spent in the Philippines was about the same.¹

Specific CINCPAC comments on the Plan/Program, forwarded to OSD along with the submission, are reflected as follows:

Japan - In accordance with the plan directive, no anti-submarine warfare (ASW) material or equipment was programmed beyond FY64. Concerned over the abrupt cessation of ASW equipment for Japan, Admiral Felt said he thought the Japanese should be encouraged beyond FY64 to improve their ASW capabilities by providing, on a cost sharing basis, equipment which could not be fabricated in Japan. Japan, in particular, required a strong ASW capability in order to control the exits which the Soviet submarines based in the Vladivostok area were compelled to use in order to reach the open seas.

Republic of China - The plan did not contain any material for the automation of Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W). While the need for automation was recognized, it could not be included because other items had higher priority.

Korea - The lack of modern air defense capability in Korea was of considerable concern to CINCPAC and to COMUS Korea. Therefore automation of AC&W was given first priority. (Reduced dollar ceilings later forced deletion of AC&W from the Korea program). U. S. support of the WON Defense budget was higher than that approved in FY63. Related to this was the requirement, under the MAP transfer program, for increasing expenditures by the ROK Government in each succeeding year of the planning period. Rising costs in Korea due to inflation, together with annual increases in the MAP Transfer program, made it infeasible to hold the U. S. support of the ROK defense budget at a steady level.

Laos - The program was flexible for Laos and was expected to have numerous deviations to meet changing conditions.

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00583, 12 Jun 63 (S)

Revision of FY64-65 MAP: As a result of anticipated Congressional reductions in the Military Assistance Program, OSD established new dollar ceilings, which necessitated a completely revised MAP for FY64 and FY65.^{1, 2, 3} Existing ceilings for FY66-69 remained unchanged. (For more on Vietnam revision see Chapter IV, Revision of FY64-65 Vietnam MAP).

The new OSD FY64 ceilings as of 31 December 1963 and comparison with original ceilings are shown below:

(figures in millions)	<u>Original</u>	<u>FY64 OSD Revised</u>
Burma	\$ 8.0	\$ 2.0
Cambodia	9.2	.3
Indonesia	16.2	.5
Japan	45.0	11.6
Laos	12.6	15.6
Korea	205.1	143.8
Philippines	36.0	23.4
China	135.7	90.0
Thailand	67.4	39.9
Vietnam	180.0	173.9

OSD revised ceilings for Korea, the Philippines, and China as shown above resulted from the redistribution of the F-5 A/B aircraft package for the three countries.⁴ The reduction in funds for Cambodia was made after Cambodia asked the U.S. to terminate its military assistance (see page 122). The OSD revision for Burma permitted only training and follow-on spares, and the program for Indonesia was decreased and eventually included only training.

On 28 October MAAG representatives met with the CINCPAC staff at Camp Smith, Hawaii for the purpose of discussing and revising the FY64 and FY65 MAP under the new DOD dollar guidelines and ceilings. Programming procedures which were followed in order to

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1. OSD ltr I-26678/64, 20 Sep 1963 (S)
 2. OSD DEF 941878 DTG 220001Z Oct 1963 (S)
 3. OSD Table 36, Dec 63 (S)
 4. OSD DEF 942236 DTG 232359Z Oct 1963 (S)

facilitate computer processing of the revised MAP caused considerable difficulty for these planners. However, on 9 November, CINCPAC submitted a revision of the FY64 MA Program to OSD.¹ The revision included marked-up Office of Defense Military Assistance Machine Listings and revision actions for all PACOM countries except Vietnam. The FY64 and FY65 revision for Vietnam was submitted separately. (S)

The FY65 revised program was submitted to OSD on 27 November and was based on a downward trend in ceilings such as had affected the FY64 Program.² It did, however, contain detailed justification for reinstatement of many FY64 Program items into the FY65 Program. Although CINCPAC recognized that Prince Sihanouk's renouncement of U.S. aid to Cambodia would alter the MAP for that country, the Cambodia Program was forwarded to OSD for information purposes. CINCPAC recommended that the \$10.3 million FY65 Cambodia program be reallocated with \$5.26 million going to the Republic of China and \$5.01 million to Korea. (S)

At the end of 1963 CINCPAC was preparing to adjust the PACOM Military Assistance Program once again, this time as a result of late year approval by Congress of the appropriation for economic and military foreign aid for FY64. (S)


Country Mission Statements

CINCPAC published new country mission statements in 1963. These statements provided guidance for development of military assistance plans and programs. They also provided information for development of United States Service programs, and formed a basis for coordinated planning and military discussions between the United States and country officials.³

All mission statements stressed the importance of country armed forces providing defense against external aggression and helping to maintain internal security. In addition each statement contained missions dealing with other problems or contingencies affecting only the specific

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 001185, 9 Nov 1963 (S)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 001224, 27 Nov 1963 (S)
3. JCS 142145Z May 1963 (TS)

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PROGRAM AND DELIVERIES BY COUNTRY FY 1950 THROUGH FY 1963



country involved.¹

PACOM MAAG Chiefs Conference

The PACOM MAAG Chiefs Conference was held 20-23 May 1963 to provide MAAG Chiefs an opportunity to discuss with CINCPAC and his Component Commanders their special problems, and to acquire a better appreciation of the over-all situation in the PACOM area through hearing individual talks and by close association with members of the CINCPAC Staff. (S)

Admiral Felt, in his opening remarks, emphasized those things he considered of collective importance to the MAAG Chiefs. He pointed out the need for them to continually review the CINCPAC mission and the CINCPAC family of plans, and stated that each Chief should be alert to the threat confronting his host country in terms of internal and external implications and the objectives spelled out in plans. He stressed the need for a thorough integration of the MAP with war plans. The flow-of-gold problem was high-lighted as an extremely serious problem that could cause the withdrawal of U. S. Forces from Japan, Korea, and Europe. Further reduction in the MAP was another possibility. Admiral Felt noted that the FY63 World Wide MAP totaled 1.3 billion dollars, of which PACOM received approximately 44%. For FY64, the MAP submission was 1.4 billion, about 2.7% of the total U. S. expenditures for military security. Admiral Felt urged the group to do all in its power to defend the programs and maintain the existing level of support as a minimum. The Admiral also told MAAG Chiefs that they must continually review, question and suggest changes to mission statements, then adjust programs to reflect the changes in mission and concept. Admiral Felt also stressed the need for discussing programs with host country counterparts, intelligence reporting, and reports of exit interviews such as those with GAO auditors.²

Following Admiral Felt's remarks each MAAG senior representative discussed his area of responsibility, covering the political,

1. CINCPAC ltrs sers 000206 through 000214, 14 Jun 1963 (TS)
2. Report of PACOM MAAG Chiefs Conference Report 1963 (S)

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economic, social and military situations. At the conclusion of the conference, Admiral Felt agreed tentatively to schedule another conference in the spring of 1964. It was also agreed that senior MAAG representatives within the northern and southern regions would meet at least once each six months in addition to the annual conference. (S)

Military Construction in Southeast Asia

By the end of 1963 the peak of a major MAP construction program in Vietnam and Thailand had passed. This is an account of progress from the 1961 decision to step up construction until the end of 1963. (C)

CINCPAC decided in mid-1961 that a major construction effort was required in both Vietnam and Thailand to provide adequate facilities for these countries to combat insurgency, defend themselves in event of over aggression, and provide an adequate logistic base for possible U. S. contingency operations.¹ A limited effort was already underway to provide critically needed facilities, such as water, POL pipelines from railheads to airfield tanks, and runway lights at up-country Thailand airfields.² (C)

A CINCPAC construction program to fill the needs of the Republic of Vietnam was developed and presented to the SecDef at conferences held in Hawaii in December 1961 and January 1962. The SecDef approved and funded the entire program the next month.^{3,4} The program provided for the construction of a 6,000 foot airstrip at Pleiku; a 10,000 foot all-weather jet capable airfield at Bien Hoa; greatly expanded temporary aircraft parking at Tan Son Nhut; five Army ammunition depots; fixed AC&W sites at Da Nang in the north and Tan Son Nhut in the south; shipyard facilities at Cam Ranh and Saigon; and a medical training center. The construction was scheduled to be completed in two to three years at a cost of \$50.0 to \$55.0 million. The joint contractor for all construction was Raymond International of Delaware and Morrison-Knudson of Asia Inc., working under the supervision of

DIRPACDOCKS. (C)

1. CINCPAC 240630Z Jul 1961 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 230305Z Mar 1961 (S)
3. JCS 301827Z Jan 1962 (S)
4. OSD 131745Z Feb 1962 (S)

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CINCPAC's program in Thailand was oriented toward developing adequate parking aprons and increased POL storage with hydrant systems at Takhli and Korat airfields; and additional parking aprons, POL storage, and minimum support facilities such as barracks and mess halls at up-country bases, particularly Udorn and Ubon.¹ The Army and Navy portions of the program, more contingency-oriented than that of the Air Force, provided LST ramps, a pier and a depot at Sattahip, south of Bangkok, and an urgently needed supply road that would bypass Bangkok and provide a linkup with surface transportation routes to the north toward Laos. The most significant Army MAP project was the Bangkok bypass road, 96 kilometers long, from Chachoengsao to Kabinburi.² The 809th Engr Bn (Constr) was deployed from Okinawa to Thailand in early 1962 and began work on the road in November 1962.

The CINCPAC MA funded construction program for Thailand was expanded in June 1962 through the Special Logistics Actions for Thailand (SLAT) program, which included construction of a permanent POL pipeline from Bangkok to Don Muang airfield, (which was subsequently dropped in favor of a plan using invasion pipeline); and forward storage depots for heavy engineer equipment at Korat and Udorn. In addition, a crash program was approved and funded to develop an air base close to the Laos border near Nakhon Phanom.³

The Thailand MA Program began to show an even greater emphasis on preparedness for contingency requirements in early FY63. A study of airfield loading during large scale troop deployments to SE Asia revealed that Don Muang lacked adequate parking aprons and load bearing capacity to handle a large number of heavy cargo aircraft. Since Don Muang was a key location in Southeast Asia, CINCPAC took steps to expand the Don Muang facility, using MAP funding.

The overall Thailand program was scheduled to take three to four years to complete and to cost \$50.0 to \$55.0 million - equal to

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00586, 23 Aug 1962 (S)
2. CINCPAC 131903Z Sep 1962 (C)
3. OSD DEF 918915 DTG 102341Z Sep 1962 (S)

the cost of the RVN program. Construction was being performed under the supervision of DIRPACDOCKS by military construction units and numerous civilian contractors.

Status of Southeast Asia construction projects at the end of 1963 was as follows:

Air Force Projects in RVN:

Pleiku Airstrip - Completed in December 1962. Minor additions to the water system and parking capability were planned for FY64.

Bien Hoa Airfield - Completed facility was accepted on 30 July 1963.

Tan Son Nhut Airfield Parking Facilities - All work except freight facilities was completed and accepted on 30 July 1963. A small additional program was underway, including an alert facility and hangar repairs.

Da Nang Airfield - The contractor began work in May 1963 to convert the 7,872 foot bituminous runway into a 10,000 foot jet-capable facility. Beneficial occupancy date (BOD) was scheduled for July 1964. FY64 program provided for complete funding of the construction effort started in May 1963.

Nha Trang Airfield - Air training center completed November 1963. FY64 Program called for overlaying runway, primary taxiway and parking apron, airfield lighting, and increased water supply system and ammunition storage.

Can Tho - A 6,000 foot flexible pavement (PSP or asphalt) airfield was designed. No construction funds were included in the FY64 program but serious consideration was being given to going ahead with plans to fund and construct this airfield.

Airfield Rehabilitation and Repair - Rehabilitation and repair of airfields at Soc Trang and Vung Tau was started in January 1963 and completed in 1963. Approximately \$.7 million was programmed for additional construction in FY64. Part of this money was earmarked

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for extending the runway at Soc Trang in the event the new airfield at Can Tho was not constructed.

AC&W - The Da Nang heavy AC&W site construction was completed in June 1963 but equipment installation had not been completed by the end of 1963. Construction had started on the semi-fixed mobile installation at Tan Son Nhut. The Can Tho semi - fixed mobile AC&W installation was in the Model Plan but construction could not begin until after the program for an airfield in the Can Tho area was resolved.

Army Projects in RVN:

Ammo Depots - The original program for construction of five depots was reduced to include only two. Construction got underway at Can Tho in November 1963 to provide for an additional 2,500 tons of storage, with BOD scheduled for November 1964. A similar amount of storage space was to be completed by April 1964 at Qui Nhon.

Hospital Augmentation - Construction of an additional 150 bed facility at Pleiku was completed late in 1963.

Medical Training Center, Saigon - Construction started in March 1963 on classrooms, laboratories, model wards, housing, messing, and administration buildings. BOD was scheduled for April 1964.

Printing Plant at Saigon - Construction started near the end of 1963 to provide RVNAF with a publications and forms printing and distribution facility. BOD was scheduled for November 1964.

Navy Projects in RVN:

Saigon Shipyard - Construction started in April 1963 on the first of two quay walls (195 meters long). A second quay wall was being designed. Construction was suspended in August 1963 due to design and construction problems. It was necessary to redesign both walls and, although construction had not resumed at the end of 1963, the walls were scheduled for construction in FY64.

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Saigon Hospital - On 28 September 1963 CINCPAC approved in principle the establishment of a temporary hospital facility in Saigon consisting of modifying and constructing certain additions to an existing facility. The project, costing \$75,000, was to be submitted through Navy channels for fundings and construction.

Cam Ranh Bay - A new 300 x 30 foot pier with 23 foot depth alongside, plus support facilities was under construction. BOD was scheduled for April 1964.

Da Nang Naval Facilities - A 120 meter pier with support facilities was designed with FY62-63 funding. Construction was scheduled for FY64.

Cat Lo - A 200,000 gallon POL storage facility was scheduled for construction in FY64.

An Thoi - A 40 x 10 meter pier at the junk fleet base on Phu Quoc Island was scheduled for construction in FY64.

Air Force Projects in Thailand:

Don Muang Airfield - Construction was underway with FY64 funding to greatly expand the military parking area and correct taxiway problems. BOD was scheduled for June 1964. Construction of an alert shelter was scheduled to begin in FY64.

Takhli Airfield - Airfield lighting, a concrete parking apron, increased POL storage, and a JP-4 hydrant system, provided for by FY62 funding, were completed. The FY63 program, providing for a control tower, rocket storage, and expanded water facilities, was under construction with scheduled BOD of January 1964. The FY64 program provided for a hangar with shops and apron and other miscellaneous support facilities.

Udorn - An expansion program started in FY62 to provide airfield lighting, runway overruns, 11 additional hardstands, POL storage, and the design of base support facilities for 1,000 men was completed. Projects under construction were a hangar with shops and

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apron, runway barriers, a large parking apron with JP-4 hydrant system, two warm up aprons, a parallel taxiway, support facilities for 500 personnel, and a flood control dam. BODs for these projects were between April and June 1964. The FY64 program was scheduled to provide for expanded utilities and a minimum number of family units.

Ubon - The FY62 MAP-provided airfield lighting, overruns, POL storage, and the design of facilities for 1,000 men were completed. The FY63 program provided for eight additional hardstands, a large apron, parallel taxiway, hangar with shops and apron, stubout for a JP-4 hydrant system and base facilities for 500 personnel. Construction of these was underway with BOD scheduled for June 1964. The FY64 program provided for a few additional facilities.

Chieng Mai - The FY64 MAP included minimum facilities to permit early deployment of a composite squadron to Chieng Mai. Included were a squadron living area, warehouses, and utilities. Construction had not started and BOD was scheduled for mid-1964. The FY64 MAP of approximately one million was the largest for any Thailand air base. Scheduled for construction were a large parking apron with hangar and shops, power plant, communications building, warehouses, utilities, and minimum family housing.

Kokethiem - There was no FY63 and prior MAP. The FY64 program was scheduled to provide warehouses, shops, hangar rehabilitation, and additional POL storage.

Nakhon Phanom - Construction of airfield runway and parking apron began in November 1962. The airfield was completed, inspected, and accepted by the RTAF in mid -December 1963.

AC&W - AC&W installations were either under construction or planned for FY64 at Korat Plateau, Udorn, and Chieng Mai.

Army Projects in Thailand:

Royal Thailand Army Post Construction - Since 1955 a total of \$20.0 million had been provided by the U.S., primarily from Agency

for International Development (AID) funds, for construction of housing and troop facilities at 20 Royal Thailand Army posts. In FY62 the availability of AID funds ceased and MAP became the only source for this type of construction. Because of the reduced MAP and the fact that almost all construction of this type resulted in an outflow of gold, only \$1.8 million was used from FY63 funds and about \$.3 million was scheduled for this purpose in FY64.

Bangkok Bypass Road - The original bypass road, designed to connect key logistic facilities south of Bangkok with rail and road lines of communication north of Bangkok, was to be routed from Chachoengsao to Prachinburi. This routing was subsequently altered to change the northern terminus from Prachinburi to Kabinburi thereby providing a direct linkup with the road from Kabinburi to Korat. The 809th Engineer Battalion, which was to receive help from the 561st Engineer Company effective in January 1964, was constructing the road in two phases, the first of which commenced in November 1962 and consisted of 37 kilometers on the southern end. Phase II, construction of the final 59 kilometers, had not started at the end of 1963; however, the road was scheduled to be completed in February 1965. (A more complete account of this project is found in Chapter IV)

Special Logistic Actions Thailand Depot Construction - Class IV Depots were being constructed at Korat and Udorn and a class V depot at Korat, for material and weapons prepositioned in support of contingency plans. Company D, 815th Engineer Battalion completed construction near the end of 1963.

Navy Projects in Thailand:

Sattahip Pier and Ammunition Depot - Construction funds for the depot were deleted because of the reductions in MAP ceilings. Difficulty was encountered in pier design due to the presence of underlying hard rock strata, which necessitated using costly caisson type construction, and the potential of wave action damage which required that the pier deck be raised 18 feet above mean water level. The result

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of these changes was that berthing capacity would exist only for one 10,000 ton ship instead of two as previously planned. It was also necessary to request additional funds. Construction was scheduled for FY64.

Sattahip LST Ramps - Most of the beach gradients in Thailand were not suitable for beaching landing ships and craft. Therefore LST ramps were essential. Construction funds were provided in the FY63 MAP for two ramps, and three additional ramps were to be constructed in FY64 with MAP funds.

Sattahip Water Development - The naval base at Sattahip lacked an adequate water supply so Architectural and Engineering funds were provided in the FY64 MAP for water exploration, well development, and distribution system design.

Ammunition War Reserve Levels

In July 1963 the JCS forwarded a staff study on ammunition war reserve levels to CINCPAC asking for his views and recommendations.¹ This study, prepared by OSD, recommended DOD policy on Ammunition War Reserve Levels (AWRL). A summary comparison of AWRLs proposed by the OSD study with those then established by CINCPAC indicated that AWRLs for small arms ammunition for Korea, Republic of China, Thailand and Vietnam would be reduced from 90 to 60 days. Levels for other types of ammunition for these countries would remain at the established level of 60 days. For the Philippines, the AWRL for Air Force Ammunition would be reduced from 60 to 30 days; that for small arms from 45 to 30 days. The reserve level for Navy and ground force weapons, other than small arms, would remain at 30 days.²

In commenting on the OSD study, CINCPAC stated that AWRLs were reviewed in considerable detail during the development of guidance for the FY64 MA Program/FY65-69 MA Plan. In view of a statement in the OSD staff study to the effect that PACOM used

1. JCS Memo 120-63, 23 Jul 1963 (S)

2. Report by SA/MAA to JCS, JCS 2315/289-1, 26 Aug 1963 (S)

"intense" rates, CINCPAC pointed out that the authorized expenditure rate was changed from intense to normal during this review.

Ammunition requirements included in the FY64 MA Program and FY65-69 MA Plan were based on this revised guidance, which was included in the CINCPAC Supplement to Part I of DOD Military Assistance Manual.

One recommendation of the study was that ammunition in authorized basic loads be excluded from computation of AWRL. CINCPAC non-concurred in this recommendation because the definition of basic load was so indefinite that the programming of the basic load would be difficult to control.¹ It was possible that the total ammunition (war reserve and basic load) authorized by the study could exceed the existing authorization. In addition, an unspecified amount of ammunition would be authorized in the unit supply trains. All of these, when added together, could more than double the "normal" expenditure rate. CINCPAC preferred to increase the war reserve level to compensate for including the basic load in the authorized levels. This would permit one computation for the total amount of ammunition (other than training) in-country and would give better control. CINCPAC excluded ships fill from AWRL since it was definable by regulations.

CINCPAC stated that small arms authorization for Korea, China and Thailand should remain at 90 days normal rate (including basic load) rather than at the 60 days recommended by the OSD study. He based this stand on the fact that these three countries were "choice pieces of real estate in the Far East Area" and after analyzing the threat, U.S. contingency plans, strong western orientation of countries, resupply factors, and the risks involved.

CINCPAC's third exception to the OSD study was in the use of the term "ammunition war reserve level" in connection with the neutral nations (Burma, Indonesia, and Cambodia) and with the RVN. Laos was also a special case. CINCPAC pointed out that ammunition operating levels rather than War Reserve Levels had been authorized for

1. CINCPAC 090415Z Aug 1963 (S)

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Cambodia, Indonesia and Burma, because of their neutral status. CINCPAC objected to a war reserve of ammunition in Laos; however, a 45-day level of ammunition was being maintained in Thailand (Saltshaker) for Laos. An AWRL was not appropriate for Vietnam because a wartime Ammunition Supply System had been approved recently by DOD for that country.¹

All Weather Improvement Program F-104G/J Aircraft

Twelve countries were programmed to receive the F-104G and F-104J aircraft to fulfill all-weather interceptor requirements. In PACOM two squadrons of F-104Gs were programmed in an attempt to meet a critical requirement for air defense of Taiwan, and Japan looked to the F-104J as a primary means of providing area defense. The Japanese were working on a project to produce 200 of these aircraft.²

Because the aircraft represented the AWX deterrent in allied countries world-wide and because of known deficiencies in the fire control and missile system, (an inability to engage and destroy in clouds) OSD felt the U. S. should initiate an R&D improvement program for the benefit of all recipients. The U. S. was prepared to fund 30 per cent of the nonrecurring R&D costs, which would be approximately \$10.0 million of a total estimated \$33.1 million. The remaining nonrecurring costs would be borne by European Consortium Nations (Germany, Netherlands and Belgium) and Japan. There was also an estimated \$330,000 additional unit cost per aircraft programmed in the Republic of China MAP for modernization kits, installation, and 2 1/2 missiles for each aircraft.³ CINCPAC strongly recommended to JCS that U. S. support be given to the program to upgrade F-104G/J electronic equipment and add radar homing missiles. CSAF indicated

1. OSD DEF 928115, DTG 160026Z May 1963 (S)
2. CINCPAC 022335Z Feb 1963 (S)
3. CINCPAC 152012Z Mar 1963 (S)

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that the Consortium Nations were unable to participate in F-104G AWX program at that time, therefore OSD withdrew its offer to support the project.¹ Since the entire program depended on what the Consortium Nations would support, there seemed to be little hope of developing the F-104G/J into a true all-weather interceptor unless DOD became willing to take a greater share of the financial responsibility. By the end of 1963 DOD had given no indication that it was willing to do this.

SAM In PACOM

The buildup of Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) in the PACOM area continued during 1963.² CINCPAC emphasis was on placing Nike Hercules and Hawk systems in Japan, Korea, and China.

Japan: In addition to the first Nike battalion (which was grant aid) the second Nike and two Hawks (plus four AN/TSQ-38 battalion operations centrals, including one for the grant aid Nike Battalion) were subjects of cost sharing negotiations.

The negotiations which were authorized by OSD-State in August 1962, began in early October. The total price of the SAM package at the beginning of negotiations was set at \$55.4 million. It was later reduced to \$53.5 million, of which the U. S. share was \$18.7 million. On 7 May 1963 State-OSD approved a draft memorandum of understanding that provided for the U. S. to furnish one Nike Hercules and two Hawk systems to Japan on a cost share basis of 65% Japan and 35% U. S. The memorandum was signed on 10 May 1963 by Chief MAAG Japan and a representative of the Japanese Government.³

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1. CSAF AFSPDAC 84034 DTG 021624Z Aug 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 1962 Command History, p. 107 (TS)
 3. CHMAAG JAPAN CME 6220 DTG 100702Z May 1963 (C)

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Korea: At the beginning of the year CINCPAC received a final draft agreement between the ROK and the U. S. , by which the U. S. was to provide one Hawk battalion to Korea. After study by CINCPAC, the draft was forwarded to OSD for review and approval.¹ The agreement was approved by OSD on 26 March and on 17 June was signed by General Meloy and Kim Sung-Eun, Minister of National Defense.^{2, 3} This was the first of three Hawk and two Nike battalions included in the PACOM MA Plan for Korea.⁴

COMUS KOREA submitted a proposal on 13 May 1963 for reduction of SAM units in Korea from ten and one half to nine battalions in order to save money for other high priority items. He proposed to delete two Nike Hercules battalions from ROK force objectives and to inactivate one U. S. Hawk battalion and use the equipment for an additional Hawk battalion for the ROKA. Further, he proposed to increase the U. S. Nike Hercules from one and one-half to two battalions by using the personnel from the inactivated U. S. Hawk battalion. One MSQ-28 control system would be deleted because of the reduced number of fire units proposed. CINCPAC did not favorably consider the proposal because the Korean air defense capability would be reduced and the MAP savings which could result from the deletions of the Nike units would be offset by an equal increase in the cost to MAP for the transfer of a U. S. Army Hawk battalion to the ROKA. In addition, the possibility of recoupage of prior year funds to be saved by elimination of the ROKA Hercules were slight.⁵

China: Nationalist China had one operational Nike battalion in 1963 and was scheduled to have a Hawk battalion in operation in FY64, and a second Nike unit operational in FY66. In March the Chinese Defense Minister indicated that his government did not want additional

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0086, 29 Jan 1963 (S)
2. SEOUL 996 to State, 17 June 1963 (S)
3. CINCPAC 272149Z Mar 1963 (U)
4. OSD DEF 926242 DTG 262028Z Mar 1963 (S)
5. CINCPAC ltr ser 00792, 29 Jul 1963 (S)

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surface to air missiles. However, during the review of the China MA plan and program, the Hawk battalion was approved for delivery to China as scheduled, and the second Nike Hercules battalion received tentative approval. Subsequently, on 22 May at Honolulu, the Chinese Defense Minister said he would accept the Nike Hercules battalion since he understood the funds could not be recouped from the deletion of this battalion and used for other purposes.¹

CHMAAG in the meantime took another look at the requirement for a second Nike battalion in view of the ever decreasing dollar ceiling and decided that the additional unit was not worth the high annual operating costs. CINCPAC supported this position and requested OSD approval to cancel the equipment for the second Nike battalion.² In response to an OSD request CINCPAC furnished information regarding the position he had taken and in addition asked JCS about the possibility of committing the U. S. to augment Taiwan's Air Defense with a SAM unit in the event of emergency.^{3, 4} CINCPAC asked ASD / ISA to give his opinions concerning the possibility of providing the GRC with material not in the existing FY64 Program in order to partially compensate for deletion of the second Nike battalion that had been funded in FY63 and prior years.⁵

JCS approved the concept of deploying a U. S. Nike battalion to augment Taiwan's Air Defense in the event it became necessary to execute OPLAN25-64 and OSD indicated that consideration would be given to reserving substantial recoupment for the GRC Program.^{6, 7} OSD approved deletion of the second Nike battalion three days after the end of 1963 and CINCPAC authorized CHMAAG to inform Minister Yu of the deletion as well as the possibility of recouping funds.^{8, 9}

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1. See 1963 items in Admiral Felt's Project Book, in J04 files (S)
 2. CINCPAC 100450Z Nov 1963 (S)
 3. OSD DEF 947066 DTG 032223Z Dec 1963 (S)
 4. CHMAAG China MGGC 12-315 DTG 121301Z Dec 1963 (S)
 5. CINCPAC 140130Z Dec 1963 (S)
 6. JCS 4143 DTG 261747Z Dec 1963 (TS)
 7. OSD 949046 DTG 192355Z Dec 1963 (TS)
 8. OSD 950430 DTG 032236Z Jan 1964 (S)
 9. CINCPAC 070320Z Jan 1964 (S)

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MAP Ship Deliveries

PACOM MA Program 1963 Ship deliveries were as follows:

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>TYPE SHIP</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Korea	Destroyer (DD)	1
	Patrol Ship (DE)	1
	Patrol Craft (PCE)	1
	Mine Warfare Ship (MSC)	2
	Landing Craft (LCM)	1
	Landing Craft (LCVP)	3
Vietnam	Patrol Craft (PGM)	11
	Gasoline Barge (YOG)	1
	Mine Warfare Craft (MSML)	12
	Amphibious Warfare Ship (LST)	1
	Amphibious Warfare Ship (LSM)	1
Thailand	Mine Warfare Craft (MSML)	3
	Mine Warfare Ship (MSC)	1
	Landing Craft (LCVP)	8
	Landing Craft (LCM)	2
Philippines	Small Harbor Tug (YTL)	2
	Landing Craft (LCM)	2
Burma	Landing Craft (LCM)	2

COUNTRY ACTIVITIES

MAP activities in Vietnam, Laos and Thailand are included in Chapter IV. (see also Southeast Asia construction this chapter).

Burma

Objectives of Military Assistance to Burma were to promote favorable attitudes toward the U. S. on the part of Burma's military leaders (who were also in control of the government), chiefly by demonstrating that the U. S. supported them in their basic objectives of internal security and national unity; to preclude or limit Burmese acceptance of assistance in the military and para-military fields from

communist sources; to increase the effectiveness of the Burmese Armed Forces in controlling or suppressing insurgencies; and to contribute to Burma's economic development and political stability. After the downward revision of the PACOM MAP in the latter part of 1963, the Burma MAP was reduced to basically include only training and follow-on spares for equipment previously delivered.

Substitution of F1-C (FJ-3) for F-86F Aircraft for Burma:

Twelve F-86F aircraft were included in the FY63 MA Program for Burma. In February OSD advised CINCPAC that availability of F-86 aircraft was critical and suggested that CINCPAC consider substituting the F-84F or armed T-33's. CINCPAC recommended the use of T-33's until F-86's were available and rejected the idea of using F-84's because of their sophistication and increased facilities requirements. ¹

OSD countered CINCPAC's proposal by suggesting that the FJ-3 (Navy version of F-86, the designation of which was later changed to F1-C) be substituted for the F-86's. ² CINCPAC and the Chief Military Equipment Delivery Team agreed with the OSD suggestion.


OSD proposed substitution of only 10 F-1C's for 12 F-86F's because of higher costs of the navy type aircraft; Burma insisted upon substitution on a one-for-one basis. Since FY63 funds would permit programming for only 10 F1-C's, OSD proposed that two of the twelve aircraft be programmed in the FY64 MAP, with estimated delivery dates being the same as if they had been programmed in FY63. ³ Burma accepted this solution. ⁴

OSD transferred this program to the Navy effective September 1963. Four aircraft were scheduled to be delivered by February 1964 and the remaining eight by the last of May. During the last month of 1963 problems were being experienced with meeting delivery dates due to inability to assemble necessary support equipment. ^{5, 6}

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- 1. CINCPAC 232352Z Mar 1963 (S)
 - 2. OSD DEF 928742 DTG 312259Z May 1963 (S)
 - 3. OSD DEF 929443 DTG 201805Z Jun 1963 (C)
 - 4. CHMEDT Rangoon MCX-121 DTG 240305Z June 1963 (C)
 - 5. CINCPAC 200206Z Dec 1963 (C)
 - 6. MSD NSC Oakland DTG 262009Z Dec 1963 (C)

BURMA

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1963

BASIC INFORMATION		OVERALL OBJECTIVE		U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	
AREA	262,000 SQ. MI.	<p>HELP BURMA SURVIVE AS AN INDEPENDENT, UNITED, NON-COMMUNIST STATE, BASICALLY FRIENDLY TOWARD THE U.S. AND THE FREE WORLD.</p> <p>GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE:</p> <p>(A) TO LIMIT OR PRECLUDE, AS POSSIBLE, COMMUNIST ASSISTANCE IN THE MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FIELDS;</p> <p>(B) TO HAVE ARMED FORCES (INCLUDING PARAMILITARY AS APPROPRIATE IN EACH CASE) WILLING AND ABLE TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY UTILIZING ROLE OF ARMED FORCES AS A BALANCING FACTOR AGAINST COMMUNIST ELEMENTS AND APPELATES IN COUNTRY;</p> <p>(C) TO EXPAND THE CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CIVIC ACTION IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIC BASE AND ESTABLISH CLOSER BONDS BETWEEN THE FORCES AND THE POPULACE;</p> <p>(D) TO CARRY OUT CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS FOR MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL POLITICAL STABILITY AND PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION.</p>		<p>U.S. AMBASSADOR HON. HENRY A. BYRONE</p>	
POPULATION	23,000,000			<p>U.S. AID REPRESENTATIVE MR. DONALD P. BARKES</p>	
ANNUAL GROWTH	1.8%			<p>CHIEF WEDT COL. MORRIS J. MAUDIS, USA</p>	
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	1.0 ACRE			<p>MAP OBJECTIVE</p>	
LITERACY RATE	60%				
LIFE EXPECTANCY	35 YEARS	<p>GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE:</p> <p>(A) TO LIMIT OR PRECLUDE, AS POSSIBLE, COMMUNIST ASSISTANCE IN THE MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FIELDS;</p> <p>(B) TO HAVE ARMED FORCES (INCLUDING PARAMILITARY AS APPROPRIATE IN EACH CASE) WILLING AND ABLE TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY UTILIZING ROLE OF ARMED FORCES AS A BALANCING FACTOR AGAINST COMMUNIST ELEMENTS AND APPELATES IN COUNTRY;</p> <p>(C) TO EXPAND THE CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CIVIC ACTION IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIC BASE AND ESTABLISH CLOSER BONDS BETWEEN THE FORCES AND THE POPULACE;</p> <p>(D) TO CARRY OUT CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS FOR MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL POLITICAL STABILITY AND PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION.</p>			
<p>CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS UNION OF BURMA REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT/DEFENSE MINISTER - GEN. NE WIN VICE CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY - BRIGADIER SER YU VICE CHIEF OF STAFF AIR - BRIGADIER THAUNG DAN VICE CHIEF OF STAFF NAVY - COMMODORE THAUNG TIN</p>				<p>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</p>	
MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES		TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES		COMBAT CAPABILITY	
ARMY	<p>4 INF DIV, 4 SIGNAL REGT (BR)</p> <p>2 INF BDE</p>	<p>73 INF BNS, 9 LIGHT INF BNS, 4 ARTY BNS, 1 AMBT TANK BN, 1 ARMOR BN, 1 ARMOR CAR BN</p>		<p>NOT YET CAPABLE OF FULLY SECURING INTERNAL PEACE AND ORDER. UNABLE TO OFFER SUSTAINED EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE TO DIRECT ATTACK BY CHINCOMS. NO SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY BEYOND BURMA BORDERS.</p>	
NAVY	<p>9 PATROL SHIPS</p> <p>11 PGH</p> <p>4 LSSL</p> <p>4 MINESWEEPERS</p>	<p>1 PE, 1 MSEA FROM 3 PT, 10 PR, 4 LCG, 2 PRGB, 7 MCB, 3 RCB, 10 RRG, 4 YAG, 8 COM, 1 CG</p>		<p>CAPABLE OF GIVING LIGHT SUPPORT TO THE ARMY, DISCOURAGING PIRACY, AND CONDUCTING INSHORE PATROL DUTIES.</p>	
AIR FORCE	<p>1 TAG FTR SQ, 2 TRANS SQ, 2 HELO SQ</p>	<p>2 TRANS SQ 3 COMMUNICATIONS SQ 1 OPERATIONAL CONVERSION UNIT</p>		<p>IT IS CAPABLE OF PERFORMING ITS PRIMARY MISSION OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY BY SUPPORTING THE ARMY AND NAVY. NEGLIGIBLE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY AGAINST AIR ATTACK BY MAJOR POWER.</p>	

Cambodia

Objectives of Military Assistance to Cambodia were to strengthen the capability of the Cambodian forces to maintain internal security against subversion and insurgency inspired by communists or other elements contrary to U. S. interest, preclude Communist Bloc military assistance and encourage pro-Western orientation.

The projected FY64 program was designed to assist in the maintenance of the armed forces, to continue the standardization of equipment, and to improve communication and maintenance capabilities. Spaces were also programmed for training a limited number of Cambodian personnel in the U. S.

Cambodia Acceptance of U. S. Naval Training: Although training in USN schools had frequently been offered, it had not been accepted by the Cambodian Government until early in 1963. One Cambodian officer reported to U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, for a course of instruction in basic naval professional subjects, to be followed by shipboard training on a U. S. Navy DE. Another officer and four enlisted men reported for builders indoctrination training in PGM's.

Also two enlisted storekeepers were enrolled in the U. S. Navy Storekeepers course at Newport, R. I. Their training complemented the training provided by a Naval Supply Team assigned to assist the Royal Cambodian Navy in establishing a navy supply system compatible with the MAP effort.¹ The acceptance of training for storekeepers was significant because it reflected a decision by Cambodia to accept U. S. advice in naval supply matters.

In December, after Prince Sihanouk's renouncement of U. S. aid, those Navy students who had not completed their training were called home by the Cambodian Government.

1. CHNAVSEC MAAG Cambodia 1st Ind on MTT2-62 Report 24 Sep 1962 (S)

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Cut Off of Ammunition to Cambodian Army: As the result of a CHMAAG Cambodia request, all shipments of ammunition for the Cambodian Army were suspended.¹ This action was taken because of the repeated failure of the Cambodian Army to use MAP furnished ammunition for its intended use, which was training. For several years Cambodia used MAP furnished training ammunition to build up a large war reserve that it was incapable of maintaining properly. In view of previous unsuccessful attempts to get the Cambodian Army to expend ammunition for training, CINCPAC directed that all remaining undelivered ammunition funded in the FY63 and prior year MAP be deleted, and that ammunition for the Cambodian Army be dropped from the FY64 MAP.²

Withdrawal of the MAAG from Cambodia: In a 5 November radio speech, Prince Sihanouk warned the U.S. that if the Khmer Serei movement and radio were not silenced by 31 December 1963, he would terminate acceptance of all free world aid (French and U.S., economic and military). He also stated that he would call in Chinese Communist financial, technical and military advisors and turn Cambodia into a People's Republic.³ The Khmer Serei movement was a Cambodian anti-Sihanouk movement, backed by Cambodians residing in Thailand and South Vietnam. Sihanouk claimed the U.S. supported the movement.

Although Sihanouk had displayed a tendency on other occasions to have rapid changes of mind, CINCPAC began making plans to withdraw the MAAG, using the experience gained in withdrawing the MAAG from Laos in 1962. CHMAAG Cambodia also made plans for the MAAG withdrawal.⁴

On 20 November the Cambodian Government passed a note to the

1. CHMAAG Cambodia 3254 AMAO DTG 090935Z Sep 1963 (C)
2. CINCPAC 172347Z Sep 1963 (S)
3. Phnom Penh 329 to State, 5 Nov 1963, 6:45 PM (U)
4. Phnom Penh 364 to State, 16 Nov 5 PM (S)

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U. S. Ambassador requesting the cessation of aid in the military, economic, technical and cultural fields and the initiation of bilateral conversations concerning the liquidation of existing programs. ¹ CINCPAC later received a MAAG outline withdrawal plan that was based on a 2 1/2 month phase-out beginning upon receipt of the order to discontinue the MAAG. ² With minor exceptions, CINCPAC concurred with the plan and recommended that MAP-funded Cambodian students be allowed to complete U. S. training. ³ Those students who had not completed training however were later called home by their government.

Negotiations with the Cambodian Government for liquidation of existing U. S. programs in Cambodia began on 29 November. These bilateral conversations were hampered because of the uncompromising manner in which Prince Sihanouk had ended the aid program. While some responsible Cambodian negotiators wished to maintain a flow of assistance, which the U. S. was quite willing to do, U. S. representatives considered that before this was possible some modification to the RKG cessation of aid was necessary. On 13 December the Cambodian Minister of Plans notified the U. S. Ambassador that negotiations were "not fruitful" and were therefore terminated as of that day. ^{4, 5} Subsequently Sihanouk decided to call his last diplomat in Washington home and asked that all U. S. AID, MAAG and USIS personnel leave Cambodia by 15 January 1964. ⁶ OSD confirmed 15 January as the latest date by which the MAAG would be discontinued. ⁷ This reduced considerably the planned time period for evacuation.

MAP material in-country that had been unloaded and to which claim could be made by Cambodia was given to that country and Cambodian equipment in U. S. hands for maintenance or repair was to be returned also. Equipment belonging to the MAAG began moving out

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1. Phnom Penh 381 to State, 20 Nov 1963 (U)
 2. Phnom Penh 427 to State, 28 Nov 1963, 4 PM (S)
 3. CINCPAC 300512Z Nov 1963 (S)
 4. Phnom Penh 499 to State, 13 Dec 1963, 9 PM (C)
 5. PACFLT Int Sum 292-63, DTG 141133Z Dec 1963 (S)
 6. DIA/CIIC DIAAP-3 78227, DTG 160637Z Dec 1963 (S)
 7. OSD 172236Z Dec 1963 (S)

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of the country in mid-December by air and ship, and at the end of 1963 all household goods and about 50% of MAAG assets had been shipped. MAAG personnel and dependents, who began leaving Cambodia in mid-December, were evacuated by the end of the year with the exception of 27 officers and enlisted men and the Chief MAAG's dependents. Records and funds close out and audit were near completion. CHMAAG Cambodia planned to prepare a final summary report of the closing out of the MAAG during a stopover in Hawaii following his departure from Cambodia. ¹

Repair and Reassignment of PGM: In November 1963 a U. S. PGM (Patrol Craft) arrived in Cambodia for transfer to the Cambodian government under the Military Assistance Program. However, because of damages incurred during shipment, it was not in satisfactory condition for transfer and remained in U. S. custody. ² During later negotiations for cessation of the MAP to Cambodia the Country Team took the position, concurred in by CINCPAC, that the PGM should remain U. S. property since it still flew the U. S. flag. ³ CINCPAC requested that CINCPACFLT obtain permission from Cambodia for a U. S. ship to enter its waters for the purpose of towing the disabled PGM to a facility for repair and possible reassignment. Permission was granted and the USS Cocopa towed the PGM to Saigon for transshipment to Subic. MAAG Vietnam requested that the PGM be assigned to the RVN upon completion of repairs; however, at the end of 1963 its reassignment had not been resolved. ⁴ (C)


Indonesia

Objectives of Military Assistance to Indonesia were to provide assistance in the form of equipment and training for the Indonesian Armed Forces on a limited but continuing basis with the primary

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1. CINCPAC 220609Z Dec 1963 (C)
 2. CHMAAG Cambodia DTG 191031Z Nov 1963 (C)
 3. CINCPAC 131821Z Dec 1963 (S)
 4. CHMAAG Vietnam DTG 220949Z Nov 1963 (C)

INDONESIA

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1963

BASIC INFORMATION		OVERALL OBJECTIVE		U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	
AREA.....	576,000 SQ MI	GROSS NATL PROD 1963 (E).....	\$6.7 BILLION	U.S. AMBASSADOR.....	HON HOWARD P. JONES
POPULATION.....	96 MILLION	PER CAPITA.....	\$ 67	USAID DIRECTOR.....	MR. EDWIN L. FOX
ANNUAL GROWTH.....	2.0 %	DEFENSE BUDGET 1963 (E).....	\$ 11 BILLION	CHIEF, MILTAG.....	COL WILLIAM HARVEY, USA
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA.....	0.5 ACRE	AS % OF CENTRAL GOVT EXPENSE FINANCED.....	400	MAP OBJECTIVE GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE: (A) TO LIMIT OR PRECLUDE, AS POSSIBLE, COMMUNIST ASSISTANCE IN THE MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FIELDS; (B) TO HAVE ARMED FORCES (INCLUDING PARAMILITARY AS APPROPRIATE IN EACH CASE) WILLING AND ABLE TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY UTILIZING ROLE OF ARMED FORCES AS A BALANCING FACTOR AGAINST COMMUNIST ELEMENTS AND AFFILIATES IN COUNTRY; (C) TO CREATE A FAVORABLE ATTITUDE OF INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES TOWARD THE U.S. AND IN SUPPORT OF U.S. POLICY; (D) TO EXPAND THE CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CIVIC ACTION IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIC BASE AND ESTABLISH CLOSE BONDS BETWEEN THE FORCES AND THE POPULACE; (E) TO CARRY OUT VARIOUS ACTION PROGRAMS FOR MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL POLITICAL STABILITY AND PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION.	
LITERACY RATE.....	60 %	AS % OF GNP.....	15.9		
LIFE EXPECTANCY.....	32 YEARS				
PRESIDENT/PRIME MINISTER - Achmed Sukarno DEFENSE MINISTER-C/S ARMED FORCES - GEN A. H. Nasution C/S ARMY - LTGEN Achmed Yani, ARMY C/S NAVY - VADM Edi Martadinata, NAVY C/S AIR FORCE - AIR MARSHAL Umar Dani, AF COMMANDANT MARCORPS - BGEN Hartono, MARCORPS MIN FOREIGN AFFAIRS/DEP FIRST MINISTER - Dr. Subandrio					
MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES		TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES		COMBAT CAPABILITY	
ARMY	120 INF BNS, 5 TK BNS, 5 ARMD CAV BNS, 15 FA BNS	140 INF BN, 17 MP BN, 8 ARMD BN 8 FA BN, 9 AAA BN, 9 ENG BN	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL MINOR INCURSIONS BUT NOT A MAJOR ATTACK. LAUNCH AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN BRIGADE STRENGTH.		
NAVY	1 MAR RLT, 8 DD/DE 22 PATROL SHIPS 15 MINESWEEPERS 1 ASW PAT SON, 12 LOG SHIPS	1 CL, 5 DD, 8 DE, 12 SS, 55 PATROL, 21 PT, 8 AD, 7 LST, 7 LCU/LSL, 3 PF, 13 MINE, 17 MISC, 24 AUX, 5 MAR BNS (INF)	SUPPRESS SMUGGLING AND SUPPORT A THREE BATTALION SIZE LANDING FORCE CONDUCT ONLY TAKEN SUBMARINE INTERDICTION AND ASW OPERATIONS. INDONESIAN MARINES ARE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING BATTALION SIZE LANDING FORCES FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS.		
AIR FORCE	1 TAC FTR SON, 1 TAC RCN SON, 2 TRANS SON, 1 ASR SON	2 LTBR SON, 1 WEDBR SON, 2 FTR/BRM SON, 2 A/WETR SON, 2 TRANS SON, 1 RECON SON, 1 ASR SON, 1 HELO SON, 1 MISSILE WING (SAM)	FORCES IN BEING ARE OPERATIONALLY READY TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE BOMBING OPERATIONS AND DEFENSE OPERATIONS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND TO SUPPORT MINOR GROUND OPERATIONS.		

objective of favorably influencing and strengthening U. S. ties with politically important military elements in Indonesia, enabling them to avoid becoming totally dependent on the Soviet Union for their military needs and bolstering their resolve to resist Communism.

Military Assistance for Indonesia had been small; only \$70 million since 1950. About two-thirds of this had been delivered. The Army received about two-thirds of the total assistance, with the Navy receiving the bulk of the remainder. The FY64-69 Military Assistance plans were designed primarily to support a civic action role. The primary U. S. problem was trying to operate without a country-to-country agreement. The only existing agreement was a 1958 Mutual Sales Agreement for items that could be mutually agreed upon. The lack of written agreements affected all MAP actions, causing them to be handled on verbal understandings and on a case-by-case method. The best use of MAP money was in the training program, because it had lasting effects while equipment wore out. The Indonesians liked to send representatives to U. S. schools and would have liked to have U. S. detachments in the country to work as training liaison teams. There was no U. S. commitment for this.¹ After the downward revision of the PACOM MAP the FY64 MAP for Indonesia contained only training.

Japan

Objectives of Military Assistance to Japan were to create a Japan, internally secure, closely allied to the U. S., and willing and able to strengthen its defense against external aggression; to support a Japanese defense effort capable of maintaining internal security against communist inspired subversion and insurgency and of assuming increasing responsibility for the defense of its area.

1. CINCPAC MAAG Chief's Conference Report 1963 (S)

The materiel program for Japan was confined to carrying out commitments for U. S. contributions to selected Japanese force improvement projects. The U. S. no longer provided any consumables or POL, nor did the U. S. contribute to force maintenance, even for items previously furnished through military assistance. Selected U. S. Navy type weapons and fire control equipment were provided to help Japan modernize the ships of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force. The FY64 program also included \$1.2 million for training in the operation and maintenance for 2 Hawk and 2 Nike surface to air missile battalions.

Japan Air Weapons Control System: In the spring of 1960, CINCPAC approved the concept of the General Electric AN/GPA-73 for automation of Japanese air defense. Cost sharing was expected to be 50/50, with hardware costs estimated near \$100 million and first increment funding to start in the FY63-64 period. Subsequently, under political pressure, the Japanese Government asked for and received bids from other U. S. companies including Hughes and Litton. Proposals varied from \$55 to \$70 million for basic systems with Electronic Counter Countermeasures (ECCM) costing an additional \$10 to \$15 million. OSD subsequently directed that the funding ratio would be 25% U. S., 75% GOJ. Officials of the Japanese Government probed the possibility of 50/50 funding as originally contemplated and suggested that a minimum ratio of 35/65 might be necessary if the Japanese were to have the system they wanted and apparently needed.¹

In March 1963 Japan asked for new bids on a "boiled down" system. A U. S. team was approved to unilaterally re-examine requirements in the ECCM and MODE II areas, and recommend to the Japanese additional information that might be necessary to insure valid pricing on which U. S. /Japan cost sharing discussions could be based.^{2, 3}

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1. CHMAAG Japan 230714Z Jul 1962 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 182124Z Jun 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 210446 Jun 1963 (S)

JAPAN

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1963

BASIC INFORMATION		OVERALL OBJECTIVE		U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	
AREA.....	143,000 SQ MI	LIFE EXPECTANCY.....	67 YEARS	U.S. AMBASSADOR.....	HON EDWIN D REISCHAUER
POPULATION.....	115 MILLION	GROSS NAT. PROD. 1963(ET).....	\$58.8 BILLION	CHIEF MAAG.....	R/G J M WASHINGTON, USA
ANNUAL GROWTH.....	1%	PER CAPITA.....	\$511	MAP OBJECTIVE	
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA.....	0.2 ACRE	DEFENSE BUDGET 1963(ET) SELF FINANCED.....	\$764 MILLION		
LITERACY RATE.....	97%	AS % OF TOTAL GNP.....	1.3%	GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE: (A) THE MAINTENANCE OF A UNITED STATES-JAPANESE ALLIANCE BASED ON THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY. (B) A JAPANESE DEFENSE EFFORT CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND OF ASSUMING INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH PACIFIC AREA TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED STATES FORCES, OF DEFENDING AND, IF NECESSARY, OF DEFEATING COMMUNIST AGGRESSION. (C) BY THE END OF THE PLANNING PERIOD, A JAPAN WILLING AND ABLE TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSE PROGRAMS ENTIRELY FROM ITS OWN RESOURCES. (D) THE MAINTENANCE OF A CLIMATE IN WHICH THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO ENJOY EXISTING AND, IF REQUIRED, ADDITIONAL OVERFLIGHT, STAGING, AND BASE RIGHTS.	
EMPEROR - Hirohito PRIME MINISTER - Hayato Ikeda MIN FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Masayoshi Ohira DIR-GEN JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY (JDA) - Tokuyasu Fukuda CHAIRMAN, JOINT STAFF COUNCIL (JSC) - GEN Keizo Hayashi, ARMY CHIEF, GROUND STAFF GSDP - GEN Kan Ohmori, ARMY CHIEF, MARITIME STAFF MSDF - ADM Ichizo Sugita, NAVY CHIEF, AIR STAFF, ASDP - GEN Takeshi Matsuoka, AF DIR-GEN, MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY (MSA) - Takao Tsuji		DENEY CONTROL OF JAPAN TO ANY HOSTILE POWER. INSURE A STRONG, FRIENDLY CO-OPERATIVE NATION FIRMLY ALIGNED WITH U.S.			
MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES 12 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 3 HAWK BN, 3 TANK BN, 1 MECHANIZED DIVISION, 1 SCHOOL BDE, 2 AAA BN, 14 ARTY BN, 3 NIKE BN, 1 ABN BDE		TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES 12 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 1 MECHANIZED DIVISION, 1 AIRBORNE BRIGADE, 10 ARTILLERY BATTALIONS, 8 AIRBORNE BATTALIONS, 2 4 2 MORTAR BATTALIONS, 1 NIKE BN, 5 SHAWT ROS, 3 TR BNS		COMBAT CAPABILITY MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONDUCT LIMITED DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS	
ARMY	10 ICHIE, 46 DESTROYER ESCORT TYPES, 33 PATROL SHIPS, 9 SS, 48 MINISWEEPERS, 40 MC, 41 ST/LSM, 12 ASW/C SON, 6 HELO SON, 1 TRANSP SON	1800, 80F, 45 PATROL, 6 SS, 37 MINE, 2 MNC, 41 ST/LSM, 48 AMPHIB, 8 AUX, 11 ASW A/C SON, 2 HELO SON, 1 TRANS SON		LIMITED ABILITY TO ESCORT COASTAL CONVOYS, 1 ASW SQDN OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE, GOOD MINISWEEPING CAPABILITY.	
NAVY	11 A/W FTR SONS, 2 TRANSPORT SONS, 2 RECON SONS, 8 TAG FTR SONS, 11 SAR DETACHMENTS.	5 A/W FTR SONS, 2 TRANSPORT SONS, 10 D/F SONS, 1 RECON SON		GOOD UNDER VFR CONDITIONS, AWX CAPABILITY GROWING, SMALL SIZE LIMITS ABILITY.	



Fig. 15

After shifting their support from one to the other of the three bidding companies, the Japanese selected Hughes (primarily because of its low bid of approximately \$36 million) and gave that company a letter of intent to let a contract. Funding problems arose due to failure of the Japanese to provide funding support to the project, differences in the U. S. and Japanese fiscal year, and the delay in acceptance by the Japanese of a 75/25 cost sharing formula. In addition, an OSD study recommending radical changes in the basic concept for air defense of Japan was yet to be evaluated. This study, made by an OSD study team headed by Dr. Wilkes of ISA, would eliminate all direction centers and decentralize air weapons controls to individual radar sites. It would also provide five E2A aircraft at a cost of \$30 million for primary interceptor control against low altitude attacks.

Following repeated delays U. S. proposals were furnished to the Japanese government on 20 November 1963. The U. S. agreed to pay 25 percent of equipment costs, provided 50 percent of the equipment was procured from the U. S. By the end of the year an official reply to the U. S. proposal had not been received.¹

MAAG Japan's Role in Military Assistance Sales: In May 1963 Japan asked CHMAAG Japan that it be given a Military Assistance Sales (MAS) Letter of Offer for Hawk training equipment (approximately \$4.2 million), and for an equipment set to outfit a third Hawk battalion and to provide extra annual service practice missiles for the battalion (approximately \$20 million).² Although Japan was not included among category A-1 nations that were entitled to submit requests for equipment and services directly to the U. S. Department of the Army, in response to a CINCPAC inquiry, this was cleared up by a May OSD policy statement that placed Japan in that category.³ Accordingly, CINCPAC informed Chief MAAG Japan that he had adequate authority

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1. USFJ Fact Sheet, Subj: Air Weapons Control System for Japan
15 Jan 64 (S)
 2. CHMAAG Japan ASL 6240 DTG 200112Z May 1963 (C)
 3. DA 930163 DTG 112112Z Jul 1963 (C)

for implementation of his recommendations under existing terms of reference.¹ CINCPAC suggested that Chief MAAG Japan work out appropriate procedural arrangements with Japanese authorities. (C)

In another action Japan began submitting requisitions through MAAG Japan on 1 July 1963 against two MAS cases established for Nike follow-on repair parts. MAAG Japan was instrumental in correcting initial difficulties with U. S. agencies involved in handling the cases.² CHMAAG Japan later requested CINCPAC's help in completing corrective action on the two cases and a team from USARPAC was sent to Japan in September to give assistance.³ (C) Action by this team subsequently resolved most of the problems in these two cases.

Service Designation of CHMAAG Japan: In September, after consulting with the U. S. Ambassador to Japan, Admiral Felt recommended to the JCS that the next CHMAAG Japan be a rear admiral, USN. An army general held this position for the first seven years during the buildup of the Japanese Defense Force. In 1957 the position rotated to the Navy, then to the Air Force, and in 1962, back to the Army. During 1963 the U. S. MAP objectives for Japan were SAM, semi-automated AC&W, and ASW. The agreements on the missiles were signed, and Admiral Felt expected the AC&W problems to be settled soon.⁴

Korea

Objectives of Military Assistance to Korea were to maintain ROK forces capable of; assuring internal security; deferring overt communist attack; and together with U. S. Forces and support, defending against such attack.

The FY 1964 program provided maintenance and selected modernization for ROK forces. The program included: general and special

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1. CINCPAC 171920Z Jul 1963 (C)
 2. CHMAAG Japan ASL 2244 DTG 080709Z Aug 1963 (C)
 3. CHMAAG Japan ASL 2484 DTG 120705Z (C)
 4. CINCPAC 162338Z Sep 63 (C)

KOREA

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1963

BASIC INFORMATION		MAP OBJECTIVE		U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	
<p>AREA 37,000 SQ. MI. POPULATION 26.1 MILLION ANNUAL GROWTH 2.5% ARABLE LAND PER CAP. 0.2 ACRE LITERACY RATE 80% LIFE EXPECTANCY 47 YEARS GROSS NAT. PROD. 1963 \$ 1.8 BILLION PER CAPITA \$ 65 DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCE (E) 1963 \$40.0 MILLION AS % OF GNP 2.2% AS % OF CENT GOVT. 7.1%</p> <p>PRESIDENT - GEN Pak Chong Inui, ROKA (Ret) PRIME MINISTER - Choc Tu-son DEFENSE MINISTER - LTGEN Kim, Sung-eun, ROKMC (Ret) C/S ARMY - GEN NIE KI-sik, ARMY CNO - VADM YI, Maeng-ki, NAVY C/S AIR FORCE - LTGEN Chang, Song-hwan, AF COMMANDANT, MARCORPS - LTGEN Kim, Tu-Chan</p>		<p>OVERALL OBJECTIVE</p> <p>PROTECT SOUTH KOREA AGAINST RE-NEWED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, PRE-SERVE AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, LOOKING TOWARD EVENTUAL PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA UNDER A FREE, DEMOCRATIC AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT FRIENDLY TO THE U.S.</p> <p>MAP OBJECTIVE</p> <p>GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE:</p> <p>(A) THE MAINTENANCE AND IMPROVEMENT OF ADEQUATE FORCES WITH AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE POSTURE; (B) THE MAINTENANCE OF A CLIMATE IN WHICH THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO ENJOY EXTENSIVE AND RE-QUIRED ADDITIONAL OVERTIGHT, STAGING, AND BASE RIGHTS; (C) THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN PROJECTS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT IMPAIRING THE PRIMARY MILITARY MISSION; (D) BEING EFFECTIVE ENOUGH TO LESSEN THE EXISTING AND POTENTIAL OF MARINE, AIR, LOGIST AND SUPPORT FORCES TO BE CAPABLE OF:</p> <p>(1) MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY; (2) DETERRING OVERT COMMUNIST ATTACK; (3) STOPPING AGAINST SUCH ATTACK WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IF SH-47 OF AA, A, GAIT COMMUNIST EFFORT; (4) ASSISTING, WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITIES, U.S. FORCES IN THE EVENT OF GENERAL WAR.</p>		<p>U.S. AMBASSADOR HON. SAMUEL D. BERSEK</p> <p>USAID DIRECTOR MR. JAMES S. KILLEN</p> <p>COMUS KOREA CHIEF, PROYMAAG MAJGEN ROYMAN B. EDWARDS, USA</p>	
<p>MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES</p> <p>18 INFANTRY DIVS, 10 RES DIVS, 10 TANK BNS 1 SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 2 MIKE BNS, 3 HAWK BNS, 1 AAA BDE, 6 8" HOW BNS, 10 MED ARTY BNS.</p> <p>800/DE, 12 LST, 12 LSM, 19 PATROL CRAFT, 2 APD, 3 PCW, 1 MAR DIV, 20 MINESWEEPER, 1 SEAL UNIT</p> <p>6 TACTICAL FTR SONS, 2 TRANSPORT SONS 1 TACTICAL RECON SON, 2 A/WTR SON, 1 TAC AIR CONTROL SON, 1 SAR SON.</p>		<p>TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES</p> <p>18 INF DIVS, 10 RES DIVS, 1 SPECIAL FORCES GP, 10 TK BNS 12 155 HOW BNS, 1 155 GRAN, 2 8" HOW BNS, 5 4.2 MORTAR BNS 1 AAA BRIGADE, 12 ARMY, 5 CORPS (HDG)</p> <p>100, 30E, 14PD, 4PF, 8PCE / PCEC, 1PC/P6S, 2PT, 9MINE, 12LSM, 8LST, 1LCU, SAKL, 440, 2ATA, 1ARL, 1 MAR DIV (-), 1 MAR BRIG, 1 MAR BN.</p> <p>5 TACTICAL FTR SONS, 2 A/WTR SON, 1 TRANSPORT SON, 1 TACTICAL RECON SON</p>		<p>COMBAT CAPABILITY</p> <p>MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL AGGRESSION FROM NORTH KOREA, ASSUMING ADEQUATE LOGISTIC & AIR SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES</p> <p>WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MINE COURTESY MEASURES THE ABILITY OF THE ROYAL MARINE CORPS AND ITS ASSIGNED MISSION IS CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY FOR THE MARINES ARE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROVIDING REGIMENTAL SIZE LANDING FORCES FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OF 1 OR LARGER SIZED FORCES, IF LIFT, AND OTHER SUPPORT IS MADE AVAILABLE</p> <p>FORCES IN BEING OPERATIONALLY READY TO SUPPORT GROUND OPERATIONS AND CONDUCT VFR AIR AND LIMITED A/W DEFENSE MISSIONS</p>	

Fig. 16

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purpose vehicles and equipment for replacing over-age World War II items; ammunition for training; POL for operation and maintenance of the forces; equipment and supplies required for maintenance of posts, bases, and facilities; raw materials for local manufacture of clothing; repair and overhaul of tanks, vehicles, aircraft; and medical supplies. The program also included training and training equipment for maintenance of combat readiness and some urgently needed construction of support facilities. (S)

Support of UN/ROK in Limited War: The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provided that in a limited war U. S. military assistance for committed allied forces would normally be provided through U. S. supply channels and would not retain MAP identity. The plan also provided that the decision to supply allied forces through the U. S. pipeline would be made by the Secretary of Defense. CINCPAC requested, in a message to JCS, that the SecDef decision to abandon MAP channels in the event of war be given in advance.¹

The JCS replied that existing law required that supplies provided to allied forces in emergencies must continue to retain the identity of the recipient country until emergency legislation had been passed which provided special contingency appropriations.²

CINCPAC, in justifying his request, outlined DA resupply plan QUICK TRIP, which was the plan providing for the timely resupply of UN/ROK Forces in the event of limited war in Korea. CINCPAC stated that peacetime MAP funding procedures operate as a valve in the QUICK TRIP supply pipeline and recommended to JCS that DOD be prepared in advance to remove MAP funding limitations immediately in a limited war situation in order to trigger QUICK TRIP and get surface shipments moving from CONUS to arrive in Korea before stocks were depleted.

The JCS reply stated that MAP fund limitations had been imposed

1. CINCPAC 260002Z Oct 1962 (TS)
2. JCS 171645Z Dec 1962 (TS)

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by Congress and applied in war until change or removed.¹ However, they implied that this was not a bar to opening the QUICK TRIP valve, since DOD could move existing service stocks to fill theater total requirements and the President was authorized by law to exceed the current MAP appropriation by \$300 million in emergencies. The JCS action gave CINCPAC assurance that planned resupply of UN/ROK forces in an emergency situation would not be delayed.

Medium Tanks for Korea: Insufficient M-47 tanks were available to meet ROKA requirements under MAP, because available M-47s were being allocated to higher priority claimants. Also the U. S. government had agreed to sell 500 M-47s to Italy, which left only 56 available for allocation. DA offered M-48 tanks, at a cost that would exceed that for M-47s.² COMUSKOREA stated that M-48 tanks would be acceptable in lieu of M-47s on a one-for-one basis if no possibility existed of reversing the decision to allocate the M-47s to claimants other than Korea.³ CINCPAC informed OSD and DA that the preferable solution would be to reconsider the overall allocation of M-47 tanks and to continue to program them for Korea as originally planned. CINCPAC's alternate recommendation was to deliver the available M-47s (understood to be 56) and to fill the remaining requirements, determined to be 188, in FY64 or early FY65.⁴ DA replied that it was planning to fill Korea medium tank requirements with M-48s and that estimated time of delivery would be in FY64 or early FY65.⁵ (S)

Korean MAP Transfer Program: The MAP transfer program was an area of disagreement between MAAG and AID representatives in Korea. AID considered it economically feasible to transfer most U. S. supported commercial consumables used by the Korean Military to the Korean budget during the FY64-69 MA Plan period. The MAAG,

1. JCS 282220Z Jan 1963 (TS)
2. DA 922365 DTG 032232Z Dec 1962 (C)
3. COMUS KOREA UK 50022 DTG 110445Z Jan 1963 (C)
4. CINCPAC 060100Z Feb 1963 (S)
5. DA 924694 DTG 131554Z Feb 1963 (S)

however, considered it unwise, especially at the rate recommended by AID, since it would strain the defense budget and weaken the military structure. The country team finally agreed to transfer an equivalent of \$40.5 million of consumables by 1970.¹ This was considered the maximum budgeting load the Korean government could absorb without seriously impairing the Korean economy.

The issue arose again when the United States Operations Mission in Korea estimated that \$11.5 million additional for POL (not Avgas) should be included in the transfer program since the Korean Ulsan oil refinery would be in production by June 1964. COMUSKOREA requested CINCPAC's support to keep the existing \$11.6 million for POL in the MA Program but CINCPAC advised that the "handwriting was on the wall" as far as continuing U.S. support for commercial consumables was concerned and that efforts should be made to turn over increasing economic responsibility to the Koreans.² COMUSKOREA then informed CINCPAC that the entire MAP transfer program was under study by the Country Team and suggested that the MAP transfer program should be extended through FY70.³ During the Washington review of the FY64 MAP CINCPAC took the position that approximately \$11.6 million for POL would be added to the Transfer Program beginning in FY65 and that the total program should be stretched out through FY71.

Kwangju Airfield Construction: Kwangju Airfield (K-57) was funded as a MAP project in the FY62 program. A \$4.5 million contract for construction was signed in July 1962. Earth moving work began in November 1962 and beneficial occupancy date was scheduled for fall of the following year. Construction work was delayed because of heavy snow and rain at the end of 1962 and early in 1963. The field was flooded because the Korean Government failed to close openings in two dikes bounding it.⁴ As a result of the delay and damage, PACAF requested

1. AMEMB Airgram A-883, 29 Apr 1963 (C)
2. CINCPAC 152143 Sep 1963 (S)
3. COMUSKOREA UK 50626 DTG 190604Z Sep 1963 (C)
4. PACAF PFCEC-E 731 DTG 170255Z Aug 1963 (C)

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\$597,500 additional funds in order to complete the project, and asked the Air Force Advisory Group Korea to submit a change to its FY64 program to obtain the necessary monies.¹ In addition, an immediate requirement existed for \$30,000 to extend an A&E Title II contract.² Because of this requirement, CINCPAC did not object to PACAF requesting emergency funds from CSAF, who subsequently approved them.^{3,4} COMUSKOREA submitted a program change in order to obtain the \$597,500 requested by PACAF.⁵ In view of possible congressional reductions to the MA Program, CINCPAC held the proposed change in abeyance, pending determination of what funds would become available. (C)

Philippines

Objectives of Military Assistance to the Philippines were to assist in organizing, training, and equipping a military establishment capable of maintaining internal security and contributing to the defense of the Philippines and the Western Pacific Area. Another objective was to help secure a political climate favorable to the continued U. S. use of bases in the Philippines.

The FY64 Program for the Army provided for minimum essential supplies and equipment necessary to maintain and use MAP - furnished material. In addition, MAP training, including OJT, and training aids and training ammunition were furnished. Navy items in the program included the overhaul of a patrol craft, communications and electronic equipment, training aids, general purpose vehicles, and tools and shop equipment. The Air Force program included equipment and construction items for the AC&W system, fighter and trainer aircraft, and helicopters.

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1. PACAF ltr PFCEO Subj: Request for Additional Funds Kwangju Auxiliary AB (K-57) Korea, 16 Aug 1963 (U)
 2. PACAF PFCEC 756 DTG 290436Z Aug 1963 (C)
 3. CINCPAC 282339Z Aug 1963 (C)
 4. CSAF AF SMDB 90851 DTG 292057Z Aug 1963 (C)
 5. COMUSKOREA UK 50565 DTG 280814Z Aug 1963 (S)

PHILIPPINES

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1963

BASIC INFORMATION		OVERALL OBJECTIVE		U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	
<p>AREA 115,000 SQ. MI.</p> <p>POPULATION 29.7 MILLION</p> <p>ANNUAL GROWTH 3.2%</p> <p>ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA 0.8 ACRE</p> <p>LITERACY RATE 75%</p> <p>LIFE EXPECTANCY 35 YEARS</p> <p>GROSS NAT. PROD. (1963) \$ 3.5 BILLION</p> <p>PER CAPITA \$ 116</p> <p>DEFENSE BUDGET (SELF FINANCED) FY 1963 (E) 44.3 MILLION</p> <p>AS % OF GNP 18</p> <p>AS % OF (SELF FINANCED) CENTRAL GOVT EXP 13.2</p>		<p>TO DEVELOP THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC INTO A STRONG, INDEPENDENT COUNTRY CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY, DEFENDING ITSELF AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK, AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE COMMON DEFENSE UNDER SEATO.</p>		<p>U.S. AMBASSADOR HON. W. E. STEVENSON</p> <p>U.S. AID DIRECTOR MR. JAMES H. INGERSOLL</p> <p>CHIEF, JUSMAG MAJ GEN WELW P. TACON, JR. USAF</p>	
<p>PRESIDENT - Diosdado P. Macapagal</p> <p>VICE-PRESIDENT - Emmanuel N. Palaez</p> <p>SECTY FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Salvador P. Lopez</p> <p>SECTY NATL DEFENSE - Macario L. Peralta, Jr.</p> <p>CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP - GEN Alfredo M. Santos, ARMY</p> <p>VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP - MGEN Pedro O. Molino, AF</p> <p>CG, ARMY - BGEN Ernesto S. Mata, ARMY</p> <p>FOIC, NAVY - COMMODORE Juan B. Magluyan, NAVY</p> <p>CG, AIR FORCE - BGEN Jonas A. Victoria, AF</p> <p>CHIEF CONSTABULARY - BGEN Nicanor D. Garcia, ARMY</p>		<p>MAP OBJECTIVE</p> <p>GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE: (A) TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN BALANCED MILITARY AND PARAPLITARY FORCES EQUIPPED, TRAINED AND MOTIVATED TO PREVENT OR DEFEAT COMMUNIST INSURREGNCES WITHOUT DIRECT INTERVENTION BY U.S. OR OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES; (B) TO PROVIDE CONDITIONS OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY WITHIN WHICH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES CAN BE STRENGTHENED; (C) TO PREPARE FOR EXTERNAL ATTACK BEING PREPARED TO OFFER SUFFICIENT DEFENSIVE STRENGTH TO COMPEL AN INTRUSION TO BE OF UNAMBIGUOUS CHARACTER AND CHARACTER TO HOLD AREAS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL RESISTANCE AND POWERS OF FORCE FOR U.S. FORCES TO COMPLEMENT U.S. OPERATIONS DURING AND AFTER SUCH A PHASE, AND TO ASSUME A VIGOROUS GUERRILLA ROLE AS REQUIRED; (D) THE DEVELOPMENT OF FACILITIES FOR: (1) LOGON MILITARY PURPOSES; AND (2) SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS BY U.S. AND/OR ALLIED FORCES CONSISTENT WITH U.S. SEATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING; (E) TO EXPAND THE CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT BY THE ARMED FORCES THROUGH CIVIC ACTION IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIC BASE AND ESTABLISH CLOSER BONDS BETWEEN THE FORCES AND THE POPULACE; (F) TO DEVELOP FORCES DEPENDABLE IN SEATO AREAS FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE TASKS; (G) TO CONTINUE THE AVAILABILITY OF U.S. BASES AND OPERATIONAL RIGHTS.</p>		<p>U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION</p>	
<p>MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES</p> <p>1 INF DIV, 1 SPEC FORCES GP</p> <p>4 RES DIV</p> <p>PHIL CONSTABULARY (15,000)</p> <p>22 PC/PF/SG, 3 DE</p> <p>61ST 31SM, 1 APD, 1 A/CNTROL SON</p> <p>173 MARINE BLT, 8M5C/M5I, 1 SEAL UNIT</p> <p>2 TACTICAL FIGHTER SONS, 2 TRANSPORT SONS,</p> <p>1 AIR RESCUE SON, 1A/WFTR SON</p> <p>1 COMPOSITE RCN SON</p>		<p>TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES</p> <p>1 INFANTRY DIV, 1 SPEC FORCES CO (ABN)</p> <p>1 RES DIV</p> <p>CONSTABULARY (1 BGT, 146 COMPANIES, 1 PRES GUARD BN)</p> <p>1 APD, 5PCE, 4PC, 2PCS, 2SC, 2LSM</p> <p>10 PGM, 2M5C, 31ST, 29LCM/LCVP</p> <p>16 SERCRAFT, 2 AOX, 3 MISC, 1 MAR BN</p> <p>3 DAY FTR SONS, 1A/WFTR SON, 1 TRP CARRIER SON, 1 AIR RESCUE SON</p>		<p>COMBAT CAPABILITY</p> <p>MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY, OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL ATTACK AND CONTRIBUTE ACT TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.</p> <p>OFF SHORE PATROL AND AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITIES SATISFACTORY. ASW POTENTIAL SATISFACTORY.</p> <p>LIMITED CAPABILITY TO FULFILL MISSION OF ASSIST ARMY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY & CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK.</p>	




Fig. 17

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In August 1963 Chief JUSMAG Philippines proposed a reorganization of the Philippine Army and a government-to-government agreement for its MAP support.¹ The JCS approved a CINCPAC recommendation that force objectives for the Philippine Army as included in JSOP-68 be amended to reflect the proposed reorganization.^{2, 3} The reorganization provided for two small infantry divisions and three brigades, each having one battalion. This would replace the former force composed of one infantry division and four reserve divisions. CINCPAC rejected the Chief JUSMAG Philippines idea of a proposed government-to-government agreement for MAP support of the Philippine Army and directed the CHJUSMAG to secure the advice and assistance of Ambassador Stevenson in order to prevent the rejection of the proposed agreement from affecting unfavorably U.S. and Philippine relations.⁴ CINCPAC later informed the Chief JUSMAG Philippines of the JCS approval of the reorganization and directed him to emphasize to the Philippine Government representatives that the U.S. was willing to participate in mutual development of supporting programs in accordance with current MAP procedures and within available funding levels, insuring that no commitment was implied.⁵

Republic of China

Objectives of Military Assistance to the Republic of China were to maintain and improve the GRC Armed Forces capability to defend Taiwan, the Penghus and the Off-Shore Islands; strengthen their ability to contribute to the collective non-communist strength in the Far East; and lessen existing and potential demands on U.S. Forces in the event of communist aggression.

The FY64 program provided support for existing forces which the GRC could not provide from its own resources. The Army program

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1. Chief JUSMAG Philippines ltr of 13 Aug 63, Subj: Proposed Reorganization of the Philippine Army (CPRS 05094-63) (S)
 2. CINCPAC DTG 042302Z Oct 63 (S)
 3. JCS 3928 DTG 102337Z Dec 63 (S)
 4. CINCPAC DTG 042301Z Oct 63 (C)
 5. CINCPAC DTG 162253Z Dec 63 (C)

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gave additional air defense ground environment equipment. The Navy program provided for activation and/or modernization of several vessels to increase the ASW capability. Improved radar and other AC&W equipment were provided to improve the air defense capability. It appeared at the end of 1963 that AvGas, an item that was funded for the Chinese Air Force in FY63 and FY64, would not be included in the very limited funding through MAP for commercial consumables in FY65.^{1, 2}

Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand

The significant CINCPAC actions in connection with the Military Assistance Program for Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand are incorporated in the respective sections of Chapter IV.

MA TRAINING PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

The objectives of the MA Training Program for PACOM in 1963 remained essentially unchanged from the previous year.³ Training programmed for the Republic of China and Korea, countries having military strengths which contributed substantially to the Free World's strength on the Asian defense perimeter, included a broad spectrum of subjects and stressed maintenance, logistics and joint and combined operations at division and higher levels. The training for the lesser developed countries of Southeast Asia was devoted primarily to the technical subjects needed to maintain internal security.(U)

MA Training Refinement Conferences

CINCPAC Army, Navy and Air Force annual training conferences were held for the purpose of helping MAAGs complete final manageable training programs for the fiscal year. This was done by a "working group" of experienced MAP personnel that helped the MAAGs develop

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1. CHMAAG China MGGD-P 11-311 DTG 140307Z Nov 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 182353Z Nov 1963 (C)
 3. CINCPAC Command History, 1962, p. 120

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1963




Fig. 18

THAILAND

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1963

BASIC INFORMATION		MAP OBJECTIVE		U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	
AREA	198,000 SQ. MI.	LIFE EXPECTANCY	50 YEARS	U.S. AMBASSADOR HON. GRHAM A. MARTIN	
POPULATION	29 MILLION	GROSS NAT. PROD. 1963 (E)	\$ 3.1 BILLION	U.S. AID DIRECTOR MR. JOHN G. EWER	
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.8%	PER CAPITA	\$ 104	COMUSMACV/THAI CHIEF JUSWAAG MAJGEN E. F. EASTBROOK USA	
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	0.8 ACRE	DEFENSE BUDGET SELF FINANCED 1963	\$45 MILLION	MAP OBJECTIVE GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE: (A) TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN BALANCED MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES EQUIPPED, TRAINED AND MOTIVATED TO PREVENT OR DEFEAT COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES WITHOUT DIRECT INTERVENTION BY U.S. OR OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES; (B) TO PROVIDE CONDITIONS OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY WITHIN WHICH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES CAN BE STRENGTHENED; (C) AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK BE PREPARED TO OFFER SUFFICIENT DEFENSIVE STRENGTH TO COMPEL AN INVASION TO BE OF UNBENEFICIAL MAGNITUDE AND CHARACTER, TO HOLD AREAS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL RESISTANCE AND POINTS OF EGRESS FOR U.S. FORCES, TO COMPLEMENT U.S. OPERATIONS DURING AND AFTER SUCH A PHASE, AND TO ASSUME A VIGOROUS GUERRILLA ROLE AS REQUIRED; (D) TO DEVELOP FACILITIES FOR: (1) LOCAL MILITARY PURPOSES, AND (2) SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS BY U.S. AND/OR ALLIED FORCES CONSISTENT WITH U.S./SEATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING; (E) TO EXPAND THE CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT BY THE ARMED FORCES THROUGH CIVIC ACTION IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIC BASE AND ESTABLISH CLOSER BONDS BETWEEN THE FORCES AND THE POPULACE.	
LITERACY RATE	60%	AS % GNP	2.7		
		AS % CENTRAL GOV-EXP	15.4		
KING - Phumiphon Adunget PRIME MINISTER, SUPREME COMMANDER THAI ARMED FORCES AND CINC ARMY - GEN Thanom Kittikachorn CINC NAVY - ADM Seasdi Bhitiananta CINC AF - AIR MARSHAL Boonchoo Chandrubeksa					
MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES		TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES		COMBAT CAPABILITY	
ARMY	3 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 1 CAV DIV, 1 PSY WAR BN, 1 RCT 1 RANGER BN (SF), 1 ABN GP, 1 155 HOW BN, 1 RES INF DIV	3 INFANTRY DIVISIONS 1 CAV DIVISION 1 RCT	1 SPECIAL FORCES GP 1 ARTY BN 1 AAA BDE	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION CAN CONTRIBUTE UP TO 1 RCT TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.	
NAVY	1 DD, 4 DE, 16 PATROL SHIPS, 8 MINE SWEEPERS, 1 ASWRON, 2 MHC 7 LANDING SHIPS, 1 SEAL UNIT, 1 MAR BRIG	1 DESTROYER ESCORT, 1 MOTOR-GUNBOAT, 11 PATROL ESCORT, 8 SUBCHASERS, 2 RIVER GUNBOATS, 3 MINE SWEEPERS, 7 LANDING SHIPS, 38 LANDING CRAFT, 8 AUXILIARY, 13 MISCELLANEOUS, 1 MARINE RCT		MARGINALLY SATISFACTORY, PATROL CAPABILITY IN GULF OF THAILAND AND INTERNAL WATERWAYS	
AIR FORCE	2 TACTICAL FTR SQN, 2 TRANSP SQN, 1 RECON SQN 6 TAC COMPOSITE SQN, 2 HELICOPTER SQN, 1 AW FTR SQN	7 FTR/RMR SQNS, 2 TRANSPORT SQNS, 1 GROUND SPT SQN, 1 RECON SQN, 2 COMPOSITE TAC SQN		LIMITED AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AND CLOSE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY, ONLY AIR DEFENSE.	

Fig. 19

VIETNAM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1963

BASIC INFORMATION		OVERALL OBJECTIVE		U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION	
<p>AREA 66,000 SQ. MI. POPULATION 14.8 MILLION ANNUAL GROWTH 2.4% ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA 1.1 ACRE LITERACY RATE 20-40% LIFE EXPECTANCY 30-35 YEARS GROSS NAT. PROD. 1963 (E) \$1.5 BILLION PER CAPITA \$95 DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED 1963 (E) \$49.3 MILLION AS % OF GNP 4.6 AS % OF (SELF FINANCE) CENTRAL GOVT EXP. 12.3</p> <p>CHIEF OF STATE - MGEN Duong Van Minh MINISTER OF DEFENSE - MGEN Tran Van Don CHIEF JGS - MGEN Le Van Kim C/S VNAF - COL Nguyen Cao Ky C/S VNN - CAPT Chang Tan Cang COMMANDER VNMC - LTCOL Nguyen Ba Lien</p>		<p>TO PREVENT FREE VIETNAM FROM FALLING UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL AND TO CONSOLIDATE VIETNAM'S POSITION AS A NEWLY-INDEPENDENT, ANTI-COMMUNIST STATE.</p>		<p>U.S. AMBASSADOR HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. U.S. AID DIRECTOR MR. JOSEPH BRENT COMUSMACV GEN. D. HARRIS, USA CHIEF MAAG MGEN C. J. THOMAS, USA</p>	
		<p>MAP OBJECTIVE</p> <p>GENERAL OBJECTIVES ARE: (A) TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN BALANCED MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES EQUIPPED, TRAINED AND MOTIVATED TO PREVENT OR DEFEAT COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES WITHOUT DIRECT INTERVENTION BY U.S. OR OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES; (B) TO PROVIDE CONDITIONS OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND SECURITY WITHIN WHICH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES CAN BE STRENGTHENED; (C) AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK BE PREPARED TO OFFER SUFFICIENT DEFENSIVE STRENGTH TO COMPEL AN INVASION TO BE OF UNAMBIGUOUS MAGNITUDE AND CHARACTER, TO HOLD AREAS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL RESISTANCE AND POINTS OF EGRESS FOR U.S. FORCES, TO COMPLEMENT U.S. OPERATIONS DURING AND AFTER SUCH A PHASE, AND TO ASSUME A VIGOROUS GUERRILLA ROLE AS REQUIRED; (D) TO DEVELOP FACILITIES FOR: (1) LOCAL MILITARY PURPOSES, AND (2) SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS BY U.S. AND/OR ALLIED FORCES CONSISTENT WITH U.S./SEATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING; (E) TO EXPAND THE CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT BY THE ARMED FORCES THROUGH CIVIC ACTION IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIC BASE AND ESTABLISH CLOSER BONDS BETWEEN THE FORCES AND THE POPULACE.</p>			
MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES		TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES		COMBAT CAPABILITY	
ARMY	<p>9 INF DIVS, 4 ARMO CAV SQDS, 1 INF REGT (SEP) 10 ARTY BNS, 1 RANGER CMB, 1 SEPF, 4 PSYWAR BN, 1 INF BN (SEP), 1 GO BDE</p>	<p>4 CORPS HQ-9 INF DIV - 1 ARN BDE (6 BNG) 3 SEP INF REGT - 1 TERR REGT - 86 RICK COS 1 SPL FRCS GP - 19 SEP BNS - CIVIL GO (86,434) 1 PSYWAR BN - SELF DEF CRPS (102,059)</p>	<p>MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY IN MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AND ALONG LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND OFFER EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE FOR LIMITED TIME AGAINST ATTACK BY EXTERNAL FORCES.</p>		
NAVY	<p>10 PC/PCE, 7 LSM 22 PRM, 7 LSL/LSSL 6 MSC, 7 LCU 41 ST, 28 JUNK FORCE DIV, 1 MAR BRIG, 1 RIVER ESCORT GROUPS</p>	<p>7 PC - 3 MSC - 138 LC - 16 LNDG SHIP - 11 PCW 16 YARD CFT - 1 MARINE RDE - 12 MLMS 38 VEDETTE - 28 JUNK DIV (615 JUNKS)</p>	<p>CAPABILITY FOR PATROLLING RIVERS AND COASTAL WATERS TO COUNTER INFILTRATION AND IN SUPPORT OF ARMY COUNTER-INSURGENCY ACTIONS. MARINE BRIGADE CAPABLE OF LIMITED ASSAULT LANDING.</p>		
AIR FORCE	<p>41 ANSON SONS, 3 TACTICAL FTR SONS, 1 TRANS SON 4 HELICOPTER SONS, 1 TAC RECON SON.</p>	<p>2 TRANS SON - 3 HELO SON - 31 LN SON 2 FTR BRW SON - 1 RECCO SON - 1 AC L W GP</p>	<p>CAPABILITY OF PROVIDING LIMITED CLOSE SUPPORT FOR ARMY, LIMITED AERIAL SUPPLY AND SUPPORT OF AIR OPS</p>		

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programs, determine if training teams would be furnished from CONUS or overseas, and solve unique training and foreign student problems.¹ Based on the refined programs, MAP funding for FY64 MA training programs was estimated at \$22.7 million for the Army, \$17.7 million for the Navy and \$13.5 million for the Air Force.

Army: The FY64 Army MA Training Refinement Conference was conducted at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, during the period 7-18 January 1963. Representatives were present from CINCPAC Staff, Department of the Army, Continental Army Command, USARPAC, USARHAW, and PACOM MAAGs. The CINCPAC presentation stressed new programming procedures, the need for development of in-country training capabilities paralleling reduction of requirements for CONUS training, and close supervision of use of CONUS trained personnel. The Department of the Army representative emphasized the need for proper student selection and the importance of English language training. Subsequent to general presentations, separate panels conducted line-by-line review of CONUS and overseas allied training programs, reviewed missile supplements, and estimated cost for each country program.

Navy: The FY64 Navy MA Training Refinement Conference was conducted at Camp Smith, Hawaii, during the period 28 January to 16 February. Representatives were present from CINCPAC Staff, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Bureau of Supply and Accounts, PACFLT, FMFPAC, the USN Training Devices Center, and PACOM MAAGs. In addition to general discussions, the program for provision of USN target submarine services, initiated in August 1962, was reviewed. MAAG representatives indicated that the training received thus far had been extremely valuable and they had informed country and naval commanders of the necessity for better maintenance

1. OSD DEF 941203Z Oct 1963 (U)

of the ASW equipment on their ships. At the conclusion of general discussions, the FY64 training requirements of each country were reviewed in detail and over 90% of the formal training was scheduled pending ODMA approval.

Air Force: The FY64 Air Force MA Training Refinement Conference was conducted in Tokyo, Japan during the period 25 February through 9 March 1963. Representatives were present from CINCPAC Staff, Headquarters USAF, PACAF, Air Training Command, Tactical Air Command, overseas training units of PACAF, and PACOM MAAGs. The first portion of the conference was spent in general discussions and a review of the new programming procedures. The remainder of the conference was used for a costing workshop and an item-by-item review and refinement of country programs. As a result of price changes, cancellation of the Laos program, and transfer of major training items to other service programs, the refined program was reduced considerably from the initial FY64 submission.

CHAPTER I I I
CINCPAC ACTIONS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN THE U. S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES

CINCPAC ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF SEATO

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization remained the most important collective defense arrangement in PACOM. CINCPAC's participation in SEATO and his efforts through other channels to unite the remaining Free Nations in PACOM are described in this chapter.

An example of CINCPAC's views regarding the importance and effectiveness of SEATO was contained in his response to a JCS request for information on that subject.¹ He stated that SEATO continued to be an effective instrument of U. S. and Free World policy and that, since its inception, SEATO's primary achievement had been its value as a major deterrent to communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Its mere existence had been responsible for the nature of communist strategy, which had avoided carefully any overt aggression that could provoke a SEATO response.

In the absence of a bilateral agreement, the Pact was the basis of U. S. defense commitments to Thailand. The 1962 deployment to Thailand of military forces from the U. S. , United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand had been the most significant military action taken under the treaty, an act that demonstrated clearly the intent of member nations to honor their collective defense commitments in Southeast Asia. SEATO had become a valuable mechanism for coordination of military planning. Under SEATO a family of plans had been developed and refined to the extent that member nations agreed on concepts, command arrangements and force levels each nation would contribute if the plans were implemented. SEATO forces conducted periodical training

1. CINCPAC 210310Z May 63 (S)

exercises, which tested the validity of its plans. Perhaps the greatest value of such exercises was that they established the credibility of the SEATO deterrent for all to see.

Another SEATO accomplishment was the establishment of a counter subversion office under the guidance of the Secretary General. This office was designed to develop measures for improving the capacity of member nations to identify and defeat communist subversion. As a result, member nations, particularly Thailand, were more aware of the subversive threat and increased the effectiveness of their counter subversion programs. (S)

Both Australia and New Zealand relied on SEATO, to varying degrees, for justifying the size of their armed forces. It was apparent that member nations were convinced that their individual security depended mainly on their willingness and capability to participate in collective defense. CINCPAC stated, in summary, that SEATO represented a credible source of Free World strength and a tested means of multinational coordination. (S)

Military Advisors Conference Number 18 (MA18C)

The Military Advisors 18th Conference was held in Paris on 3 and 4 April, with Admiral Felt attending in his capacity as U. S. Military Advisor. Of the eight agenda items approved by the MILADS prior to the conference, they reached agreement on four without extensive discussion. Those agenda items about which there were significant differences of opinion are discussed below.

SEATO MPO Plan 4C/61: The MILADS considered two changes to the assumptions upon which MILAD plans were based. One of these was to the effect that Laos would not cooperate with SEATO Forces in the event of an overt communist attack elsewhere in the Treaty Area. The second proposed change made the assumption that Cambodia would

UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND




Fig. 21

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be a most dangerous area in the event of a communist attack against Thailand and the RVN if the communists were able to use Cambodia as a base. Admiral Felt succeeded in changing the wording in the first of these to recognize only that Laos might be either unable or unwilling to assist SEATO forces in the event of a communist attack. The assumption regarding Cambodia was reworded to state that, under the conditions described, Cambodia would attempt to maintain its neutrality as long as possible in order to join the winning side, and that if Cambodia anticipated a communist victory it might consent to the use of its facilities for attacks against Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam.^{1, 2}

SEATO MPO Plan 7/62: Nine changes were recommended to this plan, of which the US MILAD favored all but one assumption that stated Cambodia and Laos would not permit use of their facilities, or the passage of SEATO Forces. Admiral Felt considered this language too restrictive and succeeded in having it changed to read that the two countries would attempt to maintain their neutrality, and were unlikely to permit the use of their facilities or the passage of SEATO Forces.³

SEATO MPO Plan 8/63: Plan 8 (draft) was the SEATO Force commander's plan to assist Thailand in countering communist insurgency, and was the first such MPO plan wherein SEATO military assistance was to be provided to a member nation. This MPO prepared draft plan and a Thailand position paper were presented for consideration of the MILADs. The MPO draft followed generally the pattern established by existing SEATO MPO counterinsurgency plans. The Thailand position paper, on the other hand, proposed a major modification to the draft plan to provide therein a rather unusual three phase concept of operations.

Prior to the Paris conference, when it became obvious to Admiral Felt that the Thais were sensitive about a plan that provided for SEATO


1. CINCPAC 132331Z Mar 63 (TS)
2. Rpt of MA18C, Apr 63. See Annex D. (TS)
3. CINCPAC 051455Z Apr 63 (TS)

forces to help Thailand with an insurgency problem, he recommended to the JCS several changes to Plan 8 that would remove the implication that the Thais weren't capable of handling their own internal security problems.¹ During discussions of the plan in Paris, the Thai MILAD indicated mixed feelings about Plan 8. The Thais expressed strong reservation about the possible use of foreign troops to contend with insurgency in Thailand, a problem that the Thais considered an internal one that they should and could handle. In this regard, the MILADS agreed that preventive measures should be taken, and that the Thais had the military capability to handle their internal security during preventive stages. On the other hand, the Thais proposed that such measures, including those of an economic, cultural and social nature, be studied and programmed by the SEATO MPO. The other MILADS did not agree with this. The solution that was reached provided for the MILADS to present the problem to the Council of Ministers at their meeting that followed MA18C. This was to be done by the Thai Council Member who was to present the matter to the Council and invite the members to direct how various studies should be undertaken. The MILADS also directed the CMPO to further develop Plan 8 in accordance with the findings of such studies.²

Philippine Proposal Regarding Indonesia Order of Battle: A month before the MILADS convened in Paris, the Philippine MILAD proposed that SEATO include in future Intelligence Committee reports the order of battle of the Indonesian Armed Forces. The basis of this proposal was that recent developments had indicated that the Indonesian Armed Forces had undergone extensive modernization and progressive military build-up, and that the status of these forces had become a matter of vital military interest.³ Admiral Felt compared this proposal with a 1962 request by Pakistan that SEATO recognize Afghanistan as a

1. CINCPAC 222317Z Mar 63 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 051455Z Apr 63 (TS)
3. USMILADREP SMPO Bangkok 050520Z Mar 63 (TS)

SEATO ORGANIZATION



ABBREVIATIONS

DPIO - PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
 PWC - PERMANENT WORKING GROUP
 SMPO - SEATO MILITARY PLANNING OFFICE

RSO - RESEARCH SERVICE OFFICER
 IAC - INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE
 CEE - COMMITTEE OF ECONOMIC EXPERTS

COUNCIL RO - CULTURAL RELATIONS OFFICE
 CSO - COUNTER SUBVERSION OFFICE

COUNCIL ON INFORMATION, CULTURAL EDUCATION AND LABOR
 AS INDIVIDUALS, THE MILITARY ADVISERS' REPRESENTATIVES ARE THE REPRESENTATIVES IN THE MPO OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MILITARY ADVISERS.

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military threat, a move which in his opinion would push Afghanistan further into the Soviet camp. Admiral Felt believed that the same principle applied to a SEATO discussion of an Indonesian threat, and that if information of such a discussion should reach Indonesia, that country could have a self-asserted cause to move closer to the communist nations and away from the U. S. and Commonwealth nations. Such a move could also set a precedent in SEATO and encourage Pakistan to try again to persuade SEATO to side with her in quarrels with India and Afghanistan. Prior to the Paris meeting, Admiral Felt advised the JCS that he would try to defeat the proposal, and would point out that SEATO was organized to deal with the threat of communist armed force, of which Indonesia was not a part.¹

When the topic was discussed at the MA18C, there was enough opposition to persuade the Philippine MILAD to withdraw the proposal.²

Question of French Participation to Support SEATO Plans: The extent of France's participation in combat that would follow the implementation of any of the SEATO plans had been open to question. A French general removed the doubt in this matter when, during a private conversation at the Paris conference, he told Admiral Felt that the French would definitely participate if fighting started in Southeast Asia, although this was something that no French official would put in writing.³

Military Advisors Conference Number 19 (MA19C)

The Military Advisors 19th Conference was held in Bangkok on 29 and 30 October. At this meeting the MILADS directed the Chief MPO to review current plans and submit proposals for amendments necessary to ensure smooth transition from one plan to another without adversely affecting the plans involved. The MILADS agreed that the MPO should develop an SOP for air forces support of ground forces,

1. CINCPAC 120205Z Mar 63 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 051455Z Apr 63 (TS)
3. AMEMB Paris 4055 to STATE DTG 061740Z Apr 63 (S)

using guidance provided by member nations. They also agreed that no current requirement existed for SOPs covering naval or ground forces in support of those ground forces committed to SEATO plans. The MILADS approved Admiral Felt's proposal that SOP documents prescribe the control agencies to be established at the various levels of command, assign functional responsibility to those agencies, and provide basic policy guidance for control and coordination functions.

An exercise schedule and forecast was approved for the period 1 July 1964 to 30 June 1969.

During the conference the Australian MILAD delivered to the Chief MPO a paper that indicated the strength of the Australian battle group and its logistic support force nominated, for planning purposes, to SEATO Plans 4 and 6 would be increased from 4700 to approximately 8000. The paper further nominated a second battle group with a strength of 4700 as a reserve force for plans 4 and 6. It was to be stationed in Australia and to remain under national command.¹

The Pakistan MILAD read a prepared statement to express his government's grave concern over action on the part of certain SEATO Allies in building up the armed forces of India, with the result that India's forces were comparable in size to those of Pakistan. He pointed out that developments since the border conflict between India and China had seriously altered the delicate balance of power on the Indian subcontinent. He concluded that there was no possibility of large scale conflict between China and India, and that having sufficiently built up its forces with western assistance, India would reach a peaceful settlement with China, and then use its armed forces against Pakistan.²

The next Military Advisors Conference (MA20C) was scheduled for 9-10 April 1964 in the Philippines.

1. CINCPAC 010853Z Nov 63 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 300500Z Oct 63 (TS)

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SEATO Fifth Logistic Committee Meeting (Log 5M)

The Logistic Committee Fifth Meeting was held at SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok from 3 to 13 September to consider 10 agenda items. CINCPAC prepared the committee position paper on "Introduction of Planning Factors for Airborne and Airtransported Operations" and a paper on "SEATO Movements Control Policy", which was in addition to the United Kingdom's committee paper on this subject.^{1, 2}

During the discussion, the committee recognized that no logistic data were then available for airborne and airtransported operations but that an urgent need existed for data of this nature since the deployment of forces by air was featured in a number of SEATO plans. The committee agreed that although the position paper on "Introduction of Planning Factors for Airborne and Air Transported Operations" was based on U. S. units and aircraft, this was permissible since only U. S. airborne forces had been declared under existing MPO plans. The committee concluded that the planning factors contained in the U. S. position paper were suitable for SEATO MPO purposes, but that if it should become necessary for the MPO to undertake feasibility studies involving the airlift of forces of particular member nations, the characteristics of the transport aircraft that might be used should be obtained from the appropriate Military Advisors' Representatives. (C)

As a related subject to the agenda item "SEATO Movement Control Policy", the U. S. delegate stated that the U. S. had not declared any airlift forces to SEATO, and that the U. S. favored applying to airlift forces the agreed SEATO principle that each nation would be responsible for the administrative and logistic support of its own forces. He pointed out that the U. S. stood ready to provide full logistic support, including aircraft, to its own SEATO combat forces. The committee concluded that the U. S. expression on this subject should be noted.

The Thailand Chief Delegate informed the committee that November

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0493 of 22 Jul 63 (C)
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00069-63 of 27 Aug 63 (TS)

and May would be the best months for future logistic meetings in Bangkok because the weather would be better for terrain studies and other administrative aspects with which the Thai delegation was concerned. The committee decided it was not possible to predict when another meeting would be required.¹ (C)

SEATO Intelligence Conference (Int9M)

The Ninth Meeting of the SEATO Intelligence Committee (Int9M) was held in Bangkok from 12 to 22 November 1963.

During the sessions, the committee members considered revisions to Country Studies on South Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, and Afghanistan. They also considered amendments to various studies that had a direct bearing on the threat estimate to other SEATO countries. The members agreed that revisions should be published by the Military Planning Office.

Order of battle information was updated for Communist China, North Vietnam, and Afghanistan. The Committee decided that in future revisions of Orders of Battle it was desirable to include a paragraph on the combat effectiveness of forces.²

SEATO Operations Plans

In 1963 the existing SEATO Plans were essentially the same as in 1962. SEATO MPO Plan 4 provided for the defense of Southeast Asia, to include the Philippines and Pakistan, against overt attack by North Vietnam and Communist China. MPO Plan 5 provided for the defense of Laos against communist insurgency and MPO Plan 6 provided for the defense of the Protocol States (Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia) against overt attack by North Vietnam. MPO Plan 7 provided for assistance to the Republic of Vietnam to counter communist insurgency. Those plan changes that were approved by the MILADS at their 18th

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1. Report of the Fifth SEATO Logistic Committee Meeting, Sep 63 (S)
 2. Report of the SEATO Intelligence Committee 9th Meeting Nov 63 (S)

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SEATO Conference were published in September 1963, and incorporated into the plans. At the end of 1963 Plan 8/63 was still in the draft stage.

Organization, Staffing, and Facilities for SEATO Force Headquarters

In early December CINCPAC responded to a USARPAC request that the Chief Military Planning Office be authorized to initiate discussions with Thai officials to determine real estate, facilities, and installations that would be made available to SEATO Force Headquarters if SEATO Plan 4 was implemented.¹ CINCPAC informed USARPAC that the most effective way to solve this problem was for USARPAC, in his capacity as Commander SEATO Force designate, to work directly with Marshall Dawee, the Thai MILAD.

The USMILADREP suggested to CINCPAC that the subject of organization and staffing of the Force headquarters, which was of interest to all SEATO members, would be appropriate to include in the April Coordination Conference agenda.² CINCPAC gave USARPAC authority to include this subject, and shortly after the end of 1963 USARPAC notified CINCPAC and the USMILADREP that the problem of facilities as well as organization and staffing, would be included for discussion at the conference.^{3,4}

SEATO Training Exercises

SEATO exercises were those conducted by one or more SEATO member nations with SEATO approval, and in which all member nations had been invited to participate.⁵ SEATO exercises were based upon problems similar to those expected to be encountered in the defense of the SEATO area and were, whenever possible, held in or near the Asian countries most seriously threatened, thereby indicating the ability and determination of SEATO nations to uphold the provisions of the Manila Charter. The two SEATO exercises conducted during 1963 are

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1. CINCPAC 040410Z Dec 63 (S)
 2. USMILADREP 060300Z Dec 63 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 130142Z Dec 63 (S)
 4. CINCPAC 022052Z Jan 64 (S)
 5. SEATO MPO Pamphlet, subj: SEAP-4A 21 Feb 63 (C)

discussed below. (S)

Dhanarajata: This exercise, the largest SEATO ground defense exercise yet conducted, was carried out in Thailand during the period 11-24 June 1963. Participating forces, totaling 24,000 (approximately 16,000 were Thais), were from Thailand, U.S., Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Pakistan, France, and the Philippines. General Chitti of Thailand was the Exercise Director. The objectives of Dhanarajata were to: (1) test the transition from SEATO Plan 5 to Plan 4; (2) develop combined staff procedures and techniques for operations; (3) test communications; (4) exercise SEATO tactical and logistical headquarters in the field; (5) develop air/ground procedures for SEATO combined forces; (6) and provide terrain familiarization for SEATO forces. The exercise demonstrated the determination and ability of SEATO member nations to muster a large force in a given area in a very short time. Many on-the-spot decisions had to be made in order to maintain continuity of operations and to meet unexpected changes. However, the play of the problem, including logistic and administrative support, was considered a success.

The deployment and redeployment of CONUS and Hawaii based units to Thailand for Dhanarajata was conducted as Exercise Tidal Wave. The test saturation of an airfield in Thailand in connection with Tidal Wave was only partially accomplished due to the necessary scheduling requirements of getting participants into Thailand at the proper time for the exercise. MATS flew 142 missions on deployment and redeployment and the 315th Air Division from Okinawa flew 118.

Numerous types of civic actions were carried out by various units during Dhanarajata. In addition, the 593rd Engineer Construction Company remained in Thailand for twenty-five days to perform such beneficial tasks as replacing bridges, drilling wells, rehabilitating

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schools, and providing playground and recreation area equipment for schools in rural areas.

The Post Exercise Report in addition to detailing the lessons learned on Dhanarajata, concluded that the value of the exercise was evidenced by the rapid deployment of units to the treaty area, the demonstration and static display, the air assaults at Roiet and Udorn, the cooperation of participating personnel and units, and the hospitality of the people of Thailand. ¹

Sea Serpent: This SEATO maritime exercise was conducted from 22 April to 9 May in the Manila and South China Sea areas. The U. S. and United Kingdom contributed the major portion of naval forces, but all SEATO member nations participated. The United Kingdom was sponsor and furnished the Exercise Director. The concept of the exercise involved enemy forces attacking a country which SEATO was pledged to support. To counter submarine, naval, and air attacks, SEATO member nations conducted operations including harbor defense, minelaying, anti-submarine warfare, and air operations. (S)

SEATO Training Exercise Schedule

The SEATO Exercise schedule, for the period 1 July 1964 - 30 June 1966, was approved by the MILADS at their 19th Conference, and published in February 1963. ² This schedule including previously approved exercises, provided for the following exercises:

20-30 April 1964	Tactical Air Deployment Exercise "Air Boon Choo" to be conducted in Thailand and sponsored by Thailand, U. S. and United Kingdom.
12 May - 8 June 1964	Airborne/Amphibious Exercise "Ligtas" to be conducted in the Philippines and sponsored by the U. S.

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1. COMUSELM OUSEA-200 DTG 200400Z Jun 63 (S)
 2. SEATO MPO Pamphlet subj: SEAP-4A 21 Feb 63 (C)

February and March 1965	CPX and Field Maneuver Ground Defense Exercise to be conducted in Thailand and sponsored by Thailand.
April 1965	Air Defense Exercise to be conducted in Thailand and sponsored by Thailand.
April and May 1965	Maritime Exercise sponsored by Australia and U. S. (S)

Other SEATO Matters

SEATO Common Cost Sharing Arrangements: In 1962 the MILADS approved a paper prepared by the Chief MPO that provided for common cost sharing in the event MPO Plan 5 (Defense of Laos Against Communist Insurgency) was implemented.¹ In response to an early 1963 inquiry by the SEATO Secretary General, the Chief MPO recommended to the MILADS that the common cost sharing arrangement, approved for MPO Plan 5, be made applicable to all MPO plans.² The U. S. MILAD concurred but made the reservation, with the backing of the JCS, that the MPO guidance paper should clarify and emphasize that the SEATO common cost sharing principle be applied only for support of SEATO headquarters and other logistic costs that were not readily assessable individually to one or more nations.^{3, 4}

SEATO/CENTO Exchange of Exercise Observers: The question of exchanging exercise observers came up again when the SEATO MILADS received an invitation from CENTO to provide two observers to attend the CENTO Annual Maritime Exercise MIDLINK VI. (See CINCPAC 1962 Command History, p. 134). Admiral Felt concurred that the invitation should be accepted but pointed out that it would be the first exchange of SEATO/CENTO observers, and would have to be

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1. MS 623/3/1/62 14 Jun 62 (TS)
 2. MS 623/3/2/62 3 Jan 63 (TS)
 3. JCS 9138 DTG 192124Z Mar 63 (S)
 4. CINCPAC 232350Z Mar 63 (S)

viewed in the light of overall policy being established by this precedent. ¹
Since reciprocity could be expected, it was directed that MPO observers
should not ask for access to material classified higher than Confidential.

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Proposal for Prepositioning of Troops (Laos): In July 1963 JCS indicated that the United Kingdom embassy representative had approached the U. S. State Department on the possibility of stationing part or all of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade in Thailand. ² This proposal was made as a need for strategic positioning of the brigade in connection with the deteriorating situation in Laos. The UK suggested joint U. S. /UK contingency planning, with Australia and New Zealand (the other countries whose personnel were part of the 28th Brigade) participating if they desired. CINCPAC received additional information from the U. S. Secretary of State indicating that the U. K. wanted to share U. S. facilities at Korat. ³

Admiral Felt explained to the JCS that he believed the U. S. camp at Korat should be maintained for American troops but suggested that the Thais might make real estate available elsewhere for the Commonwealth Brigade. He agreed that the three nations should plan how to position troops in Thailand, and indicated he would be willing to discuss the problem with representatives of the Commonwealth countries involved. Subsequently Admiral Felt discussed the situation with Admiral Begg, UK Far East Unified Commander, in Hawaii but declined to participate in collective planning talks with AUS/NZ/UK on the basis that he wished to avoid any appearance that might be regarded as a "white man's inner circle within SEATO", and to avoid four-country meetings that might risk undercutting SEATO. Admiral Felt thought it better to deal on a bilateral basis on matters of mutual concern. ⁴

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1. CINCPAC 142130Z Sep 63 (C)
 2. JCS 1540 DTG 052232Z Jul 63 (S)
 3. State UNN to CINCPAC DTG 060215Z (S)
 4. CINCPAC 311918Z Jul 63 (S)

Proposed Quadripartite Meeting: In November United Kingdom's CINCFAREAST sent an invitation to COMUSMACV through the U. S. MILADREP, asking COMUSMACV to send planners to a proposed meeting of United Kingdom, U. S., Australia, and New Zealand representatives to be held in Singapore on 5 and 6 December 1963. ¹ This was to be a preliminary to the January 1964 meeting of all SEATO Nations for the purpose of discussing Central Region SEATO Field Force Plan 4. One of the proposed subjects of the meeting was the United Kingdom's search for real estate at Korat and Ubon for the 28th Commonwealth Brigade.

CINCPAC told COMUSMACV of his longstanding policy of not subscribing to a white man's club within the framework of SEATO and said that all meetings outside of regular MILAD assemblies must continue on a bilateral basis. ² CINCPAC stated that the meeting in Singapore should not be held and as a result it did not materialize.

COMBINED EXERCISES (NON SEATO)

In addition to SEATO exercises, combined exercises were often scheduled with the armed forces of other nations as part of the Component Commanders annual training cycle. These exercises ranged in scope from important tactical training to large scale land-sea-air exercises preceded by extensive coordinated planning. Normally CINCPAC's concern in combined exercises was limited to early planning and scheduling, and granting or securing approval.

U. S. / Canadian Exercises

U. S. Forces of the Pacific Fleet conducted two combined exercises with elements of the Canadian Navy and Air Force in 1963. Exercise Golf Club was conducted during the period 18 February - 1 March 1963 and Exercise Saddle Soap took place during the period 9-20 September

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1. U. S. MILADREP SMPO 190300Z Nov 63 (TS)
 2. CINCPAC 300511Z Nov 63 (TS)

1963. Both exercises were designed to train participants in tactics and procedures used against submarines and to train submarine forces in making wartime transits and patrols. Both exercises were conducted off the western North American Coast. These exercises were two of a continuing series, planned to strengthen the combined participant's capability in anti-submarine warfare. A total of 10,000 U. S. and Canadian personnel were embarked in 30 ships and 130 aircraft during Exercise Saddle Soap. Exercise Golf Club was of a similar size.

U. S. /GRC Exercises

PACOM forces conducted four major exercises with Nationalist Chinese Armed Forces during 1963.

Exercise Sky Soldier/Tien Bing III, a coordinated U. S. and GRC airborne training exercise, was conducted during the period 23-26 February in the vicinity of Ping Tung, Taiwan. The main objective was to provide training for both U. S. and Chinese airborne units in defensive operations against an invading force which had established a beach head in the Ping Tung area.

Exercise Silver Blade, a coordinated amphibious landing exercise, was conducted during the period 15-24 March. The Chinese Marine Corps, supported by the Chinese Navy, made a conventional ship-to-shore assault. The U. S. Special Landing Force made a helicopter and landing craft ship-to-shore assault on a separate beach.

Exercise Sky Soldier/Tien Bing IV, conducted during the period 20-26 October 1963, was another in the series of defensive airborne training exercises. For the first time in the series of exercises, the field portion of the exercise was conducted in two identical phases over the same terrain. A total of four battalion task forces participated - - one U. S. and one Chinese battalion in each phase. Chinese and U. S. Air Force units provided close air support for the exercise-connected airborne jump.

Exercise Big Dipper, a coordinated amphibious/airborne defense exercise, was conducted in Southern Taiwan during the period 26 November - 7 December 1963. The exercise, designed to develop proficiency in planning and coordination of this type operation, was of a limited scale involving combined forces of the U. S. and GRC including about 20 amphibious ships, 3000 troops, and 100 aircraft.

U. S. /ROK Exercises

During 1963, U. S. /ROK forces conducted three major exercises. Two were command post exercises (CPX) and the third was an amphibious training exercise. (C)

The first CPX conducted during the period 2-10 May, was named Counter Blow. It involved U. S. and ROK division and higher headquarters, and tested operation plans and SOPs for going from a defensive position into a counter-offensive. The second CPX, Exercise Strong Shield, was conducted from 12 to 22 November and tested the readiness of United Nations troops to defend the Republic of Korea in the event limited war was resumed. (C)

Flag Pole was the name given to an amphibious exercise conducted during the period 10-30 June. It involved coordinated amphibious landings involving U. S. and ROK Naval and Marine forces. (C)

CINCPAC BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

Besides encouraging SEATO Nations to negotiate bilaterally on matters of mutual concern, CINCPAC continued negotiations in 1963 for various U. S. bilateral agreements in support of SEATO Plans. A POL agreement supporting SEATO Plan 5 was consummated on 21 January 1963 between CINCPAC and the UK Military Advisor who acted on behalf of the UK, New Zealand, and Australia. It provided that the U. S. would supply locally available POL to the Commonwealth Brigade on a reimbursable basis. This was the second of two POL agreements CINCPAC had made with Commonwealth countries. The

first agreement, completed on 8 November 1962, provided that the U. S. would arrange on a reimbursable basis to supply POL products to the Australian Air Force for support of Plan 5. Negotiations were also completed in 1962 for providing logistic support and sealift for a 1425-man Philippine BCT committed to MPO Plans 4 and 6. The agreement provided for a limited number of days supply, and sealift for the BCT using 7th Fleet or MSTTS shipping plus one Philippine LST. ^{1, 2}

In addition to the completed agreements, CINCPAC conducted negotiations concerning three other bilateral agreements. The U. S. and Australia discussed an arrangement whereby the U. S. would supply, on a reimbursable basis, mortar and howitzer ammunition to the Australian battle group committed to SEATO Plans 4 and 6. Discussions were also undertaken with Australian representatives concerning a possible agreement under which the U. S. would furnish POL support to Australian units supporting SEATO Plans 4, 6 and 7. ³ CINCPAC encouraged the UK to discuss similar POL agreements upon development of their requirements for SEATO plans. ⁴

In addition CINCPAC was involved in discussing bilateral arrangements for transportation and logistic support of the Pakistan Plan 5 force, which included one infantry battalion (reinforced with a strength of about 1400), and the remainder of an infantry brigade group numbering about 4600. CINCPAC contemplated providing transportation to lift these forces to Southeast Asia and return them to Pakistan upon conclusion of the operation. Under the proposed agreement logistic support would be given to the Pakistan forces once they had left their sector to participate in the action. Logistic support was not to include those items peculiar to the Pakistan forces which the U. S. did not stock. ⁵

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1. CINCPAC 210308Z Sep 62 (TS)
 2. Sec State UNN Feb 1 6PM (TS)
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00740 of 8 Nov 62 (S)
 4. CINCPAC 210335Z Nov 62 (S)
 5. CINCPAC 300506Z May 63 (S)

POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Because of the far reaching effect of agreements between the U. S. and other countries, CINCPAC followed carefully all negotiations with PACOM countries, especially negotiations leading to status of forces agreements (SOFA). Although the State Department had primary responsibility for the conduct of negotiations, CINCPAC was interested to see that any agreement reached would not impair his ability to carry out his mission, or adversely affect the morale or welfare of his military forces.

Once the U. S. agreed to negotiate an agreement, the State Department forwarded a proposed draft to the appropriate embassy as a basis for negotiations. To assist in the construction of this draft, CINCPAC furnished through the JCS to DOD, his detailed recommendations regarding the desired content of the SOFA from a military standpoint. Customarily, in each country in which these negotiations were undertaken, the American Embassy sought and used the advice of the senior U. S. commander in the country. In Korea, for example, members of the COMUSK staff took an active part in the negotiations. In Taiwan, the U. S. Embassy kept COMUSTDC fully informed and furnished him with copies of minutes of the negotiating sessions and other pertinent documents. In each country, the senior U. S. commander's views on embassy proposals to the State Department were forwarded to CINCPAC, together with copies of minutes of the meetings and the embassy proposals. After a thorough review, CINCPAC made his recommendations to the JCS. These recommendations were used by DOD in formulating a military position to present to the Department of State. After agreement at this level, further instructions were issued to the embassy charged with conducting the negotiations. (U)

Korean Status of Forces Agreement

Negotiations for a status of forces agreement with the Republic of Korea, resumed in mid-1962, were conducted during 1963 under a U. S.

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stipulation that an agreement would not become effective until a constitutional government was re-established in Korea.¹ A growing feeling of nationalism and independence among the Koreans, especially the younger generation, was behind the Korean desire for a SOFA with the U.S., especially after Japan, a former enemy, had such an agreement. (S)

U.S. and Korean negotiating teams met 37 times during 1963, and reached agreement on the wording of the preamble and 12 of the articles. However, neither side submitted a draft on the controversial article on criminal jurisdiction, and no agreement was reached on the important articles concerning procedures for handling claims, foreign exchange, customs, military post offices, and several other areas in which there was a wide gap between the positions of the negotiating teams. Because the more controversial subjects were not discussed during the year, CINCPAC had few comments. He did, however, express strong opposition to a proposed revision of the U.S. draft of the criminal jurisdiction article, suggested by the U.S. Ambassador in Seoul to the Departments of Defense and State. This proposed draft was designed to appeal to the Koreans because of its similarity to the comparable article of the Japanese SOFA. Although the Embassy draft was in many respects similar to the original COMUSK draft, CINCPAC considered the proposed revisions a premature retreat, and recommended to the JCS that strong efforts be made to secure acceptance by State/DOD of the original COMUSK draft as amended by changes that CINCPAC previously had recommended.² The JCS replied that they would advocate the CINCPAC position in discussions with DOD and State. (S)

Republic of China Status of Forces Agreement

Negotiations with the Republic of China for a status of forces agreement were resumed early in 1963. U.S. and Chinese officials

1. See CINCPAC's 1962 Command History, p. 138 (TS)
2. CINCPAC 130155Z Nov 63 (C)

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had discussed provisions of a SOFA since 1954 but had been unable to reach agreement on the key articles pertaining to procedures for handling claims against U. S. personnel, criminal jurisdiction, customs, taxation, and search and seizure. In 1961, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the U. S. let the Chinese assume the initiative toward conducting further negotiations; thereafter no meetings were held until 7 January 1963 when discussions were resumed on a GRC draft of 11 May 1960. During the first six meetings the Chinese proposed several changes to the draft article on criminal jurisdiction that the U. S. had submitted in 1960. In analyzing these proposed changes for the JCS, CINCPAC noted that the U. S. draft had gone as far as possible in meeting a Chinese proposal of August 1958. In particular, the U. S. draft permitted the GRC to reclaim jurisdiction in murder and rape cases. CINCPAC recommended that the U. S. reject the increased Chinese demands, which would increase the offenses over which the GRC could exercise jurisdiction, limit the accused's right of confrontation of witnesses against him, claim for the GRC the right to pretrial custody, and would tend to eliminate the conclusive nature of a commander's certificate that the U. S. proposed as a means of determining the official duty status of personnel.¹

Following the ninth meeting of the series of SOFA negotiations, the U. S. Embassy recommended several changes in the U. S. position on taxation. CINCPAC concurred in some of the suggested changes, but recommended strongly that the U. S. make it clear to the GRC that the U. S. would not pay a readily identifiable and significant tax on common defense expenditures in China regardless of the form or incidence of the tax. CINCPAC also recommended that the U. S. maintain its opposition to unreasonable search and seizure by Chinese authorities of U. S. Forces personnel, and that the U. S. grant no further significant concessions to the GRC without receiving in return concessions on matters important to the U. S.² (C)

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1. CINCPAC 291907Z Mar 63 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 150412Z Jun 63 (C)

At the 11th meeting held in June, the U.S. presented its revised article on criminal jurisdiction, one that had been approved by the Departments of State and Defense. Involved in this matter was an Embassy recommendation that the U.S. abandon its long standing position that the GRC agree to meet certain minimum standards of comfort, nutrition and sanitation in any facilities used for the confinement of U.S. personnel. The Embassy proposed that this matter be settled by a joint committee. Although COMUSTDC agreed with the proposal, CINCPAC did not. He explained to the JCS the continuing evidence of the inadequacy of Chinese confinement facilities, and the difficulty in the Joint Committee in persuading the Chinese to provide adequate facilities. He thought it necessary that the Chinese be bound by a legal commitment to provide adequate facilities.¹ Later, in July, the Chinese reported that they had constructed a suitable confinement facility. Based upon information furnished by COMUSTDC, CINCPAC advised the JCS that the facility was not completely adequate for male prisoners, and that no facilities existed for female prisoners. CINCPAC also stressed his contention that the existence of this prison did not remove the need for obtaining a firm legal commitment from the GRC to provide proper confinement facilities.²

At a 21 August meeting, the Chinese insisted that the SOFA specifically provide for a renegotiation of the Chinese - U.S. MAAG Agreement — a subject that the U.S. had always maintained was beyond the scope of a SOFA. In this regard, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the U.S. not provide the GRC with a written statement that the MAAG Agreement was renegotiable, since such a statement would imply a commitment on the part of the U.S. to change the agreement at the request of the Chinese.³

Toward the end of the year, after the U.S. Ambassador to the GRC had indicated that the U.S. would no longer insist upon a firm

1. CINCPAC 252321Z Jun 63 (C)
2. CINCPAC 070023Z Jul 63 (C)
3. CINCPAC 140251Z Sep 63 (C)

legal commitment on the part of the Chinese to provide proper confinement facilities, CINCPAC directed that an inspection be made to compare the Chinese facilities with the Japanese prison at Yokosuka, where all U. S. personnel in Japanese custody were confined. After receiving the report of this comparison, CINCPAC reported to the Ambassador that the Chinese facilities did not measure up to U. S. standards, or compare favorably with the Yokosuka prison, and that he could not concur in any arrangement that would provide for the confinement of U. S. personnel in Taiwan prisons. CINCPAC further stated that any future agreement should contain explicit provisions that would require the GRC to provide confinement facilities meeting minimum U. S. standards, authorize inspection of those facilities by U. S. officials, and give the U. S. the right to provide to prisoners medical and dental care, supplementary rations, and other health items.

Although some progress was made during the 16 meetings held during 1963, no agreement was reached on any of the more controversial articles of the proposed SOFA.

U. S. Negotiations with Japan

During previous years CINCPAC had followed closely the negotiations between U. S. and Japanese representatives regarding the Japanese request that certain facilities being used by U. S. Forces be returned to Japan. Solutions to several of these requests are described in previous CINCPAC Command Histories. There were no negotiations during 1963 for the return of the Mito Bombing Range or of the Fuji-McNair Maneuver Area, the principal unresolved problems.

U. S. Agreements with the Philippines

Efforts to resolve two long standing problem areas in the Philippines made little progress during 1963. One of these was the renegotiation of the U. S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947, which had commenced in 1956. Since 1960 negotiations had been stalled on the issue of jurisdiction in criminal cases, and there were no developments in 1963.

For several years CINCPAC's Representative to the Philippines had participated in negotiations conducted by the Mutual Defense Board (MDB) for development of a mutual defense plan. During February, the CINCPACREP Philippines advised that the Philippine cochairman of the board had proposed significant changes to the basic section of MDB OPLAN-1, which was then undergoing revision. The changes were designed to obtain an agreement that the execution of the plan would be automatic in the event of hostilities, and were also intended to include recognition of Indonesia as a military threat.¹ In order to clarify the CINCPAC position and the basic section of the MDB Plan, CINCPAC prepared a proposed complete revision of the basic section. He agreed with the Philippine proposal regarding the execution of the plan, but opposed any proposal to include Indonesia as a threat, since such action could, in effect, convert the MDB plan into a contingency plan.² CINCPAC also opposed a later Philippine proposal that would have tied SEATO arrangements to the MDB OPLAN, and he furnished guidance to ensure that SEATO and MDB plans would not be related.³

Australian Status of Forces Agreement

In connection with the establishment of a very low frequency (VLF) communications facility in Australia, the U. S. in late 1961 commenced negotiations for a SOFA to cover U. S. Naval Forces that would operate the facility when it was constructed and also members of a USAF all-weather squadron located near Melbourne. CINCPAC first became aware of the existence of these negotiations in early 1963, and indicated to the JCS his interest.⁴ The JCS provided CINCPAC the background information on the proposed SOFA, and asked for his comments. After studying the draft, CINCPAC submitted his suggestions on the scope of the SOFA and the provisions for criminal jurisdiction, claims,

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1. CINCPACREP Phil msgs 150911Z, 070035Z and 060243Z Feb 63 (TS)
 2. CINCPAC 220011Z Feb 63 (TS)
 3. CINCPAC 062351Z Mar 63 (TS)
 4. CINCPAC 261926Z Feb 63 (S)

quarantine regulations, post office facilities, customs, and taxes.¹

On 21 April, representatives of the State Department, of the Secretary of Defense, and of CINCPAC joined a negotiating team that was headed by the U. S. Ambassador to Australia. This team met with representatives of the Government of Australia to conclude the negotiation of the SOFA and an agreement on the communication facility. During 19 days of intensive negotiations, CINCPAC succeeded in incorporating into the agreement most of the features that he considered important. Signed on 9 May 1963, the SOFA became effective immediately, although it was subject to the approval of the Australian Parliament; the agreement on the VLF communications facility was to become effective upon the approval of the two governments.

At the end of May, CINCPAC recommended to CNO that the U. S., as the country sending forces to Australia, establish a "Sending State Office for Australia" to handle claims, jurisdictional and other SOFA problems. The Embassy preferred to have an assistant U. S. Naval Attache for Legal Matters be assigned to do this work, but the CNO did not consider the command relationship compatible with those of the Naval Attache. In mid-July, the U. S. Embassy in Canberra agreed to the establishment of a separate Sending State Office.²

In further implementation of the SOFA, CINCPAC recommended to the CNO that a liaison officer to the communications facility be located in Canberra, and advised that this officer would be designated as CINCPAC Representative to Australia.³ CINCPAC did not intend to select the officer for this post until the U. S. military build-up in Australia got underway in 1964.⁴

VISITS IN THE PACOM AREA

Strengthening of relationships between the U. S. and other countries in the PACOM was materially assisted by visits to CINCPAC

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 252110Z and 300225Z Mar 63 (S)
2. Canberra 42 to State of 15 July 63 (C)
3. CINCPAC 241754Z Aug 63 (U)
4. CINCPAC 162121Z Dec 63 (C)

and the Component Commanders by numerous foreign dignitaries and by personal contact of CINCPAC and his representatives who visited foreign countries in the area.

Visits by U.S. Civil and Military Officials

CINCPAC actions to improve the state of readiness of U. S. Forces in the PACOM were facilitated by briefings and discussions held with the large number of U. S. Government representatives who visited CINCPAC in Hawaii during the year.

During 1963 CINCPAC received 150 groups of high ranking officials from the Executive Branch of the government, Department of Defense, the Military Departments, the Congress and other branches of the government. The majority of the visitors transited Hawaii on inspection trips to and from the various countries in the PACOM area. Usually the visitors received background briefings from CINCPAC on their outward journey, and presented debriefings to CINCPAC on their return. The total number of CINCPAC visitors of flag rank or above was 288; an additional 514 were members of the official parties of these groups.

Visits by Representatives of Foreign Countries

During the year, 27 groups of high ranking foreign civilian and military dignitaries visited CINCPAC. The total visitors of flag or general rank was 36 with an additional 34 as members of the official parties of these groups. Most of the visits were made specifically for briefings and discussions on matters of mutual interest.

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CHAPTER IV
ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION
AND INTERNAL UPRISINGS

CINCPAC ACTIVITIES TO PRESERVE FREEDOM IN LAOS

In the enigmatic country of Laos, the events of 1963 did not always follow a direct and simple path, but, as in previous years, took frequent and unexpected turns. The quarrels and dissension that had threatened the independent existence of the country and disturbed the gentle Lao people were supposed to have been settled when the Geneva Agreement on Laos was signed on 23 July 1962. But the fundamental differences that divided the Lao ruling class into pro-communist, pro-western, and neutralist factions remained unresolved throughout 1963. The coalition government that provided for the three quarreling Lao princes to govern the tiny kingdom failed in all four aims of the Geneva Agreements - to maintain a cease-fire, to evict all foreign military personnel from Laos, to integrate the three military and political factions, and to hold free elections. (U)

Following the 6 October 1962 withdrawal of U.S. MAAG personnel in conformance with the Geneva Agreements, U.S. policy provided that the U.S. would continue its support of non-communist elements of Laos. However, CINCPAC's responsibilities in connection with events in Laos were limited to watching developments in the troubled kingdom, and maintaining plans and forces to intervene, if necessary, to prevent a complete communist take-over. U.S. aid was administered by the Embassy, the Requirements Office of U.S. AID Laos, and Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand.

Some personnel formerly assigned to MAAG Laos were assigned to the Office of the Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand as a cadre organization that could be expanded and returned to Laos if the coalition government failed.¹

The tedious responsibility of enforcing the provisions of the

1. See the 1962 CINCPAC Command History, p. 219 (S)

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Geneva Agreements was entrusted to the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICC), which was composed of three delegates - one each from Poland, India, and Canada. Like members of the coalition government, these gentlemen rarely agreed, and the first ICC investigations of 1963, conducted to determine the presence of foreign troops in Laos, were unproductive because of communist insistence that members of the ICC enter the communist controlled areas of Laos to stay only as long as the communists permitted and to visit only a few selected and prepared areas.¹ Throughout 1963 the ICC was an ineffective agency in Laos.

Admiral Felt was in Southeast Asia during January, and at that time the former CHMAAG Laos, Maj. Gen. R. H. Tucker, who was then serving as Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand, explained that there was little justification for optimism according to the information he received from his former associates in Laos. There had been little change in the disposition of forces or the numbers of troops controlled by the three factions since the U.S. MAAG left Laos. And although it was difficult to prove, the former CHMAAG Laos estimated the number of Viet Minh still in Laos at 8,000. These personnel, serving in battalion size units or as cadre for PL units, were the backbone of some 19,000 Pathet Lao forces. Although General Phoumi Nosovan had talked about reductions of the FAR, he had demobilized only a few units of questionable value, and maintained a force at the beginning of 1963 of approximately 55,000 men. The neutralist forces - those belonging to General Kong Le - were feeling the squeeze from both left and right, and although Kong Le had been credited with 6,000 troops, it was considered doubtful that more than half that number would respond to his command.²

General Tucker believed that the U.S. would have to put up with

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1. Vientiane 955 to State, 3 Jan, 6PM 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 130740Z Jan 63 (S)

[REDACTED]

a partitioned country, and that although the communist forces were capable of taking over all of Laos if they wished, to do so would arouse the U.S. government, and saddle the Pathet Lao with additional problems without improving their existing position in Laos. As long as the Pathet Lao remained in control of the Ho Chi Minh system of trails leading into South Vietnam, General Tucker expected the situation to continue to simmer without a solution, and without integration either of the government factions or the armed forces.¹

The political situation was equally unstable. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma had failed to influence Prince Souphanouvong's Pathet Lao. As prime minister Souvanna exercised little power. The only forces directly loyal to Souvanna were Kong Le's troops, which supposedly controlled the Plaine des Jarres.

The Decision to Furnish U.S. Support to Kong Le

Captain Kong Le was one of General Phoumi's officers until 9 August 1960 when, acting on an impulse and to demonstrate his discontent with what he considered corruption in the government, he seized the city of Vientiane in a surprise coup. Opposed to foreign intervention, Kong Le demanded a truly neutral government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma. By December, Phoumi marshaled his forces and drove Kong Le and his rebellious troops out of Vientiane. Without a plan or place to go, Kong Le fled north and eventually allied his forces with the Pathet Lao. Through 1961 and part of the following year, Russian supplies flowed to Kong Le as a result of a request made by Souvanna. Although proclaiming their neutrality, Kong Le's forces behaved much like the Pathet Lao until early in 1962 when the two forces commenced quarreling. Dissension increased later in 1962 when Russia decreased, and then suspended, its aid to the

1. Ibid.

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insurgent forces in Laos. (S)

By the beginning of 1963, Kong Le had cut his ties with the Pathet Lao and was hinting that he would welcome U.S. support of his neutral forces. Accordingly, in one of the strange turn of events common to Laos, a group of U.S. State Department officials, including Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs; Michael Forrestal, Special Assistant to the President; and representatives from the Embassy, U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), and USIS flew to the Plaine des Jarres early in January to visit Kong Le. The group made the trip in a plane previously furnished by the Soviets, and manned by a Soviet crew. Although Kong Le made it clear that he still supported the neutral solution under Souvanna, he stressed his need for rice, clothing, petroleum, and communications equipment. He also asked for a 50KW transmitter so his radio station could operate unhindered by the Pathet Lao. Satisfied that Kong Le was honestly interested in working more closely with the U.S., the Ambassador, with the concurrence of Hilsman and Forrestal, recommended to the Secretary of State that the U.S. give him support.¹ When Admiral Felt learned of these recommendations, and recalling General Tucker's appraisal of Kong Le's forces, he expressed to the JCS his hope that the recommendation would have some reasonable constraint attached to it and that the MA Program "would not be used as a grab bag."² The State Department, however, agreed those Kong Le requests that were in line with U.S. policy should be received sympathetically and acted upon quickly and constructively.³

A large part of CINCPAC's 1963 activities with regard to Laos were in connection with efforts to carry out this policy and to equip and support the neutral forces of Kong Le.

Willing to accept aid from any donor, Kong Le lost little time

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1. Vientiane 995 to State, 11 Jan 7PM 1963 (C)
 2. CINCPAC 141009Z Jan 63 (S)
 3. State 694 to Vientiane, Jan 14, 9PM 1963 (C)

in making up his shopping list. At the beginning of February, a Kong Le representative delivered to the U.S. Embassy requests for POL, weapons, clothing, and equipment for his neutral forces. The Ambassador, however, advised CINCPAC that, for the time being, he intended to respond only to requests received through Souvanna in the name of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG), except for small quantities of OD clothing or other non-war materiel.¹

The State Department had already established the policy that the Ambassador and the Country Team were in the best position to determine what the neutral forces needed, and when it should be delivered. Admiral Felt had some reservations about the wisdom of supporting Kong Le, because of a possible detrimental effect this would have on the FAR. Admiral Felt asked OSD/ISA to confirm his assumption that he was to furnish, in accordance with normal MAP procedures, those items that the U.S. Ambassador to Laos and AID determined were essential. He explained that, in the meantime, he had instructed the Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand to proceed with MAP functions of planning, programming, requisitioning, receipt and storage of MAP material in Thailand, and to maintain liaison with US AID Laos and the military attaches in Vientiane. From Thailand the supplies could be moved into Laos when needed.²

The broad policy to cover U.S. support to the neutralist forces was set forth to CINCPAC in a joint State/Defense message of 20 February. This specifically stated that the decision had been made to give the Kong Le forces the MAP equipment they needed, including ammunition, if they were attacked by the Pathet Lao. To be prepared to meet the requirements, the Embassy was asked to prepare estimates of the quantity and types of equipment that would be needed, taking into account CAS capabilities, and forward the lists to CINCPAC. At the same time, the American Ambassador, Deputy CHJUSMAG

1. Vientiane 575 to CINCPAC, 2 Feb 7PM 1963 (S)
2. CINCPAC 091910Z Feb 1963 (S)

Thailand, and CINCPAC were advised to develop plans to make deliveries to Kong Le on an emergency basis, if necessary. Because of the deteriorating situation in the Plaine des Jarres, State and Defense said the planning should be done quickly, and should provide for the possibility that support of both the FAR and Kong Le might have to be given at the same time. ¹

The State Department broadened this statement of policy the following day in another message that stated it was the policy of the U.S. to provide all types of MAP items to support the RLG forces, without specific reference to FAR or neutralist forces, indicating that this decision had been made on a political basis to prevent PL domination of the neutralist forces, and to strengthen U.S. ties with these forces. To the extent possible, aid for the neutralists was expected to come from the established 1963 MAP, with the best possible estimates of neutralist requirements included later in the 1964 MA Program. ²

A week later, at the end of February, the first U.S. supplies were flowing into the hands of the neutral forces. A plane made four flights to the PDJ under the supervision of ICC personnel. Other flights followed with increasing regularity. ³

This support of the neutralists cheered Souvanna, who looked upon Kong Le's forces as his personal army, and it appeared to satisfy even General Phoumi, who served as one link in the supply chain, and who became responsible for passing the U.S. furnished goods to Kong Le. For his own part, Kong Le immediately moved to eliminate some of the dissidence that had threatened his grip on the PDJ, to push against the PL, and to re-assert his leadership of the neutral forces. In spite of the disquieting reports that Kong Le forces were severely limited in their actions by the nearby PL units,

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1. State UNN to CINCPAC 20 Feb 9PM 1963 (S)
 2. State 839 to Vientiane, 21 Feb 8PM 1963 (S)
 3. Vientiane 1228 to State, 28 Feb 1963 6PM (C)

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Souvanna, Phoumi and Kong Le were all confident that the neutralist forces could hold their own.^{1, 2} By the third week of March, Kong Le's confidence had soared to the point that he struck back at several pro-communist elements within his fold, arrested and removed them. It appeared that Souvanna, who reported that he had reached an understanding with General Phoumi on a plan for the joint defense of the PDJ should the situation deteriorate to fighting, approved of Kong Le's treatment of the left-leaning group.³

The April Crisis on the PDJ

The suspicions and distrust that simmered in the coalition government pot following the mixture of the three factions bubbled over early in 1963. On 12 February a key neutralist and one of Kong Le's top commanders, Colonel Ketsana Vongsouvanh, was assassinated in the PDJ. Because Ketsana had resisted efforts by Quinim Pholsena, Lao Foreign Minister, to infiltrate and divert the Kong Le forces, U.S. and Lao officials blamed him for the murder and for disturbing the delicate balance among the three factions.^{4, 5}

Uneasiness increased as all factions waited for the retribution. In the meantime, tensions and problems and lack of cooperation spread among the three factions of the RLG. Fighting broke out again in the PDJ. Then, on 1 April, Quinim Pholsena was murdered upon returning from a reception at the royal palace. Twelve days later, one of his supporters was assassinated.⁶

CINCPAC's Advance Preparations: Admiral Felt in April was in Paris attending a SEATO conference. He was encouraged by the fact that representatives from all member nations recognized the potential trouble spot then existing in Laos, and that all were concerned about the events there. Admiral Felt asked his staff to determine

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1. Vientiane 1275 to State 15 Mar 12 noon 1963 (S)
 2. Vientiane 1286 to State 16 Mar 4PM 1963 (S)
 3. Vientiane 1313 to State 21 Mar 11PM 1963 (S)
 4. Vientiane 621 to CINCPAC 13 Feb 6PM 1963 (S)
 5. Vientiane 1172 to State 15 Feb 11AM 1963 (S)
 6. USARMA Vientiane cite HQX-62 DTG 130450Z Apr 1963 (C)

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how soon a force could be on a stand-by basis and ready to go if necessary, and what needed to be done to attain a five day reaction time for a Marine BLT and the Marine Air Group at Iwakuni to arrive at Udorn. He also asked about preparations to transport one battle group of the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii to Korat within a similar reaction time, and how soon PACAF could place an F-100 squadron at Takhli if ordered on short notice.¹ Advised that these units could attain a five day reaction if they and support units were placed on alert, Admiral Felt explored the possibility of prepositioning some units at Cubi Point or Subic Bay, and asked for a plan to move the MEU headquarters to Udorn for purposes of command and control.^{2, 3} CINCPACFLT said that MAG 12 units could be at Cubi 36 hours after receiving an alert order, that sealift for MAG seatail could be positioned at Iwakuni in two days, and that the seatail for the MEU at Okinawa could be positioned in one to three days.⁴

At this time, PACOM forces were already pressing the communists at several points, the most significant of which included a Desoto patrol scheduled to operate in the Gulf of Tonkin from 14 to 24 April, (see section on Operations of U.S. Forces, Chapter I). The USS PRINCETON was preparing to depart Subic Bay on 11 April enroute to the vicinity of Bangkok where it was to take aboard ten Air America HU-34s, several other U.S. ships were operating in the South China Sea, and the SEATO Maritime Exercise SEA SERPENT was scheduled to take place in the South China Sea commencing 24 April.⁵

CINCPACAF proposed a course of action to expand the F-100 force available for use in Laos. Since CINCPAC's Operation Plan 32-63 provided for the deployment of a tactical bomber squadron if required, CINCPACAF suggested sending a flight of four to six B-57s to bases in Thailand, a move calculated to increase U.S. readiness. The aircraft

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1. CINCPAC 081855Z Apr 1963 (TS)
 2. ADMINO CINCPAC 090615Z Apr 1963 (TS)
 3. CINCPAC 091500Z Apr 1963 (TS)
 4. CINCPACFLT 100036Z Apr 1963 (TS)
 5. ADMINO CINCPAC 100231Z Apr 1963 (TS)

could be in place 12 hours after receiving orders to deploy, although the support personnel would require a longer time enroute.¹

Proposal to Advance Date of SEATO Exercise: The situation in the Plaine des Jarres was obviously far from clear, but it appeared to be a serious attempt by the Pathet Lao to remove the neutralist influence in the divided country. Recognizing Souvanna's inability to control the coalition government, and possible need for U.S. forces to prevent a communist take-over, on 9 April the State Department suggested to Admiral Felt that the SEATO conference offered an excellent opportunity to broach the question of deploying U.S. forces to Thailand. The U.S. could test the reaction of the Thais and give them advance notice, although it was necessary to assure them that no decision had been made.² As it happened, the U.S. Secretary of State, who was also in Paris, suggested to the Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, that if the situation in Laos continued to deteriorate, the June SEATO military exercise could be held at an earlier date as a warning to the communists. Thanat thought his government would be agreeable to such a plan.³ At the same time Admiral Felt broached to Thai MILAD, Marshall Dawee, the suggestion that the U.S. send to Thailand, one or two weeks before the SEATO exercise was to commence, the U.S. battle group that was to participate in the exercise. He also discussed the possibility that the battle group could remain in Thailand for a short time after the conclusion of the exercise. Marshall Dawee readily agreed to these suggestions, and although Admiral Felt thought such a plan should be cleared through Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat, Dawee's desire to keep such arrangements on an informal basis suggested to Admiral Felt the impression that the Thais were beginning to be a little sensitive to the presence of U.S. troops in their country. (S)

The suggestion to advance the date of the exercise was dropped

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1. PACAF 122100Z Apr 1963 cite PFCNC 63-4-9 (TS)
 2. State UNN to CINCPAC, 9 Apr 10PM 1963 (S)
 3. State UNN to CINCPAC 10 Apr 2PM 1963 (S)

later, partly because the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand and COMUSMACTHAI recommended that the SEATO nations adhere to the existing schedule. In a message passed by the JCS to CINCPAC, the Ambassador said that although the schedule could be advanced moderately from the U.S. viewpoint, the extensive planning the Thai officials had to do could not be rushed without risking disorganization that might be embarrassing to the SEATO nations. The Ambassador suggested that instead of advancing the date of the exercise, the U.S. consider sending the 593d Engineer Construction Company to Thailand several weeks earlier than planned. The U.S. might benefit from the publicity that would reflect the early arrival of U.S. troops, and the Thais wanted to encourage U.S. engineer units to carry on the Civic Action program that had been so popular with the Thais on other occasions. 1

Further Actions to Advance the Date of the SEATO Exercise:

The situation in Laos had become so critical by 20 April that the JCS directed CINCPAC to explore three separate means of applying military pressure to interfere with Pathet Lao aggression. One of these was to consider further the possibility of advancing the date for Exercise Dhanarajata. To avoid loss of time, the JCS asked Admiral Felt, who had returned on 13 April from the SEATO Conference in Paris, to go to Bangkok to meet with the SEATO military representatives and get their reaction to the proposed plan for advancing the date of the SEATO exercise, and to review with them the situation in Laos. There was also a plan for Admiral Felt to go to Vientiane to see General Phoumi as a gesture to bolster Lao morale and impress the DRV, a plan that was abandoned after Admiral Felt arrived in Bangkok. If the other SEATO nations did not favor advancing the date of the exercise, the JCS hoped that arrangements could be made to move U.S. Forces associated with the exercise to Thailand ahead of the schedule, with

1. Bangkok 1564 to State 13 Apr 9PM 1963 (S)

first priority to the air units. The JCS wanted CINCPAC's views on the best way to get this done.¹ On the same day, the State Department sent instructions to the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand to discuss the Lao crisis with Prime Minister Sarit, pointing out the rapidly deteriorating position of the Kong Le forces, which had lost most of the PDJ and had been driven to the western foothills by the PL. The Ambassador was directed to advise Sarit that the U.S. was sending Governor Harriman to France and England to solicit the cooperation of those nations, that it was moving naval forces into waters adjacent to South Vietnam, and that the U.S. wanted Sarit's views on the feasibility of advancing the date of Exercise Dhanarajata or, if that was impracticable, to move participating U.S. forces into Thailand in the very near future before the exercise began.²

Admiral Felt departed on 21 April for Southeast Asia. Just before leaving he directed CINCUSARPAC to be prepared to advance the deployment date of the 503d Battle Group from Okinawa to Thailand, and he directed CINCPACAF to be prepared to move on short notice 12 F-100s and supporting personnel to Thailand.^{3, 4}

Before Admiral Felt arrived in Thailand, the JCS dispatched a message to advise that the Departments of State and Defense had modified instructions given on 20 April.⁵ Because of recent political developments, Admiral Felt was asked not to seek SEATO concurrence to advancing the exercise date to any specific date, but he was to go ahead with planned discussions, including possibility of advancing the date for Exercise Dhanarajata.⁶ This message was delivered to Admiral Felt upon his arrival in Bangkok. He went immediately to the Embassy where he met with Ambassador Young, General Harkins and other staff members, with whom he reached agreement that U.S. could deploy for pre-exercise training an F-100 squadron and a

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1. JCS 9564 DTG 202041Z Apr 1963 (TS)
 2. SECState UNN to CINCPAC 20 Apr 10PM 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 210320Z Apr 1963 (TS)
 4. CINCPAC 210322Z Apr 1963 (S)
 5. JCS 9564 DTG 202041Z Apr 1963 (TS)
 6. JCS 9578 DTG 222209Z Apr 1963 (TS)

reconnaissance task force, and with theater aircraft lift a part of the headquarters of the 503d Airborne BG with a reinforced company and signal support. Then, if MATS could furnish the aircraft, elements of the 25th Infantry with supporting units could be brought from Hawaii to prepare equipment in the Korat depot for the exercise, and the 593d Engineer Construction Battalion could be used if MATS could lift it earlier than planned. The Ambassador, Admiral Felt and General Harkins believed the desired effect would be achieved by an earlier movement of U. S. , and possibly other SEATO forces, into Thailand, without attempting to launch the exercise ahead of schedule. ¹

On the afternoon of 23 April, Admiral Felt met with the Chief MPO and the SEATO Military Advisors' Representatives. Emphasizing that the U. S. was only one of eight member nations, and that his purpose was to solicit the views of all MILADs, Admiral Felt explained that the U. S. was gravely concerned with conditions in Laos, and then raised two questions for which he was seeking the MILAD consensus. The first question concerned the possibility of advancing the date of the SEATO ground defense exercise. He explained what the U. S. could do to advance the date, but stressed the point that the U. S. believed in the collective efforts of SEATO, and that he now hoped each country would give serious consideration to a question that would affect member nations. The second question that Admiral Felt submitted to the SEATO representatives raised the possibility of having some forces scheduled for the exercise arrive in Thailand at a date earlier than originally planned. This would result in a show of SEATO force without disturbing the schedule for the exercise. He suggested that the U. S. , and possibly other nations, could deploy air units at an early date, a move that he thought would most effectively impress the communists. After stressing the point that the answers to the questions he had raised should be based upon the assessment of the SEATO

1. CINCPAC 231400Z Apr 1963 (TS)

member nations, with the approval of the JCS, he departed on 25 April for his headquarters. ¹

The enthusiasm of the other SEATO nations for advancing the date of the military exercise was somewhat less than that of the U.S. On 26 April the USMILADREP advised CINCPAC that preliminary replies from Australia, New Zealand, and the UK indicated that those countries preferred to make no change in the date, but that there was a possibility that certain participating units could be deployed earlier than scheduled. ² The Government of Thailand also favored the original date, a position that the SEATO Secretary General, a Thai national named Pote Sarasin, explained to Ambassador Young. Pote reasoned that the Asian viewpoint frequently differed from that of westerners, and that the deployment of troops to Thailand or 7th Fleet operations in Vietnamese waters would impress Russian communists who understood such power confrontations, but that it would not impress the Pathet Lao or the Viet Minh who were not concerned with military power beyond the borders of Laos. Pote favored actions in Laos to strengthen Souvanna Phouma and the forces opposing the PL, but warned that unless something was done inside of Laos, the PL/VM would continue to nibble away at the provisions of the Geneva Agreements and the other factions of the RLG. ³ By the end of the month, the communist pressure in the PDJ had been quietly withdrawn, the tension had eased somewhat, and Admiral Felt advised his Component Commanders that the replies of some of the SEATO members indicated that the movement of troops for Exercise Dhanarajata would not commence earlier than planned. ⁴

Military Actions to Influence Laos Situation: The PL threat to the three-sided government of Laos, as appraised by U.S. officials,

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1. CINCPAC 241045Z Apr 1963 (TS)
 2. USMILADREP SMPO Bangkok to CINCPAC DTG260610Z Apr 1963(TS)
 3. Bangkok 1639 to State 27 Apr 3:45PM 1963 (S)
 4. CINCPAC 290417Z Apr 1963 (S)

loomed largest during the last half of April. In addition to political maneuvers, and attempts to advance the commencement of the SEATO military exercise, the JCS on 20 April outlined to CINCPAC certain military actions calculated to demonstrate U. S. determination to stabilize the situation in Laos. The JCS directed CINCPAC to move a carrier Task Group and the Marine BLT afloat to waters off the coast of South Vietnam, to remain south of the 17th parallel, but to anticipate orders to move into the Gulf of Tonkin and display U. S. strength against North Vietnam. Although the JCS wanted no formal publicity, they wanted to be certain that this show of force wasn't wasted on Hanoi and Moscow, and asked CINCPAC to suggest methods for doing this.¹

CINCPAC immediately directed CINCPACFLT to deploy TG 77.5 from the Subic area to a position east of South Vietnam and to conduct normal flight operations in the area. To make certain that the communists understood, CINCPAC directed that normal communications be conducted during operations. He also directed that TG 76.5 be positioned in the same area, but south of TG 77.5.² By 24 April, TG 76.5, consisting of the PRINCETON, one APA, one LSD, and one DD, were conducting operations just south of the 17th parallel. In addition, the SEATO maritime exercise SEA SERPENT had just commenced operations and would continue until 9 May. In addition to forces of other SEATO nations, U. S. naval forces involved were the YORKTOWN, three DD and four DE, operating as TG 70.4.³

The two Task Groups off the RVN coast continued operations until the end of the month. On 30 April, when the threat to the coalition government of Laos appeared less serious, CINCPACFLT suggested to CINCPAC that Task Groups had attracted the attention of Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi, and had served their purpose, although he doubted

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1. JCS 9565 DTG 202043Z Apr 1963 (TS)
 2. CINCPAC 202337Z Apr 1963 (TS)
 3. ADMINO CINCPAC 240116Z Apr 1963 (S)

that the operations of the Task Groups appeared to any of the communists as an immediate threat to their attempts to erode the neutralists' area in the PDJ. Accordingly, CINCPACFLT recommended that it would be prudent to return TG 76.5 to Subic Bay and that the carrier group be released to normal operations in the South China Sea, thus conserving energy for the long haul situation.¹ In turn, CINCPAC explained to the JCS that the amphibious group had served its purpose, and recommended that it return to Subic Bay for scheduled maintenance, to which the JCS agreed.²

On 3 May the JCS authorized the release of Task Group 77.7 for normal operations.³

Considerations Regarding Implementing OPLAN 32-63: At the same time that the JCS directed CINCPAC to deploy Naval Task Groups to the vicinity of South Vietnam, the JCS were examining plans and possible courses of action to prevent the collapse of the RLG. The question arose among the JCS if it might be desirable to withhold the Marine elements from the deployments planned in Phase II Laos, in case they were needed should Phase III be directed. The JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments on the suggestion and the impact on the existing concept of operations for Phase II.⁴

Admiral Felt said that OPLAN 32-63 provided flexibility in the adjustments in force deployments at the time of implementation. But he emphasized that the foremost reason for using the Marines in Phase II Laos was because they were immediately available in the West Pacific and could be moved by PACOM airlift. Since the plan depended upon a quick reaction to secure key areas in Laos before they fell into enemy hands, Admiral Felt did not wish to upset carefully laid plans and training at that time. He also mentioned that the III MEB had conducted intensive planning, reconnaissance and loading-out training

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1. ADMINO CINCPACFLT 302107Z Apr 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 012332Z May 1963 (TS)
 3. JCS 9756 DTG 032139Z May 1963 (TS)
 4. JCS 9563 DTG 201806Z Apr 1963 (TS)

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for the specific task of seizing key areas in Laos quickly. If Phase III was directed, a possibility that would be increased by implementing Phase II, CPLAN 32-63 provided that the Marine forces were to be relieved by Army forces as soon as practicable.¹

Emergency Supply Actions

By mid-April, the Lao coalition government was being shaken by the most serious crisis of its ten month existence, with the existence of the neutralist segment of the government threatened by Pathet Lao expansion in the PDJ. The Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand advised CINCPAC on 13 April that barring an all-out PL attack, Kong Le might keep a toe-hold in the PDJ. His prospects for survival improved as a result of Phoumi's increased level of support to the neutralists. Phoumi had commenced airlifting weapons and ammunition to Kong Le, and appeared willing to give even more help.² On 14 April Souvanna submitted to the U.S. Embassy a letter requesting, in addition to the support he requested by letter on 10 September 1962, vehicles, signal equipment, defensive weapons, engineer and other equipment. The Embassy immediately passed this information to CINCPAC.³ (S)

CINCPAC's concern was to provide and deliver in time the supplies the neutralist forces needed to survive, a task that proved to be entangled with tedious detail. For a source of available ammunition, CINCPAC authorized the release of a portion of seven ammunition line items from SALTSHAKER stocks with the understanding that it be replaced by the Army. He also authorized the release of 400 carbines from the same source, and instructed CINCUSARPAC to airship an additional 800 carbines to DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand.⁴ (S)

During the first week of April CINCPAC had initiated the chain of events necessary to start the flow of supplies to Kong Le's forces.

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1. CINCPAC 212130Z Apr 1963 (TS)
 2. CHJUSMAG THAI Chief 25853 DTG 130430Z Apr 1963 (S)
 3. Vientiane 815 to CINCPAC, 14 Apr 10AM 1963 (S)
 4. ADMINO CINCPAC 050316Z Apr 1963 (S)

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Emergency supplies were diverted from FAR stocks and air dropped or delivered to neutralists. By 21 April, conditions in Laos had deteriorated to such an extent that Admiral Felt rescinded the policies that, since October 1962, had governed the delivery of supplies to forces of the RLG. He advised the Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand, who served as the non resident MAAG Laos, that the recent events in Laos had made necessary a change in policy, and that he wanted Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand to supply promptly to the RLG Armed Forces all MAP materiel for which the U. S. Ambassador in Vientiane said there was an urgent need. Except for such urgent requirements, MAP deliveries to Laos would be restricted to spare parts, clothing, and limited amounts of a few other supplies. All stored equipment and supplies in Thailand under the control of the Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand were available for filling these requirements. This included stores of supplies identified as REDCAP, and PEPPERGRINDER, and some that were earmarked for EKARAD training, but did not include the assets of SALTSHAKER, which remained a Southeast Asia reserve under CINCPAC's control.¹

Problems did arise concerning statements of requirements and deliveries, however, and in May CINCPAC sent a team to Thailand to meet with DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand and U. S. AID Laos representatives. The team was to determine causes of past misunderstandings and to prevent recurrences.²

Difficulties were due primarily to lack of detailed requirements being furnished to DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand for ammunition, weapons and POL. One misunderstanding arose as a result of failure of the Requirements Office of U. S. AID Laos to specify the pick up point for four loads of airdrop-rigged ammunition.³ Since ~~██████~~ Vientiane had requested the ammunition, DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand assumed the pick

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1. CINCPAC 210038Z Apr 1963 (S)
 2. CHJUSMAG Thailand 26340 DTG 151600Z May 1963 (S)
 3. CHJUSMAG Thailand 26275 DTG 111645Z May 1963 (S)

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up point would be Takhli, and moved it there for rigging. U.S. AID Laos assumed the pick up point would be Udorn because PEPPER-GRINDER was located there. This misunderstanding led to an accusation that DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand had failed to have the ammunition ready.

As a result of meetings with the CINCPAC representatives, the Requirements Office of U.S. AID Laos and DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand staffs agreed that they should work together and refrain from "sending up Red Rockets."

105mm Howitzers for the Neutralists

At the end of May the U.S. Embassy in Laos passed on a neutralist request for eight additional 105mm howitzers, and expressed hope that prompt action could be taken. However, Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand recommended that CINCPAC not furnish the weapons because neither the FAR nor the neutralists were trained to use artillery properly, because the terrain was unsuitable, and because it would increase the maintenance and spare parts problems. Since the FAR used howitzers more for direct fire than for indirect fire missions, Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand suggested that recoilless rifles would serve their needs better.¹ CINCPAC agreed with this position and recommended to OASD/ISA that the MA program not be burdened with more than a million dollars for howitzers or mortars that the FAR and neutral forces were unable to use effectively.²

Before these recommendations could be considered, the FAR transferred to Kong Le several howitzers and several 4.2 mortars.³ Later, on 11 June, the U.S. Army Military Attache in Vientiane recommended that 12 more howitzers be moved to the PDJ, a move that CINCPAC told the OASD/ISA he considered dangerous since it would result in concentrating two-thirds of the total FAR 105mm

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1. CHJUSMAG Thailand 26560 DTG 291015Z May 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 300150Z May 1963 (S)
 3. Vientiane 1835 to State DTG May 31, 7:00PM 1963 (S)

batteries in a vulnerable area. Accordingly, Admiral Felt recommended to OASD/ISA that no more howitzers or 4.2 inch mortars be furnished to Kong Le's force, and that the FAR be encouraged not to move additional weapons into the PDJ. He again stressed the advantages of recoilless rifles that could be used as a direct observation weapon and easily mastered by the Lao soldiers.¹ In the end, CINCPAC was overruled because of Presidential interest in convincing Souvanna, the FAR and the neutralists that the U.S. was willing to help hold positions against the PL. The OSD directed CINCPAC to provide eight 105mm howitzers and four 4.2 mortars to the FAR as soon as possible, and urged the Country Team to make every effort to provide the necessary training. The funding was to be from the FY63 Laos MA program.²

To train the neutralists in artillery methods, the Ambassador recommended that 6 officers and 12 gunners, from Thailand, be used. Admiral Felt considered this estimate too low and advised the JCS that he favored 18 officers and 36 gunners in order to have advisors to insure the targets were hit. In addition, he suggested that a complete Thai 105mm battery be infiltrated into the Thakhek position, and that the Ambassador check the artillery school at Savannakhet and consider reinstating Thai instructors.³ The Ambassador, however, felt that introduction of Thai units on the PDJ did not fit into the U.S. plan at that time, but thought the subject should be discussed with Sarit so that it could be done quickly should the need arise. The State Department agreed with CINCPAC that there should be an increase in the Thai cadres and instructors, but preferred to start with the 18 originally suggested as the first increment.⁴ Gen Phoumi stated to the U.S. Army Attache in Laos that he had no objection to training in Thailand, and on 18 July 1963 in another conversation with the Attache insisted that he did not want Thai instructors in Laos regardless of

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1. CINCPAC 132230Z Jun 1963 (S)
 2. OSD Def 929442 DTG 201805Z Jan 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 020107Z Jul 1963 (S)
 4. State 64 to Bangkok, 10 Jul 4PM 1963 (S)

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the situation. He preferred to have large Thai units appear in Laos. Training began in Thailand in September 1963 and is described in a following section of this chapter entitled Laos Army MAP Training in Thailand.¹

Request for .50 Caliber Machine Guns for Neutralists

Kong Le's decision to abandon communist backing and seek support from that portion of the Lao coalition government that was backed by the U. S. created a supply problem that was complicated because most of Kong Le's weapons were Russian made. At the end of April, when the neutral forces had nearly exhausted their supply of ammunition for their Soviet weapons, Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand recommended to CINCPAC that in exchange for those Soviet Weapons that Kong Le then had, the U. S. provide him with U. S. weapons except for additional .50 caliber machine guns.² CINCPAC approved this recommendation, and agreed that placing additional heavier machine guns in the hands of the neutralists was not worth the risk that they might fall into PL/VM hands and become an effective weapon against low flying U. S. aircraft that were engaged in supporting Kong Le.³

CINCPAC explained to the U. S. Ambassador to Laos the reason for his decision to exclude the heavy machine guns, and although the Ambassador wanted to equip Kong Le with these weapons, CINCPAC did not agree.⁴

Although the Ambassador considered the possibility that the situation could deteriorate to the point where Lao towns would be under air attack, for which the quad .50 caliber machine guns would be necessary defense weapons, CINCPAC thought that in such a situation the U. S. would take the initiative and reduce the communist air threat. In any case, he thought that the skills required to man and maintain

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1. Vientiane ARMA CX-172 DTG 181050Z Jul 1963 (S)
 2. CHJUSMAG Thailand 26093 DTG 300505Z Apr 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 040113Z May 1963 (S)
 4. Vientiane 975 to CINCPAC, 8 May 1PM 1963 (S)

complicated machine guns were not available in the numbers required.¹

Furnishing Transport Planes to the RLG

In December 1962, the USSR gave the RLG nine transport aircraft and one helicopter. Pleased by this no-strings-attached gift, Souvanna early in 1963 commenced suggesting that the U.S. give planes to the RLG, rather than provide the air transport service for which the U.S. had contracted with two civilian firms. Accordingly, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos recommended to the State Department that the U.S. place at the disposal of the RLG one C-46 and one liaison type plane, together with the crews for flying and maintaining the aircraft. Besides the advantage of letting Souvanna know that the U.S., as well as the Russians, was willing to help meet the RLG's air transport requirements, such a plane would carry RLG markings and would be able to resume the air supply of rice and other items to Meo tribesmen, hopefully without having the planes destroyed as had happened on several previous occasions.² The JCS at once asked for Admiral Felt's comments on the proposal.³ Admiral Felt said he could not agree with any plan that would provide Souvanna more than a token air supply capability. He agreed that such action might serve to balance the USSR gift, but claimed it would have little impact on the PL objective of forcing the last U.S. presence out of Laos. Since Souvanna exercised no control over the PL-held territory, his coalition government was ineffective in supporting a neutral Laos. Furthermore, if a combined U.S./USSR airlift capability, owned or otherwise controlled by the RLG, could be made to support the FAR, Kong Le and the PL could contend that U.S. contract arrangements were no longer required and should be terminated. The end result would be the loss of the Meo tribes as effective anti-communist elements in Laos, the Kong Le

1. CINCPAC 020107Z Jul 1963 (S)
2. Vientiane 523 to CINCPAC Jan 17 8PM 1963 (C)
3. JCS 8287 DTG 182152Z Jan 1963 (U)

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forces could be rendered ineffective, and the U.S. presence in the Lao countryside would be removed, thus permitting the PL and communists to expand their geographical and political control of Laos. Instead of turning the planes over to the RLG, CINCPAC recommended that the U.S. continue to control the air supply operations, that it keep them open to ICC inspection, and publicize them for the humanitarian effort they represented.¹

The State Department, however, went ahead with its plans to furnish to the RLG a C-46 and a liaison type plane and, in the meantime, authorized the Ambassador to place the two planes "at RLG disposal" on an "on call" basis.² In accordance with these instructions, the Ambassador informed Souvanna that the U.S. was prepared to place the two planes at his disposal. Souvanna accepted this offer, but made it clear that he would not be satisfied with any arrangement short of an outright grant, as the Soviets had made.³ The planes were turned over to the RLG with the understanding that flight arrangements would have to be made between the RLG and the U.S. contracting firm that flew and maintained the planes. A few days later, on 22 January, the State Department advised CINCPAC and the U.S. Embassy in Laos that, for political reasons, the U.S. was further prepared to give two C-46s to the RLG through the AID program. The reasons behind this move were several. The State Department hoped that the two planes would give Souvanna grounds for arguing with the PL that the U.S., as well as the Russians, gave unconditional help to the RLG, giving him the determination he needed to carry out the air supply to the Meo tribes, neutralists and outlying FAR, in spite of and against the opposition of the PL. In any case, the State Department reasoned that through the outright grant of two planes, it could test Souvanna's willingness or ability to stand up to PL demands that air supply to the Meo be ended, and determine if there were any tactics within the

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1. CINCPAC 200024Z Jan 1963 (S)
 2. State 706 to Vientiane, 18 Jan 1963 12AM (C)
 3. Vientiane 1032 to State, 19 Jan 1963 8PM (C)

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framework of the tripartite control that could circumvent communist obstruction.¹ (C)

The Ambassador in Vientiane explained to CINCPAC that he realized giving planes to Souvanna would not guarantee they would be used to deliver the food and supplies that the U.S. wanted to deliver. But since Souvanna failed to understand the complexity of the air supply operation, the Ambassador also hoped that after he had been softened up by the gift of the aircraft, the U.S. could persuade Souvanna to accept further lease arrangements to resupply the Meo and friendly groups.² By 25 January the U.S. told Souvanna that it was giving him the two C-46 aircraft, although both planes were not delivered immediately. If the U.S. hoped this would put an end to Souvanna's comparison between U.S. and Soviet gifts of aircraft, no one really expected any changes in PL opposition to air supply to the Meo tribes, and there were only faint hopes that Souvanna would be able to carry out his promise and make a firm stand against the PL.³ Having yielded control, Embassy personnel could only urge the RLG to make maximum use of the planes, a disadvantage that became more apparent during the first weeks of the new arrangement.⁴

For his part, CINCPAC remained concerned about the advisability of giving the planes to the RLG, particularly about the RLG's ability to maintain them acceptably. With the second of the two gift planes due to be turned over to the RLG toward the middle of March, on 7 March CINCPAC asked the Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand to review the advisability of delivering the aircraft to Laos, and if there was a valid need for logistic airlift that could not be met with the resources then available, including the country aircraft, US AID contracted aircraft, the contractor planes that had been made available for the exclusive use of the RLG, and the available Russian built cargo aircraft.⁵ Accordingly, the Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand reviewed with

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1. State 724 to Vientiane, 22 Jan 1963 8PM (C)
 2. Vientiane 538 to CINCPAC DTG 241145Z Jan 1963 (C)
 3. Vientiane 544 to CINCPAC DTG 251355Z Jan 1963 (C)
 4. Vientiane 1210 to State, 21 Feb 1963 9PM (C)
 5. CINCPAC 072244Z Mar 1963 (S)

the U. S. Ambassador in Laos the number of planes then available, compared them with the need, and recommended to Admiral Felt that the plane be delivered as planned. At that time there were six Russian cargo planes operational in Laos, two of which were reserved for the Pathet Lao, and two for pilot training. The cargo lift capacity of the other two was considered negligible. Of the nine C-47 planes, one was reserved for the king, one was used by Souvanna, one that had been damaged in a crash was awaiting repairs, and one other plane was usually undergoing periodic maintenance. Five aircraft were usually available for airlift and training requirements.¹ By mid-April, the Ambassador to Laos advised CINCPAC that, with the available aircraft, the help of the Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand, and the cooperation of the FAR, the U.S. was succeeding in getting POL, ammunition, weapons and rice to Kong Le at the PDJ. The RLG was providing five tons of rice a day to the FAR, from which it was airlifted to the neutralists.²

On 19 April, one additional C-47 aircraft was delivered to the RLG, bringing the total assigned to ten. Subsequently, OSD provided \$4.4 million to Department of Air Force in June 1963 to support Air Force MAP requirements in Laos.³ Authorization was granted to deviate these FY63 MAP funds to provide for increased airlift capability as well as to meet normal operating requirements. As part of Phase I actions, approved by the President to stabilize the situation in Laos, CINCPAC took action in early July to augment Souvanna Phouma's airlift capabilities. On 23 July, OSD approved the addition of four C-47 cargo aircraft, three U-17A liaison aircraft, and three additional H-34 helicopters.⁴ These aircraft were immediately programmed and delivery was made during September and October 1963. With the addition of four C-47s the inventory stood at 14, an

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1. CHJUSMAG Thailand Chief-A 25561 DTG 201000Z Mar 1963 (S)
 2. Vientiane 1437 to State, April 12, 7PM 1963 (S)
 3. Amemb Vientiane 1255 to Bangkok, 19 Apr 1963 (S)
 4. OSD Def 930573, DTG 232057Z Jul 1963 (S)

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increase of over 25%. The assignment of three Cessna 185s (U-17A) brought the total inventory of liaison aircraft to nine, an increase of about 33%. The three H-34s were assigned for operation and maintenance to the existing Air America MAP funded contract, with station at Udorn, Thailand. The reason for this action was the availability of helicopter qualified pilots in the RLG Air Force. However, it was originally planned by both OSD and CINCPAC that the RLG would assume operational control of at least two of these H-34s, as soon as pilots could be trained.


T-28 Aircraft for Laos

In July 1963 CINCPAC took action in accordance with State/Defense approval to replace six obsolete and almost completely deteriorated T-6 aircraft, given to the FAR in 1961, with six T-28s.¹ The T-28D aircraft were provided from Thailand assets by transfer of title from RTG to USG thence to RLG. Three of the T-28D aircraft arrived in Laos on 29 July 1963, and the remaining three arrived on 23 August 1963. The RLAF had six pilots trained by the Royal Thai AF to fly the T-28s and four additional pilots who had been training in the U.S. Thailand provided initial spare parts, ground handling equipment, .50 cal. cartridges, and 2.75 rockets. PACOM had previously provided general purpose bombs and fragmentation bombs, which were shipped to PEPPERGRINDER. Fifty of these bombs were delivered into Laos by CINCPAC authority.²

U.S. Support of Meo Tribesmen

The amount of military aid that the U.S. furnished to the non-communist elements of Laos after the effective date of the Geneva Accords was restricted sharply compared with the level of support given during periods of combat. Support to the FAR presented no

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1. CINCPAC 190324Z Jul 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 062150Z Jul 1963 (S)



difficulties but, commencing early in 1963, U.S. furnished planes drew ground fire when delivering rice to Meo and other tribesmen whose loyalty and support the U.S. wished to preserve. On 5 January, a cargo plane was shot down in the Nam Tha Province while on a routine mission of dropping rice.¹ The Lao Minister of Information, Phoumi Vongvichit, who was one of the communist members of the coalition government, said American planes distributing relief supplies to mountain tribesmen would continue to risk destruction if they passed over PL territory.

The U.S. desire to continue its support of the hill tribesmen, who were the remaining effective source of harassment to the PL, was a main reason for the U.S. willingness to go along with Souvanna's insistent request that the U.S. give planes to the RLG. (See item on this subject) Souvanna claimed that planes carrying the RLG insignia could fly anywhere in Laos, a statement that U.S. officials considered unjustifiably optimistic.² Admiral Felt approved of the State Department's determination to support the Meo and other friendly tribes, and suggested to the JCS that the U.S., proceeding cautiously, might use POL and other AID levers to pry the RLG into some action against the PL roadblocks.³

During January and February the supply flights to the Meo remained a serious problem. In mid-February a joint Embassy/U.S. AID study recommended to the Department of State that the problem be solved by relocating the tribesmen to areas not under PL control. Admiral Felt asked Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand for his views on the recommendations, and set forth his own objections to a proposal that would remove the only thorns remaining in the side of the PL, and concede ownership by the PL of a sizable area of Laos. Furthermore, CINCPAC attached importance to the Meo tribesmen's ability to

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1. CINCPAC 092205Z Jan 1963 (S)
 2. Vientiane 991 to State, 11 Jan 1963 2PM (S)
 3. CINCPAC 212305Z Jan 1963 (S)

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survive deep in the communist held portions of Laos, as a source of U.S. intelligence, and as a means of keeping pressure on the communists to live up to the Geneva Agreements. Admiral Felt believed that moving the tribesmen would be another victory, without cost, for the communists, and that it could be interpreted by Thailand and neighboring countries as another instance of the U.S. yielding to communist pressure. He asked Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand for his opinion of a system of logistic land pipelines to the Meo tribes similar to the communist supply line that followed the Ho Chi Minh trail. These could be operated by the tribes from distribution points in friendly territory, established preferably by Phoumi. ¹

Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand agreed that the Meo units should be kept in place behind the PL lines, and that the U.S. would have to give them all possible aid. He favored air delivery, if necessary from Thailand, and suggested that the Meo tribes could not survive without adequate U.S. support if they were required to keep up their existing combat commitments. ²

The Meo tribesmen remained in place throughout the year, and performed a valuable service in the struggle against communist encroachment. Providing the support for the Meo tribesmen who harassed the communists was the responsibility of ~~██████~~ which delivered to them both food and weapons. In addition, there were refugee tribesmen who depended upon the U.S. for food; this was furnished by AID.

The U.S. Military Assistance Program for Laos

By the middle of May the crisis of the previous month had passed - as far as the immediate threat to the neutralist forces was concerned. Nevertheless, there was no reason for the RLG to be

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1. CINCPAC 022231Z Mar 1963 (S)
 2. CHJUSMAG Thailand Dep Chief 2593, DTG 051035Z Mar 1963 (S)

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optimistic about the long range prospects. Souvanna Phouma, who for several months had tried to persuade his half brother, Souphanouvong, to carry out his pledged support of the coalition government, had become discouraged by his intransigence, by the failure of the ICC to enforce the Geneva Agreements, and by Russia's failure to support the neutral position in Laos. The State Department had swung from all-out support of Phoumi to a policy of restraining him and supporting the coalition government. In mid-May the Ambassador summed up the existing situation to the State Department and pointed out that his sympathies were sliding back toward Phoumi, since it was becoming clear that the communists did not intend to permit unification of Laos except on their own unacceptable terms. Although Ambassador Unger expected no large scale military action, he did believe the PL would continue to nibble away at neutralist and FAR positions all over the country, especially to get full control of the PDJ.

The Ambassador thought that the situation then developing indicated that the U. S. should define precisely the missions that the Lao forces were expected to have before becoming more deeply involved with the FAR or Kong Le Forces, or in planning with the RLG or Allies.¹

Replying with general guidance on policy objectives, the Department of State explained that U. S. efforts with non-communist forces should be to maintain them at a level of morale and equipment so they could hold against an attack long enough for the international attention to focus on the situation and permit a decision on what action the U. S. should take. Concerning the amount of support the U. S. should furnish, the State Department agreed with Ambassador Unger that the FAR and neutralists would be ineffective against any PL attack supported by Viet Minh regardless of the level of support. For those

1. Vientiane 1719 to State DTG 18 May 9PM 1963 (TS)

reasons the State Department did not consider it advisable to build up the non-communist forces either in numbers or in equipment, except for replacements of worn-out items. The goal of support for Kong Le was to strengthen him to the point where the PL would have to mount a major attack to drive him from the PDJ. U.S. objectives with the Meo tribesmen were to maintain them in the role they had occupied and to support their harassing operations that prevented the consolidation of communist control over much of the PL held areas.¹

Establishment of Support Levels for FAR/Neutralists: A joint State/Defense action in July authorized basic support for 40,000 FAR and 6,500 neutralists.² However, because of possible emergency requirements, contingency support was to be readied in Thailand for an additional 10,000 FAR, 9,000 ADC and 1,700 Neutralists. As before, the criteria for delivery continued to be the capability of the Laotian forces to use the material effectively. Pending a 1964 presidential determination and authorization, material support was to be funded from the 1963 MAP.

DOD issued to the Army a MAP order of \$4,441,300 to partially ready support for the new force levels, and authorized the Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand to submit deviations to FY63 and prior programs directly to the appropriate military department.³ CINCPAC's guidance to the Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand for the preparation of the new FY64-69 MA plan and program indicated that the new FY64 program should complete stockpile of supplies for a contingency force of 20,700, and provide requirements to support a basic force level of 46,500.⁴ (S)

Establishing Limits of Assistance: During the FY64 program review in September, CINCPAC made a decision that materiel to be

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1. State 1136 to Vientiane DTG 24 May 6PM 1963 (TS)
 2. State 79 to Vientiane, 17 Jun 1963 10AM (S)
 3. DEF 93054 DTG 231723Z Jul 1963 (S)
 4. CINCPAC 072241Z Aug 1963 (S)

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stockpiled for the contingency force would be reduced to weapons, individual clothing and equipment, medical supplies and ammunition. This was in line with the expected PACOM-wide reduction of MAP funds. The ammunition stockpile for Laos was reduced to a 90 day level, with no ammunition to be called forward to Thailand until the stock level in PEPPERGRINDER made it necessary. If additional ammunition was required for an emergency, it was to be made available from U.S. Army assets on a reimburseable basis. As a result of the program review, CINCPAC forwarded to DOD on 27 September a submission that contained programs in the following amounts:¹

(\$ Millions)

<u>FY64</u>	<u>FY65</u>	<u>FY66</u>	<u>FY67</u>	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>
18.5	27.0	10.0	5.0	5.0	5.0

OSD, however, reduced the FY64 authorization to \$15.6 million.² This reduction in funds made impossible the additional stockpiling of supplies in Thailand for the contingency force.

In October the U.S. Ambassador to Laos stated that neither the FAR nor the neutralists had been told the distinction between the basic and emergency support levels, and that due to the absence of an adequate logistic system, fragmentation of forces in scattered locations, and the requirement for a high state of readiness in all regions, supplies and equipment had been released when needed without regard for established force levels.³ The Ambassador estimated that RLG armed forces consisted of over 8,200 Neutralists and 57,000 FAR plus 9,000 ADC for a total of 74,200. He requested authority to call forward supplies programmed for the contingency force in categories of individual clothing and equipment, arms, medical supplies, and ammunition. He further estimated an additional

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0001005, 27 Sep 1963 (S)
 2. DEF 941195 DTG 171437Z Oct 1963 (S)
 3. Vientiane 499 to State, 15 Oct 1963 (S)

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\$420,000 would be needed in FY64 for small arms and ammunition and warned that unless these funds were received, he intended to draw down on all assets in-country plus REDCAP, to extent available, in order to meet requirements.

CINCPAC informed the JCS that under the Ambassador's proposed concept, supplies for the contingency force would be depleted by routine issue and therefore unavailable for an emergency. CINCPAC further advised that if the proposal of supporting a 74,000 Laotian Force on the basis of need only were approved, more MAP funds would have to be provided.¹

Following receipt of CINCPAC comments, DOD reiterated the existing policy by stating that support of RLG forces would continue for the basic force only, and that the contingency force materiel would be held for emergency.² However, DOD authorized submission of two or three additional increments, not to exceed a total of \$17.9 million for FY64, if funds became available.

Laos Army MAP Training in Thailand: As a result of continued communist pressure in Laos, the State Department decided to increase the capabilities of the FAR and neutralist forces through a training program conducted in Thailand, and directed that negotiations be started with Prime Minister Sarit. The State Department also directed that negotiations be undertaken with the Thais to introduce artillery instructors and cadre into Laos, and requested Vientiane's recommendations on how to present the program to Souvanna. However, Phoumi rejected the idea of Thai instructors and cadre for Laos, but later indicated that he would accept Lao training in Thailand. Souvanna subsequently approved such Lao training for both the FAR and neutralists.^{3,4,5,6} The Thailand Army developed a training program to

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1. CINCPAC 210639Z Oct 1963 (S)
 2. DEF 943530 DTG 012201Z Nov 1963 (S)
 3. Vientiane 125 to State 8PM, 17 Jul 1963 (S)
 4. State 64 to Bangkok 4PM, 11 Jul 1963 (S)
 5. Vientiane 248 to State 6:50PM, 14 Aug 1963 (S)
 6. Vientiane 186 to State 6:45PM, 30 Jul 1963 (S)

provide training for artillery and infantry units that, to the extent possible, would be kept operationally intact in order to preserve teamwork developed during training. Training, conducted at Camp Erawan, Thailand, began on 9 September 1963.¹

CINCPAC funded training during the August-September MAP review. As of December 1963, training had progressed as follows:

<u>FAR Training</u>	<u>Course Length (wks)</u>	<u>Approved Training</u>	<u>In Training</u>	<u>Training Complete</u>
105 How Btrys	6	5	1	2
4.2 Mtr Plat	6	5	2	
Inf Co	8	5	1	
Inf Hvy Wpns Co	6	4	1	
81mm Mtr Sect	4	5	1	4
<u>Neutralist Training</u>				
105 How Btry	6	3	1	
4.2 Mtr Plat	6	1		1
Inf Co	8	2		
Inf Hvy Wpns Co	6			
81mm Mtr Sect	4	4	1	1

This joint training was highly successful and without problems. In addition to unit training, individual training was requested for 50 officers and 150 enlisted men. CINCPAC supported this request and asked DOD to expedite approval.² The OSD, however, approved only the unit training, and at the end of the year CINCPAC had not received approval of the remainder of the program.

The June Crisis at Attopeu

The Pathet Lao, following the April threat against the PDJ area, shifted attention to Attopeu during June. Throughout that month and at the beginning of July, U.S. observers expected a serious PL/VM attempt to take that town, and CINCPAC urged the JCS to expedite training in Thailand of pilots of T-28 aircraft so that the RLG could retaliate by delivering bombs and rockets on PL/VM concentrations.³

1. CHJUSMAG Thailand JtJ3 27898 DTG 080320Z Sep 1963 (S)
2. CINCPAC 100102Z Nov 1963 (S)
3. CINCPAC 010332Z Jul 1963 (S)

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Permission to use Bombs against PL: About the same time that Admiral Felt recommended the all-out use of air support to defend Attopeu, the Ambassador advised the State Department that it appeared that the crisis at Attopeu was passing and that action was confined to small scale skirmishing. He favored keeping bombs (for T-6 aircraft) in immediate reserve. Admiral Felt reminded the JCS that the history of the three year war in Laos had been little more than a series of skirmishes, but that through these small scale actions the PL had acquired control of large portions of the country. By Lao military standards, he said, skirmishing was a serious military action. Explaining that Phoumi had enough qualified T-28 pilots and mechanics to operate the T-28s on an emergency basis, CINCPAC advised the JCS that he was standing by to move bombs into Laos from Thailand.¹ However, he did not receive the go-ahead for this action. (S)

Encadrement of FAR/KL Forces: During the June-July crisis when the communists were threatening the area around Attopeu, the State Department suggested, at a 12 July State/Defense meeting, that the U.S. seriously consider extensive encadrement of FAR/KL forces by the Thais, either before the U.S. expanded its advisory role to the FAR/KL forces, or at the same time; and consider the movement of T-28 aircraft closer to the Laos border for political reasons. The JCS asked CINCPAC for his recommendations concerning the concept, feasibility, and the number of Thais necessary.²

Admiral Felt said that he believed the key to the encadrement problem was U.S. participation, and that it was doubtful that the Thais would risk direct confrontation with the Viet Minh without American participation on a shoulder-to-shoulder basis. He doubted that Thailand would be receptive to encadrement until American military was reintroduced into Laos, but said that he believed encadrement

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1. CINCPAC 030300Z Jul 1963 (S)
 2. JCS 1630 DTG 131402Z Jul 1963 (TS)

should be a part of the overall scheme of U. S. control of the FAR-Thai-U. S. force.¹ However, if Thai soldiers were to be introduced into Laos, General Phoumi preferred to have complete Thai units, rather than cadre or instructional groups.

Plan to Re-Institute the U. S. Military Advisory Role in Laos

In response to a JCS request for CINCPAC's ideas on how best to provide military advisors to the FAR and to KL units, Admiral Felt suggested the use of advisors organized into expert teams that could be shifted among the FAR/KL battalions, depending upon the need. To furnish advisors to each battalion would require an advisory unit of 800 or more personnel in Laos. A better solution would be a 12-man team organized like the former White Star mobile training teams, with the required communication, medical, demolition and weapons personnel, that could be split readily into two six-man teams for flexibility. CINCPAC thought personnel for such advisory teams could be furnished by special forces and combat arms branches, and that they should be trained as a team and qualified in jungle operations.

If the decision was made to increase the advisory effort to the FAR/KL units, CINCPAC explained that the Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand organization (of approximately 55 persons) would be moved into Laos to take over MAP support and other functions then being performed by U. S. agencies in Laos. At about the same time, approximately 200 additional personnel to staff 15 battalion teams plus 20 personnel for advisory elements of FAR/KL headquarters should be assembled, oriented and flown into Laos. Advisory teams would be assigned to the battalions located in the key areas of the PDJ, Attopeu, Saravane, Thakhek and Savannakhet. Admiral Felt recommended that such an organization be called the U. S. Supply and Training Mission, Laos.²

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1. CINCPAC 150435Z Jul 1963 (TS)
 2. CINCPAC 102247Z Jul 1963 (TS)

Plan to Divide Laos

The possibility of dividing Laos into two areas, one controlled by the communists and the other by the non-communists, had been considered during 1961 and 1962, and it came up again early in 1963. Previously, the U.S. had weighed the advantages of supporting General Phoumi in an attempt to hold the southern part, or "panhandle" of Laos, abandoning the northern area to the Pathet Lao. In 1962 during the tedious process of reaching agreements that led to a coalition government, the Pathet Lao expanded its area of control to include that part of the "panhandle" adjacent to South Vietnam, so that the line of separation extended lengthwise through the narrow southern part of the country. In 1963, there were reports that Prince Souphanouvong proposed that Laos be divided along the existing lines. This was a proposal without advantages to the non-communists, and the U.S. State Department wanted to avoid an agreement that would turn over to the communists that area in the PDJ that was still held by the neutral Kong Le forces, even though they were surrounded by PL. The State Department, however, asked the Embassy in Laos to consider means whereby the non-communist sections of the country could be geographically consolidated along the most advantageous lines, and asked for the Embassy's assessment of the possibility that the non-communist forces could regain control of the Tchepone area, and of Pakse, Attapeu and Saravane triangle in Southern Laos.¹

Admiral Felt asked Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand for his comments on the State Department proposal.² These comments, reflecting the opinions of Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand, the former CHMAAG Laos, were to the effect that it was impracticable to expect the FAR to recapture the areas in Southern Laos, all of which were important to the communist effort in both Laos and South Vietnam.³ CINCPAC

 1. State 888 to Vientiane 15 Mar 8PM 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 180233Z Mar 1963 (S)
 3. CHJUSMAG Thailand 25563 DTG 210115Z Mar 1963 (S)

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then advised the JCS that the Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand thought that any move to extend friendly control into the Tchepone area would cause immediate military reaction from the PL/VM forces. CINCPAC suggested that any threat to the Ho Chi Minh trail would mean a fight, and doubted that the FAR could then control these areas, when it was unable to do so during previous periods of hostilities when FAR forces were substantially larger. ¹ (S)

Proposed Courses of Action to Stabilize the Situation in Laos

During mid-June the JCS asked CINCPAC to review and comment on a proposed State-DOD paper that was to be presented to the President two days later. This memorandum outlined a program of action intended to improve the Free World position in Laos, but one that recognized it might be necessary for the U.S. to initiate military action if the communists failed to respond to lesser pressures. Although the three phased courses of actions were centered on Laos, the final phase was directed against North Vietnam. Military measures proposed for the three phases included: The use of non-U.S. forces that could be supported by stretching the Geneva Accords, the non-combatant use of U.S. Forces, and the combat use of U.S. Forces. The objective of the entire plan was to halt North Vietnamese expansionist aggression in Laos and reduce the threat to peace in Southeast Asia. ²

Admiral Felt's assessment was that the PL/Viet Minh threat in Laos demanded early and more dramatic actions by the U.S. than some that were set forth in the State-DOD paper. Because the Pathet Lao nibbling in Laos had become serious enough to threaten key Mekong river cities in southern Laos, Admiral Felt warned that any action that required time-consuming development or lengthy negotiations with third countries was liable to be overtaken by events and by

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1. CINCPAC 270432Z Mar 1963 (S)
 2. JCS 1272 DTG 172006Z Jun 1963 (TS)

the PL, which held the initiative. After recommending immediate and ultimate objectives that the U. S. should seek, CINCPAC outlined six progressive steps he favored as a means of bringing the North Vietnam Government into line. Many of these paralleled the actions set forth in the State/DOD paper, but in his recommendation, CINCPAC grouped the various actions into six sequential "packages" each of which contained a number of diverse but related actions that could take place simultaneously, thus avoiding taking individual single actions and the need to wait for a reaction before proceeding to the next action. Each of the sequential packages that CINCPAC proposed increased in intensity and was calculated to bring about steadily increasing pressure against the DRV.¹

Admiral Felt's position reached Washington too late to be considered fully at a 19 June meeting during which President Kennedy approved implementation of the actions contained in the State-DOD paper as Phase I actions, of conducting detailed planning for carrying out actions listed in Phase II, and of reviewing the over-all situation in approximately four weeks.²

In addition, the Secretary of Defense asked for an approach to military actions that would be different from that in CINCPAC OPLAN 32-63, one that would avoid fighting or engaging U. S. Forces in areas other than North Vietnam. He suggested that a plan be developed on the basis of the U. S. taking the initiative using its air, naval and amphibious capability, and said he wanted a plan that could be used in case the offensive actions progressed to those contemplated during Phase III. He wanted this plan to provide for using U. S. Forces in direct attacks against North Vietnam.³

Another result of discussions on the State-DOD paper was a JCS request that CINCPAC prepare a plan with a different approach from

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1. CINCPAC 190323Z Jun 1963 (TS)
 2. JCS 1308 DTG 201400Z Jun 1963 (TS)
 3. JCS 1353 DTG 221631Z Jun 1963 (TS)

that set forth by CINCPAC OPlan 32-63; the JCS wanted an approach based on the concept that the military effort should be against North Vietnam. The result of this directive was the development of CINCPAC OPLAN 99-64.¹

Phase I, as approved by the President, included the following 11 separate actions:

1. Accept FAR and KL forces at existing levels, without further demobilization, and provide additional funds to support the FAR and KL forces through MAP and AID programs.
2. Increase on a selective basis, the flow of heavy weapons and replacement of worn-out equipment.
3. Establish direct U. S. contact with the neutralist forces and the pro-Western tribal elements; encourage improved liaison, coordination and military planning among these forces and the FAR.
4. Improve intelligence capabilities.
5. Increase the air resupply of arms on a selective basis to Kong Le, pro-Western tribal groups and FAR outposts in PL territory.
6. Expand the tribal group program in areas not under PL control, and intensify tribal group activity against communist forces and supply lines in existing areas of operation.
7. Augment Souvanna Phouma's airlift capabilities.
8. Encourage FAR forces to regain control of some areas held by the PL, and encourage the FAR to eliminate the PL in areas generally controlled by the FAR.
9. Provide T-28 aircraft and armament to the FAR in Laos to conduct reprisal strikes.
10. Commence a combined social, political, and military effort through a strategic hamlet program in the Mekong Valley area.
11. Expand the use of highly mobile RVN border patrols in Laos

1. (See Operational Planning Section, Chapt I.)

to interdict entry into South Vietnam and to gather intelligence.¹

By the end of the year, all of these actions were being implemented to some degree, but not in all cases in a manner that CINCPAC considered satisfactory. For example, artillery weapons were not used effectively to counter communist encroachment, and Phoumi's pilots were unable at first to use their newly acquired T-28 aircraft to conduct effective reprisal strikes. The increase in intelligence activities was also disappointing.²

Following the 19 June meeting, the list of actions to be included in Phase II was revised to include several of the actions suggested by CINCPAC in the message in which he recommended that the actions be grouped in "sequential packages." Phase II actions were rearranged into three groups, Group A of which included actions that were basically a continuation of Phase I and did not violate the Geneva Agreements, or which could be denied plausibly. Group B actions involved major U.S. moves outside of Laos, or violated the Geneva Agreements, but not openly. The third group of actions were in open violation of the Geneva Agreements and included the introduction of U.S. Forces into Laos or North Vietnam. On 30 July the President approved the rearrangement and delegated to the Department of State, with DOD concurrence, the authority to implement the Group A actions when they would have the maximum effect. In addition, he approved the actions in Groups B and C in principle, but specifically retained authority to execute them. The JCS furnished to CINCPAC the list of the actions under each of the three groups, as approved by the President.³ Later, in September, the JCS advised CINCPAC that, for the time being, Washington officials preferred to handle activities in Laos within the limitations of the Geneva Agreements and to avoid arousing world concern.⁴

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1. JCS SM 2344/68-6, 31 Jul 1963 (TS)
 2. CINCPAC J5 Memo 000153-63 (TS) In J512 files.
 3. JCS 1896 DTG 011937Z Aug 1963 (TS)
 4. JCS 2590 DTG 202206Z Sep 1963 (TS)

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Red Chinese Road Construction in Laos

Early in 1963 U. S. officials became concerned about a group of Communist Chinese who were engaged in a road construction project in northern Laos in the vicinity of Nam Tha. Suspecting that the Chinese would attempt to introduce a large number of agents into northern Laos, and concerned about the military threat to Thailand posed by a road leading to that country's border, the State Department urged General Phoumi to investigate and stop the projects.¹ Although the U. S. Ambassador to Laos exerted influence on both Souvanna and Phoumi, both of them appeared to be inexplicably unconcerned.² (φ)

CINCPAC's evaluation of the project, based on intelligence reports, was that it was logical to conclude that a Red Chinese battalion and possibly 2,000 road laborers were in the Nam Tha area, and possibly another 1,500 laborers in the Phong Saly area. There was, however, insufficient evidence on the important question of whether the Red Chinese had violated the Geneva Agreements by sending an identifiable military unit into Laos.³ In April Deputy CHJUSMAG Thailand informed CINCPAC that near Ban Houei Sai, approximately 18 miles from the Lao/Thailand border, there was a four lane section of road that appeared to be suitable for a landing field.

Situation in Laos at the End of 1963

During the spring and summer five-month rainy season, military actions followed a pattern of minor skirmishing with each side trying to improve its position. As the rains ended, there were unusually large convoy movements from the DRV along Route 7, and a rise in PL/VM aggressiveness - events that CINCPAC expected to foreshadow probing attacks of larger dimensions. He considered the PDJ as the

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1. State 701 to Vientiane DTG 170315Z Jan 1963 (C)
 2. State 763 to Vientiane DTG 020135Z Feb 1963 (C)
 3. CINCPAC 051836Z Feb 1963 (S)

most likely point of trouble in the north, and Thakhek, Saravane and Attopeu the potential areas of military action to secure a communist corridor to South Vietnam. Admiral Felt expected that, although the communists would continue to probe and prod, intimidate and harass, they would stop short of military action that would precipitate U. S. intervention, preferring the tedious but successful conquest - by - piecemeal method.¹ However, neither side mounted a major attack.

At the end of 1963 the military situation in Laos was only slightly more promising than when the year commenced. One of the most significant improvements from the standpoint of the Free World and the RLG was the improved position of FAR and neutralist forces in the PDJ area that occurred after the April Pathet Lao attack against the Kong Le forces. By the end of the year the neutralists had been reinforced by eight FAR infantry battalions - four located in the PDJ and four in the area near Xieng Khouang. This represented a decided advance for the FAR into areas that they had failed to penetrate by combat in 1961 and 1962. At the end of the year Phoumi's forces were stronger than they had been a year earlier, and they were getting stronger. And Kong Le, who had opened the gates to communist gains by his precipitous actions of 1960, had realigned his forces to join Phoumi in opposition to the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh. Reinforced by the eight battalions and by new recruits, and re-equipped with U. S. weapons, Kong Le's position in the PDJ was far more secure than it had been during the spring crisis.²

CINCPAC'S ACTIVITIES TO COUNTER INSURGENCY IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

The problem of how to defeat Viet Cong insurgency remained

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1. CINCPAC 200003Z Oct 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC Weekly Intelligence Digest, Nr. 42-63, 25 Oct 1963 (S)

CINCPAC's most urgent 1963 problem. The Republic of Vietnam was only one of several shifting crisis areas in PACOM, but it was the one where the most fighting was taking place, where U.S. policy was squarely at stake, and where American servicemen were being killed. The large build-up in Vietnam and the development of concepts and techniques for combatting the Viet Cong had taken place in 1962, and most military observers believed that by the beginning of 1963 the initiative had passed to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). But there remained the tasks of administering the Military Assistance Program that sustained the war in Vietnam, and of carrying out the decisions and projects and plans.

There was reason for optimism at the beginning of 1963. In a February letter to President Diem, General Harkins recognized that the Viet Cong was a long way from defeat, but he expressed his belief that the GVN had taken the initiative and that the expanding strategic hamlet program was driving the Viet Cong from its base of support, the people. Representatives attending a February SEATO meeting also shared an attitude of optimism toward events in the Republic of Vietnam and, although Admiral Felt cautioned that there was no time for "resting on oars," he believed that the GVN had developed an effective emergency structure for defeating the Viet Cong.¹ Regardless of the surge of optimism, military leaders realized that fighting the Viet Cong guerrillas was a frustrating and disagreeable operation without an end in sight.

The GVN counter-insurgency effort lost some of its impetus following an 8 May 1963 riot started when a group of demonstrators protested against a government order forbidding the flying of flags and processions on Buddha's birthday. The riot occurred in the northern city of Hue, a center for Buddhist studies. Government troops were

1. CINCPAC 132315Z Mar 1963 (S)

used to control the riot, and this use of government troops against Buddhists touched off other riots and demonstrations that plagued the Diem government until 1 November when it was overthrown by a military coup. The Buddhist riots and the deposal of the Diem regime diverted some strength from the government's effort to win the war against communist guerrillas, but at the end of the year it was difficult to assess accurately the extent of the diversion.

This section of CINCPAC's Command History is not a record of the guerrilla type fighting. Neither is this an account of full U. S. participation or assistance, since many U. S. actions and decisions were political in nature and were carried out by the Department of State or its agencies. This section of the Command History describes CINCPAC's participation in the U. S. program to furnish aid, materiel, and advice to help the RVN cope with the communist insurgency. This section attempts to set forth CINCPAC's position on major issues, his actions, efforts and the net result in terms of progress in containing and defeating communism.

The Military Assistance Plan for the Republic of Vietnam

FY64-69 MA Plan for Vietnam: During the July 1962 Secretary of Defense conference, COMUSMACV was directed to prepare a comprehensive three year plan for the RVN to provide for a gradual scaling down of his staff and forces, and the development of Vietnamese forces capable of maintaining internal security without U. S. assistance. CINCPAC submitted this plan to the JCS in a revised form during January 1963. It was approved by the JCS and forwarded to DOD. At the Secretary of Defense Conference of 6 May 1963 the FY64-69 MAP for the RVN, totalling \$1.02 billion, with \$222.0 million for FY64, was presented to the Secretary of Defense. He announced that MAP funds

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would not be available in these amounts and that it would be necessary to reduce total foreign aid for the RVN to approximately \$50 million per year by the FY68-69 time period. In this connection the Secretary of Defense stated that short cuts would have to be taken such as turning over U.S. equipment at reduced prices and using certain other U.S. assets to support RVN forces. In addition, he directed that RVN force levels be revised to reflect a force structure in the FY67-69 period that could be supported by the RVN and the reduced MAP.¹ CINCPAC revised the FY64-69 force levels based on the Secretary of Defense guidance and submitted to the JCS an outline revised plan that reduced the ARVN to five divisions and transferred responsibility for support of the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps to U.S. AID. The FY64 MAP Plan for the RVN was thus reduced to \$17.9 million and the FY65-69 MAP to \$858 million.²

OSD directed that two other plans, based on dollar levels of \$450.0 and \$365.0 million, be prepared as alternatives to the first plan. During May CINCPAC and CHMAAG Vietnam representatives went to Washington to assist JCS in preparing a study and development of a position on the force levels established by the Secretary of Defense.³ CINCPAC later instructed COMUSMACV to proceed with the analysis of alternative plans within the OSD guidelines and on the basis of the assumptions used in preparation of the JCS study.⁴ On 9 July, representatives of COMUSMACV briefed CINCPAC on their analysis and comparison of the three alternative plans required by the Secretary of Defense.⁵ Two additional plans, one developed by the JCS and the other referred to as the COMUSMACV Model Plan also were included in the briefing. The JCS additional plan called for \$450.9 million and the Model Plan was at the \$400 million level. The lower cost of the Model Plan was contingent upon holding RVN Force manning levels at

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1. JCS 9820 DTG 091805Z May 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00447, 11 May 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 240027Z May 1963 (U)
 4. CINCPAC 010338Z Jun 1963 (S)
 5. CINCPAC 152310Z Jun 1963 (S)

80% of full strength beginning in FY67. Admiral Felt recommended the Model Plan to JCS and also approved submission of the \$585 million plan but he advised the JCS that the latter plan was being submitted in compliance with directives from ODMA and did not alter his recommendation for adopting the Model Plan. ¹

In September, OSD informed CINCPAC that the Model Plan had been approved, that materiel turned over to RVNAF by departing U. S. units would be charged to MAP Vietnam at reduced costs, that C-123 aircraft would not become available until FY67-68, and that the Secretary of Defense had directed that the Department of the Army be prepared to meet RVN ammunition requirements from its assets on a reimbursable basis from MAP funds. ² In compliance with OSD directions, CINCPAC submitted a detailed analysis of ammunition requirements along with a revised FY64-69 plan reflecting the Model Plan and new guidance given by OSD. ³ Major Army forces contained in the Model Plan were:

	<u>FY65</u>	<u>FY66</u>	<u>FY67</u>	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>
Inf Divs	9*	7*	6	4	4
Mobile Bdes	0	0	4	4	4
Airborne Bdes**	1 (6)	1 (6)	1 (4)	1 (4)	1 (4)
Ranger Cos	86	86	86	86	86
Armd Cav Bns	4	4	0	0	0
Arty Bns	10*	8*	7	5	5
Psy War Bns	3	3	1	1	1

* Number of units remain at FY65 strength until Dec 65.

** Numbers in parens represent number of battalions.

Later COMUSMACV notified CINCPAC that he had been required by the Secretary of Defense to revise the Model Plan based on the following guidelines: ⁴

1. By end of CY64 insurgency north of the Delta would be suppressed.
2. By end of CY65 insurgency would be suppressed in the Delta.

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00757, 18 Jul 1963 & ltr ser 00809, 31 Jul 1963 (both (S))
 2. OSD DEF 963199 DTG 112347Z Sep 1963 (S) & OASD ltr, 13 Sep 1963 (CPRS 003642-63 (S))
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 001007, 28 Sep 1963 (S)
 4. COMUSMACV J01 7:36 DTG 010644Z Oct 1963 (S)

3. After end of CY65 only remaining U.S. elements in-country would be a MAAG to continue MAAG functions.

The Model Plan revision, known as the Accelerated Model Plan, was reprogrammed as part of the overall PACOM revisions for FY64-69. Based on the Secretary of Defense guidance and CINCPAC instructions, CHMAAG Vietnam began reprogramming for FY66-69 also.¹ In addition COMUSMACV prepared estimated revised costs for the planning period.² Major Army Forces in the Accelerated Model Plan were:³

	<u>FY65</u>	<u>FY66</u>	<u>FY67</u>	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>
Inf Div	8*	6	5	4	4
Mobile Bdes	0	4	4	4	4
Ranger Cos	86	86	86	86	86
Armd Cav Bns	4	0	0	0	0
Anty Bns	10	6	5	5	5
Psy War Bns	2	1	1	1	1

Revision of FY64-65 Vietnam MAP: On 22 October OSD notified CINCPAC of the establishment of new FY64 and FY65 dollar ceilings of \$175.5 million and \$170.0 million for the RVN MAP in anticipation of Congressional reductions, and requested CINCPAC FY64-65 revisions.⁴ CINCPAC submitted the revision to OSD on 30 November.⁵

The revised FY64 Program submitted by CINCPAC totalled \$190.7 million. This exceeded the OSD ceiling, however it included about \$13.0 million of previously unfunded ammunition in addition to \$3.5 million of Continuing Resolution Authority items that were not needed and which would be deleted later. Operating costs for ammunition were reduced as much as possible by programming costs for 2.75 inch rocket heads only in FY64, and by obtaining rocket motors from available Air Force excess.⁶ In addition to ammunition, particular efforts were made to reduce costs for clothing and equipment.⁷

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1. CINCPAC 190417Z Oct 1963 (S)
 2. COMUSMACV ltr ser 00453, 15 Oct 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00260, 5 Dec 1963 (S)
 4. OSD DEF 941878 DTG 220001Z Oct 1963 (S)
 5. CINCPAC ltr ser 001236, 30 Nov 1963 (S)
 6. CINCPAC 242105Z Oct 1963 (C)
 7. CINCPAC 230412Z Nov 1963 (S)

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CINCPAC's revised FY65 Program submission of \$146.6 million was considerably lower than the OSD ceiling due to the phase-down of requirements based upon the Accelerated Model Plan for the entire planning period. It was hoped that ammunition costs could be reduced further by again using excess Air Force rocket motors at no cost to MAP.

At the end of 1963, CINCPAC was awaiting Congressional passage of the U. S. Military Assistance Bill. As submitted to congress, this bill contained over-all reductions that would necessitate another thorough revision of the PACOM Military Assistance Programs.

MAP Supported Force Levels: During 1962 CINCPAC secured JCS authority to plan for an FY64 RVNAF strength of 225,000. On 1 July 1963 actual strengths were approximately 229,500, of which 207,500 belonged to the Army, 7,000 to the Navy, 9,000 to the Air Force and 6,000 to the Marines. In addition to these military forces, MAP support was furnished to the Self Defense Corps and to the Civil Guard. In January 1963 CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the FY63 strength be increased from 81,000 to 86,000 for the Civil Guard, and from 80,000 to 104,000 for the SDC.¹ The JCS approved these force increases in March.² The SDC, the major GVN para-military force at the village and district level, was organized into platoons and squads that were deployed in defense of the villages and strategic hamlets to deny VC access to the people. The MAP furnished the SDC with individual weapons to all members who had completed training, with communication and basic quartermaster equipment, and first level medical supplies. The Civil Guard was the major para-military force employed at the province and district level to respond to VC attacks, protect rail shipments, provide intelligence, and relieve regular forces from static positions. In addition to

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1. CINCPAC 100920Z Jan 1963 (S)
 2. JCS 131438Z Mar 1963 (S)

individual equipment, the MAP furnished some major items of equipment to the CG.¹

Junk Force: During 1963 the junk force became a going organization that was able to expand its operations into previously unpatrolled coastal areas in efforts to choke off VC traffic. By mid-year it consisted of 644 junks manned by approximately 3,500 paramilitary personnel and 450 military personnel. It operated under the control of the RVN Navy. Of the total number, 500 junks were constructed by MAP funds; the balance was constructed by the GVN. The junk force was not scheduled to receive MAP support after the end of FY66.²

FY 1964 Program: The FY64 MAP provided for early improvement of the internal security capabilities and conformed with the U.S. objective of scaling down U.S. personnel support to the GVN. It provided the additional equipment and training necessary to support Vietnamese Armed forces of 225,000, approximately 75,000 larger than the force existing on 1 February 1961. The Army program included new and replacement vehicles to improve tactical mobility and logistic support for the combat forces engaged in widely dispersed anti-guerrilla operations. Also included were small arms, mortars, flame throwers, grenades and mines. Communication equipment was provided to improve field communication capabilities. The program also listed equipment for construction of hospitals and troop cantonment areas. Continuing support to the strategic hamlet was a major item in the program. The Air Force program included helicopters and transport aircraft, construction projects, ammunition, fuel, maintenance items and spare parts. The Navy program provided for construction of naval facilities and river patrol craft as well as communications and electronic equipment and supporting materiel and services.

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1. MA Plan/Program Hq MAAG-Vietnam, FY64-69, p. G3, 1 May 1963 (S)
 2. MA Plan/Program Hq MAAG-Vietnam, FY64-69, p. G3, 1 May 1963 (S)

Supplemental FY63 Air Force Military Assistance Training

Program (MATP): The rapid build-up of the VNAF required a revision of the FY64-68 training plan for Vietnam, and submission of a supplemental FY63 AF MATP. The supplement provided training to support a composite reconnaissance squadron, increased unit equipment for the VNAF helicopter force, activation of an Air Training Center, and improvement of RVN meteorological facilities.¹ The key training projects were 44 T-28 pilot training spaces and 40 helicopter pilot training spaces. Late in 1962, CHMAAG Vietnam asked to transfer the helicopter pilot training from the USAF to the Army, since the Army did not require that trainees be qualified fixed-wing aircraft pilots, as did the USAF. This shift was made, and the supplemental AF MATP was approved on 21 February 1963 in the amount of \$1,435,670. (C)

Acceleration of VNAF Training: The Secretary of Defense decision at the 6 May SECDEF Conference to withdraw U.S. personnel from RVN depended upon an accelerated program to train RVNAF personnel. On 10 May, CINCPAC advised the JCS of several training projects that already were underway. Training of helicopter pilots in South Vietnam was progressing satisfactorily, with 15 students being trained in H-19s, a student group that could be doubled by the addition of aircraft and instructors to the Field Training Detachment then in RVN. CINCPAC requested that additional helicopters, 9 officers and 41 airmen be furnished to step up this training.²

In addition, CONUS pilot training programs were increased with the Air Force, Army and Navy all providing training spaces, graduates from previous programs already were improving the pilot-to-cockpit ratio, and CINCPAC explained that sufficient CONUS C-47 and A-1H cross training of T-28 graduates was programmed to ensure adequate

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0440, 31 Jul 1962 (C)
2. CINCPAC 102246Z May 1963 (S)

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pilot manning of VNAF C-47 squadrons.

Other training programs in Vietnam included on the job training and technical training for maintenance and support personnel, English language training to qualify students for both CONUS and in-country flying and technical training, and training in communications, AC&W, and maintenance and supply procedures. This type of training was considered a gradual, long-term process rather than a direct unit-for-unit replacement program.¹

CINCPAC also hoped to speed pilot training as a result of a request initiated in mid-March in which he asked for a detachment of 25 officers and 69 airmen to conduct liaison pilot training using 25 Cessna 185 aircraft.² By June the aircraft had been ordered to permit the first class of 50 pilots and additional mechanics to commence training in October.³

At the end of the year, the Air Force had nearly 500 students engaged in English language training to prepare them for pilot or technical type training. Fifty student pilots training with Cessna 185s were near the end of a 16-week in-country training course, 67 pilots were either in training or had completed transition training in C-47 aircraft, and seven student pilots were undergoing CONUS training. In addition, 22 students were near the end of a course in aircraft instrument repair, and an extensive on-the-job training program was underway, a program that suffered from the lack of adequate training material, all of which had to be translated.⁴

The Navy was conducting training in both CONUS and Vietnam. Twenty-eight student pilots, of 35 who entered training in September 1962, were still undergoing T-28 training at the end of the year. Five student pilots entered training in February 1963 under the FY63 MATP; four were still in training. The FY64 training program provided that

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1. CINCPAC 150216Z Jun 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 152011Z Mar 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 150216Z Jun 1963 (S)
 4. Ltr, AF Sect MAAG Vietnam, subj: Monthly Activities Summary, AF Sect, Vietnam, 14 Nov 1963. CINCPAC R/S 004327-63 (S)

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26 of the 28 students undergoing T-28 training would continue transition training to qualify as A-1H pilots. The Navy also conducted in-country transition training for T-28 pilots. An MTT of three Navy pilots conducted training under which 12 T-28 pilots qualified for day flights and 12 qualified for night time flights in the A-1H aircraft. Six CONUS-trained pilots also received advanced training in the same aircraft.¹ (C)

A program to train technical specialists to repair and maintain reciprocating engines, propellers, air frames and hydraulic devices got underway at the end of 1963. The training was conducted by an 11-man mobile training team. The first of the 148 students programmed for the courses commenced training on 21 October.² (U)

Air Operations in RVN

During the early part of 1963 CINCPAC continued a program commenced in 1962 to increase the amount of air support that could be made available to support the RVNAF. Air support reached a level in 1963 that was considered sufficient to support the ground operations. During the latter part of the year, CINCPAC's concern was to train and equip the RVNAF to assume a larger responsibility for air activities. CINCPAC's efforts to provide air support in Vietnam are summarized below.

FARM GATE: The JCS approved on 2 January an air augmentation to FARMGATE that CINCPAC had requested in November 1962.³ This increased the assigned aircraft by 10 B/RB-26s, five T-28s, and two C-47s, all of which were enroute or in RVN by the end of January, excepting two B-26s. This augmentation raised FARMGATE aircraft to 13 T-28s, four L-28s, 19 B-26s, and six C-47s.

CINCPACAF in May renewed a request for authority to test the

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1. Ltr CHMAAG Vietnam, MCAF-ABAT-2, 26 Sep 1963 (C)
 2. Ltr CHMAAG Vietnam, MCAF-ABAT-2, 7 Nov 1963 (U)
 3. JCS 8031 DTG 022340Z Jan 1963 (S)

P-2 dispenser with Blu-3B bomblets in the RVN, a request that had been denied twice previously. However, CINCPACAF pointed out that tests conducted in the CONUS had been encouraging, and that, although he agreed that use of the new weapon should be withheld until the "right" moment, he suggested that the psychological time could be at hand.¹ CINCPAC denied the request because he didn't think the new bomblets were particularly adapted for the type of targets in RVN, and because he didn't want to lose the operational impact by using the weapon against targets that could be destroyed with conventional ordnance.²

Air Augmentation: Early in January COMUSMACV asked for additional aircraft to support an accelerated campaign.^{3,4} He requested a squadron of 16 C-123s (with a second squadron to follow if the need was confirmed); a company of 16 Caribou; a squadron of 25 T-28s; a squadron of 25 B-26s; three squadrons, each having 22 L-28s; two RF-101s and two RB-26s. All aircraft were to be manned and supported by the U.S. CINCPAC recommended approval of the transport type aircraft but suggested that a better solution for strike aircraft (T-28s and B/RB-26s) would be to double the pilots and maintenance crews and get more use from the FARMGATE detachments. He also recommended approval of only two L-28 squadrons, and recommended three, rather than two, RF-101s.⁵

The JCS delayed an answer long enough to explore the planned use and the availability of the requested aircraft. By mid-March, however, the JCS advised CINCPAC that it approved deployment of one squadron of C-123s (and a second to be deployed when the need was confirmed), the 16 Caribou, and two RF-101s. For the observation aircraft requested, the JCS substituted two units with 22 L-19s, one Army unit and one Air Force unit. The JCS also approved CINCPAC's requests for a platoon of 8 Otters, 15 additional L-19s for

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1. PACAF PFODC 855 DTG 110311Z May 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 182210Z May 1963 (S)
 3. COMUSMACV J4 0066 DTG 020824Z Jan 1963 (S)
 4. COMUSMACV J5 0128 DTG 071019Z Jan 1963 (S)
 5. CINCPAC 290023Z Jan 1963 (S)

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use by USA helicopter companies and support of corps advisors, and 10 UH-1B helicopters that were intended to support the CIDG program. Most of these planes were in place by mid-May.

Helicopter Units: On 19 February the JCS approved the deployment to RVN of the 114th Airmobile Company and the 330th Transportation Company.¹ The first of these units arrived in Vietnam early in May and was the first unit of its type to be deployed there. It was equipped with 25 UH-1B helicopters, each of which could carry 10 to 12 combat troops in addition to the crew. The unit was employed in support of ARVN operations in mountainous areas of the country. The 330th Transportation Company was an Army aircraft maintenance and supply unit.

Helicopter Pilot Training: Late in 1962 CHMAAG Vietnam asked for a mobile training team to train H-19 pilots in the RVN for the VNAF. At CINCPAC's recommendation the USAF sent two officers from the USAF helicopter school at Stead AFB to determine the best way to conduct the training. As a result of this study, the USAF furnished a field training detachment of 59 men to train both pilots and mechanics. The detachment, organized by the Air Training Command, arrived in Vietnam on 12 January and conducted training throughout the year.

Force Reduction of Air Units: At the same time that CINCPAC was attempting to increase air strength in RVN, he was making plans to shift to the VNAF as much of the air operations as possible.

The number of U.S. aviation units that were in RVN at the end of 1963 is listed below, with the number of planes authorized for each unit. The figures in parenthesis indicate the number of units and aircraft that would be withdrawn from RVN during CY1964, according to plans existing at the end of 1963.

1. JCS 8701 DTG 191406Z Feb 1963 (S)

8 Helicopter Units	(2)	40 H21s	(20)	USA
		120 UH1A/Bs		USA
		24 UH34s	(24)	USMC
4 Airlift Units		52 C-123s		USAF
		16 CV2Bs		USA
2 Liaison Squadrons*	(1)	44 O1A/Es	(22)	
1 Combat Unit (To be phased down during 1964)		14 RB-26s		USAF
		4 U-10s		
		6 C-47s		
		13 T-28s		
3 Reconnaissance Detachments		6 RF-101s	(3)	
		4 RB-26s		
		2 RB-27s		

*One squadron belonged to the U.S. Army, the other to the USAF. During CY64 the U.S. Army unit would be withdrawn and its equipment turned over to the VNAF.

Jet Aircraft for the RVNAF: Having favored since 1961 introducing jet aircraft into South Vietnam, CINCPAC brought up the subject early in 1963 after the GVN had renewed its request for these planes. Admiral Felt explained that two T-33 and four RT-33 aircraft were funded in FY62, and that these six reconnaissance aircraft would be ready for delivery in the spring of 1963.¹ Toward the end of March, after the GVN renewed its request for early delivery of jet aircraft, Admiral Felt was in Washington where he again raised the subject with the JCS, who agreed another attempt should be made to get State Department agreement.² However, the Department of Defense notified CINCPAC on 29 May of the decision not to provide the jets for the GVN. Funds for the aircraft and associated spare parts and equipment were withdrawn and placed in holding account pending complete evaluation of the FY64 programmed requirements for these items.³

Rules of Engagement for U.S. Aircraft: During 1962 when the

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1. CINCPAC 042200Z Jan 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 292339Z Mar 1963 (S)
 3. DEF 928676 DTG 292326Z May 1963 (C)

U.S. was increasing the number of U.S. aircraft units in RVN, several policies and directives were set forth to govern their employment. In general, the JCS policy limited the use of U.S. armed helicopters to a defensive role. In interpreting the JCS policy, COMUSMACV directed that armament be installed in Army CH-21C and USMC UH-34-D helicopters, but that the armament be used from transport helicopters for defensive purposes only. Crewmen could not initiate fire, but were authorized to return fire only if its aircraft was fired upon. A slightly different rule applied to the Army UH-1 (Iroquis) helicopters which were deployed to Vietnam to test the use of armed helicopters to escort transport helicopters. They could not initiate fire upon any target, but could return fire if they, or any aircraft they were escorting, were fired upon. The Army OV-1, the STOL Mohawk, could be armed for combat support missions, but the armament could be used only defensively. (S)

In February CINCPAC asked the JCS to clarify what was meant by suppressive fire resulting from escort missions, and more specifically whether U.S. aircraft crews could initiate fire before the Viet Cong committed a hostile act. Rather than compare the rules of engagement for fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft, CINCPAC suggested the main question was whether any aircraft bearing U.S. markings should engage in offensive operations.¹

The JCS explained that the COMUSMACV interpretation of its policy was more restrictive than intended, and authorized CINCPAC to amend the existing rules of engagement pertaining to U.S. helicopters in RVN to allow all of these aircraft to engage clearly identified Viet Cong elements which were considered to be a threat to the safety of the helicopters and their passengers.² Accordingly, CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACV to amend his rules of engagement.³

Reduction in Force of U.S. Units in RVN

At the 6 May Secretary of Defense Conference, the Secretary

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1. CINCPAC 080451Z Feb 1963 (TS)
 2. JCS 8676 DTG 161946Z Feb 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 170613Z Feb 1963 (S)

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expressed a desire to expedite the growth of GVN self-sufficiency in order to carry out a reduction of U.S. strength in that country. At this time, COMUSMACV was asked to draw up training plans for the RVNAF that would permit the U.S. to commence withdrawing U.S. personnel earlier than theretofore anticipated. (S)

The JCS followed up with a request that CINCPAC prepare a plan for the withdrawal of about 1,000 men before the end of the year, based upon the assumption that progress of the counterinsurgency campaign would warrant such a move. The JCS asked for the withdrawal of units, as opposed to individuals, with the U.S. units being replaced by RVNAF units.¹ Based upon some CINCPAC suggestions, COMUSMACV on 20 May submitted a list of units with a total authorized strength of 711, to which he proposed that other individuals from headquarters and support units be transferred to swell the total to 1,000. He also included other units that could be withdrawn if necessary, but not without affecting his operation in RVN.² However, CINCPAC was unwilling to release several of the small units listed by COMUSMACV. CINCPAC deleted units having a combined strength of 173, making the proposed unit strength 538, thus leaving a deficit of 462 to be made up by transferring individuals.³

On the question of swelling the unit strength by transferring individuals, the JCS recommended that CINCPAC continue to evaluate the problem and then submit a detailed plan by 1 August, complying as far as practicable with the plan to withdraw units.⁴

The plan to reduce forces in Vietnam ran counter to other actions to build up Air Force units. During the early part of the year, the JCS had approved the augmentation of air units needed to support the RVN campaign plan. Although the JCS was using a strength of 15,640 as the strength in RVN, the military strength in Vietnam was projected

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1. JCS 9820 DTG 091805Z May 1963 (S)
 2. COMUSMACV MAC J-3 2975 DTG 200930Z May 1963(S)
 3. CINCPAC 260440Z May 1963 (S)
 4. JCS 1114 DTG 051714Z Jun 1963 (S)

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at 17,176. CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to review the strength figures and recommend reductions necessary to hold the peak strength at 15,640. ¹

From a review of strength figures provided by CINCPAC, COMUSMACV agreed that a peak strength of 16,732 was the most accurate basis for planning, and explained that it had been his understanding that the object was to withdraw 1,000 men during the year, rather than to reach a pre-established strength. CINCPAC advised him to submit a plan to withdraw 1,000 men, using as the base the peak strength figure of 16,732. ²

The detailed COMUSMACV plan, submitted 16 July, listed units having a total of 574 personnel; the balance of 426 would be made up of individuals from MAAG, the Army Support Element, the Air Force support element, MACV, and the Headquarters Support Activity Saigon. COMUSMACV recommended that these individuals be returned as such, without assigning them to one of the units, in order to illustrate the lessening need for advisors and administrative personnel.

To get the greatest publicity bonus from the withdrawal action, COMUSMACV recommended that the action take place in several increments, the first of which should contain colorful elements from all services, and should be composed of personnel bound for CONUS. ³

Since one objective of the withdrawal was to gain public relations benefits, CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to develop a plan to cover publicity releases in RVN, with participation by several prominent U.S. and Vietnamese individuals. ⁴

CINCPAC forwarded for JCS approval his final plan on 21 October. It listed an even 1,000 individuals separated in four groups, the first of which was due to leave Saigon on 3 December, with the others following on the 6th, 9th, and 12th of the month. He proposed

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1. CINCPAC 290343Z May 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 070020Z Jul 1963 (S)
 3. COMUSMACV MAC J3 6028 DTG 161610Z Jul 1963 (S)
 4. CINCPAC 080110Z Sep 1963 (S)

that the first contingent of 294 men go to Travis AFB with a stopover at Hickam. ¹ (S)

At the end of November, CINCPAC asked the JCS to approve a new projected end of 1963 strength figure of 15,894, a figure determined by reducing the previous level of 16,732 by 1,000, and then adding two units having a combined strength of 162. ² (S)

The withdrawal was carried out according to plan. (S)

Logistic Activities in RVN

Extension of Port Facilities Outside of Saigon: In January COMUSMACV recommended extending Headquarters Support Activity Saigon (HSAS) responsibilities to port operations outside of Saigon and developing Interservice Support Agreements covering personnel and funds for the operations. ³ CINCPAC approved the recommendation despite objections by CINCPACFLT who considered the proposal beyond the scope of existing Navy responsibility and recommended instead that a logistic command be introduced into RVN. ⁴ To carry out the approved plan, CINCPAC instructed CINCPACFLT to extend HSAS operations for receipt and delivery of cargo for U.S. Forces to the ports of Da Nang, Qui Nhom and Nha Trang, with provisions for later extension to the port of Can Tho, if required. Maximum use would be made of local facilities and personnel. HSAS responsibility at the above ports was limited to providing supervision and temporary storage, and making arrangements for transportation to move cargo for U.S. units to its destination. CINCPAC directed that HSAS would make necessary cooperative agreement with the U.S. Embassy for the receipt and delivery of USOM cargo at the above ports, but specifically stated that HSAS responsibility would not extend to RVNAF cargo. ⁵

Because none of the Services was willing to furnish the personnel, the problem of resolving the Interservice Support

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1. CINCPAC 212109Z Oct 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 302241Z Nov 1963 (S)
 3. COMUSMACV MAC J4 0604 DTG 300922Z 1963 (TS)
 4. CINCPACFLT 142201Z Feb 1963 (S)
 5. CINCPAC 270430Z Feb 1963 (S)

Agreements proved to be a tedious task that was not settled until toward the end of the year. After the U. S. commanders in RVN failed to agree, the problem was passed to the Component Commanders in Hawaii. Because no agreement existed at that level, CINCPAC approved a CINCPACFLT recommendation that the matter be referred to the CNO for resolution, and asked for prompt action since the LSTs, for which the support was required, were already arriving.^{1,2} At this point, because COMUSMACV expressed his concern that reaching an agreement in Washington might create unacceptable delays, CINCPACFLT made another attempt to settle the matter in Hawaii.³ This effort, which extended over a period of several months and which became complicated by plans for a 1,000 man reduction in RVN, ended in failure and in CINCPAC's request to the CNO that he and the other Service Chiefs settle the matter.⁴ On 20 November, the CNO advised that the Washington solution eliminated the area of disagreement by recommending that HSAS provide the necessary personnel through civilian contracts. The three services agreed to share the costs. CINCPAC concurred in this proposal and it was being put into effect at the end of the year.⁵

Hospital Facilities in Saigon: The lack of hospital facilities in Saigon was a problem that had existed since the build-up of U. S. Forces in RVN. On 24 July, HSAS asked for authority and funds from CNO to establish an interim hospital facility in existing BOQ and BEQ space at an estimated modification cost of \$24,000. HSAS also proposed two methods of constructing a permanent hospital - one costing \$348,000 and the other \$260,000.⁶ The CNO promptly funded the interim facility and CINCPAC concurred in the action, taking note, however, that BOQ and BEQ space was already critically short in Saigon. CINCPAC also asked that a further study be made to justify a

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1. CINCPAC 290036Z Mar 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPACFLT 310201Z Mar 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPACFLT 172031Z Apr 1963 (C)
 4. CINCPAC 110313 Sep 1963 (S)
 5. CINCPAC 300354Z Nov 1963 (U)
 6. HQSUPPACT Saigon DTC 240926Z Jul 1963 (U)

permanent hospital, considering the probable decrease of U. S. strength in the area, increased use of air evacuation, and the Army Field hospital at Na Trang, which never had been used fully.¹

As a result of the requested study, COMUSMACV proposed that planning for a permanent hospital in Saigon be discontinued in favor of a project to increase the interim facilities already funded and under construction. The construction of the newly proposed additions would cost \$75,000². CINCPAC approved this solution on 28 September, and directed that the project be submitted through Navy channels for funding and construction.³

Communication Activities in the RVN

During 1963 there was continuing refinement and improvement of the communications-electronics (C-E) systems and facilities installed in Vietnam during 1962, rather than significant new installations.

USAID assumed responsibility for the village-hamlet radio project, relieving the 72nd Signal Detachment in March.^{4, 5}

Perhaps the greatest new effort was expended in planning for the day when the insurgency in RVN would be controlled. This planning was based upon the assumption made by the Secretary of Defense during the Sixth SECDEF Conference, 23 July 1962, that the Viet Cong would be eliminated as a disturbing force by December 1965.⁶ COMUSMACV proposed to train the RVNAF to take over the Back Porch troposcatter system by that date. Initially, CINCPAC concurred in this approach, but subsequently recommended to the JCS that:

1. Back Porch continue to be operated by U. S. Forces until the USAID microwave system could supplant it.

2. Annual operating costs for Back Porch continue to be borne

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1. CINCPAC 032356Z Aug 1963 (C)
 2. COMUSMACV 160019Z Sep 1963 (C)
 3. CINCPAC 282329Z Sep 1963 (C)
 4. COMUSMACV MAC J6 1443 DTG 130345Z Mar 1963 (C)
 5. CGUSASGV ASGV C 3-27 DTG 190835Z Mar 1963 (C)
 6. Record of 6th SECDEF Conf, 23 Jul 1962, p. 2-1 (TS)

by the U. S. Army.

3. Ultimate disposition of Back Porch troposcatter terminals, AN/MRC-85, be determined at the time of replacement by the USAID-sponsored microwave system.¹

A revised telecommunications plan was submitted by COMUSMACV in July 1963.² This plan reflected the shift to the "Model Plan" concept. It envisioned continued U.S. maintenance of the Back Porch system with tail circuits being phased over to RVN military and civil trunks. This plan was forwarded to JCS and approved in September 1963.³ CINCPAC initiated a request for negotiations to use trunks in the U.S. sponsored AID system, southern area, which were to become available in April 1964.^{4, 5}

CINCPACAF in a letter to CINCPAC suggested that the "Back Porch tropospheric scatter system in Vietnam be used to expand the Vietnamese civil broadcasting system into a nation-wide network. PACAF stated that such extension of the RVN network would help the GVN to communicate with the people. CINCPAC forwarded PACAF's proposal to COMUSMACV and requested that COMUSMACV in coordination with the USIS and AID investigate the feasibility of implementing the proposal.⁶ COMUSMACV agreed with the suggestion and said that the circuits were available. The channels were reserved and the USIS undertook to provide the technical assistance to the GVN.⁷ (U)

R&D and Test & Evaluation Programs in Southeast Asia

Five separate organizations were engaged in the RVN conducting research and development or evaluation tests during 1963, all of them either under the direction of, or working in coordination with, the

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1. CINCPAC 290314Z May 1963 (S)
 2. COMUSMACV ltr ser 00267 dtd 25 Jun 1963 (C)
 3. JCS 2462 DTG 122046Z Sep 1963 (C)
 4. COMUSMACV MAC J6 7986 DTG 080758Z Oct 1963 (C)
 5. CINCPAC 020321Z Nov 1963 (C)
 6. CINCPAC ltr 3410, ser 1179, 4 Jun 1963 (U)
 7. COMUSMACV ltr MACJ6, 17 Jun 1963 (CPRS 4417)

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Director Joint Operations Evaluation Group, RVN (JOEG-V). Four of these units - OSD's Research & Development Field Unit; the Combat Development Test Center, Vietnam; the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV); and the JOEG-V - were established prior to 1963 and are described in CINCPAC's 1962 Command History. (See pp 167-170.) Of these, ACTIV was established during the latter part of 1962 to test Army equipment, concepts and techniques. CINCPAC favored a small permanent organization; the Department of the Army planned for an organization of 97 men. CINCPAC denied theater clearance after DA deployed 48 personnel. Thereafter, on 2 January, the DA agreed to reduce the permanent strength of ACTIV to 60 personnel.¹ CINCPAC then approved the revised TD and granted theater clearance for the remainder of the unit.² The fifth research organization, the U.S. Air Force Test Unit, was established early in 1963 to operate under the direction of the Commander 2d Air Division and the Air Component Commander of COMUSMACV. However, as with the other experimental units in the RVN, JOEG-V maintained an interest in its operations in order to evaluate results having joint implications.

Command Relationships: Early in the year, the Army Chief of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, visited RVN as head of a JCS inspection team. General Wheeler's report contained the conclusion that there were too many units in Vietnam that were engaged in combat developments, research, tests, and engineering. After reviewing the findings of his inspection team, the JCS notified CINCPAC that they were considering a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to combine all activities of this nature into a single organization that would be under the operational control of COMUSMACV. They asked for CINCPAC's and COMUSMACV's comments for consideration in developing a JCS concept for carrying out the proposal.³ COMUSMACV, who agreed with the proposal, suggested that he set up as part of his

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1. DA 923208 DTG 022324Z Jan 1963 (C)
 2. CINCPAC 070601Z Jan 1963 (C)
 3. JCS 8969 DTG 070121Z Mar 1963 (S)

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staff a Research and Evaluation Division that would incorporate JOEG-V and to which would be assigned the OSD/ARPA R&D Field Unit, the Air Force Test Unit, and ACTIV. COMUSMACV would then assume responsibility for supervising and monitoring all RDT&E projects.¹

On 3 May the JCS notified CINCPAC that the Secretary of Defense had approved consolidation of all RDT&E, combat development and related activities in RVN in a single organization under COMUSMACV. They requested CINCPAC's plan for implementation. In consultation with representatives of the component commands and COMUSMACV, CINCPAC developed terms of reference and a proposal similar to COMUSMACV's concept, and furnished this to the JCS.² At the end of the year, CINCPAC had not received approval for the implementation of this plan. One obstacle to agreement was an Air Force desire to rotate among the Services the position of COMUSMACV's Chief of CD/RDT&E, whereas the Army thought one of its officers should fill the position, because of the predominance of Army test items and interest. A second possible conflict in concept was CINCPAC's recommendation that the combined CD/RDT&E organizations be a staff element under COMUSMACV's control, whereas OSD/ARPA favored a joint field agency, the commander of which would serve also as Chief of COMUSMACV's CD/RDT&E staff section.

R&D Tests of Defoliation and Crop Destruction: Although effective means of destroying crops and foliage had been attained by COMUSMACV early in 1963, R&D activities in RVN continued during 1963 to perfect this means of assisting the counter-insurgency effort. Early in the year, CINCPAC set forth his position in favor of discontinuing further testing by the Combat Development and Test Center, Vietnam in favor of conducting in Thailand any further tests that might be necessary.³ COMUSMACV agreed with this position, but when CINCPAC presented the suggestion to the JCS they explained that OSD's

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1. COMUSMACV MAC J01 1455 DTG 130800Z Mar 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 102133Z May 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 200046Z Feb 1963 (S)

Advance Research Projects Agency was developing several new dispensing techniques that would be available for operational tests in Vietnam, with the possibility that further tests in Thailand might be unnecessary.¹ CINCPAC reaffirmed his views to the JCS, stating that there was no need for further tests in RVN under operational conditions, and recommended deletion of defoliation and crop destruction test projects from the program in RVN.² At the end of the year, however, the JCS had not made a decision, and the tests continued.

Proposed Study of Hamlet Security Program: Among several problems that arose during the year among the various R&D activities in RVN was one that resulted from a proposal by the Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (who was also responsible for the R&D Field Unit and for JOEG-Vietnam). The proposal concerned establishment of an R&D project to study the Vietnamese rural security program used to defend the strategic hamlets. The R&D director asked for General Harkins concurrence.³ General Harkins reasoned that the security of strategic hamlets was basically a military problem similar to perimeters of defense, for which an R&D project was unnecessary. He also said that R&D projects in RVN should be oriented to short-range combat and materiel development projects with a high priority payoff in the counterinsurgency field.⁴ CINCPAC also considered the studies unnecessary.⁵

The following month, in April, COMUSMACV reconsidered the proposal and reversed his position, stating that the military, USOM and USIS staffs were heavily involved in day-to-day operations, and that a close look by qualified scientific personnel would be of value.⁶ After considering COMUSMACV's reasons for his new position, CINCPAC told the JCS that he had not changed his mind. In view of

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1. JCS 1099 DTG 042256Z Jun 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 190359Z Jun 1963 (S)
 3. Ltr, Director, OSD/ARPA R&D FU/JOEG-V, CPRS 03192-63, to COMUSMACV, subj: R&D Effort in Support of Vietnamese Rural Security Program, of 6 Feb 1963 (S)
 4. COMUSMACV 1st Ind to preceding citation
 5. CINCPAC ltr ser 0210, 23 Mar 1963 (C)
 6. COMUSMACV MAC J00 2308 DTG 190948Z Apr 1963 (C)

existing plans to withdraw U.S. personnel from the RVN and the findings of a JCS team that concluded too many R&D projects were being conducted in that country, CINCPAC reaffirmed his opposition.¹

Proposed Test of "Air Assault Task Force": CINCPAC also opposed another proposed R&D project to test an Air Assault Task Force. The DA test plan proposed a task force of ground personnel and air crewmen who would train together to develop teamwork. The task force would consist of a reinforced ARVN infantry battalion with a U.S. advisor exercising operational control of all U.S. Army aviation elements of the force.² COMUSMACV said his aviation units were already too heavily committed, and that the test would interfere with the National Campaign Plan.³ CINCPAC advised the JCS that combined operations were not possible under existing U.S. policy and said that the existence of two chains of command would make it difficult to evaluate the U.S. airmobile doctrine.⁴ The JCS agreed that the situation in the RVN did not warrant further consideration of the proposal.⁵ (φ)

Combat Development Testing in RVN: The following tests or evaluations, approved by CINCPAC, were underway or scheduled for completion by the end of FY64:

1. Employment of the OV-1 (Mohawk) aircraft to support counterinsurgency operations.
2. Operational use of armed helicopters.
3. Employment of the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment in target acquisition missions.
4. Environmental test and evaluation of the Tactical Air Control System in RVN.
5. Employment of the tactical transport OV-2B (Caribou).
6. Operational test and evaluation of the YC-123H.

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1. CINCPAC 150122Z Jun 1963 (S)
 2. DA ltr CPRS 002605-63 subj: Test Plan - Air Assault Test Force, 21 May 1963
 3. COMUSMACV 071028Z Jul 1963 (C)
 4. CINCPAC 102304Z Jul 1963 (C)
 5. JCS 2173 DTG 221446Z Aug 1963 (C)

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7. Use of the high frequency single side band radio in aircraft.
 8. The Tactical Area Positioning System (TAPS)/Position Fixing Navigation System.
 9. Use of a helicopter-borne command post.
 10. Evaluation of armed helicopters in escorting transport helicopters.
 11. Operational test and evaluation of the U-10A (L-28) aircraft in RVN.

Use of Chemicals for Defoliation and Crop Destruction

Defoliation operations got underway in the RVN early in 1962 following planning and preparations made in 1961. The use of chemical agents to destroy crops that otherwise could be harvested by the Viet Cong was first proposed in 1962 and, as with the use of chemicals for defoliation, encountered State Department opposition, although the program was backed by Ambassador Nolting.¹

Some crop destruction was carried out late in 1962 to prevent food crops abandoned by Montagnard tribesmen from falling into VC hands. After a delay caused by unfavorable weather, the program commenced again on 5 February 1963, accompanied by a PsyWar effort to explain the purpose.² The use of chemicals for both defoliation and crop destruction operations was suspended temporarily by the JCS on 2 May as the result of presidential action pending a review of the entire program.³ Five days later, a joint State/Defense message established new guidelines for the use of chemicals. When the purpose was defoliation, the U.S. Ambassador to the RVN and COMUSMACV were given authority to carry out a few operations in areas where the terrain and vegetation were peculiarly adaptable to the use of herbicides, in areas remote from population centers, and when hand cutting and burning were impracticable. This authority

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1. See the discussions of these subjects in the CINCPAC Command Histories for 1961 and 1962.
 2. Saigon 735 to State, 8 Feb 4PM, 1963 (S)
 3. JCS 9737 DTG 022032Z May 1963 (S)

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could be used to cover a few high priority projects in populated areas if the military advantage was very clear and hand cutting and burning were not feasible.¹

The new guidelines for crop destruction, always a more sensitive matter, gave approval authority to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who had opposed the operations, and to the Department of Defense. In addition, crop destruction had to be confined to remote areas known to be occupied by the Viet Cong, but could not be done in areas where the VC were intermingled with the native inhabitants who could not leave the area. It was also to be limited to areas where the VC either did not have nearby alternative food sources, or areas in which there was an overall food deficit, such as the high plateau and Zone D.

For both defoliation and crop destruction, the new guidelines stressed the importance of PsyWar preparations, and suggested that where feasible the work be done by hand operations which would be less awesome than spraying by air.²

The JCS lifted its suspension of 2 May, but directed CINCPAC to follow the restrictions contained in the State message.³

Few operations were carried out under the new restrictions. A small defoliation project was approved in June, but a request the same month for authority to use herbicides against food crops in a 3,000 acre area remained without approval at the end of the year.⁴ In making this request, CINCPAC recommended an early approval so that the project would fit into a military operation then underway.⁵ The Secretary of Defense recommended approval, but the State Department delayed an answer pending further information.^{6,7} In the meantime, the proposed plan for crop destruction lost its urgency when the

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1. State 1055 to Saigon, 7 May 8PM 1963 (S)
 2. Ibid.
 3. JCS 9818 DTG 091803Z May 1963 (S)
 4. COMUSMACV MAC J-3 5108 DTG 050959Z Jun 1963 (C)
 5. CINCPAC 202331Z Jun 1963 (S)
 6. JCS 1328 DTG 211640Z Jun 1963 (S)
 7. State 1226 to Saigon 24 Jun 8PM 1963 (S)

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military operation ended. At the end of July, the U. S. Ambassador to RVN made a detailed report to the State Department on the use of chemicals to destroy crops and foliage. This report was intended to serve as a basis for a decision whether to continue these programs or not, but the Ambassador recommended that the decision be deferred until further evaluation and another report. ¹

The Vietnam Country Team submitted to the Department of State a more complete report during October. Based upon a study of herbicide operations for a one year period commencing in September 1962, the Country Team concluded that herbicide operations could be used as an effective military weapon in Vietnam, but that the existing U. S. and RVN policies and administrative procedures for approval of such operations were too lengthy and involved for something that had to be carried out promptly and rather extensively to be most effective. The report also pointed out that crop destruction was being carried out by the GVN on extensive scale by burning, pulling, cutting and other inefficient means, so that the question was not whether crops would be destroyed, but whether the destruction would be by an efficient means. The report contained the recommendation that more authority be delegated to the Ambassador and COMUSMACV to approve chemical crop destruction operations on a basis of military need. ²

At the end of the year the State Department had not relaxed restrictions.

The latest development in the use of herbicides was a bomblet that OSD's Advance Research Projects Agency had requested of Edgewood Arsenal in 1962. The OSD advised COMUSMACV that two types of such bomblets had been developed and tested in CONUS. COMUSMACV promptly asked for 3,700 bomblets to be used in operational tests. ³

In response to a JCS request for the psychological aspects

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1. Saigon 151 to State 30 Jul 1 PM 1963 (S)
 2. Saigon 668 to State 9 Oct 6PM 1963 (S)
 3. COMUSMACV MAC RD 9307 DTG 040630Z Dec 1963 (S)

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connected with the use of defoliants as a counterinsurgency weapon in RVN, CINCPAC forwarded in March a detailed report on the use of defoliant and crop destruction chemicals. The CINCPAC study concluded that the psychological aspects of the use of defoliants in counterinsurgency operations be considered a limiting factor only in the sense that operations had to be accompanied by an appropriate and continuing psychological program.¹

U.S. Precautionary Actions in Connection with Civil Disturbances

Internal problems that plagued the GVN during 1963 broke into the open on 8 May when GVN security forces, including National Police, Civil Guard and ARVN units, used force to disband several thousand people who were celebrating a Buddhist holiday in the city of Hue. Although repercussions of this incident affected political and military conditions in the RVN for the remainder of the year, CINCPAC pursued a policy of encouraging the GVN to keep its armed forces engaged with the enemy, protecting U.S. personnel in Vietnam, and avoiding interference with the internal problems of the GVN.

As tension between Buddhists and the government increased, on 5 June CINCPAC relayed directives to COMUSMACV prohibiting the use of U.S. owned aircraft to move Vietnamese troops employed in connection with the Hue incident.² The problem reached a climax on 11 June when a Buddhist monk in gasoline-soaked robes burned himself to death during protest demonstrations against restrictive government policies.

During August, civil disturbances indicated to CINCPAC that U.S. non-combatants could be endangered. Although the U.S. Ambassador was responsible for evacuating these individuals, the possibility existed that military assistance would be needed. In preparation for such action, on 25 August, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to sortie TG 76.5 (consisting of the PRINCETON,

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00278, 22 Mar 1963 (S)
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 051553Z Jun 1963 (C)

NOBLE, and THOMASTON) from Subic Bay.¹ Embarked aboard surface units of the task group was a battalion landing team and HMM 163 - the special landing force of the Seventh Fleet. After the TG reported that it was underway, CINCPAC directed it to proceed to a position within one day's steaming time of the mouth of the Saigon River.² To support this movement, COMSEVENTHFLT directed TG 77.7 to operate within 200 nautical miles of TG 76.5. (S)

On 28 August, the Director of the Joint Staff, JCS advised CINCPAC to prepare for the possible emergency evacuation of U.S. non-combatants, most of whom were in the Saigon-Cholon area. Accordingly, CINCPACFLT was directed to move TG 76.5 to the 50 fathom curve of Cap St. Jacques off the mouth of the Saigon River, and to have TG 77.7 provide air support.³ Simultaneously, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to move the KC-130F aircraft of the 1st MAW from Iwakuni, Japan to Okinawa, and CINCPACAF to position and hold all available 315th Air Division C-130 aircraft at Okinawa for possible airlift of the two Marine battalions to Saigon and evacuation of U.S. non-combatants.⁴ Altogether, 36 C-130 and 11 KC-130 aircraft were available by 29 August.⁵ (S)

In one of the key preparatory actions, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to place the KC-130Fs under the operational control of the airlift commander, and directed that a landing force commander be designated to control the two Marine battalions, and to report to COMUSMACV for operational control on arrival in RVN, but to revert to the control of the Marine landing force commander upon the latter's arrival in RVN with the airlift forces. Task Group 76.5 was also directed to provide support for the landing force while it operated ashore, and PACAF was directed to designate an airlift commander who would coordinate with and support the Marine landing force

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1. CINCPAC 252100Z Aug 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 260503Z Aug 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 281630Z Aug 1963 (S)
 4. CINCPAC 281620Z Aug 1963 (S)
 5. CINCPAC 290835Z Aug 1963 (S)

commander.¹ Later on the 29th, CINCPACAF was directed to augment the C-130 fleet on Okinawa with enough C-124s to move the Marine force in one lift and preserve unit integrity.²

Early on 30 August, both task groups were in place off of Saigon. On the same day, CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to load one reinforced Marine battalion at Okinawa and sail for the South China Sea.³

Since the assembly of aircraft on Okinawa and the movement of forces had created public interest, the operation was designated "Exercise RUNNING WATER" and explained as a training exercise.⁴ On 1 September, CINCPAC released a few of the aircraft to the Western Transportation Officer for normal operations. Several days later, on 3 September, the situation had eased enough so that CINCPAC directed that transport aircraft be returned to normal operations, terminating Exercise RUNNING WATER.⁵ (S)

Another precautionary action taken during the August crisis was to interrupt the movement of additional civilian or military persons to the RVN. On 27 August CINCPAC asked JCS to assist in suspending dependent travel, and on the following day, CINCPAC cancelled all previously approved visit clearances and set forth the prudential rule that visits would not be approved unless the request originated in Vietnam and was based upon a compelling need for assistance.⁶ (S)

Restrictions on official travel were modified on 9 October.⁷ Authority to resume the normal travel of dependents was received from the JCS on 10 October.⁸ (S)

U.S. Precautionary Actions Connected with the RVN Coup

Rumors of a coup d'etat to overthrow the Diem government were

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1. CINCPAC 290055Z Aug 1963 (TS)
 2. CINCPAC 291923Z Aug 1963 (TS)
 3. CINCPAC 301902Z Aug 1963 (S)
 4. CINCPAC 310213Z Aug 1963 (S)
 5. CINCPAC 032004Z Sep 1963 (S)
 6. CINCPAC 282311Z Aug 1963 (C)
 7. JANAFAC 58-63 DTG 09202Z Oct 1963 (C)
 8. JCS 2950 DTG 101732Z 1963 (C)

commonplace during the spring and summer of 1963, and earned some credence as the result of the August surge of political unrest because of the Buddhist problem. CINCPAC took some precautionary moves at that time to protect U.S. non-combatants, and was alert thereafter to the continuing unstable political conditions. On 11 October, CINCPAC suggested to COMUSMACV that he prepare plans for the use of U.S. forces to come to the immediate relief of the Ambassador or important U.S. installations in the Saigon-Cholon area, an action that was based upon special intelligence available to CINCPAC.¹ Accordingly, COMUSMACV prepared a plan to provide for protection or evacuation of key U.S. personnel.²

The first warning of impending trouble in RVN just prior to the November coup came on 29 October when Admiral Felt was in Southeast Asia. Vice Admiral H. D. Riley, Director of the JCS Staff, telephoned CINCPAC's Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Verdi Barnes, and directed that an afloat BLT and covering attack carrier task group sail to an area off the RVN coast - the same area in which the task group had operated during the September crisis. The task group was to move quietly and inconspicuously, but as soon as possible.³ This phone call was confirmed by message.⁴ Movement was precautionary and directed in order to reduce reaction time should developments in RVN require evacuation of American civilians. CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to move Ready Amphibious Group (TG 76.5) to the vicinity of 09-40N and 108-40E with Carrier Task Group (TG 77.5) in supporting position.⁵ At the same time, the contents of the JCS message was passed to COMUSMACV by ADMINO CINCPAC and by Admiral Felt.

The following day, 30 October, CINCPAC notified the JCS that Task Group 77.5 would be underway at first light on 31 October from

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1. CINCPAC 110349Z Oct 1963 (S)
 2. COMUSMACV OPLAN 62-64, 25 Oct 1963. On CPRS 004133-63 (S)
 3. Telecon between Vice Admiral Riley and LtGen Barnes, 291243W (292243Z) Oct 1963
 4. JCS 292331Z Oct 1963 (S)
 5. ADMINO CINCPAC 300040Z Oct 1963 (S)

Iwakuni and would arrive in its support position at 031400Z November, and that TG 76.5 (consisting of the IWO JIMA, NOBLE and POINT DEFIANCE) was expected to arrive at the area at 012100Z November. These moves were made under the guise of Exercise YELLOW BIRD, which had been scheduled previously.¹ In addition to these moves, the JCS further directed the alerting of two Marine infantry battalions plus a small regimental command element and necessary aircraft on Okinawa for a possible airlift to Tan Son Nhut airfield, if required.^{2,3}

In one of the key directives, CINCPAC assigned tasks to CINCPACFLT, PACAF, COMUSMACV, and the Chief of WESTPAC Transportation Office to carry out the intent of the JCS directives.⁴ CINCPACFLT was directed to place one Marine battalion on a four hour alert, and the other on an eight hour alert, and designate a landing force commander who would report to COMUSMACV upon arrival at Tan Son Nhut. Airlift, including the 1st MAW KC-130s, was directed to be assembled on Okinawa. In addition, Task Groups 76.5 and 77.5 were directed to expedite closing support positions. Although CINCPACFLT asked permission to go ahead with Exercise YELLOW BIRD, the exercise was postponed because CINCPAC did not wish to release the carrier.⁵ The JCS also directed that TG 77.7 (HANCOCK), then in Hong Kong, sail as soon as possible as back-up for TG 77.5. Other precautionary actions included the suspension of dependent travel, even to delaying those dependents enroute or at POEs, and cancellation by CINCPAC of previously approved clearances to RVN and notification that no visit request would be approved unless originated by COMUSMACV or for compelling reasons.⁶ CINCPAC also put MINIMIZE into effect to reduce message traffic.

The JCS guidance in respect to forces near RVN was that they would keep out of sight of land, take no action that would represent

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1. ADMINO CINCPAC 302034Z Oct 1963 (TS)
 2. JCS 301349Z Oct 1963 (TS)
 3. JCS 010942Z Nov 1963 (S)
 4. ADMINO CINCPAC 010843Z Nov 1963 (TS)
 5. ADMINO CINCPAC 041924Z Nov 1963 (S)
 6. ADMINO CINCPAC 011849Z Nov 1963 (C)

visible support for or against the government, and that there be no helicopter flights from amphibious forces to COMUSMACV, conditions that were relayed to CINCPACFLT.¹

On 1 November the JCS asked CINCPAC to review his OPLAN 99-64 and recommend actions in ascending order of intensity that should be taken in case of threatening moves or border crossings by DRV forces attempting to exploit the existing situation.² In response, Admiral Felt recommended that special photo intelligence overflights of North Vietnam be made as frequently as operationally feasible; that CAS intelligence teams in NVN be alerted to report indications of threatening moves; that the list of actions in Annex B of OPLAN 99-64 be followed, actions that he considered appropriate and that could be initiated at once. As first moves, he recommended overflights and the shifting of carrier task groups to the north.³

By 2 November, when it appeared that new government leaders were securely in power and the probability of violence had diminished, the JCS cancelled requirements for the Marine infantry battalion on Okinawa and the airlift. Accordingly, CINCPACFLT, PACAF, COMUSMACV, and the Chief of WESTPAC Transportation Office were directed to return certain alert forces to normal routine.⁴ However, the JCS retained the requirement for the three task groups and, on 4 November, directed that Task Groups 77.5 and 77.7 be positioned off the RVN coast south of the 17th Parallel and out of sight from land.⁵ CINCPAC directed that one of the task groups be shifted north to the vicinity of Hue, and that the other stay farther south in support of Task Group 76.5.⁶ Other alert measures were cancelled within the following days and, by 7 November, the JCS authorized the release of one task group from its alert responsibilities.⁷ On the following day, JCS

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1. ADMINO CINCPAC 012216Z Nov 1963 (C)
 2. JCS 3357 DTG 011937Z Nov 1963 (TS)
 3. CINCPAC 021610Z Nov 1963 (TS)
 4. ADMINO CINCPAC 022004Z Nov 1963 (TS)
 5. JCS 3376 DTG 021600Z Nov 1963 (S)
 6. CINCPAC 050420Z Nov 1963 (S)
 7. JCS 3472 DTG 071600Z Nov 1963 (S)

directed the release of the afloat BLT and the covering task group to normal operations at CINCPAC's discretion. ¹

Civic Actions in RVN

CINCPAC considered a grass-roots type civic action program the most positive approach to winning the support of the Vietnamese people, and he strongly supported a program that was winning acceptance and approval of the Vietnamese government and people. Early in 1963 the last of four civil affairs mobile training teams arrived in RVN to help train ARVN CA companies. The GVN, recognizing the need for qualified civic action cadre to work in the rural areas, allocated 20,000 ARVN personnel for civil affairs training; most of this number had completed training at the end of 1963. ~~(S)~~

One of the programs most popular among the Vietnamese was carried out by 127 medical civic action personnel, of whom 15 were doctors. The first members of this group arrived in RVN in mid-January; the entire group was at work by the beginning of May. Soon thereafter, these medical personnel were treating between 15 and 20 thousand Vietnamese a week, a fifth of whom were civilians. The teams were assigned at division and corps level, and had the dual mission of administering medical treatment and training ARVN medical personnel. ~~(S)~~

The U.S. civic action program in RVN also included four 14-man Seabee Technical Assistance Teams (STATs) and a 20-man civic action military training team, all of which performed civic action projects in support of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program; a U.S. Army Engineer Control and Advisory Detachment that did civic action work at the province level; and U.S. Civil Affairs/Civic Action officers who were assigned to corps and divisions to advise their RVNAF counterparts. ² The RVNAF carried out a separate program of improvements for roads and strategic hamlets.

1. JCS 3515 DTG 082346Z Nov 1963 (S)

2. CINCPAC ltr 5080 ser 0688, subj: Civic Action in the PACOM, 7 Oct 1963 (C)

In September the OSD asked CINCPAC to make an assessment of the PACOM civic action program.¹ When CINCPAC asked for an account of activities in the RVN, COMUSMACV explained that fighting the guerrilla war in Vietnam required as much civic action as military action, and that he believed the U. S. had finally convinced the GVN that killing the VC would not alone win the war - that the GVN first had to win the support of the people. COMUSMACV contrasted the military indifference of a year or longer ago with the existing numerous examples of spontaneous civic action on the part of most ARVN small units.

In FY63 the RVNAF activated three Civil Affairs companies for use in the field. Teams from these companies worked with division and province headquarters supporting military operations and advising members of the hamlets about security, sanitation, education, rural development and medical treatment. The approximate MAP cost for these units was \$181,000, but COMUSMACV claimed the value received could not be measured in terms of dollars.

One dramatic demonstration of the value of civic actions occurred when two strategic hamlets were attacked by the Viet Cong. Personnel in one of the hamlets had received no civic action assistance; members of the other hamlet had an aid station, a school, an adequate water source, lighting facilities, and means to provide security. They defended their hamlet and drove the VC from the area. Inhabitants of the unimproved hamlet put up no resistance and the VC destroyed the buildings, and kidnapped the key personnel of the hamlet. COMUSMACV considered the medical civic action program as the most successful, measured by its effect toward improving the image of the GVN in the eyes of the people. This program was aimed principally at rural areas. Another program that had a marked effect upon the lives of rural people was the engineer construction program - roads, irrigation ditches, bridges, and wells. For the first time, many villages had a dependable source of pure water.

1. OSD DEF 935743 DTG 092008Z Sep 1963 (C)

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Besides its war with the Viet Cong, COMUSMACV considered the RVN as a country engaged in a political, social, and economic revolution, gradually progressing in each of these undertakings. ¹ (C)

The Strategic Hamlet Program

Initiated during 1962, and expanded at a steady rate during 1963, the Strategic Hamlet Program was considered the best solid promise for helping to defeat the Viet Cong. The program represented a large U.S. investment, and was a program that had suffered from mismanagement as a result of a GVN desire to complete the program as soon as possible. One observer considered the program as the most promising concept the Free World had developed against communism. Of all the devices, tactics and means used in South Vietnam, the strategic hamlet emerged as one of the most effective weapons in the war.

Although the hamlets damaged the political and logistic structures upon which the VC depended, only a few of the approximately 8,500 completed strategic hamlets were attacked by a military force during the year. ² At the end of the year more than 10 million people were under RVN control, compared with about a million under VC control. ³ Under a program known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, U.S. and RVN special forces extended this program to remote areas not previously controlled by the RVN.

Defects in the program as carried out by the GVN could be traced to the overly ambitious scope of the program that taxed the government's capability to administer it properly from the national level. As a result, much of the program was entrusted to province and district chiefs, and the results varied with the individuals in charge. Although most hamlets were considered satisfactory, officials who evaluated those in the Delta area considered that 70% were not up to the standard required to make them truly effective, a result of excessive haste in choosing sites and in construction, much of which was

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1. COMUSMACV MAC J79 7650 DTG 240655Z Sep 1963 (C)
 2. J2 memo to J00, 30 Apr 1963 (S). In J512 file IV-11.
 3. Record of Special Meeting on RVN, 20 Nov 1963, CINCPAC ser 001218, 22 Nov 1963, p. A-2-5 (S)

done through use of forced labor. Embassy officials, however, believed the new government installed by the 1 November coup would be able to correct errors and continue the program that was generally accepted by the people.¹ At the end of the year, the program was under intensive review by the Vietnamese officials.

In 1963 the strategic hamlet program became a routine problem of funding and supplying hamlet kits, which consisted of barbed wire, weapons, ammunition, and some communication equipment. MAP support during FY64 amounted to \$5.8 million; only \$1.4 million was funded for FY65 when only maintenance support would be required.

Storage, Processing & Retrieval of Counterinsurgency Data

A significant CINCPAC action during 1963 was the development of a system for the storage, processing and retrieval of counterinsurgency data collected in the RVN. CINCPAC initiated the project as the result of an undertaking to analyze counterinsurgency and look for indicators of progress, trends, and cause-and-effect relationships. To satisfy the requirement for data, CINCPAC adapted the system so the data could be stored by automatic data processing equipment, which was available for use at the Kunia CINCPAC Command Center. The data were selected from operation and intelligence summaries, and from several reports originating in the RVN. Most of the data concerned detailed information about the frequency, unit size, location, or results of either Viet Cong actions or of friendly operations. The system provided for magnetic tape files on which could be stored a description and outcome of each friendly and VC initiated action.² (C)

The CINCPAC Staff expected to make extensive use of the tape files in responding to the requirements for counterinsurgency analyses, including those of Secretary McMamara and the Army Chief of Staff. The JCS also asked that they be provided copies of the computer data base tapes for their own use.

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1. Ibid. p. B-4-2 (S)
 2. CINCPAC Operations Analysis Technical Memorandum No. 17 Sep 1963 (C)

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In November, CINCPAC discussed the project with COMUSMACV, who established an ARVN Data Base Working Group, the purpose of which was to perfect the method of collecting and reporting the information to be stored on the tapes. The system became operational in November, using information encoded on cards by CINCPAC personnel, and then transferred to tapes. It was expected that COMUSMACV would be prepared early in 1964 to encode the data on cards, which would be forwarded to CINCPAC. (S)

Border Control Problems in RVN

The infiltration of Viet Cong and the shipment of supplies to sustain the communist insurgency had plagued the GVN for several years, and remained a major problem in 1963. COMUSMACV estimated at the beginning of the year that North Vietnam was able to train and infiltrate approximately 500 personnel monthly.¹ To COMUSMACV, the thorniest part of the entire problem was a 10 kilometer "safe haven" that had been established in the Mekong Delta areas adjacent to the Cambodian Border. This had been done to reduce the possibility of RVNAF or U. S. aircraft carrying out strikes on the Cambodian side of the poorly defined border. However, COMUSMACV pointed out that the GVN National Campaign Plan placed great emphasis on controlling the borders, which became impossible under the existing policy.²

Admiral Felt reviewed for the JCS the extent of the communist support that followed the two main infiltration routes into the RVN - the Ho Chi Minh trail, and the Cambodian artery by which smugglers moved cargo by boat or truck across the Cambodian border. CINCPAC urged that every means possible be made to stop infiltration from Laos, and that the Cambodian border problem be handled through diplomatic channels.³

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1. Study on VC Infiltration, Hq USMACV, 26 Feb 1963. On CPRS 001705-63 (S)
 2. COMUSMACV J3 2443 DTG 260246Z Apr 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 302026Z Apr 1963 (S)

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On 1 May, new rules approved by the GVN permitted ground operations up to five kilometers of the border, and air operations to be conducted up to a clearly defined border and otherwise to within two to five kilometers of the border. The number of border guards, CIDG posts, mountain scout teams, and surveillance units were increased, but throughout the year the problem of controlling the GVN border remained troublesome. ¹

RVN CHIEU HOI (Amnesty) Program

On a nation-wide broadcast on 17 April, President Diem officially launched the CHIEU HOI Program to offer to the Viet Cong (including hard core communists) an opportunity to return to the national cause under the conditions that war crimes would be forgiven, penal crimes would be punished, but that those who came over to the GVN side would have to do something to redeem themselves. The GVN asked the U. S. to help with the program. The PsyOps Committee of Task Force Saigon provided printing, motion picture, radio, and other support for the campaign that opened a year after the Strategic Hamlet Program commenced. By the end of the year, more than 17,000 persons who had been identified with the Viet Cong returned to government control. In December CINCPAC suggested to COMUSMACV that he and the U. S. Ambassador should explore the possibility of working with the new RVN leadership to improve the program. ²

CINCPAC ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN THAILAND'S RESISTANCE TO COMMUNISM

Predictably, following the 1962 withdrawal of the U. S. MAAG Laos, communist pressure that previously had been contained in Laos crossed the border to spread subversion in Thailand. There was ample evidence in 1963 that Thailand was suffering from the early phase of insurgency development that had become familiar in Southeast Asia.

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1. Item in Admiral Felt's Problem Book, subj: Border Incidents RVN/Cambodia, 6 May 1963. In J046 files (S)
 2. CINCPAC 060241Z Dec 1963 (C)

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Fortunately, Thai officials recognized the increase in subversive activities and in communist activities to train and indoctrinate the Thais in guerrilla warfare, particularly in the northern part of the country.¹

Although the only armed communist activity being conducted was by a few Malayan communist guerrillas in the Thai-Malay border area, the existence in Northeast Thailand of well disciplined Viet Minh - controlled pockets of Vietnamese refugees, totalling 40 to 50 thousand, represented a potential for insurgency that could be exploited by the communists at will. Like insurgency, the most serious threat of subversion also was in Northeast Thailand where the subversives received aid and direction from the association of Thai exiles in Laos.

Toward the end of the year, the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand submitted a revised Assistance Strategy Statement for Thailand to the Department of State. This statement had the approval of all elements of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and provided broad strategy and objectives for AID and MA Programs. The coverage of the external threat to Thailand in the statement was particularly significant since it indicated that CHJUSMAG Thailand had been able to arrive at an evaluation of the external threat that was acceptable to all elements.²

Revision of FY64-69 MAP

In August 1963 it appeared that the MAP for Thailand might be changed again to reflect increased emphasis on civic action and counter subersion/insurgency, and that the existing support to the threat against external aggression might be lowered further. The first suggestions for changing the FY64 MAP came in April from Ambassador Young who sent to CHJUSMAG Thailand a memo in which he concurred generally with the program but concluded that greater emphasis should be placed on equipment for counterinsurgency.³ In July the Embassy charge that the Thailand MAP was not properly oriented was

1. JCS 108/5 DTG 042331Z Apr 1963 (S)
2. Bangkok Airgram A520 to State, 4 Dec 1963 (S)
3. American Embassy Airgram A-46, 15 Jul 1963 (S)

repeated again; this time to the State Department. The Embassy proposed that either money be taken from MAP and applied to Agency for International Development (AID) political and economic development projects, or that MAP-supported Thai armed forces be influenced to provide much larger return in terms of increased deterrent to subversion and insurgency.

As a result of the July Embassy letter, the State Department, the Department of Defense and AID jointly requested United States Operations Mission (USOM) Thailand views on questions related to a possible reduction in the FY64 MAP from \$68.7 million to \$50-55 million and a possible reorientation of MAP along the lines of the Embassy proposal.¹ CINCPAC was asked to comment on the Mission views and provide a separate analysis. Subsequently USOM was relieved of answering two of the questions asked by the joint inquiry concerning what a \$50-55 million MAP should include, and what adjustments could be made if the decision was made to reorient MAP for Thailand to favor civic action and counter subversion/insurgency.² To assist in this effort, CINCPAC asked CHJUSMAG Thailand to furnish comments on the joint inquiry and also to provide his views on USOM's reply to the other questions asked jointly by the State Department, DOD, and AID.^{3,4} CHJUSMAG Thailand indicated that the Thais could and should do more in civic action projects, but should do so at their own government's direction and not be thrown into a crash program. He believed large cuts and reorientation of MAP would harm U.S. interests. He also disagreed with the AID contention that MAP should bear the entire cost for civic action, rather than only the cost for equipment and related support. CHJUSMAG stated that Ambassador Martin had acknowledged that Thailand armed forces were, in fact, continually engaged in civic action and that the Embassy had changed its views

1. State 264 to Bangkok 21 Aug 1963 (S)
2. State 280 to Bangkok 23 Aug 1963 (S)
3. CINCPAC 241958Z Aug 1963 (S)
4. CINCPAC 231832Z Aug 1963 (S)

considerably from those expressed in July.¹

In September the Embassy proposed to the State Department an expanded military civic action program that would include the formation of 15 Thailand Civic Action Teams. The total recommended program was estimated at \$1.0 million for FY64 and \$2.5-\$3.0 million for each subsequent program year.² CINCPAC agreed that the proposal had merit but stated that MAP should not pay for construction materials, subsistence, and per diem in support of civic action.³ Under existing state and DOD guidelines, MAP normally paid for civic action equipment and spares, maintenance of equipment and training.⁴

A reduced version of the Embassy proposal for an expanded civic action program was given the go-ahead in October by a joint State Department, DOD, and AID approval.⁵ The Embassy was given authorization to prepare detailed plans for a pilot operation of Thailand STATs not to exceed three teams in FY64 with a MAP dollar ceiling of \$.3 million. FY65 MAP ceiling for civic action teams was \$.5 million. In accordance with CINCPAC's recommendations, MAP would support only the costs of equipment, spares, maintenance and training for these teams. AID would provide the funds for other support such as material and subsistence.

A significant U.S. effort to strengthen Thailand, is described in Chapter II of this Command History, under the MAP construction section.

Civic Action in Thailand

The Thailand Government recognized that insurgency and subversion were developing in its country and took counter measures to combat them. CINCPAC knew that Thailand could not carry the burden without considerable U.S. support and, along with the Country

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1. CHJUSMAG Thailand JTJ 327902 DTG 090925Z Sep 1963 (S)
 2. AMEMB Bangkok Airgram A-225, 7 Sep 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 262356Z Sep 1963 (S)
 4. Part 1 DOD Military Assistance Manual of 1 Apr 1963 (S)
 5. State 605 to Bangkok, 17 Oct 1963 (S)

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Team, gave continuous support to Thailand's civic action programs.¹

Civic action in Thailand was broad in scope and used the military personnel of the U.S. and Thailand, working together, as the most vital force available to win the people's loyalty.² Some of the more important civic action tools were the Mobile Development Units (MDUs), Seabee Technical Assistance Teams (STATS), and the Royal Thailand and U.S. Army units. By the end of 1963 the U.S. policy of "encouraging the use of military for socio-economic development without detracting from its capability to perform the primary mission", was showing positive results.

Mobile Development Units: The primary means by which Thailand sought to counter insurgency and subversive movements was with Mobile Development Units, the missions of which were to:

1. Win the loyalty of the people to the government.
2. Assist the people of remote areas to improve their public health and welfare, communications, and productivity.
3. Survey areas for long-range development by certain ministries.
4. Develop area intelligence.
5. Develop selected villages as a measure of countering communist activity.

The MDU program was basically Thai conceived and directed. The MDUs operated under the direction of the Thai National Security organization which was established by the Council of Minister in April 1962.³ A total of thirteen MDUs were planned, to become operational over a three year period.

CINCPAC forwarded in February, to Washington an Embassy list of items to be procured for the MDUs, and pointed out that most of the items on the list were not appropriate and that a list that would stand inspection was needed.⁴ Later the Embassy forwarded a new

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1. CINCPAC 101301Z Apr 1963 (S)
 2. CHJUSMAG Thailand JTJ3 28068 DTG 201100Z Sep 1963 (C)
 3. CINCPAC 200120Z Feb 1963 (S)
 4. CINCPAC 232034Z Feb 1963 (S)

list totalling \$1.2 million which CINCPAC advised OSD was appropriate and it was approved.¹ By the end of 1963 the total \$1.5 million in FY63 MAP funds for MDUs had been obligated. AID was to fund for FY64 and subsequent year support of MDUs. MAP equipment programmed for the MDUs is shown below.

ITEM	QUANTITY
Willys audio/visual unit	4
Mobile station medical van	8
RCA SSB-1 radio	6
RCA (mobile) SSB-5 radio	12
Water purification unit	6
5-10 KW electric generator	12
DDT sprayer	18
Agricultural water pump	12
Artisian well drill	3
Various medical supplies (unit)	8
Fordson farm tractor	21
Motor road grader	12
D-7 tractor dozer	5

In action, the MDUs worked in two phases. First, during an operational phase, government representatives surveyed the needs of the people, and planned and started projects. Next, during the follow-up phase, projects were carried through to completion and new projects begun. The operational phase lasted about six weeks, but no time limit was attached to the follow-up phase.

MDU 1 completed phase one at Ban Na Khu in September 1962 and MDU 2 completed the same phase at Sakorn Nakorn in March 1963. MD 3 began phase one at Nakorn Phanom in May 1963 and MDUs 4A and 4B completed training and commenced operation in September 1963.² Plans for MDU 5 were almost complete at the end of 1963.

Evaluating the initial success of the MDUs, after a January visit to Northeast Thailand, Prime Minister Sarit said that in contrast to previous visits, areas in which an MDU had operated contained more friendly people and smiling faces. Facilities such as water, electricity and village roads satisfied the primary needs of the people.³ Each

1. Fact Sheet prepared by CHJUSMAG THAI for Ambassador Young, 1 Apr 1963 (C)
2. CINCPAC 0502192Z Oct 1963 (S)
3. Bangkok 273 to CINCPAC 14 Jan 1963 (S)

MDU was programmed to spend six weeks in its area with follow-up evaluation teams visiting each MDU semi-annually.

Seabee Technical Assistance Teams: In January CINCPAC approved a CINCPACFLT proposal to employ six Seabee Technical Assistance Teams (STATs) in Southeast Asia, two to be deployed in Thailand and four in RVN.

The original concept for STATs was to carry out in-country construction projects and provide on-the-job training for Thailand personnel. The U.S. Ambassador to Thailand requested State Department approval to use a team to engage in civic action projects and to train Thais to carry on with jobs started by the STAT.¹ CINCPAC agreed to this provided sponsoring U.S. agencies would fund the projects.²

USAID agreed to fund a STAT for six months deployment to Thailand to work with the Thai/SEATO Community Development Center at Ubon.³ One team reported to COMUSMACTHAI in June 1963 and by September had accomplished such an outstanding job on civic action projects that the Embassy proposed STATs as the model for its recommended extensive civic action expansion program. Although each U.S. Navy STAT was composed of from 12-14 Seabees, its Royal Thailand Army counterpart would total 60 soldiers.⁴

This STAT was replaced in November and the Embassy requested two other STATs for duty in Thailand. Three teams operating in Thailand would provide necessary support to train Thailand STATs. A second team reported to COMUSMACTHAI on 1 December to begin work on a dam and irrigation project at Nuang Ma-Nguang, and the third team arrived on 14 December.

Paramilitary Potential of Thailand Hill Tribes

1. Bangkok 1245 to State Mar 1963 (S)
2. CINCPAC 150414Z Mar 1963 (S)
3. ADMIN Order COMSERPAC 112014Z May 1963 (U)
4. Item from Admiral Felt's Problem Book, Subj: Seabee Technical Assistance Teams in Thailand, 17 Oct 1963 (S). In J046 files.

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With communist agents in the hills of Thailand conducting their version of civic action by luring off tribesmen to form cadres and create distrust of the government, it became increasingly important to take steps to win the loyalty of the hill tribes.¹ In June, Prime Minister Sarit intended to extend government control to 200,000 tribesmen in the northern mountains. Akha and Meo tribesmen were principal targets of the government program which included schooling, agriculture, animal husbandry, and medical assistance and training.

In August 1962 the JCS established a project to determine methods for exploiting minority groups with a paramilitary capability, and asked CINCPAC and other unified and specified commanders, for recommendations on the priority of studying such groups.² CINCPAC recommended the Meo tribesmen of Thailand for study and the JCS determined through its study that the Meos did have a paramilitary potential which, if skillfully approached and delicately handled, could be developed as an internal security asset.³

CINCPAC was asked if he thought it feasible and desirable to develop the Meos. This question was asked as a preliminary to a possible decision for CINCPAC to go ahead with detailed planning in coordination with the chief of the country team. CINCPAC answered that while it might be possible to recruit Meos in Thailand and train them as paramilitary assets, exclusive attention to Meos would not be suitable. This was true because, unlike their Lao cousins, the Thai Meos obviously were not superior to other tribesmen and also there were no Meos living along the Thailand-Burma border. CINCPAC concluded that any plan to develop the hill tribes should include Yao, Lahu, Akha and Lisu tribesmen, as well as Meos. CINCPAC pointed out that any attempt to offer a new plan to Sarit would produce confusion and might retard progress already made. He recommended that no new plan be developed until results of Sarit's Akha-Meo plan

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1. CINCPAC 200414Z Jul 1963 (S)
 2. SACSA ltr M423-62, 27 Aug 1962 (S)
 3. JCS 9069 DTG 132248Z Mar 1963 (S)

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gave indications as to desirability. JCS approved this recommendation and no further action was taken.

Communications

When the RTG agreed to permit the U.S. to introduce into Thailand U.S. mobile troposcatter equipment without a commitment to transfer title of that equipment, work was resumed to establish the C-E base reported in the 1962 CINCPAC Command History.¹ The radio relay system, which extended along the Mekong river between Udorn and Ubon, was completed by the 167th Signal Company. The RTA took over operation of this system on 15 July 1963. Other major trunks were plagued with equipment and path problems with the result that the U.S. sideband system had not achieved operational status and was not available for use during exercise Dhanarajata.² Continuing efforts to provide additional equipment and evolutionary trunking modifications showed promise of accomplishing C-E base objectives in early 1964.³ (C)

A major step forward in improving C-E posture in Thailand was the establishment of the 379th Signal Battalion in Thailand on 25 August 1963.⁴ This battalion consisted of 24 officers, 5 warrant officers and 398 EM grouped in a headquarters detachment, STARCOM Company, and Tropo and Operations Company. The AID sponsored telecommunication project in Thailand encountered delays and full service would not be available until July 1964.⁵ (C)

Redeployment of Army Units

Chief JUSMAG Thailand prepared a plan for the ground defense of Thailand that incorporated the redeployment of certain Thailand Army units to the north and northeast areas to support counter-insurgency and national defense efforts. The Chief JUSMAG plan

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1. DEP COMUSMAC Thai MASO 25145 DTG 270135Z Jan 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 070003Z Jul 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 230242Z Oct 1963 (C)
 4. DA Msg Cite DA 931552 DTG 062047Z Aug 1963 (U)
 5. DEPCOMUSMAC Thai Msg Cite JTJ6 27026 DTG 031120Z Jul 1963 (S)

provided for reducing the concentration of Army units in the Bangkok area, improving the location of battalion size units in the north and northeast areas at permanent posts, and deployment on a rotational basis of company size units to key border areas.¹ The proposed movement of units in order of priority was an infantry battalion from Korat to Sakol Nakorn, an infantry battalion from Pranburi to Kanchanaburi; one infantry battalion from Nakorn Sawan to Tak; a cavalry squadron from Prachinburi to Nan, and one rifle company from Haad Yai to Pattani.

CINCPAC approved the redeployment plan in principle but pointed out budgetary problems confronting the Thailand government and anticipated reductions in MAP funds in future years. CINCPAC originally supported the deployment to Sakol Nakorn, Nan, and Kanchanaburi on the basis that these moves would be of strategic value.² However, Chief JUSMAG Thailand later recommended construction at Cholburi for relocating major elements of a regimental combat team. Because of its southern location, elements at Cholburi would not contribute to counterinsurgency or national defense under existing plans. In view of this development and the fact that additional construction contributed to the flow of gold problem, CINCPAC approved deployments only to Sakol Nakorn, Nan, and Tak and requested Chief JUSMAG Thailand to review the overall construction requirements and to submit estimated cost data for top priority projects, taking into consideration the flow of gold problem.³ Chief JUSMAG Thailand advised CINCPAC that the U.S. cost would be \$2.3 million and the Thailand cost was estimated at \$2.6 million.⁴ During the FY64-69 MAP review, funds for the construction of battalion size posts at Sakol Nakorn and Nan were slipped to FY65 since, at the end of the year, the Thais had not yet agreed to budget for their share.

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1. CHJUSMAG Thailand JTAP 3169 DTG 251042Z Mar 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 012100Z Apr 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 112245Z Apr 1963 (S)
 4. CHJUSMAG Thailand 020930Z May 1963 (S)

Army Battalion Advisors

CHJUSMAG Thailand informed CINCPAC that battalion advisors were being included in the 1 July 1963 proposed Joint Table of Distribution (JTD).¹ Advisors were included for the three regiments and one cavalry squadron of Thailand's Second Army, and for the two regiments and one cavalry squadron of Third Army. The senior advisor in each regiment was to act as regimental advisor as well as advisor to one battalion. Advisors were requested only for those units in the critical border areas. Justification was based on the existing deployment concept for phase III operations which visualized battalions performing counterinsurgency actions as separate units, not necessarily under regimental control. CHJUSMAG pointed out that the field artillery battalions, which already had individual advisors, were better trained and more effective than the detached infantry battalions. (C)

CINCPAC confirmed the requirements, stating to JCS that emphasis upon counterinsurgency training increased the importance of small units and that the large areas of responsibility for each battalion made advisors at that level essential.² (C)

Subsequently CHJUSMAG and CINCPAC re-examined the requirement for battalion level advisors in view of overall manpower shortages and a continuing need for austerity. They decided, as an acceptable expedient, to provide advisory service by means of frequent visits by traveling teams from CHJUSMAG headquarters in lieu of permanently assigned advisors at each battalion. CINCPAC therefore recommended that JCS delete the requested 13 advisors from the proposed JTD.³ (C)

Request for Psychological Operations Personnel

Chief JUSMAG Thailand forwarded a request from U. S. Information Service (USIS) to CINCPAC for seven enlisted personnel to be placed on temporary duty from the U. S. Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity

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1. CHJUSMAG THAI JTAA 25504 DTG 150950Z Mar 1963 (C)
 2. CINCPAC 162311Z Mar 1963 (C)
 3. CINCPAC 040346Z May 1963 (C)

Pacific to augment USIS sponsored activities.¹ USIS proposed that the requested personnel be used covertly as civilians in on-the-job training and that CINCPAC obtain funding. Primary justification was that a knowledge of USIS activities gained by military personnel would facilitate military operational control over USIS in wartime.

CINCPAC did not agree fully with the justification, but recognizing the military obligation to support USIS during the cold war, agreed to approve a team of not more than eight personnel including one officer as Team Chief. For a period of temporary duty of not more than 179 days, the team was to be attached to CHJUSMAG Thailand for duty with USIS and employed overtly in uniform, if feasible. CINCPAC stipulated that the U.S. Information Agency would have to fund travel and per diem costs.²

CHJUSMAG Thailand informed CINCPAC that his conditions were not acceptable to USIS and that the matter was being referred to the State Department. CINCPAC notified the JCS of actions taken.³ The entire project was dropped in June by the USIS since conditions were unacceptable and the reasons for the program were incompatible.⁴

The Bangkok By-Pass Road

The estimate of the time required to complete the Bangkok By-Pass road, construction of which began in 1962, was extended in 1963.⁵ Originally construction time was estimated at 29 months. This estimate was based upon studies that contemplated adjacent rice paddy land for fill material. These studies made no provision for stage construction and were made prior to exploration of the adequacy of soil for road and bridge foundations.

CINCPAC approved final plans for Phase I (37 kilometers) from Chachoengsao to base camp on 15 January 1963. These plans differed

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1. CHJUSMAG Thailand ltr of 9 Mar 1963 (CPRSOO1818-63) (S)
 2. ADMINO CINCPAC 231902Z Apr 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 060047Z May 1963 (S)
 4. Ltr CHJUSMAG THAI JTJ3, ser 002766, 6 Jun 1963 (S)
 5. Planning and initial progress on road is found on p. 237 of 1962 History, see also, Military Construction in Southeast Asia, Chapter II of this history.

from the preliminary plans in many major items among which were increased quantities of sub-base, increased embankment requirements due to grade raise, restricted road side borrow which caused approximately 50% of the embankment materials to be hauled over a long distance and a requirement for two stage construction and sur-charging at various locations as a result of soil explorations.

CINCPAC received by 12 July 1963 all prefinal plans for Phase II (58 Kilometers) from base camp to Kabin Buri. These plans required six reinforced concrete bridges spanning approximately 680 meters and requiring an estimated 3500 meters of precast piling. As a result of this and unforeseen construction difficulties, the construction schedule again had to be revised. A final construction schedule was prepared which stretched out the project into FY65.

Hand in hand with construction schedule changes came revised funding estimates. Total obligations and programmed future funding for the road were as follows:

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Obligated</u>	
1962	\$1.503 million	
1963	<u>\$1.802 million</u>	
Sub Total	\$3.305 million	
<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Orig Prog. 64 Submission</u>	<u>Revised 64 Prog. Submission</u>
1964	\$2.037 million	\$3.353 million
1965	<u>-0-</u>	<u>\$2.200 million</u>
Sub Totals	<u>\$2.037 million</u>	<u>\$5.553 million</u>
Total Program Cost	\$5.342 million	\$8.858 million
Increase		<u>\$3.516 million</u>

The original estimate of total cost in FY62 was \$5.892 million. It was funded to that extent and the unobligated balance turned back. In FY63, \$3.815 million was made available of which \$1.802 million (see above) was obligated for the road. Of the balance, \$1.223 million was reprogrammed to Thailand Air Force requirements and \$0.220 million to communications requirements. The remainder was turned back.

The increases in FY64 and 65 shown above were attributable to

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underprogramming of maintenance, spare parts, and POL costs based on inadequate experience with the construction difficulties. End of job overhaul and redeployment costs were also left out of the original 64 program submission, as was the cost of stretch-out into FY65. The stretch-out was caused by incomplete knowledge of the scope and difficulty of the job and the fact that the final A&E study for the complete road was not furnished until June 1963, at which time the construction schedule was revised. At the end of 1963 the estimated completion date of the road was brought forward from 5 May 1965 to 15 February 1965 due to the expected reinforcement of the 809th Engineer Battalion, which was constructing the road, by the 561st Engineer Company effective 15 January 1964.

Malay Peninsula Canal

Responding to a Department of State request for the military implication of a canal across the Malay Peninsula, the JCS requested CINCPAC's views.¹ CINCPAC answered that the reduction in transit time from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean would not be militarily significant since ships would have less freedom of maneuver and action in time of stress or emergency.² Also there was a question whether the deep draft attack aircraft carriers could use such a canal. In addition, CINCPAC said that Singapore military base might be weakened if the canal siphoned off trade and prosperity from the Island. CINCPAC pointed out that it was to the U.S. military interest for United Kingdom forces to remain and operate the Singapore base.

Reduction of Tactical Fighter Squadron at Takhli

Upon the 1962 withdrawal of other U.S. combat troops from Thailand,³ DOD proposed to replace the 430th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) at Takhli with a unit of six aircraft. This constituted a

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1. JCS 3108 DTG 171752Z Oct 1963 (C)
 2. CINCPAC 250335Z Oct 1963 (S)
 3. p. 242 of 1962 CINCPAC Command History

reduction of 12 aircraft. Neither CINCPAC nor CINCPACAF were initially consulted on this proposal.¹

At the same time the State Department urged the continued presence of the Australian air unit in Thailand. Admiral Felt pointed out to the JCS that Australia wished to keep its air unit at Ubon only as long as a U. S. TFS remained in Thailand. He also believed that withdrawal or reduction in strength of U. S. air units in Thailand in addition to the withdrawal of the Army battle group, plus the departure of United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australian air units could be taken by communists as an invitation to increase pressure in Southeast Asia. He therefore recommended retention of a full strength TFS in Thailand.

The 430th TFS at Takhli was the second of a series of tactical fighter squadrons rotated to Thailand beginning in May 1962 when the 510th Squadron was deployed to Thailand from Clark Air Base in the Philippines.² The 430th was a Tactical Air Command unit under the operational control of CINCSTRIKE, who wanted "his chickens back in the coop".³ CINCSTRIKE proposed to consolidate his forces in the Pacific at Kadena air Base on Okinawa and rotate personnel and six aircraft each 30 days to meet the commitment in Thailand.⁴ He argued that this would give him better span of control, particularly in the maintenance area.

In the end JCS decided to reduce the size of the TFS in Thailand as it had originally planned.⁵ Effective 1 February personnel of the 522nd TFS replaced those of the 430th TFS, leaving only six aircraft at Takhli. Personnel and aircraft were not placed on the rotational basis recommended by CINCSTRIKE.

Prepositioning Aviation Fuels

----- In view of bulk POL deficiencies in Thailand, CINCPAC sought -----

1. CINCPAC 072225Z Dec 1962 (S)
2. CINCPAC 200008Z Dec 1962 (C)
3. CINCPAC 082045Z Dec 1962 (S)
4. CINCSTRIKE T/STRJ3-01283 DTG 061730Z Jan 1963 (S)
5. CSAF T/A FOOP TA PC 68396 DTG 151759Z Jan 1963 (S)

and received concurrences of CSAF and the Thailand Air Force to preposition additional aviation fuels in newly constructed MAP tankage at Thailand up-country airfields. ^{1,2,3} The fuel was to be prepositioned by contractor prior to 30 June 1964. The fuel when added to that already on hand would provide prepositioned quantities (in thousands of barrels) as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>AVGAS 115/145</u>
Korat	42.4	30.0
Takhli	10.0 (RTAF)	21.8
	72.4	
Udorn	10.0 (RTAF)	7.4
	22.4	
Ubon	20.0	6.3

Coordination of RDT&E Activities in Thailand

Research, Development, Test and Engineering (RDT&E) in Thailand as part of a program for research and development in Remote Area Conflict, code name Agile, was the responsibility of OSD/ARPA in conjunction with the Thailand Military Research and Development Center. Also, the terms of the Memorandum for Implementation of RDT&E in the PACOM area ⁴ stated that CHJUSMAG "will participate in and concur or recommend disapproval of any recommendation regarding proposals". In practice CHJUSMAG had learned of several projects after they had started and sometimes learned of them by chance. He had also been questioned by the Ambassador about some projects of which he had no knowledge. (ϕ)

In a fact sheet prepared for Admiral Felt's November visit to Thailand, CHJUSMAG stated his problem with RDT&E to be: (ϕ)

1. A need to clarify JUSMAG's responsibilities relative to the RDT&E effort in Thailand.
2. A need to enforce the provisions of the Memorandum for the Implementation of RDT&E.

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1. CINCPAC 030330Z May 1963 (S)
 2. CSAF 102226Z May 1963 (C)
 3. CHJUSMAG Thai 281010Z Aug 1963 (S)
 4. Felt/Godel Agreement

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CINCPAC advised the Director of Project Agile that the existing situation was unsatisfactory and requested that steps be taken to improve the coordination. The Director agreed that the situation needed improvement and agreed to take the necessary action.

Thailand POL Pipeline

Adverse Washington reaction to a plan that would have made the U.S. liable for the expenses of the peacetime operation of a permanent Bangkok to Don Muang POL pipeline system, plus repeated difficulties in reaching agreement with the Thailand government resulted in CINCPAC recommending that DOD seek RTG concurrence in cancelling the project. CINCPAC also recommended that plans for a permanent pipeline be replaced with plans for 238 mile long invasion pipeline stretching from Siracha to Korat via Don Muang. This pipeline would be installed only if needed for contingency purposes. The CINCPAC proposal called for the pipeline to be stored at Korat pending a requirement for its use.^{1, 2, 3} In response to an OSD request, the American Embassy in Bangkok advised that Marshal Dawee concurred with the CINCPAC proposal, and it was learned that Prime Minister Sarit approved also.^{4, 5} Accordingly, CINCPAC asked DIRPACDOCKS to proceed with an architectural and engineering design for the Siracha-Don Muang leg of the pipeline, and that appropriate component and sub-unified commanders incorporate the planned invasion pipeline into their logistic plans.⁶ CINCPAC advised these commanders that if the pipeline was required prior to completion of the Thai oil refinery at Siracha, estimated to occur in the fall of 1964, it probably would originate at Bangkok and proceed via Don Muang to Sara Buri where it would branch to Korat and Takhli. If it was not needed until after completion of the Siracha refinery, it was probable that the pipeline would originate at Siracha and proceed, by-passing Bangkok, via

1. ACP Lajes Azores Tango 56 DTG 110100Z Apr 1963 (C)
2. CINCPAC 040500Z May 1963 (S)
3. CINCPAC 182212Z May 1963 (S)
4. AMEMB Bangkok msg 12 noon 18 Jul 1963 (S)
5. Bangkok to State 161019 Sep 1963 (C)
6. ADMINO CINCPAC 242020Z Jul 1963 (S)

Don Muang and Sara Buri to Korat.

Pipe began moving into Thailand and, by the end of 1963, most of it was in country. ¹ In addition CINCUSARPAC requested \$74,500 for prepositioning in Thailand materials for installation of the two alternate pipelines. ² CINCPAC asked ASD/ISA for authority to use surplus A&E funds for this purpose and OSD later designated CNO to provide them from change order account. ^{3,4} The funds were provided and at the end of 1963 details were being worked out for requisitioning and shipping the necessary materials. ^{5,6}

Change in Thailand Political Leadership

The death of Thailand's Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat on 8 December 1963 ended the almost complete power he held over Thai politics, and no clear or final pattern of political power had emerged by the end of 1963. It appeared that Thailand would continue its pro-West, anti-communist orientation, but the personalities and policies of implementation were likely to be subject to rapid change. In the initial smooth transaction General Thanom Kittikachorn, Sarit's Deputy Prime Minister, was confirmed by the King as the new prime minister. Thanom also became Supreme Commander of Thai Armed Forces, CINC Royal Thai Army and retained his own important post of Defense Minister. Another of Sarit's positions, that of Director General of Police, Thanom passed to General Prasert Ruchirawong, former Deputy Director General. Thanom made General Praphat Charusathien the indisputable number two man of the regime. Praphat retained his post as Minister of Interior, and assumed Thanom's former positions as Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Supreme Commander Thai Armed Forces. Thanom also replaced General Chitti Navisthira as Deputy CINC Royal Thai Army and Chitti was made Assistant Supreme

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1. OSA San Francisco SSOM 09484-P DTG 181600Z Jul 1963 (C)
 2. CINCUSARPAC RJ 84967 DTG 120130Z Oct 1963 (C)
 3. CINCPAC 242003Z Oct 1963 (C)
 4. OSD DEF 945809 DTG 210033Z Nov 1963 (U)
 5. CINCUSARPAC RJ 85875 DTG 210236Z Dec 1963 (C)
 6. CHJUSMAG Thailand JTJ4 DTG 270459Z Dec 1963 (U)

Commander Thai Armed Forces, a figurehead position, in addition to being appointed Deputy Minister of Agriculture. Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya retained his position as Chief of Staff Supreme Command, and was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense. Pote Sarasin, resigning as Secretary General of SEATO, re-entered the Thai cabinet as Minister of National Development.¹

1. PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest, 50-63, 20 Dec 1963 (S)

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CHAPTER V

CINCPAC EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE FLOW OF GOLD DEFICIT IN
THE PACOM

The continuing problem connected with the balance of payments that was adverse to the United States affected CINCPAC's decisions throughout 1963. The specific problem was to find ways of reducing the outflow of gold that would not weaken CINCPAC's capability to carry out his assigned missions, or create an unacceptable increase in the overall cost. During 1962 CINCPAC examined the feasibility of reducing U.S. forces based overseas, particularly support type units in Japan and, in October of that year, recommended against such a move on the grounds that it would affect adversely the operational readiness of PACOM forces.¹

In February 1963, as a result of a Secretary of Defense request for a plan of action to reduce the balance of payments costs of maintaining U.S. military forces in Japan, the JCS asked CINCPAC for his views.² CINCPAC advised the JCS that a review of the requirements for forces based in Japan reaffirmed his position of the previous October. He pointed out that combat units based in Japan had tasks under the CINCPAC General War Plan or contingency plans, and were an essential part of the CINCPAC general war posture. In regard to the proposal to relocate units in a non-gold flow area, Admiral Felt said the base structure on Okinawa was already saturated, and the distance factor made Guam unsuitable for either tactical air or Naval forces. Pointing to significant measures that already had been taken to reduce the flow of gold, Admiral Felt said his Component Commanders felt that they had reached the irreducible minimum, and that any future consideration should recognize the actions already taken.

Possible actions that CINCPAC has examined were: Reduction of overseas depot maintenance activities; a reduction of hired foreign national personnel; reduction or complete removal of the U.S. Army

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1. CINCPAC 120110Z Oct 1962 (S)
 2. JCS 8715 DTG 201714Z Feb 1963 (S)

Logistic Center, Japan (USALCJ); decreasing or eliminating the homeporting of U. S. ships in Japan; and a reduction or relocation of U. S. Air Force units in Japan. For each of these possibilities, Admiral Felt listed the advantages and disadvantages, and concluded that the overall increase in operating costs, and the impairment to the operational readiness of PACOM forces were unacceptable.¹

JCS Proposals Made in March 1963

Again in March, the JCS made a number of proposals that were intended to reduce the balance of payments deficits expected in fiscal years 1964 and 1965. The JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments on those proposals pertaining to PACOM, for his estimate of the overall impact if the Secretary of Defense ordered them carried out, and for any suggested alternatives.² Of the 16 actions proposed by JCS, nine were connected with PACOM operations.

During 1962 the JCS had asked for CINCPAC's views on proposals to move some U. S. forces and support facilities from Japan to the U. S. as a means of reducing expenditures in the Far East. At that time CINCPAC had stated his firm belief that it was necessary for the U. S. to keep its Japanese base complex in order to carry out the U. S. forward strategy in the Pacific. He considered the U. S. position in Japan as an integral part of the U. S. forward strategy in Korea, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. He also thought that if the U. S. was to continue its progress toward strengthening its alliance with Japan, any steps taken should be acceptable to both sides and appear more attractive to Japan than the alternatives of neutralism or alignment with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Admiral Felt suggested that the proposed reduction in military capability could well be interpreted by Japan as a breach of faith with her only real ally, and that her reaction might make it difficult or impossible for the U. S. to retain its bases in Japan.

In his answer to the March JCS message, Admiral Felt expressed his concern that carrying out the proposed actions would impair his

1. CINCPAC 282114 Feb 1963 (S)

2. JCS 9282 DTG 282346Z Mar 1963 (S)

ability to carry out his assigned task of defending the United States against an attack through the Pacific Ocean by maintaining a forward strategy on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc in the Western Pacific, assisting in the defense of the Republic of Korea, and in maintaining the security of Japan.

Listed below are the specific proposals for reducing the outflow of gold, and CINCPAC's general comments:¹

1. Transfer the USALCJ from Japan to Hawaii. The USALCJ was a distribution depot established to provide repair parts support for the PACOM MAP countries. CINCPAC advised the JCS that he did not believe that the USALCJ mission could be reduced or relocated from Japan without impairing the PACOM MAP logistic support, and without increasing the cost of the service out of proportion to the flow of gold savings. The JCS had suggested Hawaii as a possible location for the depot. Admiral Felt doubted that Hawaii offered any significant advantages over direct supply from a CONUS Pacific coast site.

2. Transfer the Army and Air Force depot level maintenance from Japan to Hawaii. CINCPAC did not support this suggestion because it would have a serious impact on the logistic support of the U.S. forward strategy. He doubted that Hawaii had the facilities and skills that would be needed, and that the move could be completed without excessive costs. If the facility had to be moved from Japan, he recommended that it be relocated in the continental U.S., despite the greater distance.

3. Reduce MAP expenditures in FY64 by 20 percent. CINCPAC applied this reduction to his MAP expenditures, and furnished a list of items that he believed could be eliminated with the least impact upon the MAP program.

4. Reduce foreign exchange expenditures in Korea. The JCS had indicated that they hoped to save \$30 million flow of gold by carrying out this proposal. CINCPAC estimated that the U.S. could save approximately \$16.8 million by a program of offshore procurement,

1. CINCPAC 090243Z Apr 1963 (TS)

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and by returning all dependents to the CONUS, neither of which he recommended because of the impact upon the Korean economy and upon Korean confidence in the U. S.

5. Reduce estimated foreign exchange costs for construction overseas. By eliminating some items from the FY64 projects, CINCPAC estimated that \$5 million of non-MAP construction could be saved, but he pointed out that all of the projects had been analyzed thoroughly, and were considered essential.

6. Examine the long range commitments for POL, and reduce POL expenditures in FY64. CINCPAC did not comment upon this proposal since the JCS explained none were desired.

7. Reduce estimated foreign exchange costs for contractual services overseas. CINCPAC agreed that a small reduction could be made in such areas as travel, transportation and communications, but at the expense of already austere functions such as training and accessorial activities.

8. Return the 1st Marine Air Wing to the U. S. from Japan, and place Iwakuni and Atsugi Air Bases in a "dispersed operating base" (DOB) status. Admiral Felt said he could not support this proposal since the 1st MAW and the 3d Marine Division comprised a unique and integral part of the U. S. forward strategy in the Far East. The 1st MAW was heavily committed in support of every major CINCPAC plan, and in case of general war, it was committed for certain non-alert SIOP sorties (approximately 10% of PACOM's total). In contingency plans it was committed to Southeast Asia, Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong, and to the support of CINCNELM in the Middle East. Besides, its three fighter squadrons represented nearly half of the U. S. air-defense-capable aircraft in Japan. The loss of this unit, coupled with the proposed 5th Air Force degradation, would cripple air defense capability and increase the ease with which the Communist Bloc could gain access to Japan, Korea and the 7th Fleet operating areas. CINCPAC preferred not to deploy the 1st MAW. If any move was made, he suggested the deployment of one Marine air group (MAG) from

Japan to Futema or Hawaii, consolidating the remainder of the wing at Iwakuni. Keeping MAG 11 in Japan would let it continue with its portion of the air defense of U.S. forces, and the movement of MAG 12 to Futema would not disturb the forward position of those SIOP sorties assigned to the Wing, which would be done if either MAG was deployed to Hawaii. CINCPAC considered the proposal to split the wing from its ground counterpart in the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) one of the most serious among those contemplated. CINCPAC also pointed out that members of the 1st MAW were in Japan without dependents and therefore the Wing operated at minimum cost insofar as the flow of gold was concerned.

9. Deploy various USAF units from Japan. The same disadvantages connected with the proposal to move the Marine air wing from Japan would result from moving Air Force units from Japan. CINCPAC pointed out that the Japanese bases provided a position of strength for launching critical military operations, and a forward logistics complex that provided staying power for sustained operations in the entire West Pacific. He claimed that the relocation of the Japan based air units as proposed would greatly reduce PACOM's capability to react quickly to contingency situations, eliminate vital early support for U.S./ROK forces in Korea, and drastically reduce PACOM's participation in SIOP and in contingency plans. Relocating the fighter interceptor squadrons to the CONUS would also have a serious impact on the entire West Pacific air defense system.

JCS Proposals Made in June 1963

On 21 June, the JCS sent to CINCPAC a second list of actions that were under consideration and that could be completed by the end of CY 1964, and which Department of Defense officials thought could reduce the annual rate of DOD expenditures abroad by \$300 to \$400 million below the FY63 levels. The JCS explained that the proposed actions were based on the United States' increasing strategic missile capability, which would permit less reliance on overseas based

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manned bombers, the increased capability of U.S. forces to deploy rapidly, and upon the need for the U.S. to continue to meet its commitments of effective military forces.¹

The JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments on 12 proposed actions, all of which were different from those included on the March list. In developing his comments, he and his Component Commanders gave precedence to the urgency of reducing the gold flow, and subordinated the increased risk resulting from a reduction in operational capabilities, morale of personnel, increased maintenance costs, and other factors. However, in instances where Admiral Felt believed that relocation would significantly increase the probability of a successful Sino-Soviet attack on the U.S., he recommended that no change be made. The JCS proposals for changes in the PACOM, and CINCPAC's comments on each are listed below:²

1. Accelerate by six months the phase-out of the B-57 wing at Yokota Air Force Base in Japan. CINCPAC considered the phase-out of the 3d Bomb Wing in July 1964 rather than January 1965 acceptable provided that the 15th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) equipped with F-4C aircraft had been moved from the ZI to Yokota by that time, so that it could take over both the contingency and general war commitments of the 3d Bomb Wing. Otherwise there would be a gap in CINCPAC's ability to support contingency, SEATO and general war plans, and approximately 10% of the SIOP targets would be uncovered by PACOM forces.

2. Replace two permanently assigned F-100 squadrons at Misawa AF Base with two F-100 squadrons rotated from the U.S. to Yokota by 1 July 1964; move an RF-101 squadron from Misawa to Yokota by 1 July 1964; proceed with the existing AF program of phasing out the F-102 squadron (20 aircraft) at Misawa; and place Misawa on a DOB status by 1 July 1964. For the following reasons, CINCPAC did not favor these proposals. The two rotational squadrons would have 14 less aircraft

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1. JCS 1325 DTG 210001Z Jun 1963 (S)
 2. CINCPAC 240140Z Jun 1963 (S)

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(36 instead of 50) than the two F-100 squadrons at Misawa, and the replacement units would be able to cover only 62% of the SIOP targets covered by the tactical fighter squadron (TFS). Also, relocating the unit to Yokota would decrease its capability to attack some sensitive targets in the northern maritime provinces. These targets included MRBM sites. To move the RF-101 squadron from Misawa to Yokota would place all but three of its 22 preplanned general war reconnaissance targets in the USSR beyond un-refueled range. Neither did Admiral Felt favor the proposal to phase out the F-102 squadron and place full dependence upon the Japanese Air Self Defense Force for air defense. To withdraw the U.S. fighter-interceptor squadron from Japan would weaken the air defense of Japan against planes attacking from the Sakhalin area, especially since the F-104 aircraft programmed for the JASDF would lack an all weather capability for the foreseeable future.

3. Use an expanding MATS capability by extending Pacific routes, which would permit returning a C-124 squadron of 16 aircraft from Tachikawa to CONUS by 1 July 1964. CINCPAC's position on this proposal was that an extension of MATS routes was not a substitute for theater assigned forces responsive to his command, and he pointed out that a JCS study of transportation requirements under wartime conditions in FYs 63 through 66 indicated there would be a critical shortage during the first five days of limited war in Southeast Asia, Korea, or Taiwan. For this critical period, CONUS based planes would be of no value. Admiral Felt recommended that no reduction be made of C-124 or C-130 squadrons assigned to his operational control.

4. Transfer the responsibility for air defense to Japan as its F-104s became operational and, thereafter, return two F-102 squadrons (46 aircraft) to the U.S. by 1 July 1965; and transfer the AC&W network to Japan by 1 January 1966. The same objections that CINCPAC set forth in paragraph 2 above against phasing out the F-102 units, applied to this proposed action. As far as the AC&W system was concerned, Admiral Felt pointed out that it had been transferred to the JASDF and that only 81 U.S. military personnel remained at control centers and

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that these were essential to a coordinated wartime effort.

5. Move the 1st MAW from Atsugi and Iwakuni to Naha, thus collocating it with the 1st Marine Division by 1 January 1965; then consolidate at Atsugi the Navy activities at Iwakuni and Atsugi, and place Iwakuni on a DOB status. If the MAW moved from Japan, CINCPAC said that Naval activities could be consolidated at Atsugi, but he recommended that such a move be coordinated with the Japanese who were then using Iwakuni for training. The proposals to relocate the 1st MAW to Naha would also be affected by one of the proposals concerning units then on Okinawa, a proposal to replace the permanently assigned F-102 squadron at Naha with an F-4C squadron to be rotated from the U. S. and based at Kadena by 1 November 1964; to move two squadrons of C-130s (32 aircraft) to Kadena from Naha by 1 November 1964, and to transfer Naha to the MAW by 1 December 1964.

After reviewing the number of aircraft proposed for the Naha, Kadena and Andersen fields, all of which were operating at near saturation level, and considering the extent of the construction program that would have to be carried out before the proposed shifts could be made, together with the early strike capability, Admiral Felt recommended that the status quo be maintained at Kadena, Naha, and Iwakuni.

6. Move an F-105 wing (75 aircraft) from Kadena to Guam by 1 October 1964. CINCPAC noted that the general war capability of these F-105s would be reduced to insignificance unless KC-135 tankers were assigned to enable them to operate from Guam. This would be a serious loss of PACOM rapid reaction capability. CINCPAC also estimated that a \$40 to \$50 million construction program would be needed to accommodate the unit on Guam.

7. Expand MATS capability and return a C-130 squadron from Okinawa to CONUS by 1 October 1964. CINCPAC's comments regarding this proposal were generally the same as those that applied to the proposal for returning a C-124 squadron from Japan to CONUS as set forth in paragraph 3 above.

8. Substitute a rotational F-100 squadron for the existing assigned squadron in the Philippines, and replace the F-102 squadron with a rotational F-4C squadron. Regarding the first part of this proposal, CINCPAC pointed out that the permanently based squadron maintained four alert and 16 follow-on sorties as its share of the SIOP. A rotational squadron of 18 aircraft could not support the 20 sorties, and it would have a reduced capability to deploy aircraft in support of contingencies. CINCPAC favored the substitution of the F-4C squadron for the F-102 unit, but stressed the problem of orienting rotational crews, a problem that would also exist if the first of these proposals was carried out. (S)

9-12. Four other JCS proposals concerned Naval units or facilities. CINCPAC concurred in the disestablishment of the Fleet Air Command at Cubi Point, and in changing the home port of the USS CORMORANT from Sasebo, Japan to Long Beach. CINCPAC considered two other proposals unacceptable. The first of these was one to reduce ship repair and aircraft repair facilities at Yokosuka, and the second was to change the home ports of three air patrol squadrons from Naha, Sangley and Iwakuni to the CONUS and then to deploy them on a rotational basis after 1 January 1964. CINCPAC explained that these squadrons were needed to meet the increasing Soviet submarine threat in the West Pacific, and that rotating these seaplane squadrons would be inefficient. He recommended that these units be homeported where they were. (S)

JCS Proposals Made in July and August 1963

After considering CINCPAC's comments, the JCS on 8 July asked CINCPAC to conduct a detailed analysis of the feasibility of redeploying the 1st MAF from Japan to Okinawa and the F-105 tactical fighter wing from Okinawa to Guam.¹ On 24 July, the JCS expanded the scope of this study by requesting that CINCPAC consider Hawaii and CONUS as alternate locations for the F-105 TFW.² On the following day the JCS

- 1. JCS 1561 DTG 082304Z Jul 1963 (S)
2. JCS 1746 DTG 241427Z Jul 1963 (TS)

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asked CINCPAC to include in his considerations political problems that were raised by Ambassador Reischauer, particularly a proposal to inactivate the air base at Misawa and retain the base at Itazuke. The Ambassador claimed that the Japanese would be more receptive to the redeployments being considered if Itazuke, rather than Misawa, was put in a deferred status.¹ On 1 August the JCS again expanded the task by asking CINCPAC to consider the feasibility of alternatives to the proposed movement, including the following:

1. Move the F-105 wing from Itazuke to Yokota, place Itazuke on DOB status, and maintain Misawa as an operating base for RF-101 and rotational F-100 squadrons.

2. Move the F-105 wing from Itazuke to Yokota, move the F-100 and RF-101 squadrons from Misawa to Itazuke, and place Misawa on DOB status.

3. Move the F-105 wing from Itazuke to Iwakuni (if the Marine air wing moved to Okinawa) and place Itazuke and Misawa on DOB status.

The JCS also asked CINCPAC to evaluate the implications of withdrawing the first F-102 squadron from Itazuke, rather than Misawa, and of rotating two F-4C squadrons to Yokota or Misawa instead of the F-100 or F-105 squadrons after 1 July 1965 in order to maintain a USAF all weather intercept capability in Japan after the return of the remaining two F-102 squadrons. The JCS pointed out that any alternative plan should offer flow of gold savings equal to those anticipated from the original proposal.²

In preparing his answer to these requests, CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF to prepare detailed feasibility studies, which were forwarded to the JCS. CINCPAC's comments and analysis were contained in a 25 page message.³ Admiral Felt first explained that although he recognized the urgency of reducing expenditures that

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1. JCS 1759 DTG 251341Z Jul 1963 (TS)
 2. JCS 1898 DTG 012017Z Aug 1963 (TS)
 3. CINCPAC 112218Z Aug 1963 (TS)

contributed to the gold flow, he could not agree with any action that would degrade PACOM's combat capability, or that would increase PACOM's susceptibility to communist encroachments or penetrations. In brief, Admiral Felt was opposed to any move that would weaken his ability to maintain a forward strategy on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, a responsibility for which the military posture in the PACOM continually had to be modernized and strengthened. However, if the decision was made to move forces in Admiral Felt's area of responsibility, he recommended the following four courses of action, which would reduce the gold flow with the least damage to PACOM's combat readiness: Retain the 1st MAW in Japan; retain the 18th TFW at Kadena; move the 8th TFW from Itazuke to Yokota, place Itazuke on DOB status, and retain Misawa as an operational base; and retain the U.S. air defense capability in Japan until Japan achieved an acceptable all-weather capability.

Project CLEARWATER and September Proposals

While the JCS continued questioning CINCPAC about his views on flow of gold proposals, the President on 16 July approved certain actions to reduce overseas expenditures. Among these were a number of adjustments to overseas Air Force deployments that were given the project nickname of CLEARWATER.¹ The Secretary of Defense stated that the approved actions were based on the facts that U.S. commitments of effective military forces would continue to be met, that a gradually increasing capability of the armed forces to deploy rapidly would permit some reduction in other overseas forces, and that increased strategic missile capability would permit, by the middle of 1964, somewhat less reliance on overseas based manned bombers.² (S)

After considering CINCPAC's and other commanders' recommendations as well as those of appropriate embassies, OSD and the Secretary of State directed CLEARWATER actions, some of which

1. JCS 1728 DTG 222337 Z Jul 1963 (S)
2. CSAF AFCVC 82176 DTG 261951Z Jul 1963 (S)

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were continuing to be adjusted at the end of 1963.¹ The Air Force Chief of Staff was tasked with the job of making necessary redeployments and adjustments called for by CLEARWATER.

By the end of 1963 these CLEARWATER actions had been approved: In Japan two F-100 tactical fighter squadrons, the 416th and 531st, would be returned to CONUS from Misawa in June 1964. These two squadrons would be replaced at Misawa by two rotational F-100 squadrons during the same time period. The 4th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS), which was composed of F-102s, was scheduled to return to CONUS from Misawa in June of 1965. Also in Japan, the 8th TFW, composed of F-105s, was scheduled to move from Itazuke to Yokota in June 1964. The 68th FIS, equipped with F-102s, was scheduled to return from Itazuke to CONUS in July 1964. Itazuke was to be placed on DOB status on 30 June 1964, however six aircraft would remain there through October 1964 on alert status. From Yokota the 3rd Tactical Bomber Wing, with B-57s, would return to CONUS in April or May 1964 and the 40th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (F-102s) was programmed to return to CONUS in June 1965. Deployment plans for the 12th TFW (F-105s) and a squadron of tactical reconnaissance RF-4Cs, both programmed for arrival at Yokota in the second quarter of FY65, were cancelled. The 6th Troop Carrier Squadron, made up of C-124s, was scheduled to move from Tachikawa to Hickam in June 1964.

The 16th FIS (F-102s) was scheduled to return to CONUS from Naha in December 1964, and to be replaced by a rotational tactical fighter squadron of F-4Cs. A Naha based tactical carrier squadron of C-130s would return to CONUS in September 1964. At Clark AFB, the 510th TFS (F-100s) and the 509th FIS (F-102s) would return to CONUS in March 1964 and May 1965 respectively. They would be replaced by a rotational F-100 squadron to arrive in 1964 and a rotational F-4C FIS to arrive in 1965. Deployment of a squadron of tactical reconnaissance RF-4Cs and an F-4C tactical fighter wing programmed for

1. SEC STATE to Tokyo 733, Sep 20 7PM 1963 (S)

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Clark in FY66 was cancelled and a rotational squadron of RF-4Cs would be assigned to Clark in FY66. ^{1, 2, 3} (§)

Also included in CLEARWATER were plans to reduce to an absolute minimum, personnel of PACAF, both military and civilian, including a significant reduction of foreign national employees. ⁴ (§)

On 11 September the JCS asked CINCPAC to comment on further proposals, which were contained in a DOD draft memorandum, to reduce DOD expenditures. ⁵ One was a proposal to cancel plans to deploy an F-4C wing to Clark in FY66 and activate an RF-4C squadron there in the same period. An additional RF-4C squadron would instead be activated in the U.S. and a squadron equipped with these aircraft would rotate to Clark. CINCPAC objected to the proposed redeployments, to those at Clark in particular, saying that they would reduce the PACAF forces to the point where only marginal capability would be available to meet contingency commitments. CINCPAC gave alternate proposals for reductions in support areas, but the DOD proposals for Clark redeployments were eventually approved for CLEARWATER. ⁶

The DOD memorandum also proposed withdrawing the two U.S. divisions from Korea, one to be withdrawn by April 1964 and the other by April 1965. CINCPAC opposed this proposal for its provisions and also because of existing plans for a 70,000 man reduction in ROK Army strength. He pointed out in detail how these combined reductions would put the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in a position to invade South Korea before U.S. reinforcements could arrive and be effectively placed in the battle. CINCPAC stated that although the U.S. had increased its ability to react more rapidly than in the past and that this capability would increase in the future, there was "no substitute in this game for eyeball to eyeball contact". He felt that

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1. SEC STATE 733 to Embassy Tokyo, 7PM 20 Sep 1963 (S)
 2. JCS 2625 DTG 242137Z Sep 1963 (TS)
 3. CSAF AFCAV 66415 DTG 252219Z Oct 1963 (S)
 4. CSAF AFCAV 66415 DTG 252219Z Oct 1963 (S)
 5. JCS 2431 DTG 110107Z Sep 1963 (S)
 6. CINCPAC 130735Z Sep 1963 (TS)

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withdrawal of the two divisions from Korea and concurrent reduction of ROK forces would be considered as the most serious degradation of U.S. effort in the PACOM since the end of World War II, equalled only by the ill-fated U.S. withdrawal from Korea in 1949.

Other proposals contained in the DOD draft memorandum, with CINCPAC comments, were as follows:

1. Reduce the employment of foreign nationals by an additional 10 percent below the end FY63 level by end FY64. CINCPAC considered this feasible but recommended that the cut be applied on an overall PACOM basis rather than a directed percentage in each subordinate command or area.

2. Reduce foreign exchange costs of construction and family housing, and of contractual services. CINCPAC had explored possible savings in this category during April when he advised the JCS of seven FY64 construction projects that could be reduced or eliminated to save approximately \$5 million.¹ He considered these projects still valid for consideration for reduction in the FY64 construction program. Smaller additional savings would occur in FY65 and 66, and placing Itazuke in DOB status would result in a \$1.8 million saving on construction projects, accruing from FY64 through FY69.

3. Reduce by 15 percent personnel in military headquarters, including unified command headquarters located in foreign countries. This reduction would be effected by 1 July 1964 and would be applied to the end FY63 strength. CINCPAC explained that manpower surveys had already resulted in substantial reductions in the PACOM and recommended that the 15 percent reduction be applied PACOM wide with CINCPAC having authority to vary reductions in specific cases.

4. Miscellaneous reductions, including \$10 million world-wide in MAP. CINCPAC thought DOD might intend this reduction to apply to administrative support which was limited by the appropriations act to \$25 million world-wide. He stated that a 40 percent reduction in this category would prevent adequate supervision over advisory and

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 090243Z Apr 1963 (TS)

administrative functions, as well as end-use inspections which were required by Congress.¹

Additional Proposals

In October the JCS requested CINCPAC's views on several alternative actions to provide an all weather interceptor (AWX) capability to the Japanese in view of the decision that had been made to include three Japan based U. S. fighter interceptor squadrons in CLEARWATER for movement to CONUS prior to July 1965.² The possible alternative actions with summaries of CINCPAC comments were:³ (§)

1. Loan to the JASDF aircraft and equipment for two F-102 squadrons to replace the two U. S. squadrons being withdrawn. CINCPAC stated that this would not fulfill requirements to maintain three modern AWX squadrons under U. S. Air Force control for defense of Japan and Korea. He pointed out that the existing rules of engagement did not permit the JASDF to attack hostile aircraft penetrating its air defense system unless Japanese installations were attacked or until defense emergency or mobilization was declared. Such a system would neither provide an acceptable degree of protection for U. S. personnel in Japan nor insure the capability of U. S. forces to carry out SIOP and contingency commitments. (§)

2. Station approximately six F-102s at Iwakuni after redeployment of the Itazuke squadron. This would create several operational problems since Iwakuni could not accomodate the additional aircraft unless more facilities were constructed, and the air base was poorly situated as an air defense base for the western approaches to Japan. In addition Iwakuni had marginal all weather capability. For these reasons CINCPAC stated that this course of action was feasible but unsuitable. (§)

3. Transfer the mission of the air defense of Japan from the

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1. CINCPAC 130735Z Sep 1963 (TS)
 2. JCS 2967 DTG 102152Z Oct 1963 (S)
 3. CINCPAC 202330Z Oct 1963 (S)

F-102 squadron at Itazuke to the Marine air wing. CINCPAC stated that this mission would not be compatible with the existing mission of the MAW which was to maintain a mobile force in readiness for immediate deployment to support contingency plans. Therefore, in a contingency situation, when requirements for the air defense of Japan could be expected to be increasing, the MAW would be otherwise employed.

CINCPAC gave an overall opinion of the proposed courses of action, saying that "on the assumption that the more preferable solution of retention of at least two F-102 squadrons under USAF control is ruled out, and these units must withdraw from Japan by 1 July 1965, there are no proposed alternatives deemed feasible."

In December, CINCPAC again recommended to the JCS that the F-102s be retained in Japan until the Japanese attained an acceptable AWX capability.¹ CINCPAC made this recommendation to the JCS in a message in which he explained that he was holding in abeyance the JCS directed actions to adjust to the change in operational forces that would occur when Itazuke was placed on DOB status, the 8th TFW was moved from Itazuke to Yokota, and the three F-102 squadrons were returned to CONUS from Japan.²

DOD had taken action in late November to obtain clearance of the PACAF programmed action directive for moving the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing and placing Itazuke on DOB status. The State Department noted that as soon as action was taken for implementing the move of the 8th, it appeared that questions would arise in Japan concerning Air Force plans for the F-102 squadron at Itazuke. This could cause the Japanese to question U.S. intentions since the all-weather defense mission problem presented by the planned withdrawal of the three F-102 squadrons had not been resolved.³ CINCPAC backed a recommendation, made by the American Ambassador to Japan, that

1. CINCPAC 042317Z Dec 1963 (S)

2. JCS 2625 DTG 242137Z Sep 1963 (TS)

3. SEC STATE 1374, Tickler 27025A 9PM 26 Nov 1963 (S)

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frank discussions with the Japanese government concerning redeployment actions would be beneficial to both sides. CINCPAC urged an early resolution to the Japanese air defense problem. At the end of the year action was being taken to implement planned actions; however, attempts were being made to preclude the Japanese from getting the impression that a firm decision had been made to withdraw the F-102 squadron from Itazuke.¹

1. CSAF AFCAV 82264 DTG 041536Z Jan 1964 (S)

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
1 January 1963 - 31 December 1963

- Jan COMUSMACV's 3 year RVN Plan was approved.
- 2 Jan JCS approved aircraft augmentation for FARM GATE.
- 4 Jan CINCPAC stated to JCS that he favored introduction of jet aircraft into RVN.
- 9 Jan CINCPAC arrived in Saigon for a two day visit with COMUSMACV.
- 12 Jan Mobile team to train H-19 pilots arrived in RVN.
- 19 Jan Two additional surgical teams arrived in RVN to be located at Pleiku and Danang.
- 23 Jan GVN decided to postpone its surrender program for several months.
COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that Laos and Cambodia border control with RVN remained ineffective.
- 26 Jan General Wheeler, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, said "It will take a long, vigorous effort to turn the tide once and for all" in the Vietnamese war.
- 1 Feb CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to set up a program and hold press conferences to improve relations with the press.
- 16 Feb Rules of Engagement for U.S. helos expanded.
- 19 Feb JCS approved the deployment to RVN of the 114th Airmobile Company and the 330th Transportation Squadron.
- 21 Feb The supplemental AF Military Assistance Training Plan for Vietnam was approved at \$1,435,670.
- 22 Feb JCS General Offensive Campaign Plan signed by General TY.
- 24 Feb Senate Majority Leader Mansfield submitted U.S. Senate Study Group Report on SEASIA to Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- 25 Feb General O'Donnell at Saigon said U.S. would not send jet fighter planes to Vietnam to help in the war against communist guerrillas.
- 6 Mar Vietnamese Navy took over patrol of RVN's coast from the 7th Fleet.
- 13 Mar JCS approved a CINCPAC recommendation that strength of MAP supported forces be increased from 81,000 to 86,000 for the Civil Guard, and from 80,000 to 104,000 for the SDC.
JCS approved request for additional aircraft.
- 3 Apr CINCPAC arrived in Paris to attend SEATO military advisers meeting.
-

- 17 Apr President Diem proclaimed Amnesty Program for VC defectors. First Anniversary of Strategic Hamlet Program.
- 22 Apr Secretary Rusk said "(US) cannot promise or expect a quick victory" in RVN and that its role was "limited and supporting." He called situation "difficult and dangerous" and "often poorly understood if not deliberately misrepresented."
- 27 Apr The Vietnam Press reported that, since 18 Feb, 3,448 VC rallied under Chieu Hoi Program.
- Apr C-123 Squadron arrived in RVN.
- 1 May Operations within five kilometers of Cambodia border permitted in GVN.
- 2 May JCS temporarily suspended herbicide operations.
- 6 May Secretary McNamara at conference in Hawaii stated training of VNAF was to be accelerated to build in-country capability and permit release of U. S. units.
- 7 May New guidelines for the use of herbicides were established for defoliation and crop destruction.
- 8 May Riot at Hue broke out.
- 9 May JCS lifted its 2 May suspension of herbicide operations.
RVN concluded agreement with U. S. -- RVN to finance local cost (17 million dollars) of operating its hamlet program and transportation of U. S. economic and military equipment, food and other supplies.
- 10 May CINCPAC requested plan from COMUSMACV for maximum use of medical civic action personnel in training RVN medical personnel.
- 11 May CINCPAC authorized conduct of PsyWar missions for FARM GATE aircraft.
- 15 May Buddhist leaders presented their demands to President Diem.
- 22 May President Kennedy said the U.S. "would withdraw troops, any number of troops, any time the Government of South Vietnam would suggest it. The day after it was suggested, we would have some troops on the way home."
- 29 May DOD notified CINCPAC of the decision not to introduce jets in the RVN.
- 3 Jun Buddhist demonstration renewed in Hue. GVN imposed martial law in Hue.
- 5 Jun CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV not to use U. S. owned aircraft to transport VN troops to control Buddhist demonstrations in Hue.
- 10 Jun General Harkins ordered U. S. military advisers not to report

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- to RVN units to which they were assigned if such units were used to quell Buddhist demonstrations.
- 11 Jun First Buddhist monk committed suicide by fire in front of Cambodian legation.
 - 15 Jun Tentative agreement reached between President Diem and Buddhist leaders on May 15 demands.
 - 16 Jun Largest anti-government riots to date staged in Saigon.
 - 27 Jun President Kennedy announced appointment of Ambassador Lodge.
 - 7 Jul U. S. correspondents were assaulted by Vietnamese police.
 - 9 Jul Nguyen Tuong Tam, Buddhist and prominent author who was scheduled for trial, committed suicide.
 - 20 Aug Martial law imposed in Danang.
 - 21 Aug Martial law declared throughout RVN.
 - 23 Aug U. S. State Department announced no change in U. S. basic policy in prosecution of war against Viet Cong.
 - 24 Aug Diem declared to press "I trust in the Army, and in fact I maintain control over the situation."
 - 25 Aug CINCPAC directed TG 76. 5 to maneuver near Vietnamese coast.
 - 26 Aug Ambassador Lodge presented credentials to Diem.
 - 27 Aug Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with RVN, but stated intentions to continue trade.
 - 28 Aug The JCS directed CINCPAC to prepare for evacuation of U. S. non-combatants in the RVN.
CINCPAC cancelled all scheduled RVN visit clearances.
 - 29 Aug Thirty-six C-130 and 11 KC-130 aircraft were ready for air evacuation of RVN non-combatants.
President deGaulle released a statement setting forth a new policy regarding Vietnam, implying French support of neutral policy.
 - 30 Aug TGs 76. 5 & 77. 7 were in place off Saigon.
 - 3 Sep CINCPAC terminated alert operations commenced on 25 August.
 - 9 Sep President Kennedy said "it would not be helpful at this time" to reduce U. S. aid to South Vietnam, comparing it to the collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek Government in China following WWII.
 - 11 Sep Model Plan was approved.
 - 12 Sep President Kennedy declared "we want the war won, communists

- contained and Americans home."
- 13 Sep Souvanna Phouma supported President deGaulle's proposal for a neutral and united Vietnam
- 14 Sep GVN Presidential decree announced end of martial law on 16 Sep, and elections for the National Assembly to be held on 27 Sep.
- U.S. State Department called the ending of martial law a step in the right direction.
- 21 Sep President Kennedy ordered Secretary McNamara and General Taylor to go to Vietnam.
- 24 Sep Secretary McNamara and General Taylor arrived in RVN.
- 27 Sep Elections for RVN National Assembly were held.
- 2 Oct The Secretary of Defense and General Taylor reported to the President and National Security Council on their mission to Vietnam.
- 5 Oct A Buddhist monk, the sixth and most publicized of those who burned themselves, burned himself in Saigon.
- 10 Oct The JCS authorized normal travel of dependents to RVN
- 17 Oct Ngo Dinh Nhu declared to the press that he could not understand why the U.S. had "initiated a process of disintegration in Vietnam." and again accused CIA of staging a coup d'etat against the Diem Government.
- 21 Oct U.S. announced it would withhold financial aid to the special forces of Colonel Le Quang Tung.
- 1 Nov Military coup d'etat staged in Saigon.
- 2 Nov Diem and Nhu killed as a result of the coup d'etat. The Military Revolutionary Council suspended the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly.
- CINCPAC directed normal operations for forces alerted, with the exception of TG 76.5, TG 77.5 and 77.7.
- 5 Nov General Minh, as head of the Military Revolutionary Council, issued a decree covering a provisional constitution.
- 7 Nov CINCPAC released CVA TG 77.5 from operations off RVN to normal operations and training.
- U.S. recognized the new government of RVN.
- 8 Nov Secretary of State Dean Rusk rejected French President de Gaulle's proposals for a neutral, independent Vietnam, stating that the result would be a Communist Vietnam. He asserted that the U.S. military role in Vietnam was to ensure a "secure and independent" South Vietnam, free from foreign subversion and infiltration.
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U. S. Department of Agriculture announced Food for Peace sale to RVN of \$4.7 million worth of agricultural commodities for local currency.

- 9 Nov CINCPAC released TG 76.5 and 77.7 from operations off RVN to normal operations and training.
 - 13 Nov General Harkins stated, in an interview in Saigon, that the overthrow of the Diem regime would have little overall effect on the military campaign against the Viet Cong.
 - 15 Nov U. S. military spokesman in Saigon reported that 1,000 personnel would be withdrawn from RVN, beginning on the 3rd of December.
Hoa Hao sect announced support for the new government.
 - 18 Nov France recognized the new government of RVN.
 - 20 Nov Secretary of Defense Conference was held at Camp H. M. Smith, with Secretary of State Rusk in attendance.
 - 22 Nov GVN dismissed 31 high ranking military officers for having actively supported the Diem Government.
 - 24 Nov President Johnson affirmed U. S. intentions to continue the military and economic support of South Vietnam's struggle against the Communist Viet Cong.
 - 30 Nov CINCPAC submitted to OSD Vietnam's MAP revision for FY64-65.
 - 3 Dec Cambodian Prince Sihanouk proposed a neutral confederation of Cambodia and South Vietnam.
 - 9 Dec Maj Gen Minh stated that he did not think an international conference on Cambodian neutrality "would be of any use. I think the best solution is to have good relations between Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam."
 - 11 Dec GVN closed three more newspapers for a "disloyal attitude."
 - 15 Dec GVN announced the dispatch of a diplomatic mission to Cambodia.
 - 19-20 Dec Secretary McNamara and Mr. McCone, CIA head, were in Vietnam to evaluate the new government's efforts toward the war.
-

GLOSSARY OF TERMSA

AAA	Anti Aircraft Artillery
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
ACTIV	Army Concept Team in Vietnam
AD	Air Division
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
ADPS	Automatic Data Processing System
AEACP	Airborne Emergency Alternate Command Post
AGC	Amphibious Force Flagship
AID	Agency for International Development
ALD	Accounting Line Designator
AMEMB	American Embassy
ANZAM	Australia, New Zealand and Malaya Protection of Federation Independence
ARPA	Advance Research Projects Agency
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASAPAC	Army Security Agency Pacific
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATW	Air Transport Wing
AUS	Australia
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AWRL	Ammo War Reserve Level
AWX	All Weather Interceptor

B

BCT	Battalion Combat Team
BLT	Battalion Landing Team
BOD	Beneficial Occupancy Date
BUDOCKS	Bureau of Yards and Docks
BUSHIPS	Bureau of Ships

C

CANCOMARPAC	Canadian Commander Maritime Forces Pacific
CARIBCOM	Caribbean Command
CAS	Controlled American Sources
CASF	Composite Air Strike Force
CDC	Control Data Corporation
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CHJUSMAGTHAI	Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand
CHJUSMAGPHIL	Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines
CHMAAG	Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group
CHPROVMAAGK	Chief Provisional Military Advisory Assistance Group, Korea
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIDG	Citizens Irregular Defense Group/Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CINCCARIB	Commander in Chief Caribbean

CINCNELM	Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
CINCPACREP	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative
CINCPACREP BONIN	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative Bonin Islands
CINCSTRIKE	Commander in Chief of the Strike Command
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief United States Army Pacific
CINCUSNAVEUR	Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe
CMPO	Chief Military Planning Office
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COC	CINCPAC Operation Center
COMHAWSEAFRON	Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier
COMSTSFEAREA	Commander Military Sea Transport Service Far East Area
COMUSJAPAN	Commander U.S. Forces Japan
COMUSKOREA	Commander U.S. Forces Korea
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSMACV	Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COMUSTDC	Commander U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
CONUS	Continental United States
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CSAF	Chief of Staff Air Force
CSFF	Commander SEATO Field Force
CTF	Commander Task Force
CTG	Commander Task Group
CVA	Attack Aircraft Carrier
CVS	Anti-Submarine Support Aircraft Carrier

D

DA	Department of the Army
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCAPAC	Defense Communications Agency, Pacific
DDR&E	Director, Defense Research and Engineering
DE	Patrol Ship (Destroyer Escort)
DEFCON	Defense Condition
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRNSA	Director National Security Agency
DIRPACDOCKS	Director Pacific Docks
DOB	Disbursed Operating Base
DOD	Department of Defense
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North)
DSA	Defense Supply Agency
DTG	Date Time Group

E

EAM	Electronic Accounting Machine
ECCM	Electronic Counter Countermeasures

UNCLASSIFIED

ECM Electronic Countermeasures
ELINT Electronics Intelligence
EUSA Eighth United States Army

F

FALLEX Fall Exercises
FAR Forces Armees du Royaume (Royal Armed Forces of Laos)
FAU Frequency Allocation and Uses
FBM Fleet Ballistic Missile
FICPAC Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific
FIS Fighter Interceptor Squadron
FMFPAC Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FOCCPAC Fleet Operation Control Center, Pacific
FOG Flow of Gold
FTX Field Training Exercise
FY Fiscal Year

G

GAO General Accounting Office
GOJ Government of Japan
GRC Government of the Republic of China
GVN Government of the Republic of Vietnam

H

HAWK Homing-All-The-Way-Killer
HF High Frequency
HSAS Headquarters Support Activity - Saigon

I

IBM International Business Machine
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICC International Commission for Supervision and Control
IG Inspector General
INA Indonesian National Army
IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
ISA International Security Agency

J

JASDF Japanese Air Self-Defense Force
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSAN Joint Chiefs of Staff Alert Network
JGSDF Japanese Ground Self Defense Force
JOEG Joint Operation Evaluation Group
JP-4 Jet Fuel
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSDF Japan Self Defense Force
JSOP Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JSTPS Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
JTD Joint Table of Distribution

JUSMAG Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group

K

KL Kong Le
KMAG United States Army Advisory Group, Korea

L

LST Landing Ship Tank (Amphibious Warfare Ship)

M

MA Military Assistance
MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group
MACE Surface to Surface Missile
MACV Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MAG Marine Air Group
MAM Military Assistance Manual
MAP Military Assistance Program
MAS Military Assistance Sales
MATS Military Air Transport Service
MAW Marine Air Wing
MC&G Mapping, Charting and Geodesy
MCON Military Construction
MDB Mutual Defense Board (U. S. -Philippines)
MDU Mobile Development Units (Thailand)
MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEDT Military Equipment Delivery Team (Burma)
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit
MICS Military Integrated Communications System
MILAD Military Advisor (to SEATO or ANZUS Council)
MILADREP Military Advisors Representative
MILTAG Military Technical Advisory Group (Indonesia)
MPO Military Planning Office (SEATO)
MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MSTS Military Sea Transport Service
MTT Mobile Training Team

N

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCOSSACT Naval Command Systems Support Activity
NAVSECGRUPAC Naval Security Group Pacific
NIKE Surface-to-air missile
NSA National Security Agency
NSAPAC National Security Agency Pacific
NZ New Zealand

O

OASD/ISA Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense/
International Security Affairs
ODMA Office of the Director of Military Assistance

UNCLASSIFIED

OJT On - the - job - training
OPLAN Operation Plan
OSD Office of Secretary of Defense

P

PACAF Pacific Air Forces
PACFLT Pacific Fleet
PACOM Pacific Command
PACOM FAU Pacific Command Frequency Allocation & Uses Document
PAD Programmed Action Directive
PAF Philippine Air Force
PDJ Plaines de Jarres
PEMA Procurement of Equipment and Missiles Army
PGM Patrol Craft
PL Pathat Lao
POL Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PROVMAAG Provisional Military Assistance Advisory Group
PSI Pounds per square inch

R

R&D Research & Development
RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Engineering
REDLOG Logistic Readiness Report
REDNON Operational Readiness Report (Non-atomic)
RISOP Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan
RITOP Red Integrated Tactical Operational Plan
RKG Royal Cambodian Government
RLG Royal Laotian Government
ROC Republic of China
ROK Republic of Korea
RTA Royal Thailand Army
RTAF Royal Thailand Air Force
RVN Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S

SAC Strategic Air Command
SAM Surface-to-air missile
SATM Supply & Training Mission
SEAL Sea, Air, Land (Team)
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SIGINT Signal Intelligence
SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLAT Special Logistic Actions Thailand
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
SOP Standing Operating Procedure
SSSS Subsystem Selection Switch
STAT Seabee Technical Assistance Team

STRAC
STRICOM

Strategic Army Corps
Strike Command

T

TFS
TFW
TTI

Tactical Fighter Squadron
Tactical Fighter Wing
Tactical Target Illustration

U

UK
UN
USAF
USAFSS
USALCJ
USAMSFE
USARHAW
USARJ
USARPAC
USARYIS
USIS
USMILADREP
USN
USOM
USSR

United Kingdom
United Nations
United States Air Force
United States Air Force Security Services
U. S. Army Logistics Center Japan
U. S. Army Map Service Far East
United States Army Hawaii
United States Army Japan
United States Army Pacific
U. S. Army Ryukyus Island
United States Information Service
United States Military Advisor's Representative
United States Navy
United States Operations Mission
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

V

VC
VDC
VLF
VM

Viet Cong
Volunteer Defense Corps (Thailand)
Very Low Frequency
Viet Minh

W

WESTPAC
WTO

Western Pacific
Western Pacific Transportation Office

Z

ZI

Zone of Interior





COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
(USCINCPAC)
CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-5025

J042
5720/FOIA-39F/8-84
J042 Ser 036
15 March 1994

Mr. Peter Hayes
Nautilus Pacific Research
746 Ensenada Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94707

Dear Mr. Hayes:

Enclosed is the 1963 CINCPAC Command History. Certain portions of the attached history are current and properly classified per sections 1.1(a), (2), (3), 1.3(a)(3), (4), (5), (7) and (8) of the Executive Order 12356 of April 1982 and they must be denied. You may appeal this determination per Title 5, U.S.C. 552(b).

If an appeal is made, we understand that you will appeal after you receive the last history (1984). Appeal procedures will be included in the letter forwarding the last history.

Command Histories for the year 1964 is still being reviewed. As soon as we complete the review, we will forward it to you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "K. Kibota", is written above the typed name.

K. KIBOTA
Chief, Administrative
Support Division
Joint Secretariat

Enclosure:
1963 CINCPAC Command History

