




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
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE OPEN  
LITERATURE ON DECEPTION

Zell Stanley

December 1985

N-2332-NA

The Director of Net Assessment,  
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Deception, its significance in peacetime, in war, and in war avoidance, and how to counter deception, are topics of a widening public literature. This bibliography of open literature on detection in the English language <sup>includes</sup> ~~is divided into twelve sections~~ on:

(1) arms control and deception; (2) behavior of targets of deception; (3) bibliographies on deception; (4) China: military and political deception; (5) countering deception; (6) general deception studies; (7) historical studies; (8) human deception; (9) interspecie deception; (10) surprise attack and deception; (11) Soviet military deception; and (12) Soviet political deception. The volume includes an index of authors.

In author index is included  
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
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## PREFACE

Deception, its significance in peacetime, in war, and in war avoidance, and how to counter deception are topics of a widening public literature. Deception in peacetime can affect the strategic balance of forces, the propensity to commit forces in conflict, arms control strategies, and various decisions affecting defense capabilities. The Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, has for some time encouraged the study of deception in peace and war. Under sponsorship of OSD Net Assessment, the present bibliography has been prepared.

This collection is believed to be one of the largest, most up-to-date, and most comprehensive checklists of open literature on deception to date in the English language. Parts of the bibliography have entries--and citations on those entries--relevant to current national issues. They include possible Soviet deception regarding SALT commitments, specific allegations of such deception, reports by arms control associations and governmental advisory groups on possible Soviet deception, and the effect of deception on the ability to verify various arms control agreements.

The author has assembled the available texts and selectively annotated them for the assistance of other scholars and interested readers.

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## SUMMARY

This bibliography of deception and how to counter deception was done functionally by twelve categories:

A section on Arms Control and Deception addresses arms control policies and deception, agreements, and violations of arms control agreements as well as commentary on issues of compliance and noncompliance.

The section on Behavior of Targets of Deception analyzes methods of influencing actions by decisionmakers.

China: Military and Political Deception. This section recounts the role of deception and stratagem in China's history of warfare, with emphasis on 20th century development.

The section on Countering Deception contains a small body of writings on structuring and analytic procedures to detect and counter deception.

The General Deception Studies section covers broad theoretical works on a variety of aspects, including persuasion, self-deception, and strategic deception from the perspectives of history, political science, psychology, and organization.

The section on Historical Studies encompasses works on World War II and before, and comprehensively relates deception operations and tactics, including specific techniques, such as the use of agents and double agents for deception.

The Human Deception section is largely about individuals and groups in their role-enactment and deception methodologies and involvement of interpersonal deception.

The section on Interspecie Deception compares studies of mimicry and alarm systems in insects.

There is an overlap between the section on Surprise Attack and Deception and USSR Military Deception and USSR Political Deception. Because so much of the material collected concerns Soviet deception activities, it is organized into these last two sections.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This Note draws primarily upon the collection of public source literature of William R. Harris, supplemented by computer literature searches. I am grateful and indebted to him; without his help and encouragement this undertaking would not have been possible.

Also, I would like to thank Hugh B. Carnes, not only for his contributions but also for his assistance and invaluable critique. Gratitude is also expressed to Barton Whaley and William L. Griego for their expertise and helpful suggestions, as well as to Colonel A.G. Jannarone and F.R. Feer.

I would like to express my appreciation to Roberta Shanman and Joan Schlimgen of the Rand Library for their computer searches and never ending patience; and to Marjorie Behrens of the Rand Soviet Library for her assistance in Russian transliterations and translations of titles and text.

Finally, I would like to mention my daughter, Alison--always an inspiration.

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An international lawyer involved in treaty verification compares six 20th century regimes for verification of arms control commitments: the Versailles regime of unlimited, foreign national inspection; a data exchange system in the 1930s; a limited inspection regime that discouraged agreements after World War II; verification by national technical means (NTMs); verification by NTMs aided by data exchanges and presumptions; and verification by NTMs with systematic countermeasures impeding verification. The author asserts that maskirovka induces arms control built around misperceptions; that the verification process has aided Soviet maskirovka programs; but that U.S. verification efforts have been remarkably successful as indicated by four declassified Presidential reports (1983-1985) on Soviet noncompliance with arms control commitments. The author sees Soviet maskirovka programs at current levels of effort a threat to peace, with or without arms control.

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A former U.S. ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna illustrates Soviet negotiating tactics, including deception. He claims that not only did the Warsaw Pact misrepresent force levels that, if accepted, would have expanded the manpower advantage of the Eastern states had agreement been reached, but further, during a period from 1965 to 1980, the Warsaw Pact-NATO ratio of weapon systems (excluded from negotiations) increased (by one public estimate) from about 1.5 to 1 to 4.4 to 2. Examples of personal and tactical deception are provided.

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The story of German disarmament evasion has never been told in its entirety. This monograph is the preliminary effort to survey this story of evasion and inspection, espionage and counterespionage, illusion and deception. Chapter I is a summary of the report and sets forth the major conclusions drawn from the analysis. It describes Germany's process of rearmament and how it went through four distinct phases: Phase I, the post-Versailles disarmament (Chapter II); Phase II, a period of covert arms evasion but little actual buildup spans 1920-1926, ending with the departure of the Allied Control Commission (Chapter III); Phase III, a period of clandestine rearmament beginning in 1927 and ending in 1935 when Hitler took the political decision to abrogate the Versailles Treaty and display German rearmament publicly (Chapter IV); and Phase IV, a period of overt rearmament and bluff in which the nature of deception shifted from deliberate understatement to deliberate overstatement (Chapter V).

Of significant interest is the lengthy and successful covert German-Soviet military collaboration (Chapter VI). The international naval weapons cheating in connection with the Washington Naval Limitation Agreement of 1922 as summarized in Chapter VII is of special interest. See also Mihalka, *German Strategic Deception in the 1930s* (1980).

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## BEHAVIOR OF TARGETS OF DECEPTION

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Axelrod, Robert, "The Rational Timing of Surprise," *World Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 2, January 1979, pp. 228-246.

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This paper treats concepts of "moral neutrality" within academic centers and a "high culture" reflected in U.S. media that, in the author's view, raise the susceptibility of public opinion and elected officials to Soviet disinformation. The author sees trade unions and the working class as among the few groups immunized against the "left mystique" about which the author writes. The paper proposes Congressional and academic efforts to publicize the scope and role of Soviet active measures.

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Heuer, Richards J. Jr., "Soviet Organization and Doctrine for Strategic Deception," Paper, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1985. Forthcoming in Brian Dailey and Patrick Parker (eds.), *Soviet Strategic Deception*, 1986.

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## SURPRISE ATTACK AND DECEPTION

Anderson, Major Ruth M., *Understanding Deception*, prepared for Directorate of Concepts, DCS/Plans and Operations Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Monograph D, May 1978, 27 pp.

Addresses the concepts of deception and perception management (*Maskirovka*) highlighting Soviet perpetration of such activities to further national goals. According to the author, in Soviet military deception practices, both active and passive means are used to prevent our discovery of capabilities and intentions, and could cause us to overestimate, underestimate, or be unsure of our analysis. It concludes that in order to counter deception we must understand it and recognize when it is being employed.

Aspin, Les, "A Surprise Attack on NATO: Refocusing the Debate," *Congressional Record*, February 7, 1977, pp. H911-H914.

Axelrod, Robert, *The Rational Timing of Surprise*, Paper, Department of Political Science and Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, July 1977, 50 pp.

Paper addresses the problem of when a resource for surprise should be exploited. The first part of the paper shows how broad the problem is in international relations in general and political-military affairs in particular. The second part develops a rational choice model to treat the problem.

Azar, Edward E., Richard I. Brody, and Charles A. McClelland, *International Events Interaction Analysis: Some Research Considerations*. International Studies Series No. 02-001, University of Kentucky, (Vincent Davis, ed.). Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications, 1972, 80 pp.

The three chapters in this publication deal with interaction research, in contrast to what might be regarded as action-oriented research. Theoretical and empirical research in the areas of foreign policy and international relations has tended to cluster around two distinct analytic foci: action and interaction.

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Article juxtaposes the predominant preconceptions and beliefs pertaining to Japanese military capabilities and predisposition to take risks, held by U.S. decision makers on the eve of the Pacific War. The analysis indicates that misperceived notions contributed

both to the outbreak of the War and to the manner in which it was terminated. The lesson from this study in misperception can be formulated as the need to evaluate tactical field information on its own, and to avoid interpreting such data solely in the light of strategic assumptions which reflect the decision maker's images of an opponent. The article suggests that increased weight should be given to tactical indicators when these are at variance with strategic assumptions.

Ben-Zvi, Abraham, "Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks," *World Politics*, Vol. 28, April 1976, pp. 381-395.

Betts, Richard K., "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence," *World Politics*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2, January 1985, pp. 153-178.

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Betts, Richard K., *Surprise Attack. Lessons for Defense Planning*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982, 318 pp.

On indications and warning intelligence, a key increment of the intelligence profession. The volume contains examples from 1940 onward, analyzes the problems of being prepared for actual or potential surprise attack from the perspective of both the producers and users of intelligence. Enunciates and studies: the need for analysis by intelligence professionals of advance information; the prompt dissemination of such analysis to policy makers responsible for minimizing or thwarting the surprise; and aiding the decision makers to understand the problems with warnings. Stresses the essential relations between the policy and decision makers and their chief intelligence officers.

Betts, Richard K., "Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability," *International Security*, Spring 1981, pp. 117-149.

Discusses one aspect of the surprise attack problem: the potential mismatch of current military planning assumptions and future crisis decision-making processes.

Betts, Richard K., "Hedging Against Surprise Attack," *Survival*, August 23, 1981, pp. 146-156.

Betts asserts that "those who believe it is necessary to be able to defend Europe against the Soviet Union should also believe it would probably have to be done under conditions of surprise." Betts makes suggestions for structuring warning procedures within the NATO Alliance, but he focuses on approaches that are more in the political and military than in the intelligence realm.

Betts, Richard K., "Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed," *Political Science Quarterly*, Winter 1980, pp. 551-572.

Article puts in perspective: the problem of warning relative to an impending strike; surprise as an absolute problem rather than as a matter of degree; and prevalent derivation of theories from single cases rather than from comparative studies.

Betts, Richard K., "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," *World Politics*, 31 October 1978, pp. 61-89.

Bosak, Nora, Stephen Isaac, Donald Kearin, Frank Kosin, and Murray Rosenthal, *Warning Systems Research Support: Concord Study*, System Development Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, TM-2870/010/01, June 30, 1966, 52 pp.

Purpose of paper is twofold: 1) to present data gathered in a field investigation of public responses to a false alarm sounding of civil defense sirens in the City of Concord, California, on July 14, 1965; and 2) to present some general tentative conclusions based on an analysis of the responses.

Brodin, Katarina, "Surprise Attack: The Case of Sweden," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, May 1978, pp. 98-110.

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Brody, Richard I., "The Limits of Warning," *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1983, pp. 40-48.

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Daih, "Les cinq adaptations byzantines des stratagèmes de Polyon," *Revue des études anciennes*, Vol. 33, pp. 321-345.

Daly, Judith Ayres, and Stephen J. Andriole, "The Use of Events/Interaction Research by the Intelligence Community," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 12, No. 2, August 1980, pp. 215-235.

A review essay that applies academic and operational research community criteria of evaluation to a project founded on events/interaction data. The project, the Early Warning and Monitoring System (EWAMS), is built on academic research but also takes into account requirements of the operational community. The article: (a) suggests criteria for evaluation of quantitative interaction research approaches; (b) describes an Early Warning and Monitoring System based on the events/interaction approach; (c) evaluates the Early Warning and Monitoring System and its use of the events/interaction approach in terms of academic and operational criteria of evaluation; (d) suggests requirements for transferring other quantitative IR approaches to real-world users.

Daniel, Donald C., and Katherine L. Herbig (eds.), *Strategic Military Deception*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982, 378 pp.

A compilation of studies by various authors who formed a multidisciplinary "Deception Working Group" at the Naval Postgraduate School. Part I comprises papers on the theory of strategic military deception. Part II papers test the validity of these theories in case studies from World War II through the Yom Kippur War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Two chapters deal with cases of Chinese military deception.

Dayan, Moshe, *Diary of the Sinai Campaign*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 67, 70-74, 77, 89-91, 98. (See Historical Studies section.)

Defrasne, Col. J., "L'armée française devant l'alerte de 1870," *Revue hist. de l'armée*, No. 26, 1970, pp. 37-57.

De Jong, Louis, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de tweede Wereldoorlog*, Vol. II, *Neutraal*. 'S-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1969, esp. ch. 3, "Het Venlo-incident," 80-115; ch. 4, "Het eerste alarm," 222-34; "De contacten met België, Frankrijk en Engeland," 252-68; "De Duitse spionage," 318-27; 456-9; 464-72. (Dutch, French, and Belgian surprise, May 10, 1940). Vol. III, *Mai '40*, 1970, 558 pp. *passim* (consequences of surprise). (See section on Historical Studies.)

Dening, B.C., "The Possibility of Strategical Surprise in Position Warfare," *Army Quarterly*, Vol. 10, July 1925, pp. 287-297 + Table surveying 21 offensives, pp. 298-299.

Infers surprise attacks in German offensives against Russia (Jurborg, April 1915; Pirot, October 1915; Russian surprise attack at Lutzk-Czernowitz, June 1916; German, Bulgarian, and Turkish surprise attack at Sistora and Vulcan, November 1916. Identifies seven major offensive failures on the Western Front where strategic surprise was neither sought nor obtained; British surprise attack at Cambrai, November 1917; German deception, detected by British intelligence before attack between St. Quentin and Arras, March 1918; a German deception and successful surprise between La Fere and St. Quentin, March 1918; German surprise, La Bassee-Armentieres, April 1918; German surprise attack, Chemin-des-Dames, May 1918; surprise in German attack, Rheims, July 15, 1918; French deception and surprise attack at Chateau-Thierry-Soissons, July 18, 1918; Anglo-French surprise attack at Amiens, August 8, 1918. (See section on Historical Studies.)

Despres, John, Lilita Dzirkals, and Barton Whaley, *Timely Lessons of History: The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy*, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, Report No. R-1825-NR, July 1976, 84 pp. (See section on USSR Military Deception.)

Study concentrates on distilling the contents of certain Soviet military publications and on identifying the strategic concerns, institutional preoccupations, and political initiatives that were most closely associated with Soviet military interest in the Manchurian model. It examines the brief war of August 1945 from the viewpoint of Soviet military authorities in the 1960s and 1970s. See also Drea, 1984.

De Weerd, Harvey Arthur, *Strategic Surprise in the Korean War*. The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, Paper P-1800-1, 1962, 29 pp. In *Orbis*, Fall 1962. (See section on Surprise Attack and Deception.)

Dinerstein, Herbert S., *War and the Soviet Union*, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, Report No. R-326. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976, ch. 6, "Surprise and the Initiation of War," pp. 167-214.

Doran, Charles F., and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, No. 4, December 1980, pp. 947-965.

Study probes empirically the impact of long-term nonlinear changes in a state's relative power on its propensity for extensive war. Concludes that an understanding of the major power cycle of systemic participation may bring us somewhat closer to an understanding of the cause of some of the most serious wars.

Douglass, Joseph D., Jr., and Amoretta M. Hooper. *Selected readings from Soviet "Military Thought" (1963-1973)*, System Planning Corp., Report No. 584, April 1980, 694 pp. (See section on USSR Military Deception.)

Drea, Edward J., "Missing Intentions: Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, 1945," *Military Affairs*, April 1984, pp. 66-73.

A detailed analysis of how Japanese intelligence in 1945 vastly underrated Soviet capabilities in Manchuria and therefore miscalculated Soviet intentions to launch a large-scale offensive in August 1945.

Einhorn, Eric S., "Surprise Attack and the Small Power: The Case of Denmark, 1940." Paper, Government 282, Harvard University, December 1966, 49 pp. MS. (See section on Historical Studies.)

A case study of strategic intelligence failure, April 9, 1940.

Finer, Herman, *Dulles Over Suez*. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964, pp. 333-336, 348, 352-354, 356-357.

Fukuyama, Francis, "Nuclear Shadowboxing: Soviet Intervention Threats in the Middle East," *ORBIS*, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 579-605, Fall 1981.

Fukuyama argues that a major component of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar era has been direct intervention in regional conflicts. However, they face serious constraints in their use of force in regions where the United States and its allies have corresponding or superior interests. If factors affecting Soviet political calculations remain unchanged and their Middle East policy remains cautious where U.S. interests are heavily involved, it is questionable whether U.S. policymakers should exploit this caution by calling the Soviet bluff.

Garthoff, Raymond L., *The Soviet Image of Future War*, Ch. 3, "The Role of Surprise and Blitzkrieg, pp. 60-137." Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1959, pp. 60-137. (See section on USSR Military Deception.)

Gooch, John, and Amos Perlmutter (eds.), *Military Deception and Strategic Surprise*. Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1982, 192 pp.

An anthology of writings on military deception and strategic surprise by six authors. Three of the chapters consider the subject in the light of specific cases: German covert rearmament, 1919-1939; Soviet deception on nuclear missile development, 1955-1981; and the Egyptian/Israeli confrontation, 1971-1973. A chapter is included on "Intelligence and Deception," and two chapters are theoretical studies.

In bringing together historical case-studies, the authors demonstrate that deception is conceptually related to perception and misperception, and provide an analysis of a significant aspect of military activity and statecraft in the modern world.

Griffith, Samuel B., II, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1967, ch. 6, "Naked, Deliberate, Unprovoked Aggression," pp. 104-122, esp. pp. 104-106, 110-114, 117-122; 123-124, 127-129; 139-149. (See section on China--Political and Military Deception.)

Grigorenko, Petr Grigorevich, *Memoirs*. New York, NY: Norton, 1982, ch. 10, "Intelligence Summary Number Eight," pp. 114-121 (June 22, 1941). (See section on Behavior of Targets of Deception.)

Grigorenko, Petr Grigorevich, *The Grigorenko Papers*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976, ch. 1, pp. 7-51 (24 June 1941). (See section on Behavior of Targets of Deception.)

Gupta, Karunakar, "How did the Korean War Begin?" *The China Quarterly*, No. 52, Oct/Dec 1972, pp. 699-716.

Alleges possible South Korean preemptive attack on city of Haaju, north of the 38th parallel, early on June 25, 1950 as trigger of North Korean invasion of South Korea.

Hand, Lt. Col. Robert P., U.S. Army, "CG23 Deception Planning," *Military Review*, Vol. 47, No. 2, September 1967, pp. 44-48.

A discussion of deception planning, the pros and cons.

Handel, Michael I., "The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 1977, pp. 461-502.

Handel, Michael I., "Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, September 1984, pp. 229-281.

A look into the phenomenon of surprise attack. Handel states that surprise attack is almost always unavoidable and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future, even though all efforts are to the contrary. "The advantages, from a military point of view, to be derived from achieving strategic surprise are invaluable."

Handel, Michael I., "Intelligence and Deception," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, March 1982, Vol. 14S, pp. 122-154.

Handel, Michael I., "The Diplomacy of Surprise: Hitler, Stalin, Sadat." Cambridge, MA: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1981, Ch. 2, pp. 31-96.

About the difficulties involved in estimating Hitler's intentions and in predicting his style of operation.

Handel, Michael I., "Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War", *Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems*, No. 19, The Hebrew University. Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post Press, 1976, 67 pp.

The first part of this paper is a summary of some of the theoretical and practical problems involved in the efforts of intelligence services in guarding against a possible attack. The second part is the application of these elements to the Arab surprise attack on Israel in the opening hours of the Yom Kippur War.

Hartmann, Sverre, "Varslene til de Nordiske Legasjoner for den 9. april 1940," *Jyske Samlinger* (New Series) 4, 1958, pp. 141-184. (See section on Historical Studies.)

Haselkorn, Avigdor, *Israeli Intelligence Performance in the Yom Kippur War*, Discussion Paper. Tuxton-on-Hudson, NY: Hudson Institute, Inc., July 17, 1974, 20 pp.

A study of the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War.

Herzog, Major General Chaim, *The War of Atonement: October 1973*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975, 300 pp.

This account of the 1973 Yom Kippur war is a professional analysis of Israeli intelligence failures. The author was the former Israeli Director of Military Intelligence.

Holst, Johan Jorgen, "Surprise, Signals and Reaction: The Attack on Norway April 9, 1940 - Some Observations," *Cooperation and Conflict, Nordic Studies in International Politics*, No. 1, 1966, pp. 31-45. Rev. of *Arms Stability in the Cold War*. Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 1964; ch. 3, "Surprise Attack: The Anatomy of an International Problem," pp. 59-91; ch. 4, "Norway's surprise on April 9, 1940 - A Failure of Anticipation," pp. 92-112; ch. 5, "Surprise Attack and Conference Diplomacy," pp. 113-170. (See section on Historical Studies.)

Patterning his analysis after that of Robert Wohlstetter's in *Pearl Harbor: Signal and Decision*, Mr. Holst provides observations on prejudice, surprise, and strategic intelligence. But see Whaley's *Stratagem* (969) for appropriate exposition of German deception, preceding the attack of April 9, 1940.

Howard, Michael, "Military Intelligence and Surprise Attack: The Lessons of Pearl Harbor," *World Politics*, N.Y. 25, 1963, pp. 701-711.

Ivanov, General S.P. (ed.), *Nachal'nyi period voiny* [On the Initial Period of War]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974, 356 pp.

Karber, Phillip A., *The Impact of New Conventional Technologies on Military Doctrine and Organization in the Warsaw Pact*, Adelphi Paper No. 44. London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1978.

King, Admiral Jerry, *Strategic Warning: A Briefing*. Marina del Rey, CA: R&D Associates, June 1980, AFWL-TN-NT-80-1.

Kir'ian, M.M., "Vnezapnost'" [Surprise]. In *Sovetskais Voennais Entsiklopediya*. Moscow: Voenizdat, Vol. 2, 1976, pp. 161-163. (See section on USSR Military Deception.)

Knorr, Klaus, and Patrick Morgan (eds.), *Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983, 265 pp.

An anthology on the subject by five authors, including contributions by Michael Doyle, Michael Handel, and Richard Betts. Concentrates on strategy in the use of force, in the adoption of which governments play a decisive part. Twenty cases are examined. Considers four European wars, beginning with Prussia's victory against Austria in the battle of Sadowa and on to World War I (Knorr); strategic surprise in the Far East, commencing with the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, and including Japanese aggressions in World War II, the atomic bomb attack, and the Soviet attacks in the Far East at the end of World War II (Morgan); the North Korean surprise attack against South Korea in June 1950, with Chinese intervention in that war, and the Bay of Pigs: April 1961 (Doyle); crisis and surprise in three Arab-Israeli Wars (Handel); and strategic surprise for war termination: Inchon, Dienbienphu, and Tet (Betts).

Koeltz, Louis, *Comment s'est joué notre destin: Hitler et l'offensive du 10 mai 1940*. Paris: Hachette, 1957, 252 pp.

Lanir, Zvi, *Fundamental Surprise: The National Intelligence Crisis* (In Hebrew). Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMeuchad, 1983.

Lebow, Richard Ned, "The Soviet Offensive in Europe: The Schlieffen Plan Revisited?" *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 4, Spring 1985, pp. 44-78.

Lebow, Richard Ned, "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?" *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1, Summer 1984, pp. 147-186.

A "window of opportunity" is a period during which a state possesses a significant military advantage over an adversary. This has been a central concern of American strategic analysis.

LeMattro, Chef de Bataillon, "La deception dans les operations de guerre en surface milieu hostile: un cas concret historique, L'operation Auvergne (Indochine: Juin-Juillet 1954)," *L'Armee*, Paris, No. 5, 1960, pp. 41-52; No. 6, 1960, pp. 48-57.

Levy, Jack S., "Historical Trends in Great Power War, 1495-1975," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 1982, pp. 278-300.

Author argues that the probability of a war between the superpowers is diminishing but its potential destructiveness is increasing is widely believed. Levy concludes that we have established empirically, over the last five centuries, wars between the Great Powers have become less frequent but more serious in terms of their extent, severity, intensity, concentration, and magnitude. The big question is, whether there will be Great Power wars in the future, and if so, what will they be like.

Lugand, Lt. Colonel, "Les forces en presence au 10 mai 1940," *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième*, Nos. 10-11, June 1953, pp. 5-48.

McCaffrey, William J., *Shiloh: A Case study in Surprise*. M.A. Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, AD No. 733391, 1970.

Mescheryakov, Col. Gen. V., "Strategic Disinformation in the Achievement of Surprise in the World War II Experience" [in Russian], *Voyenna-Istoricheskiy zhurnal*, No. 2, February 1985, pp. 74-80. JPRS translation as "Strategic Disinformation in the Achievement of Surprise." (See section on Historical Studies.)

Midgaard, John, *9. April 1940*. Oslo: Aschenhoug og Co., 1960.

Myklebust, Svein Lorentz, "The Greatest Deception in the History of Warfare: Hitler's Deceptive Operations in the Months Prior to the Attack on Russia in June, 1941." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, U.M. No. 8015221, November 1980, 315 pp.

Nekrich, Alexandre M., *1941, 22 Iyuniya*. Moscow: Nauka, 1965.

Translated in Vladimir Petrov with further material as *June 22, 1941: Soviet Historians and the German Invasion*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1968; translated in Marie Bennigsen, as *L'armée rouge assassinée*, June 22, 1941. Paris: Grasset, 1968, 317 pp.

Professor Nekrich's cautious, somewhat candid history cost him his academic position and his party membership; further materials, some of questionable authenticity, are found in Vladimir Petrov's English-language edition. See Whaley's *Codeword Barbarossa*, 1973, for a more candid and extensive study. (See section on Historical studies.)

Noorani, A.G., *Our Credulity and Negligence*. Bombay, India: Ramdas G. Bhatkal, 1963, 167 pp. (Indian misestimates of China, 1962). (See section on Behavior of Targets of Deception.)

Nunn, Sam, and Dewey F. Bartlett, *NATO and the New Soviet Threat*, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 95th Congress, 1st sess. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977.

Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr., Uri Ra'anam, and Warren Milberg (eds.), *Intelligence Policy and National Security*. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1981, 318 pp.

Papers that grew out of a 1979 Conference hosted by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The overall Conference title was "Intelligence: Deception and Surprise," but the intelligence subjects covered were broader in scope. The participants came from government, academe, and the private sector. Authors: R.V.Jones, Roberta Wohlstetter, Ithiel de Sola Pool, John Erickson, Richard Pipes, William Colby, Amron Katz, Richard Betts, John Roche, and Thomas Latimer. (See section on Arms Control.)

Place, Richard, "The Self-Deception of the strong: France on the Eve of the War of the League of Augsburg," *French Historical Studies*, Vol. 6, Fall 1970, pp. 459-473. (See sections on Behavior of Targets and Deception and Historical Studies.)

French underestimation of German strength and logistic capabilities before invasion of Rhineland, September 1688.

Pohle, Victoria, *The Viet Cong in Saigon: Tactics and Objectives During the Tet Offensive*. The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, RM-5799-ISA/ARPA, January 1969, 75 pp.

Possny, Stefan T., "Reconnaissance in Time Perspective," at p. 17 (French reconnaissance failures, August 1914); pp. 21-25, May '10, 1940; p. 23, April 9, 1940; pp. 25-27, June 22, 1941, pp. 27-28, December 7, 1941; page 28, June 25, 1950.

Poteat, George, *The Intelligence Gap: Hypotheses on the Process of Surprise*, a paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, February 18-23, 1975.

Paper is concerned with the dynamics of surprise and relates to questions such as: Why does strategic surprise happen? When are intelligence failures most likely to occur? And, How can the problem of surprise be understood and anticipated? The intention of the paper is to present hypotheses about the likelihood of strategic surprise in any given political context.

Savory, Reginald J.O., "The Invasion Scare of 1755-1756," *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, [London] October 1970, pp. 64-69.

Sherwin, Ronald G., and Barton Whaley, "Understanding Strategic Deception: An Analysis of 93 Cases." In Daniel and Herbig (eds.), *Strategic Military Deception*. New York and London: Pergamon Press, 1982, pp. 177-194.

This analysis helps clarify some of the empirically operational attributes of deception so that comparison could be made across a large number of cases. The conclusions concern the likelihood that deception will be employed in a strategic engagement as well as an assessment of the most likely individual tactics that may be employed in an overall deception scheme.

Shlaim, Avi, "Failures in National Security Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War," *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 3, April 1976, pp. 348-380.

An analysis of the Yom Kippur War and Israel's surprise by the timing, method and place of the attack. According to the author, there have been few parallels in history for strategic surprise as complete as that achieved by Egypt and Syria in this war (October 6, 1973).

Sidorenko, Col. A.A., *The Offensive*. Washington, D.C., United States Air Force, 1970, 228 pp. (See section on USSR Military Deception.)

Skaggs, Glenn, Glenn Bailey, and Steven Spayed, *Surprise and Preemption in Soviet Nuclear Strategy*. Washington, DC: National War College, April 1983. Paper 83-015.

"Sovetskii organy gosudarst-vennoi bezopastnosti v velikoi otechestvennoi voyni," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 5, May 1965, pp. 20-39. (See section on USSR Military Deception.)

"Sovetskie organy gosudarst-vennoi bezopasnosti v gody Velikoj Otechest-vennoj vojny." (NKGB deception of German intelligence before Crel-Kursk offensive, May-July 1943; Karelian offensive, June 10, 1944; Belorussian offensive, June 23, 1944; Kishenev offensive, August 20, 1944; German underestimate of Russian military strength, 1940-1942). (See sections on Historical Studies and USSR--Military Deception.)

Stein, Janet Gross, "'Intelligence' and 'Stupidity' Reconsidered: Estimation and decision in Israel, 1973," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2, September 1980, pp. 147-177.

A look at the structure and content of strategic arguments used by Israel's leaders to organize their consideration of information and options in the days preceding the unanticipated attack by Egypt and Syria on October 6, 1973. Only the substance of one set of concepts in this one case is treated. Concludes with an assessment of the logical completeness and coherence of these concepts and examines their impact on estimates and choice.

Tuony, Ferdinand, *The Battle of Brains*. London: Helheimann, 1930, at pp. 245-247. (British naval intelligence deception of German intelligence, December 1914 of phoney Grand Fleet sailing for Germany; German redeployments resulted in British military intelligence war scare, December 1914, with fears of German invasion of England). (See section on Historical Studies.)

U.N. General Assembly, *Report of the Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might Be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack and for the Preparation of a Report Thereon to Governments*, Document A/4078-S14145, An. 6, 7, and 12. New York, NY: United Nations, January 5, 1959.

U.S. Air Force, Net Assessment Task Force, *The Critical Properties of Sudden Attack: A Study Proposal*, Washington, D.C., November 1976.

U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, *Hearings*, 79th Congress, 1st sess. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946, 39 v.

Authoritative materials which may support significant findings beyond those of Wohlstetter and Farago. See Whaley, *Operation BARBAROSSA*.

U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, *Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*. Senate Doc. No. 244, July 20, 1946, 79th Congress, 2d sess. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946.

U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. *Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, and Additional Views of Mr. Keefe Together with Minority Views of Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946.

Vanwelkenhuyzen, Jean, "Die Krise vom Januar 1940," *Wahrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, Vol. 5, February 1955, pp. 66-90.  
(See section on Behavior of Targets of Deception.)

Vanwelkenhuyzen, Jean, "Die Niederlande und der 'Alarm' im Januar 1940," *Vierteljahrsshefte fur Zeitgeschichte* [Stuttgart], Vol. VIII January 1960, pp. 17-36 (10 May 1940); rev. and trans. as "Het alarm van januari 1940 in Nederland," in Pierre de Meyere (ed.), *Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis van de tweede Wereldoorlog* [Brussels], No. 1, 1967, pp. 127-181; excerpted and trans. as "L'alerte de janvier 1940 aux Pays-Bas," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* [Paris], Vol. 82 April-June 1968, pp. 97-133. (See section on Behavior of Targets of Deception.)

Surveying relevant secondary sources, citing unpublished archival materials and providing useful source notes, this piece contributes to an understanding of Dutch, Belgian and French intelligence failings, May 10, 1940. Lacks an appreciation of German deception planning, found in Barton Whaley's *Stratagem*. Criticized by Brausch.

Vanwelkenhuyzen, Jean, "La drole de guerre en Belgique: Des plans tombes du ciel," in Robert Aron (ed.), *Histoire de notre temps: Toute la verite*. Paris: Plon, No. 2, 1967, pp. 149-181 (10 May 1940). (See section on Behavior of Targets of Deception.)

On the authenticity of the Mechelen-sur-Meuse documents found on 10 January 1940.

Waiting, Allen S., *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960, section on "prospects of North Korean Victory," pp. 38-40; section on "Peking's Warnings: How Credible?" pp. 109-112; chap. 8, "Motivations Behind Intervention," pp. 151-162; section on "Communications Among Nations in Limited War," pp. 168-169; section on "Subjective Limitations," pp. 169-171; section on "Objective Limitations," pp. 171-172; Note 40, pp. 190-191; Note 3, pp. 192-193. Also, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, paperback, ed. 1968. (See section on China: Military and Deception.)

Wohlstetter, Roberta, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, Stanford University Press, 1962, pp. 336-338.

Ziethen, General, "Aus groszer Zeit vor zwanzig Jahren: Die Durchbruchsschlacht von Gorlice." [Twenty Years Ago: The Breakthrough Offensive at Gorlice] *Militär-Wochenblatt*, May 4, 1935. (See section on Historical Studies.)

Surveys Austro-German preparations, April 17 to May 2, 1915, preceding German breakout at Gorlice, on the Russian Carpathian Front; complements Whaley's *Stratagem* (1969 ed.) Case A3, Gorlice.

### USSR MILITARY DECEPTION

Abel, Elie, *The Missile Crisis*. New York: Lippincott, 1966, pp. 49-50, 74-77, 168-170; as *The Missiles of October: The Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962*. London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1966.

Adam, Engr.-Lt. Col., and Lt. Col. R. Gebel, "Military Camouflage." In *Selected Readings from Military Thought 1963-1973*, Studies in Communist Affairs. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Vol. 5, Part II, 1973 pp. 157-163; *Militärwesen*, No. 9, 1970; No. 3, 1971; *Voyennaya mysl'*, No. 11, November 1971, FPD 0004/74, 24 January 1974.

Beaumont, Roger, *Maskirovka: Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and Deception*. College Station: Texas Engineering Experiment Station, Center for Strategic Technology, 1982.

Becker, Abraham S., *Strategic Breakout as a Soviet Policy Option*, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, Report No. R-2097-ACDA, March 1977, 56 pp. (See section on Arms Control and Deception.)

A study of one of the basic assumptions underlying the U.S. approach to SALT. It discusses Soviet "strategic breakout" (large-scale violation of the SALT agreements) as a set of issues of Soviet policy.

Beketov, Anatolii A., et al., *Maskirovka Deistvií Podrazdelenii Sukhoputnykh Voisk* [Ground Troops Concealment]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976, 139 pp.

Caravelli, John M., "The Role of Surprise and Preemption in Soviet Military Strategy," *International Security Review*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 1981, pp. 209-236.

Cohen, Samuel T., and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Selective Targeting and Soviet Deception," *Armed Forces Journal*, September 1983, pp. 95-101.

deLaon, Peter, *Soviet Views of Strategic Deception*. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, Paper P-6685, September 1981, vii + 34 pp.

This paper summarizes views of selected Soviet writers, and contains a Table (pp. 28-29) of possible deception objectives and means.

Despres, John, Lilita Dzirkals, and Barton Whaley, *Timely Lessons of History: The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy*, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, Report R-1825-NA, July 1976, 84 pp.

Study concentrates on distilling the Soviet experience with blitzkrieg, including night-only operations and mobility of forces during the Manchurian Campaign of 1945. This study draws upon military publications, and it identifies the strategic concerns, institutional preoccupations, and political initiatives that were most closely associated with Soviet military interest in the Manchurian

model. It examines the brief campaign of August 1945 from the viewpoint of Soviet military authorities in the 1960s and 1970s, the so-called "Manchurian generals" who dominated key elements of the Soviet General Staff in the 1960s. The officers involved in the Soviet Manchurian Campaign assumed key military positions in 1960 and later. Concurrently, the Strategic Rocket Forces became a separate command, and KGB deception resources supported the "Manchurian" strategy of the 1960s.

Dinerstein, Herbert S., *War and the Soviet Union*, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, R-326. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976, ch. 6, "Surprise and the Initiation of War," pp. 167-214.

Douglass, Joseph D., Jr., and David S. Sullivan, "Intelligence, Warning, and Surprise," *Armed Forces Journal International*, December 1984, pp. 133-136. (See section on Arms Control and Deception.)

Douglass, Joseph D., Jr., "Soviet Strategic Deception," DS2002 +, August 1984, pp. 87-99.

That the U.S. military, economic, and foreign policies may be based on erroneous and detrimental assumptions concerning the Soviet Union raises questions, explored in this article.

Douglass, Joseph D., Jr., "Chemical Weapons: An Imbalance of Terror," *Strategic Review*, August 13, 1982, pp. 36-47.

Douglass, Joseph D., Jr., "Soviet Disinformation," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1981, pp. 16-26.

An analysis of the urgent need to attack the problem of Soviet intentions and disinformation, consistent with the Soviets' emphasis on the principle of surprise. Douglass states, "An obvious need is to study more intensively the 'anatomy' of Soviet disinformation--its purveyors, tactics, themes and objectives--and to integrate the findings into the intelligence process." He states that the solution to the rising problem lies in a more rigorous, comprehensive and skeptical assessment of all dimensions of the data base in which intelligence estimates are steeped. (see section on USSR Political Deception)

Douglass, Joseph D. Jr., "The Growing Disinformation Problem," *International Security Review*, Vol. VI, No. III, Fall 1981, pp. 333-353.

Concerns the importance of awareness to Soviet-directed disinformation and its possible effectiveness in disrupting and derailing Western foreign policy and national security programs.

Douglass, Joseph D., Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoeber. *Selected readings from Soviet "Military Thought" (1963-1973)*, System Planning Corp., Report No. 584, April 1980, 694 pp.

An important selection of Soviet doctrinal materials.

Druzhinin, V.V., and D.S. Kontorov, *Konfliktная Радиолокация (Radar Combat)*. Moscow: Radio i Sviaz', 1982.

Dziak, John J., "The Organizational and Operational Tradition of Soviet Deception: An Historical Sampling," Paper, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1985.

Mr. Dziak, a production manager at the Defense Intelligence Agency, reviews definitions, and early cases of Soviet political deception. Using archival holdings, Mr. Dziak compares General Gehlen's evaluation of Soviet use of only limited signals deception with the "MAX-MORITZ" case involving about 5,000 Soviet-controlled messages between Sofia and Berlin in July 1941-February 1945.

Dzirkals, Lilita I., "Lightning War" in Manchuria: Soviet Military Analysis of the 1945 Far East Campaign, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, P-5589, January 1976, 116 pp.

This Paper presents the initial results of a survey of Soviet military literature on the campaign the Soviets waged against Japanese forces in Manchuria in 1945. It also takes note of the prominence of officers involved in the Manchurian Campaign and its historiography in Soviet command positions in the 1960s. It was undertaken for the purpose of eliciting evidence on current Soviet precepts regarding military operations in the Far East military theater. It is intended as a guide to the material discovered. See also Despres, et al., 1976.

Epstein, Edward Jay, "Disinformation: Or, Why the CIA Cannot Verify an Arms Control Agreement," *Commentary*, Vol. 74, July 1982, pp. 21-28.

Feer, Fredric S., *The Impact of Soviet Misinformation on Military Operations: 1920-1979*, Analytical Assessments Corporation, Marina Del Rey, CA, AAC-WN-7906, April 1979, 43 pp.

The stated purpose of this study, by a former CIA intelligence analyst, was to attempt to answer critical questions pertaining to the Soviet Union's concealment and deception capabilities. Because of declassification limitations, the text treats the titled subject, only in the World War II period.

Foote, Alexander, *Handbook for Spies*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1949, Chap. 13, "The Vultures Gather," pp. 135-153; Chap. 14, "The Doctors Decide," pp. 154-165; Chap. 15, "Hospital and After," pp. 166-180.

An authentic memoir and description of the Rado-Rossler Soviet GRU espionage network in Switzerland during World War II. A second, much inferior edition (London: 1962) deletes some of Foote's original material and interpolates new editorial material and text.

Garthoff, Raymond L., *The Soviet Image of Future War*, Ch. 3: "The Role of Surprise and Blitzkrieg." Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1959, ch. 3, "The Role of Surprise and Blitzkrieg, pp. 60-137. (see section on Surprise Attack and Deception)

An important analysis of Soviet military doctrine. See also H.S. Dinerstein's study.

Garthoff, Raymond L., *Soviet Military Doctrine*. The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, R-223, ch. 16, "Deception, Surprise, and Security," May 1, 1953, pp. 265-276.

Gertz, Bill, "Soviets fill craters, dig new ones to fool U.S. on missile accuracy," *Washington Times*, August 7, 1985, p. 1.

Gontaev, Rear Admiral A., "Vnezapnost' kak kategorija voenno-morskogo iskusstva" [Surprise as a Category of Naval Art], *Morskoi Sbornik*, No. 3, March 1973, pp. 30-35.

Gordyev, Capt. N., "Protivodeistvie razvedke protivnika," [Counteracting Enemy Intelligence], *Morskoi Sbornik* (Naval Review), No. 10, October 1972, pp. 31-35.

Article provides references to Western works on modern intelligence. It discusses "operational camouflage" in WWII.

Gordyev, Capt. N., "Operational Camouflage in Naval Landing Operations." [in Russian], *Voyenna-Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, April 1969, JPRS Trans. 48, 346, July 3, 1969.

Green, William C., "Soviet Disinformation and Strategic Deception Concerning Its Nuclear Weapons Policy," Chapter 5, Draft Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, February 1984, 34 pp.

Green argues that the Soviet Union's major object of strategic deception after the signing of SALT I was to convince the United States that they had accepted mutual deterrence and had no strategic objectives beyond parity. The author identifies deceptive aspects of Soviet information policies.

Haltom, Margaret Saxton, "Discrepancies in the Lend-Lease Program," *Southern Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1966, pp. 446-468.

Discusses the Lend-Lease Program, authorized in 1941, and administered by the office of Lend-Lease Administration, which within 5 years dispensed 42 billion dollars to other nations. The article examines complaints against the functioning of the department, with specific reference to Soviet technology and weapons acquisition beyond officially authorized transfers.

Harris, William R., "Counterintelligence Jurisdiction and the Double Cross System by National Technical Means." Paper, Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1980, in R. Godson (ed.), *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Counterintelligence*. Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1980, pp. 53-82, discussion pp. 83-91. (see section on Countering Deception).

Harris, William R., "Counterintelligence Jurisdiction and the National Act of 1980." Prepared Statement on S.2284, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 1980.

Asserts that the USSR systematically biased indicators of ICBM accuracy with effects on U.S. intelligence estimates and delays in protecting or replacing Minuteman ICBM systems.

Heuer, Richards J., Jr., "Soviet Organization and Doctrine for Strategic Deception," Paper, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1985. Forthcoming in Brian Dailey and Patrick Parker (eds.), *Soviet Strategic Deception*, 1986.

Provides an organizational context for the allocation of roles and missions for active measures (including political disinformation and strategic deception), counterintelligence, and maskirovka (defined as military camouflage, cover, and deception). This conception of roles and missions, presented by a retired officer of the Operations Directorate of CIA, implies significant constraints upon the peacetime KGB role in mounting deception operations relating to U.S. and NATO defense programs, particularly through controlled double agents-in-place.

Horelick, Arnold L., and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1965, Part II, "The Politics of Soviet Missile Deception, 1957-61," pp. 33-102; Part III, "Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy," Chap. 9, "The Missile Deception in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1957-62," pp. 205-116. (See section on USSR Political Deception.)

An influential study of Soviet uses of military secrecy, military parades, and public diplomacy to project power and translate perceptions of that power into foreign policy advantage in the period 1957-1962. While the Soviets did not deploy the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, nor the ABM systems implied by their boasts, they did, by 1960, establish both Strategic Rocket Forces, new design bureaus, and a Deception Department in the KGB. In the 1966-1970, and subsequent Five Year Defense Plans, the Soviets realized much of the military prowess discussed in 1957-1962.

Later writers (e.g., Harris, "Counterintelligence Jurisdiction and the Double Cross System by National Technical Means," 1980), propose that the Soviets underrepresented the planned capabilities of countercommand and counterforce ICBM systems tested in the 1960s. Hence, the Horelick-Rush model of Soviet "bluffing upwards" for

deterrence and potential war fighting may fail to capture concurrent "bluffing downwards" in 1959-1965 relative to weapons development for force deployments in the 1966-1970 and 1971-1975 Defense Plans, when the Soviets invested in unexpected quantities of ICBMs for unexpected wartime missions. The Horelick-Rush study is of continuing importance in understanding the evolution of U.S. concepts of Soviet deception, and the effects of these concepts upon U.S. intelligence underestimates in the 1960s and arms control strategies in the 1970s. See also Mihalka, 1982, for a largely sympathetic treatment of the Horelick-Rush "bluffing upwards" model of Soviet deception in the 1957-1962 period.

"How Russia Hides Its Missiles," *Foreign Report*. London: The Economist Newspaper Limited, March 5, 1981, pp. 1-3.

Two allegedly top-secret American intelligence reports are summarized by *Foreign Report* which indicated the variety of techniques the Russians used over the past two decades to disguise their nuclear weapons from western intelligence. The Molander Report prepared for the National Security Council in 1979 on Soviet compliance with SALT I, and SALT II verifiability is summarized. It is reported that the Russians developed an elaborate system of concealment and deception. Fifteen concealment techniques are identified.

Ianov, Maj. Gen. Arty M., "On the Methods of Influencing an Opponent's Decisions," *Voennais mysl'*, No. 12, December 1971. In USAF, *Selected Readings from Military Thought, 1963-1973*, Vol. 5, pt. 2, GPO, 1982, pp. 164-171.

Katz, Amrom H., *Radar, Strategy and Political Intent: A Discussion*, R&D Associates, Marina Del Rey, CA, SA/044-259/78, July 1978, 128 pp.

A study of the strategic implications of Soviet defensive electronic systems and interactions with U.S. intelligence. Includes a collection of articles relevant to *maskirovka*.

Kir'ian, M.M., "Vnezapnost'" [Surprise], *Sovetskais Voennais Entsiklopediia*. Moscow: Voenizdat, Vol. 2, 1976, pp. 161-163. (see section on Surprise Attack and Deception)

Lambeth, Benjamin S., *Risk and Uncertainty in Soviet Deliberations About War*, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, Report No. R-2687-AF, October 1981, 28 pp.

A survey of the elements of risk, uncertainty, and unpredictability that might moderate Soviet behavior and undermine the confidence with which Soviet decisionmakers would consider entering into a major military conflict with the United States. It describes certain realities of Soviet style and leadership concern about possible Soviet military inadequacies that make the more ominous features of Soviet doctrine and force development appear somewhat less alarming.

Lee, William T., "Debate over U.S. Strategic Forecasts: A Poor Record," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 7, Summer 1980, pp. 44-57.

Levin, Col. V., and Col. V. Kolchevsky, "Engineer Camouflage," *Soviet Military Review*, No. 4, April 1981, pp. 42-44.

Limny, A., and A. Gorkin, "The Effectiveness of Maskirovka" [in Russian], *Voennaya Vestnik*, No. 5, 1980, pp. 83-85.

Malisov, Col. Iu, "Maskirovka--delo vazhnoe," [Concealment and Deception], *Voennyi Vestnik*, No. 12, December 1979.

"Masking [maskirovka] of the attacks in Europe and the Pacific," in Army General S.P. Ivanov (general editor), *Nachal'nyi period voyny* [The Initial Period of War]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974, pp. 160-176.

Describes German and Japanese political and "operational-strategic" deception measures before the start of WWII.

Matsulenko, Maj. Gen. Viktor Antonovich, "World War II Soviet Camouflage Operations Described," *Voenna-Istoricheskii zhurnal*, Moscow, in Russian, No. 1, January 1975 signed to press December 24, 1974, pp. 10-21.

Concerns the Wisla-Oder operation, carried out by forces of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts in World War II. The Soviet command concealed from the enemy the starting time for the operation, its scale and in part, the directions of the main attacks. Misinformation measures contributed to the unexpectedness of the offensive and therefore to its successful implementation.

Matsulenko, Maj. Gen. Viktor Antonovich, "Tactical Camouflage of Soviet Troops in the First and Second Periods of the War," *Voenna-Istoricheskii zhurnal*, Moscow: Russian, No. 1, January 1972, signed to press December 1971, pp. 11-20, translated on *USSR Military Affairs*, No. 785, JPRS No. 55246, February 22, 1972.

Defines tactical camouflage as a complex of diversified measures carried out by command elements for the purpose of deceiving the enemy on the nature of imminent troop actions, a plan of operation, scale, time, as well as the physical concealment of friendly troops and military installations. Camouflage is one of the principal means of achieving tactical surprise. Cites examples of camouflage used in various Soviet confrontations.

Matsulenko, Maj. Gen. Viktor Antonovich, *Operativnaia Maskirovka Voisk* (*Po Opymn vedikoy otechostvennoy voyny*) [Operational Military Camouflage and Deception: Based on the experience of the Great Patriotic War]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975, 198 pp.

The author reveals improvements in methods of cover and deception, and shows its planning and accomplishment, the art of commanders and the

expertise of soldiers. This is one of the significant Soviet studies on denial and deception activities, drawing heavily upon World War II experiences.

Mihalka, Michael, "Soviet Strategic Deception, 1955-1981." In John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter (eds.), *Military Deception and Strategic Surprise*. London: Frank Cass & Co., 1982, pp. 40-93.

The author describes and evaluates deception and the debate over Soviet pursuit of strategic superiority. This article examines Soviet procurement of and claims about nuclear weapons their accompanying delivery systems. This study relies in substantial measure upon Soviet public pronouncements. It disputes the conclusion of W. Harris [A SALT Safeguards Program, 1979; Counterintelligence Jurisdiction, 1980] that the Soviets biased indicators of ICBM missile accuracy to protect counter-MINUTEMAN missions of the Strategic Rocket Forces in the 1960s, but does not draw upon the evidence utilized by Harris. The Mihalka article tends to support, with further quotations, the "bluffing upwards" hypothesis of Horelick and Rush, published in 1965.

Ostrich, John T. Jr., and William C. Green, "Methodological Problems Associated with the IISS Military Balance," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 151-171.

A critique of the IISS annual report, *Military Balance*, that examines four main areas in which current methodology used to produce this book allows arbitrariness and inconsistencies to occur which indicate serious problems with the methodologies used in its compilation.

Ostryakov, Sergei Zakharovich, *Voyenne Chekisty* [Military Chekists]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979, 320 pp.

Quester, George H., "On the Identification of Real and Pretended Communist Military Doctrine," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 10, June 1966, pp. 172-179. (See sections on General Deception Studies and China: Military and Political Deception.)

Reid, Clifford, "Reflexive Control in Soviet Military Planning," Paper, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1985, 39 pp. (See section on General Deception Studies.)

An important synthesis of Soviet studies of Vladimir Lefebvre, et al., on "reflexive control" as a Soviet paradigm for *maskirovka* in strategic and operational deception.

Reitz, James T., *Lexicon of Selected Soviet Terms Relating to Maskirovka (Deception)*, Washington, DC: Dept. of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, International Applications Office, October 1983, 52 pp.

A compendium of terms and concepts relating to the general topic of *maskirovka* (deception), this DIA study discusses the broad range of actions embodied within the meaning of the word, indicates how deeply ingrained and central to the conduct of wartime and peacetime military

and political activities, the concept of *maskirovka* is, and attempts to resolve some of the differences in understanding among Soviet studies specialists. Included are related expressions derived from official Soviet military lexicons currently in use, with references to Soviet publications.

Reznichenko, Lt. Gen. V., "Creativity in Tactics Urged," *Krasnaja Zvezda*, Moscow, Russian, December 28, 1971, pp. 2-3. Translated on *USSR Military Affairs*, No. 779, JPRS 55128, February 7, 1972.

A view that innovation in tactics is manifested by means of the continuous improvement of its theoretical recommendations in battle and on exercises. "During the first postwar decade, main attention in the development of tactics was turned to the investigation and generalization of the war which had taken place."

"Role of Soviet Secret Police in the Occupation of Czechoslovakia," *Radio Free Europe*, September 16, 1968.

Report surveys available information on presumed infiltration and activities of Russian KGB agents in Czechoslovakia, based on limited data.

Savkin, Col. V. Ye., "Surprise," *Military Review*, April 1974, pp. 84-91.

"Secret report claims Carterites hid Soviet tricks to aid SALT II," *Washington Times*, August 24, 1983, p. 6A.

Sejna, Jan, *We Will Bury You*. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd., 1982, 205 pp.

Summarizes the thesis of General Sejna, former Chief of Staff to the Czech Minister of Defense, and an aide to the Czech Defense Council, that Soviet deception activities are largely linked to a 15-year Strategic Plan.

Shchedrov, V., "Camouflaging Troops During Regrouping and Maneuvers," *Voennaia Mysl'*, No. 6, 1966.

Shimanskii, Col. A., USSR, *About the Achievement of Strategic Surprise in the Summer-Fall Campaign of 1944* [in Russian], *Voyenna-Istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 6, 1968, pp. 17-28. Joint Publications Research Service Series, No. 46237, August 20, 1968. English translation available as *1944 Summer-Fall Campaign on the Eastern Front*. Soviet Military Translations No. 467.

Shtemenko, Army General S.M., *General'nyi shtab gody voiny* ["The General Staff during the War Years"]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968; English translation as *The Soviet General Staff at War 1941-1945*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970.

The first Soviet account to reveal how their General Staff systematically incorporated deception plans into each operation,

implicitly showing the increasing sophistication of Soviet deception through World War II.

Shutov, Cole. Z., M. Sc., "Surprise," *Soviet Military Review*, November 1975, pp. 55-56.

Asserts that even before World War II, Soviet military theory had correctly estimated the importance of surprise. "Surprise ensures success not by itself but in combination with other factors." The article recounts Russia's use of the surprise factor in World War II, and its effectiveness in gaining victory.

Sidorenko, Col. A.A., *The Offensive: A Soviet View*. United States Air Force Translation, 1970, 228 pp. (See section on Surprise Attack and Deception.)

An important Soviet study of surprise and war initiative.

Simakov, Col. Ye, "Operational Camouflange of Air Assets," *Soviet Military Review*, 1982.

Simakov, Col. Ye, "Operativnaia maskirovka VVS v nastupatel'nykh operatsiiakh" [VVS (Air Force) surprise and deception during offensive operations], *Voenna-Istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 12, 1977, pp. 19-26. Published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period."

Describes measures that were taken in World War II to create dummy airfields and planes, the camouflaging of operational ones, and the very strict observance of camouflage discipline.

"Sovetskii organy gosudarstva - vennoi bezopastnost v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voyni," *Voprosy istorii*, No. 5, May 1965, pp. 20-39. ["Soviet Organs of State Security in the Years of the Great Patriotic War," *Problems of History*, May 1965. English Summary on pp. 219-220.] (See sections on Historical Studies and Surprise Attack and Deception.)

This article refers to various Soviet deception accomplishments, all too briefly highlighted. Includes references to: NKGB deception of German intelligence before Orel-Kursk offensive, May-July 1943; Karelian offensive, June 10, 1944; Belorussian offensive, June 23, 1944; Kishenev offensive, August 20, 1944; German underestimate of Russian military strength, 1940-1942.

Stepanov, Yu G., *Maskirovka ot Radioelektronnogo Nablyudenija* [Camouflage from Electronic Surveillance]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963.

Stevens, Jennie A., and Henry S. Marsh, "Surprise and Deception in Soviet Military Thought," *Military Review*, June 1982, pp. 2-5; July 1982, pp. 24-35.

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categories of Soviet deceptive practices in detail to provide a more complete understanding of this concept's diverse potential applications. Include: concealment, imitation, demonstration maneuvers and disinformation.

Stueck, William, "The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War," *World Politics*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, July 1976, pp. 622-635.

A review of Robert R. Simmons' book, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, P'yongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War*. Simmons analyzes politics in North Korea and concludes that the Kremlin approved of and anticipated the June 24, 1950 invasion by North Korean forces.

Suvorov, Viktor, [pseud.], "GUSM: The Soviet Service of Strategic Deception," *International Defense Review*, Vol. 18, No. 8, September 1985, pp. 1235-1240.

A former GRU officer assesses the role of a Principal Directorate for Strategic Deception (GUSM) within the Soviet General Staff, between 1968 and the present.

Suvorov, Viktor, [pseud.], *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1984, 193 pp.

Written by Suvorov, a former Soviet Army officer writing pseudonymously, on the GRU--Soviet military intelligence.

Suvorov, Viktor, *The Liberators: My Life in the Soviet Army*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1983, 202 pp.

Tolochkov, M.I., *Maskirovka v sovremenennom boiu* [Camouflage in Modern Combat], 2d ed. rev. and enl. Moscow: Izd-vo DOSAAF, 1975, 88 pp.

Ulsamer, Edgar, "The Fog of War," *Air Force Magazine*, October 1985.

Discusses and provides in summary fashion comments concerning Soviet tactical deception from 1979 to the present.

Valenta, Jiri, "Soviet Use of Surprise and Deception," *Survival*, Vol. 24, March/April 1982, pp. 50-61.

"Addresses the evolution of Soviet views and practices regarding deception and strategic surprise since World War II in the area of conventional warfare." According to the author, the real test of Soviet mastery of deception techniques and strategic surprise would come only during a conflict with NATO countries.

Valenta, Jiri, "From Prague to Kabul: The Mode of Soviet Invasions," *International Security*, Vol. 5, Fall 1980, pp. 114-141.

Vasendin, Maj. Gen. N., and Kuznetsov, Col. N., "Modern Warfare and Surprise Attack," *Voyennaia mysl'* [Military Thought], No. 6, 1966. In U.S. Air Force, *Selected Readings from Military Thought 1963-1973*, Vol. 5, pt. 1, 1982. Washington, DC: GPO, 1982, pp. 226-233.

Vasilev, Col. P., "Ob operativno-strategicheskoi dezinformatsii vo vtoroi mirovoi voine. Po opyту inostrannykh armii" [On Operational-Strategic Deception in World War II], *Voenno-Istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 3, 1962, pp. 41-52.

Vigor, Peter H., *Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. (See section on Surprise Attack and Deception.)

Whaley, Barton S., "Surprise in the Manchurian Model: The Soviet General Staff's Talent for Strategic Surprise and Deception Planning," draft, July 1975, 107 pp.

A single case study of the Soviet Union's full-scale invasion of Japanese-held Manchuria on August 9, 1945 and how they achieved nearly complete strategic (and tactical) surprise. Findings partially incorporated into Despres, Dzirkals, and Whaley report of 1976.

Whaley, Barton, *Public Diplomacy Aspects of the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968*. Medford, MA: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, ch. 5, "Invasion, Deception as the Key to Surprise," 1969, pp. 31-49. Revised in Gregory Henderson (ed.), *Public Diplomacy and Political Change*. New York: Praeger, 1973.

Wishnevsky, Julia, "Information on the Operation of Glavlit Section No. 2," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 494/76, December 8, 1976, 10 pp.

Yefimov, V.A., and S.G. Chermashchentsev, "Maskirovka," *Sovetskaya Voyennaia Entsiklopediya* [Soviet Military Encyclopedia]. Moscow: Voenizdat, Vol. 5, 1978, pp. 175-177. Translated in USAF, *Soviet Military Concepts*, February 1979.

Zakharchenko, Major-General of Artillery A.P., "Voyennaia khitrost' v sovremennom boiu" [Stratagem in Modern Combat], *Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oborony*, No. 9, 1970, pp. 7-10.

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Zimmerman, William, "The missile age and post-Stalinist Soviet foreign policy: a review," of Morelick and Rush's *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. X, No. 4, December 1966, pp. 524-528.

### USSR POLITICAL DECEPTION

Abd An-Nasir, Jamal. Speech, Cairo University, February 22, 1967, on Radio Cairo, Domestic Service in Arabic, 1620 GMT (February 22, 1967). (Egyptian president Nasir's disbelief of UAR intelligence on U.S.-Turkey-Iraq contingency plan for Syria, 1957.)

Veiled reference to Soviet deception plan in May 1957.

Agursky, Mikhail, and Hannes Adomeit, "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex," Survey, Vol. 24, No. 544, April 2, 1980, pp. 1-11.

An analysis of the Soviet military-industrial situation. A lack of technological sophistication in the USSR and their military-industrial inefficiency does not mean that their military power is politically and militarily ineffective.

Alexiev, Alexander R., *The Soviet Campaign Against INP: Strategy, Tactics, Means*. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, Note N-2280-AF, February 1985.

"Ambiguous Russian Salesman: Victor Yevgenyevich Louis," *New York Times*, August 12, 1967, p. 26.

Ardamatskiy, Vasiliy Ivanovich, *Vozmezdiye [Retribution]*. Moscow: Molodaya Grardiya, 1968, 591 pp.

Utilizes archival material on OGPU entrapment of Boris Savinkov in 1924.

Barghorn, Frederick, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Barron, John, *KGB Today: The Hidden Hand*. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1983, 489 pp. Notes, including bibliographical notes.

An important segment of this book is devoted to what the Soviets call "active measures." A major section of the book sets forth information provided the author in his interviews with Major Stanislav Levchenko, KGB officer specializing in Soviet "active measures" at his post in Japan until his defection to the U.S. in 1979. Material on the KGB's major efforts to obtain advanced American industrial, scientific and technical information and materials through clandestine collection are included in the book.

Barron, John, *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents*. New York, NY: Reader's Digest Press, 1974, 462 pp.; New York: Bantam Books, 1974, pp. 109-110, ch. 8, "Disinformation: Poisoning Public Opinion," pp. 223-253, 431.

Beichman, Arnold, "Soviet Active Measures and Democratic Culture,"  
Paper, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1985, 33 pp.  
(See section on Behavior of Targets of Deception)

Binder, David, "Journalists Foiled Plot to Justify Invasion," *The Times*,  
September 6, 1968, p. 7

Work of Czech news service, CTK, in foiling Soviet disinformation  
plans.

Bittman, Ladislav, *The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider's View*. New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984. 216 pp.

The author served as Deputy Chief of the Czech STB's Disinformation  
Department before defecting in 1968. This volume has not yet been  
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Bittman, Ladislav, "Soviet Bloc 'Disinformation' and other 'Active  
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(eds.), *Intelligence Policy and National Security*. Hamden, CT: Archon  
Books, 1981.

Bittman, Ladislav, *The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in  
Soviet Political Warfare*. New York: Syracuse University Research  
Corp., Vol. XXV, 1972, 246 pp. (See section on Historical Studies.)

Blackstock, Paul W., *Agents of Deceit: Frauds, Forgeries and Political  
Intrigue Among Nations*. Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1966, 315 pp.  
Bibliographical notes.

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Great's Testament to the Cold War. Particularly pertinent with  
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Blackstock, Paul W., "'Books for Idiots': False Soviet 'Memoirs,'" *The  
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Brodie, Bernard, "Military Demonstration and Disclosure of New Weapons,"  
*World Politics*, Vol. V, No. 3, April 1953, pp. 281-301.

Bukovsky, Vladimir, *Illusion in the West's Pacifists Against Peace*.  
Santa Monica, CA: California Seminar on International Security,  
Discussion Paper 103, December 1984.

Bukovsky, Vladimir, "The Peace Movement and the Soviet Union,"  
*Commentary*, May 1982, pp. 1-36.

Carynnik, Marco, "The Famine the 'Times' Couldn't Find," *Commentary*, No. 76, November 1983, pp. 32-40 (New York Times correspondent Walter Duranty and the Ukrainian famine of 1933-1934).

Clews, John C., *Communist Propaganda Techniques*. New York, NY: Praeger, 1964, Part 4, "A Propaganda Case History: Bacterial Warfare," pp. 177-268.

Conquest, Robert, "Ideology and Deception," Paper, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1985, 25 pp.

Debo, Richard K., "Lockhart Plot or Dzerzhinsky Plot?" *Journal of Modern History*, No. 42, September 1971, pp. 413-439.

"Department D at Work," *Foreign report* No. 1052. London, *The Economist*, May 2, 1968, at pages 7-8.

On the KGB's Department "D" and its late chief, General Agayants, with data on its Hungarian counterpart, the *Aktiv Intezkedesek Alosztalya*, AVH.

"Disinformation: War With Words," *Air Force*, March 1982, pp. 85-87.

The staff of *Air Force* magazine looks at the Soviet disinformation, which is sizable and amply demonstrated.

Douglass, Joseph D. Jr., "Soviet Strategic Deception," *Strategic Science*, August 1984, pp. 87-99.

Soviet deception today continues unabated. Themes introduced in the 1950s have been modernized and expanded. However, there has not been a concerted effort to find out what Soviet strategic deception is or how effective it has been, or if there is any belief in Soviet long-range plan and strategic objectives.

Douglass, Joseph D., Jr., "Soviet Disinformation," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1981, pp. 16-26.

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