

CONFIDENTIAL

SSFP file  
COPY

976  
42

R

SIXTH SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

THE EVOLUTION OF COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

THE CASE OF VIETNAM


by

Richard M. Lee

Colonel USA

June 30, 1964


DEPARTMENT OF STATE	IS/FPC/CDR	Date. 12/22/92
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE DROPE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY ( ) DECLASSIFY IN PART ( ) DELETE Non-Responsive Info	MR Cases Only: EO Citations _____
FOIA Exemptions _____ PA Exemptions _____	TS authority to: ( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C OADR ( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C OADR	
p. 24 not available	THIS STUDY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY	



Foreign Service Institute

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL



0  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9

10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60  
61  
62  
63  
64  
65  
66  
67  
68  
69  
70  
71  
72  
73  
74  
75  
76  
77  
78  
79  
80  
81  
82  
83  
84  
85  
86  
87  
88  
89  
90  
91  
92  
93  
94  
95  
96  
97  
98  
99

100  
101  
102  
103  
104  
105  
106  
107  
108  
109  
110  
111  
112  
113  
114  
115  
116  
117  
118  
119  
120  
121  
122  
123  
124  
125  
126  
127  
128  
129  
130  
131  
132  
133  
134  
135  
136  
137  
138  
139  
140  
141  
142  
143  
144  
145  
146  
147  
148  
149  
150  
151  
152  
153  
154  
155  
156  
157  
158  
159  
160  
161  
162  
163  
164  
165  
166  
167  
168  
169  
170  
171  
172  
173  
174  
175  
176  
177  
178  
179  
180  
181  
182  
183  
184  
185  
186  
187  
188  
189  
190  
191  
192  
193  
194  
195  
196  
197  
198  
199  
200

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Introduction.....	1	
Chapter I	Trends in Political Counterinsurgency Strategy in Vietnam.....	3	
Chapter II	Trends in Military Counterinsurgency Strategy in Vietnam.....	17	
Chapter III	Trends in Economic Counterinsurgency Strategy in Vietnam.....	31	.....
Chapter IV	Trends in Psychological Counterinsurgency Strategy in Vietnam.....	42	.....
Chapter V	Toward a More Integrated Counterinsurgency Strategy in Vietnam.....	53	.....
	Footnotes.....	64	.....
	Bibliography.....	67	.....
	Biographic. Note.....	70	.....

03 45 58 70 30

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

- 1 -

INTRODUCTION

In my readings on the problems of Communist insurgency, I have come in time to acquire no small concern over the revolutionary strategy developed by Mao-Tse-tung and the Chinese Communists in the 1930's and 40's. Its operational principles are well known, but particularly important, it seems to me, is the powerfully effective manner in which political, military and psychological resources are combined into a simply stated, integrated insurgency strategy.

A search among the mass of available material on this subject does not reveal a comparable, succinctly stated overall U.S. strategy of counterinsurgency. For this reason I decided to examine Vietnam as a case study, to look into our policies and programs in the pertinent fields, to see where they tend. What are the key relationships? Is there a central theme and an overall focus? What are the major issues and indicators?

This paper will be restricted to those matters having to do with the present scope of the war effort within Vietnam. Its first four chapters will deal separately with US/GVN political, military, economic and psychological programs. The final chapter will discuss major issues in our strategy which are presented at this time.

It seems that such an analysis could prove useful. If, indeed, the US and GVN can concentrate their great power in optimum amounts and combinations at the proper places and times, this could make all the difference. The author's basic conviction is that in the mid-sixties

CONFIDENTIAL

031557130

the US is at last holding the Communist World at bay and has frustrated its drive for world domination in a most profound and fundamental way on all major fronts but one. This, their technique for "wars of national liberation" remains the last major resource we have yet not been able to counter with complete success. The confrontation is in Vietnam, and a victory for the US and GVN could well signal the acceleration of adjustments, already begun among some communist states, to the reality and magnitude of US power. A victory could also generate much confusion and further division within the Communist world, and possibly cause the West to be spared "wars of national liberation" in other vulnerable areas, such as Africa and South America.

Finally, it seems reasonable that in spite of the adverse situation and the lateness of the hour in Vietnam, the US, with its record of leadership over the past twenty years and its enormous material resources, can meet this challenge. There seems to be a good deal of sense in Somerset Maugham's statement that, "The inevitable is only what a fool hasn't the wit to avoid."

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER I

TRENDS IN POLITICAL COUNTERINSURGENCY IN VIETNAM STRATEGY

Among Mao Tse-tung's familiar principles of guerrilla warfare, perhaps the foremost is this:

"Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses of the people and is supported by them it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation."<sup>1</sup>

This conviction of the over-riding importance of political mass support has been the key pattern in Viet Cong (VC) operations in South Viet Nam. Captured documents and experience to date confirms that the VC are committed in unceasing, thorough, well planned efforts to organize the peasantry and win their adherence. Their goals are designed with precision to appeal to the 11 million peasants (80% of the population) who occupy the land. A political framework, the National Liberation Front, provides the center about which VC political workers have organized and led youth movements, peasant associations, women's leagues and other activities which seek to identify the peasant with the insurrection. Together with these efforts, the VC have organized a political administration under party control which performs the normal functions of government in competition with the established government - collecting taxes, educating, punishing, organizing, etc. The carefully protected growth of this political structure, rather than the military campaign, is the true measure of progress of the insurgency. Che Guevarra, Mao's disciple, underlines this point:<sup>2</sup>

"A political error could slow down the campaign's development and is therefore more serious than a military error."

A second equally key feature of Communist guerrilla warfare is an extraordinary skill in the coordination and integration of political, military and psychological resources to achieve their purposes. It is probably this feature which has given conventional governments such trouble in countering Communist "wars of national liberation."

In South Vietnam, the insurgency is nothing if not well planned. After the Geneva Accords (1954), some 2,000 hard core agents were left behind in the South (mostly in the Delta) with caches of ammunition. By late 1961 the insurgency was desperately far-advanced with some 20,000 armed VC in the field. More ominous was the VC political administration spreading outward from consolidated strongholds, operating behind a screen of guerrilla military operations. Sabotage, terror, assassination and attacks on hamlets and villages were the hallmark of VC progress. During 1960 and 61 some 3,000 civilians, mostly GVN local officials, were murdered, and over 2,500 were kidnapped.<sup>3</sup>

Following a review of the situation in Vietnam in November 1961, US political and military leaders recognized the advanced state of the rebellion and proposed that the US respond to President Diem's appeal with a massive effort to subdue the insurgency. A US decision was then taken to apply American power to an unprecedented degree at every point short of committing US troops directly to shore up the Government of Vietnam (GVN). The US review had also been convincing that the GVN was using poor tactics and an inefficient administrative system. In its decision the US was in effect undertaking not only



to give the GVN the materiel means to win, but also to develop the techniques for mobilizing the support of the Vietnamese people and defeating the VC in the field. Thus the stakes were large, because US power and leadership was directly committed in a major test against the vaunted Communist strategy of "wars of national liberation." The financial drain would be extremely heavy, but the real test would lie in its intellectual challenge to US leaders and staffs in Washington and Saigon to comprehend the nature of the enemy strategy and to develop a winning counter-strategy. The purpose of this paper is to trace the course of this effort.

In the years 1962-63 the US realigned its political, economic and psychological programs away from the normal purposes of supporting US objective and long range "nation-building" in Vietnam, and directed all US Country Team agencies to the short-term objective of helping the GVN advance its counterinsurgency program. Instead of the cities, the center of impact of all programs was now the countryside, where the war was being fought out.

The major political achievement and the brightest aspect of these years was the Strategic Hamlet program, borrowed in concept from the Malayan insurgency experience. Its purposes were to: (1) isolate and protect the peasantry from the VC, (2) prevent the peasantry's use by the VC as a logistic and recruitment base, and (3) identify the peasant's loyalty with the GVN through economic programs to raise his standard of living. Of the program's objective to build and defend 11,000 strategic hamlets and 12 million peasants, it had by

0315507000

September 1963 reached substantial fulfillment. Some 9.5 million of the peasantry were housed in over 8,000 hamlets of varying degrees of completion and protection. Over 200,000 hamlet militia were semi-armed and partially trained to defend the hamlets, which were also the center of a wide variety of civic action, school construction, agricultural and other social and economic programs to improve standards of living generally.<sup>4</sup>

This political success was matched by better planned and conducted military pacification operations under direct US guidance at all major levels; by early 1963 the VC's military forces and political infrastructure were feeling the pressure. In the North, the VC were losing their ability to extract taxes from the population, secure their cooperation and use them as a source of recruits, medical supplies, food and a place to hide, rest and train. Recognizing the strategic hamlets as the cause of their diminishing power, they sought to destroy them. In doing so they were at last playing the US/GVN's game, for their attacks cast them in the role of the aggressor. Their operations met with stiffening resistance, and the peasants in growing numbers were providing intelligence to the GVN. While the Delta remained the stubborn center of VC resistance, hope for the successful defeat of the insurgency rose high. President Kennedy reflected this view in a statement that "the spearpoint of the aggression was blunted in Vietnam."<sup>5</sup>

Now six months later, in December 1963, the situation had reversed. President Diem was dead by assassination, the morale of the people at

large was at a low ebb, and the VC were on the political and military offensive everywhere. The fabric of the government itself was torn; the political control structure from Saigon down into the hamlets had virtually disappeared. Of 41 incumbent province chiefs in late 63, 35 were replaced. Nine provinces had three chiefs in three months; one province had four. Almost all senior military commands changed hands twice. GVN military defections mounted to an alarming total for 1963, and thousands of weapons were lost to the VC; meanwhile VC defections fell to a new low.<sup>6</sup> What had gone wrong, and what was being done to recover lost ground? The record of US/GVN actions, particularly since November 1963, possibly may provide the clues of developing political strategy; for the leadership was driven by the spur of crisis.

First, there is the issue of leadership in counterinsurgency. Obviously, there was much that the US mission in Saigon could do little about, for the ultimate power belonged to the Diem family regime. Much of the problem of winning the war was the requirement for wisdom and resolute leadership at the top posts of the GVN, and here there were serious shortfalls. Brian Crozier's remarks about governments in the face of an insurgent problem seems to apply to the Vietnam case:<sup>7</sup>

"An administration, given long and ample warning that a rebellion is brewing ought to be able to prevent it. In practice few....do. It is not that they do not act, but they take the wrong kind of action."

Diem, his family and regime all fell short of Mao's prescription about leaders: they "must be models for the people."<sup>8</sup> Diem lacked

CONFIDENTIAL

wisdom in his fatal involvements with the Buddhists and the students, and further, in the tradition of the withdrawn, dignified mandarin, he lacked the charisma so essential to the leadership of a people involved in civil war. By his actions and policies it appeared that he had surrendered the causes of nationalism, political unity and reform to the VC.

In 1964, General Khanh came to the head of the GVN. In contrast to Diem he seemed to be an able and energetic leader with demonstrated grasp of the political, military and psychological elements needed to defeat the VC. At the moment he is struggling to renew the attack against the VC, to rebuild the police and operations of the civil government and to restore the morale of the people. The significance of this experience seems clear: regardless of the magnitude of the US effort in skill and materiel, the task of counterinsurgency in Vietnam or elsewhere cannot succeed without judgment, personal leadership and a high order of skill in the indigenous leadership. The US mission chiefs exploited the new situation by reaffirming US support of the GVN and by repeated encouragement to General Khanh to provide the charismatic, vigorous and able leadership the situation demanded.

Together with this new vitality at the top, the former regime's policy of holding US advisors at arms length in all but military matters has also changed for the better. The present GVN attitude is to seek closer cooperation with US agencies in Saigon and in the field. The change has provided an important opportunity for the US to participate more actively in the necessary reform and training of

SECRET

the GVN political administration at the national and local level. The evils at which reform was directed were the main causes of popular loss of support. The principal talk of the people has been about the corruption of officials, abuse of police power, extortion, summary justice, arbitrariness, unkept promises and inefficiency of local leaders. US advisors have long known of these defects and attempts were made in the past to correct them by training elements of both the national and local political administration. The present trend would appear to be a recognition by both the US and GVN of the need for thorough-going reform on a broad scale never fully attempted before with US civil advisors from AID and USIS participating directly. This would include on the job training of district, hamlet, village and province chiefs and their staffs, as well as suitable training for hamlet action teams and civic action cadres. The problem seems to require not only technical guidance, but a change in the attitude of officials toward the peasantry.

As mentioned above, the GVN under President Diem did not take US advisors into its confidence in many non-military matters, was unwilling to provide much-needed information, and frequently delayed or took no action on matters the Country Team regarded as important. The US had sought to press its views through proposals for joint US/GVN committees, to take lists of major problems to Diem and his ministers for action, to push continuously day-by-day on single projects considered important, or to seek to bypass the ministers and work on an ad hoc basis at the local level. These techniques were

01150700

often slow and sometimes fruitless; frustration led to the feeling at times that the job of counterinsurgency was too big for the GVN, and that, in its own interest, the US should exercise direct overall command of the war effort. While this point of view appears somewhat extreme and incompatible with the political character of the struggle, it is indicative of the constant search for better arrangements to unify, coordinate and integrate the activities of the many US/GVN agencies operating in the countryside and Saigon. There is reason to believe that better coordinating machinery could and should be provided at the top US/GVN political level (discussed in Chapter V, pp. <sup>54-55</sup> ). Given the new high in US/GVN cooperation, there is an opportunity which could be exploited to provide the mechanisms for a more unified direction of the war which would hopefully provide the US leaders wider sources of information and far greater participation in decision-making.

The problem of coordination are also present in the conduct of US Country Team programs. Since the step-up of US civil and military efforts in 1961 and their focus on the countryside, the trend has been toward improved arrangements for such coordination. All US agencies have discovered that this problem is most pressing and not fully solved. Here the issue is posed that more central direction and more effective and detailed coordination seems necessary that can be provided under the Country Team concept in the face of a full-blown, Communist insurgency. (Discussion in Chapter V, p. <sup>54-55</sup> ).

DELETED



and to provide a plan for political action with public appeal. Its provisions include: (1) promises to remove many of the injustices of the New Rural Life Hamlet Program (NRLHP), (2) steps to decentralize and simplify the administration of government and improve selection of officials, (3) the easing of terms of payment and taxation on land, and permitting squatters to use land temporarily occupied by them, (4) the provision of social, educational and public health services to the nation, and (5) the establishment of a General Office for People's Suggestions and Complaints - "a link between me and every citizen in the whole country."<sup>12</sup>

Top US leaders appear to be favorably impressed by General Khanh and his program.<sup>13</sup> While the program has merit, there is reason to ask if it goes far enough. Assuming that it is a genuine basis for action, and that action will shortly follow, it still is not the total political program which can compete with the VC cry of "Land for the Tiller." It falls short of striking at the age old inequities and grievances--to satisfy the desire of the peasant for land. In fairness, many hold that land and tenancy reform is not a major source of peasant discontent. The Viet Min experience, however, suggests otherwise, that land reform became a vital issue during the Indo China War (1945-54). General Giap has written on this point:<sup>14</sup>

"....the anti-feudal task was somewhat neglected and the peasant question underestimated in importance. In 1952-53 our party decided to mobilize the masses for a drastic reduction of land rent and carry out land reform, implementing the slogan, "Land to the Tiller." Hence, the resistance

DELETED



spirit of millions of peasants was strongly roused...and resistance activities intensified."

On the French side, a colonel commanding a mobile group in Indo China said in 1953:<sup>15</sup>

"This is not a military war in the old sense. It is not even a political war. What we're facing here is a social war, a class war. As long as we don't...abolish excessive tenancy rates, and do fail to give every farmer his own plot of land, this country will go Communist as soon as we turn our backs."

While judgments of this sort are difficult, these views suggest that any political program which does not address itself to this point-- which does not promise and fulfill rather sweeping measures of land and tenancy reform--will fail to arouse support in a land where 80% of the people are peasants. The VC have long promised the land free; the peasants in South Viet Nam are, therefore, not impressed by permission to use the land temporarily and by promises for long and low payments plans. The time may have come where the redistribution must occur on a free basis, with the US helping in the dislocation and costs involved.

Perhaps US reluctance lies in approaching a problem where aggravated class conflict surely exists within the Vietnamese society. Nevertheless, a start was once made, and some 140,000 landless peasant families received land from 1954 to 1959.<sup>16</sup> Progress could and should be resumed, but within a wider context of programs to provide reasonable farm credit, cheap fertilizer, cooperative market facilities, and supported agricultural prices. Such a step may be the missing element in General Khanh's political

01150700

program. The time is late, and if land and tenancy reform are to be a part of broad political reform, it must be soon. The Director General of GVN Land Reform believes that the VC are making headway with their land reform propaganda and that "most peasants feel they would get land under the Communists."<sup>17</sup>

Another possible shortfall in General Khanh's political program is in the area of "grass roots" political organization and local self government. The Diem regime proliferated political organizations in the countryside, to the extent that mandatory membership in frequently more than one became time-consuming and burdensome; however, these were for the purpose of indoctrination and control of the population. Local expression of independent views were discouraged and when the crisis came in November 1963, this structure of political organizations largely collapsed. At the moment, there is no genuine, strong, popularly supported GVN political structure at the local level to counter the incessant drumfire of VC propaganda and provide a basis of political support for the government. The GVN is therefore at a major and perhaps fatal disadvantage in the battle for the peasant's mind--the primary objective of the conflict. It lacks the machinery of support and persuasion.

The beginnings of "grass roots" support are possible, it would seem, if the government is prepared to trust the peasantry sufficiently to permit them to elect their own hamlet and village leaders. This hopefully could not only engender support for the GVN, but would also generate open local views and permit these views (with the help

of a reformed local administration as promised by General Khanh) to permeate upward through district and province to national level, where they can be considered and acted upon. Also, to provide the machinery of political organization, it would appear that the GVN would require teams of political action personnel, dedicated and trained - perhaps with US help - to operate at hamlet level and move throughout the unsafe country areas. Considering the nature of the VC terror such people are hard to find; but it is possible that the students, who are increasingly active politically, could provide the source for the rather substantial numbers of these cadres needed. This step could also provide a useful, positive political role for young intellectuals, presently uncommitted politically, who if left in their present situation could turn to the VC. Meanwhile, however, on the GVN side the emphasis on local political action, as it appears in both General Khanh's political program and other statements, seems still to be in the direction of indoctrination, control and coercion, with no more than promises for future steps toward more representative institutions.

To sum up, major strides have been made in continuing US/GV efforts to apply the large resources of both governments more efficiently and successfully to the tasks of counterinsurgency.

1. The US has learned a lot of lessons quickly since 1961, including the vital one that its own wisdom, energy and power will fail in Vietnam unless there is also present a wise, energetic, charismatic, indigenous leadership.

01150700

2. The US does understand that political success in the countryside is mandatory, and that a reasonably honest, able non-political, public administration service is indispensable to that political success.

3. The US/GVN leadership has become more conscious of the need for unity, cooperation and coordinated, joint leadership of US and GVN counterinsurgency programs in the countryside.

4. Within the US Country Team, the need for combined and coordinated planning and action is deeply felt, and steps in this direction have been a conscious effort since 1961 and especially today.

5. In perhaps the decisive political area, General Khanh with US guidance has acted vigorously to remedy a major failure of the past by providing a generally well conceived, short-term political program of reform and progress with considerable appeal to the people as a whole. The view here is that the program specifically fails in the area of land and tenancy reform.

6. A further shortfall is in the need for greater self-government at the hamlet and village level together with the need to organize a more genuine and acceptable political organization in the countryside to support the regime. The opportunity seems still available but time is fleeting.

7. In political counterinsurgency strategy the US/GVN have achieved a crucial advance through the adoption and implementation of the Strategic Hamlet Program as the central instrument in the pacification of the countryside and the focus for nearly all of the civil and much of the military effort of both governments.

CHAPTER II

TRENDS IN MILITARY

COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN VIETNAM

At the outset certain comments are useful concerning the nature and thrust of VC military strategy which adheres closely to Chinese Communist precepts. Of overriding importance is its subordination to political objectives and strategy:

"It is vital that these simple minded militarists be made to realize that between politics and military affairs, military action is a method used to attain a political goal."

Mao Tse-tung<sup>18</sup>

Equally important is the corollary that uniting the entire people to fight the resistance war is essential to success in "wars of national liberation". Mao provided guidance on this point:

"All the people of both sexes from the ages of sixteen to forty-five must be organized into self defense units... they must be given both military and political training. Their responsibilities are: local sentry duty, securing information of the enemy, arresting traitors, and preventing the dissimulation of enemy propaganda...(they must) assist the combatant guerrillas...they furnish stretcher bearers to transport the wounded, carriers to take food to the troops with tea and rice....Such units are the resevoirs for the orthodox forces."<sup>19</sup>

VC tactical doctrine also follows Mao's instruction.

"In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attack from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harrass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws."<sup>20</sup>

031557130

No guerrilla battle is regarded as decisive; when the farmer receives arms he becomes a soldier and is regarded as a better one than a regular army soldier, "because the latter are not able to undergo the hardships of guerrilla campaigning over long periods."<sup>21</sup> In Military terms the correct strategy is:

"Long term resistance war, self-reliance and the guiding principle--guerrilla warfare and eventually advancing to mobile warfare."

The VC conduct of the war to date reflects these principles.

Since 1954 they have established base areas (or strongholds) in the central lowlands, in the south east provinces and in the Delta. All are fortified, intensely active, and near rich agricultural areas with access to recruitment and popular support. Here the VC are building and training their regular forces toward the final, decisive period of mobile warfare. Within the past year the number of VC regular battalions has mounted. This buildup has been possible, not only because of the security of these bases, but because of continuing support from North Vietnam. In 1963 over 2,000 Communist military personnel infiltrated from the north; these were not just soldiers, but regular army cadres of platoons, companies, battalions and higher commands and staffs, the skeleton of the formal VC military structure which peasant recruits from the south would flesh out. With these men have come arms, ammunition and munitions from North Vietnam and Red China.<sup>23</sup>

In this connection, and of real significance, is the fact that the VC has not, except in the instance of November 1961, fully employed its military strength. They are not forcing a military decision at this time, but are building up their forces and political strength to the point where there is no danger of defeat. VC forces now probably have the strength to take several provincial capitals in the delta, but have deliberately held their hand.

The point of this review is to suggest that the VC military action has a uniquely dangerous quality--that it is not an end in itself but a controlled, supporting tool of political strategy. The war is far more than a guerrilla operation, for behind the screen of guerrilla activity is an operating government, both national and local with its own province and district chiefs, staffs and functionaries. There are therefore two governments, two administrations at war on the same territory, both seeking to influence, direct, and govern.

With this backdrop against which to measure the trends of US/GVN military strategy, it is now useful to return to the US decision of late 1961 (see Chapter I, p. 4). In its steps to provide massive support to the GVN, the US sought to maximize the capability of GVN military forces to defeat the VC. This meant, among a number of actions which were rapidly taken, a reorganized and expanded Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to train and advise GVN forces, an expansion of GVN military, paramilitary and covert forces, the provision of much special equipment (aircraft, helicopters, small naval craft, etc.), and of decisive importance a redirection of all

031507030

major civil programs to support the expanded counterinsurgency military operations. On its side the GVN took two important related actions-- an acceleration of the Strategic Hamlet Program and the development of an overall [tactical] counterinsurgency plan by the VN Joint General Staff.

Underlying these measures was a change in the strategic concept away from conventional operations (those for which the US had trained GVN forces since 1954) to small unit operations oriented on the offensive and emphasizing action. Implementation of the concept was not simple or rapid because conventional forces had to be trained for the independent nature, hardships and uncertainties of counterinsurgency operations, that is, to adopt guerrilla tactics themselves.

Also the nature of the conflict was complex, and even the best trained troops had difficulty in grasping the political context in which counterinsurgency operations take place, with the need for judicious balance between the operations that maintain and strengthen popular support and simultaneously ferret out the guerrillas seeking to destroy the society.

US/GVN actions were vigorous, on the whole well directed, and showed results. US Army helicopter companies, Special Forces units and Air Force (Jungle Jim) units soon appeared on the scene; US advisors were assigned to battalion level in Armed Forces Viet Nam (ARVN) units, a nation-wide military communications net was established, and both US and VN military strength increased steadily.<sup>24</sup>

DECLASSIFIED



US	To 15,500	Mid 1964
VN		
ARVN (Regular Forces)	250,000	" "
Civil Guard (Province Troops) and Self Defense Corps (District Troops)	200,000	" "
Hamlet Militia (Hamlet local defense tps)	200,000	" "

A number of organizational adjustments occurred. The powers of the Joint General Staff were broadened to better cope with the demands of the war. A National Campaign Plan appeared - the first of its kind. It aimed at clearing and holding critical areas of the country-side, using small unit operations and stressing mobility with helicopters and tactical air support. It directed priority areas of operations; military "clear and hold" operations were related to the Strategic Hamlet Program, and closer coordination of ARVN, CG and SDC units, together with air units, was provided. Measures were also taken to improve the conduct of troops toward the peasantry, including matters as depending on military rather than civilian sources of supply, paying for broken things, not walking on growing crops, leaving the women alone, and assisting in local aid projects through military civic action. Publications on these subjects are strikingly similar to Mao's "Three Rules and Eight Remarks."<sup>25</sup>

President Diem's support of this strategy began a fruitful period of intensified cooperation at all US/GVN military levels, and US advisors got directly into the planning and coordinating process. This set the stage for a country-wide counterinsurgency offensive. Due to rapid reaction capabilities (especially in using helicopters and bombing aircraft), the tempo of GVN attacks mounted, thus denying

011507100

the VC time to plan and launch major attacks. Meanwhile, the Strategic Hamlet Program was progressing rapidly. Especially in the north, successful operations gave promise of a growing GVN capability to clear and hold the countryside. In the south, some gains were made, but the GVN could do little more than fight a holding operation while awaiting more troops. By mid- 1963 VC casualties were mounting; their troops were on the defensive. This was a time of crisis for the VC, for the revolution was failing to widen and deepen, and numbers of resistance fighters began to lose faith. There were shortages of food, and VC troops were diverted to raise food or seize it through raids on the hamlets.<sup>26</sup>

In spite of this brightening military picture, the political crisis of late 1963 and the confusion of its aftermath brought the military pacification program to a halt and reversed the situation to one of deep crisis for the GVN. The surprising thing, in retrospect, is not that the deterioration in national morale at this time caused the offensive to lose momentum, but that the military effort continued at such a high level and with considerable success for weeks after the political disintegration of the Diem Regime was far advanced.

Thus, the political reasons were primary in the weakening military effort, but there was military reasons for weakness too. Apparently at Diem's direction there had been an overcentralization in the conduct of operations in Saigon, which caused deep frustrations and much fruitless activity at local level. There were also competing, divisive, multiple channels of authority which stalemated and confused the operating level, as well as a compartmentalization of forces

which hindered necessary coordination. The Strategic Hamlets Program had been overextended beyond the point where GVN forces could protect them. The training of Hamlet Militia had not kept pace, and many were half trained and unarmed. Morale was low because of Diem's political failures and injustices, poor pay and combat losses to the VC. The morale of other GVN forces suffered some deterioration for similar reasons. Also, as the Diem regime fell, the VC seized the opportunity to launch their greatest offensive of the war, and many hard-won gains of the months past were wiped out with losses in men, materiel and weapons.

As the new regime of General Khanh sought to stabilize the military situation in the countryside and restore the lost momentum of the GVN military offensive, it was clear that there was much rethinking necessary, for the old answers were no longer adequate. There were first of all efforts to correct the errors of the Strategic Hamlet (now the New Rural Life Hamlet) Program (NRLHP). The central role of the program in holding the countryside, indeed in saving the state, was understood, for only through this program could sufficient political support, military security and economic resources be brought to bear on the hamlets to enable the GVN to compete with the VC for the loyalties of the peasants. Among other things, the requirement that the peasant must live in strategic hamlets was relaxed, certain of the more flagrant abuses were eliminated, and exposed hamlets too far in VC-held territory were give up. Other hamlets were consolidated for greater security. And most important,

CONFIDENTIAL

the new regime was determined to integrate the New Rural Life Hamlet Program fully with the military clear and hold operations. The GVN plan for resuming the offensive <sup>27</sup> sought to meld the two concepts into one, and is largely addressed to the task of adjusting military support and other types of resources to protect and consolidate the hamlets.

While there are many similarities between the new Plan and the old National Campaign Plan, a number of differences appear which seem designed to enable the former to cope somewhat better with the situation. A primary emphasis of the Plan is its concern with the political objective: the people. Its central thrust is to ferret out and destroy the underground VC infrastructure and establish a friendly one. Of equal importance is its drive to win local support through coordinated political-military-economic-social action at the hamlet level. The primary objective is not so much VC forces, who are screened away from the pacification area by ARVN and paramilitary units, but the security and control of the people.

Another key aspect of the Plan is the decentralization of detailed planning and operational responsibility to the province chief and his staff. (An experiment is under way in the 21st ARVN Division area which tends to support a further shift downward of the focus of combat planning and operations to the District Chief.)<sup>28</sup> This shift will generate changes in the function of higher headquarters (Division, Corps, GVN Joint General Staff) by: (1) reducing their role to that of policy guidance and the provision of troops and

DECLASSIFIED



The point is that an effort of this magnitude, going on throughout the country, presents a tremendous problem in training hundreds of these specialist groups in the first place and then in coordinating and supervising their operations. Such an effort appears beyond the scope of the GVN province and district administrations without direct US civil and military participation and much assistance. If realistically pursued, the effort could not do otherwise than result in many more US, USOM, USIS and MAAG personnel in operational duties at province and district level. At the present time only the US Army has advisors at the district level.

Just as the decentralization of operations to province chiefs creates the need for much greater unity in policy direction and coordination, so also do the operations of New Life Hamlet Construction Groups. It appears that demands for coordination may become so heavy and continuing that new organizational machinery would be necessary to coordinate US County Team activities and US/GVN central direction and coordination as well. If the new plan is fully implemented, it should without doubt present an unparalleled challenge to both US and GVN officials at all levels.

It should also be said that there seems to be a greater GVN effort then before to get away from "broad generalities" and down to the specifics - "the short strokes" - in military planning. With the center of gravity of operational planning and operations at province level, there may be a better opportunity to focus effort on

DECLASSIFIED

the real situation, and carry out with help from above, the practical, detailed, realistic actions that are necessary.

Finally, in seeking the trends and directions in military strategy, the judgment is sound that there has been a steady record of progress from 1961 to the present. This progress appears to be that of a widening discovery of the nature of the conflict together with a process of seeking and attempting to implement new techniques which show promise. This process of discovery has accelerated as the Khanh regime struggles to consolidate its position and renew the military offensive. At this stage it is possible to hazard certain implications:

1. Counterinsurgency operations are far more difficult to conduct than insurgency operations. The US/GVN has to "play ball all day every day to win, but the VC only has to come out and play when it chooses to do so."<sup>29</sup>

2. More troops will be required than the US probably had any reason to believe in 1961 or possibly realizes now. Perhaps a ratio of 15 to 20 GVN to one VC will be needed.

3. The US will find it increasingly difficult to limit its role to that of advisor, trainer and provider of resources only for the GVN. The pressures of active warfare push US civil and military personnel into operating roles, and this is often imperative to get the job done. The new Plan in its coordinated military-political-economic- psychological thrust will reinforce these pressures.

0311507030

4. There is still a conflict between winning the war and winning the people. The sorts of actions the GVN military propose to control the population, wipe out the VC infrastructure and replace it with a friendly one, are not in some respects the actions designed to win the support of the population. Yet these military actions appear necessary for security reasons.

5. Similarly, there is a tendency among the GVN military and civil officials to give the peasant what the authorities think is good for him in civic action and similar programs and not to satisfy his real grievances--to give him what he wants.

6. The demand for better US/GVN military coordination at all levels is an unprecedented challenge for both the US and GVN.

7. The shortage of troops seems to have prevented attempts thus far to go directly and finally at the VC strongholds while concurrently conducting the pacification program under current seize and hold operations. Since the former task cannot continue to go untended, and GVN resources are already overstrained, the US must sooner or later be driven to considering its own forces for this mission, or to bolster seize and hold operations.

8. The war is going to be very long, if the present GVN military planning is a reliable guide for the future--perhaps as long as ten years. However, the period of 1961-63 seems to give evidence that the VC was vulnerable and far from impregnable. Perhaps VC vulnerability stems from the fact that the revolution, if it is to succeed, must continually grow; it must widen and deepen. Therefore, if the

DECLASSIFIED



insurgency can be pushed back, if it can at least be held resolutely, the signs of decay and disintegration should begin to appear among the VC.

9. Of the utmost importance, military planning has so integrated the New Rural Life Hamlet Program into clear and hold military operations that both programs have in fact melded into a single integrated concept and program at the operational level (See Chapter V, pp. 59-62).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER III

TRENDS IN ECONOMIC COUNTERINSURGENCY

STRATEGY IN VIETNAM

General Giap, Commander of Viet Min forces during the French Indo-China War, states the problem of Communist insurgency in logistics, supply and resources generally in these words: "The sole source of supply could only be the battle front."<sup>30</sup> While the statement is not wholly true for the present situation, since military supplies, equipment and weapons are brought in from North Vietnam, it does suggest the poverty of VC resources. In the field, VC forces must live off the land or the enemy; this means seizing or "taxing" food from the peasantry, raising it themselves, or attacking GVN units to seize their needs. In contrast the situation of the GVN could hardly seem more favorable. In addition to its own resources, it has received some \$200 million a year in economic aid from the US, a massive program for a country of some fifteen million people.<sup>31</sup>

This US/GVN advantage is so overwhelming that one would expect to find here a major weapon for the defeat of the VC; indeed the history of USOM's actions in Vietnam since 1962 has been a vigorous, continuing effort to make this so. The problem, however, was not a simple one. Prior to 1962, US aid was directed primarily toward long range economic and social development. This approach stressed the development of economic and social infrastructure; that is basic, long range investment, development of national institutions and key

human resources. All of these were important for Vietnam's future growth but were generally of indirect benefit to the rural population. By mid 1962 USOM leaders were seeking to respond to the US decision that economic aid should be diverted from this role and committed as quickly and effectively as possible in support of the counterinsurgency effort. They were perplexed because with such heavy dollar expenditures annually to assist and strengthen the Vietnamese, the peasantry seemed unaware of what was being done for them; and the VC, supported by a large percentage of the local population, was taking over more and more of the countryside. USOM concluded that the situation was not alone the result of military mistakes but weaknesses in AID's and the GVN's area of economic responsibility.<sup>32</sup>

While AID activities conformed to all normal criteria and guidelines of US AID practice, the program impact was generally in the cities, not the countryside where the decisive operations were being fought out; the programs were designed for long term results, yet the country was going down the drain in the short run. Little really coordinated AID effort occurred in a given area or village. Programming procedures for obtaining resources and technicians from the US were based on a three year cycle, which was too slow to cope with the rapid, changing demands of the counterinsurgency effort. USOM customarily delivered supplies to the GVN ministries under project agreements, but the latter were ill-equipped by experience and training to pass on the benefits to the countryside or to act as rapidly and efficiently as the situation demanded. USOM had little access to

CONFIDENTIAL

internal GVN budgetary or economic planning, which in any event were too slow and inflexible for the job to be done. Also, in spite of the tremendous US dollar commitment in AID there were often local currency shortages in trying to support the right counterinsurgency effort at the right place and the right time. Within USOM, AID technical divisions tended to operate somewhat independently and generally resisted measures to control and coordinate them closely. Indeed the organization of USOM did not lend itself to true integration of effort, and had never been designed to wage economic counterinsurgency warfare. It was also true in some cases that USOM personnel tended to regard counterinsurgency as the military's business, not AID's, and to some extent a business-as-usual attitude rather than a sense of urgency existed.

In the period 1962-63 the great bulk of the AID program was decisively reoriented from the traditional economic development and technical assistance programs to direct support of the US/GVN counterinsurgency effort. The first category of the new program was "Counterinsurgency" and consisted of action plans supporting the hamlet establishment or development phases of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Its second element was "War Infrastructure", those activities devoted to the maintenance or improvement of national communications, utilities, etc. required to support the war effort. The final and now minor part of the program was the "social and economic development" category, which was longer-range, rather similar to the old program, and designed to facilitate the eventual transition of the nation from war to peacetime operations.

In a basic departure, program procedures were changed to "deprojectize" many activities, so that time-consuming features could be eliminated or shortened. Among these the Action Plan Memoranda (APM) were developed, which spelled out definite agreements between the two governments on defined aspects of the program, set forth what was to be done during the year, who was to do it, etc. The Action Plan Piastre Agreement (AP/PA) was a further step by which the governments agreed on the piastre requirements for an APM. By these devices to habit of delivering aid resources to the ministries was moderated, and a basis was established for common understanding and coordination on adequately funded programs. To permit placement of commodity orders direct by USOM to the degree needed to cut lead time drastically the Procurement Authorization Application (PAA) and the Procurement Authorization Purchase Requisition (PA/PR) were set up as instruments for the initiation of dollar procurement of commodities required by an approved APM.<sup>33</sup>

To further expedite AID operations, two distinct, concurrent logistic cycles were set up: (1) a stockpiling operation similar to military supply dumps, established prior to firm plans as to use and available for emergencies, either physically in Vietnam or in pipeline to insure quick reaction time; and (2) a concurrent cycle for identification and approval of resources to be committed as a part of combined US/GVN pacification operations.<sup>34</sup> This latter cycle constituted USOM's effort to conduct its major and deliberate planning processes as a coordinated input into the Strategic Hamlet Program.

0315070311

SECRET

SECRET

As an indicator of the positive nature of USOM's shift from its customary role into the counterinsurgency field, GVN pressures for a US dollar cost grant were converted into a US purchase of \$10 million in piastres which USOM, through its field operations, could commit to meet immediate, pressing counterinsurgency needs.

Of the first importance, the USOM staff was reorganized to permit USOM to respond rapidly and to coordinate its input into counterinsurgency operations. The customary system of strong, parallel, generally independent technical divisions was subordinated within a chain of command and staff type organization not unlike the military. Province representatives were established in the critical provinces; they reported to a new key staff officer in USOM, the Assistant Director for Rural Affairs, a "line officer" who became the action center in coordinating the development and implementation of the USOM counterinsurgency program in Vietnam. As such, much of his task was to integrate the activities of the several technical divisions (Agriculture, Public Safety, Public Administration, Education, Communications Media, Public Health, and Industrial Development) by monitoring expediting and integrating their counterinsurgency action plans during their execution in the provinces.<sup>35</sup>

As a major attempt to improve the integration of AID programs in counterinsurgency with other US Country Team policy and programs in the same field, USOM's Assistant Director for Rural Affairs became the AID representative on the US Agency Province Rehabilitation Commission,

031507030

using the Technical Divisions for advice and support.<sup>36</sup> This arrangement hopefully would inform USOM on a more full and timely basis of the nature, thrust and scope of the many other US military and civil activities involved. This coordinating process it was believed would enable AID resources to impact on the countryside in a more precise, intended and integrated way than before.

The end result of these adjustments, new relationships and reorganizations was to make USOM an operator to an unprecedented degree at the local level. Now, or in the near future, in each province a three-man committee (the Province Chief, the US Military Sector Advisor and the USOM Province Representative) plan and coordinate most of the operations and commodity input into counterinsurgency in their respective provinces. As a member of this group the USOM province representative in the role of expeditor in a very wide range of activities. These included timely support for the counterinsurgency battle itself, disaster relief, refugee relocation, medical care, simple construction, improvement of agricultural practices, establishment of hamlet schools, rehabilitation of VC defectors, emergency shipment of commodities, planning and demonstrating self-help projects, drafting of surrender appeals, advising on improving hamlet elections, and working as a planner on pacification operations. He customarily made direct disbursements of piastre funds for such items as living expenses for Hamlet Militia in training, pay for civic action cadre, health workers and local employees; above all the Province Representative was now cast in the role of informal staff assistant of the GVN

REF ID: A66110



Province Chief. Probably no other US official abroad with the possible exception of the MAAG advisor in Vietnam, is so intimately and fully committed in the detailed, daily conduct of another country's business.<sup>37</sup>

Another indication of the profound involvement of USOM in counterinsurgency is the number and variety of the programs being supported and the dollars funded for each. Some of the more representative programs are listed for purposes of illustration (see page 38):<sup>38</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY:

FY 63      FY 64  
(in Thousands Dollars)

Counterinsurgency Category	16,178	22,760
War Infrastructure	7,810	6,019

COUNTERINSURGENCY

<u>Strategic Hamlet Plans (Provincial)</u>	2,352	3,459
Resettlement	226	160
Self-Help	1,532	1,406
Hamlet Schools	117	80
Provincial Development Works	191	1,803
Local Windmills	20	0
VC Rehabilitation and Resettlement	30	10

Strategic Hamlet Plans (National)

Rural Wells	164	2,705
Special Livestock Development	166	110
Fertilizer	3,846	6,400
Plant Protection	1,309	960
Village Hamlet Radios	456	497

Rural Operations Support

Land Settlement and Agric. Equip. & Maint	262	86
Irrigation	93	85
Rural Health	2,358	4,800
Malarial Eradication	858	550
Support of Rural Affairs	530	1,370
Military Civic Action	670	130

WAR INFRASTRUCTURE

Electric Power	2,394	1,400
Railway Sabotage Replacement	324	100
Dredging and Waterway Maintenance	1,328	1,500
National Information Program	275	275
National Radio Network	238	177
National Radio Network	173	53
Public Safety Services (Police)	2,174	1,800

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED

In spite of the redirection of USOM's effort, the political crisis, intervening in mid 1963, caused such turmoil and confusion that GVN economic programs lost momentum and started sliding downhill by September. Only in some cases were USOM rural activities able, by their own direct operations and plugging gaps where GVN efforts were suspended, to keep programs on schedule. In early 1964 the Khanh Regime, seeking to revitalize the economic counterinsurgency program, proposed a joint US/GVN review of economic problems. Meanwhile USOM, also greatly concerned, offered to increase support for the counterinsurgency program, particularly in the Delta where the military situation was most acute. The US offer involved acceleration and expansion of FY 64 programs.<sup>39</sup>

At this time there is again a search for more effective ways to conduct all aspects of economic counterinsurgency, for vigorous as developments have been since 1961, they now appeared less than adequate to counter a situation of further deterioration of the GVN position. What further changes will come are, of course, speculation. However, the developing nature of economic strategy up to the present time should provide some indicators,

1. Primarily the trend has been toward a more short-term economic strategy featuring integrated activities within USOM, between USOM and other Country Team agencies, between USOM and GVN Ministries.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. There has particularly developed far greater operational integration at the rural level, where the AID Province Representative, while retaining his role as advisor, is now an operator and expeditor in numerous civil-military operations.

3. The trend has also been toward new organizational arrangements and procedures to obtain greater, rapidity, efficiency and flexibility of operations. These new procedures have emphasized a larger leadership role in USOM vis-a-vis the GVN Ministries in contrast to the former advisory role; they have tended to generate action and coordination in the GVN ministries, and to make USOM an operator in the sense that it had only partially been before.

4. There appears little doubt that the impact of AID on the country side has been a powerful weapon for the GVN and vital to the NRLH Program. As the crisis worsens, it is reflected by US offers to increase and accelerate the flow of economic resources into the counterinsurgency battle.

5. AID programs are having a fundamental impact and are in fact generating a vast social revolution throughout the nation. However, its persuasive effect in bringing the peasantry to support the GVN have probably been less than our expectation. There has been the view that a major missing ingredient beyond the purview of the economic area is the need for a "rice roots" political organization, self-governing at hamlet level, to exploit the impact of AID and translate it into meaningful terms to the peasantry.

DECLASSIFIED

6. A further major issue which arises frequently in the economic field is that the GVN must soon offer basic incentives to restore peasant support for the regime; primarily this means that the GVN should launch a prompt, meaningful land and tenancy reform, perhaps accompanied by forgiveness of back rest<sup>✓</sup> and taxes to small holders. This step would create a large number of small farmers with title or holding rights to small plots of land; many small farmers would acquire a major stake in the survival of the GVN.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CHAPTER VI

TRENDS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL COUNTERINSURGENCY

STRATEGY IN VIETNAM

The emphasis on psychological warfare and propaganda in the strategy of Communist insurgency is so well known that little amplification is needed here. Chapter I and II (pp. 8-50) have summarized briefly the total nature of the VC political and psychological effort. Their success in generating wide support, dedication, even fanaticism, for the VC cause is a recognized fact and a genuine cause of concern.<sup>40</sup>

In the winter of 1961-62 when the US initiated its program of accelerated, massive support for the GVN, it became apparent that the VC were dismayingly more effective than the US/GVN in its propaganda. The numbers of the VC propaganda workers were known to be at least twice as many as the 2,000 urban and provincial Vietnam Information Service (VIS) staff. Moreover, the VIS was found to be largely ineffective.<sup>41</sup>

At this time the United States Information Service (USIS) in Vietnam was concentrating on the standard USIA objective worldwide of building an image of "a strong enlightened America."<sup>42</sup> Its staff was small and its budget was modest (as late as FY 64 no more than \$2,250,000).<sup>43</sup> In early 1962 USIS responded to the US national decision and sought, as did other in-country agencies, to convert its efforts into direct support of the counterinsurgency operation, primarily to the task of persuading the Vietnamese people to support the GVN against the VC insurgents. USIS increasingly camouflaged

these activities behind the front of the Vietnam Information Service (VIS), for open operations would have been exploited by the VC, and the GVN would only accept US direct efforts on this basis.

As time passed the USIS made progress in reinforcing VIS operations; counterinsurgency expenses came to represent two-thirds of overall direct costs.<sup>44</sup> USIS personnel felt, as they recognized gaps and requirements in the VIS effort, the need to perform many GVN psychological operations themselves; such operations would hopefully be on a short term basis, and would phase out as soon as the GVN could be sufficiently trained to take over. This major degree of involvement in GVN information activities generated considerable development in USIS doctrine and experience in counterinsurgency. US psychological objectives were worked out which aimed at: (1) generating popular support for the GVN, (2) undermining VC morale, and (3) strengthening GVN psychological operations. The peasant was identified as the major target, with youth (55% of the population) as the second target audience, and the urban intellectual as a third target.<sup>45</sup>

As USIS direct involvement became greater after 1961, its contributions to counterinsurgency mounted. The USIS unilateral program included the production of films, preparation of radio programs, a poster project publicizing GVN policies and numerous pamphlets and leaflets. For the hamlet level an agricultural magazine (Hong Que) of 250,000 circulation and a tabloid size weekly newspaper (35,000 circulation) were distributed to explain and dramatize clear and hold operations and the Strategic Hamlet Program. To this end also the

0310507030

USIS prepared numerous films, posters, match folders, booklets, radio interviews with hamlet chiefs, a comic strip ridiculing the VC, etc.<sup>46</sup>

During this period of accelerating US psychological effort, the GVN Ministry of Information (MOI) was broadcasting eighteen hours of radio programs daily, producing and showing some seventy five films annually, printing two regular publications, a weekly eight page news magazine (Dong Que), a weekly picture poster in 50,000 copies, and also numerous pamphlets and leaflets.<sup>47</sup> Distribution of both US and GVN materials was through the VIS, since the US did not have its own distribution capacity. Both programs, thus, were operating daily with the US powerfully supplementing, indeed the backbone, of the GVN effort.

This situation forced a series of organizational developments from 1961 through 1963 as the Country Team sought to adjust itself to the demands which were being placed by several psychological programs interacting upon one another in the counterinsurgency field. An institutional vacuum existed in coordinating the five US agencies engaged more or less in psychological matters (Embassy, MACV, MAAG, USOM, USIS). The decision was taken to give USIS the primary role in coordinating policy as to what advice all US agencies should give the GVN on counterinsurgency psychological operations. As early as 1961, the Public Affairs Officer, as the Ambassador's direct representative, became Chairman of the Psychological Operations Committee of the Saigon Task Force, the major coordinating arm in the psychological

DECLASSIFIED



field. There followed in May 1962 the creation of a Special Programs Division in USIS responsible for determining what kind of approaches were most successful in swaying the VN peasant. This action aroused MAAG interest and resulted in a proposal for creation of a permanent US inter-agency working group which would perform the same research service on behalf of all five agencies and also serve as secretariat and planner for the Psychological Operations Committee.<sup>48</sup>

Coordinating machinery with the GVN was established between the US Psychological Operations Committee and the parallel GVN Psychological Operations Committee which represented both the Arva Psychological War Directorate and the MOI. Joint monthly meetings were held in which the US side attempted to develop a unified, functional approach to psychological operations.<sup>49</sup>

At the rural level USIS sought to conduct field operations through five rural offices, each with a US/VN staff to maintain contact with the peasants. However, the primary effort was to strengthen VIS field operations, which consisted of some nineteen field support operations posts located in the forty-one provinces. USIS-trained and paid VN employee was stationed in each post with full GVN knowledge and approval. Though this employee was expected to work under the Province VIS chief, under this novel arrangement USIS gained information and influence. These employees deployed and used USIS equipment (projectors, films, etc.), and were a positive effort where in many cases the VIS personnel were largely inactive. The theory was to expose VIS local workers to the knowledge, energy and sense of

0915307034

duty of the USIS-trained operator; hopefully VIS personnel would also improve their performance, and then the whole operation and its equipment could be turned over to them.<sup>50</sup>

The political crisis of late 1963 and the period since have been a time of much reexamination for both USIS and the GVN. Notwithstanding USIS efforts, it had long been known that much was wrong with the US/GVN information effort. Most of it was beyond USIS control. The political mistakes and military reverses of this time combined to produce much confusion, chaos and lethargy in the GVN decision-making process, particularly in the MOI. This ministry had suffered from interference and arbitrary control from the Diem family. Following the coup it was further weakened by three changes in top leadership and almost total lack of policy direction. Added to these pressures were longstanding disintegrating factors of inefficiency, low morale, low pay and lack of incentive.<sup>51</sup>

Under Diem the MOI had adopted an "arms length" policy toward USIS, its nominal advisor, and primarily for this reason USIS had never been successful in persuading the GVN to adopt a combined set of objectives.<sup>52</sup> On its own the GVN had never issued a statement of its counterinsurgency objectives in the National Campaign or elsewhere. Nhu, Diem's brother, probably came closest to such a statement with "achieving a new style of life with new values."<sup>53</sup> In the absence of stated political objectives it is not surprising that there were no stated psychological or information objectives to guide the GVN ministries and field agencies.

The same lack of coordination and diffusion of effort that marked the GVN were also sometimes characteristic of US efforts in USIS and elsewhere. The USIS view had been that there has been no effective central coordinating agency that had sufficient authority and broad outlook to provide general guidance and direction to the US programs. While individual agency efforts have been considerable and in many ways effective, they have lost some of their impact through failure to work together on the basis of an overall plan. The US tendency has been for various agencies and corollary GVN operations to function independently. Thus, USIS tended to respond the field needs without adequate consultation or coordination. USIS has further felt that to secure a more effective GVN effort, one must also have a more effective overall US operation.<sup>54</sup>

The situation of late 1963 was even more confused at the local level than in Saigon. There was no clear cut definition of responsibility between the MOI and the province chiefs. The VIS would often not act without directions from Saigon, thus frustrating the efforts of the province chiefs to coordinate local operations. Apart from sector psychological war US advisory personnel there were no US information advisors at the province level, nor was there a coordinating body at this level to pull together the various US and GVN civil information projects. The GVN budget was not only small but so inflexible that even small amounts of piastres were unavailable for many inexpensive but useful projects. The greatest gap of all was the fact that the VIS stopped at the District level, and was not staffed for continuous

031507030

representation at the hamlet level--the decisive area where the impact of VC propaganda was heaviest.<sup>55</sup>

As bad as the situation was, there was one clear factor that favored the constructive development of counterinsurgency strategy in psychological and other fields as well. This was the disappearance of the Diem regime and General Khanh's greater willingness to work closely with US agencies. Developments in psychological strategy in recent months have therefore been rapid.

First, there were efforts to decentralize US/GVN psychological operations from Saigon to the province level, with national agencies in the role of providing guidance, resources and support. Of equal importance USIS has pressed the GVN to prepare and publish at an early date a National Information Plan containing statements of objectives, targets and other information policy necessities which would provide a foundation for the nation-wide information effort and media. Also in the policy field USIS has pushed for a short range GVN political program as a first priority matter and directed at the hamlets and villages. General Khanh's political address of 7 March 1964 constituted such a program, and assuming continuing action to fulfill the promises of that program, there is much appeal in it for the countryside. His frequent appearances in the provinces and "fireside chats" have been ideal steps which USIS has encouraged to dramatize the program and explain how political promises are translated into reality. USIS has proposed that much of the national information effort be built around the political program; the GVN should establish a system of

DECLASSIFIED

centralized collection of material on achievements and fulfillments, so that the peasantry could be informed on a timely and repeated basis. USIS has also favored the creation of an independent inspector system in the information field with US personnel participating, which would check the performance of the VIS at the local level.<sup>56</sup>

Trends in the area of organization simply press further in the directions already taken. Recognition is general of the need for unified, coordinated leadership and organization in the informational field on the part of both the GVN and USIS. Also there is the strong view that both government agencies should have a structure which should parallel and relate to one another at all levels. In the information field much of this exists in the US and GVN Psychological Operation Committees. However, to bring the two countries into closer operational harmony, General Khanh and Ambassador Lodge recently approved in principle a Joint Psychological Operations Group to serve as the central binational body.<sup>57</sup>

To provide integrated, binational support from Saigon to the provinces, USIS has in process of development and partial operation a Joint US/VN Service Center to which all US and VN agencies involved in the information program contribute personnel and equipment. This Center (now operational in eighteen of forty-three provinces) has a growing responsibility for production, distribution, analysis, planning and training of counterpart GVN personnel. The concept is that the center, with US personnel initially running it, would help the GVN carry out its National Information Program.<sup>58</sup>

031507034

To simplify the coordination mechanism at the province level, USIS has supported VIS province chiefs reporting to province chiefs and not primarily to the MOI. Coordination within the province, under the USIS view, could be greatly improved by the device of a joint (US/GVN) Provincial Psychological Operations Committees, which was tried with success in Binh Dinh Province in 1962.<sup>59</sup> By pooling effort and resources and providing machinery for coordination, it is hoped this device could focus a planned, energetic, coordinated information program into the hamlets. Under the chairmanship of the VIS province chief, representatives would be provided from ARVN Psychological War, the MAAG sector advisor, the USOM province representative, and the sector G-5. Because of the shortage of VN trained personnel, US personnel, either military or civil, would have to perform the bulk of this local effort initially and for some time to come.

At the hamlet level, USIS believes that the key to successful psychological operations is rural personnel who can communicate with the hamlet population on its own terms. USIS has therefore felt that highest priority be given to the training and development of skilled local information workers, who would be members of the hamlet action teams and work intimately in the New Rural Life Hamlet Program. In this way the chain of information would at last be constructed as a complete entity from the central government to the peasant.

USIS has had difficulties similar to USOM in the flexible adjustment of US and GVN budgetary resources to meet the demands of counterinsurgency on a timely basis. Piastres necessary at local level were badly needed to meet many minor costs (maintenance of

equipment, purchases of supplies, pay for minor employees, etc.). To meet such costs USIS had advocated the creation of a peastre petty cash fund which USIS and USOM local information officials could spend on a decentralized basis to meet local needs as they arose. Such officials it is believed, would require no more than \$150.00 a month in piastres for this purpose.<sup>60</sup>

Ultimately, the US/GVN information effort can only improve at the rate that technical skills, motivation and professionalism is trained into the MOI and the VIS. The pressure of USIS has been steady in this direction; meanwhile US personnel, to an increasing degree for the foreseeable future, will be thrust further into the provincial areas and deeper and more decisively into the daily process of grass roots operations.

It would seem that the implications of this review are these:

1. In spite of the best efforts of USIS since 1961, events largely beyond its control have frustrated the progress desired; the VC information and propaganda programs are probably still superior to those of the US/GVN.

2. This is due largely to the failure of the Diem regime to cooperate wholeheartedly with USIS in an information effort which required integrated direction and operation for success.

3. The recent thinking about USIS operations in Vietnam has emphasized the course which US/GVN information strategy in the counterinsurgency field could take in coming months.

031507034

(1) In policy, the implementation of an active political program with strong appeal to the countryside and a national information program to exploit it fully.

(2) In organization, steps toward strong, unified direction and integration of policy among US agencies and with the GVN Ministries.

(3) In the field, decentralization to and combined US/GVN operations at province and district level where the informational battle is heaviest. There is further the move to extend the VIS information structure to hamlet level.

4. In this larger, more integrated effort, USIS will play an expanded role; it would seem that US information officials must, while leaving the nominal leadership to the GVN, actually dominate the program at province level and below.



CHAPTER V

TOWARD A MORE INTEGRATED COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

In retrospect it would seem that the US has done about as well as could be expected in the novel environment of a Vietnamese civil war. US agencies have indeed shifted their programs from the customary objectives to meet the new demands of counterinsurgency operations. These shifts were accompanied by continuing changes in organization and policy to obtain better coordination, greater impact, increased flexibility and responsiveness.

Yet the present weeks find the US/GVN fortunes at a low ebb with the situation most serious and political collapse a not remote possibility. It seems that the US has about one more good chance to retrieve the situation; it must act boldly and wisely before the problem becomes irreparable. While examination of yet untried courses of action outside South Vietnam is properly going on, it is also essential for the US and GVN to do the things much better that we have been trying to do the past three years. In this respect, our present experience with counterinsurgency strategy suggests that US/GVN interests have reached a crossroads. The effectiveness of programs must remain about the same or only slightly improved unless a number of key problems are faced and resolved. These could be identified as essential requirements for maximizing the counterinsurgency effort within Vietnam. They are discussed below, not necessarily in any order or priority.

031557100

1. The need for unified leadership of the US/GVN counterinsurgency effort. As programs have steadily mounted in scope and intensity, civil and military efforts of all kinds and by both countries have impacted on local areas, sometimes in unexpected and conflicting ways. Never before had either country confronted a task where the people and resources of both were so intermingled. While the minimum essential requirement was full US/GVN cooperation at all levels, really effective, optimum counterinsurgency operations require a conscious effort to seek and establish no less than a single binational leadership in Saigon. Without such leadership the problem of coordinating at lower levels becomes too involved and chaotic. The problem gets down to organizational arrangements, for the difficulties are too many, continuing and complex to be solved by informal and intermittent meetings of the top US/GVN leaders.

The nature of such organizational machinery is a difficult question, for an organization frequently can slow down, complicate and frustrate decision-making as readily as it can expedite and coordinate it. As a suggestion, one line of approach would be to set up a version in Saigon of the old combined Chiefs of Staff organization of World War II (except on the US/GVN political rather than the military level). Here the key issues of counterinsurgency could be faced, decisions taken and single directives issued to both US and GVN agencies. The US Ambassador and General Khanh, or their deputies, would be the national representatives.

2. The need for close coordination of programs at Saigon level. One lesson of the past three years is that counterinsurgency operations

require a coordination, timing, and fusing of effort involving all the relevant aspects of US/GVN power, which surpass in its demands for efficiency even US World War II requirements. Ad hoc arrangements and the normal processes of coordination are not fully adequate either within the US Country Team or with GVN Ministries.

It is timely to inquire whether the Country Team concept is capable of providing the full integration of US effort which is needed to cope with the situation in Viet Nam. It carries too much of the implication of a congerie of equals, each guided and sustained by its own department in Washington. The Ambassador tends to be first among equals, even though a strong ambassador can make his leadership effective and decisive. The question here is whether the ambassador's traditional position is strong enough to enable him to manage a major counterinsurgency operation. He is more than the President's personal representative to the GVN; he is in fact running a two-country war effort, seeking to direct or persuade a host of US and GVN leaders and agencies into a precise application of political, military, economic and psychological forces.

In this situation a single US leader of preeminent stature is necessary, one who cannot be checked or frustrated by chiefs of country team agencies whose views may be contrary to his. Perhaps his position could be substantially raised; he could be given a new title with expanded powers for example "US Ambassador and Supreme Commander to the Republic of Vietnam." Such a figure could command sufficient authority, prestige and broad outlook to provide

09150703

the central direction, control and management of all US programs that is necessary. Only such a leader could weld all agency programs into a single overall war effort, and bring US efforts into full harmony and close harness with GVN Ministries. (possibly through the combined structure - Paragraph 1). The "Ambassador and Supreme Commander" could either be a political or military man, depending on the situation, but his task must clearly be that of operational chief of all US agencies. Responsibility for overall success or failure would be his.

3. The need for US/GVN integration of operations at the action level. A cardinal lesson of the Vietnam experience in counterinsurgency has been that the prescribed US role of providing advice and resources to the GVN is insufficient for the full scale effort necessary to defeat the insurgency. The GVN administrative apparatus, only nine years old, is too inexperienced, slow-moving and torn by internal problems to execute the sort of tasks that would challenge the most modern, efficient Western administration. US and GVN leaders should therefore recognize and support a trend that is already taking place by adopting and forcefully implementing the concept of US/GVN combined organization and operations at local level. The precedent already exists in USIS' US/GVN Service Center and in the province Psychological operations committee idea, in the duties of USOM's Province Representative, and in the role of the military advisor at all levels. Such a solution in many areas of activity (not necessarily all) should generate much additional efficiency, flexibility and know how in getting the

DECLASSIFIED

job done; and most important, provide the mechanism for a total, integrated commitment of US and GVN resources in the right amounts, at the right places and at the right times. At such times as US personnel have trained their UN counterparts to perform efficiently, the former would return to their customary role of advice and support.

4. The need for a short term GVN political action program which responds to the felt needs of the people. Though military operations opt the center of the stage, political issues are the decisive ones. This is so because the people, primarily the peasantry, are the objective in this unique kind of war, and all civil and military operations must join to win and not to alienate them.

General Khanh has enunciated much of a program designed to improve the life of the people, to protect them against the VC, to reduce corruption among GVN officials, and to ease the land ownership and tenure problem. However, there is reason to believe that until the GVN takes decisive, prompt action to give the peasant his own small plot of land by changes in the land and tenancy laws, the government will not win the peasantry. In a time of revolution the US/GVN too must do revolutionary things to win.

Perhaps the measure of our courage lies in this issue, for the problems of land and tenancy reform are the hardest of all to approach. An early, essential solution could hardly do less than adversely effect the landlord class in favor of the peasantry. Yet, positive action with a vigorous follow-through to get the job done is surely a large part of the price of a GVN victory. Such steps are within

03:45:00:00:00:00

the US/GVN grasp, for land reforms were partially accomplished in the earlier years of the Diem regime. Moreover, the US is no stranger to this issue; it administered the most successful land reform in modern times, in Japan during the Occupation. As a suggestion, Mr. Wolf Ladajinsky, who worked so successfully in the Japan and Taiwan land reforms, could be brought to Vietnam and given guiding role in the GVN land reform program.

5. The need for a genuine grass-roots political organization at local level to support the GVN. The Diem system of political organization at village and hamlet level to control the population largely collapsed in late 1963. Yet political organization supporting the GVN is a necessity to counter VC propaganda, to provide a reservoir of popular support for the government, and to translate and explain to the people the benefits of the New Rural Life Hamlet Program and military operations. The Diem experience has demonstrated that to be viable such organizations cannot be imposed from above but should derive to some extent from a pattern of popular support perhaps from free elections at the village and hamlet level.

To achieve this purpose, no less than a major, national effort is necessary with large numbers of GVN political workers trained and deployed as organizers among the peasantry for long periods, probably as members of Hamlet Action Teams. While real improvements would not be quickly or easily forthcoming, a start must be made, for otherwise the crucial field of political warfare will be left to the unchallenged initiative of the VC.

RECEIVED

6. The need for an honest, efficient GVN political administration.

The corruption, arbitrary acts and inefficiency of the GVN political administration during the 1961-63 period contributed importantly to the disaffection of the population. Unless public administration can be improved, growing peasant support for the government is probably not possible. In spite of past efforts, the US is faced more than ever before with the necessity of providing a well-organized, extensive training program which hopefully can equip GVN central and provincial officials and workers to carry out their parts in the involved task of counterinsurgency, and above all to perform the vital task of winning the confidence of the peasantry. Progress will be slow, for it will be a matter of "on-the-job" training, with US personnel in far greater numbers than ever before performing operational jobs in the countryside and simultaneously training their GVN counterparts. Here it appears that the concept of combined US/GVN operations is mandatory (Paragraph 3, page 56) if the desired results are to be achieved. A long time will pass before US personnel can be withdrawn to their customary role of advice and provision of resources.

7. The need to implement the two central operational concepts of counterinsurgency, the New Rural Life Hamlet Program (NRLH Program) and clear and hold military operations as a single integrated program.

There has long been a growing appreciation of the close interrelationships between the two programs. Their merger, never succinctly expressed, but approached in fact by post-coup planning, could be an emerging reality of the utmost importance to the war effort. In other words,

0310507030

the US/GVN strategy is approaching the line where political and military warfare intercept--and there may lie the secret of victory. This convergence should be given a title of its own for purposes of emphasis, to advertise its unitary nature. Let us call it the "unified action" concept which implies the integration of all civil and military resources under a single operational plan which commits these resources progressively from the most safe to the least safe areas.

The convergency exists because each program depends on the other for its own success. The NRLH Program is obviously futile unless the military can drive the VC from the area being pacified and keep them away until the political, economic and psychological programs can have their desired impact on the local population. Likewise, the military operations will be little more than sweeps, conducted at great cost and effort, unless the benefits of the NRLH Program succeed in consolidating genuine village and hamlet political support behind the GVN.

Another aspect of this convergence should be stressed. Since the NRLH Program is the very core of counterinsurgency strategy (because it is primary in achieving peasant support), it is the primary program of the two. Nevertheless, clear and hold military operations are the catalyst which determines the scope, timing, location and degree of integration of the entire civil military effort. Clear and hold determines which geographic areas, including its villages and hamlets, will be saturated with military forces and protected from the VC; thus it also determines where the priorities

CONFIDENTIAL



in political, economic, and psychological resources go under the NRLH Program. Clear and hold focuses all effort on many small unit operations, often in remote and nearly inaccessible parts of the country side. For success, it therefore needs a major decentralization in decision-making and operations to the local level. The Province Chief and District Chiefs become key operational leaders and coordinators, and their staffs become a civil/military center of combat and logistic planning which directs a phased commitment of differing levels of military and civil resources into specific hamlets and villages.

Clear and hold establishes a momentum which pushes all US agencies directly into grass-roots operations. Though not a new concept, this activity would now be on a very large scale and would take place at many remote areas at once. Expansion of both US and GVN civilian staffs will surely occur in all major fields at local level. The Hamlet Action Teams, guided and trained by US/GVN officials from district and province, will be greatly expanded in numbers and will live and work within hamlets. These teams could become the spearpoint and main instrument of the GVN in the countryside.

Clear and hold will force civil programs at local level to move at the pace of military operations, since resources and trained people must be funneled into hamlets at scheduled times when ARVN units are screening away the VC and rooting out the VC infrastructure. This confronts US and GVN civil agencies with a new dimension of activity: the demand to respond most rapidly and efficiently under combat conditions, not infrequently on a "crash basis", and often

03150703

at some remote rural location. USIS and USOM are already responding by stockpiling supplies in local areas, by pooling resources and personnel with GVN counterpart agencies, and by working out arrangements where piastre funds can be spent by US local officials to meet pressing needs.

In conclusion, these seem to be the important issues of our developing counterinsurgency strategy as the writer sees them at this time. While specific solutions have been suggested in some cases, these are admittedly not the only ones; they are advanced only to sharpen the issue and stimulate thinking as to what may turn out to be the ultimate solutions. There are a few last things to be said.

The deliberate, step-by-step nature of clear and hold operations, the time required for the NRLH Program to achieve peasant support, and the real power of VC infrastructure and popular support all combine to dictate that the pace of pacification will be very slow and difficult with many setbacks. Progress will be slow also because of the unfamiliarity of our counterinsurgency strategy to military and civil officials who are involved. It will take time before the necessary numbers of US/GVN personnel understand sufficiently well to execute their interrelated roles in such thoroughly combined and complicated civil/military operations.

These suggestions about counterinsurgency strategy may seem to those already absorbed in the task to be "the counsel of perfection," but at least they tend to pose the measure and magnitude of our task. This leads to the view that there is little chance now of winning the

CONFIDENTIAL

war as cheaply as we have been waging it thus far. Costly as it is already in lives, effort and money, the financial and human costs must continue to rise in the coming years. For example, it seems inescapable that US military and other advisors must remain on the job, dangerous and lacking in comforts as it is, for more than a one year assignment. At present many return home just as they acquire the knowledge and experience to become fully effective. Further, the GVN may not have sufficient troops or national morale to conduct fully effective clear and hold operations and concurrently make the decisive, full-scale effort that is needed to destroy the VC strongholds and the regular VC forces building within them. At some stage the US may have to decide if it must commit its own ground forces to bolster GVN forces, and there are many difficulties and disadvantages in this course. Even after the military defeat of the insurgency, costs will continue high, for the US will remain the sponsor and support of the GVN, just as we are for the Republic of Korea on the other flank of Communist China.

A final comment is in order: in spite of the costs and open-ended commitments, there is every reason to say that the strenuous US/GVN effort is worth it. Our persistence, courage and stubborn refusal to give in could eventually be the decisive action that casts doubt on the strategy of Communist "wars of national liberation" as a practical measure, that discourages their outbreak elsewhere, and that forces accommodations among the Communist Powers to the vitality and reality of US power and leadership.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOOTNOTES

1. Brig. Gen. S. B. Griffith, Mao-Tse-tung on Guerilla Warfare, p. 44.
2. Che, Guevara, On Guerilla Warfare, p. 4.
3. R. McNamara, The Struggle for Vietnam, p. 10.
4. C. J. V. Murphy, "Vietnam Hangs on US Determination", Fortune, May 1964, p. 229. Joint Staff, JCS, An Overview of the Vietnam War 1960-63, p.9.
5. R. McNamara, op. cit., p. 21.
6. Ibid, p. 21.
7. B. Crozier, The Rebels, p. 10.
8. Brig. Gen. S. B. Griffith, op. cit., p. 45.
9. USIS, Saigon, Notes from the Underground, the Mistique of a Viet Cong, pp. 1-30.
10. Brig. Gen. S. B. Griffith, op. cit. p. 43.
11. \_\_\_\_\_. Text of a Reform Program announced by Prime Minister General Nguyen Khanh on March 7, 1964. Department of State Handout, undated.
12. \_\_\_\_\_. Text of Radio addresses by Prime Minister General Nguyen Khanh, April 4 and April 11, 1964, Department of State Handout, undated.
13. \_\_\_\_\_. "Text of President's Message on Vietnam", Washington Post, May 19, 1964, p. A16. Also, see Rusk view, Washington Post, April 20, 1974, p. 7.
14. General Giap. Peoples War, Peoples Army, p. 95.
15. Major J. R. Cleland, The Communist Guerilla and his Defeat, p. 21.
16. R. McNamara, op. cit., p. 7.
17. D.S.P.P.C., The Political Relationship, Between the Central Government and the Countryside, p. 32.
18. Brig. Gen. S.A. Griffith, op. cit., p. 88.
19. Ibid., p. 89

20. Ibid., p. 46.
21. Ibid., p. 52.
22. Gen. Giap, op. cit. p. 98.
23. C. J. V. Murphy, op. cit. p.162.
24. Ibid., p. 228.
25. Brig. Gen. S. A. Griffith, op. cit., p. 92.
26. C. J. V. Murphy, op. cit. p. 229.
27. Plan of 22 February 1964.
28. Comment based on conversation with Lt. Col. J. R. Cushman, US Army, former advisor to 21st ARVN Division, 24 April, 1964.
29. Comment based on conversation with Lt. Col. J. R. Cushman, US Army, former advisor to 21st ARVN Division, 24 April, 1964.
30. Gen. Giap, op. cit., p. 52.
31. \_\_\_\_\_, United States Assistance to Vietnam, AID Memorandum 1 March 1964, p. 1.
32. W. G. Stoneman, Rationale for changed nature of the Vietnam Program in USOM Organization, p. 1. (This very valuable source has been drawn on heavily for the materiel in this chapter.)
33. USOM, Organization and Functions Manual, p. 2.
34. W. G. Stoneman, op. cit., p. 7.
35. USOM, op. cit., p. 4.
36. W. G. Stoneman, Op. Cit., p. 8.
37. \_\_\_\_\_, Illustrative Jobs Being Performed by USOM/Vietnam Provincial Representatives, AID Handout, Washington, D.C. (undated), p. 1.
38. \_\_\_\_\_, Summary of US aid to Vietnam, AID Pamphlet, Washington, D.C., March 6, 1954, pp. 30-31.
39. "Text of President Johnson's Message on Vietnam (to Congress)", Washington Post, May 19, 1964, p. A16.

CONFIDENTIAL

40. USIS, Saigon, Notes from the Underground, the Mistique of a Viet Cong, pp. 1-24.
41. USIA, USIS in Vietnam, p. 3.
42. Ibid, p. 3.
43. Ibid, p. 1.
44. Ibid, p. 1
45. USIS, Saigon, Vietnam Country Plan FY 63, pp. 7-10.
46. Ibid, p. 15. USIS, Saigon, Suggestions to GVN for its National Info. Plan., p. 4.
47. Ibid, p. 4.
48. USIA, USIS in Vietnam, p. 2.
49. Ibid, p. 2.
50. USIS, Saigon, Vietnam - Country Plan, FY 63, pp. 16-18.
51. USIS - Saigon, Suggestions, etc. pp. 1-3.
52. Ibid, p. 11.
53. Ibid, p. 8.
54. Ibid, p. 10.
55. Ibid, p. 5.
56. Ibid, pp. 36-44.
57. Ibid, pp. 15-17.
58. Ibid, p. 17.
59. Ibid, p. 19.
60. Ibid, pp. 29-31.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cited References

- Cleland, Major J.R., The Communist Guerilla and His Defeat, (Student Thesis, Armed Forces Staff College, Washington, D.C., May 15, 1962)
- Crozier, B., The Rebels: A Study of Post War Insurrections, Boston, Press, 1960.
- Department of State Policy Planning Council, The Political Relationship Between the Central Government and the Countryside, Washington, D.C., July 17, 1962 (Draft)
- Fischel, W.R., Problems of Freedom, South Viet Nam Since Independence, New York, Free Press of Glencoe Inc., 1961.
- Garthoff, R.L., "Unconventional Warfare in Communist Strategy", Foreign Affairs, July, 1962,
- Giap, V.N., Peoples War Peoples Army, Hanoi, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1961.
- Griffith, Brig. Gen. S. B., Mao-Tse-tung on Guerilla Warfare, New York, Fredrick A. Praeger, 1961.
- Guevara, Che (Ernesto), On Guerilla Warfare, New York, Fredrick A. Praeger, 1962.
- McNamara, R. (Sec. Def.), The Struggle in Vietnam, (Speech delivered March 26, 1964 before the National Security Industrial Association in Washington, D.C.), Pakistan, USIS,
- Murphy, C.J.V., "Vietnam Hangs on US Determination", Fortune, May 1964, pp. 159-162, 227-232.
- Moore, R.L., "I fought in Vietnam", US News and World Report, June 8, 1964, pp. 44-47.
- Office of Special Asst for CI and Spec Activities, Joint Staff, An Overview of the Vietnam War 1960-1963,
- Pacific Command, "The War Situation in South Vietnam," Weekly Intelligence Digest, No. 12-64, Pearl Harbor, 20 March 1964.
- Stoneman, W.G., Rationale for Changed Nature of the Vietnam Program in USOM Organization, (Internal AID Study, Washington, D.C., undated),

USIA, USIS in Vietnam, Washington, D.C., April 1, 1964 (Working Paper)

USIS-Saigon, Notes from the Underground, The Mistique of a Viet Cong, February, 1962.

USIS-Saigon, Country Plan FY 1963, March 7, 1963,

USIS-Saigon, Suggestions to Government Vietnam for its National Information Plan, (Second Draft), April 15, 1964.

USOM-Saigon, Organization and Functions Manual, April 4, 1963,

\_\_\_\_\_. Text of Radio Program Announced by Prime Minister General Nguyen Khanh on March 7, 1964, Department of State, Undated.

\_\_\_\_\_. Text of Radio Address by Prime Minister General Nguyen Khanh of April 4 and April 11, 1964, Department of State, Undated.

\_\_\_\_\_. United States Assistance to Vietnam, AID Memorandum, Washington, D.C., March, 1964.

\_\_\_\_\_. Illustrative Jobs Being Performed by USOM/Vietnam Provincial Representatives, AID Handout, Washington, D.C., Undated.

\_\_\_\_\_. Summary of US Aid to Vietnam, AID Pamphlet, Washington, D.C., March 6, 1954,

\_\_\_\_\_. "Text of President Johnson's Message on Vietnam," The Washington Post. May 19, 1964, p. A16.

Background Sources

Fall, B.B., Street Without Joy, Harrisburg, Pa., Stackpole Col, 1961.

Fall, B.B., Counterinsurgency; the French Experience, Washington, D.C., Ind. College of the Armed Forces, 18 January 1963.

Fischel, W.R. (Editor), Problems of Freedom: South Vietnam Since Independence, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961.

Nasution, A.H., Principles of Guerilla Warfare, MS, Djakarta, 1 May 1953.

Lansdale, E., The Insurgent Battlefield, MS, Denver, Colo., May 25, 1962.

Osanka, F.M., Modern Guerilla Warfare, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.

S.O.R.O., US Army Handbook for Vietnam, Washington, D.C., American University, September, 1962.

DELETED



S.O.R.O., Case Studies in Insurgency, Vietnam 1941-1954, Washington, D.C., American University, January, 1964,

S.O.R.O., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare, Washington, D.C., American University, November, 1963,

\_\_\_\_\_, Special Warfare, Fort Bragg, N.C., US Army Special Warfare Center, (Undated),

\_\_\_\_\_, Counterguerilla Operations in the Philippines, US Army Seminar, Fort Bragg, N.C., June 15, 1961.

\_\_\_\_\_, US Army Counterinsurgency Forces, (FM31-22), Washington, D.C., November, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Colonel Richard M. Lee, USA

Born: Idaho, January 17, 1917.

Education: University of Maryland, B.A., 1936-1940; Harvard Law School, 1940-1942; Command and General Staff College, 1943; Princeton University, M.P.A., 1949-1951; US Army War College, 1957-1958.

Second Lieutenant, Infantry, US Army, 60th Infantry, 1942, US; Aide de Camp, Assistant G-3 and Assistant G-1, 89th Infantry Division, 1942-1945, France, Germany; Secretary, General Staff, US Forces Austria, 1946-1948; Regimental S-3 and Battalion Commander, 39th and 47th Infantries, 1948-1949, US; Staff Officer, International Branch Plans Division, G-3, Department of Army, Washington, D.C., 1951-1954; Battalion Commander and Regimental Executive Officer, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1944-1945, Japan; Aide de Camp to Commander in Chief, Far East and United Nations Commands, 1945-1947, Japan-Korea; Staff Officer in Office, Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, D.C., 1958-1960; Battle Group Commander, 1st Battle Group, 3rd Infantry, 1960-1962, US; Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, I Corps (Group), 1962-1963, Korea.

DECLASSIFIED