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AMERICAN COLLEGE ELITE OPINION

AND

INTERNATIONAL ASSURANCE

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THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to clarify the relationships among US arms control policies, US college educated elite opinion and international assurance. Nationwide samples of college educated public opinion were given the same items in a survey for 10 different waves or administrations from 1960-1967. Items dealt with amount of assurance that there would be no war; trust related attitudes toward the USSR; and comparative power of the USSR.

An analysis of the results showed that the college educated elite was moderately assured based on both moderate trust in the USSR and a belief that US and USSR are at least equal in power. Trust related attitudes toward the USSR seemed more related to assurance than US power; and missile power parity seemed to have no adverse affect on assurance. US science superiority seems to be a major component of US power. It may be that prior to 1961, the college educated elite based assurance and trust primarily on US power. However a critical transition occurred around January 1962 in which US power superiority became clearly established to the college educated. Then further increases in assurance (beyond a minimal level) may have depended on increasing trust in the USSR.

General implications for theoretical issues are that trust related factors cluster as theoretically expected. Power gains do not depress trust, which was not expected. The product of trust and power is the best predictor of assurance, as expected. The elite public has a complex view of power, trust and assurance which gets simpler and more power oriented under high anxiety, as expected.

General implications for policy are that simple arms superiority will not produce stable high assurance in the elite (or stable agreements with the USSR). The elite might accept (because of their complex power view) an arrangement in which each nation had power superiority in one area of power, while they maintain parity or inferiority in other areas. A less tricky possibility might be total parity, given a continuance of the current rise of trust over power as a basis of elite assurance. Still another possibility is the use of US scientific superiority to justify arms limits or even arms parity concepts. Finally the data may hint that support for general disarmament may be emerging in the elite, if trust continues to rise (barring the emergence of a new threat). A final implication is that surveillance and intensive verification are not considered essential elements of arms treaties with the USSR by the college educated elite (in the trust climate of 1962-1967).

It is suggested that these results indicate the kind of policies which can most assure the college elite. The results also reveal that these policies can be accepted by the USSR as credible, since they are not likely to produce an "assurance crisis" with subsequent pressures for new governors and abrogations of previous arms treaties. This of course assumes that the USSR continues to act in a way which does not threaten the elite's trust.

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AMERICAN COLLEGE ELITE OPINION
AND
INTERNATIONAL ASSURANCE

PART I - THE PROBLEM¹

A. Public Opinion, Assurance and Negotiations Among Nations

In negotiation among nations the opinions of the publics of the involved nations are often quite important. This is particularly true in long term negotiations, such as those involved in arms control and disarmament issues. Without supporting opinion of a stable nature in their respective publics, negotiators of arms control issues lack a degree of credibility in their proposals, which may severely hamper long term progress.

The following analysis of the opinion of the American college educated elite is a first step in the formulation of a more precise understanding of how opinions critical to arms agreements are formed. The data to be presented shows how college elite opinion actually developed during the era of Kennedy and Khrushchev. It suggests a theoretical framework for understanding how elite opinion functions now and in the future. This framework may enable us to understand how much support arms limitation may have, and how stable this support will prove to be.

A basic concept in relating opinion to negotiations with an adversary government is assurance. Assurance is generally defined as an expectation that another country will act, for whatever reason, in a way consistent with the interest of one's own country. At its most basic level, when one is assured, one believes that at very least another country will not attack one's

(1) The author expresses gratitude to Judith Samet-Driver for critical reading and editing of the text.

own country. A basic assumption of this study is that when the public of a nation is assured concerning another nation, arms negotiations can occur in a more credible fashion. When publics are not assured, arms limitations will be viewed as dangerous. The assumption then is that pressures will be brought to bear on the government involved to desist from such negotiations or suffer loss of office. Figure 1 summarizes the relationships for the case of the US government negotiating with the Soviet Union. The degree of assurance in the US public towards the USSR will affect their support for the position taken by the US government in arms control vis à vis the Soviet Union. This support level will affect credibility from the view of the USSR. The credibility of US proposals will in turn affect, in part, the seriousness of Soviet reactions.

It is understood in this study that most public opinion concerning the USSR is based on events presented by the News media. Other reports in the study (see Walton, Gould, Strickland & Driver, 1968) will report on how the media transmit news concerning Soviet and American behavior. The concern of the present report will be on how assurance is developed in the American public - particularly in the college educated sector of the public.

B. A Theoretical Framework of Assurance

Developed from a review of behavioral science research, (see Walton, 1968) a theoretical framework for analyzing the basis of assurance is suggested. Two major bases of assurance are postulated: trust and power. A fundamental idea is that a public will be assured to the extent that:

- 1) It sees its own government as powerful relative to a possible adversary.
- 2) It trusts another nation.
- 3) It sees both power in its own government and displays trust toward another nation.

In this framework, trust is defined as the belief that another nation is capable of and voluntarily desires to further one's own nation's goals. Power is used to mean primarily possession of the capability and means to inflict damage on an adversary through military action. Figure 2 presents a summary of this assurance framework.

Each of these bases of assurance can in turn be related to other factors. Trust is expected to be related to perceived positive intention, liking, perceived similarities, beliefs in the possibility of cooperation and coexistence, and US national esteem. Perceived decision making competence of USSR leadership when combined with perceived positive intent will also enhance trust.




Figure 1. A basic system for relating public assurance to negotiations between nations.




Figure 2. A Theoretical framework concerning the bases of assurance.

Power is based on perceived Soviet and American power as well as on Soviet competence. To the extent that trust does not exist, perceived Soviet competence in decision making will decrease, perceived US power and deflates assurance. Soviet competence thus can aid or decrease assurance, depending on the degree to which assurance is based on trust or power.

A similar two edged sword is surveillance capability in the US and in the USSR. A high US surveillance capability (e.g. intelligence) vis à vis the USSR will boost perceived US power; but it may also throw doubt on the spontaneity of Soviet "good intentions." It will be uncertain whether the USSR "good intentions" are due to genuine concern for US interest or merely to impress a powerful observer. Very ubiquitous surveillance may also generate resentment in the USSR. This would lead to hostile intent in the USSR, hence less trust by the US public.

A final issue concerns the relationship of power and trust. Social psychological literature suggests that high or increasing power tends to generally lower trust. One reason for this might be the reasoning that the other side must be doing something against our interests to require our power levels. Another view, however, would stem from common sense - the more power we have, the less another will logically want to harm us, hence the more we can trust them. Since this relationship is not clear, we shall not make any definite predictions in Fig. 1.

This framework has several important implications for negotiations. For instance, if assurance is primarily trust based, then arms limits, or decreases, possibly even disarmament, can be sought without alarming the public. Treaty proposals will be seen by the other nation as having a basis of public support, hence as credible, stable offers to be met with similar responses. If assurance is primarily power based, then arms decreases will be alarming. Even if proposed, they will possibly be later abrogated by a new government brought in on a wave of public fear. Soviet negotiators must be aware of this and will deal with such proposals as not credible. Agreements for propaganda purposes may be achieved, but genuine long-term commitments to arms decreases are not likely. Other more subtle issues are touched by the framework (e.g. the issue concerning the viability of arms parity as a negotiation objective) however, it would be more useful to see how

well the framework works concerning actual public opinion before exploring implications any further.

C. The Focus on College Elite Opinion

A critical question in the analysis of public opinion is the sector of the public which should be examined. Many theories of the communication process (see Secord & Backman, 1965) suggest that certain elite groups are the keys to public opinion and to elections. It has also been suggested that governments are sensitive only to certain elite groups during their stay in office. Hence, both long and short term credibility of US arms control offers may hinge mainly on the known assurance of certain elites.

A further question would then be which elite is it profitable to examine. The resources of the present study would permit the analysis of assurance in only one elite. It was decided to consider college graduates as a particularly important elite. The decision is based on several criteria. First, it is increasingly clear that the college educated group is having a very powerful effect on the course of elections and mass public opinion in general. Second, previous studies have shown how this group consistently displays marked differences in form and content of opinions from the non-college educated mass.

To fully see the effects of education on opinion, it is useful to distinguish between two aspects of assurance - its structure and its content. By "structure" we will mean whether it is based on one factor (e.g. power), two factors, or even three or more factors. The more bases underlying assurance, the more this opinion system will be described as having complex structure. By "content" we will mean which basis is related to assurance - i.e. is it a trust or power oriented system?

In both structure and content, educated opinion can be expected to be different. For instance, Scott (1965) finds that the more informed respondents were on international events, the more dimensions or attributes they used in developing images of other nations. Since education can be expected to relate to information on international affairs this result suggests the college elite is likely to base assurance on several factors.

Research on the content of attitudes and opinions related to education is even clearer. For instance, Farris (1960) finds a negative relationship between "jingoistic" distrust of foreign nations and educational level. Levinson (1957) finds that nationalistic distrust of others is related to high scores on an authoritarian ideology scale, which in turn is related to low education.

More specific data on assurance and attitudes on Russian intentions is available. With respect to attitudes concerning the USSR, Caspary (1967) reports that college educated displayed a significantly higher expectation of Soviet cooperation from 1942 until the announcement of the "Truman Doctrine" in 1947. From 1947 to 1949 no special college bias is noted by Caspary. Scott (1965) notes, however, that in 1954 a Canadian poll shows education related to belief in US - Soviet coexistence. In 1959, Scott reports a similar Canadian Institute of Public Opinion poll finding that the more educated desired to visit the USSR. However, in 1955 a Canadian poll revealed that education did not relate to beliefs in improved Russian sincerity. Whether this is due to a peculiarity in wording or a repetition of Caspary's finding that at times college opinion is not different from the mass is unclear.¹

With respect to assurance, the college group tends to display generally higher assurance. Canadian polls (Scott, 1965) show strongly positive relationships between education and assurance concerning the impossibility of a nuclear war. The results for 1954, 1958 and several times in 1959 confirm this association. Again in 1955, the relationship does not occur. The suggestion is that in certain times, the college view loses its uniqueness. Finally Inkeles (1960) reports a confirmation that in the long run the educated public is more optimistic on peace, hence more assured.

With respect to the importance of military power a somewhat less clear picture emerges. Putney & Middleton (1962) found no relation between a "hard line" and education within college students (a very restricted sample). Some studies find a relation between high power orientation and high authoritarian ideology which in turn relates to low education (see Eckhardt, Manning, Morgan, Subotnik & Tinker, 1965; Fensterwald, 1958; French & Ernest, 1955; Rosenberg, 1965)

In summary, scattered studies often using unclear items and indirect chains of inference suggest that a college educated assurance system would exhibit these traits:

- 1) It would be based on both trust and power
- 2) It would de-emphasize power
- 3) Trust in USSR would be fairly high, except during "bad" periods (e.g. 1947-49)
- 4) Assurance would be generally high

None of the studies cited above directly measured trust, power perceptions and assurance for the same sample at the same time.

(1) It is possible to see the Russians as sincere, while not seeing them as getting more sincere. Poll items often have deplorable wording.

Thus relationships among variables are quite conjectural. Neither trust per se or perceived Soviet positive intent were usually measured at all. Even the assurance level is largely based on Canadian data. Hence, it is clearly necessary to find a better data source for building an understanding of the structure and dynamics of college elite assurance. The present analysis attempts to begin this task.

D. The Selection of a Time Period

It is necessary to limit any study of public opinion to a particular period of time. Initially the period from Kennedy's inauguration (1961) to his assassination in 1963 was selected. This period is fairly recent, yet good documentation on key events is now available. The major leadership in both major world powers was stable during the period. Thus, major changes in opinion due to leadership changes would be avoided.

However, due to availability of data, (see below) the period for analysis is extended to include 1960-1967. It will now be possible to present a set of findings on quite recent opinion, which has current implication. It is also a broader time base on which to examine the adequacy of theory and provides greater confidence in making future projections.

PART II - METHOD

A. Rationale for Selection of the Benton & Bowles Survey as Prime Data Source

A search was made of public opinion polls during the Kennedy-Khrushchev period. Data from Gallup and other standard polls were collected and coded. These polls were found to be plagued by many persistent problems:

- 1) Many items were completely useless due to ambiguous wording or poor format.
- 2) Some items appeared to relate to theoretical variables such as assurance but in an ambiguous fashion. Clear-out assignment of the item to a variable, e.g. trust, was often exceedingly difficult.
- 3) Most useful items were given to the public only once or at best a few times. This meant that there is some question whether two different items, both relating to a variable such as trust, can be viewed as measuring the same thing. If public response to one "trust" item differs from a second, different "trust" item at

a later date is it because of a change in opinion or due to differences in wording of the item? As it turns out, the former explanation seems tenable for most items used in this study. But short of an independent, reliable measure of the variable in question, this issue would have been rather vexing.

Difficulties of the above variety were resolved by the discovery¹ of a series of opinion surveys given to a nation-wide sample by the Benton & Bowles Agency of New York. The questions asked by this agency very closely related to the variables in the theoretical framework for assurance. In general, the items were well and clearly worded; far superior to the usual poll item. Most fortunately of all, the same items were repeatedly used in up to 10 successive administrations or "waves" of the survey from 1960 to 1967. Each wave was given to a nation-wide representative sample ranging in size from 1246 to 1412 individuals. Details on sampling technique are available from Benton & Bowles. The Benton & Bowles agency provided the break-down of the data for the college graduates, reported below.

B. Rationale for Benton & Bowles Items Selected to Measure Assurance Variables.

Table 1 presents a summary of the relevant data from the Benton & Bowles surveys. Waves are numbered from 1 to 10 across the top of the table. Under each wave number is given first the number of college graduates who responded to the item then the month and year in which the wave was administered. (Note how the waves cluster in the 1960-1963 Kennedy - Khrushchev era) Then follows the per cent of agreement data for items assessing 24 variables. A brief description of each variable is given over the percentages of agreement data. Furthermore, the number of the Benton & Bowles item with which the variable is measured is indicated in parenthesis after the variable description. The actual items from the questionnaire relevant to this analysis are given in Appendix I. These items are arranged to follow in a theoretical order, the actual position or item number of the item in the Benton & Bowles questionnaire is given in parentheses following the title of the item in the Appendix. It will be noted that only some of the original survey items are included, since many items were irrelevant to the focus of the present analyses.

(1) Our gratitude goes to Jacqueline Mithun who first suggested the Benton & Bowles data while working at the Arms Control & Disarmament Agency.

Table 1. Summary of Benton & Bowles college elite opinion data relevant to international assurance.

Number	Wave									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
College Elite Sample Size	170	188	188	163	202	201	200	214	208	224
Date of Administration	7/60	11/60	4/61	9/61	1/62	6/62	3/63	2/64	10/64	2/67
<u>Variable No. 1</u>	<u>Non-Assurance (inverse: General Assurance) - per cent of elite certain of world war in future (based on item No. 1, e-h, Appendix I).</u>									
Per cent	32	38	36	42	37	29	35	26	28	26
	N.B. The following figures give the total per cent of the elite not certain of world war. This inverse of non-assurance will be termed <u>general assurance</u> :									
Per cent	68	62	64	58	63	71	65	74	72	74
<u>Variable No. 2</u>	<u>High Positive Assurance - per cent of elite who feel war is doubtful or impossible (based on Items No. 1f, 1g, 1h, Appendix I).</u>									
Per cent	17	19	16	13	11	21	19	22	22	21
<u>Variable No. 3</u>	<u>Relative Assurance - per cent of elite not ranking war as one of three top concerns (based on Item No. 2d, Appendix I).</u>									
Per cent	61	54	59	43	49	64	60	67	68	59
<u>Variable No. 4</u>	<u>US War Power Superiority - per cent of elite seeing US ahead of USSR in war preparedness. (based on Item No. 3e, Appendix I).</u>									
Per cent	33	34	36	24	44	49	55	51	58	52

Table 1. - Continued

<u>Variable No. 5</u>	<u>US-USSR War Power Parity</u> - per cent who see US and USSR equal in war preparedness (based on Item No. 3e, Appendix I).									
Per cent	45	42	42	44	32	37	31	37	34	37
<u>Variable No. 6</u>	<u>US War Power Inferiority</u> - per cent of elite who see the USSR ahead of the US in war preparedness (based on Item No. 3e, Appendix I).									
Per cent	17	14	17	22	12	10	8	8	7	7
<u>Variable No. 7</u>	<u>US Missile Power Superiority</u> - per cent of elite who see the US ahead of the USSR in missile-rocket-space power (based on Item No. 3b, Appendix I).									
Per cent	26	28	18	13	33	38	35	42	26	50
<u>Variable No. 8</u>	<u>US-USSR Missile Power Parity</u> - per cent of elite who see the US and USSR equal in missile-rocket-space power (based on Item No. 3b, Appendix I).									
Per cent	34	30	34	15	26	35	29	32	26	32
<u>Variable No. 9</u>	<u>US Missile Power Inferiority</u> - per cent of elite who see the US behind the USSR in missile-rocket-space power (based on Item No. 3b, Appendix I).									
Per cent	39	41	47	70	36	26	34	23	47	16
<u>Variable No. 10</u>	<u>Defense Concern</u> - per cent of elite who rank national defence as one of their top three concerns (based on Item No. 2b, Appendix I).									
Per cent	51	52	52	60	52	50	49	42	49	44
<u>Variable No. 11</u>	<u>Peaceful Soviet Intent</u> - per cent of elite believing USSR wants peace (either at "all costs" or "but may start war because of lack of trust in US"), (based on Items No. 4c & 4d, Appendix I).									
Per cent	56	41	40	43	41	54	55	56	69	70

Table 1. - Continued

<u>Variable No. 12</u>	<u>Soviet Intent to Cooperate</u> - per cent of elite who believe the USSR is more interested in "getting along" with non-communist countries than Red China (based on Item No. 5b, Appendix I).									
Per cent	--	--	--	--	--	--	77	84	82	89
<u>Variable No. 13</u>	<u>Soviet-American Common Goals: Individual Freedom</u> - per cent of elite who believe the USSR is more interested in giving her citizens individual freedom than Red China (based on Item No. 5a, Appendix I).									
Per cent	--	--	--	--	--	--	44	45	55	69
<u>Variable No. 14</u>	<u>Soviet-American Common Goals: Raising Living Standards</u> - per cent of elite who believe the USSR is more interested in raising living standards than Red China (based on Item No. 5a, Appendix I).									
Per cent	--	--	--	--	--	--	68	76	72	79
<u>Variable No. 15</u>	<u>Coexistence Impossible between Democracy and Communism</u> - per cent of elite believing East-West coexistence is impossible, one system must "go" (based on Item No. 6a, Appendix I).									
Per cent	16	20	20	25	34	24	15	15	14	12
<u>Variable No. 16</u>	<u>Coexistence Maybe Possible between Democracy and Communism</u> - per cent of elite who believe that East-West coexistence may be possible - with effort (based on Item No. 6b, Appendix I).									
Per cent	65	63	61	59	58	63	67	63	64	58
<u>Variable No. 17</u>	<u>Coexistence Definitely Possible between Democracy and Communism</u> - per cent of elite who believe that East-West coexistence is definitely possible - with effort (based on Item No. 6c, Appendix I).									
Per cent	18	15	18	17	16	12	16	21	20	28

Table 1. - Continued

<u>Variable No. 18</u>	<u>China Threat to USSR (Possible Common Goal with US)</u> - per cent of elite seeing Soviet-Red China relationships worsening or breaking off (based on Item No. 8c and 8d, Appendix I).									
Per cent	--	--	--	--	--	--	68	67	61	76
<u>Variable No. 19</u>	<u>Communist Takeover Threat</u> - per cent of elite ranking communist takeover of other nations as one of top three concerns (based on Item No. 2f, Appendix I).									
Per cent	49	50	53	57	56	57	64	54	43	30
<u>Variable No. 20</u>	<u>Soviet Takeover Threat</u> - per cent of elite seeing the USSR more interested in taking over other countries than Red China.									
Per cent	--	--	--	--	--	--	42	35	29	29
<u>Variable No. 21</u>	<u>US Scientific Superiority</u> - per cent of elite seeing the US as superior to USSR in scientific advancement (based on Item 3d, Appendix I).									
Per cent	64	62	57	66	67	74	71	69	73	71
<u>Variable No. 22</u>	<u>US Cold War Victor</u> - per cent of elite seeing the US as likely winner over Communism (based on Item No. 7d and 7e, Appendix I).									
Per cent	--	--	--	79	88	90	92	91	90	89
<u>Variable No. 23</u>	<u>US Superiority in World Respect</u> - per cent of elite seeing the US ahead of Russia in obtaining world respect (based on Item 3a, Appendix I).									
Per cent	77	84	73	76	77	79	76	70	83	78
<u>Variable No. 24</u>	<u>US-Soviet Equality in World Respect</u> - per cent of elite seeing the US and USSR equally respected (based on Item 3a, Appendix I).									
Per cent	20	11	19	20	13	17	18	22	13	16

Even eliminating some of the Benton & Bowles items is not enough to render the data manageable. Many of the items needed to be condensed for the sake of clarity and economy. The rationale for the 24 variables in Table 1 will now be briefly discussed.

Three assurance variables are given in Table 1. There were two items in the survey that related to expectations of world war. One item directly asked how certain people were that a world war was coming. The second item asked respondents to rank nine political issues in order of concern; among these issues was the possibility of world war. A basic issue here is whether either item assesses assurance vis à vis Russia. However, it can be assumed that for most Americans, even today, world war probably means war with the USSR.

The item asking for certainty on world war permitted quite a range of response from certain of world war within the next month to certainty world war will never come again. For the sake of theoretical economy some of these response categories were condensed. For instance, all responses reflecting any certainty of world war (regardless of when it is expected) can be grouped into a general class of non-assurance. Thus the percentages associated with each response claiming certainty of war (i.e. Item No. 1a thru 1d, Appendix I) are summed to give a total per cent certain of world war, given in Table 1. At times it will be useful to watch how the per cent of non-assured (who are certain of war) varies: at times the reverse of this percentage - those who were not certain of world war will be analyzed. This variable will be termed general assurance. Keep in mind that this is simply the inverse of non-assurance. If percent non-assured goes up, percent generally assured (not certain of war) goes down. The sum of their percentages must equal 100. Both percentages are given under variable No. 1 - Non-Assurance.

Among those who are generally assured, i.e. are not certain of war, two classes can be further distinguished:

- 1) Those marginally assured - i.e. who feel there may be another war (Item No 1e, Appendix I).
- 2) Those who are possessed of relatively high assurance - i.e. they doubt a war will recur, or see war as probably not occurring or even feel certain of no world war. These three responses are combined since their separate percentages are too low for separate analysis and since, theoretically, they all at least doubt the probability of world war.

This second group of relatively high assurance responses will be used to measure high assurance (Variable No. 2, Table 1). This variable is really a combination of moderate and high assurance. However, in contrast to the class of those who are merely not certain

of war - i.e. the "generally assured", which contains a large percentage of those who believe war may come, those who at least doubt war can be described as having high assurance. We will employ this variable since high assurance may not vary inversely with non-assurance. For instance there may be times when non-assurance declines but high assurance does not rise, since the non-assured are merely shifting from certainty of war to a view in which war may occur.

As a further measure of assurance the item concerning the relative rank of concern over world war is employed. It is described as measuring relative assurance. The difficulty here is that the rank is merely relative, if world war is ranked as one of the top three concerns, it may be because the other issues are trivial and the absolute concern over war is really not high. Conversely, if world war is ranked low, it still may be of great absolute concern. This problem plagues all rank order items. Nevertheless, it appears that the percentage of elite who do not rank world war as one of their top 3 concerns might vary over time like either high positive assurance or general assurance. If so, the coherence and consistency of either of these latter measures will be greatly enhanced.

Fortunately the items bearing on power are rather clear cut. There were two of them. One dealt with US vs. USSR preparedness to wage successful war. The other contrasted the two powers on missile-rocket-space craft power. Three possible responses were given for each item: US superior, US-USSR equal or USSR superior. The simplicity of these response categories dictated no condensing or collapsing of categories. Hence in Table 1, percentages are given for each of the three categories of response under both war power and missile power headings. Of particular interest is the difference between US superiority and parity data.

In addition to the direct power measures, there is a related variable: defense concern. This variable is based on the same issue-ranking item as the one measuring relative assurance. Hence, it suffers from the same critique of ranking items. Nevertheless, it provides a measure of the concern over power, as opposed to a measure of perception of relative US-USSR power. This is interesting since it may reveal the importance of power in college elite opinion. Also, it should vary inversely with US power superiority and provide a test of the consistency of these variables.

No direct measures of trust were available. However, several items more or less clearly measured variables predictive of or related to trust. Positive intent is predicated as a precursor

of trust (see Figure 2). One item assessed whether the Russians were perceived as wanting peace or war. It is assumed that peaceful intentions are positive intentions. This variable should thus reflect trust in the USSR (unless the peaceful intent is based on US power superiority, which can be tested, see below). To attain clarity the 4 response categories to this item were collapsed to two. The percentages of those who saw the USSR as wanting peace either "at all costs" or despite a possible tendency to start a war because of low trust in the US were added together. This combined percentage is that of those who saw the Russians as having basically peaceful intent (any war would be defensive-against a "treacherous" US). The percentage of college elite who see the USSR as wanting war, either now or when the USSR was stronger, can be found by subtracting the percentages listed for Variable 11 in Table I from 100.

Another "positive intent" item concerned the relative desire of the USSR to "get along" with the non-communist world as compared with Red China. Clearly the item does not measure absolute Soviet cooperative intent. But we can generally assume that Red China is seen as extremely negative in every respect by most Americans. Hence, when the USSR is seen as the same as Red China or worse, it is indeed bad. However, when it is seen as better than Red China, then at least some degree of positive attribution to the USSR can be assumed. Hence, while of limited value, this kind of item does reveal how much the USSR is seen in a more positive light compared with Red China. Note that unfortunately this item was given in only the last four waves of the survey.

A second precursor of trust was perceived common goals (Figure 2). Here again the item comparing Red China and the USSR was helpful. Two basic American goals - individual freedom and a high standard of living are at issue. The item asks whether USSR or Red China is more concerned with these goals. It is again safe to assume that Americans see Red China as absolutely unconcerned about these goals. Hence, if the USSR is seen as more concerned with these goals, we can be sure this means the USSR is seen as having them in common with the US - to at least some extent. In this item as with the other one on Sino-Soviet differences, the percentage of those seeing China and Russia as alike are not distinguished from those seeing China ahead. In either case Russia is painted black.

A final trust related item concerns possibilities of co-existence between East and West. Three responses were provided: coexistence is impossible, may be possible - with effort, and definitely possible - with effort. Percentages for all 3 response categories are given in Table 1. While coexistence potential is not a precursor of trust in the theoretical framework, there is

reason to believe that they are related. It is hardly bearable to contemplate an endless prospect of coexistence based on mutual terror. Hence, it seems likely that a belief in coexistence implies at least some trust in the positive intent of Russia. There are even some findings that suggest that trust and belief in cooperation potential (e.g. coexistence) are actually related (e.g. Richman, 1966; Solonch, 1960; Lieberman, 1964).

A marginally trust relevant variable concerns Red China's threat to the USSR. Presumably, the more the USSR is threatened by Red China the more it shares the goal of deterring and containing Red China with the US. One item did ask how Chinese-Soviet relations would fare. Four response categories ranged from seeing relations improving to seeing an absolute break. For simplicity, percentages for the two responses seeing deterioration or breaks in Sino-Soviet relationships were summed as a measure of the extent to which China is seen as a threat to Russia. Unfortunately, the item was used in only the last four surveys waves.

Finally, Table 1 presents item responses measuring variables which might affect assurance, though not directly in the basic theoretical framework. These variables include Communist and Soviet threat, US scientific competency, Cold War victory and World Respect. Two items dealt with threat to the US, one from Communism taking over previously friendly nations; the other threat is specifically from USSR in the exact same context. In a sense this activity of taking over other nations may be seen as a threat - as evidence of negative USSR intent and hence productive of distrust. However, the first item deals with Communist threat - not necessarily from the USSR - hence, it may be ambiguous - implying Red China, Cuba etc. Further it is a relative rank ordering item (see above). The second item on Russian "take over" mentality contrasts USSR with Red China's "take over" mentality. Clearly if USSR is seen as more threatening than Red China in intent, it is perceived as dangerous indeed--and this variable may relate to distrust. In this item, as with all Red China-USSR items, the difference in percentages between those who see the USSR and China as equal and those who see Red China ahead are not given.

US scientific advancement was of interest initially since it might bear on US vs. USSR competence (see Figure 2). It might also be a factor in producing envy in the US or USSR if the two countries were not in balance. Hence, percent of agreement that the US leads the USSR in science was included...with dramatically unexpected results. It should be noted that the percentage seeing the USSR ahead was so trivial as to be negligible. The alternative to US superiority was parity. Hence, percentages of those seeing equality and those seeing USSR ahead are not distinguished.

The Cold War Victor item was included since if the US is seen as losing to Communism it may sap public esteem for the government and indirectly lower trust for the USSR (see Figure 2). The percentages reported in Table 1 combine the percentages of those who feel certain of US victory and those who aren't certain but see a US win as likely. The small percent who do not fit the above combined category felt that Communism might win; that it is likely to win or that it will win.

The final variable in Table 1 concerns World Respect. Again if the US was ahead in perceived world respect, public esteem of the US government would be high with positive overtones for trust. However, it may be that equality in respect would eliminate some competition between US and USSR and thus induce trust. Hence, both US superiority percentages and equality percentages are given in Table 1.

C. Methods of Data Analysis

The data in Table 1 can be analyzed in a number of interesting ways:

- 1) The agreement percentages for each variable can be analyzed to find the median or middle value over all 10 waves. This will give a picture of the overall or median position of the college elite on each variable. It will not indicate how the variables are related however. For instance it will not tell us whether assurance is more related to power or trust related variables. A correlational analysis will remedy this defect.
- 2) The percentages can be correlated over time with each other. Each variable's percentages can be arranged in rank order from high to low agreement. Every variable can be compared with all other variables to see how similar the rank order of percentages are. If they are highly similar then the two variables show a similar pattern of change in elite opinion over the 10 waves from 1960 to 1967.

To measure this similarity, Spearman's technique of rank order correlation was selected (Siegel, 1956). This measure assumes only that increasing percentage of agreement with an item is an ordinal measure of the variable involved - that higher agreement means the variable's strength increased in the elite. Any assumption that the percentages were interval scale measures of variable intensity seemed highly suspect. Hence, non-parametric statistics will be employed throughout this study (Siegel, 1956).

The correlation analysis should tell us what variables relate or co-vary with other variables. It will not indicate causality. Two variables may correlate very highly yet neither "causes" the other; both may be caused by a third factor, hence, they vary in a similar fashion. Furthermore, the correlational picture will be static. It will show how variables are related over the entire span of time from 1960 to 1967. We need some way of possibly detecting causal patterns and changes in time.

- 3) The percentages can be examined for periods during which there is a significant change in extent of agreement as compared with previous periods. For instance, we may find that in waves 1-5, percentages are quite low, then in waves 6-10, they go up and stay up. Given our assumption that this data is ordinal, a test of significance for the difference between percentages in one period vs. another would be the Mann Whitney U test (Siegel, 1956).

What one can do then is examine each variable in Table 1 to see whether there are any periods in which percentages are higher or lower than in the preceding period. One can begin by comparing Wave 1 with Waves 2-10, then Waves 1-2, with Waves 3-10, Waves 1-3 with Waves 4-10, and so on until one is comparing Waves 1-9 with Wave 10. By comparing when a significant change occurs in one variable compared to another, we may begin to suggest causal links. If variable A changes, then B changes, we might tentatively infer a possible causal link between A and B. For confirmation of this link it must be shown that whenever A changes a change in B follows. Furthermore, the effects of other variables must be partialled out. This form of analysis requires time series analysis (see Blalock, 1964) which is beyond the scope of this study.¹

D. Rationale for Selection of Additional Survey Items from AIPO

Although the Benton & Bowles data will be the basis of the present study, some of the material analyzed from the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) files was also relevant. In some cases AIPO asked questions, more than once, which were relevant to theoretical variables. This data should reflect findings from Benton & Bowles data. If it does, it will add credibility

(1) Time series analyses of these variables could be carried out with additional funds.

that the theoretical framework holds up despite changes in wording of items and a different sample of college opinion.

A summary of these items is given in Table 2. The same variable names and numbers are given in Table 2 as were used in Table 1. A brief description of what the AIPO item tapped is given after the variable name. Note, that the wording is not the same as in Table 1. After each description is given, in parentheses, the AIPO item number on which the description is based. These AIPO items are given verbatim in Appendix II. Under each variable is given the AIPO survey number from which the item comes, the date of administration, the percent of the sample described by the variable, and the sample size. These items were given to a large national sample. The breakdown of this data for college graduates was done by the Roper Public Opinion Research Center.

The rationale for the selection of these items is worth considering. The AIPO item on missile power is very like the Benton & Bowles item on this variable, omitting only a reference to space craft. Thus, it provides an even cleaner measure of missile power than the Benton & Bowles item. The item assessing USSR peaceful intent is quite ambiguous. The rationale used here is that if Russia is seen to have peaceful intentions, war will not "come from" her. It may be seen as a US problem or due to other causes, but not Russia. One problem is that if it is seen as "coming from" Russia, it may yet be defensive or reactive rather than due to bad intent. This is a difficulty of the very unclear wording of this item. Furthermore, if war is seen as "coming from" some source other than the USSR, this may still not exempt the USSR from warlike intent. It may only mean someone else is more warlike, or that Russia is heavily deterred. Still another possibility is that a reader would interpret the item as asking "will Russia attack". In this case it becomes an assurance item.

A similar confusion clouds the item on coexistence. The item assesses how much the elite sees a chance for a peaceful settlement of US-Soviet difference. The problem is that this could mean a peaceful takeover or whittling away of the USSR by the US. However, we view this as a very unlikely interpretation of this item for most Americans. Or, it could mean "how much do the Russians want peace," since for most Americans, the US is seen as wanting peace and the USSR as causing all difficulties. (Withey, 1962). Belief in peaceful settlement would thus be belief in USSR peaceful intent.

A second type of interesting AIPO item concerned specific attitudes on arms negotiations. It was possible to find four items bearing on actual arms control negotiations in the AIPO files which could be analyzed for college graduates. The Benton & Bowles survey

Table 2. Summary of AIPO college elite opinion data relevant to international assurance.

<u>Variable No. 7</u>	<u>US Missile Power Superiority - per cent of elite who see the US ahead of the USSR in the field of long range missiles and rockets (based on Item No. 1a, Appendix II).</u>				
AIPO Survey No.	640	645	647	659	668
Date	1/61	5/61	6/61	5/62	2/63
Per cent	43	47	37	60	56
Sample Size	203	301	263	268	355
<u>Variable No. 8</u>	<u>US-USSR Missile Power Parity - per cent of elite who cannot see a difference between the US and USSR in the field of long range missiles and rockets (based on Items No. 1c and 1d, Appendix II).</u>				
AIPO Survey No.	640	645	647	659	668
Date	1/61	5/61	6/61	5/62	2/63
Per cent	12	17	18	18	26
Sample Size	203	301	263	268	355
<u>Variable No. 9</u>	<u>US Missile Power Inferiority - per cent of elite who see the US behind the USSR in the field of long range missiles and rockets (based on Item No. 1b, Appendix II).</u>				
AIPO Survey No.	640	645	647	659	668
Date	1/61	5/61	6/61	5/62	2/63
Per cent	45	38	45	22	18
Sample Size	203	301	263	268	355

(1) This group either had no opinion or did not know whether the two nations differed. We assume this is equivalent to seeing them as equal, but this is of course not always true. Hence, this variable is not exactly equivalent to the one in Table 1.

Table 2 - Continued

<u>Variable No. 11</u>	<u>Peaceful Soviet Intent²</u> - per cent of elite who see another war as "coming from" primarily the USSR; as opposed to both US and USSR, the US, etc. (based on Item No. 2b, Appendix II).				
AIPO Survey No.	639	647	659		
Date	12/60	6/61	5/62		
Per cent	31	38	26		
Sample Size	269	263	268		
<u>Variable No. 15</u>	<u>Coexistence Impossible between Democracy & Communism³</u> - per cent of elite who feel it is impossible to reach a peaceful settlement of differences with Russia (based on Item 3b, Appendix II).				
AIPO Survey No.	639	654	666	674	676
Date	12/60	1/62	12/62	6/63	8/63
Per cent	60	57	35	32	33
Sample Size	226	272	244	303	336

(2) This item could also be coded - general assurance, if a reader takes it to mean "will Russia launch a war?"

(3) This item could also be coded - peaceful USSR intent - if the "peaceful settlement" were seen to depend on USSR intent.

did include some disarmament and arms control items in Waves 6 through 10. But, due to time and cost pressures, they could not be analyzed for the college elite.¹ Hence, the AIPO items provide our only link between the elite assurance variables and elite attitudes on arms negotiations.

The items concerning arms agreements are presented in capsule form in Table 3. The items are summarized at left (they are given in detail in Appendix II). After each item is given the AIPO survey number, date of administration, response percentages and sample size. Note that the first item merely asks if a test ban agreement is likely, yet we include it since predictions often reflect desires (see McGuire, 1960). The second item asks for opinion directly on how reliable the Russians would be in holding to a treaty. The final two items ask for attitudes on arms agreements per se. As is usual in AIPO data, comparability among items is low, yet some interesting hints may lurk in this data. After presenting the results from the Benton & Bowles data, we shall return to this AIPO data.

PART III - RESULTS

In general, we shall present the results of the median analysis, correlation analysis and change analysis for Benton & Bowles data first. Then the relevant AIPO material will be presented.

A. The Median View of the College Elite on Assurance Variables.

The response percentages presented in Table 1 for each variable were analyzed over all 10 waves (or less where fewer waves are involved) to determine the median, or middle, percentage.² The median percentages reflect the overall position of the college graduates on each variable. The data is presented in Table 4. After each median percentage is given the range of percentages from highest to lowest.

(1) This arms negotiations data will be presented in Technical Report 4.2 - (American mass opinion and assurance between nations). With further funds, these arms negotiation items could be analyzed for the college graduate responses.

(2) A median is the number in a series which is larger than half of the numbers and smaller than the other half. For ordinal data, such as this, it is equivalent to an average.

Table 3. Summary of AIPO college elite opinion data on disarmament and arms control issues.

Item No.	AIPO Survey No.	Date	Per cent Yes No		Sample Size
1. Will there be a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with Russia? (Item No. 5, Appendix II)	669	3/63	53	39	398
2. Will Russia live up to test ban treaty? (Item No. 6, Appendix II)	669	3/63	33	60	398
3. Should US agree to reduce arms if Russia agrees too? (Item No. 7, Appendix II)	616	8/63	53	35	336
4. Should Senate approve test ban treaty? (Item No. 8, Appendix II)	676	8/63	74	13	336

Table 4. Median percentages and ranges of response among the college elite for assurance variables.

Variable	Median Percentage	Range
		(from-to)
1. Non-Assurance	33.5	26 - 42
General Assurance	66.5	58 - 74
2. High Positive Assurance	20	11 - 22
3. Relative Assurance	59.5	43 - 68
4. US War Power Superiority	46.5	33 - 58
5. US-USSR War Power Parity	37.0	31 - 45
6. US War Power Inferiority	11	7 - 22
7. US Missile Power Superiority	29.5	13 - 50
8. US-USSR Missile Power Parity	31	15 - 34
9. US Missile Power Inferiority	37.5	16 - 70
10. Defense Concern	50.5	42 - 60
11. Peaceful Soviet Intent	54.5	40 - 70
12. Soviet Intent to Cooperate ¹	83	77 - 89

Table A. Continued

Variable	Median Percentage	Range
		(from-to)
13. Soviet-American Common Goal: Individual Freedom ¹	50	44 - 69
14. Soviet-American Common Goals: Raising Living Standards ¹	74.5	68 - 79
15. Coexistence Impossible	18	12 - 25
16. Coexistence Maybe Possible	63	58 - 67 ³
17. Coexistence Definitely Possible	17.5	12 - 28
18. China Threat to USSR ¹	67.5	61 - 76
19. Communist Takeover Threat	53.5	30 - 64
20. Soviet Takeover Threat ¹	32	29 - 42
21. US Scientific Superiority	70	57 - 74
22. US Cold War Victor ²	90	79 - 92
23. US Superiority in World Respect	77	73 - 84
24. US-USSR Equality in World Respect	18.5	11 - 22

- (1) Medians based on 4 waves.
 (2) Median based on 7 waves.
 (3) Low range of less than 10 percentage points.

Note that non-assurance is fairly low, (33.5%) meaning that general assurance is wide spread (66.5%). Yet, high positive assurance is not very widespread (20%). The relative assurance measure, however, again suggests that at least some moderate assurance was widespread.

Belief in war power superiority is not very high, but if one combines superiority and parity, 83.5% of the elite see the US as at least equal to the USSR in war power during this period. The perception of US missile power is less optimistic. Less than a third normally see the US ahead of Russia in this field, and only 60.5% see the US as at least equal to Russia. It seems possible that the slightly higher general assurance of this period is not entirely based on perception of US missile power. As might be expected from the latter data, Defense Concern was rather widespread, at least half seeing it as one of 3 top worries.

With respect to trust variables, a fairly sanguine image of Russia emerges. A majority attribute peaceful intent to Russia, and, at least compared to Red China, an overwhelming percentage see Russia as cooperative to the West (from 3/1963 on). A bare half see Russia as more concerned with individual freedom than China (from 3/1963 on). But nearly three fourths see Russia more concerned with the American fixation on living standards than China (from 3/1963 on). Hence, for the college elite Russia is generally seen as basically peaceful, to some extent sharing in US goals.

On the coexistence issue, a large percent see it as "maybe possible", with equal fringes seeing it as impossible and definitely possible. Most college respondents saw China as a threat to the USSR - giving her another link with the US.

With respect to variables not included in the framework, the following is clear. While communism is a majority concern, Russia is seen as at least less of a threat than China to the US (from 3/1963 on). The US is given strong scientific superiority over USSR and is overwhelmingly seen as the ultimate winner in the cold war. Finally, the US is viewed very strongly as the more respected nation around the world. The last two findings suggest that Kennedy regime had high esteem, which should aid trust in the USSR.

In general, the broad general assurance seems based on both perceived power (parity plus superiority) and rather wide trust. The fairly widespread worry over defense and communism, plus the rather weak perceived missile strength may account for the low spread of high positive assurance. It should be noted that if the college elite is indeed more complex in its perceptions of assurance, as suggested above, then a moderate stress (threat or worry) will

actually serve to raise the complexity of their assurance to a maximum (see Schroder, Driver & Straufert, 1967 and Driver, 1967)-- it looks in this overall picture as though college elite assurance is fairly complex - it is at least based on two factors, power and trust - and that moderate anxiety reigns.

At any event, we cannot really tell how the variables are inter-related from the above account. Does assurance change more as power changes, or as trust variables change? Are trust variables related to power? To answer such questions we must turn to the correlational analysis.

B. Intercorrelations among Key Assurance Variables for the College Elite

It is possible for all 24 variables presented above to be intercorrelated with each other. The resulting matrix of 24 by 24 variables would show how each variable related to the others. However, many of the variables are not independent (e.g. non-assurance and general assurance are simple inverses). Furthermore, the interpretation of such a large set of intercorrelations would be quite formidable. A factor analysis (see Harmon, 1960) would enable us to determine how the variables clustered. We might find, for instance, that assurance is related to a cluster of power variables and to a cluster of trust variables. However, such an analysis is beyond the resources of the present study. Hence, we decided to eliminate any variables which were not independent. This immediately eliminates non-assurance (general assurance was thought to be a more positive way to look at this data).

A second method to cut down on variables was to examine for each variable, the variance or the variability of percentages across waves in Table 1. If percentages remained fairly constant over time, it was clear that that variable would hardly correlate with any variable, except other "constants". One variable discarded on this basis was Coexistence-Maybe possible. The range on this variable was only 9 percentage points (see Table 4).

A third elimination tactic was to examine the percentages of a variable for excessively low figures - which might mean unstable data. US War Power Inferiority was discarded since its median value was only 11% and many values were even lower. Other low median values are found for High Positive Assurance, Coexistence Impossible, Coexistence Definitely Possible, and US-USSR Equality in World Respect. For the first and last of these, variance was also low (11 percentage points). Hence, they were dropped as unpromising.

The variables measured by the item contrasting Russia with Red China were present in only the last four waves of the survey. Any correlation based on such a low sample size ($N=4$) is suspect. Hence, these variables - dealing with Soviet intent, shared common goals, Soviet threat and China's threat to the USSR will be reserved for a separate analysis.


We are more rapidly approaching a desirable point where each basic concept is represented by one or at most two variables. We wish to retain two measures of assurance for reliability purposes as this is the central variable. For the power variables, both superiority and parity had theoretical interest, hence they are retained. US Missile Power Inferiority is a fairly strong, highly variable entity. However, it correlates $-.96^1$ with US Missile Power superiority, hence it hardly seems worth while considering it further as an independent variable. Defense concern and Peaceful Soviet intent are retained.

While Coexistence impossible and Coexistence definitely possible are both interesting, they also are negatively correlated ($-.69$). While this figure clearly does not imply identity between the variables, it does imply a strong, significant² negative relationship. Hence, in the interest of economy Coexistence impossible is dropped from the correlational analysis. Coexistence impossible will be retained in the change analysis to follow. Communist threat, US scientific superiority, US cold war victor, and US superiority in world respect are all retained.

For various purposes, mainly to illustrate key trends, most of the variables which were retained for correlation, plus Coexistence impossible are presented in Figures 3 and 4. Percentages are plotted on the vertical axis and time on the horizontal axis. Assurance is represented in both graphs by general assurance. Figure 3 contains assurance and most of the trust related variables (the only omission is the marginal item on Chinese threat to the USSR). Figure 4 contains assurance and most of the power oriented

(1) Correlations are expressed in units from +1.0 to -1.0. A + 1.0 means the ranks of one variable perfectly coincided with those of the other. A - 1.0 means that the ranks are perfectly related in an inverse way - where one is high the other is low. A zero correlation means there is no relationship.

(2) Significance implies that the result is non-random, with a probability of error of 1 out of 20 (which is usually termed $p=.05$) or 1 out of 100 (which is usually termed $p=.01$). For a sample of 10 cases, a correlation of $\pm .53$ has a $p=.05$ error possibility of being random; a correlation of .76 is significant at $p=.01$ level.



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Figure 3. Assurance and Trust related variables for college elite opinion (Benton & Bowles) data

Per cent of College Elite described by variables




Figure 4. Assurance and Power variables for College elite opinion. (Benton & Bowles data)

variables. Parity variables are omitted for reasons to be discussed below. Defense concern is inverted (i.e. it means "lack of" defense concern) to better illustrate patterns. US science superiority is seen as a potential power variable. The threat, cold war and respect variables are not fundamentally oriented to theory and are omitted. The most striking thing about these figures is the apparent similarity in variation for all variables. The degree of this similarity can be seen by correlation analysis.

In a final effort to diminish the number of variables to be intercorrelated, all remaining variables were correlated with general assurance. The logic in most cases was that if some variables failed to correlate with assurance their role in any theory of assurance is marginal and further correlations can be eliminated.

The most striking results of these preliminary correlations was that US-USSR war power parity correlated a meaningless $-.15$ with assurance. US World Respect also showed essentially a zero correlation with general assurance (or any other variable, for that matter). Hence, these two variables are eliminated from any further intercorrelation. On the other hand, relative assurance correlated $.82$ with general assurance. This very high correlation suggests that the two variables may be almost identical - that they both reliably measure the key variable of assurance. This result provides additional confidence in focusing on general assurance as a central variable. From this point on, relative assurance will not be considered in the correlational analysis.

Several variables showed a marginally significant correlation with assurance. These included US-USSR Missile Power Parity, US Cold War Victor and Communist threat of takeover of previously friendly nations. These variables will be included in the intercorrelation, to yield 10 variables which were intercorrelated. The resulting coefficients of correlation are presented in Table 5. Significant ($p=.05$ of error) correlations are denoted with an asterisk, while very significant correlations ($p=.01$) are signified with a double asterisk. All correlations are over 10 waves except for US Cold War Victor which was correlated with all other variables over only the last seven waves.¹

The principal interest in Table 5 are the correlations of general assurance. Assurance is strongly related to perceived US power superiority over USSR. The relationship with pure Missile Superiority is not as strong. Missile parity is marginally related

(1) For a sample size of 7, a correlation coefficient of $\pm .714$ is significant, $p=.05$; $\pm .893$ is significant, $p=.01$.

Variable	US War Power Superiority	Missile Power Superiority	US-USSR Missile Power Parity	US Science Superiority	Defense Concern	USSR Peaceful Intent	Coexistence Definitely Possible	Communist Threat	US Cold War Victor
General Assurance	.73*	.61*	.50	.59*	-.75**	.80**	.66*	-.47	.48
US War Power Superiority		.59*	.06	.76**	-.51	.58*	.50	.19	.35
US Missile Power Superiority			.35	.58*	-.54*	.48	.27	.16	.20
US-USSR Missile Power Parity				.01	-.26	.06	.02	.18	.55
US Science Superiority					.17	.60*	.04	.10	.98**
Defense Concern						-.74*	-.74*	.53*	.00
USSR Peaceful Intent							.65*	-.48	.35
Coexistence Definitely Possible								-.65*	-.13
Communist Threat									.48

a. Sample size = 7, all other cases sample size = 10.

* p=.05

** p=.01

Table 5. Rank order correlations among key assurance variables in college elite opinion, 1960-1967.

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to assurance. What this result suggests is that both missile equality and superiority were related to college elite assurance. Missile inferiority was related to lack of assurance. In overall war power, parity is not associated with assurance. This suggests that parity, in certain limited areas of military power, is acceptable if the US maintains an overall war power lead.

On the other side of the picture, assurance is also highly correlated with perceived peaceful intent in the USSR and somewhat less strongly with the belief that coexistence is definitely possible. In other words, assurance is related to both power and trust-related factors as expected in our theoretical framework. Concretely this means the college elite will be assured only when the US has a general power edge and the USSR is seen as trust-worthy in some elementary way.¹ Both US and USSR actions would thus seem to be taken into account by this sector of the public.

Another basic observation is the trend for trust variables to be slightly stronger in their relation with assurance than power variables. The strongest correlate of assurance is perceived Soviet peaceful intent. It is the only variable whose correlation coefficient with assurance is extremely significant ($p=.01$). The next best correlate is war power superiority, but next comes belief in coexistence - ahead of missile power superiority. In short, trust variables came in first and third, power variables were second and fourth. While these results are not at all conclusive, they suggest that a slightly greater emphasis on trust than on power may characterize the college educated elite of this period.

It may be objected that defense concern was really the second best correlate of assurance, and that this is a power variable. A careful glance at Table 5 dispells the latter idea. Defense concern, surprisingly, is only marginally related to any power variables. On the contrary, it relates very strongly to both trust variables. Hence, it seems better to class defense concern as a part of the trust cluster of variables. A similar logic would link science superiority to power variables. If we thus rank the 3 trust and the 3 power variables in order of relation to assurance, we find ranks 1, 2, and 4, go to trust variables. The Mann Whitney U Test (Siegel, 1956) suggests that this rank order supports the proposition that trust was more related to assurance than power ($p=.10$).

(1) When the USSR is trusted more than it was 1961-1967, power parity may replace power superiority as an essential ingredient in assurance.

However, an immediate issue arises. Are trust and power really separate factors? The general answer seems to be: Yes. True, US war power superiority relates slightly to perceived Soviet peaceful intent. But war power superiority barely relates to co-existence beliefs at all. US missile power superiority relates much more poorly to either trust variable. Missile parity is totally unrelated.

Furthermore, both war power and Soviet peaceful intent correlate more with assurance than they do with each other. This suggests that although power and trust factors have some relatedness, they remain separate factors in relation to assurance. Finally, note the pattern of correlations for war power and Soviet peaceful intent. They differ sharply in relation to defense concern and communist threat. They differ somewhat in relations with coexistence and missile power superiority. These differences further suggest that power and trust are separate factors in this data.¹

Within the power cluster we would include missile, war power and scientific superiority. Missile parity stands by itself. The rather low correlation of missile and general war power superiority, suggests that to the college elite, war power is a much broader package than just nuclear missiles. The implications of this complex view of power will be discussed below. The strong identification of science and power is also striking. In the college elite, federal spending on science would seem to have unexpected dividend in public assurance.

The near identity of science and US Cold War Victory is extraordinary. It points out a possibility that the arms race might easily be converted to a "science race", with no loss of public assurance or conviction of ultimate victory for democracy.

Within the trust cluster are USSR peaceful intent and belief in coexistence. It is instructive to see that belief in coexistence is strongly related to positive USSR intent but not strongly to US power. As noted, low defense anxiety seems also to fit with positive perception of USSR rather than with pure US power. Again note the importance of trust rather than sheer power in allaying college public fears. The fact that defense fear negatively correlates with assurance is a further proof of the consistency of these responses. One would expect assurance and anxiety to be inversely related. The linkage of assurance, low anxiety, and trust, further strengthens the image that trust factors are very important to the college elite.

(1) However, only a factor analysis of the correlations would conclusively substantiate this issue.

The remaining variables seem to have only distant connection with assurance, power or trust. Missile parity only approaches a significant correlation with assurance and possibly with US Cold War Victory. It seems to be a rather isolated variable, whose role in public opinion may as yet be just emerging. Surprisingly, Communist threat to other countries has a very weak relationship to assurance per se. It does tend to have the expected negative relationship. As would be expected, threat is negatively related to USSR peaceful intent and positively related to defense concern. Hence, this would appear to be a marginal member of the trust cluster. The interesting implication of this inclusion is that the college elite may be responding to Soviet actions, positive and negative, in building its perception of USSR intent. US power, per se, does not seem very critical in the college image of the USSR. Finally, US Cold War Victory seems even more marginal; covarying mainly with science and hence with the power cluster. Since it is calculated for only the last 7 waves of the survey, Cold War Victory's pattern of correlations with other variables will not parallel those of Science, which was correlated with other variables over 10 waves, even though science and Cold War Victor correlate .98.

Before leaving the correlational analysis, it is useful to consider those variables measured only in the final waves of the survey. Three of these relate to trust: Soviet intent to get along, Soviet interest in freedom and Soviet interest in high standards of living. The other two assess Soviet threat to take over other nations and China's threat to the USSR. While these variables are measured by an item that merely gives USSR values in relation to Red China and the data is available over only four waves, an analysis of correlations in Table 6 is instructive (see also Figure 3).

First note that the three "trust" variables are more or less strongly positively intercorrelated. Then note that all three strongly relate to one of the two main trust variables - (USSR peaceful intent or coexistence) and weakly to the other main trust variable. They also negatively relate to defense concern just as the two main trust variables do. In other words, they join the "trust cluster," as expected. Furthermore, two of them strongly relate to assurance; one weakly relates. Again this reflects the strong relation between trust factors and assurance. The weak relationship between these new trust factors and power is also in keeping with trends found in Table 5. As might be expected, they relate negatively to perceived Communist threat and positively to US Cold War Victory (i.e. the US "wins" as Russia adopts "our goals").

The remaining two variables in Table 6 hardly relate to anything. USSR threat is inversely related to USSR peaceful

Variables	USSR Interest in Getting Along	USSR Goal: Individual Freedom	USSR Goal: High Living Standards	China Threat to USSR	USSR Threat
USSR Goal: Individual Freedom	.8				
USSR Goal: High Living Standards	1.0*	.8			
China Threat to USSR	-	-	-		
USSR Threat	-	-.95	-	-	
General Assurance	1.0*	.8	1.0*	-	-
US War Power Superiority	-	-	-	-	-
37 US Missile Power Superiority	.8	.7	.8	1.0*	-
US-USSR Missile Power Parity	.75	-	.75	-	-
US Science Superiority	-	-	-	-	-
Defense Concern	-.95	-.75	-.95	-	-
USSR Peaceful Intent	.8	1.0*	.8	-	-.95
Coexistence Possible	1.0*	.8	1.0*	-	-
Communist Threat	-.8	-1.0*	-.8	-	.95
US Cold War Victor	.8	1.0*	.8	-	.95

A dash means that the correlation was too low to be worth recording.
* $p < .05$

Table 6. Rank order correlations among assurance variables given over final four waves (3/65 to 2/67) of Benton & Bowles survey, for college elite opinion.

intent and positively related to Communist threat and US Cold War victory. The latter correlation suggests that as USSR threat increased the college elite sees the US as more a winner in the Cold War. Might this be due to a defensive increase in perceived US capability in response to Soviet threat?

Red China's threat to USSR relates only to US missile power superiority. Is this coincidental? Or may it be that as China was seen as a threat to USSR in elite opinion it was seen as a rising threat by the US government, which contributed to our actual rise in missile power? Further comments on the implication of Red China for this study will be made below.

In summary, the college elite seems to relate assurance to US power superiority and positive trustful views of the USSR. Science seems to be an unexpected key to US power, overshadowing missile power per se. In fact, missile parity seems somewhat acceptable to the college elite, using assurance as a criterion for acceptance. Trust would seem to require positive Soviet action, as well as US power. The dependence of trust on power seems rather slight, though certainly not nonexistent.

The correlation data can be interpreted, tentatively, in a causal way. It could be that changes in either perceived US power or Soviet trustworthiness cause changes in assurance. A more elaborate "model" is shown in Figure 5. The two principal "causes" of assurance are shown by heavy arrow lines leading from Power and Trust to assurance. Trust, in turn, is inferred from the correlations of USSR peaceful intent and coexistence with assurance and each other. It was not directly measured (but see Strickland, 1974). One can infer that perceived Soviet peaceful intent causes belief in coexistence rather than the opposite, hence, the causal arrow from USSR intent to coexistence in Figure 5. Furthermore, increased belief in USSR peaceful intent probably "causes" decreased defense concern in the college public. If lower defense concern is responded to by the government, US power will decline, causing a drop in assurance. So ironically, trust could cause a drop in assurance if the government lowers power as trust increases. It would seem that until power superiority is replaced by parity or is eliminated as an assurance base, as in US-Canadian relations, the government cannot relax power as trust increases. However, it may be that at certain "critical" high trust levels, power may have either no effect or a negative effect on trust. Further implications of this data will be discussed below.

The "causal model" of Figure 5 must be viewed as purely suggestive. Correlational analysis as done here cannot substantiate causal analysis. Only a time series analysis could begin to do this. However, an analysis of major changes in college elite opinion can shed some light on possible causes of assurance. It may also foreshadow the direction in which college elite opinion is moving.




Figure 5. Tentative causal model of assurance, based on correlations among college elite opinion variables.

C. Major Changes in Assurance Variables for College Elite Opinion

A Mann Whitney U test (Siegel, 1956) was conducted on all variables in Table 1, which were measured in 7 or more waves. These variables are listed in Table 7. After each variable, is indicated the direction of change, if any. Then the amount of change from the median of the pre-change period to the median of the post change period is given. Next comes the date when change began and the date when change terminated. Thus, for non-assurance, the 85% decrease occurred between 9/61 and 1/62. The U value indicates how statistically strong the change was. The lower the U value, the stronger the change. Next are given the number of waves prior to and succeeding the change - n_1 and n_2 respectively. Finally, the significance level for each U is given. In every case, U values for possible changes at any point in time were computed. In two cases noted in Table 7 the point of change was uncertain and marginally significant earlier change dates are given as footnotes. It may be helpful in viewing this data to consult Figures 3 and 4.

A summary of Table 7 would be that:

- 1) Assurance showed modest to strong increases.
- 2) Perceived US power increased strongly.
- 3) Perceptions of positive intent and coexistence potential increased in strong and modest degrees respectively.

In other words, the period from 1961 to 1962 was one of an increasingly positive opinion climate. Note that in no case is the change over 20%. This is in line with findings of Deutsch & Merritt (1965) that at least 40% of a population never seems to alter their attitudes. 60% shifts are rare effects of sustained, extremely dramatic events (e.g. World War II). They note that under more normal circumstances, sustained, dramatic events can induce 10-20% changes. Isolated dramatic, or undramatic sustained events impact less than 10%. Thus a change under 10% is called modest.

The issue, however, is which variables changed first. It is more probable that if variable A changes and then B changes that A causes B, rather than the reverse. Table 8 summarizes the changes in major variables over time. Note that the first variable to alter was US Science superiority which rose between April, 1961, and September 1961. This was followed by an increase in perceived US war power superiority at the expense of parity and inferiority from September 1961 to January 1962. A similar rise in US Missile power was at the expense of inferiority not parity.¹ At this same time

(1) This echoes correlation data showing missile superiority and parity as unrelated.

Table 7. Direction, amount and time of major change in assurance variables for college elite opinion.^a

Variable	Direction of Change	Amount of Change	Time Change Begins Ends	U	n ₁	n ₂	p
1. Non-assurance	decrease	- 8.5%	9/61 - 1/62	3	4	5	.033
2. High Positive Assurance	increase	5.5%	1/62 - 6/62	1	5	5	.008
3. Relative Assurance	increase	10 %	1/62 - 6/62	3	5	5	.028
4. US War Power Superiority	increase	18 %	9/61 - 1/62	0	4	6	.005
5. US War Power Parity with USSR	decrease	- 7.5%	9/61 - 1/62	0	4	6	.005
6. US War Power Inferiority	decrease	- 10.5%	9/61 - 1/62	1	4	6	.01
7. US Missile Power Superiority	increase	- 14.0%	9/61 - 1/62	2	4	6	.019
8. US Missile Power Parity with USSR	no change	0					
9. US Missile Power Inferiority	decrease	14. %	1/62 - 6/62	4	5	5	.048

(a) Mann Whitney U values signify amount of change, Siegel, 1956.

Table 7 - Continued

	Variable	Direction of Change	Amount of Change	Time Change Begins Ends	U Value	n ₁	n ₂	p
10.	Defense Concern	decrease	- 3 %	1/62 ^b - 6/62	0	5	5	.004
11.	Peaceful Soviet Intent	increase	15 %	1/62 - 6/62	3	5	5	.033
15 ^c	Coexistence im-possible	decrease	- 7.5%	1/62 - 6/62	4	5	5	.048
16.	Coexistence may be possible	no change	0					
17.	Coexistence definitely possible	increase	5 %	3/63 ^d - 2/64	0	3	7	.008
19 ^c	Communist threat	no change	0					
21 ^c	US Scientific Superiority	increase	9 %	4/61 - 9/61	0	3	7	.008
22.	US Cold War Victor	increase	6.5%	1/62 - 6/62	2	5	0	.047
23.	US World Respect	no change	0					
24.	US-USSR World Respect Equality	no change	0					

(b) A change from 9/61 to 1/62 is marginally significant: U=3; n₁=4; n₂=6; p=.056

(c) Omitted variables (from Table 1) are those measured in only four waves, for which the Mann Whitney U is meaningless.

(d) A change from 6/62 to 3/63 is marginally significant: U=3; n₁=6; n₂=4. p=.056

Major Variables	Time				
	4/61 - 9/61	9/61 - 1/62	1/62 - 6/62	6/62 - 3/63	3/63 - ?
Power	US Science Gain	US Power Superiority Gain	"US Cold War Victor" Increase		
Assurance		"Non-Assured" Decline	High Positive Assurance Gain		
Trust		Defense Concern	Decline USSR Peaceful Intent gain Coexistence Impossible Decline	Coexistence definitely possible gain	

Table 8. Summary of Major Changes in Elite Assurance Variables, 1960 - 1967.

non-assurance declined. It is possible that defense concern also began to drop in this period.

Then beginning in January 1962, a new series of changes occur reaching culmination in June 1962. Perceived peaceful USSR intent went up. Defense concern was definitely down. High positive assurance went decisively up. During this period, belief that coexistence is definitely possible increased, possibly from June 1962 but definitely from March 1963 on to February 1964. It is quite interesting to note that once the "thaw" had set in by June 1962, positive images of the USSR, US power, and assurance remained high through to 1967. The Cuban missile crises of late 1962 was unable to significantly affect any of these variables. Note in Figures 3 and 4 that only a slight and temporary drop in missile power (not war power) and in assurance (not trust factors) followed the Cuban crisis; and that recovery was rapid.¹

A simple causal interpretation of these changes is that a US power gain, foreshadowed or caused (?) by a science gain led to increased trust and assurance. It is quite reasonable to infer that since the USSR has lost power, it can and will do less harm-hence, one can be more assured. It is also plausible to assume that since the USSR has less power than the US they must develop more positive goals and tactics concerning the US. It is usually the case that the weaker develops positive modes of dealing with the stronger. Apparently, the social psychological literature that suggests that high power interferes with trust (Walton, 1968) is not supported in the college elite.

However, this interpretation may not be correct. The correlation analysis suggests that trust factors are somewhat more central to assurance than to power, and that trust and power are only weakly correlated. How can this be reconciled with the strong role and impact attributed to power in the preceding passage? Social psychology has found that weaker parties tend to dislike the stronger (Mulder et al. 1965), and that weaker parties are less trusting regarding stronger (Solomon, 1960). Assuming that these views are valid, is it possible that the college elite is not aware of this and assumes that the inferior USSR will not dislike and distrust our superior power?

(1) The failure of the crisis to permanently dislocate opinion may be due to: a. Kennedy's careful stress on Soviet cooperation and trustworthiness during the crises (Gould, 1968); b. Kennedy's use of "hard" data - photos - to dispell doubt (Gould, 1960); c. The tendency for crises to "freeze" attitudes into closed systems into which new data cannot get (Strickland, 1968; Schroder, Driver & Streufert, 1967).

An alternate interpretation of the events of 1961-1967 may alleviate some of these problems. Note in Table 8 that only "negative"¹ attitudes changed when perceived power shifted from August, 1961, to January, 1962; (i.e. non-assurance and defense concern declined); but those convinced of peace stayed low and trust factors stayed unchanged. Only after January, 1962, did "positive" attitudes grow. Coexistence beliefs followed a similar sequence delayed one cycle - first belief that coexistence was impossible declined (1/62 - 6/62) then, from 6/62 on, belief in definite chances for coexistence rose. These sequences suggest a very tentative explanation in terms of two phases (see Figure 5).

Phase One: The power superiority gain of the US reduced college elite certainty of war and defense anxiety in the period from 4/61 to 1/62. During this period, the college elite opinion became more open to new information about the USSR and more able to develop a complex view of the USSR as not all bad. Psychological literature is replete with data suggesting that extreme fear blocks the intake of new information discrepant with established views (Janis & Feshback, 1953; Gollob & Dittes, 1965; Leventhal, Singer & Jones, 1965). It is probable that non-assurance and defense concern equate with fear. Thus, as long as the fear persisted any new data from the news media suggesting positive acts or traits in the USSR would not be assimilated and the image of the USSR would stay negative. The fear decrease of 9/61 - 1/62 enabled the college elite to take in any available positive information about the USSR. Psychological research also suggests that under high stress, such as fear, complex views, (especially those including positive and negative traits) of others are unlikely (Driver, 1967; Streufert, 1967; Gollob & Dittes, 1965). Thus, only if fear is reduced, as in 9/61 - 1/62, will the college elite be expected to show a more balanced, complex view of the USSR, in which positive factors are balanced with negative.

Phase Two: In the less anxious climate following 1/62, positive behavior by the USSR and US, reported in the news media, induced a rise in trust for the USSR in the more "open" college elite. Accompanying this trust gain was a rise in positive assurance in which war was seen as improbable.² Figure 6 presents this

(1) The distinction that positive and negative aspects of attitudes operate under separate dynamics has support elsewhere - (see Schroder et al. 1967; Herzberg, 1966).

(2) Coexistence beliefs lagged behind the general trend, though showing the same sequence: A negative view going down first, then an increase in positive views. The lag may be due to the fact that coexistence concerns longer range phenomena (goals) than assurance or intent. Longer range phenomena may be slower to change.




Figure 6. Tentative model for college elite assurance, based on major change data.

tentative model of this two phase shift. Note that both changes in US science potential dating from 4/61 and probably, actual changes in US power (e.g. the news releases claiming the US had eliminated the missile gap) generate a perceived power gain. This in turn diminishes negative attitudes and generates "openness" to new information. Reports of positive events generate a gain in positive attitudes. (see also Driver, 1968c).

There are critical implications in this model which must be drawn:

- 1) Power gains did not directly cause gains in trust related attitudes. The power shift was a critical pre-condition of rising trust, but trust gains depended mainly on US and USSR positive actions. This accords with the correlation data.
- 2) Positive assurance is related almost entirely to gains in trust variables. Non-assurance decreases with gains in power; but it is replaced with a marginal view in which war may or may not come - as long as trust is low. In other words, power per se can only generate marginal, not high, assurance. Thus, the elite may very well be aware of the limits of superior power at moderate to low trust levels as a means of gaining further trust in another party (some of which limits are suggested by social psychology).

A further problem in this model is whether with new, emerging high trust levels, power superiority is needed at all. In the correlational data, missile parity had some relation to assurance. In the post June, 1962 period, did parity become acceptable? Did the role of power decline further? We cannot tell from present data. A glance at Figures 3 and 4 show that at no time from June, 1962, onward did both war power and missile power decline simultaneously. The rather steadily high assurance level was never subjected to a total power decline. Hence, it must be left to a future analysis to determine whether trust and assurance vis à vis the Soviet Union are now high enough in the college educated public to survive a drop in power to parity levels.

D. Summary and Comparison of the Three Benton & Bowles Analyses

In general, the three analyses of college elite opinion converge on the same dual factor model of assurance. The general median analysis shows a high assurance level based on high perceived power and fairly high general trust related attitudes. The correlation model confirms the relationship of assurance to power and trust factors. But it throws clearer light on the pre-eminence

of trust during the entire period. The correlation model also spotlights the important role of US science superiority in power perception and the very weak role of power parity - neither of which roles are clear in the median analysis. Finally the major change analysis adds several new insights. It is clear that all three major variables - trust, power and assurance showed a sharp increase in or around the period from August, 1961, to June, 1962. It is also clear that a change in power was the key that unlocked increases in trust and assurance. However, a more detailed analysis of the change data showed that the power shift is accompanied by changes only in negative components of trust and assurance. Positive components of these variables shifted months after the power shift - probably in response to world events.¹

Thus, the major change and correlational analyses are not necessarily at odds. Both suggest that gains in power will affect trust and at least minimal assurance. However, power's effect on assurance was strongest prior to the major shift. As long as assurance and trust were largely negative, changes in US power were potent "causes" of assurance and trust variation. However, once the shift to high US power occurred, with consequent decrease in negative attitudes, the role of power diminished. Trust and positive assurance are still probably dependent on some kind of power superiority, but increases in trust or assurance beyond low levels must come from other sources; and the interdependence of trust and assurance should increase - at the expense of power. The thrust of this development may be the capability of the collage elite to accept power parity with no loss of trust or assurance.

A few minor points round out this discussion. The division of attitudes into positive and negative components is found only in the major change analysis. This distinction could be analyzed via correlation techniques if a more expanded intercorrelation of all variables in Table 7 were carried out. For the moment, however, we urge caution in viewing the major change model of Figure 6.

Another difference between correlation and major change models concerns the role of defense concern. In the correlation model (Figure 5) positive Soviet intent "causes" defense concern to decline. However, this inference is based solely on a correlation between the variables. Causality might as easily be reversed, or come from a third factor (as the Major Change model suggests). In the major change model (Figure 6), declining defense concern "causes" openness to positive events which in turn causes an increase in perceived positive intent in the USSR. Since correlational data is so suspect when causally analyzed, we lean to the model based on major change data. The interpretation that defense concern changes prefigure intent perceptions in no way conflicts with the correlation between them.

(1) See Driver, 1969c.

Another point concerns the increasingly clear role of events as one goes from the median to major change data. No role of events is clear in the general picture. The impact of Soviet threats and intent in the correlation model suggests slightly that USSR acts might be keys to assurance based on trust. But in the major change data the role of actual power and science events and of real positive actions by both nations seems clearest. In another place (Driver, 1968c) this problem of the role of events will be discussed.

A final point concerns Science. In the correlation model it is a correlate of power. In the major change model its change precedes power changes. Can this imply that Science changes induced the power change and possibly the whole sequence of events? Such a conclusion would fit our technique of assigning causality to events that precede other events. If this is substantiated, the role of science in international relations assumes hitherto unforeseen significance.

E. An Analysis of Data on College Elite Assurance from AIPO Sources

The AIPO items which were closest to the Benton & Bowles items are presented in Table 2. They were not given at the same times as the Benton & Bowles waves, so any direct comparison is not possible. However, the items can be plotted along with their Benton & Bowles counterparts to depict their general patterns.

Figure 7 shows the general assurance and peaceful USSR intent items from Benton & Bowles contrasted with two trust related AIPO items. The AIPO item labelled "peaceful intent or assurance" in Figure 7 is ambiguous. It asks "if war comes, will it come from Russia...". This could mean "will Russia attack" to some readers, or "is Russia desirous of war" to others. It seems to describe a U curve in Figure 7, which conforms generally to assurance or, less well, to peaceful USSR intent Benton & Bowles items. In per cent of agreement level, it most resembles Benton & Bowles' assurance. We would thus guess that most AIPO respondents read it as "will war come".¹

Note that this AIPO item clearly identifies the source of war as USSR. Yet the item still fits the Benton & Bowles general war concern item quite well. This supports an earlier contention that the Benton & Bowles assurance item relates to assurance vis à vis USSR.

(1) Thus, our interpretation in Table 2 was incorrect. It does not seem to be a peaceful intent item.




Figure 7 Comparison of Benton & Bowles and AIPO items on assurance and trust related variables, college elite opinion

The other AIPO trust item asks for belief in the possibility of peaceful settlement with the USSR. It too is ambiguous - does it imply peaceful intent within the USSR or potential for coexistence? A glance at Figure 4 shows that this AIPO item is at a much higher level of acceptance than the Benton & Bowles items on coexistence. Hence, it is related to perceived USSR peaceful intent in Figure 7. The "fit" is exceedingly good. Here again the Benton & Bowles item may clarify what a rather typically ambiguous AIPO item is really assessing. The close fit of these two items also suggests that belief in USSR peaceful intent is linked to seeing a peaceful solution of US-USSR problems. This in turn might amplify the reason for a correlation between peaceful USSR intent and coexistence beliefs in the Benton & Bowles data. Obviously, the peaceful solution of US-USSR differences bodes well for coexistence.

More generally, note that both AIPO items show an upward shift following 1/62. This is the same point when Benton & Bowles "positive" items swung upwards. A statistical test for change in these two AIPO variables is rather useless given the fact that one has only 5 and the other 3 readings. However, if we take a relativistic view, and ask, for each item, how many readings are above the mean for the item, and how many below, we can combine the two items' data. One can see that for the "assurance" AIPO item, the first 2 readings are below a mean value for that item while the last reading is above the mean. For the peaceful settlement item, the first two readings are below while the last three are above. If we use 1/62 as a pivot point, it turns out that the four readings from both items below the mean values of their own set come before 1/62. The four percentages above the means of the appropriate set are all after 1/62. The Fisher Exact Test (Siegel, 1956) finds this shift significant ($p=.05$). Thus, if one combines data, the AIPO items show a significant rise in assurance and peaceful intent measures in January, 1962. This is precisely when the assurance and peaceful intent items rose in the Benton & Bowles data. We, thus, have an independent confirmation of the timing of change on a separate sample. The universality of the Benton & Bowles sample is strongly supported.

In Figure 8, a similar analysis of an AIPO missile power item is given. The wording of this item is very similar to the Benton & Bowles item, however, the AIPO item omits reference to space craft. Note that the AIPO item is consistently more endorsed than the Benton & Bowles item. Evidently, the US elite were much less sanguine on US space craft superiority than they were on US missile-rocket superiority. Yet, the pattern of agreement is very similar for the two items. Both show an upward shift after 9/61. For the AIPO item a Mann Whitney U test, shows a maximum U of 0 ($n_1=3, n_2=2$) which can only attain a $p=.10$ given such low sample sizes. The AIPO power item exactly mirrors the point of change for Benton & Bowles power items; again reflecting a remarkable universality in these opinion shifts.




Figure 8. Comparison of Benton & Bowles and AIPO items on US Missile Power superiority, college elite opinion.

F. College Elite Opinion on Arms Control

The implications of the above data are that following 1/62, college elite opinion shifted towards trust in the USSR. Trust includes a majority view that coexistence and a peaceful settlement with the USSR are possible. Therefore, one can predict that college opinion in post 1/62 will definitely favor arms controls freezing the perceived US power edge. They will possibly favor agreements on disarmament, if and only if trust is high enough to enable them to tolerate power parity.

Several AIPO items dealt with arms negotiations (see Table 3). Two were administered in 3/63. One of these asked if a test ban treaty was likely with the USSR. The college elite said yes (64%). A second item asked if the USSR would live up to this treaty. Only 40% said yes. In 8/63 another set of two items was administered. One asked if we should approve of the partial test ban treaty. Some 71% said yes. When asked if we should sign a disarmament treaty (of unstated magnitude) with the USSR, 53% were in favor.

In general, when a test ban was in question, an increasingly large majority were in favor as time progressed. This is despite a 60% belief that the USSR would not be reliable (in 3/63). Unreliability may not mean negative intent. It could mean a belief that a very defensive USSR might go back on its pledge as it had in 1961. However, in 8/63, the college elites were for a disarmament pact of unspecified magnitude. This is quite important. The wording is crucial (see Table 3) - "if Russia agrees to reduce armaments and armed forces...should the US agree?" One possible thrust of this item is parity. There is no guarantee here of US supremacy. Yet, in 8/63 it was endorsed. Does this result mean that by 8/63 the US college elite had begun to accept parity? It may be so. If so, assurance has remained high through 1967. So have trust factors. The suggestion is that possibly in late 1963, the college elite had moved to a point where high trust so sustained assurance that war power parity (not just missile power parity) was an acceptable policy. Part of such a change could be expected on the basis of an analysis of current events. But this is beyond the scope of the present study (see Driver, 1968b & 1968c).

PART IV - DISCUSSION

There are two sets of wider implications in this data. One set is concerned with theoretical implications for psychology and political science. The other set deals with pragmatic implications for arms control and disarmament policy.

A. Implications for Psychology and Political Science I:
Content Findings

First let us consider the findings relevant to the content of assurance attitudes. Later we can consider the implications of the structure of the assurance attitudes revealed in this study.

With respect to trust factors, this study confirms most expectations based on prior research. For instance the positive relationships among perceived goal similarity, perceived positive intent and perceived cooperative potential are in accord with social psychological literature on these topics (see Secord & Backman, 1965). The only possible surprise in this set of data was the fact that perceived coexistence (cooperation) potential changed after perceived positive intent changed. By certain views, one might have expected perceived cooperative potential to change before and potentially cause a change in perceived positive intent. On the contrary it seems that in the present college sample, changes in perceived intent in another nation may set off changes in perceived cooperative potential.

A much more surprising result was the failure of the position of the US in "world respect" to in anyway affect power, trust or assurance. One interpretation of this would be that apparently to the college elite in general the court of world opinion is of little importance. This is surprising in view of the importance assigned to world opinion by certain US leaders. It may mean that the college elite is jaded on the value of world opinion. Another possible alternate explanation may be that this "variable" varied very little (see Table 4) and was generally quite high - most college elite saw the US ahead of the USSR from 1960-1967 in world respect. If there had been more variability, especially with times when the USSR was ahead, this variable might have had more impact.

The failure of world respect to affect assurance may dispute another hypothesis based on social psychology. We suggested that assurance might vary positively with the US's "self esteem". In part, this is based on psychological literature that suggests a strong link between prestige or self respect and levels of anxiety, fear and general non-assurance in individuals (e.g. Cohen, 1959; Rosenberg, 1962). The failure of confirmation in this area may be due to variable problems cited in the preceding paragraph; to failures in conceptualization (e.g. world respect may not relate to "self esteem" of the public toward the US, or anxiety may not equal non-assurance); or to a simple refutation of this interpersonal finding at the level of international attitudes.

Turning to the power area, several points deserve emphasis. First is the extremely strong role of science as a probable basis of power. Many catalogues of the bases of power in political

analysis (e.g. Knorr, 1956) do not focus as strongly on the role of "expertise" - particularly scientific expertise - in national power as the college elite does. Compilations of "national power" rarely include measures of scientific attainment. This study suggests that in at least one very important segment of the US public, power is seen in terms other than mere economics or military capability. If this finding is more generally true of the US public and other national publics, then science must join dollars and guns as an element in even the most pragmatic of "real politik" views of the world. In future calculations of power balance, these public views on the relevance of science must be considered. If nothing else, these results strongly support the emphasis in the Department of Defense on science and research.

A second point concerns a basis of power not measured in our study: capability of A to offer B desirable goods or services. In social psychological research, this "positive incentive" power ranks as a strong base of real power (Rosen et al., 1961). In future research on US vs. USSR power, this power base should also be assessed.

A third and final point concerns the critical issue of surveillance. Social psychology (Kelman, 1961) suggests that trust and surveillance are mutually exclusive. The present study suggests a mounting trust in the college elite; it also suggests little concern for surveillance over the USSR in disarmament treaties (at least in 8/63). Does this result imply that the college elite sees surveillance as destructive of trust, or that surveillance is irrelevant when trust is high? Unfortunately the present survey items do not provide conclusive data (e.g. they do not indicate the limits of the college elite's tolerance of non-surveillance, nor do they give any changes in time).

A final content area concerns the interaction of trust and power variables. A primary assumption of this study is that assurance is jointly related to US power and trust in the USSR. More specifically we can cite Singer's (1958) formulation that threat (non-assurance) equals the product of power in the other nation and negative intent in the other state. Previously, we presented data that showed both US power and perceived USSR peaceful intent separately correlate with assurance. Now, however, we will consider the inter-relation hypothesized by Singer. If we multiply the percentages believing US war power ahead of the USSR by the percentages believing the USSR has peaceful intent we obtain the product which Singer says should relate to threat. This was done for the percentages in question over 10 waves. The products of US power and USSR peaceful intent (Variables 4 and 11, Table 1)

for each wave were rank ordered and correlated with general assurance:

The coefficient between assurance and the product of US power and USSR peaceful intent was .86, significant well beyond the .01 level.

In sum, Singer's model is upheld, as is the basic premise of our theoretical framework: The best single predictor of assurance is neither trust nor power alone, but rather their product.

A second and final issue on power - trust relations, concerns the effect of power imbalance on trust. Again social psychology suggests that if one actor is inferior in power he reacts negatively to the superior actor. It appears that power is very often used to coerce inferiors (e.g. Solomon, 1960). Hence, power inferiors dislike superiors (Mulder, 1965) and generate hostile, distrusting action toward superiors (Solomon, 1960). In particular, increases in power induce decreases in trust in inferiors (Pruitt, 1965).

Yet, in the present study the college elite saw Soviet positive intent go up as US power superiority over the USSR increased. Why? One possible difference between the present US-USSR situation and psychological studies may be the amount of power difference. It is possible that the laboratory studies used far larger power margins than ever obtained between US and USSR. Another possible resolution may be that the power increase was only a pre-condition for trust gains which were due to other factors (see Page 45). Still another possibility may be that the actual dynamics of interpersonal and international power behaviors are not comparable. It may be that in interpersonal areas, power inferiority leads to hostility, etc., whereas in the international arena this same inferiority is productive of conciliatory positive action from the inferior, who must first of all survive in the "international jungle". It is also possible that perceptions of international and interpersonal power are not the same. People may see inferior people being hostile, but fail to see this in nations (even though it may be true).

These remarks point out the dangers of any simple translation of social psychology (particularly of the experimental variety) to the international arena. In most experimental social psychological studies of topics such as trust, power or cooperation, certain critical context variables may be omitted in the interest of control or simplicity - e.g. instead of behavior regarding real or simulated "nations" behavior regarding other persons will be employed. Or motivations in experiments may totally differ from those in publics or governments confronting real issues. In any event, behavior and perception attributed to

the interpersonal arena should probably be analyzed at the international level for final confirmation.

In a similar vein, social psychology suggests that if A is superior to B, then A's superiority is evidence per se of B's negative intent. Why else would A have so much power if B were not intending harm to A. Again our data do not confirm such laboratory findings. High US power went hand in hand with increasing belief in USSR positive intent. Several possible explanations occur: US power may be seen merely as a guarantee against the risk of potential threat from the USSR - not against perceived current threat. (only if the USSR were normally seen as evil would a sudden US arming against the USSR seem to strongly imply immediate and new negative intent in the USSR). Another possibility is that in our achievement oriented society, arms superiority is one more area of US achievement - having no implication for USSR intent. Other explanations doubtless occur, but the principle is clear - inferences about people in laboratory settings may often be poor models for the behavior or even perceived behavior of nations.

B. Implications for Psychology and Political Science II: Structural Findings

The principal structural expectation was that college educated elite assurance attitude would be multidimensional. Work on cognitive structure (e.g. Scott, 1965; Schroder, Driver & Streufert, 1967) has suggested that education is related to the complexity of international attitudes. The present findings suggest that assurance is based on two factors: (power and trust); that the variables in the trust cluster are closely related but not identical - i.e., coexistence views change months after perceptions of peaceful intent; and finally that the two assurance factors are interrelated in a fairly complex fashion.

In passing, it should be noted that the apparently lesser status of power, compared to trust in college elite assurance is also related to structure. In at least one other source (Driver, 1968d, complex attitudes on international topics are related to a relative demphasis on power relative to trust.

A final structural point concerns the role of anxiety or concern and complexity of attitude structure. Theoretical formulation in this area (Driver & Streufert, in press) suggest that anxiety will relate to complexity of attitudes in a curvilinear fashion. That is, the complexity of assurance attitudes should at first increase then decrease as anxiety goes from low to high values. However, empirical research on this topic (e.g. Driver, 1967; 1968d) suggests that anxiety or threat is negatively related

to complexity of international perception or attitudes. In particular, increasing threat relates to a decreasing role of trust.

The present study echoes the same empirical result: Defense concern (anxiety) was negatively related to increasing trust factors. Furthermore, as concern or worry over defense decreased, the role of trust seemed to become much more salient, and a genuine two dimensional view of the USSR as both good and bad seemed to become possible (see Page 49). Note, however, in the median data that over-all moderately high anxiety over defence went along with an over-all COMPLETE assurance view. In further defense of the curvilinear theory however, it should be said that in all of these studies, a full range of anxiety was not covered, hence, a curvilinear pattern might still be found.

In summary, it appears, then, that complex - multidimensional, integrated - assurance views are found in college educated opinion, especially when fear or concern diminishes from high to moderate levels. Whether, the views of the less well educated public are less complex remains to be seen.

C. Implications for Policy I: Objectives for Arms Control Negotiations - The Parity Issue

Probably the most important implication of this study for arms control and disarmament negotiations concerns the main objective of arms negotiations themselves - should the US negotiate for power superiority, parity or...what? Other policy issues concern the importance of verification and how the college elite can be presented arms control measures in the best possible light. Let us focus first on the parity issue.

The general implication of the data presented above is that the public is most assured when belief in US war power superiority over the USSR is most widespread. War power superiority even seems a cause or pre-condition for trust. Belief in US-USSR parity in war power had no relation to trust or assurance. In fact, as parity tended to decline, assurance rose (major change data). Since any democratic government wishing to remain in power must heed basic public needs, and national security generally ranks as one of the most basic needs, it follows that the US government should try to keep its public assured. Negotiations aimed at freezing US power superiority would seem the best route to maintain general assurance.

However, power superiority also seems to have fatal flaws. For instance, if both US and Soviet elites require power superiority as an ingredient of assurance (and their assurance is deemed vital for political survival by each government) how can a stable arms control level or general disarmament be obtained? How can either nation realistically expect any stable, long term treaties under these conditions? It would seem that any inferior or equal power

position would generate elite fear and pressure to surpass the other nation despite treaties. Each government must at least tacitly recognize this - hence, no stable agreement can be reached.

Furthermore, the data suggest that power superiority, per se, does not generate high assurance only a modest or minimal kind of assurance. For higher assurance, trust must be generated. But high trust may be difficult to attain under non-parity conditions - if social psychological inference can be accepted. There is even a suggestion in the major change data that power superiority is only a precondition for higher trust; that trust is then built in part on positive acts by the USSR. However, if the USSR is trying to also attain superiority, it is doubtful whether her actions will induce US public trust. In short, there is reason to believe that stable trust and high assurance can only be attained under conditions of power parity. Hence, any long term realistic arms negotiations would seem to be most credible and meaningful when aimed at parity by both nations.

How can this policy dilemma be resolved? Six possible approaches are suggested by the data:

One: Negotiators can aim for total arms superiority, recognizing that any long term treaty offers are not credible or stable; and that the college educated elite is likely to attain only marginal assurance. As a long term goal this state of affairs is not very likely to lead to elite public satisfaction with government. It is further quite possible that a climate of long term marginal assurance (i.e. a climate of mild fear) can have poisonous, over-simplifying effect on the quality of thought needed in an elite which has to manage a complex and changing society.

Two: Negotiators can aim for "balanced military power superiority." Military power can be defined as having more than one aspect. For instance power can be subdivided into several components, such as missile power, naval power, air power, etc. A "balance" between the US and USSR might be attained if one country were ahead in some power areas while the other country was ahead in others. For example, the US might bargain for a treaty guaranteeing it supremacy in nuclear submarines, while the USSR could negotiate for supremacy in nuclear equipped ground divisions. A settlement on these terms could enable each country to claim "superiority". Each nation could further claim that the power area in which they have superiority is the most important, deterring, awesome, etc. Thus, the US could claim that nuclear submarine power was the "key to military dominance"; whereas the USSR could claim that

nuclear equipped land divisions were the "sine qua non" of military supremacy. Each nation could claim superiority in the "most important" areas of power. The arms race could cease, and possibly some "balanced" de-escalation could occur.

The data of this study suggest that both general war power and missile power correlated with assurance. These two types of power were related, but not so strongly that they could be called identical. Thus, to the college elite each type of power independently "supported" assurance. Even if one type of power went down in the elite's view, assurance did not decline, if the other form of power stayed high (see Figure 4). This data suggests that the complex view of the college elite may have at least a two dimensional power concept, and it is quite possible that their power concept is even more complex than the Benton & Bowles items could reveal. Hence, the US might aim for superiority in some areas, settling for inferiority in others. This would not offend the college elite since they can deal with complex concepts of power, as our data shows.

Many problems stalk this notion however, Publics, especially the mass public, may not accept their government's definition of what components of power are crucial to national security. Some might believe that the component in which the adversary is permitted superiority in the negotiation was actually more important. Furthermore, many groups, particularly those with simpler more absolute international attitudes, would feel that inferiority in power in any area is unthinkable. Finally, out-of-office politicians seem to delight in seizing on any "fans" in power as fuel for re-election.

To somewhat offset these objections this possible negotiations objective may be altered as follows: The US would aim for superiority in some areas of power, and settle for parity in areas deemed "less critical". There is now less question of inferiority. College educated elite opinion data actually tentatively supports the above formula. Recall that missile parity correlated .50 with assurance (nearly significant, $p=.05$). General war power parity did not show such a relationship. What this implies is that as long as the US maintains a general power superiority, parity in certain power areas supports assurance. It is still an open question whether even a partial parity is acceptable to those who in their simplistic view of power, fear any American weakness. Further research is needed on this point.

Another problem is the simplistic power concept displayed by the USSR. Their insistence on total disarmament or nothing reveals the operation of a unidimensional power concept, quite alien to the "complex power balance" noted here. However, there are signs that a more complex idea of power is emerging in the USSR. The

partial test ban of 1963 is a case in point, as was the concept of missile withdrawals from Cuba and Turkey proposed by Khrushchev in the Cuban crisis of 1962. It may just be possible that the USSR may now be able to deal with power in a more complex fashion.

A final objection to "complex power" as a way out is that the very elite which may most accept it, may be the same people for whom a general parity idea is at least equally acceptable, far easier to grasp; and far more stable as a basis for realistic long term negotiation. This will be particularly true as trust rises above the levels formed in 1961-1967. One key idea is that during this period elite trust went from moderate low to moderate high. The importance of general military superiority may have faded, but did not disappear. However, if the US pursues actions to raise assurance to high levels (which surely is a national goal), then it must raise trust in the USSR to higher levels, since power alone seems able to generate only minimum assurance. But raising trust may lead to exactly the climate of opinion in which general arms parity can be accepted. Hence, if trust does rise, then parity, not complex power balance may be the best means of satisfying elite opinion.

In summary, it seems that the multidimensional power idea with symmetric superiorities in different areas (or even the version with superiority, plus partial parity) is rather tricky and less stable than parity. It constantly invites each nation to "make up" the inferiority in the deficient areas. Even with parity, not inferiority, in power areas for which superiority is not sought, the absolutists may be thoroughly dissatisfied, deeming superiority as the only correct course of action. The more complex opinion, such as the college elite, may be as sanguine toward total parity as partial parity (particularly if trust is rising further). Further analysis of current opinion on these precise issues is needed.

Three: Negotiations can aim for complete parity. It is evident that in the college elite data, missile parity related to assurance. Furthermore, the role of power may be declining as the role of trust increases. We may be reaching a point where parity can be accepted in lieu of superiority. It is evident from above data, that the US government in its pursuit of high assurance for its elite opinion blocs must go beyond power to try to build trust in the USSR (if the USSR permits). In so doing, the government may attain or already have attained levels of trust where parity is acceptable. Even now, our data suggests that negotiations for parity in some areas, e.g. missiles, is not going to adversely affect elite assurance. If partial parity agreements work, full parity negotiations might then be in order.

Note that if parity levels in general, or in certain fields, are set in the nuclear "overkill" range, deterrence is not lost. Nor is a capability of either power to deal with new nuclear threats (e.g. China) lost. In fact, as a new threat emerges, both the US and USSR could equally increase arms without destroying parity. If perchance, such threats dissipate, then both the US and USSR might be able to equally decrease arms - maintaining parity - until disarmament is attained. These arrangements could be suggested to the USSR now in some marginal areas - e.g. cruiser strengths.

Problems in any pursuit of parity are obvious. For some, but not apparently for the college elite, superiority is the only possible "solution". For others, demanding iron clad deterrence, the idea of parity only in a super "overkill" range may make sense. For many other superiority enthusiasts, if parity is tried in some areas, and works, it may be more generally acceptable (see Walton et al., 1968). Yet to be determined is the view of the non-college elite on even partial parity. Until such an analysis any determination of the percentage of opposition to parity is impossible (see Driver, 1968a).

Even among the elite who might favor parity - a further problem lurks. Precise balance invites anxiety. Under such conditions, demands for surveillance of the USSR might greatly increase as opposed to US power superiority conditions. However, such demands for surveillance would probably not be well received by the USSR. The USSR might see itself as not trusted. This would result in a debacle. Again a way out might be to set parity in the overkill range. In this range, exactness of balance is not too crucial. If the US can totally destroy the USSR once, even taking into account a Soviet first strike and Soviet defense, does it matter that the USSR can do the same to us twice? It may be that to college elites, at least, surveillance in the overkill area is not needed. This problem is vitally in need of further research.

Finally, we must consider the USSR. It is clear that the USSR can not treat as serious and credible any long term US proposals on parity unless significant amounts of stable US public opinion would support such offers. This in turn means that both countries would have had to strive for the development of mutual trust in publics, especially in their elite publics. Just how the US and USSR must act to generate enough trust to permit mutually credible parity talks is beyond the scope of this report (see Walton et al., 1968).

Four: A rather novel suggestion is to gradually divert the arms race and the focus on military power to a national concern over science. Recall that the US science superiority correlated .59 with assurance, .79 with US war power superiority, and .60 with USSR peaceful intent. Lacking the factor analysis of correlation

data, we can only suggest that science was primarily a power related variable. This is supported by the major change analysis in which a shift in US science superiority was followed closest by a power shift. It seems logical to see US science superiority as a possible cause of US power superiority rather than the reverse.

Could it be possible for scientific superiority to partially eclipse, even replace military power superiority in college elite opinion? It is already a surprisingly strong correlate of power. Careful documentation and publicity by press and government of the genuine basis for science as a factor in national power could be widely disseminated (by both the US and USSR). If public opinion increased its perception of science as a major ingredient in power, both governments could take steps to foster this reallocation of concern. For instance, ACDA could suggest to the USSR that both countries tacitly or openly agree to channel funds to scientific competition - e.g. space race, -and away from military spending. This would attain both de facto arms limitation and, by necessity, increased government and media attention to scientific endeavors.

The science area has many desirable features. It is already probably much less unidimensional and more ambiguous than military power. It would be far easier to claim "superiority" in "key" areas in this ambiguous world. Countries might even agree to focus on different areas - e.g. computers vs. biology, to enhance complex balance (i.e. claims in both countries of superiority in different "key" areas of science). Science competence, also, is easier to check in a non-lethal manner. Space flights can demonstrate science capability in a much less fatal manner than nuclear explosion demonstrate military capability. Finally, science cooperation - a mode of science parity - is already accepted in some areas. So the road to parity in science is already open.

At a more immediate level, ACDA might begin a move toward science by "justifying" positive overtures to the USSR, concessions and even parity moves by citing the widely believed US scientific superiority over the USSR, as a basis for belief that the USSR will not attack us. Later, scientific superiority could be employed as a reason why the USSR would not dare upset a negotiated arms parity - i.e. our science could build to a superior arsenal faster than theirs.

Russian response to such overtures might be rather good. During the Khrushchev era, there was considerable emphasis on using scientific (as well as economic and cultural) competition instead of military collision (Asparturian, 1968). It is quite possible

that the more moderate faction in current Soviet leadership would welcome a US overture to divert effort to science, etc. The response of the more militant group is harder to gauge, and their importance in Soviet councils, following the Czech crisis is still unclear.

Admittedly, this is a most novel suggestion. Yet, the high belief in science by the elite should not be ignored. It seems quite practical to test these ideas by the increased use of science superiority as a justification for certain arms negotiation moves and offers. If such justifications work in allaying elite fears, further steps might be tried. The strength of this suggestion would be enhanced if the mass public also laid heavy emphasis on science in national security (see Driver 1968a).

Five: If conditions warrant, negotiations could aim for complete disarmament based on extremely high mutual trust. This seems far from reality, at present. Yet, some developments suggest that it is not a totally mythical idea. Trust is apparently already a stronger factor than power in college elite opinion. Power may be fading as a primary concern, as evidenced by a significant decline in power concern for the elite.

This fading of power, in favor of trust, present in college graduates, 1960-1967, may be carried even further in the new generation of college graduates. In a pilot study of 24 student college editors conducted at System Development Corp. (Driver, 1968d) very interesting orientations on trust and power emerged. For about half of these students, trust in other governments was the central focus and national power or control were despised as modes of action in the international arena. For the other half, trust was also rather high and power was despised; although control and, possibly, violence were not ruled out when needed. It would be informative to see if an age trend emerges even among the Benton & Bowles college respondents. If the young graduates are discarding power, then disarmament indeed will have tremendous support among the educated. The view of the masses on such matters remains to be seen.

However, even if public support were moving toward trust not power, negotiators have a clear responsibility to guard against Soviet duplicity. One possible check is that if the USSR is aware of genuine trust in the US elite (or mass) it may itself trust the US and act in a generally trustworthy way. This phenomena apparently began to operate for Khrushchev after the Cuban missile crisis (Asparturian, 1968) and may begin to operate for the present rulers of the Kremlin. For that reason, results of studies such as this one should receive "wide" circulation.

(1) The assistance of Dr. Gerald Shure in supporting this study is gratefully acknowledged.

It should be noted that none of the potential objectives for negotiation described above are necessarily mutually exclusive. Some of them might be adopted in a combined fashion. In any event, the strength of trust factors, the possibility that at least partial parity is acceptable, the strong role of science underlying military power in the college educated elite from 1960 to 1967 bodes well for acceptance of arms limits and possibly for eventual disarmament.

It should also be clear, however, that if another nation, e.g. Red China, seriously enters public assurance perspectives, then the same pattern for assurance would hold toward the new threat that held vis à vis the USSR. That is, if Red China is seen as malevolent and capable of nuclear assault on the US, only arms superiority over China will lead to elite assurance. If, somehow, China is seen as more positive in intent, the same emergence of trust over power in relation to China should occur as seems to have been occurring in the elite from 1947 to 1967, with respect to the USSR. In 1947 to 1949 the college educated sample saw the USSR as extremely un-cooperative (Caspary, 1967) whereas in the period 1960-1967 the general picture on Soviet intent had gotten much more positive.

The emergence of any new threat could thus revive the saliency of power in the US public's views on assurance. It does not imply that arms agreements, even parity agreements, need be abandoned with the USSR. On the contrary, many such threats will threaten the US and USSR alike. The college group sees China as quite a threat to the USSR even in 1967. Thus, common goals between the US and USSR would be increased - inducing still more trust for the USSR and easing the way still more for US-USSR parity. The parity levels could be now set for dual superiority over China or any new threat. The emergence of new nuclear powers does pose serious limits on both "science race" and total trust objectives between the US and USSR. The science race could be pursued as outlined above to "justify" US-USSR parity (even with a China threat) but until all nations attain at least minimal trust, it is doubtful that total disarmament can be a serious goal. At the moment, China seems to be a prime challenge to the establishment of trust (though by no means is this impossible). At any rate, it must be left to future analyses to decipher the effect of other nuclear threats on US-Soviet agreements and public assurance.

D. Implications for Policy, II: Verification and Support for Arms Control

Two final issues can be briefly dealt with. An interest of this study was in the kind of information elite opinion required to build trust in arms related matters. Unfortunately, no public data bore directly on this issue. However, the item from Gallup on approval for a disarmament treaty does not specify any surveillance or verification of Soviet action is involved. Yet, a majority of

the elite were for it. This may indicate that the elite, with a fairly high trust in the USSR, do not believe in the necessity of verification. They may even see verification as an obstacle or detriment to trust rather than a guarantor of trust. Clearly more data would be welcome on this issue; but if the hint in the above item is correct, the college elite does not require the verification currently being required by the US government in negotiations with the USSR. This may provide for some maneuvering room in negotiations, should negotiators come to feel that verification is unnecessary (but hold to it to assuage "public opinion").¹

A second issue concerns means of obtaining support for arms control. This support will vary directly with the degree that assurance is based on trust. Power based assurance can obviously not generate strong feeling for disarmament. Hence, any means of enhancing trust enhances support for disarmament. One implication in correlation data is that trust in part must come from diminished Communist threat, i.e. USSR actions are vital in developing US elite trust. Trust is further enhanced by power parity, once a "critical level" of moderate high trust is reached. Hence, power parity objectives should in the long run strengthen support for arms decreases and eventually disarmament. Obviously, too, if science can absorb some of the role of arms, then arms decreases will be more welcome and even necessary.

Just how the US and USSR must act to enhance trust - aside from focusing on parity vs. superiority and on science vs. arms and aside from Soviet diminishing of threats - is unclear from public opinion data alone. In another report (Walton, et al., 1968) some elements of this problem are discussed, and in subsequent reports, (Driver, 1968b and 1968c) this issue will be directly addressed.

PART V - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The focus of this study is upon the assurance attitudes of a nationwide sample, taken by the Benton & Bowles Agency, of the college educated elite in the US. The same survey items were given to comparable college elite samples in ten successive waves from 1960 to 1967. In each wave items measured assurance that the US

(1) It is, however, possible that when trust is strained as in the Cuban crisis, elite opinion will respond best to hard facts (photos) as opposed to either emotional appeals or no data - see Gould, 1968; or Strickland, 1968).

was safe from attack, US military power and factors associated with trust in the Soviet Union.

Across the entire period it was found that:

- a) Moderate assurance was fairly widespread (66.5%).
- b) Belief in American power supremacy was not very widespread (46.5%) but when combined with the percent of belief in US-Soviet parity, there were 83.5% who did not see the USSR ahead of the US.
- c) Trust related factors (e.g. peaceful Soviet intent, common goals, Soviet cooperativeness etc.) varied from 54.5% to 83% in extent of belief.

It was unclear whether assurance was related more to trust or power. The responses to a critical set of these items were rank ordered and correlated over all ten waves. Here it was found that:

- a) Assurance was most highly correlated with the product of perceived US war power superiority and Soviet peaceful intent (.83).
- b) Assurance was correlated next best with trust factors (.80 to .66).
- c) Assurance was correlated least well with power superiority factors (.73 to .61).
- d) Assurance had a tenuous relationship (.5) with US-USSR missile power parity - (Not general power parity).
- e) Trust and power factors were somewhat related (correlations range from .58 to .27), but not enough to discount a 2-factor model of assurance.
- f) Power itself is strongly related to US science superiority (.76).

What emerges is a fairly complex view of assurance, in which trust is slightly more important than power, and power is partially related to science. However, no causal inferences can be drawn from correlation results. Nor can any trends or changes in the model be detected from any results, so far. Hence, the variables were examined to determine whether opinion had significantly shifted at any time from 1960-1967. The results were that:

- a) Perceived US science superiority rose significantly from April, 1961 to September, 1961.
- b) US perceived power superiority rose significantly from September, 1961, to January, 1962.
- c) Belief in war (non-assurance) and defense anxiety declined in the same period.
- d) Positive assurance and trust in the USSR rose from January, 1962 well into mid-1963. This condition held through to the last wave in 1967.

- e) The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 did not seriously or permanently alter the upward rise of trust in USSR or perceived US power.

One interpretation of these phenomena is that a power change induced a rise in trust and assurance. An alternate explanation is that the power change only reduced anxiety and fear of war - it permitted minimal assurance and an "openness" to new information on the USSR which could build a more complex view of the USSR as neither all good or all all bad. Positive events then built a rise in trust and positive assurance in the less fear ridden atmosphere of post January, 1962. If this is a correct interpretation then power superiority can generate only minimal assurance and is at best a precondition to building trust on which positive assurance is founded. This higher trust in turn may permit a movement from power superiority to parity and ultimately, to a fading of power concern altogether.

An analysis of data from scattered (AIPO, Roper, etc) surveys using different items confirms some major finding noted above. The items from these surveys concerning power show an upturn between September, 1961, and January, 1962. The items dealing with assurance and trust show a rise following January, 1962. Thus, the findings concerning significant changes are not restricted to a single survey.

Data from these surveys on disarmament views also suggest that the college elite is in favor of nuclear test ban treaties and even disarmament (with no stipulation for verification or US superiority). Whether this implies that by then, August, 1963, the college elite was so assured and trustful that they would support arms parity and lack of verification remains to be seen.

The implications of these results are many. A few will be summarized. Those concerned with theoretical issues were:

- a) Social psychological hypotheses on connections among perceived common goals, cooperation and positive intent were confirmed.
- b) World respect was of no significance to trust or assurance, posing some problems.
- c) Scientific expertise may be an under-valued basis of national power in some forms of political analysis.
- d) "Positive incentive" power needs to be included in future analyses.
- e) Surveillance does not seem to be required in a high trust setting, confirming social psychological analyses.
- f) The product of power and intent of other predicts assurance, as forecast by political science analysis.

- g) A gain in US power superiority does not reduce trust in USSR. This conflicts with social psychological analysis. The conflict may be due to differences in amount of power differences, the absolute levels of trust, difficulties in social psychological experimental technique applied to international phenomena or to basic differences between interpersonal and international behavior.
- h) As expected from social psychological analysis, the college educated sample had a complex, multi-dimensional view of assurance.
- i) Anxiety seems to negatively relate to the holding of a complex, multivalent trust-inclusive view of the USSR; as expected from social psychology.

Those implications concerned with policy were:

- a) The US can focus arms discussions on total arms superiority only if it is willing to accept minimal assurance in elite opinion, unstable trust for the USSR, and unstable agreements which will continue the arms spiral indefinitely.
- b) The US could aim for superiority in some areas of military power and either parity or inferiority in other areas. There is some support for the idea that partial parity would be acceptable. However, this notion is both complicated and potentially unstable. Yet, the complexity of elite views makes this a possible alternative.
- c) The US could aim for total parity in arms (initially at overkill range). Some support for this view might be inferred among the college elite. Yet, it seems that rather high trust must be developed for this policy to have support and to be therefore credible to the USSR. Such trust is needed, however, for high assurance and is thus a reasonable US goal (USSR willing).
- d) The US could strive to replace or eclipse the arms race with a science race. Elite opinion already sees science as vital in US power. US scientific superiority might be used to justify arms limits, even parity or ultimately disarmament.
- e) Total trust or complete disarmament might find increasing support among new college graduates - boding well for long term support for arms control activity.
- f) Soviet cooperation in any such endeavors requires evidence from the US that genuine trust for the USSR exists in US elite opinion (as well as genuine pressure within the USSR for trust and cooperation vis à vis the US).

- e) The emergence of a new nuclear threat might draw the US and USSR closer together - it would not prevent parity agreements, but would hamper total disarmament.

In conclusion, it must be said that only thru further research can the elite opinion model be:

- a) More clearly understood
- b) Extended in time to the present
- c) Related to world events
- d) Extended to other nations, e.g. the USSR.

Nevertheless, it is suspected that the present results provide considerable food for thought.

PART VI - REFERENCES

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Appendix I. Items from the Benton & Bowles "Cold War Issues" Survey, used to assess college elite (and mass) assurance.

Note: Items appear here in theoretical order: actual item numbers in the Benton & Bowles questionnaire are given in parentheses.

Item No. 1. Absolute assurance: (Benton & Bowles item No. 6).

All things considered, would you tell us, in your opinion which one of the following statements best describes how you feel about whether or not we will have another war?

- a. I am certain there will be another World War within the next month or so.
- b. I am certain there will be another World War within the next six months.
- c. I am certain there will be another World War within the next year.
- d. I am certain there will be another World War sometime in the future.
- e. There may be another World War some time.
- f. There might be another World War some time, but I doubt it.
- g. There will probably not be another World War.
- h. There will never be another World War.

Item No. 2. Relative Assurance: Defense concern: Soviet threat to take over: (Benton & Bowles item No. 1).

Listed below are a series of issues which are reported in newspapers, radio, television on a day to day basis. These are issues that could affect the well being of our American way of life. These issues may be of more or less concern for individual Americans today. Would you please read the complete list of issues described below. Then place a "1" on the appropriate line after the issue you yourself are most concerned about. Then place a "2" after the issue you are next most concerned about, and so on until you have numbered all nine issues.

Please indicate how concerned you are about the issues listed below, by assigning numbers 1 through 9.

- a. Schools . . . Adequate educational facilities . . . _____
- b. National Defense . . . Military protection for the US _____
- c. Inflation . . . The high cost of living _____
- d. War . . . The chance of a world war _____
- e. Organized labor . . . The power of unions _____
- f. Communism . . . Communist gaining control of governments friendly to the US in the past . . . _____
- g. Juvenile delinquency and Crime . . . The number of law breakers _____
- h. Depression . . . A major crash such as we had in the 1930's _____
- i. Big business . . . the size and power of corporation _____

Item No. 3. War Power, Missile power, World Respect, Scientific competence: (Benton & Boxles item No. 5).

Now we would like your opinions on another subject. Listed below are a series of statements that we have heard people make - some of them have been made with reference to Russia and others with reference to the United States. Would you please read each statement and, as you do, indicate whether it best describes the United States or whether it best describes Russia. Try to select one or the other country. However, if you feel that you cannot make a choice and the statement applies equally to both, indicate this in the appropriate box below.

	Best Describes Russia	Best Describes US	Both Equally
a. Most respected country in the world.	_____	_____	_____
b. Most advanced in the development of missiles, rockets, space ships.	_____	_____	_____

Appendix II. Items from American Institute of Public Opinion, used in assurance study.

Item No. 1. Which country - the United States or Russia do you think is farther ahead in the field of long range missiles and rockets?

Check One

- a. US _____
- b. Russia _____
- c. No opinion _____
- d. No answer _____

Item No. 2. If a war should come, do you think it is more likely to arise through U.S.A., Russia or some other way?

- a. U.S.A. _____
- b. Russia _____
- c. Both _____
- d. Don't know _____
- e. Other or neither _____

Item No. 3. Do you believe it is possible or impossible to reach a peaceful settlement of differences with Russia?

- a. Possible _____
- b. Impossible _____
- c. Don't know _____

Item No. 4. Do you think the day will come when we have a nuclear test ban treaty with Russia, or not?

- a. Yes _____
- b. No _____
- c. Don't know _____

Item No. 5. If a test ban treaty were put into effect do you think Russia would live up to her part of the agreement, or not?

- a. Yes _____
- b. No _____
- c. No opinion _____

Item No. 6. Some people say that the US should make further agreement with Russia to reduce armaments and armed forces. If Russia agrees to reduce their armaments and armed forces, do you think the US should agree to this, or not?

- a. Yes, should agree _____
- b. Should not _____
- c. No opinion _____

Item No. 7. Do you think the Senate should vote approval of (the agreement to have a partial ban on the testing of nuclear weapons) or not?

- a. Yes, it should _____
- b. No, it should not _____
- c. No opinion _____

(1) The item reads "approval of this ban", but the previous question asks if respondents had heard of the ban and describes the ban as indicated between brackets above.

- c. Has the firmest beliefs - and will not compromise on these beliefs _____
- d. Most scientifically advanced . _____
- e. Best prepared to successfully wage war right now _____
- f. Is first in the production of industrial and consumer goods . _____
- g. Most concerned about the welfare of the world - not only itself. _____

Item No. 4. Positive Soviet intention: (peaceful intention): (Benton and Boyles item No. 3).

For a moment, would you think about the Russian government. People have expressed different attitudes on how Russia feels about having a war. What do you think the Russian government's attitude is about a war?

Check One

- a. Russia want war now - she is looking for an excuse to declare war _____
- b. Russia wants war but not right now - she wants to wait until she can increase her military power _____
- c. Russia really wants peace but might start a war because she doesn't trust the US _____
- d. Russia really want peace - she will try to avoid a war at all costs _____

Item No. 5. Positive Soviet Intention (common goals with US): Soviet threat to take over: (Benton & Boyles item No. 11).

We have heard people express different opinion about Russia and Communist China. We would like to have your opinions of these two countries. Would you please read each of the statements below. As you read each, would you indicate whether you feel Russia is much more or somewhat more interested than China in this area or whether China is somewhat more or much more interested than Russia. If you feel that there is absolutely no difference between China and Russia in a particular respect, then check the column at the right.

	Russia is much more interested than China	Russia is somewhat more interested than China	China is much more interested than Russia	China is somewhat more interested than Russia	The Two Countries are absolutely the same in this respect
a. In keeping the Chinese-Russian alliance strong	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
b. In getting along with non-communist countries	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
c. In giving her citizens individual freedom	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
d. In building up her military strength	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
e. In raising the standard of living of her people	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
f. In trying to gain control of non-communist countries	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

Item No. 6. Possibility of US-Soviet coexistence: (Benton & Bowles Item No. 4).

We have listed below a number of attitudes that people have expressed from time to time. Which of these three statements agrees with your opinion?

- Check One
- a. It is impossible to live peacefully with two different systems - either Communism or Democracy will have to go _____
 - b. If the US and Russia make an effort it may be possible to live peacefully with the two different systems _____

- c. If the US and Russia make an effort, Communism and Democracy will definitely be able to live together peacefully _____

Item No. 7. Cold War Victory: (Benton & Bowles item No. 8).

While Premier Khrushchev of Russia was visiting the US in 1960, he said that Communism will win out over Democracy. His words to Americans were: "Your grandchildren will live under Communism." Some people - even though they are opposed to Communism - feel he may be right. Others disagree. How do you think the struggle between Communism and Democracy will come out in the end?

- Check One
- a. I feel certain Communism will win _____
 - b. I think Communism is likely to win _____
 - c. I'm not certain, but I think Communism might win _____
 - d. I'm not certain, but I don't think communism is likely to win _____
 - e. I feel certain Communism won't win _____

Item No. 8. China threat to USSR: (Benton & Bowles item No. 10).

Russia and Communist China have been allied with each other for a number of years. Some experts say they will continue to be friends indefinitely; others say that the Russians and Communist Chinese are apt to quarrel with each other. What do you think will happen to Russian-Chinese alliance? Check the statement below that comes closest to describing the way you feel.

- Check One
- a. The ties between Russia and Communist China will probably grow even stronger than they are now _____
 - b. The ties between Russia and Communist China will probably stay about the way they are now without becoming either stronger or weaker _____
 - c. The ties between Russia and Communist China will probably weaken somewhat _____
 - d. The ties between Russia and Communist China will probably be broken completely _____