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Technical Report #3

CONTENT ANALYSIS

E-104

Prepared for

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Prepared by

DONALD A. STRICKLAND

Assisted by

T. CAFFERTY
R. ALLEN
W. KLECKA
S. SILVER

Herman C. Krannert Graduate School of
Industrial Administration

PURDUE UNIVERSITY

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Precis

The results of a detailed content analysis of New York Times* editorials and news items dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis, Berlin, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the Vienna Summit Conference are here reported.

In the neighborhood of 20,000 items of data were analyzed. These results are of special interest because, unlike most content analyses, this one combined a rich longitudinal analysis of attitudes with a comparison of crisis and non-crisis milieux during a period (1961-63) when the American and Soviet leaderships remained unchanged. Furthermore, the present study attempts to measure some structural properties of "elite opinion," clarifying the process of decision-making during crisis and conciliation phases.

The findings and hypotheses with strong statistical and evidentiary support are as follows:

Perception of threats to world peace was found to be strongly associated with the saliency of the report. We concluded that threat is a very reliable vehicle to attention-getting in politics. Hence, the media and decision-makers would find that the exaggeration of threats enhances their value to the populace and increases their support-base.

Belief in common interests (as between adversaries) is strongly associated with trust, cooperation, and good intentions. We hypothesized that an increase in any one of these factors might produce an increase in the others. This implies that the media and the decision-makers could promote amicable solutions to international political conflicts by emphasizing shared values or propensities to cooperate or to trust, or by favorably advertising claims to good intentions.

Perceived threats to world peace were found to be very strongly related to the simplification of issues and the concretizing of thinking. We hypothesized that any one of these factors might instigate the other two. If this is so, a crisis mentality could be induced by the media or by the decision-makers either by over-simplifying issues, habituating the populace to concretized-ad hoc thinking, or by exaggerating external threats

* See pp. 3-4 for an explanation of the choice of The Times.

to the political system.

Changes in Soviet intentions and cooperativeness were associated not with changes in perceived U.S. cooperativeness (which scarcely varied), but with Soviet initiatives. This suggests that the adversary can be viewed as amenable to detente if and only if the change of position ("concession," "capitulation," etc.) can be assigned to him or to some third party. It also suggests a direction in which U.S. maneuverability is self-limited.

The aforementioned relations tended to be looser in periods either of deep crisis or of conciliation. We hypothesized a "numbing" effect which inhibits either type of arousal beyond some threshold. This implies that public reactions can be affected by controlling the quantity of positive and negative stimuli about the international political system.

A separate statistical analysis of data from the deepest crisis periods and from conciliation phases revealed the following: Simplification of issues was significantly associated with distrust of the Soviets in the crisis data and with trust of them in the conciliation phases. Moreover, simplification was strongly associated with an absence of good intentions on the part of the Soviets (less so in conciliation phases). These findings implied that both trust and distrust of the Soviets were based on some fairly stereotyped model; and it revealed the relative unimportance of perceived intentions to shifts in trust levels. That means that the trust is (in the language used elsewhere in our study) "power-based assurance." This in turn suggests a deeprooted distrust (since even in conciliation phases the intentions of the adversary are not perceived as humane).

Perception of common values also varied significantly under the crisis-conciliation conditions, and in ways that supported our finding that U.S. cooperativeness is seen as fairly constant and variations are attributed to the Soviets. That is, the fact of conflict tended to obliterate any belief in underlying common interests.

The crisis-conciliation data showed, finally, that "seriousness of threat to world peace" was very strongly associated with the galvanizing of thought during crises. This comparison merely highlights our other findings to the effect that thought processes are seriously deteriorated by the introduction (or perception) of threats.

The data generally showed that the arousal of interest in conciliation phases (as measured by space allocation and location of items in the newspaper) is slower than in crises and exhibits recession if the detente is protracted over time. This suggests that conciliations are less reliable attention-getters and provoke pessimistic reactions ("slumps") when long-drawn-out.

Arousal to threats was rapid and tended toward consequent lull followed by re-arousal (recapitulation). The implication here is that threats stimulate a larger popular investment of attention in the political system and are dependable for at least one "recapitulation."

I. Introductory Remarks

The Model set out in Technical Report #1 featured hypothetical relationships between two variables: 1) events in the external world, and 2) assessments of those events by particular people. We might refer to the second variable as opinions.

Opinions (whether they are predispositions of long standing in a person's mind, or current assessments of on-going events) are partly based on information from the outer world. That is to say, our Model describes a feed-back mechanism whereby a) information about external events instigates opinions in relevant publics, b) some of the opinions ripen into decisions, c) some of these decisions result in new events (actions), d) some of which evoke new opinions, e) and so on and so forth.

On the empirical side of this project we have also approached the event-opinion-decision process in three ways. One was to prepare detailed case studies, retaining all the real-life subtleties of the problem. A second was to look at the relevant opinions as reflected in public opinion polls. And the third was to examine the opinions by content-analyzing newspapers.

Now, at our present level of theory, the link between opinions, actual political decisions, and events is sufficiently obscure that we hesitate to focus on either a broad or a narrow range of public opinion. What is more, the costs of doing a study such as this become higher as the range of analyzed opinions is increased. For these reasons we relied, perhaps more than our present level of knowledge warrants, on a group of studies that emphasize the hierarchical organization of public opinion in decision-making.¹ The basic idea here is that some opinions count for more than others in political decision-making, either because the people who hold them are the political leaders, or because the people who hold them are capable of persuading lots of other people, or both.

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1. P. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, The People's Choice (1948), p. 151. Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-to-Date Report on an Hypothesis," Public Opinion Q., vol. 21, Spr. 1957, p. 61 (and bibliography thereto). R. Merton, "Patterns of Influence: A Study of Interpersonal Influence in a Local Community," in P. Lazarsfeld & F. Stanton (eds.), Communications

(cont.)

With the hierarchic assumption--that the "peak" of the opinion structure will be more sensitive to changes in levels of bilateral trust--we then had to confront the problem of defining the "peak". Since the public opinion polls frequently provide a breakdown by respondents' educational level, including the category "college educated," we decided to use this as our definition of "peak opinion." "Educated opinion" is perhaps too broad a category to satisfy those who believe that the cardinal decisions in this political system are made by a mere handful of powerful individuals (a "power elite"). Yet the category at least would include most such elites (of whom virtually all have enjoyed some college education). And it is, at all events, the only category that permits us to make comparisons between the content analysis, the public opinion poll data, and the case studies.

Common sense suggests another reason for singling out "educated opinion" for special study. For a large minority of the people in any industrialized political system, the chief problem of citizenship is how to avoid running afoul of the authorities: Beyond were fear of the authorities, such people are more or less alienated from the processes of government. By and large the educated citizenry do not belong to this apathetic mass because their education will have increased their sense of political efficacy and responsibility. Furthermore, the decision-makers at any given time are only a small fraction of that larger category of attentive opinion--advisers, former office-holders, commentators, exiles, retirees, experts, opposition leaders, etc.--who used to have, or might have, a hand in the making of governmental decisions. This larger body of informed opinion begins to approximate the breadth of our category "educated opinion." These are the people who need information, know where to get it, know how to analyze it, and what to do about their conclusions.² Hence, it makes good sense to suppose that virtually all the people whose opinions have special weight in decision-making are included in this category, and that even those educated opinion-holders without much political influence are somewhat more effective in the political system than the average member of the "mass opinion" category.

1. (cont.) Research 1948-49 (1948), pp. 187f. James N. Rosenau, National Leadership and Foreign Policy (1963).

2. See, e.g., V.O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion (1961), p. 349. Survey research has in recent years demonstrated rather conclusively that elite groups, as compared with "mass" opinion, have more information and a different set of attitudes about particular issues: Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in D.E. Apter (ed.),
(cont.)

The opinion leaders in different sectors of American society are, to be sure, more like their clientele than they are like one another.³ At the level of foreign policy-making, however, the elite cliques begin to converge. The editors of the prestige newspapers are in relatively close contact with the decision-makers in Washington, and the opinion leaders at this level tend to read and heed the same sources.⁴

It appears then that the prestige papers both reflect and effect changes in the opinion of leadership circles. The foremost newspaper in the 'prestige' category in this country is The New York Times.⁵ And we therefore chose it as the vehicle of our content analysis.

Generally speaking, editorials in the prestige newspapers in Western countries have been found to be good measures of peak opinion on foreign affairs.⁶ This is not to suggest that columnists,⁷ texts of speeches, news magazines, and other media would not also provide useful data. Constraints of time and money have prohibited our pursuing all these routes. Moreover, we have some reason to suppose that newspapers alone provide an accurate measure of opinion-change.⁸

2. (cont.) Ideologies and Discontent (1964); Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffmann, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers," Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., vol. 44, Je. 1960, p. 406; and Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (1950).
3. R. Merton, op. cit. See also R.C. Angell, "Content Analysis of Elite Media," J. Conflict Resolution, vol. 8, Sum. 1964, p. 329; and R. Axelrod, "The Structure of Public Opinion on Policy Issues," Public Opinion Q., vol. 31, Spr. 1967, p. 51.
4. I.deS. Pool et al, The "Prestige Papers": A Survey of Their Editorials (1952). See also V.O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (1963), p. 405.
5. Editor and Publisher, Apr. 12, 1960. See also J.D. Singer, "Soviet and American Foreign Policy Attitudes: Content Analysis of Elite Articulation," J. Conflict Resolution, vol. 8, 1964, p. 424. For an excellent statement of the dimensions along which the media typically and necessarily distort news coverage, see J. Galtung and H. Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News," Journal of Peace Research, No. 1, 1965, p. 64.
6. I.deS. Pool et al., Symbols of Internationalism (Hoover Inst. Studies, Series C, Aug. 1951), p. 60.

The point of content analyzing newspaper articles and editorials is that trends and in obvious meanings come out far more clearly than they do in memoires and impressionistic studies: One's memory plays tricks; and anyhow, reading such sources day in and day out, along with a welter of other, often unrelated, information, it is almost impossible to form a confident judgment about the subtle changes in opinion over the days and years.

The methodology of content-analysis is well-established.⁹

The technique has been used for a wide range of purposes in recent years. The latest refinement in the methodology is the use of computers to content-analyze vast numbers of utterances.¹⁰ (It should be noted that the larger the body of data being analyzed in this way, the more significant certain trends become, simply for statistical reasons.) After consulting with some of the leading specialists in computerized content analysis, we decided not to use that technique in the present project.¹¹

Technical Considerations

The following remarks about the design of our content analysis will be of interest mainly to the reader experienced in designing such experiments, or to the general reader only in light of our own subsequent Findings.

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7. (cont.) Given our limited resources, we decided to content analyze relevant letters-to-the editor rather than the columnists, on the ground that the former would give us a somewhat broader range of opinions.
 8. R.F. Carter and B.S. Greenberg, "Newspaper or Television: Which Do You Believe?" Journalism Q., vol. 42, 1965, p. 29.
 9. B. Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (1952); R.C. North, Content Analysis (1963); P.J. Stone et al., The General Inquirer (1966).
 10. Stone et al., op. cit. See also E.D. Jansen, "A System for Content Analysis by Computer of International Communications for Selected Categories of Action," Amer. Behavioral Scientist, vol. 9, 1966, p. 28.
 11. The considerations that led to this decision can be found in Ch. VIII of R.C. North et al., op. cit.

The two formats used in this analysis are attached as Appendices 1 and 2. They are largely self-evident. However, it may help to explain the Findings if we here define some of the categories and forewarn the reader of complications we encountered.

As a general proposition, we employed most of the variables (e.g., 'trust', 'cooperation', 'intent') as 'primitive terms', i.e., as terms the meanings of which were both well-known and analyzable. Elsewhere in this report, of course, we engage in considerable analysis of them. The inter-coder reliability problem¹² is an indication both of the utility of proceeding with such commonsense primitives in their ordinary form, and of the residual ambiguities in most of the variables used to explain political attitudes and behavior.

The dimension 'exhortatoriness' was meant to measure pressure for action expressed in an editorial opinion. It was our assumption that a high degree of moral urgency and stridency went with a high need for defensive or preventive maneuvers, which in turn would correlate closely with low trust.

The category 'seriousness of threat to world peace' was the most difficult to code. We tried to steer a course between 1) the editorial writer's assessment, which was almost always higher than our own, and 2) our "objective" assessment, based in part on knowing how world history has gone since 1961-63. Furthermore, there is a latent confusion of (a) the event which the writer is discussing (e.g., the escape of Herr X over the Berlin Wall), with (b) the larger event (e.g. Berlin or the Cold War). To mitigate these difficulties we adopted as a rule of thumb this procedure: The 'event' is taken to mean the general topic to which the writer refers; its 'assessment' is taken to mean the probable attitude of an average reader of this newspaper toward the writer's assessment. We do not want to minimize the difficulties of applying this rule of thumb in actual content analysis.

The 'abstract-concrete' dimension also proved a bit troublesome. This is attributable largely to the fact that many writers use concrete argumentation to allude to principles, and abstract argumentation to make cliched and non-logical points.

12. Inter-coder reliabilities are being calculated, item by item, and will be reported in an addendum (Appendix 3) to this Technical Report.

Owing to the fact that a large mass of material existed in the newspapers bearing on our case studies only incidentally, we took as another rule of thumb the notion that the item should be chiefly concerned with one of the cases and specifically with US-SU interactions. In other words, we eliminated items which discussed (say) Berlin in the midst of reviewing the year's events, or the Cold War, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. When in doubt, we followed the rule that the item would not be included unless its headline or sub-head included a clear reference to one of the cases (e.g., the word 'Berlin' in that case). These procedures account for the quantitative discrepancies between this report and the case studies.

To distinguish the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 from the larger issue of disarmament, we arbitrarily limited our content analysis on this topic to the period 1 January 1963 to the formal conclusion of the Treaty on 11 October 1963. This was necessary because the earlier discussions on the general and abstract topic of a test ban melded indistinguishably into the materials on disarmament, arms control, and (to some extent) weaponry.

Moreover, even during the period 1 January to 11 October, we excluded items which were primarily addressed to the larger topic and/or unconnected with the chain of developments leading to the Treaty.

By 'strong verbs' we meant all variants on the following lexicon: 'must', 'ought', 'should', 'has to', 'cannot but'. We refer to the moralizing uses of those words and therefore exclude from our account such uses as "We shall arrive at 6 p.m." or "I should be happy to come."

By 'weak verbs' we meant all variants of 'to be' except where used as auxiliary verbs. Thus we counted "If I were you" but did not count "He was going to meet her." We included such verbs used along with infinitives, e.g., "I am happy to meet you."

Our underlying assumption here is that the rate at which 'weak verbs' are used is a stylistic constant, varying from writer to writer; whereas the ratio of the rate of 'strong verbs' to 'weak verbs' is a predictor of the moral urgency of the message.

II. Gross Properties of Editorial Data

The graphs following this page show the varying attention given Berlin, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the Vienna Summit Conference by The New York Times. Berlin, in particular, is characterized by its recurrence as a crisis. (Hypotheses about the deliberate manipulation of the Berlin issue by the Soviets are well enough known to students of international affairs.)

The gross attributes of the editorial data clearly vary a good deal from issue to issue. On one attribute, however, they are consistent; and that is "average length." It seems that over time the editorials on a particular issue are slightly longer at the beginning of the life-cycle of the issue, then describe a gently declining curve. This suggests a certain consistency in the editors' assessment of the saliency of the issue.


If such constancy is a general property of international political issues and is attributable merely to the editors' fear of stultification, then we should expect to find it everywhere, as a predictable attribute of having "taken a side." If, however, it is an "objective property" or the result of a general human need to maintain a minimum crisis-level in the political environment, then we should anticipate that the negative slope of the curve is determined by the super-additive effects of concurrent crises (as per the hypothesis mentioned in Technical Report No. 1). Obviously our present data cannot begin to resolve these two interpretations.

Having accentuated the factor of editorial position by dividing the length of the editorial by the order in which it appeared in the editorial columns, we obtained a Prominency Index on each issue over time. (See charts on following page). The overall results here are so familiar as to be misleading--viz., on each issue we get a heavily distorted sine-curve. Since one intuitively knows that interest in particular political issues comes and goes, ebbs and flows, this result is not at all surprising. Therefore, the alternatives get lost sight of.

The simplest alternatives, which also sound plausible in the abstract, are 1) a positively-inclined linear or exponential curve, or 2) a negatively-inclined linear or exponential curve: In other words, we can easily imagine a) that international political issues would typically get more and more intense until a resolution is attained, whereupon they would disappear, or b) that international political issues would appear in a burst of excitement and then become progressively less engaging until forgotten.





Editorials, * New York Times: BERLIN

(* measurements unadjusted for special width of the editorial columns)



Editorials,* New York Times: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

(* measurements unadjusted for special width of the editorial columns)



1962

Oct. 23-29

Oct. 30-Nov. 5

Nov. 6-12

Nov. 13-19

Nov. 20-26


Nov. 27-Dec. 3

Dec. 4-10

Dec. 11-17


Editorials*, New York Times: TEST BAN

(* measurements unadjusted for special width of the editorial columns)







Editorials,* New York Times: Vienna Summit Conference

(* measurements are adjusted for special width of the editorial columns)



1961

Editorials, New York Times: PROMINENCY INDICES ($\frac{\text{length}}{\text{positional index}}$)



Notice that in either case we are speaking of the interest invested in the phenomenon; we are not referring to any "objective conditions" from which, having specified them, one could deduce the inclination of the curve. As in Technical Report No. 1, we are, that is to say, talking about universal human routines of conflict-management and -resolution.

It follows from the above comments that the sine-curve response,* if typical of all, or of some set of, international political episodes, guarantees that beyond a certain threshold of intensity no issue can disappear without having been recapitulated or reactivated at least once. It also follows that no issues, beyond a certain level of intensity, will fail to decline in interest considerably and fairly suddenly after its first motion. We so hypothesize. (Guessing when a particular issue has reached its highest time and strength of the recapitulation, are of course practical problems, or at least theoretical problems of a different and more refined type than the ones under consideration here.)

The objection will now arise that we are talking about a plenum of issues, about issues with differential life-spans, and about an undulating field of variables too numerous and ramified to admit of scientific analysis. If that were true, the general properties hypothesized above would be artifacts of a hopelessly over-determined field of events; and the validity of any such hypothesis would quickly be destroyed by putting the particular issue back into its (chaotic) context. This is a serious objection. But it is no more serious than it was for the astronomers and physiologists in the early stages of their sciences.

*By choosing 'episodes' we have, to be sure, already selected for events with some dramatic symmetry. Yet the shape of the curve, even within an episode-framework, is not logically pre-determined by this fact; it remains an empirical question how episodes manifest themselves.

The tradition and realities of newspaper reporting do bias them in the direction of 'dramatization' and a certain presentation of issues. This means that we have a kind of artifact, since it is not altogether realistic to view issues as clearly separable or as coming and going in the fashion they do in the newspapers. At the same time it would have to be said that statesmen, civil servants, and the attentive public have got used to thinking of the issues that way too. From a bargaining and negotiating perspective (not to mention ideology), it is clear that everything depends on which issues are viewed as "really separable" and which are viewed as "really inseparable"; hence, to the extent that we are dealing with an artifact it is very important (cultural) one.

For one thing, it may be said that the objection would become increasingly less serious if as a statistical matter it were found that most or all international political convulsions exhibited histories described by a rough sine-curve and not by numerous other descriptions which are equally likely in abstracto. (This argument is weakened somewhat by the practical difficulties in isolating discrete issues.)

There are two other answers to the objection. 1) It may be that the ability of the human mind to tolerate, resolve, manage, and process information about intra-species conflict (especially deadly quarrels) provides limits which will admit of scientific investigation regardless of the "objective" complexity and fluidity of politics. 2) Since every subject-matter that has proved scientifically amenable has at one time or another been believed to be impenetrable, the only way to establish whether issue-analysis in international politics is or is not such a subject-matter is to try to apply the scientific method to it and to fail.

III. Gross Properties of the News Story Data




Overall, the properties of the news items are similar to those of the editorials. The amount and prominence of the coverage is quite similar - which is hardly surprising, since the editorials are written about tirely, i.e., newsworthy, events.

If we take total headline space (see graphs on following page) as a measure of prominence, we notice that each issue tends to peak once, in a rather parabolic fashion. (Berlin exhibits a second, minor peak, but only several months after it had become a relatively dead issue.)


On the assumption that we are studying properties and limits of the human mind as it responds to complex and frightening events in world politics, we might indeed expect a somewhat different pattern in the news item data, since editorial interpretation leaves more freedom to express psychological traits. And, contrary to the hypothesis formulated in the previous section, the news item data suggest that - at least as perceived and managed by the international political system and the media - each major issue is uniconvulsive: Each event captures attention, mounts in seriousness (or elation), reaches a climax of sub-fatal tension, and progressively loses attention.*

*News rapportage is necessarily more closely bound to the progressive unfolding of external events than is editorial writing--which helps explain the difference between these curves and the editorial pattern. (See Footnote on Page 8).




News Items, New York Times: TOTAL HEADLINE SPACE (= Depth of
 Headline in Inches X Number of Columns
 in width)



E-104
News Items, CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: Total Headline Space



News Items, The New York Times: BERLIN



61 MR AP MY JE JL AG S O N D JA F MR AP MY JE JL AG S O N D JA F MR AP MY JE JL AG S O N D
62 63




The gross data on Berlin (see graphs following the following page) tend also to disconfirm the hypotheses enunciated in connection with the editorial data. The number of news stories, like the headline space index, shown the one-peak pattern. The amount of coverage (in column inches), on the other hand, shows a sustained interest over months: It is interesting that the average length of items on this issue approaches a flat curve. We might attribute this to the gravity of the Berlin confrontations, or we might hypothesize more generally that crises in the international political system receive a routine treatment by the media (and the policy-makers)--they are either "in" or "out"; if "in" they receive the standard minimum attention; if "out" they receive more.

The total space (total column inches) devoted to Berlin describes a much more erratic curve. This is the so-to-speak seismographic record of the gravity of the issue in the eyes of the decisional elites. These data suggest the hypothesis: Crises in the international political system follow the unconvulsive pattern; and where, over time, they exhibit a polyconvulsive pattern it is because they are separate "crises" which just happen to involve the same parties, places, or rhetoric.




The data on the Vienna Summit Conference (see following page) show a uni-convulsive pattern. It is of interest here that the average length of items on Vienna increased consistently up to the end of the conference. Since Vienna increased and offered some hope of detente, we might interpret this as meaning that arousal of interest is more sustained and slower when the bilateral confrontation threatens an amicable outcome. So we hypothesize that international-political incidents which promise to culminate in cooperation are characterized by a linear, positively inclined arousal curve.

The Test Ban data--also a case of detente--present unique problems (see following page). To wit, publicity on the progress of the partial test ban negotiations sounded, almost up until the initialling of the Treaty in Moscow, rather pessimistic; and it was the deliberate policy of the Kennedy Administration to underplay or to keep silence on the promise of amicable solution. Our case study of this event established that this was a deliberate policy, the consequences of which are probably, as Professor Walton suggests, largely determined by the following mechanism: Disappointment (lack of closure) over earlier, unfulfilled promises of detente will inhibit new efforts; therefore, silence will facilitate new efforts.

News Items, The New York Times: Vienna Summit Conference






News Items, The New York Times: Partial Test Bar



The sudden elevation of the curves in August, 1963, is in large part attributable to the flood of information following many weeks of silence or ambiguous rumors. The "average length" curve reflects this clearly. That curves indicates furthermore that (hypothesis) incidents which promise a detente through a deliberate systems-adaptation over time (cf. a detente brought about dramatically by the charisma of leaders meeting for a short "summit meeting") are characterized by a bi-model curve registering an initial surge of optimism followed by a thought of pessimism followed by a stronger surge of optimism.

Cuban Missile Crisis. (Nb. The news item data reported on here represent only the period 23 Oct. 1962 to 31 Oct. 1962, that is, the intense phase of the crisis. The diffusion of the issue thereafter - e.g. into questions of NATO, Berlin, Turkey, etc. - convinced us it would be advisable to confine ourselves to the intensive phase of the crisis. We excluded, furthermore, terms involving third parties, in keeping with a general policy of concentrating on bilateral US-SU relations). The graphs on the following page generally support the "peaking" or climax-closure theory that we have advanced regarding the news items. This is clearest in the curve for "average length." The weaker elevations in the "number of items" and "total column inches" curves are attributable entirely to the fact that the ratio of length/number of items changed and broadening of the issue occurred (resulting in more interpretative articles and new background articles) after the first week of the crisis.

News Items, CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS



IV. Findings and Special HypothesesEditorial Data

All Issues -- 3 Years. Using the gamma statistic* as a non-parametric test of our results, we found the following relations to be highly probable (more than $\pm .33$ gamma). (See charts, next page.)

1) Belief in the good intentions of the US varied inversely with trust of the SU ($g = -.50$). 2) The incidence of exhortation in editorials varied indirectly with the incidence of abstract-logical thinking ($g = -.35$). 3) The incidence of concrete-ad hoc thinking varied directly with exhortation ($g = .38$). 4) Exhortation varied directly with "seriousness of threat to world peace" ($g = .36$). 5) Concrete-ad hoc thinking varied directly with "seriousness of threat to world peace" ($g = .37$). 6) Incongruity varied directly with saliency ($g = .59$). And 7) saliency was also strongly related to "seriousness of threat" ($g = .52$).**

Interpretation. The theoretical propositions to which support is lent by this analysis are: (a) People who distrust other countries tend to believe their own country has good intentions toward the other (untrustworthy) country; or (a') people who believe in the good intentions of their own country toward another country distrust the other country; or (a'') countries are perceived by their own elites as having good intentions toward "adversaries" if and only if the "adversaries" are clearly perceived as being untrustworthy; or (a''') countries are perceived as untrustworthy if and only if their "adversaries" are perceived as having good intentions.

(b) People who make exhortatory statements are less able to think abstractly and logically; or (b') people who have not learned to think abstractly and logically are prone to exhortation.

* We employ here the technique which Goodman and Kruskal term gamma, which is a member of the class of proportionate reduction-in-error statistics possessing the properties which, when applied to normally distributed variables inter-
vally measured leads to the square of the Pearson Product-Moment correlation, which represents proportion of variance accounted. We refer to that technique hereinafter as "the gamma statistic". See their "Measures of association for cross classifications." J. Amer. Stat. Ass'n, vol. 49, p. 732 (1954).

**These terms were given operational definitions above so as to avoid the apparent tautologies and analytic solecisms.

(c) People who make exhortatory statements are prone to concrete-ad hoc thinking; or (c') people given to concrete-ad hoc thinking are also given to exhortation.

(d) People express more exhortation when the world situation is grave; or (d') the world situation seems graver when the media adopt a more exhortatory style.

(e) When the world situation seems grave, people find it easier to perform concrete-ad hoc thinking (and harder to think logically); or (e') people who are given to concrete-ad hoc thinking are more apt to view the world situation as grave.

(f) Unexpected international-political events are highly likely to capture the attention of the average reader; or (f') the reader's attention is most apt to focus on surprises (pleasant or unpleasant); or (f'') the relation between these two variables is tautological.

(g) The attention of the average reader is very likely to fix on serious threats to world peace; or (g') serious threats to world peace are what gets reader-attention.

All Issues -- 1961. [The comments here, for separate years, are limited to features of the data which diverge somewhat from the characteristics already noted in the previous subsection.] 1) We found a strong relation between distrust of the SU and belief in the good intentions of the US ($r = -.96$). 2) Exhortation varied indirectly with abstract-logical thinking ($r = -.38$) and directly with concrete thinking ($r = .49$) and directly with "seriousness of threat" ($r = .55$). 3) "Seriousness of threat" varied indirectly with abstract-logical thinking ($r = -.43$) and directly with concrete thinking ($r = .53$). 4) Saliency varied directly with incongruity ($r = .46$) and with "seriousness of threat" ($r = .78$).

Interpretation. These findings lend support to the following theoretical propositions: (a) The "adversary" can never be trusted where belief in the good intentions of one's own country is unquestionable (ex def.). (b) Political exhortation is a behavior instigated by perceived threats in the absence of an ability to use abstract-logical thought processes. (c) Perceived threats monopolize a person's attention and induce concrete-ad hoc thought processes. (d) Perceived threats are always regarded as salient and deserving of attention, and are always seen as highly "concrete" (cf. evanescent, sporadic, hyperbolic, dramatic, etc., phenomena).

All Issues -- 1962. For 1962 and 1963, only findings different from those of 1961 will be discussed. 1) The correlation between exhortation and concrete-thinking to and

similar to, but slightly weaker than, 1961. 2) The correlations between "seriousness of threat" and both abstract thinking and concrete thinking are stronger than in the 1961 data. 3) The correlations between incongruity and saliency are also stronger. 4) The correlations between saliency and "seriousness of threat" are weaker.

Interpretation. Thinking of 1961 as the year of the Vienna Summit Conference and the first wave of the Berlin Crisis our findings raise the following hypotheses: (a) The deeper the crisis, the less the effect of exhortation on thought processes. (a') The deeper the crisis, the less likely it will be that non-logical thinking results in exhortation. (b) The deeper the crisis, the more directly perception of threat will affect thought processes. (c) The deeper the crisis, the more directly will the surprise element affect the allocation of attention, and vice versa. (d) Perceived "seriousness of threat" will have less of an effect on the allocation of attention in the deeper crises (perhaps as a result of the "numbing" effects of an on-going, honest-to-goodness crisis).

All Issues -- 1963. 1) We found the relations between exhortation and (a) abstract thinking, (b) concrete thinking, and (c) "seriousness of threat" to be statistically trivial. 2) The correlations between "seriousness of threat" and thought processes also turned out to be statistically trivial. 3) The direct relationship between incongruity and saliency was much stronger than in either 1961 or 1962. 4) The relations between saliency and seriousness of threat proved to be statistically trivial.

Interpretation. Thinking of 1963 as a year of detente and of the somewhat unexpected signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, our findings lend support to the following theoretical propositions. (a) In periods of detente, the apparent causal links between thought processes, perceived threat, and exhortation tend to dissolve. (b) Below some threshold, as perceived threats are receding in intensity, the employment of appropriate thought processes is determined less and less by the existence of such threats. (c) In periods of detente, incongruous messages attract more attention than in times of crisis because the need for incongruity and novelty is not otherwise met by the fantasy-enriching crises and threats. (d) Beyond some threshold, as the seriousness of perceived threats recedes, the allocation of attention is determined less and less by the presence of threats and more attention is free to be invested in non-menacing events and messages.

Berlin -- 3 Years. We found the following relationships to be statistically significant: 1) Distrust of the Soviet Union

varied directly with belief in the good intentions of the US ($r = -.93$, for trust: intention). 2) Abstract-logical thinking varied indirectly with exhortation ($r = -.46$). 3) Exhortation varied directly with "seriousness of threat" ($r = .49$). 4) Abstract-logical thinking varied indirectly with "seriousness of threat" ($r = -.46$). 5) Seriousness of threat varied directly with concrete-ad hoc thinking ($r = .65$). 6) Saliency varied directly with incongruity ($r = .40$). And 7) Saliency varied directly with seriousness of threat ($r = .84$).

Interpretation. These findings lend support to the following theoretical propositions: (a) The more the "adversary" in suspect, the more the motives of one's own country must be viewed as unimpeachable. (b) High arousal prevents abstract-logical thinking. (c) Perceived threats instigate exhortation. Or (c') exhortation distorts perception of the seriousness of external threats. And, since the ability to think in abstract-logical ways is impaired by exhortation (finding 2), then (d) the more seriously (alarmingly) the external threat is imagined to be, the less logical thinking is available to fashion solutions to it. Or (e) the more seriously the threat is perceived to be, the more the responses to it are likely to be products of concrete-ad hoc thinking. (f) Surprise is the key to attention. (g) Threat is the key to surprise, wherefore (g') the exaggeration of threats is a reliable way to keep up interest.

Cuba -- 1962. 1) The above-mentioned relations between exhortation and thought processes were dissimilar in this case.* 2) The relation between exhortation and "seriousness of threat to world peace" is somewhat higher. 3) The relations between "seriousness of threat" and thought process and saliency are higher.

Interpretation. The Cuban Missile Crisis was objectively the most serious incident of the Kennedy-Khrushchev period. That is, there was more overt behavior, as distinct from verbal declaration and generalized anxiety, which pointed to violence on a large scale. Cuba was in the years since Hiroshima-Nagasaki, the first crisis in which the attentive public had grounds for fearing a nuclear incident within hours or days.

Our findings here are thus of special interest. They support the following propositions: (a) In deep international-political crises, increments of exhortation do not instigate as

* Concretization was slightly more closely associated with exhortation ($r = .32$, cf. $.28$), but abstract thought was much more strongly correlated with exhortation ($r = -.46$ Cuba, $-.29$ Berlin).

much change in the direction of concretized thinking as at lower levels of crisis; (a') nor does the specificity-concreteness of a live crisis leave as much room for diffuse exhortations. (b) In deep international-political crisis, exhortation varies with what an average citizen would gauge to be the seriousness of the situation, whereas at lower levels of crisis the media are more apt to be urging the citizen to alter his assessment of the threat. A corollary to this is (b') that the media may abandon attempts to manipulate public opinion through student redefinitions-of-situation beyond some threshold of objective threat. (c) In deep crises the tendency toward concrete-ad hoc thinking is more closely tied to a "social" perception of the threat (ex. def., and because the threat to survival imposes more strongly and predictably a sub-panic mentality on people than do lower, more diffuse sorts of political crises. (d) The pre-emption of attention by the fear of cataclysm is instituted above some threshold of perceived threat; and (d') since most people most of the time do not regard themselves as being in mortal danger, the higher levels of international crises are perceived as highly incongruous and "unreal," (d'') with the consequence that people become more willing, indeed more eager, to accept simple solutions and strong leaders to dispel the "unreality" and to reinstitute normal routines.

Test Ban -- 1963. 1) As with the total data, trust of the SU and belief in the good intentions of the SU varied closely. 2) The relations between neither (a) exhortation and (b) thought processes, nor (c) seriousness of threat and (d) thought processes were statistically significant here. 3) The incongruity-saliency relation was rather high. And 4) the saliency-"seriousness of threat" relation was almost non-existent.

Interpretation. Although our other data often do not provide a statistical reading on the intent-trust relation, one would intuitively expect, as these data actually show, that (a) those who distrust the "adversary" do not attribute good intentions to him and (a') those who are suspicious of his intentions do not trust him. (b) At low levels of international-political crisis it is very difficult to manipulate thinking styles, and (b') the perceived (low threat) state of the international political system does not affect thinking styles in any direction. (c) Reader attention can be kept even in the absence of high threat messages, so long as the reported developments are viewed as "surprising." (d) At low levels of international-political crisis, reader attention is not affected by divergencies in assessment of threat.

All Cases -- 3 Years -- Anomalies. For two correlations we did not obtain results that were statistically significant where we might well have expected a strong positive or negative relation. 1) Intent of the SU and intent of the US did not co-vary to a significant degree. The absence of a relation here is anomalous because we did get a fairly consistent relation between Trust and Intent elsewhere. This result is partly attributable to a large proportion of uncodeable (Y) cases where Soviet intentions are not discussed explicitly but are probably presumed by the reader to be bad: In other words, the editorialists often leave it sort of vaguely implicit that US intentions are good and SU intentions are bad. In addition to uncodeability, the reason for this finding is that, while US and SU good intentions do covary, all the bad intentions are attributed to the Soviets, which is to say that there is a strong indirect relation between US-SU bad intentions. Thus, by separating the two types of intentions we get a result that fits the common-sense expectation -- that perceived intentions of Self will not be unresponsive to perceived intentions of Adversary.

2) The other finding which is consistently anomalous is the relation between US and SU cooperativeness. Again, there are many uncodeable cases, and especially for the US when the SU is seen as uncooperative. And, as in the previous anomaly, we may interpret this as stemming from a refusal to view one's own country as "uncooperative" under any circumstances.

News Items

The statistical analysis of news items are designed to test several hypotheses on all the data for all three years.

1. It was hypothesized that perception of common values would enhance the impression of SU cooperativeness, trustworthiness, and good intentions (or that the enhancement of these attitudes would result in the perception of common values). The hypothesis was tested by correlating "common values" with "cooperativeness SU," with "trust SU," and with "Intention SU." It was supported by the analysis at a remarkably high level of confidence ($r=.84$, $.76$, and $.81$).

2. It was hypothesized that US intentions are always seen as good and our trustworthiness as high, whereas our willingness to cooperate with the SU is contingent on SU intentions and cooperativeness. This was tested by correlating "cooperativeness US" with "Intentions SU" and with "Cooperativeness SU." The hypothesis was clearly supported by the statistical analysis ($r=.55$ and $.61$).

3. It was hypothesized that strong feelings of trust, good intentions, etc., will be more easily evoked when issue-simplicity is high. This was tested by correlating "simplicity" with "trust SU" and with "Intentions SU." The inverse relation between trust and simplicity was supported ($g=-.33$), but that between simplicity and intentions was not ($g=-.11$).

4. It was hypothesized that the US is perceived as behaving very consistently, whereas the SU is perceived as shifting its positions. Thus, a rise in the feeling of shared values would have to be attributed to the SU's coming around to the US point of view; or, activity (change of position) = incongruity (instigated by SU). This was tested by relating "common values" to "incongruity." However, the statistical analysis revealed that there was no relation at all between these variables ($g=-.04$).

5. It was hypothesized that incongruity would be negatively related to the seriousness of threat to world peace -- this on the supposition that the adversary stereotypy would be upset if the SU were to change position by making a peaceful overture. To test this, "incongruity" was related to "seriousness of threat". This hypothesis was not supported ($g=.48$). What was supported, though, is the counter-hypothesis, which says that even where they expect hostile behavior, people view serious threats to world peace as incongruous (disorganizing).

6. It was hypothesized that serious threats to world peace would consistently be viewed as being highly salient or attention-worthy. This was tested by relating "saliency" and "seriousness of threat." The hypothesis was supported very strongly ($g=.75$).

7. It was hypothesized that serious threats to world peace would tend to elicit more concrete, ad hoc thought processes and styles. This was tested by relating "concreteness" and "seriousness of threat." The hypothesis was strongly supported ($g=.63$).

8. It was hypothesized that thinking would become more concretized as issues came to be cast more simply. Thus "concreteness" and "issues simplicity" were related. The hypothesis was strongly supported ($g=.60$).

9. It was hypothesized that serious threats to world peace would induce people to view the issues more simply. So "seriousness of threat" was related to "issue simplicity." The hypothesis was supported moderately ($g=.36$).

10. It is perhaps superfluous to add that the direction of the causality cannot be determined by our present methods. To some extent, common-sense argues that one direction is more plausible than another, e.g., that it would sound plausible to say that threats to world peace cause people to simplify the issues, and implausible to say that simplifying issues causes international political crises. There is also the possibility that some of these variables are not causally linked at all, but are inseparable aspects of a single phenomenon or concomitant symptoms of an underlying syndrome. For determinations of this order, however, we must await certain refinements of technique and further empirical researches.

News Items: Crisis-Conciliation Breakdown

A further statistical analysis was performed on the news item data grouped according to crisis and conciliation conditions. That is, the data on the Cuban Missile Crisis and on the most intense phase of the Berlin crisis were taken together as a crisis condition and were compared with the joint data for the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Vienna Summit Meeting.

We shall comment here on significant differences revealed by comparing these two conditions, and secondly on relations that remained similar under both conditions.

Shift Cases. The relation between "simplification of issues" and both a) Soviet intentions and b) trust in the Soviets differed considerably in the two conditions. (See Crisis-Conciliation chart, following page.) This finding clearly indicates that definite trust or distrust of the Soviet Union was associated with simplification of issues. Simplification was, however, associated with the attribution of bad intentions to the Soviets without being significantly associated with belief in their good or anomalous intentions. To account for this finding we should have to theorize that the trust in this case was what we elsewhere refer to as power-based-assurance, or was based on the perception of some "objective" conditions other than good intentions. In other words, the (recent) adversary cannot be permitted to have good intentions; or if he is credited with good intentions, they are not a discernable factor in the rise in trust. The very fact of such a discrimination (between trust and intention) suggests the presence of very strong projection and stereotypy.

The moderate association ($r = .383$) between simplification and concretized thinking in the crisis condition is strengthened considerably in conciliation phases. This rather suggests that

Crisis-Conciliation Comparisons

(Numbers refer to gamma statistics, explained in the footnote at the beginning of this section; variables in the left margin are taken from the content analysis formats, attached as Appendices I & II.)

	<u>Crisis Phase</u>	<u>Conciliation Phase</u>
Simplification/Trust SU	-.491	.429
Simplification/Intention SU	-.423	-.175
Simplification/Concr.Tho't	.383	.584
Common Values/Incongruity	-.450	.078
Common Values/Trust SU	.802	.478
Common Values/Coop.US	.919	.704
Serious Threat/Incongruity	.636	.307
Serious Threat/Saliency	.920	.692
Serious Threat/Concr.Tho't	.646	.430
Coop.US/Coop SU	.868	.563
Common Values/Coop.SU	.905	.921
Common Values/Intention SU	.792	.772
Coop.US/Intention SU	.566	.597
Serious Threat/Simplification	.562	.615

both simplification and concrete thought tend to diminish as the crisis mentality abates.

"Common values" was significantly (negatively) correlated with incongruity and very strongly with trust in the U.S., in the crisis condition. But both of these associations were dramatically weakened in conciliation phases. This means that the assertion of common values is not perceived as startlingly novel during crisis periods; and thus (since by definition a crisis would be a time in which common values were submerged) the sense of incongruity is negatively associated with the assertion of common values. Likewise, when common values are seen as almost absent, their absence is linked with a distrustful attitude toward the Soviets. The weakening of the association of common values with U.S. cooperativeness ($r = .919$ to $.704$) is further evidence of our aforementioned hypothesis, that U.S. cooperativeness is perceived as being more or less constant, such that other factors vary around it as a basing point.

The very strong correlation between Soviet and American (un)cooperativeness in crisis periods results somewhat in detente phases. That suggests once again that Soviet-American cooperation dispositions are parallel only when both are absent, and that U.S. cooperativeness tends to be seen as a constant.

The association of incongruity, saliency, and concretized thought with "seriousness of threat to world peace" was very strong in the crisis condition. All these correlations were less strong in the conciliation condition. The association of "serious threat" with saliency was unusually strong in both cases, especially the crisis condition. (With the detente data, this means that a very few instances of serious threat are highly correlated with a very few instances of saliency). These findings demonstrate once again the ability of a perceived crisis to capture attention, provide novelty, and galvanize the thinking of observers and participants.

No-shift Cases. Four of our significant correlations remained very nearly the same under both conditions. The associations of common values with both cooperativeness of the S.U. and with Soviet intentions was strong for crisis and conciliation. This reinforces our earlier theorizing that a perception of shared interests turned almost entirely on (perceived) changes in Soviet attitudes and behavior. The next correlation, U.S. cooperativeness with Soviet intentions ($r = .566$ to $.597$) illustrates exactly this point.

It is also of interest that "seriousness of threat" was associated with simplification of issues at about the same level

in both conditions. Along with the findings discussed at the beginning of this section, that suggests a close causal connection between simplification and the other attributes of political crises.

V. Conclusions

The richness of a content analysis involving thousands of separate ratings and qualitative judgments can scarcely be exaggerated. Even though we limited ourselves to a single newspaper and to a period (1961-63) during which the major Soviet and American decision-makers remained the same, the number of possible interpretations and hypotheses suggested by our data is vast indeed. We have confined ourselves therefore to an assessment of the findings, so to speak, rather than to a compendium of all the findings and all the possible implications thereof. What follows in this section is a selection of findings and hypotheses, a selection based on our assessment of their relevancy to the current issues of social research and to the interests of the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency.

Findings and hypotheses (or "interpretations") are ordered below in a way that reveals something like a coherent theory not entirely obvious from the previous sections (see our Final Report for the explicit statement of this proto-theory).

Findings

1. An exceedingly strong correlation was found between belief in the good intentions of the US and distrust of the SU.
2. The relation between perceived common values and cooperative behavior by the Soviets was exceedingly strong.
3. The relation between perceived common values and trust of the SU was found to be exceedingly strong.
4. A remarkably strong relation was discovered between perceived common values and the good intentions of the SU.
5. Strong relations were found between perceived U.S. cooperativeness and both Soviet cooperativeness and Soviet intentions.
6. Strong correlations were found between issue-saliency and perception of a serious threat to world peace.

7. A strong relation was found between saliency and incongruity.
8. Strong relations were found between concrete-ad hoc thinking and perceived seriousness of threat.
9. Concrete-ad hoc thinking was found to be strongly related to issue-simplicity.
10. Firm correlations were discovered between concrete-ad hoc thinking and both exhortatoriness and perceived seriousness of threat to world peace.
11. A firm relation was found between exhortatoriness and seriousness of threat.
12. Strong correlations were found between saliency, incongruity, and seriousness of threat to world peace during a time of deep crisis (Cuba).
13. Strong correlations were found between incongruity and saliency during a period of detente (Partial Test Ban Treaty).
14. The relation between saliency and seriousness of threat was found to be weaker, though still significant, during deep crisis.
15. A moderate correlation was found between issue-simplicity and distrust.
16. The relation between issue-simplicity and seriousness of threat was moderate.
17. Seriousness of threat did not correlate with abstract or concrete thought processes during a time of detente.
18. Longitudinal analysis showed that the standard pattern of editorials on the same issue is described by a slightly negatively inclined curve representing the average length of the editorial by the week or month.
19. Longitudinal analysis showed that the prominency with which editorials are displayed tends to describe a sine-curve.
20. Different measures of the editorials and news stories revealed either a uni-convulsive (one-peak) pattern or a bimodal curve with major and minor peaks; with detente events, the major peak arrived last, and with deep crises the major peak came first.

21. A special analysis of crisis and conciliation data revealed significant shifts (under those two conditions) of the correlations between simplification of issues and a) Soviet intentions and b) trust in the Soviets; between simplification of issues and concrete thinking; between common values and a) incongruity, b) trust in the U.S., and c) U.S. Cooperativeness; and between "seriousness of threat to world peace" and a) incongruity, b) saliency, and c) concrete thinking.

22. The special crisis-conciliation analysis revealed no shift (under these two conditions) in the correlations between common values and a) S.U. cooperativeness and b) S.U. intentions; between U.S. cooperativeness and S.U. intentions; and between "seriousness of threat" and simplification of issues.

Hypotheses*

1. Reported threats to world peace always get attention and are therefore beneficial to the interests of news media and decision-making elites in need of support.

2. Serious threats to world peace, concretized thinking, and simplification of issues are very strongly associated, such that the introduction of any one of them will produce the others, and with them an adversary-crisis milieu.

3. Perception of values common to both adversaries will lead to more cooperative and trusting attitudes and will enhance belief in the good intentions of the adversary. Any one of these factors may itself produce the aura of common values.

4. The position of Self tends to be viewed as constant, such that changes in the perception of Adversary, as more cooperative or better intentioned, happen only when Adversary changes position.

5. Issue-saliency, incongruity, and seriousness of threat to world peace are closely associated because surprise brings issues to the forefront of attention, and because threats are almost always experienced as salient and surprising ("shocking").

* As this study was being concluded the author's attention was drawn to an excellent review of the question of news management of international political events: see Einar Oestgaard, "Factors Influencing the Flow of News," Journal of Peace Research, No. 1, 1965, p. 39. Oestgaard reaches very similar conclusions (p. 55) to ours on the matter of the saliency and exaggeration of conflicts.

6. In deep crises there is less exhortation and a leveling-off of issue-saliency because of the "numbing" effect of high and protracted arousal.

7. During detente phases, the relation between saliency and incongruity is higher because of a "breathless" expectation of international amity.

8. Reported threats to world peace affect thought processes less in times of detente or deep crisis because of the "sobering" or "relaxing" qualities of extreme situations.

9. Arousal during detente phases is slower than during crises, is progressive, and uni-convulsive; except in protracted detentes when the pattern tends toward an optimism-pessimism sine-curve, due to the doubts and fears that arise during lulls.

10. Arousal in deep crises is bi-modal, with a sharp alarm-reaction, a lull, and a weaker recapitulation-reaction -- in that order.

11. Comparing conciliation phases with deep crises, it would appear that the adversary was conceived of in highly stereotyped terms, that the assurance exhibited in conciliation phases was "power-based-assurance," and that a so-to-speak "all or nothing" attitude characterized the trustworthiness of the Soviets.

Appendix 1: Content Analysis Format for Editorials and Letters-to-the-Editor (much abbreviated)

- Newspr_____ Date_____ Page_____ Case_____ Length_____ Position_____
- No. Paragraphs_____ No. Sentences_____
- 1) Writer quotes opinion or interpretation of another --A) Soviet official; B) U.S. official; C) other official; D) Soviet non-official; E) U.S. non-official; F) other; G) approvingly; H) disapprovingly;
 - 2) Writer's attitude toward present U.S. policy vis a vis the S.U. is -- A) positive; B) negative; Y)
 - 3) Writer's attitude toward present S.U. policy toward the U.S. is-- A) positive; B) negative; Y)
 - 4) Writer suggests that U.S. policy toward SU is -- A) well-intentioned; B) ill-intentioned; C) indifferent; Y)
 - 5) Writer suggests that S.U. policy toward U.S. is -- A) well-intentioned; B) ill-intentioned; C) indifferent; Y)
 - 6) Common or shared values between the U.S. and S.U. are -- A) asserted; B) denied; Y)
 - 7) To what extent are two or more sides of the issue discussed by the writer? A) hardly at all; B) a little; C) quite a lot; D) extensively.
 - 8) To what degree is a trusting attitude expressed toward the U.S.? A) a lot; B) some; C) some distrust; D) lots of distrust; Y)
 - 9) To what degree is a trusting attitude expressed toward the S.U.? A) a lot; B) some; C) some distrust; D) lots of distrust; Y)
 - 10) Make a judgment about the level of exhortitoriness, stridency, urgency, moral urgency, etc., in this item -- A) high; B) fairly high; C) fairly low; D) low; E) virtually absent.
 - 11) Amount of abstract argumentation and reasoning employed -- A) extensive; B) some; C) a little; D) practically none.
 - 12) Amount of concrete, ad hoc, and analogic argumentation employed -- A) extensive; B) some; C) a little; D) practically none.
 - 13) Dispositions toward cooperative behavior and attitudes on the part of the U.S. are seen as -- A) high; B) low; C) unchanged; Y)
 - 14) Dispositions toward cooperative behavior and attitudes on the part of the S.U. are seen as -- A) high; B) low; C) unchanged; Y)
 - 15) The economic capabilities of the S.U. are perceived as -- A) higher; B) lower; C) unchanged; Y)
 - 16) The economic capabilities of the U.S. are perceived as -- A) higher; B) lower; C) unchanged; Y)
 - 17) The military capabilities of the S.U. are perceived as -- A) higher; B) lower; C) unchanged; Y)
 - 18) The military capabilities of the U.S. are perceived as -- A) higher; B) lower; C) unchanged; Y)
 - 19) The level of activity by the SU is seen as -- A) high; B) moderately high; C) moderately low; D) low; Y)
 - 20) The level of activity by the U.S. is seen as -- A) high; B) moderately high; C) moderately low; D) low; Y)
 - 21) The level of (personal and organizational) skill or competence in the Soviet political system is seen as --A) high; B) moderately high; C) moderately low; D) low; Y)

- 22) The level of (personal and organizational) skill in the U.S. political system is seen as -- A) high; B) moderately high; C) moderately low; D) low; Y)
- 23) The main source of threats to international peace is seen as -- A) the S.U.; B) the S.U. and U.S. together; C) the S.U. and 3d party; D) the U.S.; E) the U.S. and 3d party; F) a specified 3d party; G) an unspecified 3d party; Y)
- 24) The writer expressly desires more information about the topic -- A) yes; B) no; Y)
- 25) The writer seems to feel that the news media are -- A) highly reliable; B) fairly reliable; C) occasionally reliable; D) quite unreliable; Y)
- 26) Number of strong verbs_____.
- 27) Number of weak verbs_____.
- 28) Ratio of strong to weak verbs_____.

- i) Dramatization by way of personalization is --
Hi 1 2 3 4 5 Lo
- ii) Degree of issue simplicity and specificity is --
Hi 1 2 3 4 5 Lo
- iii) Concreteness of symbols is --
Hi 1 2 3 4 5 Lo
- iv) Incongruity of event is --
Hi 1 2 3 4 5 Lo
- v) Personal relevance -- probability of intrusion into the consciousness of and private life of the average adult --
Hi 1 2 3 4 5 Lo
- vi) Serious of threat to world peace --
Hi 1 2 3 4 5 Lo

Appendix 2: Format for Content Analysis of News Stories
(much abbreviated)

- Nwspr. _____ Date _____ Page _____ Case _____ Coder _____
 (Note: the six-point scales should be interpreted thus: 1-3 goes from high to low relevancy on factor one; 4-6 goes from low to high relevancy on factor two.)
- 1) Give your impression as to the number of sides of the question presented by this news item -- A) one; B) two; C) more than two; Y)
 - 2) The general impression is that the disposition of the US is to be -- cooperative toward Su _____ uncooperative toward SU _____
 1 2 3 (Y) 4 5 6
 - 3) The general impression is that the disposition of the SU is to be -- cooperative toward US _____ uncooperative to US _____
 1 2 3 (Y) 4 5 6
 - 4) The overall impression is that US intentions toward the SU are -- positive _____ negative _____
 1 2 3 (Y) 4 5 6
 - 5) The overall impression is that SU intentions toward the US are -- positive _____ negative _____
 1 2 3 (Y) 4 5 6
 - 6) The overall effect of the item is to portray the SU as -- trustworthy _____ untrustworthy _____
 1 2 3 (Y) 4 5 6
 - 7) The overall effect of the item is to portray the US as -- trustworthy _____ untrustworthy _____
 1 2 3 (Y) 4 5 6
 - 8) Allusions to common values between the SU and the US are -- present _____ absent _____
 1 2 3 4 5 6
 - 9) Threats to international peace are reported as coming from
 A) the SU; B) the SU and US together; C) the SU and 3d party;
 D) the US; E) the US and 3d party; F) a specified 3d party; G) an unspecified 3d party; Y)
 - 10) Acts or opinions are attributed to the U.S. administration.
 A) Yes B) No
 - 11) Acts or opinions are attributed to other US officials.
 A) Yes B) No
 - 12) Acts or opinions are attributed to Soviet officials.
 A) Yes B) No
 - 13) Page on which the item first appears _____.
 - 14) Quadrant of the page: A) NE B) NW C) SE D) SW _____.
 - 15) Measure the depth of the headline _____.
 - 16) Number of columns covered by the headline _____.
 - 17) Number of column-inches of text, incl. continuations and pictures but not continuation headlines _____.
- Note presence and degree of following factors: NEED INFORMATION _____ MEDIA RELIABILITY _____ DIVERGENT PUBLIC OPINION _____

EXHORTATION _____ SU/US ECONOMIC POWER _____ SU/US MILITARY
 POWER _____ SU/US SKILL _____ SU/US ACTIVITY LEVEL _____
 Supplement:

- i) Dramatization by way of personalization is:
 Hi 1- 2- 3- 4- 5- Lo
- ii) Degree of issue specificity and simplicity:
 Hi 1 2 3 4 5 Lo
- iii) Concreteness of symbols and referents:
 Hi 1 2 3 4 5 Lo
- iv) Incongruity of event:
 Hi 1 2 3 4 5 Lo
- v) Personal relevance -- probability of intrusion into the
 consciousness and private life of the average adult:
 Hi 1 2 3 4 5 Lo
- vi) Seriousness of threat to world peace:
 Hi 1 2 3 4 5 Lo

SUPPLEMENTARY

INFORMATION

NOTICES OF CHANGES IN CLASSIFICATION,
DISTRIBUTION AND AVAILABILITY

06 69-19 1 OCTOBER 1969

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