EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS JAPAN: TRILATERALISM'S WEAKEST LINK

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

EXECUTIVE SEMINAR IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1979-80

THIS STUDY HAS BEEN PREPARED AS PART OF THE CURRICULUM OF THE EXECUTIVE SEMINAR IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE STUDY ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR. THEY DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT EITHER THOSE OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE OR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS JAPAN: TRILATERALISM'S WEAKEST LINK

A Case Study

ROBERT IMMERMAN



TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

EXECUTIVE SEMINAR IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1979-80

THIS STUDY HAS BEEN PREPARED AS PART OF THE CURRICULUM OF THE EXECUTIVE SEMINAR IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE STUDY ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR; THEY DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT EITHER THOSE OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE OR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS JAPAN: TRILATERALISM'S WEAKEST LINK

by

Robert Immerman

SUMMARY

The commitment of the American Government and foreign policy establishment to trilateralism--the view that the U.S., Western Europe and Japan are equal partners in an alliance of the industrialized democracies--is not yet widely shared in Western Europe. Not only do the Europeans regard their relationship with the United States as incomparably more important to them than their ties to Japan, but they tend to view Japan primarily as an economic competitor rather than as member of the democratic alliance.

While the major nations of Western Europe share the same preoccupation with the Japanese economic challenge, the British, French, and West Germans see Japan under somewhat different lights. In the U.K., deep hostility, based on unpleasant World War II experiences, is now tempered by Europe's strongest Japan lobby which recognizes Japan's importance to the West. The fascination of French intellectuals with traditional Japanese culture has now combined with their fear and admiration of Japan's economic accomplishments to produce a rather distorted vision of a faceless people with little in common with the West. The Germans maintain a nostalgic fondness for their former ally but are disappointed by Japan's passive approach to international issues. Low-key Japanese behavior in the OECD and, paradoxically, an aggressive pursuit of NATO have not served to generate within those organizations a feeling of shared interests with Japan. The Common Market bureaucracy, however, contains the most outspoken exponents of a special relationship between Europe and Japan in the political as well as economic realm.

In fact, however, the Europeans have begun to recognize trilateralism. They have joined with the Japanese on a governmental level in the annual Economic Summits and on the private level in the Trilateral Commission. Greater acceptance by them of trilateralism will depend in the first instance on a more visible willingness on the part of Japan to accept the responsibilities which are attached to full-fledged membership in the alliance. Nevertheless, there are some steps which the United States can take to encourage greater support for trilateralism among our European allies. First and foremost is a determination to consult with Japan whenever we do so with our European allies. Secondly, we must never again repeat the approach symbolized by the Guadeloupe meeting of American, British, French and German leaders in December, 1978, where, with our acquiescence, the Western Europeans succeeded in excluding the Japanese from top level participation in the alliance.

Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs

April 1980

DECLASSIFIED

I 335

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

INTRODUCTION

The concept of trilateralism, as enunciated by Professor Brzezinski in such books as Between Two Ages and The Fragile Blossom in the early seventies, given organizational expression by The Trilateral Commission since 1973 and proclaimed as a principal tenet of U.S. foreign policy by the Carter Administration on taking office in January, 1977, is generally accepted as a truism by most Americans concerned with international affairs, the attacks on George Bush during the New Hampshire primary for his Trilateral Commission membership notwithstanding.

Trilateralism, as defined by such American proponents as Brzezinski and David Rockefeller, assumes the existence of a special community of interest among the industrialized democracies of North America, Western Europe and Japan. Only these nations have the potential to shape from the shocks and crises of the 1970s an international order congenial to democratic values. To do so, however, they must maintain democratic political systems, pursue policies encouraging domestic economic growth, avoid internecine economic conflicts, develop a coordinated strategy to deal with politico-military challenges posed by the USSR, and cooperate with each other in assisting the nations of the Third World to raise the living standards of their populations. Underlying this concept is the assumption that, unless the industrialized democracies work together to manage the political and economic problems of the coming decade, totalitarian forces led by the USSR will impose their version of a new international order on the world.

As first enunciated, the concept of trilateralism represented a direct challenge to the tactics-if not the theories-of the Nixon Administration, particularly its chief foreign policy strategist, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger's predilection for secrecy, for one-to-one deals, and for leaders of authoritarian regimes who could be "relied on" as well as his disdain for democratic processes and the organs of public opinion led him almost inevitably to overemphasize U.S. relations with the USSR, the PRC, Pinochet's Chile, and the Shah's Iran at the expense of our ties to the less firmly ruled but genuinely democratic governments of Western Europe and Japan. The earliest exponents of trilateralism took issue with this approach by arguing that it was in our national interest to place at the center of our foreign policy relations with the democracies.

Trilateralism also emphasized the importance of Japan as a full-fledged member of the club of industrialized democracies. The Nixon Administration's view of Japan as a not too trustworthy partner in Asia, to be consulted only on occasion, was roundly criticized. From the perspective of trilateralism, the U.S. relationship with Japan in

UNCLASSIFIED

the context of the Mutual Security Treaty was as important to the U.S. as our ties to Western Europe through NATO.

Interestingly enough, Henry Kissinger eventually converted to trilateralism, thereby conferring on it bipartisan respectability in the U.S. Kissinger's highly publicized "Year of Europe" (eventually amended to include Japan), although unsuccessful as a diplomatic exercise, helped to make trilateralism an integral part of U.S. foreign policy from 1973 on.

In recent years, trilateralism has found considerable favor in Japan as well. Japan has finally achieved its 100 year goal of catching up with the West and is now searching for a new objective. The Japanese Government has begun to pay considerable lip service to Japan's new role in the world as a post-industrial democracy. Many Japanese bureaucrats, politicians and intellectuals, therefore, take trilateralism quite seriously; to them, it symbolizes Japan's acceptance as a full-fledged member of the exclusive Western (read white man's) club.

What of the Western Europeans? Do they accept the assumptions of trilateralism? Do they view Japan as an ally or even as a nation with whom they should develop a special relationship? This study examines current European attitudes towards Japan in an effort to determine if a special link exists between Europe and Japan and whether Europeans consider such a link desirable and as part of a triangular relationship.

To obtain a relatively representative sampling of European attitudes, interviews with government officials, politicians, businessmen, university professors, labor leaders and journalists were conducted in Bonn, Brussels, London and Paris during a three week period in March, 1980. Those interviewed ranged from diplomats with considerable expertise in Japanese affairs to businessmen and politicians with a general interest in but no specialized knowledge of Japan. The opinions of Japanese diplomats and journalists proved to be particularly useful, since many of them had the rare gift of being able to view their own country from a European perspective.

The View From France

Whether they are confirmed Atlanticists, ardent Gaullists or apolitical technocrats, French intellectuals draw virtually the same word portrait of Japan. They see it as a unique Confucian civilization which, in spite of its modernist overlay, does not share any of the basic Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian values which have shaped the nations of Western Europe and North America. Regardless of their political persuasion, they believe that the enormous cultural gap between Japan and the West reduces the concept of trilateralism either to a somewhat idealistic academic exercise or much more likely as far as they

are concerned-to a rather simplistic, made-in-America justification of intensified U.S. Government efforts to bolster America's declining position in the world by extracting greater contributions from our principal allies.

While many French international relations theorists summarily dismiss trilateralism as unworthy of serious consideration, they display an unexpectedly high degree of interest in Japan as such. They discuss Japan with a combination of annoyance and admiration. Somewhat facetiously, they accuse Japan of having committed two sins that are almost unpardonable in European eyes. First, after absorbing almost all that Europe had to offer in modern industrial and military technology, Japan adapted this technology to change more effectively than did its teachers and then shamelessly re-exported it, first militarily to Europe's Southeast Asian colonies during World War II and then economically to Europe itself since the 1960s. Secondly, after courting Europe assiduously from the 1860s until World War II, Japan transferred its affections to the United States after 1945 and commenced to treat Europe merely as an outlet for its manufactured goods and as a playground for its tourists.

Nonetheless, Japan still exerts a considerable fascination on French intellectuals. While the more traditional preoccupation with Japan's supposedly superior esthetic impulses has been supplemented to some extent by a rash of books and articles praising as worthy of emulation Japanese patterns of industrial organization, the exotic aspects of Japan still draw the most attention. In early March, Parisian billboards prominently displayed posters advertising Japon Interdit (Forbidden Japan),an illustrated series of lectures featuring phallic festivals, religious rites of the Buddhist evangelical organization Sokagakkai and the suicide by disembowelment and beheading of novelist Yukio Mishima. The attitudes of French intellectuals towards Japan are typified by a noted political philosopher who told a visitor last month: "We are fascinated by Japan, which is a unique and important country, but we do not know the Japanese. They do not share our values and there is little direct communication with them because of their extremely difficult language. Therefore, I do not know what the Japanese are thinking...or even if they are thinking."

Accompanying this fascination is a fear of Japan's economic prowess. This fear so far has little basis in reality. France's major industries, whether steel, autos, petrochemicals or electronics, have not been seriously challenged in their home markets by their Japan-based competitors, thanks to a complex network of nearly invisible trade barriers as well as a series of behind-the-scenes gentlemen's agreements worked out between mercantilist minded French bureaucrats and their like-minded counterparts in Tokyo. Japan's annual exports of autos to France--approximately 30,000 vehicles--are no greater than its shipments to Belgium or Finland even though France's population is at

least six times as large as either of the other two nations. Nevertheless, the French are frightened by what may lie ahead. They regard the current surge of interest on the part of Japanese auto and electronics industries in establishing plants on the territory of France's EEC partners, particularly the UK and Italy, as foreshadowing the erection of a Japanese model of the Trojan Horse inside the protective trade walls of the Common Market. French businessmen, who do not take seriously the possibility of competing within the Japanese market, also fear that their traditional export markets in France's former colonies as well as in Latin America are about to be invaded by the Japanese.

There are some voices in France, however, calling for a more sober appraisal of Japan's significance to France and to Europe as a whole. The Patronat Francais (National Association of Employers) has recently established a special Committee on Japanese Trade, in part in order to publicize examples of successful French business ventures in Japan and thereby persuade a greater number of French enterprises to enter the Japanese market. Le Monde has assigned to Tokyo as its correspondent one of the few recent French university graduates in Japanese studies; his articles, which appear to have a wide readership among French intellectuals, are one of the few sources of information in Paris on current political and economic developments in Japan. A new government-subsidized research institute, one of whose directors is considered to be France's leading student of the Japanese economy, has organized an interdisciplinary team to analyze Japanese techniques for dealing with current social and economic issues as well as the possibility of applying these techniques to France. Jean Jacques Servan-Schrieber, whose book The American Challenge provoked the French business community into taking American owned multinationals seriously in the mid-1960's, is currently attempting to develop support for the establishment of a new organization which, according to his promotional material, intends to link European tradition and experience with Japan's economic might and Arab financial power.

While both fearing and respecting Japan as an economic superpower, French intellectuals continue to dismiss Japan as a political pygmy, without an independent foreign policy or meaningful defense capability. Those espousing a Gaullist view of the international scene ridicule what they regard as Japan's complete dependence on the United States for its defense and profess to favor a significant increase in Japanese military strength. They would not object to the development of nuclear weapons by the Japanese. They argue that, with a respectable military establishment, Japan would not only be capable of a more autonomous foreign policy but would serve Western interests by acting as an effective deterrent to the expansion of Soviet power in East Asia.

French Atlanticists, on the other hand, while favoring a gradual buildup of Japan's military forces and generally agreeing with U.S.

efforts to prod the Japanese in this direction, insist it is even more important that Japan begin playing a more active political role. They sharply criticize what they label as Japan's irresponsible attitude towards pro-Western nations in need of immediate financial aid and long-term economic assistance. Only when Japan takes the lead in bailing out such nations as Portugal, Turkey or Pakistan can it be considered as a genuine member of the free-world alliance.

Surprisingly, in view of the low esteem in which they hold Japanese diplomacy, French intellectuals attach considerable importance to the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1978. Some even claim that the treaty marks the inauguration of a new "Neo-Confucian" power bloc in Asia, combining Japan's industrial might and managerial know-how with China's human and national resources. They find confirmation of this theory in the Ohira Government's recent trumpeting of a "Pacific Community" as one of Japan's new foreign policy objectives.

In sum, while French intellectuals now consider Japan to be a worthy subject of their speculative talents, this speculation tends to reflect French foreign policy concerns rather than careful analysis of Japanese preoccupations and intentions. As for the attitudes of the general public, they were revealed in a recent poll conducted by the magazine L'Express. Asked to name their favorite foreign country, the French ranked Germany, other Western European nations and the United States in the top ten, placed China eleventh and the Soviet Union twelfth, and ignored Japan completely. It does not even show up among the "also rans" (less than 2% response). In this terrain of massive indifference, it is difficult to cultivate trilateralism.

German Attitudes

The view of Japan from Bonn is strikingly different from the one received in Paris. Instead of regarding Japan as a threat and the Japanese as a faceless people of much less intrinsic interest than the Chinese, the Germans, overall, are very favorably disposed towards a country they hail as a former ally and partner in suffering. German nostalgia for the hundred year old association with Japanese science and industry and the alliance prior to and during World War II is reinforced by a profound respect for Japanese hard work, discipline and endurance in the post-war period. To the Germans, the post-war Japanese success story is the mirror image of their own economic miracle. However, unlike France, Germany does not have a well-organized, easily identifiable group of intellectuals able to impose a single view on the nation. The German establishment is of several minds about Japan. Thus, as one senior Foreign Ministry official asserted, the FRG, while accepting Japan as an industrialized democracy and hoping that it will play an increasingly important role, especially in Asia, on behalf of the alliance, never-

theless shows disappointment with Japanese performance so far. The greatest congruence of German and Japanese interests is of course in the economic arena. Both nations are outspoken advocates of free trade, both believe that their respective domestic economic policies must guard against inflation and a weakening of their currencies even if such policies mean lower growth rates. Both resist what they view as unrealistic U.S. solutions to balance of payments problems. Yet, the Germans are saddened by what they regard as Japanese failure to live up to worthwhile economic principles. They are disappointed in Japan's continued reluctance to open fully its markets to foreign manufactures.

While the Germans worry that their less sympathetic EC partners (particularly the UK and France) will use alleged Japanese protectionism as a justification for blocking the development of even closer ties between the EEC and Japan, they claim that Japan, rather than their EEC partners, constitutes the principal barrier to the development of a genuine trilateralist outlook in Western Europe. They criticize Japan for its failure to accept any global political responsibilities on behalf of the democratic alliance and for continually arguing that in spite of its enormous economic power, it is merely a resource poor, overcrowded nation with responsibilities limited to Korea and Southeast Asia. German officials are particularly critical of recent Japanese passivity in multinational efforts on behalf of Turkish aid and Vietnamese refugees. They also charge Japan with leaving to others all responsibility for coping with Middle Eastern problems, including access to oil supplies (which they understand are more vital to Japan than to any Western European country).

In Bonn, there is hope that a greater Japanese defense effort, which would represent a contribution to free world security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, might offset to some extent European criticism of Japan's poor performance in the economic aid area. FRG officials sympathize with Japanese military planners. They claim to see a parallel between the difficulties which the FRG faced both domestically and externally when it proceeded to rearm within the NATO framework and the current problems facing the GOJ as it attempts to increase defense spending. German Government officials call attention to the fact that by sending its Defense Minister and Navy Chief of Staff to Tokyo in the early 1970's, the FRG was the first European ally of the U.S. to signal to the Japanese that the two nations had similar interests in the defense field. While these visits have continued (the current Minister of Defense visited Japan in March, 1980), the Germans emphasize that they are basically exchanges of information and do not involve any form of joint strategic planning. The FRG Foreign Ministry also tries to play a role in this area by injecting into its annual political consultations with the Japanese Foreign Office discussion of such military questions as theater nuclear forces modernization. They have found the Japanese hesitant to

engage in any meaningful dialogue on such subjects, however.)

To the Germans, then, Japan should be welcomed to the club but only if it is willing to pay its dues. The Germans believe that if Japan agrees to do so, the alliance will be strengthened and those in the FRG advocating a special relationship between Europe and Japan will be vindicated.

The British Perspective

Initially, one is struck when discussing Japan in London by the considerable hostility which the British still display towards the Japanese. Memories of World War II, particularly tales about cruel treatment meted out to civilian prisoners of war in Hong Kong and Singapore, are still very much alive. As for contemporary Japan, politicians, businessmen and labor leaders echo the same litany. The Japanese, according to them, are systematically waging war against the British economy by concentrating their exports in certain sensitive industrial sectors; selling at less than cost in order to wipe out British firms; preventing most potentially competitive British goods from entering the Japanese market; and -- where British products actually do penetrate Japanese import barriers -- maintaining a distribution system which requires reliance on venal middlemen, corrupt politicians and complicated import licenses. This indictment of Japanese trade practices usually culminates in the harshest possible charge which an Englishman can make - the Japanese simply do not observe the rules of "fair play".

This impression is strengthened by what appears to be widespread indifference to Japan's political significance. Even British intellectuals refer derisively to the lack of individuality in Japanese behavior -- what they term a herd instinct -- and argue that genuine democracy can not flourish in such an environment. Contributing to this attitude, of course, is the fact that ever since the UK's withdrawal from East of Suez, the British have paid relatively little attention to security issues in East Asia and have considered the area to be an exclusively American concern.

There is, however, another current of opinion towards Japan in the UK, one which appears to be increasing in importance. It was clearly enunciated by Peter Jay, former British Ambassador to the United States, in the Winter 1980 issue of Foreign Affairs. Jay has written that Japan shares with the U.S., Canada, the Western European nations, Australia and New Zealand a set of values and commitments which require us to accept it as a member of the Western alliance. Moreover, the most active promoters in recent years of an expanded dialogue between Western Europeans and Japanese have been British or continental Europeans resident in London. (Their efforts

have resulted in one of the most interesting spinoffs of the Trilateral Commission--an annual meeting, known as the Hakone Conference, of Western Europeans and Japanese without American participation.) There are even outspoken advocates of the Japanese way of doing business in the UK. In some of his recent articles, Norman Macrae, the ebullient Deputy Editor of the Economist, goes as far as to urge both the U.S. and the UK to look to the Japanese example in coping with industrial reorganization and developing new overseas markets. In recent years, some British defense analysts have even begun to engage in cooperative programs with their Japanese counterparts under the auspices of the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies and one of the IISS' most distinguished alumni, Brigadier Hunt, now writes directly for a Japan-based research institute concentrating on East Asian security problems. A sizable lobby of Japan experts in the British Foreign Office (the only one in Europe which systematically offers its young diplomats Japanese language training) presses ever more firmly on a sucession of Foreign Secretaries the view that the UK must treat Japan as a member of the alliance.

Other examples abound of an impressive resurgence of British interest in and sympathy for Japan. The two most outstanding European students of modern Japan, Ronald Dore and Richard Storry, are attached to British universities. Most major British news organizations now maintain full-time correspondents in Tokyo. The average Londoner seems to receive greater exposure than his continental counterparts to contemporary Japanese life; currently, the Victoria and Albert Museum is displaying a major exhibition entitled Japan Style and the BBC is showing a weekly series on Japan thirteen installments. Thanks to the efforts of these British opinion leaders, their countrymen's deep-rooted prejudice against Japan is steadily being overcome and a noteworthy constituency for trilateralism is being created.

Japan as Seen From The Multinational Organizations: OECD, NATO and EEC

OECD

The first seeds of trilateralism were sown in the early 1960s when the U.S. persuaded the Japanese to apply for OECD membership and then lobbied intensively with our skeptical European allies to win approval of the application. Japanese membership in the OECD was hailed at the time as the first grudging admission by Europe that Japan was an industrialized democracy.

Unfortunately, these seeds have not borne fruit in the OECD atmosphere. Even though they maintain the largest permanent delegation of any OECD member, the Japanese through the years have

carefully refrained, with a single exception (the ill-fated Interfutures Project of the mid 1970s), from taking the lead on any issue before the organization, whether it be development assistance, industrial restructuring, economic growth, energy or labor market analysis. OECD staff and representatives of member delegations regard the Japanese as the "odd men out" whose main concern seems to be to find the middle position on any issue but who refrain on controversial questions even from proposing the possible outlines of a consensus. European delegations reportedly try to prevent Japanese from chairing OECD meetings, make little effort to consult with them, look to the U.S. to deal with them on major issues and show little enthusiasm for U.S.-backed efforts to increase the number of Japanese on the OECD staff.

To make matters worse, trilateralism as such has become a divisive influence within the OECD. The smaller European nations and the Australians view it as providing a rationalization for the growing tendency of the U.S. and the larger Western European nations to exclude them from participation in the key economic decisions of the alliance. The seven-nation Economic Summits are resented by many delegations at the OECD and the fact that Japan has participated in them has not made it any more popular among these delegations.

NATO

Attitudes towards Japan are no more sympathetic at NATO Headquarters, for precisely the opposite reason. The Japanese, although they are not members, have displayed towards NATO what appears to some members to be excessive curiosity. Frequent visits by successive Ministers in charge of the Japanese Defense Agency, poorly handled invitations to Secretary General Luns to visit Japan and occasional overly aggressive efforts by Brussels-based Japanese diplomats to obtain information from NATO staff members have aroused European displeasure. With the exception of the British and the Germans, most European members of NATO are disturbed by any sign of NATO involvement with Japan. Not only do they view Asia as clearly outside the scope of the NATO Treaty but, preferring ever since Vietnam to minimize the significance of U.S. military commitments to other areas of the world, they officially ignore the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. While Americans assume a linkage between the two treaties in containing potential Soviet aggression, this is not the view of NATO's European members. Even in meetings of NATO's political experts, where developments in Africa, the Middle East and even East Asia are discussed periodically, Japan receives little attention (China reportedly exercises greater fascination). Speculation over whether the Japanese may someday seek some informal link to NATO is greeted with horror; according to some

delegations, even talk of such a development merely provokes the Soviets unnecessarily. While the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may eventually serve to convince some NATO delegations of the relationship between developments in Asia and European security, there still does not exist at NATO Headquarters any discernible realization of the community of interest between Japan and the West when it comes to defending democracy against the Soviet threat.

European Economic Community

Across town in Brussels, at the Headquarters of the EEC's European Commission, the most ardent advocates of trilateralism in Europe are to be found. To these veterans of the trade and investment disputes and negotiations among the EEC, the U.S. and Japan over the last decade, Japan looms large in Europe's future. Commission Headquarters personnel push with almost missionary zeal the view that the U.S., Japan and the EEC should pursue a vocation higher than that of simply resolving the specific sectoral disputes which now separate them. They urge the major industrialized democracies to devise a common strategy for expanding trade and investment opportunities, not only among themselves but with the developing world as well. They claim that, otherwise, a renewed surge of economic nationalism in Europe and heightened political instability in the Third World will threaten the survival of democratic institutions in the alliance.

Currently, the Commission is attempting to persuade the Council of Ministers and EEC member states that Japan should not be made the scapegoat for the increasingly intractable issues facing the Common Market. Commission officials point out, for example, that it is illogical to castigate Japan for its excessive trade surplus with the EEC while at the same time ignoring the fact that Austria's favorable balance with the EEC, when calculated on a per capita basis, is 28 times larger. It also is trying to convince the Japanese that their recurrent and seemingly planned efforts to acquire rapidly the lion's share of the market in such labor intensive sectors as autos and electronics can lead to further dangerous political confrontation. The Commission holds as a tenet of faith that, if the Japanese slow down the rate of increase in exports in certain sensitive fields and do more to open up their domestic market, a new coalition of European consumers--pleased with the high quality and low cost of Japanese products--and businessmen--delighted with new export opportunities--will help to overcome traditional fears of Japan and permit the establishment of a genuine economic partnership between the EEC and Japan. Such partnership should work to the benefit of both by encouraging greater investment in each other's economies, cooperation in the development of new energy sources, joint participation in large scale

DECLASSIFIED

industrial projects in the Third World and possibly even the internationalization of the yen. Commission officials admit ruefully, however, that they still do not possess sufficient political power to transform their vision of cooperative action into reality. The necessary impetus still can be provided only by the top political leaders of the major Western European nations, who must be convinced of Japan's crucial importance to the alliance. The Commission therefore looks to Summit meetings and to the Trilateral Commission to provide these leaders with an exposure to Japan sufficient to convert them to trilateralism.

Trilateralism Enshrined: The Economic Summits and The Trilateral Commission

Europeans generally agree that trilateralism has achieved its most successful organizational manifestations in the (by now) annual meetings of the heads of government of the seven industrialized democracies--the Economic Summits--and the privately sponsored Trilateral Commission. Summitry has carried further what the OECD tentatively initiated--confirmation of Japan's status as an equal in efforts by the principal industrialized democracies to coordinate at the highest level their respective economic policies. This acceptance has been grudging at best. On occasion, as at Guadeloupe in December, 1978, the Europeans, by successfully excluding the Japanese, have succeeded in demonstrating to the U.S. that the trans-Atlantic relationship still is more equal than others. At the Tokyo Summit last year, European leaders' negative perceptions of the Japanese were strengthened when weak Japanese leadership required the Guadeloupe four (U.S., UK, France, FRG) to negotiate during an informal breakfast gathering before the second day's session the conclave's only tangible accomplishment, the energy declaration. European diplomats present at the Tokyo Summit say that the passivity and indecisiveness displayed there by the top levels of the Japanese Government revived talk among their principals that trilateralism was still an American idea whose time had not yet come. They believe that the Venice Summit this June will represent trilateralism's next big test. The UK, France and the FRG all assume that for the first time one full day will be devoted to what will be billed openly as political discussions. Will the Japanese participate actively and offer any proposals of their own or will they remain passive onlookers?

Apart from the authoritarian right and the Marxist left, the Western European intellectual establishment now accepts and even welcomes the Trilateral Commission as a forum where Western politicians, businessmen and opinion makers have a unique opportunity to exchange opinions frankly and on a regular basis with their Japanese counterparts. Europeans who have joined the Commission admit that they had opposed, in the early 1970s, American efforts to include the Japanese in the prestigious Bilderberg Conferences and

later tried to limit Trilateral Commission membership to Westerners. They are therefore surprised and delighted by a new Japanese willingness to state positions clearly, to disagree with them at times and to affirm, as did former Foreign Minister Miyazawa at the March 1980 London meeting, that Japan is now prepared to assume the responsibilities devolving upon it as one of the world's major economic powers. Some negative comments are heard about the Japanese tendency to ask for European as well as American "understanding" of their views while dismissing as emotional or irrelevant the efforts of European trilateralists to call attention to the political risks attached to certain Japanese economic activities in Europe. Nonetheless, the Trilateral Commission, in the view of many of its European members, has enabled them for the first time to explore with their Japanese colleagues issues that the industrialized democracies must solve through joint action. If trilateralism is to take hold in Europe, it will be due in good part to the efforts of the Commission. A new generation of European foreign policy thinkers, attached to such institutions as the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and IISS in London, the Institute of International Relations in Paris, the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy in Bonn and the European University Institute in Florence, are taking the lead in preparing Commission reports, in leading Commission discussions and, of perhaps greatest importance, in impressing upon public opinion in their respective countries the necessity of including Japan in the Western alliance.

CONCLUSIONS

1. There is no single consistent view of Japan in Europe. There are significant differences separating the UK, where deep emotional hostility is now being tempered by a new realism, from the FRG, with its romantic attachment to its pre-war ally, as well as from France, where economic fears mix with esthetic appreciation to create a very distorted image. However, in these three nations, an almost exclusive preoccupation with Japan as an economic threat is giving way, at varying speeds, to a new attitude which seeks to learn from Japan.

2. While there are an increasing number of influential Europeans willing to accept Japan as an economic equal and ready to benefit from its industrial and technological know-how, there is precious little recognition of the fact that Japan is a stable democracy which shares with Western Europe and the United States a genuine commitment to the preservation of free institutions. Europe's political leadership is not yet genuinely convinced of the need to include Japan in major gatherings of the Western alliance, particularly when they are political rather than economic in nature. In Europe's eyes, Japan is not yet a full-fledged member of the alliance.

DECLASSIFIED

3. Japanese attitudes towards Europeans in recent years have not helped to strengthen trilateralist sentiment in Europe. They have tended to dismiss the nations of Western Europe, with the possible exception of the FRG, as societies in an irreversible decline, sapped of their strength by the loss of colonial empire abroad and the work ethic at home. The Japanese display little interest in or understanding of the regenerative possibilities of the idea of a united democratic Europe, as represented not only by the EEC but also by the political and ideological aspects of the NATO alliance. Just as many Europeans are intrigued only by what is exotic and different in Japan, so Japanese are mesmerized by Europe's past and tend to neglect its potential future importance.

4. Nevertheless, contrary to the assertions of some Europeans (particularly in France), trilateralism is gradually gaining some acceptance there. Summitry has made trilateralism somewhat respectable to European Governments, if not particularly welcome. The Trilateral Commission and such organizational spinoffs as the Hakone Conferences of Europeans and Japanese have a demonstrable appeal to a new generation of European technocrats and foreign policy analysts. What may have been originally a made-in-America concept has attracted a steadily growing group of European disciples. Europe is beginning to take Japan seriously.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Obviously, the era when America alone could forge an alliance is long over. Europeans will have to undertake most of their voyage of discovery of Japan on their own. Yet we can still play a role in helping to heighten European recognition of the vital importance of Japanese membership in the alliance:

1. The U.S. Government must continue to adhere to its recent practice of including Japan in all consultations undertaken with our European allies, even if at first glance the issue does not appear directly relevant to the Japanese. If we talk to the UK, France, or the FRG about SALT negotiations, nuclear proliferation, energy development or initiatives on Africa in the United Nations, we should do so with Japan as well. This should help to counteract lingering suspicions in both Europe and Japan that the U.S. still sets greater store by the Atlantic alliance and only gives lip service to trilateralism.

2. The U.S. Government should never again agree to any European proposal for meetings or consultations which result in the exclusion of Japan. The failure to invite Japan to Guadeloupe has not only made it harder to obtain Japanese cooperation on such specific projects as Turkist aid. It has had the much more serious effect of strengthening

the influence of those Japanese, to be found in increasing numbers in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy and the media, who insist that racial prejudice in the United States and Europe make it impossible for the Western democracies to accept Japan as an equal and who urge Japan to look for its future elsewhere. If we are not careful, Neo-Confucianism could become something other than the idle speculation of some European and Japanese intellectuals. Western interests would not be served if Japan were to move away from the alliance of democracies.

3. There are some small steps that the Department of State and the International Communication Agency could take to facilitate European acceptance of the trilateral relationship:

a. propose the establishment of annual joint meetings of the planning staffs from the foreign ministries of the seven nations attending the Summit.

b. include Japan as an agenda item or topic of discussion in all regular ministerial consultations we hold with our European allies.

c. continue the useful trilateral journalists conferences held under ICA auspices and consider broadening them by including Japanese media representatives stationed in Europe and European free lance writers and scholars of international affairs.

d. station Foreign Service Officers with a background in Japanese affairs in our embassies in major European capitals as well as our missions to EEC, NATO and OECD.

e. invite European foreign ministries with no regular training programs of their own in Japanese to utilize the Foreign Service Institute's Yokohama Language School (which already admits Australian, Canadian and New Zealand diplomats).

4. Most important of all, U.S. leaders, beginning with the President and Secretary of State, should reaffirm continually in their foreign policy utterances a special bond between the U.S. and other industrialized democracies. The trauma of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have helped to reawaken the American people to the need for a firm alliance of the democracies. In recent years, fascination with detente, a rediscovery of the PRC and an unnecessarily guilty conscience towards the Third and Fourth World caused us to neglect the alliance. Now as detente dims and international tensions increase, differences between us and our allies over specific policy measures and recriminations over consultations or the lack thereof may lead us to overlook the fundamental truth of the alliance. In an increasingly hostile international environment, the democracies must reaffirm their commitment to defend together

those values which they have contributed to the world. That is the true raison d'être of trilateralism.

###

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX

DECLASSIFIED

Individuals interviewed in connection with this project were:

Wolfgang Abel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Foreign Economic and Trade Policy, FRG Ministry of Economics, Bonn

Peter Ainsworth, Private Secretary to Sir John Stewart-Clark, British Conservative Party member of European Parliament, London

Raymond Aron, political philosopher; columnist, Le Figaro, Paris

Siegfried Bangert, Director, International Division, Friedrich Ebert Institute, Bonn

Wolfgang Bente, Director, East Asian Affairs, FRG Foreign Ministry, Bonn

Juan Cassiers, Director, Asian Affairs, Belgian Foreign Ministry, Brussels

Jean Luc Domenach, Planning Staff, French Foreign Ministry, Paris

Peter Dryer, EEC Correspondent, Journal of Commerce, Brussels

Paul Fabra, Financial Editor, Le Monde, Paris

George Franklin, Coordinator, Trilateral Commission, New York

James Gass, Director, Manpower and Social Affairs, OECD Secretariat, Paris

William Grewe, former FRG Ambassador to Japan and the United States, Bonn

Masamichi Hanabusa, Counsellor, Japanese Embassy, London

Michael Hardy, Chief, Japan, Australia and New Zealand Division, Directorate General for External Relations, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels

Wilfried Hoffman, Director of NATO Affairs, FRG Foreign Ministry, Bonn

Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, British Atlantic Committee, London

Pierre Hassner, Professor, Institute of Political Science, University of Paris

DECLASSIFIED

Martin Hillenbrand, Director General, Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, Paris

Hisanori Isomura, Chief, European Bureau, Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), Paris

Stewart Jack, Officer-in-Charge of Japanese Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

Tomohiko Kobayashi,Japanese diplomat now serving as Special Counsellor to the Secretary General, OECD, Paris

Flora Lewis, Chief, Paris Bureau, New York Times

Roderick Macfarquhar, former Labor Party Member of British Parliament, London

Norman Macrae, Deputy Editor, The Economist, London

Jacques Machizaud, Chairman of the Board, Roussel Uclaf Pharmaceuticals; Chairman, Committee on Japan, French National Association of Employers, Paris

Christopher Makins, former Research Fellow, Carnegie Endowment

Heinz Markman, Director of Economic and Social Policy, German Trade Union Federation, (DGB), Duesseldorf

David MacEachron, President, Japan Society, New York

Benedict Meynell, Director of U.S., Japan and Australia-New Zealand Affairs, Directorate General for External Relations, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels

Steven Milligan, EEC Correspondent, The Economist, Brussels

Francois Missoffe, former French Ambassador to Japan, Paris

Michio Morishima, Professor, London School of Economics, London

Masahiro Nishibori, Japanese Permanent Representative to the United Nations; former Japanese Ambassador to the European Communities

Philippe Petit, Planning Staff, French Foreign Ministry, Paris

Hans Pleuger, Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, FRG Foreign Ministry, Bonn

Konrad Porzner, Parliamentary Whip, Social Democratic Party (SPD), Bonn

DECLASSIFIED

Jean Pierre Rampelbergh, Deputy General Manager, International Division, Societe Generale de Banque, Brussels

Kunihiko Saito, Minister Counsellor, Japanese Mission to the European Communities, Brussels

Christian Sautter, Associate Director, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales, Paris

Francios Sauzey, Editor, *Trialogue*, Trilateral Commission, New York

J. Robert Schaetzel, former U.S. Ambassador to the European Communities, Washington

Juergen Schlueter, Brigadier General, FRG Ministry of Defense, Bonn

Sir Andrew Shonfield, Professor of Economics, European University Institute, Florence

Nicholas Spreckley, European Integration Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

Mike Thomas, Member of Parliament (Labor-Newcastle), London

Phillip Trezise, former U.S. Ambassador to the OECD; Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington

Martine Trink, European Secretary, Trilateral Commission, Paris

John Vanderveken, Assistant General Secretary, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Brussels

Alain Vernay, Deputy Editor in Chief, *Le Figaro*, Paris

Manfred Wegner, Chief Advisor, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels

Bunroku Yoshino, Japanese Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED