

781

145

# JAPAN'S EVOLVING DEFENSE CONCEPTS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/SEC/ASB

( ) CLASSIFIED AS \_\_\_\_\_  
 ( ) UNCLASSIFIED  
 ( ) CONFIDENTIAL  
 ( ) SECRET


AUTHORITY TO: \_\_\_\_\_  
 DATE: 8/21/81

( ) CLASSIFIED AS \_\_\_\_\_  
 ( ) DOWNGRADE IS TO ( ) S or ( ) C, OADR

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION

**EXECUTIVE SEMINAR IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



1978-79

THIS IS AN EDUCATIONAL EXERCISE AND DOES NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWPOINT OF THE EXECUTIVE SEMINAR IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

03150700

037120A 1930

0507 021110

# JAPAN'S EVOLVING DEFENSE CONCEPTS


A Case Study by MARTIN PACKMAN



TWENTY-FIRST SESSION

EXECUTIVE SEMINAR IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



1978-79

THIS IS AN EDUCATIONAL EXERCISE AND DOES NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWPOINT OF THE EXECUTIVE SEMINAR IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

031507030

037122A.030

4 1195  
copy

037122A.030

-i-

JAPAN'S EVOLVING DEFENSE CONCEPTS

by

Martin Packman

Summary

Questions about the proper size and nature of Japan's defense program, debated for decades, have newly engaged both Japanese and non-Japanese defense experts.

- Some observers profess to see in the renewed discussions and in the remarks of certain public figures the signs of a "resurgence of militarism."
- Most experts maintain that these developments merely reflect the Japanese public's acceptance at long last of the Self-Defense Forces. They contend that Japan is unlikely to do more than slightly increase defense spending and make qualitative improvements.
- This writer, though satisfied that there is no "resurgence of militarism," is persuaded, nevertheless, that domestic and international pressures will lead Japan by the mid-1980s to double its defense budget, acquire new weapons systems (but not nuclear arms), and broaden the missions of its naval and air forces.

The most significant of these pressures are:

- The swing toward right-wing nationalism. More and more people, especially among those born since the war, are raising questions about the adequacy of the Self-Defense Forces.
- Increasing Japanese resentment over continued US criticism, e.g., that Japan has been getting a "free ride," spending less than 1 percent of GNP on defense while NATO members spend 4-5 percent; that it has failed to reduce its large trade surplus.
- The growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the face of the declining US military presence in East Asia, a concern heightened by the specter of Soviet bases in Vietnam.
- Most important of all, the Japanese belief that the US is "withdrawing from Asia" and that Japan may be unable to depend on the US security guarantee. This fear was reinforced by the planned US withdrawal of its ground forces from South Korea and persists despite repeated US denials.

Executive Seminar in  
National and International Affairs  
April 1978

031557130

037129A.1930

DEC 21 1960

TABLE OF CONTENTS  
DECLASSIFIED

	<u>Page</u>
Introduction	1
I. Evolution of Japan's Military Forces	3
A. From the "Peace" Constitution to the Korean War	3
B. Between the 1952 and the 1960 Treaties	3
C. From Buildup in the 1960s to the Present	4
II. Pressures for Expansion of Defense Forces	7
A. Perception of US "Withdrawal From Asia"	7
B. Growth of Soviet Military Presence in East Asia	7
C. Industry Pressure for More Defense Business	8
D. Growing Nationalist Sentiment	9
E. The China Factor	10
F. Conflicting Advice From US Sources	10
III. Likely Reactions of Japan's Neighbors to Defense Buildup	12
A. Soviet Union	12
B. China	12
C. South Korea	13
D. Southeast Asia	14
IV. What Will Japan Do?	15
A. "Going Nuclear"	15
B. Adherence to Present Course	16
C. Significant Expansion	17
V. Conclusion	20
Appendix (Tables)	22
Footnotes	25
Bibliography	29

DECLASSIFIED

031712291034

031712291034



## INTRODUCTION

For more than a year, Japanese journalists, academicians, and "defense intellectuals" (as well, of course, as government officials) have been examining a few what the proper size, nature, and role of the Self-Defense Forces should be. These discussions have appeared in both the mass media and in scholarly journals. Moreover, the subject has engaged non-Japanese as well as Japanese writers.

What are the reasons for this development? Does it portend changes in Japan's defense posture?

Some Western commentators have suggested that there are signs of a resurgence of militarism in Japan. A headline in the London Economist last July claimed that Japan was "starting to rearm."<sup>1/</sup> And a Los Angeles Times correspondent reported in March 1979 that the fear of Soviet strength was creating acceptance in Japan of "a quantum leap" in its military spending.<sup>2/</sup>

Other (mainly Japanese) commentators have maintained that the increased discussion of military affairs reflects merely the Japanese public's acceptance -- at long last -- of the necessity of having armed forces. Takuya Kubo, a prominent "defense intellectual" who until recently was Secretary General of the National Defense Council, has said:

"...public defense consciousness...is undoubtedly changing.... [But] this...[reflects] an understanding of the present requirement for the Japan-US security treaty and the Self-Defense Forces and does not indicate any approval for further large reinforcement of domestic defense strength."<sup>3/</sup>

One of the most respected Japanese defense commentators, Tomohisa Sakanaka of the Asahi Shimbun, has listed three reasons for the increased attention to defense matters:

- the change in the international environment surrounding Japan (the collapse of South Vietnam, the planned withdrawal of US ground forces from South Korea, and the buildup of the Soviet Pacific Fleet);
- the rise in the Japanese public's support for defense, which led the government and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to take a more positive attitude toward defense;<sup>4/</sup>
- the mounting inclination by Japanese businessmen to meet the criticism in the US and Western Europe that Japan was not making its due contribution to the maintenance of international peace.<sup>5/</sup>

Until last year, there was a kind of public taboo against discussing defense openly and directly. But in January 1978 Prime Minister Fukuda devoted a section of his policy statement to the Diet to defense affairs. This was the first time that any Prime Minister had done so in the post-war period.

Many articles and roundtable discussions followed, but the debate proceeded fairly calmly until last July, when the civilian Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency (in effect, the Minister of Defense), Shin Kanemaru, abruptly dismissed the Chairman of the Joint

Staff Council, General Hiroomi Kurisu (roughly, the counterpart of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US). Kurisu had told a questioner at a press conference a few days earlier that, inasmuch as only the Prime Minister can order the Self-Defense Forces into action, if there were a surprise attack on Japan, military commanders might have to take "supra-legal" actions so that the country could survive.

Prime Minister Fukuda quickly ordered the Defense Agency to undertake a study of legislation and measures for coping with an emergency.<sup>6/</sup> Prime Minister Ohira, who succeeded Fukuda late in the year, told a press conference early in December that he felt the government could cope with an emergency under the present arrangement, but he took note of the Defense Agency's studies.

Kurisu had a history of making provocative remarks. In October 1977, when he was designated as Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, he said that the incumbent of that position should require the "attestation of the Emperor" and that, furthermore, he expected to report periodically to the Prime Minister. These views violated the postwar traditions that the Emperor did not command the military and that the top military leaders reported to the civilian Director of the Defense Agency. In January 1978, Kurisu wrote in a magazine article that it was impossible to deal with offensive operations by defensive means alone (the Self-Defense Forces, as their name implies, have been committed to a defense-only doctrine).

Kurisu's dismissal caused fewer repercussions than might have been expected. Yet the questions that this episode helped to raise persist: Will the role of the Japanese armed forces be changed? In seeking the answers to this question, it is useful, first, to trace the evolution of the forces since World War II and to note the ways in which the Japanese Government has imposed constraints on them but also has retained the capacity to expand them and re-interpret their mission.

DECLASSIFIED

I. EVOLUTION OF JAPAN'S MILITARY FORCES<sup>7/</sup>

A. From the "Peace" Constitution to the Korean War

"In order to avoid any recurrence of the ravages of war," states the 1978 Japanese Defense White Paper, "Japan has made consistent efforts since the end of World War II to establish itself as a peace-loving nation."<sup>8/</sup> That consideration, in one formulation or another, has remained paramount in all official Japanese pronouncements since it was first set forth in the oft-quoted Article 9 of the "Peace" Constitution, which was promulgated in November 1946 and became effective in May 1947. Article 9 states:

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

"In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

Despite the seemingly exclusive language of this Article, successive Japanese Governments have interpreted it (with US encouragement or acquiescence) as permitting military forces of a defensive nature. This interpretation has repeatedly been challenged by various opposition elements, who have argued that the Self-Defense Forces are unconstitutional, but the Japanese courts have upheld the government.<sup>9/</sup>

Until the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950, the Japanese Government did nothing to move toward the establishment of even self-defense forces.<sup>10/</sup> When North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, most of the US forces stationed in Japan were sent to Korea, and Japan's internal security was thereby weakened. Consequently, General MacArthur "authorized" ("instructed") the Japanese Government to establish a 75,000-man National Police Reserve to deal with possible internal disorders.

B. Between the 1952 and the 1960 Treaties

During negotiations in 1951 for the US-Japan security treaty, Special Ambassador John Foster Dulles reportedly urged that the National Police Reserve be expanded to 350,000 men. Prime Minister Yoshida refused to go along, and General MacArthur sided with him. Later, however, the US-Japan peace and security treaties (signed in September 1951, effective in April 1952), moved Japan another step toward rearmament.

The peace treaty reconciled Article 9 of the Constitution (which renounced armed forces) with the security treaty (which provided a rationale for Japan's establishing armed forces for its self-defense).<sup>11/</sup>

--The preamble to the peace treaty referred to the UN Charter, which recognizes every nation's inherent right to individual and collective self-defense.

--The preamble to the security treaty took note of that reference and went on to state that the US was willing to maintain armed

forces in Japan "...in the expectation...that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter."

After the peace and security treaties went into force, the National Police Reserve was expanded to about 100,000 men and renamed the National Safety Force; a Maritime Safety Force of about 9,000 men was established; and both the new forces were put under the National Safety Agency. The Agency's mission, going beyond that of the Police Reserve, was to "preserve the peace and order of the nation and protect lives and property." During the next year or so, elements of the two new forces gradually replaced US units defending Hokkaido. Thus, they not only carried out internal security duties but also participated in external defense functions.

In 1954, Japan's military forces were again reorganized and enlarged. (Table 1 in the Appendix shows the growth in the authorized and actual strength of the Self-Defense Forces.) The Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law created the Defense Agency (headed by a civilian Minister of State called Director General), which controlled and administered three Self-Defense Forces -- Ground, Maritime, and Air. The mission of these forces, according to the 1954 laws, was "to defend Japan against direct and indirect aggression, and when necessary, to maintain public order." This was the government's "first official acknowledgement of its responsibility for Japan's external defense."<sup>12/</sup>

The Hatoyama government (1954-56), which succeeded Yoshida's administration, wanted to replace the 1951 security treaty with a more explicit agreement. With US forces in Japan being reduced, Secretary of State Dulles insisted that Japan needed ground forces of about 200,000 men so as to be able to defend itself against a Soviet invasion, but the Japanese balked. By 1957, almost all US combat infantry units had been withdrawn from Japan. The three Self-Defense Forces totaled more than 200,000 men, but they were still primarily internal security forces and were not able to assure the external defense of Japan.

In 1957, also, the National Defense Council (roughly the counterpart of the US National Security Council) issued "Basic Policies for National Defense." It called for dealing with external aggression "on the basis of the Japan-US security arrangements but also for developing "progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense." Shortly afterward, the government announced the first of what were to be four Defense Buildup Plans; it proposed rapid expansion of the ground forces to cope with the reductions in US ground forces in Japan.

Negotiations for a new mutual security treaty continued through 1958-59, and were finally concluded in 1960. Under it, Japan obtained a formal US commitment to be defended against external attack, and it took on the obligation to defend itself against external attack not outside Japan.<sup>13/</sup>

#### C. From Buildup in the 1960s to the Present

Under Prime Minister Ikeda (1960-64), the Self-Defense Forces were gradually improved. The Second Defense Buildup Plan, in July 1961, aimed at strengthening Japan's defenses to the point where they could meet

conventional aggression of a scale no greater than localized conflict, i.e., before US aid arrived.

The Third Defense Buildup Plan, announced in March 1967 by the Sato government (1964-70), repeated this aim and added one word to it: "establishing an efficient defensive system capable of dealing most effectively with aggression on a scale not greater than localized conventional warfare." It emphasized the strengthening of naval and air defense capabilities, a reflection of concern over the growing Soviet naval presence in the area. This plan, according to one Japanese scholar, represented Japan's "first effort to provide for its own defense -- an attempt prompted by both Japan's desire to lessen its heavy dependency on the US except in the area of nuclear deterrence, and increasing American pressure on Japan to provide more self-help."<sup>14/</sup>

Japan's first Defense White Paper, issued in October 1970, was prompted in part by the announcement the preceding year of the Nixon (Guam) Doctrine. The White Paper was notable mainly for its enunciation of the concepts of "autonomous defense" and "defense strictly and exclusively for defense."

--Autonomous defense meant that "each one of the people has the spirit of independence (i.e., patriotism), and that the defense of the nation will be carried out primarily by themselves." Japan would cope with aggression "primarily...by its own power..." but autonomous defense did not necessarily mean "single-handed defense"; a collective security system (i.e., the US-Japan mutual security treaty) was also noted as "one form of autonomous defense."

--Defense strictly and exclusively for defense meant "abiding strictly by the Constitution." In the case of aggression against it, Japan would "abide thoroughly by a strategic defensive position." Japan's goal was limited to "conventional weapons, capable of coping effectively with limited wars." Japan could not possess long-range bombers, offensive aircraft carriers, and ICBMs. It was adopting "the three non-nuclear principles" (not manufacturing, not having, and not permitting the entry of nuclear weapons). At the same time, possession of small-size nuclear weapons would be constitutional if they were required for self-defense, but the government would not have them even if they were legal.<sup>15/</sup>

The Fourth Defense Buildup Plan, finally approved in October 1972 after several scaling-down revisions, was basically a follow-on to the third and stressed the continued modernization or replacement of outmoded equipment. Through these four plans, the authorized strength of the Ground Self-Defense Forces was increased from 170,000 to 180,000 men and the number of major naval vessels from 61 to 75.

Japan's second Defense White Paper, issued in June 1976, took note of the 1973 Mideast war, the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, and the different Soviet and American interpretations of detente. It stressed anew the importance of collective security but used the occasion to emphasize the importance of individual nations defending themselves with their own resources. What Japan needed after the end of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan, the 1976 White Paper concluded, was a "Standard Defense Force."

011507100

In October 1976, the government adopted the National Defense Program Outline, which was designed to set "fundamental guidelines for Japan's defense posture in the future" and to develop the concept of a Standard Defense Force. That Force was to be able, i.e.:

- to maintain an adequate surveillance posture;
- to cope with domestic insurgency;
- to respond to cases of direct aggression in accordance with the scope of the aggression;
- to rebuff cases of limited and small-scale aggression, in principle without external assistance.

The third Defense White Paper, issued in July 1977, elaborated the Standard Defense Force concept by pointing out that the resultant defense posture "should be capable of adapting smoothly to meet any serious changes in the situation around Japan which might require such adaptation." The necessity for this ambitious and seemingly all-encompassing formulation was attributed to changes in the international situation -- specifically to "a marked expansion of Soviet forces" over the past decade "in striking contrast to a quantitative decline in the previously overwhelming American posture"; the post-Vietnam reduction in US military strength in East Asia; and the announcement of the US intention to withdraw ground forces from South Korea.

The 1978 Defense White Paper, released last July, again confirmed the policy of strengthening Japan's defense in accordance with the National Defense Program Outline of 1976. The White Paper stressed "the unignorable factor" of increased Soviet naval power in the Far East and noted that "against this background, the level of American forces stationed in the Western Pacific has continued to decrease...." It showed sensitivity about Japan's dependence on imported resources and on the oft-criticized lack of clarity in the mission of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces: It stated that the Seventh Fleet does "not have sufficient capability to protect merchant shipping and therefore will have difficulty in completely fulfilling its assigned mission of maintaining sea lanes in the face of Soviet attempts to sever such lanes."

DECLASSIFIED

## II. PRESSURES FOR EXPANSION OF DEFENSE FORCES

### A. Perception of US "Withdrawal From Asia"

"Some Japanese, including some government officials, are concerned that the United States appears to be engaged in a strategic withdrawal from Asia." That was one of the key conclusions of the Senate Armed Services Committee's Pacific Study Group, headed by Senator Nunn (D.-Ga.), which visited Japan in January to evaluate the US-Japan security relationship. Prime Minister Ohira recently acknowledged that "some experts" believed that the US was "turning away" from Asia or "may do so." He tried to counter this belief by saying that the US was actually improving its defense capabilities in the Western Pacific.<sup>17/</sup>

A related concern was reflected in the finding of a public opinion poll last October that 56 percent of the Japanese questioned thought that the US would not make a serious effort to come to their defense in case of an emergency -- up from 38 percent in April 1978. The prestigious business newspaper Nihon Keizai, in an editorial on July 29, 1978, the day after the latest Defense White Paper had been issued, observed that "what the Japanese most strongly want to know...is... 'whether the US forces are truly willing and able to come to the aid of Japan, without delay, in time of emergency.'"

Concern over US disengagement from Asia and the concomitant decline in the credibility of the US security guarantee began as long ago as the announcement of the Nixon (Guam) Doctrine in 1969. But these qualms became more concrete with the withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam in 1973 and the collapse of the Saigon government in 1975. Many Japanese doubted that after Vietnam the US would ever again send troops to support another country.

These concerns were fed further by the announcements in 1976 by candidate Carter and in 1977 by President Carter that the US planned to withdraw its ground forces from South Korea. According to one Japanese writer, that created "a shock wave in Japan's foreign policy and defense circles."<sup>18/</sup> The US decision on troop withdrawal from South Korea (despite the subsequent US announcements of, first, a slowdown and, then, a suspension) was cited by every government official and non-governmental expert whom I interviewed during a visit to Japan in March 1979.

### B. Growth of Soviet Military Presence in East Asia

Also contributing heavily to Japanese anxiety is the visibly growing Soviet military presence in the area. The then Director General of the Defense Agency, Shin Kanemaru, told a group of Japanese businessmen last May that Soviet warships "throng the Sea of Japan as if it were a Soviet sea... [and] Soviet submarines openly sail near Japan's offshore areas...."<sup>19/</sup> Prime Minister Ohira recently told a US correspondent that he was disturbed by the USSR's "energetic buildup" in the Far East; he mentioned such activities as the Soviet Pacific Fleet's use of ports at Cam Ranh Bay, Haiphong, and Danang.<sup>20/</sup> Japanese neuralgia was twinged in March by the news that the Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk was apparently on its way to join that fleet.

The 1978 Defense White Paper noted that each year about 300 Soviet warships pass through the three main Japanese straits. It pointed out that the Soviet Pacific Fleet comprises about 725 ships totaling

1,330,000 tons while the US Seventh Fleet has only 55 ships totaling 600,000 tons (it noted that these numbers were not the only criteria for comparison). Defense Agency analysts were said to have concluded last May that Japan could no longer depend on the Seventh Fleet because the US had reportedly decided to move part of it to the Atlantic in the event of a war in Europe.<sup>21/</sup>

The White Paper also noted that Soviet aircraft approach Japan around 200 times each year. Japanese unease over the increasingly visible Soviet military strength and the country's vulnerability was intensified in September 1976, when a defecting Soviet pilot flew his MiG-25 fighter under the Japanese radar screen and landed at Hokkaido airport before Japanese fighters were able to find it.

Another Soviet activity that concerned (and infuriated) Japan was the USSR's deployment last year of ground forces on two of the four disputed islands off Hokkaido. Japan claims these four islands as its Northern Territories, but the Soviet Union, which seized them at the end of World War II, has refused to return them. The Japanese had originally thought that Soviet forces were only holding a military exercise on the islands. Defense Agency officials now believe, however, that the Soviets were still building installations on them as recently as March and intend to maintain a permanent presence there.

#### C. Industry Pressure for More Defense Business

Some industry spokesmen, especially those representing distressed industries, such as shipbuilding, have urged that defense spending should be increased. According to one academic critic, "it would appear" that the powerful Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) has "reached a consensus on the desirability of expanding Japan's defense industries."<sup>22/</sup>

Another writer has asserted that demands are being made to relax the nearly all-encompassing restrictions on arms exports.<sup>23/</sup> The "three principles" on weapons exports -- none to Communist states, to countries where such exports are prohibited by UN resolution, and to nations involved or feared to be involved in international conflicts -- were strengthened a few years ago to prohibit arms exports even to areas other than those originally specified.

Two cases are often cited as evidence that the ban on arms exports has already been breached -- the sale of a drydock to the Soviet Union and of hand grenades to the Philippines.

--The drydock was delivered last September -- over the protests of the US -- on the ground that it was not necessarily a military item even though admittedly it was large enough to accommodate the new Soviet aircraft carriers. There were also indications that the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, which issues the licenses for arms exports, had failed to coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency.

--News reports about the sales of grenades to the Philippines were in error. In September 1978, on the complaint of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the police arrested a small-scale entrepreneur for illegally shipping hand grenade fuses to the Philippines.



In March 1978, the president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Shigeo Nagano, called on the government to relax the export ban in order to help counteract the slump in shipbuilding. He urged approval of the export of such vessels as oil tankers and survey ships, which need not necessarily be considered weapons.

Some observers see China as a new export market. There have been reports that Beijing wants to buy tanks, missiles, and radar. A Japanese defense industry team went to China last year, and a high-ranking Chinese military delegation visited Japan.

#### D. Growing Nationalist Sentiment

To judge from numerous articles in Japanese publications over the past year and from my interviews with Japanese defense experts this spring, there is a swing toward conservatism and nationalism in Japan, and on defense questions in particular.

On March 13, 1978, the Asahi Shimbun, the world's largest newspaper, began a 13-part series on defense entitled "Slowly Turning to the Right -- Japan's Direction -- Are Defense Discussions All Right?" In the first article, the paper commented:

"The arguments of the hawk faction on defense are suddenly coming to carry weight. The 'limits of self-defense power' under the Constitution are gradually being expanded by the government.... One feels that the stage is slowly turning to the right...."

The article went on to quote a comment by a former head of the Defense Agency, Michita Sakata: "Nationalism and state awareness are emerging, and the national defense allergy is weakening."

Two of the most recent manifestations of nationalism reported by the press were the following:

--Former Supreme Court Justice Kazuto Ishida, speaking at the National Defense Academy commencement on March 18 said that the 1882 imperial rescript for military servicement, which served as the spiritual cornerstone of the armed forces until the end of World War II, "should not be discarded even if times have changed."

--The Asahi newspapers revealed on April 19 that the 14 most prominent Japanese war criminals had been secretly enshrined last October in Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine, the country's major Shinto war memorial.

Neither the quotations from the Asahi Shimbun of a year ago nor the more recent incidents should be construed as indications of a resurgence of nationalism of the prewar strain; no one is suggesting that the situation is remotely like that of the 1930s. It seems fair to say, however, that more than three decades after the end of World War II a reassertion of nationalistic spirit is evident.

Many foreign observers have long wondered: How long can Japan, an economic giant, remain a military dwarf? Former Secretary Kissinger reportedly once told a Japanese journalist that it was inconceivable that

a country like Japan would be content to play such a small role in its own defense.

Most observers disagree about the causes of this re-emerging nationalism. They tend to agree, however, on the influence of generational changes. Half the population of Japan today was born after World War II and has no personal experience of the war or the occupation. This generation does not have the allergy to military matters that its predecessors do. The younger generation, some of whom are now in junior professional positions in journalism, business, and government, is far less likely than was its predecessors to accept without questioning the adequacy of present arrangements and far more prone to ask such questions as:

- Why can't Japan be more like China, which has nuclear weapons?
- Is the old concept of "no retaliation" still valid?
- Why is it only Japan that does not export weapons?
- Why doesn't our country stand up to the Soviets in fisheries negotiations?

There are other reasons why those Japanese leaders who favor the strengthening of Japan's posture might feel that the time is propitious to push their views. There has never been a time when public acceptance of the Self-Defense Forces was as great as it is now; as of last December 86 percent of those polled said that they believe that the SDF should be maintained.<sup>24/</sup>

Another manifestation of propitiousness is the fact that several of the opposition parties, which used to act as a brake on some of the government's inclinations in the defense field, have recently caved.

- The Democratic Socialists and the New Liberal Club now virtually agree with the government's defense policy.
- The chairman of the Komeito (Clean Government) Party, the largest opposition party, in a statement in January 1978, in effect accorded recognition to the SDF.
- The Socialist Party, highly friendly to China, has fallen silent since the PRC invaded Vietnam.

#### E. The China Factor

Another factor that may influence Japanese deliberations about future defense policy is the change in China's attitude toward US-Japan relations -- from criticizing Japan for being an ally of the US to encouraging Tokyo to strengthen its ties with Washington. (At one time, Japan had considered China a threat and feared getting entangled in a US-China confrontation; Tokyo re-established diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1972.) (For further details, see below, under "Likely Reactions of Japan's Neighbors to Defense Buildup.")

#### F. Conflicting Advice From US Sources

Still another factor encouraging the Japanese to consider expanding their armed forces is the fact that -- in the words of the Pacific Study Group's report -- "our government...has spoken with many voices on the

issue."<sup>25/</sup> Government officials and journalists interviewed in March 1979 pointed out that some Senators, Congressmen, lecturers, and writers have prodded Japan to build up its forces.<sup>26/</sup> That is not the official US position, but some Japanese are confused and others apparently believe that the "real" US position is the unofficial one.

03:15:08:03

III. LIKELY REACTIONS OF JAPAN'S NEIGHBORS TO DEFENSE BUILDUP

A. Soviet Union

Relations between Japan and the USSR are currently strained. The Soviets refuse to return the Northern Territories, and, as noted earlier, are apparently building installations on two of the islands. Moscow tried, but failed, last year to discourage Japan from concluding a peace and friendship treaty with China that contained the Soviet-hated anti-hegemony clause.

The USSR opposes the US-Japan mutual security treaty, has long harangued against alleged signs of "resurgent militarism" in Japan, and would be angered and alarmed at indications that the Japanese were significantly expanding the Self-Defense Forces. Even a casual sampling of articles in Pravda and Izvestiya last year shows the Soviet neuralgia on this point.

--An article in Pravda on February 1, 1978, noted the Japanese decision to buy F-15s and P-3Cs. It charged that "military circles" were attempting to expand their influence and arms manufacturers were "pushing the Japanese Government onto the dangerous path of militarization."

--A commentary by Yuriy Zhukov in the March 31 Pravda castigated Prime Minister Fukuda and other government officials for having said in the Diet that "possession of low-yield, defensive nuclear weapons was not prohibited by the Constitution." Zhukov suggested that these statements were trial balloons.

--Further charges about the "'constitutionality'" of nuclear weapons were contained in a despatch from Tokyo in the June 20 Izvestiya, which asserted that General Kurisu had advocated acquiring "several of our own nuclear warheads."

When Kurisu was dismissed in late July, Pravda went all out. It called him "an ardent champion of militarization," alleged that he had been dismissed to "camouflage" a "rapid increase in military preparations," and concluded that Japan was following "the dangerous road of the arms race and militarization" in contravention of Article 9 of its Constitution.

B. China

The PRC for years vilified Japan for being an ally of imperialism and castigated the Self-Defense Forces as evidence of resurgent militarism in Japan. As the Soviet threat came to loom larger in China's strategic considerations, Beijing began to express understanding of Japan's military ties with the US -- but privately.

--By 1973, Zhou Enlai reportedly was showing support for the US-Japan mutual security treaty in conversations with foreign visitors.

--By 1975, PRC media were picking up favorable Western press references to the treaty.

DECLASSIFIED

--In the fall of 1976, Chinese cadres told a visiting American delegation that the US should give the US-Japan security relationship top priority in its Asian policy.<sup>27/</sup>

--A year later, a Japanese group visiting China was told that Japan should strengthen its own forces to compensate for any reduction in US capabilities.<sup>28/</sup>

B. 1978, Beijing was publicly supporting the treaty, maintaining that it was essential to protect Japan against Soviet aggression. Last October, when Deng Xiaoping was in Tokyo for the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty, he told Prime Minister Fukuda that he supported the US-Japan mutual security treaty and the buildup of Japan's defenses.<sup>29/</sup> And in January of this year, top Chinese leaders told the visiting Nunn Pacific Study Group that they would welcome an upgrading of Japanese self-defense forces.<sup>30/</sup>

While the strategic reasons for China's favoring strong US-Japan security links and a buildup of the Japanese forces are obvious, the question still arises: wouldn't the PRC be worried that it might once again become the victim of Japanese aggression? One answer to that has been provided by a Japanese officer who served as military attache in Beijing from 1974 to 1977. He told a Japanese newsmen last year:

"High officials of the [PRC] Ministry of Defense state positively that, however much the Self-Defense Forces might be strengthened, they are confident that there would be no aggression against China."<sup>31/</sup>

Despite their enthusiastic endorsements of a Japanese buildup, Chinese officials have rarely been explicit about how they believe those defense forces should be strengthened. However, one PRC official in Hong Kong recently indicated that the Maritime Self-Defense Forces should be improved in order to counter the expansion of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. And he added that Japan should improve its radar and communications capabilities.

### C. South Korea

Koreans have long memories of Japanese domination, and most of them would probably look with disfavor upon a significant expansion of the Japanese military forces. Recent interviews suggest, however, that there may be some ambivalence in those feelings. Some Foreign Ministry officials believe that Japan should be strong in order to counter-balance the buildup of Soviet and North Korean forces. But talk about Japanese forces being strong enough to defend the sea lanes all the way to the Malacca Straits and to give Japan greater political self-confidence -- as some Japanese writers have suggested -- causes worry.

A high-ranking defense official commented that Japan should be strong enough to share the burden of ensuring security, and he believed that it would expand its armed forces eventually. He said that he would be apprehensive, however, if Japan should become militarily strong enough to gain enhanced political self-confidence.

While the South Koreans are concerned about the planned withdrawal of US ground forces, they do not want direct Japanese military assistance. Furthermore, they fear that a Japanese buildup will lessen the United States' reason for remaining in South Korea.

D. Southeast Asia

"The prospect of Japanese rearmament on a significant scale undoubtedly inspires serious doubts and misgivings, not to say anxiety and apprehension, among the peoples of Southeast Asia, who still bear the scars of Japanese aggression, conquest, and occupation during World War II."<sup>32/</sup>

That view, which appeared in a recent issue of a business journal that is published in Manila by a former Philippine diplomat, is undoubtedly widespread in Southeast Asia. A number of leaders there believe that Japan will "rearm." Still, there are differences between -- and even within -- countries.

In the Philippines, a sub-cabinet-level official said recently that in his view Japan should -- and will -- expand its defense capabilities because:

- the flag follows trade, not vice versa;
- Japan has the necessary resources;
- it is the leader in Asia and should assume more of the burden of security.

Other observers -- from academic and business circles -- indicated that they would welcome Japan's "re-arming" because it would then serve as a counter-balance to the Soviet Union.

At the same time, memories of Japanese behavior in World War II cause many Filipinos to worry. Japanese awareness of Southeast Asia's uneasiness prompted Prime Minister Fukuda to say during a visit to Manila in August 1977 that Japan "rejects the role of a military power."<sup>33/</sup>

Some Filipinos have remarked that President Marcos had been able to "forgive and forget" -- a reference to his recent appearance at a memorial service together with the Japanese Ambassador -- and that their countrymen ought to try to emulate him. Others have contended, however, that Marcos strongly dislikes the Japanese.

Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew told reporters in October 1977, "As long as Japan does not go nuclear and...[its] forces operate under the American nuclear umbrella, I am not alarmed."<sup>34/</sup> Malaysia would be fearful about significant Japanese rearmament. Military circles in Thailand would probably approve of Japan's assuming a stronger military role.

In Indonesia the military leaders were trained by the Japanese, admire them, and probably would not be alarmed to see Japan "rearm," but the general populace would most likely feel quite differently. One Indonesian public official has asked:

"When we see Japan's economic presence...steadily expanding and...becoming still more mammoth..., is it not natural for us to think that, in case of emergency, Japan will resort to military power in order to protect its interests?"<sup>35/</sup>

RECEIVED

IV. WHAT WILL JAPAN DO?

Against this background of pressures for, and constraints on, expansion of its defense establishment, Japan could:

- move toward unarmed neutrality;
- "rearm" but opt for neutrality;
- develop nuclear weapons and "go it alone";
- maintain roughly its present course, holding defense spending to 1 percent of GNP (or only slightly more) and continuing to rely on the US security guarantee;
- increase its defense spending to at least 2 percent of GNP and expand its forces but continue to rely on the US security guarantee;
- choose various combinations of certain of the above.

Nearly all students of Japanese military affairs agree that the first two of the listed options -- unarmed and rearmed neutrality -- are highly unlikely. The third option -- development of nuclear weapons -- would be quite feasible for Japan, but most experts doubt that it will choose that course and "go it alone."

The current conventional wisdom is that Japan will most likely pursue the fourth option, perhaps raising its defense outlays from the present 0.9 percent of GNP, but to no more than 1.1 or 1.2 percent, and stressing qualitative rather than quantitative improvements. The origin of the 1-percent-of-GNP ceiling was a decision in November 1976 by the government of Prime Minister Miki to hold defense spending to that level "for the time being." In point of fact, during most of the past two decades the defense budget has never reached 1 percent of GNP but has hovered just below that level (see Appendix, Table 2). At the same time, it should be noted that the Japanese budget figures, unlike those for NATO countries, do not include such items as military pensions and housing. If those were included, current Japanese defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP would amount to about 1.5 percent.

In my view, the odds favor Japan's opting for the fifth course -- at least doubling its defense spending by the mid-1980s and significantly strengthening its defense posture (i.e., acquiring new weapons systems and broadening the missions of its naval and air forces).

Let us examine the major options -- "going nuclear," adhering to the present course, or expanding significantly.

A. "Going Nuclear"

As noted earlier, Japan has long declared its adherence to the so-called three non-nuclear principles -- not manufacturing, not having, and not permitting the entry of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Japan signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 and ratified it in 1976.

Yet, for at least a decade, government spokesmen have stated that nuclear weapons were not forbidden by the Constitution. In 1969, one government official informed the Diet that nuclear weapons would be legal

if they served the purpose of preserving the life and security of the people. And the government's first Defense White Paper, issued in 1970, while reiterating adherence to the three non-nuclear principles, stated:

"If small-size nuclear weapons are within the scale of real power needed for the minimum necessary limit for self-defense, and if they are such as will not be a threat of aggression toward other nations, it is possible to say that possession thereof is possible, in legal theory."

In February 1978, the government indicated during debate in the Diet that tactical nuclear weapons (along with aircraft carriers for anti-submarine use and cruise missiles) could be justified under the Constitution if they were defensive. The government did not say that it intended to have such equipment but indicated rather that it did not want to give replies that would foreclose future options.

Despite this persistent posture of retaining its options, no Japanese Government has moved to "go nuclear," and it is the consensus of knowledgeable observers (both Japanese and American) that Japan is most unlikely to do so for the following reasons:

- A nuclear-armed Japan, like a nuclear-armed Germany, would incur the suspicion and enmity of most of the world. It would especially alarm China and the Soviet Union.
- Acquisition of nuclear weapons would cause serious instability in Japan, where the populace still has a "nuclear allergy."
- There are few suitable targets for the kind of nuclear force that Japan would be most likely to try to develop. They are either too far away or too numerous; while the USSR can attack all of Japan from the Maritime Territory, Japan cannot reach the major population centers of the Soviet Union from any place in the home islands.
- The major purpose of nuclear weapons is generally assumed to be deterrence; the US security guarantee accomplishes that purpose for Japan.
- The high concentration of Japanese population and industries could put a nuclear-armed Japan in an extremely disadvantageous position when facing a hostile nuclear power.

#### B. Adherence to Present Course

Key Japanese Foreign Ministry and Defense Agency officials -- as well as most non-governmental experts -- interviewed in March 1979 believed that there would be no significant change in Japan's defense posture over the next several years.<sup>36/</sup> Nearly all, however, added the caveat, provided that there is no drastic change in the international security environment.

Several government officials expressed the belief that defense spending might rise slightly but would not exceed 1.1 percent of the GNP through the 1980s. They pointed out that, given the vast size of Japan's GNP (more than \$1 trillion in 1978), raising outlays of only, say, 0.2 percent would make available an additional \$2 billion and allow considerable



improvements and sizable purchases; increasing spending more than that, they contended, would result in more equipment than could be absorbed.

Common to many of these judgments was the view expressed by one key official that the Japanese people were very conservative, very status-quo-minded, and very slow to change. (He admitted, however, that the generation born since World War II was beginning to ask questions about defense matters.)

Also underlying these judgments was recognition of the continuing influence of the traditional constraints on expansion of the armed forces: Article 9 of the Constitution; the doctrine of "defense exclusively for defense"; the three non-nuclear principles; the 1-percent-of-GNP ceiling.

Prime Minister Ohira, delivering the commencement address to the National Defense Academy on March 18, 1979, said that Japan should have a "limited but high-quality defense capability" complemented by the Japan-US security treaty. Noting that he favored qualitative improvement, he went on to say that Japan's defensive strength should not be excessive and should not pose any threat to other countries, yet serve as a "true deterrent."<sup>37/</sup>

Even some of the critics who contend that correction of the deficiencies in the Self-Defense Forces is urgent suggest that the necessary improvements can be made without enlarging the forces or increasing the budget. Sakanaka, for example, has written that:

- the ground forces are seriously under-manned and lack sufficient reserves (for authorized and actual strength of Self-Defense Forces, see Appendix, Table 3);
- ammunition and fuel reserves are "very inadequate";
- fighter aircraft do not have a real "immediate response" capability;
- there is a lack of coordination among the three Self-Defense Forces, and they could not cope with a large-scale surprise attack.

He has argued that, inasmuch as the US might not choose to come to Japan's aid, Japan must have "a conventional defense capability which will enable her to repel an invasion unaided...." He has proposed, therefore, that the size of the ground forces be reduced and that the resultant savings be put into improving the air and maritime forces -- e.g., reducing the vulnerability of air search radar sites and enhancing the anti-air capability of naval vessels.<sup>38/</sup>

### C. Significant Expansion

Despite the above-noted indications that the Japanese Government intends to hold defense spending down to 1 percent of GNP, there have been other reports suggesting that change may be in the offing.

- The military affairs critic of the Yomiuri newspaper, Hajime Dohba, wrote in March 1978 that "the argument for a large-scale expansion" of the Self-Defense Forces has "come to gain strength" in some government, financial, and academic circles.<sup>39/</sup>

DISCONTINUED

--The new Director General of the Defense Agency, Ganri Yamashita, told a news conference on December 12, 1978, that 1 percent of GNP was adequate for the present; but he reportedly held out the possibility that that limit might be exceeded in the future.<sup>40/</sup>

--A key foreign affairs official interviewed in March said that he was predicting "no change," but he felt that the situation was highly fluid.

--A senior news executive also interviewed in March said that he did not foresee an immediate change in defense spending but noted that the pressure for change, within limits, was greater than ever before.

Masamichi Inoki, until recently the head of the Japanese National Defense Academy, has suggested that Japan should double its defense spending gradually over the coming decade. That would enable it, he said, to meet its obligations as a responsible member of the Free World.<sup>41/</sup>

Increasing defense outlays would also help Japan to rid itself of the oft-heard criticism that it has been getting a "free ride." Inoki has commented elsewhere that in Europe people say that

"they are supporting the NATO defense force by at least 3 or 4 percent of their GNP while Japan, spending only 0.9 percent of its GNP on defense -- not what an independent country properly should spend -- is encroaching on their markets."<sup>42/</sup>

Other developments that may prepare the way for eventual changes -- both quantitative and qualitative -- in the Japanese defense program are the appearances of numerous articles critical of the alleged inadequacies of the Self-Defense Forces. We have previously noted some of Sakanaka's criticisms. He has also said that, while it is "not necessary for Japan to have great military power," it is important to have enough power to "become self-confident in its diplomatic activities." If Japan had such power, he continued, it could "change its posture toward the Soviet Union in negotiations...started in the event of...such incidents as seizure of Japanese fishing ships...."<sup>43/</sup>

The director of international security studies at the Japanese National Defense College, Makoto Momoi, has written that in order to prevent a potential aggressor from launching a limited attack against Japan, it must be able to deny him access to its air and sea space. That would require, he continued, such assets as precision-guided munitions (PGMs), vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft, and satellite-based intelligence systems. He concluded that such a buildup would be very expensive and implied that it was therefore unlikely.<sup>44/</sup>

The emphasis which such articles -- and the above are but two of many -- put on the shortcomings in Japan's defense posture can hardly help but predispose the public to accept a larger defense budget. The government could begin by raising expenditures to only 1.1 or 1.2 percent. If that proved acceptable to the Diet and the public, the government could -- and probably would -- move on to 2 percent.

Evidence that some government and business circles are anxious to create a more hospitable climate for the discussion of defense matters is provided by the recent establishment of two research institutes.

SECRET

--The Japan Security Research Center, organized in February 1978, is understood to be backed by the Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) and the Nikkeiren (Japanese Federation of Employers' Associations). Some of the figures associated with it are generally considered to be right-wing.

--The Peace and Security Research Institute, founded in October 1978, is headed by Inoki. Funds for this institute are understood to come from three major sources -- from the Defense Agency; from contract research commissioned by the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Agency; and from contributions by industrial and financial circles.

The idea for the Peace and Security Research Institute reportedly originated with a former Director General of the Defense Agency, Michita Sakata, who has long tried to develop a national consensus on defense. It is believed that the work of this Institute will include the preparation of trial balloons and other articles that may represent Defense Agency thinking but from which the Agency may wish to disassociate itself.

0315587030

V. CONCLUSION

The combination of the pressures for the expansion of the Japanese armed forces -- and the likely continuation of the international developments that gave rise to those pressures -- cannot help, in my view, but lead to increases in the Japanese budget and to broadened roles for at least the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces. To re-cap the most important pressures:

- The growth of right-wing sentiment and nationalism in Japan, while not to be equated with "a resurgence of militarism," is, nevertheless, a significant factor in Japan's desire to have a stronger defense capability.
- Related to this sentiment is Japanese resentment over continued US criticism (both official and unofficial) that Japan has been getting a "free ride" in its defense efforts; that it has failed to reduce its large trade surplus; and that it insists on co-production rather than purchase of new arms.
- The growth of the Soviet military presence in East Asia, especially the Soviet Pacific Fleet, in the face of the declining US military presence in the area, is a major factor. Concern over the Soviet buildup has been accentuated by the specter of Soviet bases in Vietnam and the continued Soviet refusal to return the Northern Territories to Japan.
- Most important of all is the growing Japanese belief that the US is "withdrawing from Asia" and that Japan may no longer be able to depend on the US to guarantee its security. This belief persists despite repeated denials by US officials. It was strongly reinforced by the announcement of US plans to withdraw ground forces from South Korea, and it has not been noticeably lessened by the suspension of those withdrawals pending a further US review of North Korean strength. Many knowledgeable Japanese still believe that the US will come to Japan's aid in an emergency, but even some of them fear that it will come only belatedly.

An American professor and expert on Japanese affairs, who recently spent a year in Japan, has written that, as a result of the "widespread doubts" in Japan about the "reliability and credibility" of the American security guarantee, "a developing 'mainstream' of opinion has begun to build a case for an augmented and more self-centered Japanese security posture...." And he concluded: "As a result, it is already a near certainty that over the next three to five years Japan will increase significantly its defense capacity...."<sup>45/</sup>

The report of the Nunn Pacific Study Group took the proposition one step further when it stated:

"If the confidence in the US security commitment continues to erode, it could lead to...a push for an independent, fully rearmed Japan...[and] closer military ties between Japan and... China...[which] could be destabilizing to Asian security."<sup>46/</sup>

DELETED

Early in this decade, one of the most experienced American students of Japanese military affairs, Martin E. Weinstein, wrote that the Japanese Government would be forced to alter its defense policy "only if one major change occurs in the international environment." That change," he said, "would be the perceived loss of the capability or the willingness of the United States to defend Japan." And he continued:

"If, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the United States drastically reduces its military presence in Asia and the Pacific Ocean, or unilaterally and without Japanese cooperation undertakes to restructure its relations with China or the Soviet Union, or pursues a protectionist foreign trade policy that seriously damages Japan's economy, then the conservative [Japanese] leadership will be compelled to either devise a new defense policy, or to make way for fresh leaders who will do so."<sup>47</sup>

There would seem to be little argument that several of the contingencies posited by Weinstein have already occurred.

03 15 58 10 30

APPENDIX

Table I. STRENGTH OF SELF-DEFENSE FORCES (GROUND, MARITIME, AND AIR), 1954-1978 (in thousands)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1954	152	146	Self-Defense Forces established
1955	180	178	
1956	197	188	
1957	214	211	All US ground combat troops withdrawn
1958	222	214	1st buildup plan
1959	231	215	
1960	231	206	Revision of Security Treaty
1961	242	209	
1962	244	216	2nd buildup plan
1963	244	213	
1964	246	216	
1965	246	226	
1966	246	227	
1967	250	231	3rd buildup plan
1968	250	235	
1969	258	236	
1970	259	236	
1971	259	234	
1972	259	233	4th buildup plan
1973	260	233	
1974	260	237	
1975	260	238	
1976	260	233	
1977	266	236	
1978	268	240	

---

Source: Defense White Papers.

DECLASSIFIED

Table 2: JAPAN'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 1954-1978

Fiscal Year (April 1 to March 31)	Defense Expenditures (million US \$)*	GNP (billion US \$)*	Defense Expenditures as % of GNP
1954	375	21.7	1.73
1955	375	24.6	1.52
1956	397	27.6	1.44
1957	399	31.2	1.28
1958	412	32.7	1.26
1959	432	37.8	1.14
1960	444	45.0	0.99
1961	510	55.1	0.92
1962	594	60.2	0.99
1963	688	71.0	0.97
1964	780	82.0	0.95
1965	846	90.7	0.94
1966	959	105.9	0.91
1967	1,075	124.3	0.86
1968	1,172	146.6	0.80
1969	1,375	174.2	0.79
1970	1,640	203.4	0.81
1971	2,252	255.3	0.88
1972	2,601	285.7	0.88
1973	3,118	366.0	0.85
1974	3,643	438.3	0.83
1975	4,424	528.3	0.84
1976	5,041	560.3	0.90
1977	8,453	964.3	0.88
1978	9,505	1,053.0	0.90

\* Conversion: Up to 1970 -- \$1.00 = 360 yen.  
 1970-76 -- \$1.00 = 300 yen.  
 1977-78 -- \$1.00 = 200 yen.

Source: Defense White Papers.

031507030

0750130

Table 3. AUTHORIZED AND ACTUAL STRENGTH OF SELF-DEFENSE FORCES (SDF), MARCH 31, 1978

	<u>Ground SDF</u>	<u>Maritime SDF</u>	<u>Air SDF</u>	<u>Joint Staff Council</u>	<u>Total</u>
Authorized	180,000	42,278	45,492	83	267,853
Actual	155,586	40,527	43,786	83	239,982
Fill ratio (%)	86.4	95.9	96.2	100.0	89.6

---

Source: 1978 Defense White Paper.

0750130



FOOTNOTES

1. "A New Sun Rising," The Economist, July 29, 1978, p. 15.
2. Don Kirk in Los Angeles Times, March 2, 1979.
3. Takuya Kubo, "Security in Northeast Asia," a paper presented to a RAND conference on "East Asian Security in the 1980s," at Santa Monica, California, January 1979.
4. Surveys taken by the Prime Minister's Office and the Defense Agency show that the percentage of respondents who believe that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) should be maintained rose from 73 percent in 1972 to 86 percent in 1978 while the percentage of those who believe that the SDF should be discontinued dropped from 12 percent to 5 percent in the same years. -- Defense Agency, Defense Bulletin, January 1978, p. 25; Japan Times, March 4, 1979.
5. Tomohisa Sakanaka, "A Stab at Defective Points in Japan's Defense Policy," Chuo Koron, October 1978. (This and all subsequently listed Japanese publications were read in translation.)
6. Fukuda had informed a parliamentary committee in March 1978 that he had already instructed the officials concerned to see that legal barriers that might impede the timely deployment of the Self-Defense Forces in an emergency were removed. Defense Agency officials had already been studying the matter.
7. This summary is drawn mainly from the official Japanese Defense White Papers, issued in 1970, 1976, 1977, and 1978; Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968, Columbia University Press, 1971; and Makoto Momoi, "Basic Trends in Japanese Security Policies," in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, University of California Press, 1977.
8. Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1978, July 1978, p. 56. As Kubo has said, "Compared with other peoples, the Japanese are anti-war and pacifist to an almost abnormal degree, stemming from the experience of defeat in World War II and the acceptance of the Peace Constitution." -- "Japanese Defense Policy: Decision Making Process and Background" (manuscript), June 1978, p. 10.
9. In 1959, in the Sunagawa case, the Supreme Court stated: "The peace principle enunciated in Japan's Constitution does not in any way eliminate all defense or resistance.... It is natural that Japan, in executing the powers inherent to a state, take steps that are deemed necessary to the preservation of the peace and security of itself, and to perpetuate its existence."

In 1976, in the Naganuma case, the Sapporo High (Appeals) Court rejected the claim that the Self-Defense Forces were unconstitutional.

In 1977, in the Hyakuri case, which was in litigation for 18 years, the Mito District Court ruled that Japan has an inherent right of self-defense; that Article 9 should not be interpreted to mean that Japan has renounced war even for self-defense; and that Japan's maintenance of appropriate measures required for national self-defense does not violate Article 9.

U.S.S.R.

Summaries of all these cases may be found in Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1978, pp. 183-86.

10. Foreign Minister Ashida had proposed in 1947 that Japan should be permitted to establish police forces in order to deal with possible internal unrest and that Japan and the US should conclude a mutual defense agreement to cope with possible external threats, but his proposals were not taken up. -- Weinstein, op. cit., pp. 21-22, 39-40.
11. See Paul F. Langer and Richard Moorsteen, "The US/Japanese Military Alliance...", RAND Paper P-5393, January 1975, pp. 36-38.
12. Weinstein, op. cit., p. 76.
13. Although scholars consider the 1960 treaty a major diplomatic achievement for Japan, the public did not see it that way. There were protests, strikes, and riots. President Eisenhower had to cancel a scheduled visit to Japan in June 1960, and Prime Minister Kishi eventually had to resign. Some scholars believe that the demonstrations were protests against Kishi's tactics and style, and not against the treaty itself.
14. Momoi, op. cit., p. 354.
15. Defense Agency, Japan's Defense, October 1970, pp. 15-20.
16. Senate Armed Service Committee, "United States-Japan Security Relationship -- the Key to East Asian Security and Stability," Report of the Pacific Study Group, March 22, 1979, p. 8.
17. Interview with Henry Scott-Stokes in New York Times, April 20, 1979.
18. Hideaki Kase, "The New Debate on Defense," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 2, 1978, p. 27.
19. Quoted in Asahi Shimbun, May 11, 1978, p. 3.
20. Interview with Scott-Stokes, op. cit.
21. As reported in Daily Yomiuri, May 9, 1978, p. 1.
22. Kazuo Tomiyama, "The Future of Japan's Defense-Related Industries," Japan Quarterly, October-December 1978, p. 411.
23. Shingo Fukushima, "Japan's Wavering Defense Plan," Japan Quarterly, October-December 1978, p. 403.
24. For further details, see footnote 4, above.
25. Senate Armed Services Committee, op. cit.
26. For example, the Asahi Shimbun of March 15, 1978, reported that Dr. Richard Foster of the Stanford Research Institute had urged during a visit to Japan that defense expenditures should be increased to 3-5 percent of GNP; at present, they amount to 0.9 percent.
27. As reported in Sheldon W. Simon, "Japan's Foreign Policy: Adjustments to a Changing Environment," Asian Survey, July 1978, p. 677.
28. Ibid.

DECLASSIFIED

29. As reported in South China Morning Post, October 25, 1978.
30. Senator Sam Nunn, "China: Northeast Asia Security," January 21, 1979, p. 4. This was the last in a series of four newspaper articles written upon the completion of the study group's trip to the Far East.
31. Interview in Asahi Janaru, March 17, 1978.
32. "Japan -- Strategic Dilemma," Asian Arab Forum (Manila), January-February 1979, p. 8.
33. As reported in Asahi Evening News, August 19, 1977, p. 2. Fukuda had gone to Kuala Lumpur to meet with ASEAN leaders after they had concluded a summit meeting. He then made official visits to their capitals. His reception was in contrast to that of Prime Minister Tanaka, who toured Southeast Asia in January 1974; on that occasion, serious anti-Japanese riots occurred in Jakarta and Bangkok.
34. Quoted in Michael Pillsbury, "A Japanese Card?" Foreign Policy, Winter 1979, p. 6.
35. Quoted in Asahi Shimbun, March 24, 1978, p. 1.
36. Most American scholars also have held this view in recent years. See, for example, James W. Morley (ed.), Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970s, Princeton, 1972, p. 6.; Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, Berkeley, 1977, p. 407; James H. Buck (ed.), The Modern Japanese Military System, Beverly Hills, 1975, p. 229.
37. See also Ohira's interview with Henry Scott-Stokes in the New York Times, April 20, 1979, in which the Prime Minister said that he favored qualitative improvements but, because payroll costs were so high, not larger forces.
38. Tomohisa Sakanaka, "Japan's Military Capability: Present and Future," Japan Quarterly, October-December 1978, pp. 414-15, 418-20. Takuya Kubo has said that "while there will be no major quantitative increases from the present force levels, major improvements are being sought in both quality and functional capability." -- Paper presented to RAND Conference, Santa Monica, January 1979.
39. "Roundtable Discussion -- If the Self-Defense Forces Were to Fight Now," Shukan Yomiuri, March 5, 1978; see also "Defense Problem Comes Into Renewed Limelight," Oriental Economist, August-September 1978, p. 8.
40. As reported by the Defense Attache's Office, Embassy Tokyo, December 14, 1978. UNCLASSIFIED.
41. Interview in Japan Times, January 4, 1978.
42. Quoted in Shoji Takase, "The Recent Defense Debate," Asahi Janaru, March 17, 1978. Makoto Momoi has written: "Few Japanese realize how arrogant it must sound to most Asian nations when their government refers to its defense expenditure costing less than 1 percent of Japan's GNP; in real monetary terms, the amount is comparable to the total national budget in many other Asian countries." -- Momoi, op. cit., p. 349.
43. Yonosuke Nagai and Tomohisa Sakanaka, "Is Military Power Necessary for Japan?" Chuo Koron, New Year Issue, 1979.

44. Makoto Momoi, "Are There Any Alternative Strategies for the Defense of Japan?" in Franklin E. Weinstein (ed.), US-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia: The Next Decade, Boulder, Colo., pp. 88-90. Osamu Kaihara, Once Secretary General of the National Defense Council, has also charged that Japan does not have the arms, missiles, or replacement personnel needed for a protracted war against a foreign invader. -- "Japan's Military Capabilities: Realities and Limitations," Pacific Community, January 1978, pp. 136-42.
45. Bernard K. Gordon, "Loose Cannon on a Rolling Deck? Japan's Changing Security Policies," Orbis, Winter 1979, pp. 989, 970.
46. Senate Armed Services Committee, op. cit., p. 9.
47. Martin E. Weinstein, "Strategic Thought and the US-Japan Alliance," in James W. Morley, Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970's, Princeton, 1972, p. 84.

DECLASSIFIED

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Official Documents

Japan. Defense Agency. Japan's Defense. Tokyo: Defense Agency. 1970.

\_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ . Defense of Japan 1976. Tokyo: Defense Agency. 1976.

\_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ . Defense of Japan 1977. Tokyo: Defense Agency. 1977.

\_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ . Defense of Japan 1978. Tokyo: Defense Agency. 1978.

\_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ . Opinion Survey for Analyzing Public Relations. Tokyo: Public Information Division, Defense Agency. January 1978.

United States Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Pacific Study Group. United States-Japan Security Relationship -- The Key to East Asian Security and Stability. Washington: US Government Printing Office. 1979.

Books and Reports

Buck, James H. (ed.). The Modern Japanese Military System. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 1975.

Langer, Paul F. and Moorsteen, Richard. The US/Japanese Military Alliance: Japanese Perceptions and the Prospective Impact of Evolving US Military Doctrines and Technologies. Rand Paper P-5393. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation. 1975.

Morley, James W. (ed.). Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970s. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1972.

Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr. and Davis, Jacquelyn K. Japanese-American Relations in a Changing Security Environment. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 1975.

Scalapino, Robert A. (ed.). The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1977.

Weinstein, Franklin B. (ed.). US-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia: The Next Decade. Boulder: Westview Press. 1978.

Weinstein, Martin E. Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968. New York: Columbia University Press. 1971.

Articles

"China's View of SDF," Asahi Janaru, March 17, 1978. 23-24.

"Defense Problem Comes Into Renewed Limelight," Oriental Economist, August-September 1978, 8-9.

0315570311

- "Financial Circles Join Liberal Democratic Party and Defense Agency in Supporting Creation of the Peace and Security Guarantees Research Institute," Sekai, September 1978, 269-72.
- Fukushima, Shingo. "Japan's Wavering Defense Plan," Japan Quarterly, October-December 1978, 401-06.
- Gordon, Bernard K. "Loose Cannon on a Rolling Deck? Japan's Changing Security Policies," Orbis, Winter 1979, 967-1005.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Japan, the United States, and Southeast Asia," Foreign Affairs, April 1978, 579-600.
- "Japan -- Strategic Dilemma," Asian Arab Forum, January-February 1979, 7-12.
- Kaihara, Osamu. "Japan's Military Capabilities: Realities and Limitations," Pacific Community, January 1978, 136-42.
- Kase, Hideaki. "The New Debate on Defense," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 2, 1978.
- Kubo, Takuya. "Security in Northeast Asia," a paper presented to a RAND conference on "East Asian Security in the 1980s" at Santa Monica, California, January 1979.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Japanese Defense Policy: Decision-Making Process and Background" (mimeographed), June 1978.
- Nagai, Yonosuke and Sakanaka, Tomohisa. "Is Military Power Necessary for Japan?" Chuo Koron, New Year Issue, 1979.
- Pillsbury, Michael. "A Japanese Card?" Foreign Policy, Winter 1979, 3-30.
- "Remarks of SDF Leaders," Asahi Janaru, March 17, 1978, 6-13.
- "Responsibility for Civilian Control," Asahi Janaru, March 17, 1978 14-17.
- "Roundtable Discussion -- If the Self-Defense Forces Were to Fight Now," Shukan Yomiuri, March 5, 1978.
- Sakanaka, Tomohisa. "A Stab at Defective Points in Japan's Defense Policy," Chuo Koron, October 1978.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Japan's Military Capability: Present and Future," Japan Quarterly, October-December 1978, 413-21.
- Scott-Stokes, Henry. "It's All Right to Talk Defense Again in Japan." New York Times Magazine, February 11, 1979, 18 ff.
- Simon, Sheldon W. "Japan's Foreign Policy: Adjustments to a Changing Environment," Asian Survey, July 1978, 666-86.
- "Slowly Turning to the Right -- Japan's Direction -- Are Defense Discussions All Right?" Asahi Shimbun, March 13, 1978.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Takase, Shoji. "The Recent Defense Debate," Asahi Janaru, March 17, 1978, 18-22.

Tomiyama, Kazuo. "The Future of Japan's Defense-Related Industries," Japan Quarterly, October-December 1978, 407-12.

Tsunoda, Jun. "Is Japan's Defense Posture Adequate?" Asian Affairs, March-April 1978, 199-215.

Newspapers

Asahi Shimbun, selected issues, 1978-79, in translation.

Asahi Evening News, selected issues, March 1979.

Hong Kong Standard, selected issues, March 1979.

Japan Times, selected issues, 1978-79.

New York Times, 1978-79.

Sankei, selected issues, 1978-79, in translation.

South China Morning Post, selected issues, March 1979.

Tokyo Shimbun, selected issues, 1979, in translation.

Washington Post, 1978-79.

Yomiuri, selected issues, 1978-79, in translation.

DECLASSIFIED