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OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, FORCE STRUCTURE: THOUGHTS FOR PLANNERS

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
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
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
Case Study by ROBERT S. THOMPSON



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
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OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, FORCE STRUCTURE:

Thoughts for Planners
by

ROBERT S. THOMPSON

SUMMARY

This essay starts from the premise that the West is ill-equipped today to meet the challenges being presented to its interests by a changing international environment. The essay briefly surveys this environment and concludes the present is little different than the past, except the West has accepted the idea that the use of force is not acceptable and is limited in its utility as means. An idea not shared by the vast majority of the world's actors and an idea the evidence does not support. Consequently, Western military and civilian planners have entered the lists at a double disadvantage--they represent the status quo and they have self-limited their means to defend or advance interests.

The essay then examines three areas--interests and objectives, strategy, and force structure. The examination is abstract and it identifies points the essay's author believes to be important and which planners should take into consideration. The examination is not meant to be definitive. As a personal and somewhat ideosyncratic clarification of ideas, it is meant to be suggestive, pointing out problem areas rather than resolving them.

Interests are seen as representing both intrinsic and instrumental values. The aspirational interests intrinsic values represent only lead to confusion on the part of planners. It is the operational interests that instrumental values represent with which planners should concern themselves. These interests can be translated into identifiable and definable objectives at successive lower and lower levels. Successive identification and definition is seen to be essential, but all too frequently ignored. Strategy is viewed as being of objectives and for objectives at the general level--the first being a strategy of capabilities, and the second being a strategy for action. Each has different consequences for the West.

The mechanisms for using armed forces--direct use, threat, and anticipation--and two operational strategies--influence and force--are examined and related to the general strategies. Force structure is approached from the perspective of real and perceived warfighting effectiveness, and structural and nonstructural influences impacting on the structure's effectiveness are reviewed.

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One of the commonplaces today is the argument that we stand on the threshold of a new era and the future is unpredictable and uncertain. That traditional domestic and international relationships--political, social, economic, ideological, technological, military, etc.--have been transformed. That the old means for the solution of problems and resolution of disputes no longer suffice and new means will be required if we expect to be able to cope, find solutions, stem chaos, and avoid disaster.

These suggestions are not surprising to anyone familiar with the course of events. The past decade has routinely provided abundant evidence of new challenges and arrangements in the international system. The distribution of power has been undergoing a change and new centers are rising. Regional geopolitical blocs are evolving, raising ever-new and increasingly strident demands for a radical redistribution of valued things and for access to influence. Broadly based transnational concerns are constantly being expressed over the need to take urgent action to solve a growing number of global problems. Disturbing shifts have occurred and continue to occur in the always dangerous pattern of East-West cooperation and competition. The list goes on and on and there seems to be no end to it.

Many of the more disconcerting events have served no doubt, either intentionally or unintentionally, as probing actions "designed to clarify the limits of acceptable maneuverability in an arena of clearly changing but ambiguous patterns." ^{1/} These events serve to indicate that a growing number of actors, representing both developed and developing nations, believe the current system to be unsatisfactory and inadequate for their needs. There is no reason, given the nature of the challenges, to expect that probing will not be repeated. And it is difficult to conceive how major confrontations and crises can be avoided in the future, as they have not been avoided in the past.

In truth, there is little new or unusual in any of this. Demands for change are not unprecedented, nor is opposition to them. Crises and confrontations are the stuff of which history is made. The legitimacy and efficacy of means-to-ends have always been the subject of controversy. And it does seem to be natural that the members of each new generation, as they take their turn at the wheel, tend to become blinded and bound by their vision of their responsibilities--arguing, with no little vehemence and arrogance, that their problems and the dangers they pose are unique.

The structure of the situation today, however, does present something different which catches one's attention: i.e., the existence of a remarkable and perhaps unprecedented asymmetry in attitudes regarding the use of military capabilities to influence outcomes. One set of attitudes stems

1/ Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 94.

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from a belief that changed conditions in the international environment limit the utility and legitimacy of armed force to deterrence and defense against direct threats to the security of homelands and key allies. The traditional use of armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy is seen to have been shriveled and severely truncated because (a) the economic and security needs once met through territorial expansion and control have been made obsolete and outdated by modern weapons technology and the operation of the international economic system; (b) the potential political, social, and economic costs incurred in using armed forces far outweigh possible gains; and, (c) international relationships have been transformed by a growing web of interdependence, particularly in economic relations, and transnational global concerns. As a result, in this view international affairs have become more and more about common problems which are irrelevant to the use of force and by their nature encourage negotiation. This set of beliefs dominates the thought of the developed Western nations and has had a remarkable influence upon their outlook and behavior. 2/

On the other hand, another set of attitudes can be distinguished. Its beliefs have not been set down and articulated in the same well-reasoned, coherent intellectual fashion as have been those which are dominant in liberal Western societies. Their statement has been through behavior and actions. Klaus Knorr, in examining the proposition that the utility of force has declined, found little evidence to support the Western conviction. His examination did not find significant change to have occurred in actual behavior: opposing interests still frequently result in major armed conflict when other solutions fail; border clashes of varying magnitudes and for multiple reasons remain a common event; and, outside intervention in support of ethnicity, ideologies, and their spheres of influence, etc., are all too regular. To be sure, in recent years the major powers have been able to avoid armed conflict with each other, but this is not unprecedented as it has happened before during quite long periods of strained relations; however, considering Soviet and American activities and relations it may have been so far only fortuitous they have not clashed. If the past is to be any indicator of the future, sharing common problems and mutual dependence does not necessarily mean interests will be common, shared, or resolvable without hostilities occurring at some point.

Knorr also found a growing and more widely distributed capacity to do violence. During the period 1965-1974, for example, everywhere but in the West a larger share of scarce national resources was being devoted to the creation and improvement of military capabilities. Military expenditures, in constant dollars, rose worldwide by 28 percent, arms imports by 60 percent, and military manpower by 24 percent. The most significant changes occurred in the Third World, followed by the nations of the Warsaw Pact.

2/ This and the following is indebted to two analyses made by Klaus Knorr. See his "On the International Uses of Military Force in the Contemporary World." Orbis, Spring 1977, and "Is International Coercion Waning or Rising?", International Security, Spring 1977.

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This has not changed and they continue to rise. The West's efforts, exemplified by NATO nations, were significantly less--expenditures as a percentage of GNP fell by an average of about 20 percent, with only slight manpower increases of considerably less than 10 percent being noted. Only recently has this trend in NATO begun to change, and Soviet defense efforts, for example, still exceed those of the United States by some 30 percent plus. ^{3/}

When all of the evidence is considered, it is difficult not to conclude that armed force continues to have utility and, at least in the minds of the vast majority of the world's national actors, it remains a useful and acceptable instrument of policy. On reflection, it would appear that normative and pragmatic restraints on the use of nuclear weapons, nuclear parity, the fear of escalation, and the widespread acquisition of modern and sophisticated military capabilities have linked in differing combinations to enhance the utility of force not only for deterrence and defense, but also to make available a new range of options for those willing to use them. For the Third World actors, a new and previously unknown freedom to influence others has been the result.

Overall, rather than the utility of force decreasing, its utility and acceptability may be increasing given the trends. From all appearances, military power will continue in the future, as it has in the past, to be one of the major currencies for the price of admission to negotiation no less than to confrontation and crisis. Whether the West likes it or not, force continues to play a central and crucial role in international relations and it remains the ultimate arbiter in disputes. In essence, historically familiar conditions prevail. The change held by some to be in the process of occurring has not come to pass. As one observer has noted, "statecraft with nuclear weapons looks very much like statecraft without nuclear weapons. Wars are fought . . ., force is threatened, crises are waged, arms races are run, territory is coveted, and allies are hoarded." ^{4/} In sum, post-1945 international politics resemble to a remarkable degree pre-1945 international politics.

The mistaken belief, on the part of the Western powers about force's limited utility, strains the already difficult position in which they find themselves as representatives of the status quo. Committed by self-interest to orderly change and opposed to jagged and disjunctive approaches conducive of instability, the West finds itself by definition on the defensive, unable to avoid leaving the initiative to those willing to pick it up. To this is added the disadvantage which comes from self-limitation, for whatever

^{3/} This last point is noted in Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979, p. 19.

^{4/} Colin S. Gray, "Across the Nuclear Divide--Strategic Studies, Past and Present," International Security, Summer 1977, p. 32.

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reason, when potential adversaries do not share your views and do not limit themselves.

The course of events, however, appears to be forcing a reevaluation. In Europe, a growing anxiety over Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional force improvements has raised doubts about the military balance, and increasing worry is evident regarding the possible political significance and meaning of the improvements. As a result, as far as the direct threat to European security is concerned, the debate is no longer over how much should be allocated to defense, but how much more is enough and how the force should be structured.

Interest has been less marked in the requirements for other areas of the world and for other less directly threatening situations. But here again, events may be forcing a reassessment. Soviet and Cuban actions in Africa have given rise to considerable additional anxiety. Tentative and probing as they might be, these actions have been clearly, but indirectly threatening to Western interests and have served to underscore the inherently defensive nature of the Western position with regard to its interests. These actions have also served to demonstrate others' views about the use of force and their ability, given the will, to take the initiative and assertively project their power with confidence and little fear when those opposing their actions are self-deterred.

But beliefs about the limited utility of force have not been the only influence on Western views regarding military power and its uses. Western states have also been influenced by a deeply seated propensity to ignore the multifunctional nature of military power and its uses. Traditionally, their focus, and particularly the American focus, has been upon the direct use of armed forces and their warfighting capability. This has been especially true of those professional groups responsible for providing military advice. Military officers have been comfortable and familiar with force structure, weapons systems, and the operational requirements for the direct, active, and hostile use of military capabilities. The majority of these officers see themselves as "managers of violence," in Lasswell's famous phrase, possessing a unique expertise in a world where military objectives, operational strategy, and tactics are the essence. Few see themselves as being, in addition, managers of the potential for violence; and, they are far less comfortable and expert when required to move away from the physical dimension of warfighting effectiveness to the less discrete, more amorphous and ambiguous perceptual arena of the political functions of military capabilities, their relationship to other instruments of statecraft, and a different set of strategic requirements. In sum, they are less comfortable and less adept in the politico-military world and its operational requirements.

But the military are not alone in their short-sightedness, the professional diplomat shares it. The idea that force is severely limited in its utility has been particularly influential in shaping the diplomat's thinking; and, the skill with which Western foreign ministries once wielded

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their nations' armed forces in other than a warfighting capacity has deteriorated. Politico-military expertise on the part of foreign service professionals is limited, and little has been done to develop the ability to think from such a perspective.^{5/} Both groups have exhibited a pronounced tendency to push to the back of their minds the thought that armed forces serve two purposes--a military purpose and a political purpose--and they should be developed and used with both purposes in mind if the maximum potential for influence their capabilities hold is to be realized. To do otherwise is a luxury ill-afforded in an era when the political aspects of international problems cannot be separated from their military aspects, nor can the military be separated ultimately from the political, except in the least important international concerns.

The value of the politico-military perspective is being pointed out anew by recent events, and these events pointedly demonstrate the multifunctional nature of armed forces. Given their recent course, a pungent poignancy accompanies any suggestion that the party holding the most influential hand will be the party best able to develop, organize, and use its available resources in the most effective manner "to persuade, trick, or coerce his adversary into accepting some desired outcome." ^{6/} In some cases, these same events have also demonstrated that the strongest participant is not necessarily the one possessing the most in the way of physical power or other tangible and intangible resources. Such statements are, of course, self-evident; but they do contain effective truths all too frequently ignored.

Being able to develop, organize, and use available resources effectively as means for influence assumes the existence of some conception regarding the nature of the resources, the purposes they serve, what is to be accomplished, how they can be used, and the mechanisms for their use. All things considered, it appears to be an appropriate time to review some aspects of these factors as they relate to military power. Massive attention has been paid, of course, to the operational aspects of the direct, active, and hostile application of military capabilities. Such technical and tactical considerations are the bread-and-butter business of the military profession and little attention will be required. Our concern in this essay is more basic. It comes from a deeply held belief after some years of teaching and working in politico-military planning that many ideas associated with military power are based more on inarticulate intuition than they are on analysis. Our purpose here is to go back to basics, to the rock-bottom, and see if by focusing attention on the idea of objectives, strategy, and structure whether a path can be charted through the underbrush. If successful, maybe some ideas useful in planning might be perceived, even if only dimly.

^{5/} This point has been repeatedly made to the Executive Seminar by senior US Government officials.

^{6/} Young, p. 40.

The concept of the objective is central to any reasoned consideration of military power and its first-order business regarding the development, organization, and use of military capabilities. The determination of what a desired outcome embodies impacts not only on the definition of the situation causing concern, but also on (a) what must be accomplished to achieve the desired outcome, (b) how it is to be gained, and (c) which means are the most appropriate to be used. In other words, logically, the objective can be said to drive strategy and the structure of military capabilities. ^{7/} This is all too frequently forgotten. It can be likened to the operation of the planning, programing, and budgeting system (PPBS), currently so popular, in which the first P, planning, tends to be silent. Forgotten and silent because it is a conceptually difficult area which does not lend itself to quantification--subjective qualitative judgments are its hallmark.

But we are ahead of ourselves as objectives also serve prior purposes. A good place to begin our examination is with the answer to the question--Why military power? As might be expected, the answer is--A state's interests require it. Interests need to be maintained, protected from threats, and advanced. The "supply of opportunities" for a state's interests to be realized is not unlimited ^{8/} and interests can suffer in the face of competing claims should the state not have access to sufficient and adequate means to press its own claims. This leads to a second question--What are national interests? Not what are the national interests? This latter question is irrelevant to our concern. The first question is not.

The path to any conception of national interest is strewn with pitfalls and traps for the unwary. At times, because of the problems the concept creates, one wishes it did not exist, but it is a powerful and, where given content, emotion-laden concept, useful in gaining support for actions and for their justification. More often than not it is fuzzy in its meaning and its use. But the idea does reflect a sense of national purpose and of national goals. If the extraneous is stripped away and only bare bones exposed, it is possible to discern two distinct meanings associated with the idea, functioning on different levels and expressing related but separate concerns.

On the one hand, there can be distinguished the level of use focusing on the long-term interests a state holds which are rooted in its history, express its vision of the world as it ought to be, the nature of the goals

^{7/} This is not to ignore the reality of means limitation driving the choice of a strategy and ultimately the choice of an objective in any given situation.

^{8/} The highly suggestive idea of the "supply of opportunities" in the International environment is one proposed by Richard Rosecrance. See his International Relations: Peace or War? (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1973), pp. 88-106.

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the state would like to reach in this perfect world, and how they are ideally to be reached. National interests from this perspective represent a state's "intrinsic" national values,^{9/} and articulate its aspirations for self and others. At this level, national interests are determined and defined more by "political will rather than by capabilities, they may not even influence policy, although they may provide some sense of purpose for it." ^{10/} It might also be said, they reflect in part at least a state's sense of its national style.

In contrast to this set of national aspirations, another set of interests can be distinguished. More transitory and less permanent than are aspirational interests, this set reflects interests that can be operationalized. Short-term, rather than long-term in the concerns they express, the goals operational interests reflect have a reasonable chance of being realized within a foreseeable future. More often than not, they seem to stem from conditions of necessity arising out of the turn of events, or of expediency, and they usually are of paramount importance and concern to decisionmakers. The basic nature of aspirational interests makes it difficult, if not impossible, to translate their expressed concerns into objectives; and seldom, if ever, is consideration given to the question of capabilities. This is not true of operational interests where potentially attainable objectives can be identified and defined. Because these operational interests mirror goals reflecting a state's "instrumental values," its power values, ^{11/} means, and capabilities can be considered and costs estimated.

Achieving the goals expressed in operational interests may appear to some as way-stations on the journey to reaching their aspirations--a sort of salami tactical approach. This may be the case where the American beliefs in human dignity, freedom of choice and from want, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," democratic governments for others as well as self, etc., are finding expression in a current operational interest of instrumental value to the ongoing completion of ideologies--the pursuit of limited human rights on a selective basis. And, in the same way, the desire for security in a Hobbesian world of competing sovereign nations has always been an aspiration whose reality is devoutly to be wished. Its translation has always been deemed possible by many; and, under their influence, states have devoted considerable effort and energy to schemes designed to eliminate the dangers inherent in a world lacking central

^{9/} Glenn H. Snyder, in Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), points out that a state has different values to defend. See p. 31 for his discussion of intrinsic values.

^{10/} Unfortunately, I cannot recover the source of this perceptive comment.

^{11/} See Snyder, p. 32, for a discussion of instrumental values.

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authority. Most of it has come to naught. And it might be suggested that much of the Western questioning of the utility of force represents in part a belief in the realization of this aspiration. Specific threats to security are, however, a different matter, and they create security interests which can be effectively operationalized. NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the strategic nuclear force postures of the United States and the Soviet Union reflect their translation into a form where capabilities are considered and costs estimated. Given the differences, reality seems to demand that the distinction existing between aspirational and operational interests be continually borne in mind. Otherwise, the unattainable is pursued.

If a state's interests represent its wants and needs, it is the objectives which a state sets for itself that establish and specify what is required for those interests to be advanced, protected, maintained, realized, etc. Americans are not very good at defining their objectives, and at times they appear to be even less skilled in the process of identifying what is required for them to be reached. It is easy to say A is wanted or needed; and, if A can be achieved, this will be the impact and these are the implications. A current problem provides us with an illustration. If Soviet and Cuban presence and the influence it brings can be reduced in the Horn of Africa, then America's security and other interests in the area will be enhanced. The potential threat posed to the critical sea routes for access to oil, vital to allies and increasingly important to the United States, will be less; friends and allies will be reassured of American will to protect mutual interests; and, opponents perceiving resolve will be deterred from further actions in Africa. These are the views currently being expressed and receiving attention in the media. They are representative and reflect many actor's approach to objectives and the interests they serve as they stop at this point. But views such as these do not outline objectives, they state a concern and, in tracing its impact on security and other interests, they operationalize the interests.

There is nothing wrong with such views. They are a necessary first step, providing recognition for the existence of a problem. A great deal of hard and grueling, pick and shovel work remains to be accomplished if those conditions are to be identified and defined which will provide some probability, when they are realized, that the concern will be ameliorated or eliminated--i.e., if x, y, z, etc., then A. Returning to our example, what conditions can be identified, which if attained, will result in a reduction of Soviet and Cuban presence and influence in the Horn? What needs to be done? These questions are not easy. They are not difficult to pose, but they are difficult to answer. But they are questions which must be asked and for which answers must be attempted.

A natural aversion exists over asking and answering questions about objectives explicitly. To do so requires that judgments be made about what will influence an opponent--a subjective endeavor by nature and one always fraught with risk--and of making decisions regarding these judgments--a contentious task at best and one always subject to controversy.

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Many actors prefer to avoid such commitments and, consequently, the questions are not asked, let alone answered. Intelligent, thought-through questions and answers are essential, and it is answering the question about what is required (x, y, z, etc.) which identifies a concern's first-order objectives. But the process does not stop here, or should not. Further identification and definition of objectives is required at successively lower and lower levels--i.e., if x, y, z, etc., are seen as being required for A's realization, then what do x, y, z, etc., require for their attainment; again, if 1, 2, 3, etc., then x; and so forth. As was suggested earlier, it is ditch-digging work and it requires judgments based on a knowledge of the situation, opponents and their beliefs about the situation, and what it is that will affect their perceptions.

To avoid the frustrations involved in making such judgments and the controversy that is likely to surround them, it is frequently argued that flexibility is required and generality, rather than specificity provides needed flexibility, as generality is conducive to the maintenance of freedom of action. There is truth in this argument, but other truths may undermine its importance. First, it would seem that the identification and definition of the necessary, and hopefully sufficient, conditions for A (x, y, z, etc., i.e., the first-order objectives) determines not only what must be accomplished, but would also give a strong indication of whether it is going to be possible to attain A at all. As lower order objectives are determined, what is involved should become ever more apparent; and, it should be possible to address not only probability, but also acceptability from an analytical and not intuitional base. Alternatives should also be evident and it is possible to conceive of various courses being charted through what would seem like a sea of lower-order objectives at the second, third, and fourth levels. All things considered, true rather than sensed flexibility and freedom of action should be the product of specificity. Second, the expanded description of requirements is essential to the rational determination of appropriate and adequate means for the tasks to be accomplished, as well as for the selection of strategies for the use of these means. In sum, the idea of the successive identification and definition must be seen as being the heart of any concept of objectives, if not the strategic planning process. The more completely and comprehensively it is accomplished the better. Without it, strategic planning is incomplete. If slipshod or inadequate, strategic planning will be faulty.

There is another aspect involving interests and objectives which merits attention before we turn to ideas about strategy. This involves their description or classification. Richard Rosecrance has suggested that three general types of objectives can be discerned which reflect national material, ideological, and security concerns. ^{12/} In his construction, material objectives are those involving access to the rewards the international system can provide by way of economic and financial gain,

^{12/} Rosecrance, pp. 199-216.

prestige and glory, territory, and general influence. He sees ideological objectives as goals involving those political, social, and economic ideas which motivate, mobilize, and organize people and which structure national and international institutions. To these we would add race and religion. Security objectives in his framework are more traditional and, as might be expected, concern establishing conditions conducive to the survival, viability, and integrity of a state. Rosecrance's scheme has much to commend it. However, it does seem, given the line of reason this essay has been following, that the categorizations material, ideological, and security reflect interests more than they do objectives. Objectives can serve more than one interest. Returning to our earlier example, objectives designed to reduce Soviet and Cuban presence in the Horn of Africa would support not only security interests, they would also support the material interests of influence and prestige maintenance, as well as the ideological interest held by the United States about what set of ideas is going to guide future political, social, and economic development in Africa. This should not be taken to mean, however, that all objectives all of the time support more than one interest. They might not, and, as successive definition of objectives takes place, undoubtedly objectives which support specific interests will be identified.

The categorization of interests under these definitions does appear, however, to be useful. Insofar as they direct attention away from the ingrained and disturbing habit of classifying problems and goals in the traditional manner as being either political, military, or economic in nature and assist in breaking down the proclivity to see their resolution through the counterpart means, it should add a measure of realism to analysis. Recognition that support for material or ideological interests may require the use of military means is just as important as the recognition that the maintenance of security interests may require instruments other than just military means. This follows the argument advanced earlier that military capabilities are multifunctional and can be used for a variety of purposes.

That means can be used for a variety of purposes cannot help but have consequences for how military power is to be developed and organized for use. More important perhaps, the classification scheme should facilitate an understanding that circumstances can change and objectives which once reflected the concerns of one interest can be transformed into objectives representing other interests. For example, until recently, access to oil has always been (wartime situations excepted) an objective reflecting a state's material interests operationalized in its energy requirement. This is no longer true and access to oil has become an objective representing security interests. States' economic viability and ultimately their political stability depend today upon a continuing and uninterrupted supply of oil. Such shifts have consequences when they occur for the identification of subsidiary objectives and their definition. As some interests are undoubtedly more important than others, the old lower-order objectives, the strategies, and means will require at the minimum reexamination, if not change. This can be an agonizingly slow process, laden with dispute

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as we have seen in the current energy crisis. But reexamination is required. Not to do so is to jeopardize the chance to protect interests.

Strategy is a fascinating, as well as a frustrating topic. Cloaked in mystery as much as it is in clarity, it is not surprising that widely divergent opinions are held about what strategy is truly all about. ^{13/} Despite this disagreement, however, general agreement would probably greet the assertion that a strategy is the answer to the question How, as an objective was seen to be the answer to the question What. More completely, strategy is about how means are to be used to achieve ends. Thus, it is the bridge between a state's objectives and the state's capabilities. And, strictly speaking, without strategy capabilities have no significance as means.

Logically, strategy is driven by the objective and strategy in turn drives the requirement for capabilities. But logic doesn't always prevail and limited resources may restrict the development of capabilities. Should this occur, the existing strategy may need to be modified, a new one designed, or objectives may have to be redefined. There are also objectives which skip strategy in the accepted sense and directly drive the development of capabilities. Before turning to these and other objectives which have a major significance for strategy, however, it is necessary to pay at least passing attention to how military capabilities can be used--operational strategies, the strategies of strategy, if you will--and the mechanisms through which they receive expression.

Three primary methods or mechanisms can be said to exist which provide the outlets through which the capabilities armed forces possess find expression in the pursuit of an objective. They are the direct, active, and hostile use of armed force, the threat or promise that their capabilities will be used, and anticipation that they will be used. ^{14/} The first two mechanisms are common and well understood. Much has been written about them and little can be added here. ^{15/} The idea of anticipation is far

^{13/} For two excellent discussions of what is best called the philosophy of strategy, see Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) and B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd Rev. Ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967).

^{14/} These mechanisms are those proposed by Klaus Knorr in his seminal examination of military power in Military Power and Potential (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1970), pp. 3-9.

^{15/} For an excellent discussion of the positive and negative aspects involved in threat and promise, see Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975), pp. 7-14.

less familiar and some discussion might be useful. Anticipation as a mechanism involves the expectation on the part of others that a state's military capability might be used against them should they take some unwanted action or fail to undertake a wanted one--an expectation which influences their decisions. As a mechanism, anticipation acts to express the capability which is implicit in a state's latent military potential and in its in-being armed forces. Anticipation's use may be intentional on the part of a strategist, but its effect is always uncertain. Strategic planners should bear it in mind, however, when developing, organizing, and using the capabilities at their disposal. They should explicitly try to maximize the perceptual impact of their armed forces to create the conditions necessary for anticipation to be operative.

Mechanisms require something to give them meaning and direction. Capabilities are not used through these mechanisms without purpose, and this direction is provided by operational strategy. There are two basic operational strategies--a strategy of influence and a strategy of force. The first is far richer in the styles available to it and all three of the mechanisms can function through it. An influence strategy is operative when a state intends to directly or indirectly use its military capabilities to alter behavior or change an outcome by convincing the other party to do so. Any one of three different modes for influence may underlie the attempt, or all three may be used in some combination. In attempting to influence another, actions designed to persuade, to induce, or to coerce a change may be undertaken which may result in the desired outcome being attained. Coercion involves either threatening to add new disadvantages to the situation to convince another to change, or directly adding those disadvantages until the opponent is compelled to change under their pressure. As coercion adds or threatens to add disadvantages, advantages may also be used. If the inducement mode is chosen to influence another, rewards are promised or made in order to convince another to do what is desired. As might be expected, inducements and coercion may be linked in a carrot-and-stick approach. The final influence mode involves persuasion where no advantages or disadvantages are added or threatened. Force of argument, prestige, and reputation all have a part in this mode. The definition of the situation and its dynamics, advantageous strategic positions also, no doubt, play a role in persuading another to do something he otherwise would not have done. And, it is the persuasion mode in which the anticipation mechanism comes into its own. It stands behind persuasion, so to speak, lending the unstated weight of capability to arguments.

Strategies designed to influence attempt to convince another to do something he otherwise would not do without influence being attempted. Strategies of force are different. They do not try to convince another and thereby provide him with the opportunity to do something. They purely and simply seek to force him to do what it is that is wanted. There is no persuasion, no inducement, and no coercion. Anticipation plays no role and threats or promises are not made. Military capabilities are actively and directly applied to seize, deny, constrain, etc.; whatever is necessary is done to impose by brute force the desired outcome. Violence may or may

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not occur; it makes no difference. It is a pure test of the participant's relative military strength.

Operational strategies and strategic mechanisms are applicable to all general strategies ^{16/} and must be considered in all situations. But what types of general strategy can be distinguished which might have relevance to planners? Two types of general strategy can be distinguished and each finds its origin in a different general objective. On the one hand, there are those objectives whose goal it is to convince or to cause others to undertake a wanted action--i.e., to convince or to cause them to do something they otherwise would not do. On the other hand, there are those objectives whose goal is to discourage an unwanted action from occurring--i.e., to convince them not to do something they otherwise might do. Objectives of the first type are positive in nature and they are oriented toward bringing about some change in a situation. Both strategies of force and of influence appear to have relevance. All three mechanisms seem to be appropriate. On the other hand, objectives of the second type, focusing as they do on the maintenance of a given situation or existing conditions, appear to be more negative in their character than do objectives of the first type. The operational strategy of force does not appear to be generally useful for objectives of this type. Influence strategy does, however, in all three of its modes--persuasion, inducement, and coercion. Of the mechanisms, only direct use appears to be inappropriate. Threat, of course, being of considerable significance and promise and anticipation of some relevance. Objectives of the first type seem to require a general strategy for the objective; whereas, objectives of the second type seem to call for a general strategy which might be best described as a strategy of the objective. When all things are considered--the nature of the objectives, the operational strategies, modes, and mechanisms--each general type has a different set of implications for the development and organization of means and ultimately for their use.

A strategy of objectives is frustrating to the traditional strategist. The goals are negative goals and its second-order objectives, as determining conditions for first-order realization, must identify and define capabilities. The How question does not answer how capabilities are to be used, it identifies and describes what capabilities are required. Strategy in its common use drops out and the objective directly drives capabilities and structure. The current United States strategies of deterrence provide two illustrations. According to the FY 79 Department of Defense report, the "conditions of deterrence" of strategic nuclear war are survivability and control, assured destruction, and flexibility. ^{17/}

^{16/} The term policy may seem to some to be more appropriate than general strategy. As used here, general strategy is similar to, but not the same as, grand, total, or national strategy.

^{17/} Annual Report, pp. 54-56.

The conditions of conventional deterrence for Europe and elsewhere are forward defense, firepower, rapid reinforcement, readiness, sustainability, sea control, and power projection.^{18/} With determining conditions defined in this manner, the task at lower levels becomes one of identifying and defining the capabilities which are required to give meaning to these conditions, developing them, and structuring the force. In sum, a strategy of objectives is a strategy of and for the development of capabilities. Goal attainment is seen in possessing the requisite capabilities and, as has already been suggested, the operational strategy is an influence strategy. While all of the modes are potentially useful, coercion is the most convincing with military means expressing themselves primarily through the threat mechanism and secondarily, and then only hopefully, through anticipation. The direct use mechanism is a negation of the strategy and an admission of its failure.

Strategies for the objective are active, not passive strategies. Unlike strategies of the objective, where the capability is the strategy, strategies for the objective are action strategies. Capabilities strategy can at best only hope to influence an opponent not take an unwanted action. Strategies for objectives can use the capabilities at their disposal and seek to influence an opponent to take a wanted action, to physically force him to do it, or both. Action strategies may also be designed to influence or force an opponent not to do something. There can be a strategy for deterrence as well as there can be a strategy of deterrence. Capabilities strategy, on the other hand, cannot influence or force an opponent to take a wanted action.

Second, third, and lower-order identification and definition of objectives in action strategies is much more task oriented than it is in capability strategies. If we return to the earlier Horn of Africa example, the reduction of Soviet influence in the area may require second-order objectives such as, (a) the removal of Cuban troops from Ethiopia, (b) a reduction in the number of Soviet advisors, (c) the building of Somali military capabilities, (d) American military aid to Ethiopian rebels, etc. Any number of illustrations could be developed and successive definitions can specify what is required for each of them to be attained. The operational strategy is not as constant as it is in capability strategy. Let us say, for example, that 1, 2, and 3 represent the lower-order objectives which must be reached for x to be realized. A coercive influence strategy expressed through threat may be the most appropriate for 1; for 2, a force strategy might be best; and, for 3, persuasion may be seen as having a chance of success should 1 and 2 succeed.

Action strategies also provide for a broader and more flexible use of available means. Should existing capabilities be inadequate to support a preferred operational option, e.g., a force strategy, adaptations can be

^{18/} Ibid., pp. 81-87.

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made which still may result in the objective being realized, e.g., a change to a coercive influence strategy through threat. Capability strategies do not have this flexibility. Perhaps even more important, action strategies encourage the development and organization of capabilities which can support the broad range of options available in influence and force strategies. Capabilities developed to support strategies of the objective have no requirement to do so--they are situation bound.

The dominant strategy in the West today--deterrence--is a capabilities strategy and its impact is manifest in a number of important ways. Capabilities development under its wing has been constrained. Narrow and primarily military in its outlook and purpose, the flexibility needed to support the variety of objectives and strategic options necessary for dealing with a changing world is lacking. More important, perhaps, it has engendered defensive and negative thinking, more tactical than strategic in nature, in an era which clearly requires a positive action-oriented politico-military perspective if the West's interests are to be advanced and not just badly protected. Capabilities strategy cannot provide for the breadth and range of options and resources required today. 19/ There is no reason to believe, however, that a dominant strategy for objectives oriented toward action cannot provide the means and the ideas necessary to prevent unwanted actions as well as those actions which are wanted. The strategy, not the objective should drive capabilities development.

These ideas about general and operational strategies are just as applicable to a state's economic and diplomatic/political instruments as they are to its military instrument. It should not be too much to expect that strong, integrated, action-oriented national (and hopefully alliance) politico-military strategies might be developed with operational strategies of the instrument, the means, being articulated to support them.

Throughout the essay, it has been suggested that a state's armed forces are multifunctional in their purposes, and they should be organized and developed to possess the ability to support influence and force strategies through any one of the three use mechanisms. It has also been suggested that, given the changing international environment, success in advancing and protecting interests will require strategy's means be sufficiently broad and flexible to meet any number of differing and difficult situations which can be expected to arise. What then needs to be kept in mind in structuring armed forces so these requirements can be met?

19/ This is being increasingly recognized and arguments are being expressed for different reasons than those argued here for a change. See Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977), a provocative, but frustrating work, and Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). George and Smoke's work focuses on conventional deterrence, is first-rate, and is relevant to the concerns of policymakers and planners.

One idea above all others stands out--warfighting effectiveness. In other words, the ability of a state's armed forces to accomplish the tasks traditionally seen as being assigned to them. Not a very surprising idea. There are, however, two types of effectiveness, real effectiveness and perceived effectiveness--and each has its own affect and place. To be used as an instrument of policy under either influence or force strategies, armed forces only need to be perceived as being effective by a state's decisionmakers. This may not be wise, but it is true. To be successful as instruments of policy under a strategy of influence, the same is also true, the opponent needs only to perceive the armed forces as being effective or potentially effective. It is valid even for the direct coercive use of armed forces. As long as the opponent is convinced, real effectiveness need not exist. It is only under the guidance of a strategy of force, historically the least used strategy, do armed forces require real effectiveness. Vietnam may provide, in an oversimplified way, an example of what is meant here. The United States pursued a strategy of influence in both the threat and the direct-use coercive mode. United States decisionmakers perceived that the armed forces possessed real warfighting effectiveness, and there is little doubt that they did possess it at the tactical level. However, the opponent on the strategic level did not perceive it to be real. Anticipated success was not realized, and it can be said that its failure triggered a series of actions which led to the United States withdrawal and the ultimate failure.

Under this conception of warfighting effectiveness, perceptions become a major, if not the major consideration in developing and structuring the armed forces. This is not in any way meant to denigrate the importance of real warfighting effectiveness. What it does mean, however, is that in developing armed forces and in determining how they should be structured, military planners need to give as much consideration and attention to their potential for psychological impact as they do to their potential for physical-material impact. This is particularly true when resources are scarce or limited by competition for their use. Resources are not unlimited, and those allocated to the armed forces need to be used in a manner which will maximize their potential value for influence as well as force.

Little consideration has been given to the psychological side of force planning. The attention that has been paid has been hesitant, inchoate, and intuitive. Despite the central importance of perceptions to the current strategy of deterrence, little concrete can be said about how its capabilities create and mold the perceptions of others. Fortunately, of late, an increased interest in perceptions and their role has been evidenced, 20/ and voices are being heard which call for a recognition of the importance

20/ Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). See also his Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).

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of the perceptual dimension to operations and force planning. 21/ But guides for planners are lacking and they need to be developed.

There are some factors, however, which can be identified that seem to be important in influencing others' perception of a state's armed forces' potential effectiveness for achieving desired outcomes. Some involve the armed forces' structure directly, others involve perceptions about their development and use. These latter factors concern beliefs about a state's capacity to provide the resources necessary to develop an effective armed force and its capacity to increase its military capabilities should the need arise. This is a traditional area of concern involving, as it does, the idea of the war potential of states. Will, on the part of decisionmakers, and its internal domestic base is another factor, a terribly important factor in any calculation. A state's armed forces may be perceived by an opponent as possessing real effectiveness; but without the perception of the will to use them in support of interests, they become ineffective as instruments to affect outcomes.

The third nonstructural factor involves the reputation of a state and its armed forces. From one perspective, little can be done to change past crisis and military behavior. It is part of the historical record. But at least some perceptions regarding it can be influenced, perceptions which affect not only reputation, but also will. Again, the Vietnam experience may provide an example. It is generally believed to be true that the armed forces of the United States failed in Vietnam. Reputation suffered, as did will. But was the failure a failure of the armed forces or was it a failure of adequately identifying and defining objectives and/or a failure of strategy and its implementation? To be sure, insofar as there were failures in these areas, the armed forces share in the failure. But were they a failure tactically? It has already been suggested that they were not, and ample evidence exists from intelligence that the armed forces of the Soviet Union are jealous of the United States forces' warfighting experience and give full recognition to it in their perceptions. For a state to focus on its failures to the exclusion of all else is only self-defeating and degrades perceptual effect. In addition, and very important, is the recognition that reputation is a factor, and a factor which affects perceptions of will as well; and, consideration may have to be given to the use of armed forces where they might not otherwise be used in order to preserve or enhance reputation. In other words, the intentional use of armed forces in order to affect future perceptions.

It is the structure of the armed forces and the perceptions about their structure which give reputation meaning and give weight to expressed will in any situation. Much discussion, analysis, and debate accompanies any force structure planning. How questions are answered and what actions

21/ Edward Luttwak, "Perceptions of Military Force and U. S. Defence Policy." Survival, January-February 1977.

are taken regarding (a) the size, organization, and equipment; (b) the doctrine, training, and leadership; and (c) the availability, deployability, and sustainability of a state's in-being and reserve armed forces will play a major role in determining their real as well as their perceived effectiveness. It is the result of the interaction between the perception of these structural considerations and perceptions regarding the nonstructural factors--capacity to develop and increase military capabilities, will, and reputation--which determines what credibility others will attach to the effectiveness of a state's armed forces. And it is possible that these four factors might serve as the base points on which to focus renewed attention on what once was referred to as strategic psychological operations, an area all but moribund today. But it is an area which needs to be reviewed for tomorrow. ^{22/} A state's military capabilities can, if given a chance, exercise power in two dimensions, not just one. Others realize this. Does the West?

What can be concluded from this ideosyncratic journey through a confused and chaotic jumble of ideas. There should be little doubt that intuition rather than analysis still holds sway. However, it is possible that engineer tape may have been placed around the minefield and some preliminary idea about where the mines are likely to be located has been gained from surveying the terrain. The probing for them and their removal remains to be done however. Planners might wish to keep their location in mind.

All in all, it does appear that the West, and particularly the United States, is not as well-equipped as it should be to deal with the challenges the future can be expected to pose. A new and positive action-oriented outlook is required. Improvements need to be made in the identification of interests and objectives. A new vitality is imperative in strategic and tactical thought. The current general strategy needs to be replaced by an action strategy. Operational strategies must be developed and refined. Explicit consideration is called for regarding the tactics of how armed forces can be used in a variety of situations to persuade, induce, or coerce others into accepting outcomes supportive of the West's interests. The perceptual dimension of force planning has had little attention, and strategic and force planners need to pay greater attention to its requirements. Intangibles are often decisive and the optimization of real warfighting effectiveness should not dominate. Force planning, doctrine, weapons systems, deployments should be aimed at projecting images of effectiveness as well as creating real effectiveness. In sum, a new politico-military perspective is essential if we want to be able to cope, find solutions, stem chaos, and avoid disaster.

^{22/} For older ideas regarding strategic psychological operations, some of which should receive consideration, see Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), particularly the first two chapters.

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