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# THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE POSTURE ON SELECTED FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

Case Study by LEO W. SMITH II

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
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THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE POSTURE  
ON  
SELECTED FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

By

Colonel Leo W. Smith, II, USAF

SUMMARY

The study examines the relationship between the Departments of State and Defense in the formulation of foreign policy. Both a historical and projected perspective are used. The former to evaluate past performance and identify limiting factors, if any, and the latter to determine if lessons have been learned and applied to future planning.

Examinations of past events indicate breakdown in certain aspects of State-Defense planning, which in some cases were very nearly catastrophic. A look at U. S. planning today for current and future policy shows very limited progress in coordinated efforts and the same potential for failure.

It is evident that there is a need to plan, and there is a potential to plan. However, in this vital process there is a fundamental requirement to recognize certain limitations and to adjust actual commitments to existing or attainable capabilities.

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The purpose of this brief study is to examine the relationship between two governmental departments which have, since 1947, influenced in a major way the formulation and execution of U. S. foreign policy - the Departments of State and Defense. The focus of the examination is on the requirement for coordinated planning and execution of long range policy objectives. In this respect the effort is both forward and rearward oriented. In the latter case, specific historical instances have been chosen for examination--separated temporally, geographically, and in terms of national emotional impact. The intent is to determine, if possible, whether foreign policy options were constrained or largely foreordained by virtue of independent or uncoordinated activities directed by either the Department of State or Defense. The forward perspective is intended to display areas of potential foreign policy difficulties, analyse courses of action selected by the author, and judge adequacy of ongoing military planning to support these courses of action.

The length of this report, even in view of the limited examination of only two departments of the government, is not sufficient to form the basis for a set of well documented recommendations. Thus the reader is confronted with a series of observations which, it is hoped, will provide the catalyst for others to undertake additional and more comprehensive efforts to examine, define and manage the relationships between all government departments and agencies whose activities impact U. S. foreign policy.

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I would also like to recognize the efforts of colleagues who undertook the painful task of reading and commenting on a series of drafts. Their observations have proved invaluable.

A special thanks is due to Professor Dean Rusk for his kindness in granting a personal interview and his courtesy in permitting use of his responses.

Finally, I must acknowledge that the views expressed in this paper are my own, and do not in any way reflect an official position of either the Department of State or Department of Defense. Any errors of fact are the sole responsibility of the author.

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## I. BACKGROUND

Introduction

Therefore, the enlightened ruler

is prudent and the good general  
is warned against rash action.  
Thus the state is kept secure  
and the Army preserved. 1/

The policy maker must be con-  
cerned with the best that can  
be achieved not just the best  
that can be imagined. 2/

Written twenty four centuries apart, these words portray the constancy of foreign policy complexity. In the span of time between these two observations, and for the future, survival of political institutions was and will be measured by an ability to adjust to change--both internal and external. It is that process of adjustment, past success, current progress and future prospects which may well define the life span of our nation.

Organization for Foreign Policy Formulation

It is instructive in and of itself to trace the historical origins 3/ and development of the various actors in the foreign policy process, but for the purpose of this discussion the focus will be on the Departments of State and Defense since 1947. The significance of this date rests on the creation, at that time, of both the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. Their import will be examined in subsequent paragraphs.

The President is the chief author of both foreign and defense policy and the focal point of all significant decisions. The principal advisor to the President on foreign policy matters is the Secretary of State. The principal advisor to the President on military matters is the Secretary of Defense. The President is also advised, in a statutory sense, by the National Security Council, a collegial body whose importance is dictated by the personality of the individual residing in the oval office.

Within both departments, designated offices support the process of integration of foreign and military policies. This task is undertaken, within the Department of State, by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Within the Department of Defense, the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs is the chief spokesman but is supported by military staffs within each Service as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The result is a plethora of interest and involvement in the foreign policy process which was unthought of thirty years ago.

1/ Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith (New York; Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 143.

2/ Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York; W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1974), p. 260.

3/ Sun Tzu Lists Factors for Consideration in The Art of War, pp. 64, 73, 74 as does Thucydides in The Peloponnesian War, trans. by Rex Warner (Bungay, Suffolk; the Chaucer Press, Ltd., 1971), pp. 208, 374.

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Organizational Responsibilities

The basic organization for foreign policy in many ways dictates the functions of each agency--or at least, implies their nature. The roles of the Secretaries of State and Defense, within their respective spheres of influence, are clear. What is less obvious are the coordinating roles of the supporting staffs within the departments, and the statutory responsibility of the National Security Council.

The principal obligation for advising the Secretary of State on the implications of defense policy rests with the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. The charter of this organization charges it, as the central point of contact within the department, with the responsibility for cognizance of all issues with political-military implications and all matters under joint consideration by the Departments of State and Defense.

Department of Defense staff functions present a somewhat more complex picture owing to the existence of formal organizations which represent individual Service and Joint Staff interests in foreign policy issues. Accommodation of diverse views is undertaken through formal working group sessions at all levels with results presented to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs who is responsible for the coordination of relations between the Department of Defense and the Department of State. As would be expected, the Assistant Secretary also serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters relating to State-Defense coordination.

Where divergent views between State and Defense cannot be accommodated or significant policy decisions are required, recommendations to the President may be solicited from and formulated by the National Security Council. This forum, through the mechanism of the inter-agency process, is structured to examine issues and to intergate domestic, foreign and military policies. Its very existence reflects the bureaucratic understanding of what Dean Acheson called ". . . the utter folly of trying to put political and military considerations through the equivalent of a cream separator." 4/

Given the organization for State-Defense relations in foreign policy formulation, the charter of these organizations, and assuming successful accomplishment of assigned functions, there would be no need for further examination of political-military coordination. However, as with any task, the availability of tools is no guarantee of a successful project. Skill in the selection and application of those tools is essential, and herein lies the key to success or failure of any foreign policy. It is within this context, and particularly as it applies to long range planning, that a selected group of past events will be examined as well as a list of potential areas of foreign policy confrontation. The issue is past effectiveness and future promise.

4/ Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York; Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1972), p. 159.

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## II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

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General

It is rarely wise to view the future through the lense of the past, but it can be of value to examine the processes which have, in the past, shaped events. In many ways such an examination of U. S. foreign policy would produce the feeling "that the American military profession has been prepared to fight the last war and the diplomatic has been prepared to prevent it." 5/ In part this observation could be supported by examining the breakdown in coordinated foreign policy planning in both the short and long term, and in the responsibility for its execution short of direct military involvement. Secretary of State Rusk noted that the problem of foreign policy planning involves not just the "formulation of clear policy guidelines" but their transmittal "to all departments for their guidance and instruction." 6/ Nelson Rockefeller, in 1969, spelled out one of the reasons for lack of coordination when he pointed out that ". . .the State Department does not have effective overall responsibility for foreign policy where the interests of other departments of the government are concerned." 7/ This charge is even more surprising in view of the attempts by Presidents Kennedy 8/ and Johnson 9/ to centralize responsibility within the Department of State. But perhaps the most telling blow is the assertions that even today ". . .the power necessary to the conduct of foreign policy is fragmented. . . ." that ". . .the linkage between U. S. military forces and the nations foreign policy objectives is typically loose and occassionally broken," and that ". . .the means for insuring the integration and coherence of policy are everywhere meager, while the pressures toward the disjointed and conflicting treatment of related issues are uniformly powerful." 10/ There are those, however, who would contend that coordinated foreign policy has been developed, adopted and employed to the benefit of the nation. Dean Acheson states that President Truman looked ". . .principally to the Department of State in determining foreign policy and--except when force was necessary--exclusively in executing it." 11/ Robert McNamara, in a letter to Senator Henry Jackson, commented that he doubted if there had ". . .ever been any closer coordination, cooperation and mutual understanding between the two Departments [State and Defense] than we are now experiencing." 12/

5/ Donald F. Bletz, The Role of the Military Professional in U. S. Foreign Policy (New York; Praeger, 1972), p. 268.

6/ U. S. Department of State, "The Underlying Crisis: Coercion vs. Choice," Department of State Bulletin, Vol XLV, #1153 (31 July 1961), p. 179.

7/ U. S. Department of State, "Quality of Life in the Americas," Department of State Bulletin, Vol LXI, #1589 (8 December 1969), p. 509.

8/ U. S. Department of State, "Responsibilities of U. S. Ambassadors," Department of State Bulletin, Vol XLV, #1172 (11 December 1961), p. 994.

9/ Frederick C. Mosher and John E. Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership (New York; Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 3.

10/ Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy (New York; Basic Books, Inc., 1976), pp. IX, 171, 15.

11/ Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York; W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), p. 734.

12/ Robert S. McNamara, Letter to Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 13 July 1964.

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The difference of opinion may spring from ones view of the foreign policy process itself, and it may be useful here to distinguish between the macro policy of national survival and the more micro policies which, though of national security significance, by comparison deal with regions or issues. In the former instance, it would be difficult to view State and Defense as lacking in long range coordinated planning. Differences of opinion would rest on the degree of acceptable risk associated with a particular posture rather than on the need for survival. The more difficult issues are those which demand more conventional responses--where national survival is not so directly threatened--where commitment may bring more immediate grief than reward.

In either case the call has been for more systematic foreign policy formulation <sup>13/</sup> to avoid what has variously been described as ". . .the grief and frustration encountered in both the framing and understanding of foreign policy. . ." <sup>14/</sup> and as ". . .generalization and ambiguity. . ." <sup>15/</sup> Using these brief comments to illuminate the way, the first historical milestone reads. . .

Korea - 1950

U. S. involvement in Korea was precipitated by World War II, and the subsequent evacuation by American forces following the establishment of a South Korean Government--a logical and necessary decision. It was logical because no one in either the Departments of State or Defense saw Korea as essential to U. S. national security. <sup>16/</sup> It was necessary because of declining force levels, resulting from budget cuts, to support other programs. By February 1948, "the services did not have enough men to implement their joint war plan, and the strength of the Army was below that considered necessary to perform even its routine occupation and training missions." <sup>17/</sup> The nations defense was a ". . .hollow shell. . ." <sup>18/</sup> It was also, however, a time when "in a variety of ways it had become evident within the government that defense capabilities and commitments bore little relationship to each other." <sup>19/</sup> In this atmosphere NSC 68 was born to ". . .undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans. . ." <sup>20/</sup>

The North Koreans did not await the outcome of this study but rather read the signs (reduced budget, manpower levels, and public pronouncement) as abandonment of South Korea and invaded. Acheson saw the attack as ". . .an open, undisguised challenge to our internationally accepted position as the protector

<sup>13/</sup> U. S. Department of State, "U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace," Department of State Bulletin, Vol LXII, #1602 (9 March 1970), p. 280.

<sup>14/</sup> U. S. Department of State, "Capability and Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin, Vol XXXVII, #940 (1 July 1957), p. 22.

<sup>15/</sup> Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 430.

<sup>16/</sup> Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 357.

<sup>17/</sup> Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York; Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 41.

<sup>18/</sup> Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>19/</sup> Ibid., p. 285.

<sup>20/</sup> Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 349.

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of South Korea, an area of great importance to the security of American occupied Japan." 21/ He further noted that "to back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States." 22/ The question of our ultimate involvement was then not so much one of should we, but could we. Although willing to approve commitment of air and naval forces, the military chiefs were not in favor of using ground troops but Acheson prevailed and a regimental combat team was dispatched, as a precursor of other forces, to the peninsula. He would have reason to recall that the confidence which he ". . . felt on June 30 was shaken by the inability of the outnumbered, poorly equipped and very green American troops to hold back the North Koreans." 23/ Dean Rusk has suggested that initially committed U. S. forces were saved from total defeat by the very act of entering the conflict. It gave the North Koreans and their sponsors pause to reflect on the political and military consequences of engaging American troops. Time bought survival. 24/

In this situation, the state of our military readiness was brought about by rapid post war demobilization, military budgets of only thirteen billion a year (with a target of ten), and forces in being, which were described as ". . . a present weakness [which] would prevent us from offering effective resistance at any of several vital pressure points." 25/ The apparent reversal of our diplomatic stance was the result of a growing list of Soviet actions--no doubt spawned in part by our own military posture (Iran, Eastern Europe, Berlin, and the Russian detonation of an atomic device).

In this instance military readiness and foreign policy commitment passed each other going opposite directions. There was no coordinated planning until too late to avert a near disaster. What coordinated planning did occur in NSC 68 prior to the outbreak of the war formed the basis for initial rearmament. 26/ As noted by Glenn Snyder:

NSC 68 became a milestone in the consolidation of perspectives, establishing at least some kind of order of priority and magnitude between economy and security, domestic and foreign commitments, economic and military means, American and allied strength, and short and long range national interests. 27/

21/ Ibid., p. 405.

22/ Ibid., p. 405.

23/ Smith, Dean Acheson, p. 193.

24/ Dean Rusk, Private Interview held at University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, March 1977.

25/ National Security Council, NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (14 April 1950), p. 36.

26/ Shilling, Hammond, and Snyder, Strategy, p. 351.

27/ Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder, Strategy, p. 363.

Cuba - 1962

The Cuban missile crisis--a political and military confrontation described as ". . . as grave a crisis as mankind has been in." 28/--has been widely discussed, journalized, analyzed and dissected. To examine its origins, trace its development and disposition, would be of little utility. What is of significance is how events were channeled.

For the U. S. it was a successful, if hasty and unplanned, marriage of diplomacy and force to achieve what was essentially a return to the status quo ante. Satisfaction must be tempered, however, by viewing this success in the context of the time and place of occurrence. The time was but a year after the Bay of Pigs debacle, a disastrous example of incomplete planning and coordination. 29/ Dean Rusk has observed that much was learned from that failure about the necessity for thorough and detailed verbal (as opposed to written) examination of options. 30/ These lessons were applied to the missile crisis. The place was equally important, and the proximity of the potential conflict arena bestowed upon the U. S. a preponderance of local superiority--a situation which augured well for success. 31/ This last point is especially significant if one recalls that but a year earlier, during the Berlin crisis of 1961, reserve forces had to be mobilized in order to meet the requirement for additional troop units in Europe. 32/ The difference between 90 miles and an ocean away is striking.

Dean Rusk has remarked that in his opinion, the planning and execution of the military and diplomatic aspects of this confrontation were as technically well handled as anything in his experience. 33/ Its success was not based on prior contingency plans or matured policy. Rather, local military superiority in every category, coupled with the Secretary of States determination to ". . . stop all ships. . . if need be. . . with a shot across the bow. . ." and ". . . if this is ignored, the next shot will be into the ship itself," 34/ was the catalyst for accommodation.

Cyprus - 1963 and 1967

The two previous events pitted U. S. diplomatic and military strength against adversaries--separated though they were by time and relative distance. Cyprus was, by contrast, a problem which involved not only two allies, but two members of the NATO alliance, and two whose geographic locations were critical both for

28/ U. S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram from Rusk, 23 October 1962 (Limited Official Use).

29/ Morton H. Halperin takes specific note of JCS failure to properly analyze the Bay of Pigs plan in Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.; Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 119.

30/ Rusk, Interview, March 1977.

31/ One of several factors discussed by Commander James Alden Barber, Jr., USN, in "Military Force and Non-Military Threats," Military Review (Feb 1975), p. 5.

32/ For a more complete discussion see Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York; Harper and Row, 1968), p. 79.

33/ Rusk, Interview, March 1977.

34/ U. S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram from Rusk, 23 October 1963.

defense of that alliance and for U. S. based intelligence efforts. 35/ Diplomatic techniques were somewhat different.

The Cypriot problem did not arise as a new issue. It had smoldered for many years under various masters--but by this very fact the forces for independence focused internal dissension against external presence. Independence was achieved in 1960, and guaranteed by a tripartite commission composed of Britain, Greece and Turkey. Naturally, independence did not resolve the conflicts between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish minority. Rather it permitted the focusing of dissent which in the span of three years brought not only Cyprus to the brink of civil conflict but threatened to involve Greece and Turkey as well.

The 1963 confrontation presented the tripartite commission with an almost insoluble situation and caused British Colonial and Commonwealth Secretary Sandys to remark to Secretary Rusk that ". . .one should be prepared for violence. . . ." 36/ The U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were particularly concerned at the apparent inability of the United Kingdom to react to the Cyprus situation 37/ and this concern was not assuaged when it became known that the British had no contingency plans to forstall or control Turkish unilateral action--an event which seemed most likely. 38/

Continued deterioration of the situation on Cyprus, British decisions to withdraw from the commission and relinquish responsibility for the area, and growing tensions between Turkey and Greece 39/ led the U. S. to the forefront in attempts to find the basis for a negotiated settlement. Dean Rusk has noted that the form of the agreement or settlement really did not matter to the U. S. --it was the cessation of hostilities on Cyprus, the prevention of open warfare between allies, and the preservation of the NATO alliance which was important. 40/ In retrospect this attitude may have perpetuated difficulties, for although a formula was worked out in conjunction with United Nations participation, the basic problem of Cyprus remained unattended and unsolved--perhaps obscured by other more immediate problems.

Untended problems have a habit of reappearing and the Cyprus situation was no exception. It rekindled and flared anew in 1967, in many respects more violently than ever before. The U. N. forces were incapable of containing the conflict and were reduced to reporting events. The Governments of both Greece and

35/ This was particularly true by 1967 when these intelligence and communications installations were judged to be--to a large extent--irreplacable. U. S. Department of State, Memo for Cyprus Working Group from NEA/RA, "Contingency Paper: Suspension of U. S. Military Assistance to Greece and Turkey" (21 November 1967), SECRET/LIMDIS.

36/ U. S. Department of State, Memo of Conversation Between Colonial and Commonwealth Secretary Sandys and Secretary Rusk (19 December 1963), SECRET.

37/ U. S. Department of State, Memo to Johnson from William Tyler (16 January 1964), CONFIDENTIAL. See also State/JCS Meeting of 17 January--U.K. Military Involvement Worldwide.

38/ U. S. Department of State, Draft Memo to Undersecretary Ball from Phillips Talbot, NEA, "Cyprus Contingency Planning to Forstall or Control Turkish Unilateral Action" (14 February 1964), SECRET.

39/ U. S. Department of State, Incoming Telegram from Ankara, Turkey, Quoting from Unsigned Milliyet Editorial of 30 December 1963 (1 January 1964).

40/ Rusk, Interview, March 1977.

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Turkey were reminded repeatedly by the U. S. of the ". . . incalculable costs of war. . . ." 41/ but the principals did not appear to recognize reason. Finally, more out of a sense of desperation than hope, President Johnson dispatched Cyrus Vance as a special envoy to ". . . assist the Government of Greece, the Government of Turkey and the Government of Cyprus to discover a peaceful way out of the present situation of tension and to remove the danger of war from the Eastern Mediterranean." 42/ Secretary Rusk indicated that the "strategy for the U. S. is now in the hands of the Vance mission, and we here do not yet know what form this is taking." 43/ It is a tribute to Mr. Vance's ability as a negotiator that a peaceful settlement was achieved.

The reader may have noted a lack of discussion about U. S. military involvement in either Cyprus crisis. With the exception of forces ready to evacuate U. S. dependents there was little involvement. In fact, Dean Rusk indicated that direct intervention of U. S. forces was never considered in these instances. He did note however, that Turkey had been warned that open warfare with Greece, which might involve third party intervention [Russia] would negate U. S. NATO commitments to Turkey. 44/ Certainly this could qualify as indirect application of U. S. military force.

U. S. diplomatic efforts on the other hand, while more obvious, appeared to be built around a crisis management mentality as opposed to a solution orientation. While basic problems were finally addressed by a special study group on Cyprus in December of 1967, 45/ follow up was not aggressively pursued and this permitted continuing, unresolved, simmering confrontation between not only the Cypriot communities but the Governments of Turkey and Greece as well. Mr. Vance, while noting that his mission ". . . properly eschewed responsibility for long term solutions. . . ." cautioned that all interested parties ". . . expect dangerous crises to recur in the months and years ahead unless a fundamental solution can be developed acceptable to all." 46/ The special study group concluded that ". . . a settlement will likely have to be sought on the basis of. . . ." if not partition, 47/ at least ". . . an independent Cyprus." 48/

Cyprus was then a situation where adequate military leverage was available to permit control of conflict and allow diplomatic initiatives. U. S. policy, however, was to forgo direct military intervention and obtain any agreement which would give the appearance, if not the fact, of tranquility. Thus, the difficulties and uncertainties associated with negotiations for a permanent solution were

41/ U. S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram from Rusk (22 November 1967), SECRET.

42/ U. S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram (23 November 1967), CONFIDENTIAL.

43/ U. S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram from Rusk (24 November 1967), SECRET.

44/ Rusk, Interview, March 1977.

45/ U. S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram from Katzenbach (12 December 1967), SECRET.

46/ U. S. Department of State, Memo for the President from Vance (5 December 1967), SECRET.

47/ U. S. Department of State, Memo to Mr. Jernegan, NEA, "Long Range Solutions in Cyprus" (5 March 1964), CONFIDENTIAL.

48/ U. S. Department of State, Memo for the President from Rusk, "Strategy for Negotiation of a Cyprus Settlement" (17 January 1968), SECRET.

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avoided. Foreign policy options were not constrained by military factors since forces planned for NATO and the Mediterranean were adequate to meet such a contingency. Constraints were diplomatic and self imposed.

Israel - 1973

The last of the historical events to be examined is the most recent conflict between the Arab world and Israel. This confrontation was especially interesting because it required a foreign policy response attuned to military, economic and emotional pressures. In the first instance the goal was to maintain the military balance between the Arabs and Israelis; in the second to preserve the flow of petroleum to the U. S., Japan and Europe; and finally to balance the sensitivities of Arab and Jewish apologists in both the U. S. and Mid-East while working to achieve a negotiated settlement.

The need to maintain a military balance brought strong emotions into play within the Arab world and resulted in an oil embargo which threatened to strangle the economic life of our allies.

(b)(1)  
~~(S)~~  
(a)(5)

49/ U. S. Department of State, Incoming Telegram, "Middle East War--British Request for Information Regarding U. S. Resupply of Israel" (15 October 1973), SECRET.

50/ U. S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram from Kissinger (17 October 1973), SECRET.

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This situation was one in which U. S. policy was clear--support for the existence of the State of Israel--but neither diplomatic nor military planning had been tested for adequacy to support that policy. Most planners, both diplomatic and military assumed that use of bases and overflight permission would be virtually automatic. Planning based on these assumptions very nearly failed for two reasons. First, on the diplomatic side, there were no agreements specific enough to permit U. S. use of bases and prepositioned stocks to defend U. S. national interests anywhere in the world. Secondly, on the military side, flight crews on the C-5 aircraft were not trained in air refueling even though the aircraft was so equipped, and the C-141 aircraft had no air refueling capability at all. There was, in short, only planning for the best of all circumstances.

Foreign policy options were constrained both diplomatically and militarily--reinforcing the bad features in each case. There was a breakdown in coordinated planning which failed to examine the range of likely contingencies. The line between success and failure was thinly drawn.

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III. INTERREGNUM

These four events paint a confused picture on the canvas of political-military coordination and long range planning. In only one was U. S. foreign policy clearly indicated--Israel. Cyprus was an example of a non-policy, Cuba an ad hoc policy and Korea a reversal of policy. Military readiness to support foreign policy goals cannot be judged more kindly. There were no forces for Korea--but there were none for any other contingency either, although this was not a military decision. Cyprus and Cuba presented opportunities for use of forces to promote U. S. national interests, but not by virtue of specific plans. Cyprus was covered by NATO forces--Cuba by proximity to the U. S. homeland. Finally, Israel pointed up the lag between need, recognition and acquisition in a changing environment. The Arab use of oil as a weapon was clearly possible, the plans to foil such a contingency were unformulated. Military power was unprepared. An examination of these events suggests three very general guidelines which might have improved U. S. foreign policy performance. These are:

- Military forces in being should be sufficient to meet our foreign policy commitments--not all simultaneously--but those most likely to arise in concert.
- Specific contingency plans for every situation are unnecessary [Cuba and Cyprus] but general guidelines (security of Israel; freedom of the seas; NATO support, Japanese defense treaty; etc.) should be formulated, promulgated and supported by military procurement.
- Coordinated long range planning between State and Defense--which has been less than successful in the past--is a necessity if present and future foreign policy initiatives are to have any hope of success.

Given a very broad understanding of some of the possible causes for failure in the past, an examination of potential areas of conflict may indicate the degree to which we have absorbed lessons learned.

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IV. POTENTIAL AREAS OF CONFRONTATION

General

The future is now! Many times this theme is used to introduce new products or services. Many times the veracity of that claim may be questioned. With respect to military forces however, the claim is valid and must be recognized by those who develop our foreign policy. Forces we have in being today--in terms of quality and quantity--were determined five or more years ago. What we will have five or more years from now is being decided today. Policy may be changed by the stroke of a pen. Resources to support a change may require years to realize.

Because of this lead and lag phenomena, it is, in the words of the Murphy Commission, essential that ". . .foreign policy--achieve coherence overtime." 51/ It continues with the admonition that:

The planning function must insure that current policy takes account of future trends and long term purposes and priorities, that current actions are reevaluated from time to time, and that new initiatives are generated. 52/

Our recent past provides hope that we have learned at least some lessons, but there remains more which must be done. For example, in 1970, Secretary of Defense Laird modified the then current two-and-one-half war force posturing requirement to one-and-one-half for a very practical reason. Force levels required for the former had never been achieved and were unlikely to be attained. 53/ More recently it has become clear that competing domestic requirements, internal and external economic and political pressures, and legitimate national interests, increase the possibilities for world instability.

Certainly most recognize the need for planning, but policy guidance for purpose and priorities is not always clearly stated. Admiral Thomas Moorer has criticized this shortcoming and stated that as a result:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had found it necessary to draw on speeches, press conferences, congressional testimony, and documents issued by the President and senior cabinet officials for the guidance necessary to develop the joint strategic objectives plan which is the foundation of the structure of the Defense Department budget. 54/

51/ Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Robert D. Murphy, Chairman (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 13.

52/ Ibid., p. 13.

53/ U. S. Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird Before the House Subcommittee on DoD Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget (25 February 1970), p. 16.

54/ Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret.), "Formulation of National Policy," Strategic Review (Fall, 1975), p. 7. (The author has experienced this same difficulty.)

The result has been that while--

In principle, the U. S. military posture should be designed to reflect a coherent view of foreign policy objectives and threats to those objectives, at present it is difficult to extract such a link from official statements except at the most general level. 55/

This is where the planning process stands today and one need only turn the page to examine readiness to meet potential difficulties.

Korea

Recent public discussion over a phased withdrawal of troops from Korea has generated concern among U. S. Pacific allies--most notably Japan. The cause for concern rests not so much on the fact of discussion as on the source--the President of the United States.

Defense planners have recognized the need to examine future modification of our Korean force levels, but policy guidance has been slow. In terms of defense planning, Secretary of Defense Laird suggested that:

As ground force capabilities of our Asian allies improve, we should reconfigure our ground force structure to better suit our needs--such as NATO. . . . This guidance does not preclude the actual utilization of U. S. ground forces in the event of a Chinese attack. Nor does it mean that we will not continue with our guarantees of ground force assistance to our allies, if needed. 56/

More recently Secretary Schlesinger directed that:

While the Republic of Korea may attain enough military capability to successfully defend itself against North Korean aggression, U. S. forces are required in Korea, in the short run at least, to perform a key stabilizing role in the regional and global balance. 57/

In his guidance the present Secretary of Defense hopes to:

Encourage the Koreans to improve their military capabilities so that in the longer run U. S. deployments may be reduced. 58/

55/ U. S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Planning U. S. General Purpose Forces: Overview (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1977), p.2.

56/ U. S. Department of Defense, Defense Policy and Planning Guidance for FY 1974-1978 (23 October 1971), p. 11, SECRET.

57/ U. S. Department of Defense, Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (4 November 1975), p. 6, SECRET.

58/ U. S. Department of Defense, Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (11 March 1977), p. I-6, SECRET.

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Diplomatic reexamination of our Korean commitment appears to have been less objective, for at the same time that a goal of phased withdrawal of ground troops was announced, a reaffirmation of our commitment to South Korea was promulgated. The two pronouncements appear orthogonal rather than congruent and in fact may produce enough uncertainty to invite conflict in the years ahead.

The question of commitment should examine scope, duration, and forces necessary to meet our pledge. If direct military support is promised, particularly ground forces, then some U. S. troops should be based within the host country. Dean Rusk views such basing both as a tripwire and as a token of our commitment, each a valuable foreign policy asset. <sup>59/</sup> It is not unlikely that the U. S. would commit additional resources given that ground troop units were engaged with an adversary. On the other hand, it is problematic that any would be introduced into the conflict if none were already present or engaged. The price of maintaining forces in a host country is much less than the cost in time, lives, and dollars of forcing their return or re-entry in the face of resistance.

If our commitment remains the preservation of the independence of South Korea as a sovereign state, and if our current troop levels within Korea are maintained, then our promise is realistic. If our commitment does not change and ground forces are withdrawn, then it is not obvious the forces planned for the future are capable of meeting our pledge. The choices seem clear, maintain forces to support current obligations or bring guarantees into line with planned military capability. In the latter case, if compacts are of finite duration or decreasing scope, then it should be so indicated. The failure to support a commitment can be more disastrous to international confidence and prestige than defeat in the attempt.

#### Berlin

The situation in Berlin is intriguing from the point of view of U. S. ability to defend that city against a communist takeover--either by diplomacy or military force. Commitment here is charged with emotion. Secretary of Defense McNamara once described the situation in the following words:

What is at stake there is not only the territory of that city [Berlin] or the freedom of its two million people, but even more important, the ability of the free world alliance to continue to be master of its own destiny. <sup>60/</sup>

Yet historically the U. S. has been militarily unprepared to counter threats against that city with less than all out war--a threat which even in 1948 and 1961 would have surpassed the bounds of credibility. Today our military situation remains unchanged.

<sup>59/</sup> Rusk, Interview, March 1977.

<sup>60/</sup> U. S. Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary of Defense McNamara Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on the FY 1963-1967 Program and the 1963 Defense Budget (19 January 1962), p. 7. SECRET.

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The diplomatic situation remains unchanged as well. Far from revising our commitment we insist on its restatement. The current Vice President of the United States, as one of the first acts of the new administration, visited West Berlin and pledged U. S. support. The guarantee is clear but the question remains as to the means to enforce it.

If it is judged that West Berlin is critical to our national security, then we should be prepared to honor our pledges. We are not prepared to do so today, and our planning for future forces does not contain those elements requisite to the accomplishment of such a task--even with first use of tactical nuclear weapons. It is difficult to suggest that NATO leaders view the situation through rose colored glasses. It is not unlikely, however, that the people of Europe and particularly of Germany and West Berlin believe that U. S. military force would be used to preserve that city's existence. If this policy--this guarantee, real or implied--is an anachronism, then it should be modified, however painful may be the process. The existence of a commitment which cannot be honored in the breach is an open invitation, to friend and foe alike, to view all commitments with suspicion--a situation with catastrophic potential.

Middle East

Conditions in the Middle East since 1973 have remained static although efforts have been undertaken to move toward some negotiated settlement in the Arab-Israeli dispute. There remains nevertheless, the very real threat of renewed conflict both on the military and economic fronts. The former as a result on the internecine warfare in Lebanon, the latter as a consequence of diplomatic sluggishness in Arab-Israeli negotiations.

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61/ U. S. Department of State, Incoming Telegram, "Saudi Thinking on U. S. Resupply of Israel, Saudi Arabian Government Involvement in War, and Possible Use of Oil Weapon" (12 October 1973), SECRET.

62/ Ibid.

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63/ Ibid.

64/ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "U. S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus,"  
Foreign Affairs, Vol 50, No. 4 (July 1973), p. 720.

65/ Ibid., p. 723.

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66/ U. S. Department of Defense, Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (FY 1977-1981), 27 October 1974, p. 3, SECRET.

67/ U. S. Department of Defense, For Comment Draft of the Defense Guidance (9 July 1976), p. 18, SECRET.

68/ U. S. Department of Defense, Defense Policy and Planning Guidance For FY 1974-1978 (23 October 1971), p. 18.

69/ U. S. Department of Defense, For Comment Draft of the Defense Guidance (9 July 1976), p. 2, SECRET.

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V. OBSERVATIONS

Integrated, coordinated foreign policy planning seems no more present today than in the past, though time compression of events on the one hand and lead time for military hardware on the other make it more necessary. It is all too true that:

International politics is dominated by crisis. The result is that we often mistake these crises for the reality of international politics. Going from crisis to crisis, we simply lose sight of the more basic and often more important changes that imperceptibly re-shape the world in which we live. 70/

Military planning reaches five years into the future in terms of funding profiles and well beyond that time frame in terms of requirements. However, given no firm policy goals, planning is conducted in a vacuum which, while not total, suffers from a lack of balance. It is therefore often too focused and inadequate to meet diverse demands. Thus it is, that while:

Decisions can be avoided until a crisis brooks no further delay, until the events themselves have removed the element of ambiguity. . . at that point the scope for constructive action is at a minimum. Certainty is purchased at the cost of creativity. 71/

If we examine Korea, Berlin and the Middle East, it is clear that none but the last represents an area critical to our national survival. All have, however, assumed criticality by virtue of habit, custom and usage. In so doing they have limited U. S. flexibility and independence of action and have placed our entire alliance system in jeopardy. Recognizing this fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated:

The credibility of U. S. commitments is a security asset. Failure to honor valid commitments not affecting U. S. vital interests could imperil other and much more vital interests. If commitments are not to be honored, they should be withdrawn. 72/

As noted, the Middle East is a different matter in terms of national security, but even here our ability to meet stated objectives to allies, Arabs and Israelis is non-existent--both now and for the foreseeable future. We cannot guarantee uninterrupted petroleum supplies to our allies, we cannot promise a negotiated peace which will please everyone, and most importantly, we have failed to establish a realistic set of regional priorities consistent with our capabilities.

70/ U. S. Department of State, "The Implications of Change for U. S. Foreign Policy," Zbigniew Brzezinski, Department of State Bulletin, Vol LVII, #1462 (3 July 1967), p. 19.

71/ Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, p. 18.

72/ U. S. Department of Defense, Joint Long Range Strategic Study, FY 1986-1995 (8 August 1975), p. 11, SECRET.

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Needs are clear, but solutions in terms of identification and implementation are more difficult. It has been suggested in the Murphy Commission report that:

One major impediment to effective longer range forecasting and planning for foreign policy has been a strong reluctance [within the State Department] to employ new methodologies and analytic techniques. 73/

The output of these techniques would provide the basis for a more closely orchestrated foreign policy under the direction of the Secretary of State. The problems of and approaches to a coherent foreign policy formulation were defined by Ambassador Hare, apply to all participants in the process and remain as true today as when he stated them twenty years ago. He said that:

. . .there are certain rules governing foreign policy somewhat like those governing other sciences, especially the social sciences; that among these rules is that of capability; that because of the limitations of capability, there are corresponding limitations in foreign policy formulation; that there is no excuse for failure to analyze foreign policy problems beyond the usual margin allowed for the fact that we are human; but that foreign policy is not in the nature of some newfangled wonder drug capable in itself of producing international miracles but is subject to practical procedures by which problems can be realistically and systematically analyzed and logical conclusions reached; that despite our great strength, the potential available for application to any specific problem is limited in many ways; that just as the problems themselves are complex, so must the solutions usually be mixtures of things which we desire and things we would prefer to have otherwise; that with our increased responsibilities come greatly increased limitations on our actions to which governments of smaller countries are not subjected; that these limitations of capability are not something to be accepted with resigned fatalism but rather are factors to be studied objectively with a view to making the most of our planning skills and our capability in working toward our objectives. 74/

It is not possible to know with certainty if such an approach would bear fruit; it is too late to ignore the possibility. Time, given the volatile nature of international relations, is no longer on our side.

73/ Commission on Organization for Conduct of Foreign Policy, Murphy, p. 149.

74/ U. S. Department of State, "Capability and Foreign Policy," Ambassador to Egypt Raymond A. Hare, Department of State Bulletin, Vol XXXVII, #940 (1 July 1957), p. 25.

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