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
EDITORIAL PERCEPTIONS OF DETENTE

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EIGHTEENTH SESSION

SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



1975 - 1976

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EDITORIAL PERCEPTIONS OF DETENTE

Case Study by THOMAS J. HIRSCHFELD

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Editorial Perceptions of Detente

Methodology:

In the preparation of this study, I reviewed a large number of recent detente-related editorials from a variety of American newspapers in an attempt to identify the principal areas of editorial disagreement about detente. These included: the "actual" meaning of the word--what Nixon, Kissinger, and/or Brezhnev intended in the first place; what the American public understood by this concept, and whether or not such understandings had been intended; the motivations behind President Ford's attempt to redefine detente--whether detente was equally beneficial to both sides; whether the Soviets are greater beneficiaries of this policy, or even, as some contend, whether detente is a one-way street. Most discussion tended to be cast in terms of positions on: who got more from the (grain) deal; who won (SALT); was detente dead or worth pursuing, and were there any real alternatives. Specific subjects included: 1) Arms Control, particularly SALT¹--did the Soviets cheat in SALT I, did they achieve a better bargain, are the Vladivostok accords a sound basis for SALT II,² or does the US need to get "more"; 2) how to reconcile recent Soviet (or Cuban) behavior in Southern Africa with the May 1972 US/Soviet undertakings to "do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which will serve to increase international tensions";³ 3) Soviet interest in US grain, credits and technology, and more specifically, whether the US has or could successfully manipulate these interests to its advantage; 4) China--was there really an improved relationship with mainland China, and if so, was it worth cultivating; 5) moral questions--could the US pursue detente, or an improved closer relationship with the USSR without confronting the latter on matters of traditional US interests in human freedom, e.g. Soviet dissidents, emigration of Soviet Jews, better treatment for journalists; 6) defense questions--if the Soviets were building their forces at the rates some observers suggested, was detente a sensible policy, should we attempt to match them, and if so, with what forces, at what cost?

These questions or subject areas were used as points of departure for interviewing the editorial page editors and editorial writers listed in the appendix from the following Middle-Western and Western newspapers chosen as representative: Cincinnati Enquirer, Minneapolis Tribune, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Denver Post, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Los Angeles Times.

Many editors or writers had particular hobby-horses or reflected the particular interests of local readerships, e.g. keen interest in US grain sales, juxtaposed with rather cursory understanding (but sometimes strong views) on European security issues (CSCE/MBFR).⁴ Given these variations of knowledge and interest, I used an informal interviewing approach, trying to touch on each subject area as it arose naturally in discussion, rather than employing a questionnaire.

Furthermore, I tried to avoid giving any impression that a Washington investigation or survey of press attitudes was in progress, or that the Government was in any way attempting to influence editorial opinion by providing an occasion for discussion or argument. I therefore made clear that Senior Seminar papers were independent and individual studies, and that I was interested in their personal and professional views as opinion formers, rather than in any conformity or nonconformity of their papers to current US policy lines. Subjects were raised on a straightforward basis--"how do you or your paper define detente", or on an either/or basis--"some say that....however others contend....do you agree with either...."

Without exception, the editors and writers interviewed were friendly, forthcoming, and straightforward. If I have misrepresented any of their views in any way, it is entirely unintentional.

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Toujours pas trop de Zele; toujours la precision

Talleyrand

I. Detente Defined:

The dictionary (in this case Larousse) defines detente in the international context as an easing, relaxation, or slackening of tensions or of a situation. There are no synonyms in English or Russian.

In March 1976 President Ford called the term "detente" "no longer applicable" in describing the US relations with the USSR and China, adding that the US will continue to negotiate with them in "a policy of peace through strength". "Detente is only a word that has been coined," the President said. "I don't think it is applicable anymore. I think we have to talk about the reality--negotiations for the lowering of the strategic nuclear ballistic capability. We ought to talk about trade. We ought to talk about science, and those things, in an atmosphere where we're dealing from strength, and we recognize others may have some. But we have to have the strength to move ahead."

The Department's semi-official capsule elaboration of the Detente policy as issued by the Bureau of Public Affairs, (February 1975) and, therefore, presumably available to the press, runs as follows:

MEANING: The search for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. A continuing process.

RATIONALE: Based on the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. No peaceful international order or stability can exist without a constructive relationship. Neither power can impose its will on the other without running an intolerable risk.

DIFFICULTIES: Agreements are hard to reach due to deep differences in historical development, values, ideology and interests.

PRINCIPLES: Not based on Moscow's good intentions or the compatibility of domestic systems. American and Soviet purposes do not have to converge for discussion of issues.

-- We must oppose aggressive actions and irresponsible behavior, but do not seek confrontations lightly.

-- We must maintain a strong national defense, but recognize the complexity of the relationship between military strength and politically usable power.

-- We cannot be neutral between freedom and tyranny, but there are limits to our ability to produce internal changes in a foreign country.

-- Advantages must be provided for both sides if a stable relationship is to exist.

DEVELOPMENT: Despite postwar tensions and sporadic confrontations, repeated efforts have been made to improve our relationship with the Soviets: Geneva, Camp David, Glassboro.

-- Time was propitious in the late 1960's for an attempt to go further: fragmentation of the Communist world, near parity in strategic weapons, economic problems, desire of Soviet people for an improved standard of living.

-- Clear choice for the US: provide incentives most conducive to peace.

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BENEFITS: Tension reduced, framework for more cooperative future established.

- SALT agreements on nuclear arms
- Agreement on the status of Berlin
- Negotiations on MBFR/CSCE on Europe
- Commercial, scientific, technological, cultural agreements signed
- Principles of behavior signed on avoiding confrontation, need for mutual restraint, etc.
- Channels of communication established to lessen chances of misunderstanding.

MOMENTUM: Depends on cooperation to remove crises. Progress in one area adds to progress in others. The balance must be struck over a whole range of relations over a period of time and not on each issue every day.

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II. Detente Perceived:

No editor or writer took the extreme negative position, i.e., that detente is an error, that the concept should be scrapped with the term, and that the US should recognize "realities" by returning to a posture of across-the-board confrontation. In definitional or explanatory terms, the differences of view related to how narrow the areas of attempted US/Soviet cooperation should be, and on where the US needed to be strong and show its strength. In this sense there seemed to be sympathy among some editors and writers with the underlying purpose of President Ford's redefinition, although, paradoxically, few took the redefinition itself seriously. Most ascribed it to the needs of the 1976 presidential campaign. Writers said that there was little more than political polemics in the attempt to define the word itself; that the word was "not gone," but redefined in haste; that redefinition was a silly reaction to co-opt Reagan and Jackson supporters--just a change in terminology; that the President acted because he felt detente was a codeword for Soft-on-Communism. Others said detente is a succinct word which neatly fits headlines and doubted that it means much to the average reader, or that detente was a perfectly good word, and attempts to change it were absurd.

One editorial writer characterized negative public attitudes about detente from both ends of the political spectrum as follows: from the right: can't trust the Russians, no sense in dealing with them, detente is a one-way street, and we have been gulled. US is now afraid to stand up for freedom (in Angola, for Solzhenitsyn), US fails to support its friends, detente casts doubt on American credibility as an Ally and resulted in half-way measures in Vietnam where we could and should have won; from the left: detente is shorthand for Kissinger/Nixon/Ford and, as such, represents foreign policy by secrecy and duplicity (Allende/Castro Assassination plots); although not directly related, detente calls to mind, by inference, Mayaguez, Cambodia bombings and Vietnam. Finally both kinds of detente critics make much of the allegation that practicing detente inhibited our ability to be true to our principles (viz. Solzhenitsyn, emigration of Soviet Jews, etc.).

No one would quantify how much of the feeling or steam behind attacks on detente were personal, i.e., directed at Secretary Kissinger. None seemed to think that he was the central factor, but most thought that he was an important consideration. In the words of one editor, "much of the carping at detente is really carping at Kissinger. His style is beginning to pall on the Hill; his personality is beginning to rub many the wrong way. Much of it is just plain jealousy within the establishment. Kissinger is a hard act to follow."

Opinions differed on the issue of whether the Administration had oversold detente, and on whether and how much the public misinterpreted the concept. Thomas Gephardt (Cincinnati Enquirer) thought that the principal danger in detente lay in its public interpretation as a broad condition beyond relaxation of bilateral tensions or a period of negotiations in contrast to confrontation. Since detente was made possible by a credible military posture, a broad or relaxed public interpretation of the term could erode the very military strength which makes the policy possible. Woo (St. Louis Post-Dispatch) agreed that the concept had not been deliberately oversold. In his view, however, unreal public expectations were raised by the intensity of the rhetoric flowing from or related to the political timing of detente events (e.g. SALT I, 1972), when detente achievements were maximized in an atmosphere of political self-congratulation as the election approached. This process tarnished the government's credibility, raising questions about many issues, including detente.

As to what detente means, journalists questioned differed considerably, not only among themselves, but also with the Administration's views, and the views they ascribed to the public. White (Minneapolis Tribune) saw detente as referring primarily to the US/Soviet relationship. He agreed with critics

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III. Detente Issues:


A. SALT/Arms Control:

No one said that strategic arms limitations were not worth pursuing. The arguments related to whether the Soviets could be trusted, whether the bargains already struck were equitable, (or onesided in favor of the USSR) and whether the Vladivostok accords provided a sound framework for the next SALT agreement. Gephardt was satisfied with the outcome of SALT I and the Vladivostok framework for SALT II. He saw little benefit in arguments that the USSR had gotten more, and trusted the Administration that the USSR had honored its agreed commitments and that the US had achieved an equitable package. He felt the President had a broader perspective on the value of these agreements than individual critics within the Administration and outside. White said that even if one conceded the point that the Soviets gained more than the US in SALT I, there is enough in the agreement and in the process to satisfy both sides. SALT and other central US/Soviet detente negotiations are worth pursuing despite Angola or other peripheral events because SALT is not a gift to the Soviets but in our own interest as well. Although the USSR had apparently violated the unilateral US definition on what constituted large missiles, this was not cheating because there was no agreement on this point. Woo did not really know, but did not believe the Soviets had cheated in the sense of having violated the letter of the agreement; the throwweight advantage the Soviets enjoyed was adequately compensated for now by US advantages in deliverable warheads and the American technological lead. Allegations of cheating were not well enough supported to be credible. On the other hand, Robert Patridge and Max Price of the Denver Post thought that the US had gotten the worst of the bargain in SALT I. Price said that as a major paper which had to report on a broad spectrum of issues, the Post was forced to rely on expert opinion in formulating editorial positions on more complex subjects. In this instance, Price thought Pentagon experts and Paul Nitze were more convincing than the Administration, particularly on the question of the importance of the greater throwweight which the agreement allowed the USSR. Nevertheless, Price and Patridge thought both sides had enough destructive power and favored arrangements along the lines of the Vladivostok framework accords, assuming they provide for "equity." John de Yonge thought both sides were better off with the SALT agreements than without them. As for critics, it was hard to tell who was right, given the obvious difficulty of comparing and negotiating about dissimilar systems. Presumably any real parity (whatever that was) would do. The margins of toleration for both sides should be rather wide. The alternative to a real effort to limit strategic arms was destruction. He assumed both sides cheated to some extent, and did not know what the limits were or should be.

Earnest Conine of the Los Angeles Times referred to his Editorial piece of January 9, which states in part, "There is no longer any question that if the Russians have not violated the SALT I agreement itself, they have certainly violated the American understanding, as presented to Congress, of what the Pact required."

Conine added that "there is some reason to believe that Kissinger really does consider a vague, even faulty arms control pact better than none, because, in his view, it maintains the atmosphere and momentum of detente."

Conine added in conversation that the real test of the value of SALT I was the outcome of the present round, SALT II.



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B. Confrontation in Peripheral Areas:

This proved to be the most contentious area, possibly because the Administration's reaction to Cuban and Soviet activity in southern Africa was current news. More fundamentally, perhaps the Angola/Rhodesia/South-West Africa complex of issues implied evidence of the failure of detente as a policy for those who were suspicious of detente, and was seen as peripheral by those who thought there was no other alternative. Several held that the US should make this kind of behavior as costly as possible for the Soviets, noting that the Soviets wanted US grain, technology and credits, and suggested there might be some leverage there. None of these could cite a clear analogous example where an important country had been dissuaded from unacceptable behavior by economic sanctions or the threat of sanctions, but some thought that this sort of "linkage" should at least be tried, and might work, perhaps once. The issue of thereby calling into question US reliability as a grain supplier had not been thought through by those who liked this idea. None were willing to suggest direct military intervention, at least not in southern Africa under present circumstances.

White said Angola was the wrong place and time to engage; Angola was not a principle and not Vietnam. He said the US should maintain the capability to extend its strength overseas to areas where a clear US interest was involved. Clearly we needed to defend Europe and Japan. Beyond that, he was not a scenario writer, but obviously situations could arise where the US would be called on to defend its interests. In the same way, the USSR could be counted on to pursue its own goals. He assumed the USSR acted rationally. Neither the US or USSR should be deflected from managing the strategic relationship. The consequences of not doing so posed the greatest danger to both parties.

Woo noted that for every Angola there was "an Egypt." He said the USSR, like other outside powers, had as much to lose as to gain in the third world. Events in southern Africa are temporary peripheral phenomena to which we should not over-react. The argument that the US should confront the USSR in peripheral areas so as to maintain its credibility as an ally is tenuous. We have, on occasion, done very well without any apparent US involvement at all, i.e., Indonesia, where communists were set aside without involvement of US forces. The Administration's attempt to become directly involved in Angola was a knee-jerk reaction, an attempt to avoid possible short-run penalties, rather than look five years into the future. Although the Cubans are admittedly trying to export revolution, and furthermore, with Soviet help, there is no reason to assume that the Cubans and Soviets, being outsiders, will not get mired down and, ultimately, be expelled or leave.

On the other hand, Patridge and Price believed that the US was being tested in Angola. Like Gephardt, they thought the Soviets would continue to seek targets of opportunity, such as Angola, and that the US should make this sort of behavior as costly as possible for them beginning with "diplomatic means" not otherwise specified. Like Conine they saw interference in southern Africa as a violation of the 1972 US/Soviet understandings to "do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which will serve to increase international tensions;" also, like Conine and Gephardt, Patridge and Price considered it ominous that the USSR was expanding into areas where it did not heretofore have a presence. Patridge and Price believed that if the US were tested again in Africa detente would or should "disappear." They admitted that the USSR had interests of its own in the third world, such as ideological rivalry with the Chinese, but, nevertheless, considered the emergence of a Soviet presence, or at least Soviet clients in southern Africa, provocative and a violation of what the public understood as "the spirit" of detente.

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De Yonge was not surprised by the Administration's tough stance on southern Africa, it being election time. He found it interesting that the US has not specified what it would do if challenged. He speculated that a direct and unavoidable challenge may be regarded by the public as the end of detente. He hoped there would not be a continuing confrontation, and thought the US, if it chose to act, might choose to confront the Cubans in some fashion such as blockade. This would face the Soviets with the choice of whether to confront the US and place the onus for the rupture of detente relations on them. For his own part, de Yonge preferred measured international action, preferably some attempt to involve the UN Security Council in an arrangement for peaceful change in southern Africa.

C. China:

No one contested the wisdom of opening a dialogue with China, although several wondered what tangible benefits the US had derived from this relationship. Gephardt made the latter point, noting concurrently that the US had not given anything up either. White also thought that relations were superficial, and that the opening toward China stimulated Soviet interest in better relations with us. Nevertheless, he thought that over the longer term a growing Sino-American relationship had more value in itself than any effect it might have in assuring better Soviet behavior. Woo agreed with the latter point, saying that the "middle kingdom" is not moved in a hurry, but that the relationship was worth pursuing over time. De Yonge thought there was historical continuity in Chinese policy regardless of regime. He thought the Chinese, then as now, attempted to define and control their physical and cultural space and to fend off or manage client states on China's periphery, notably in the North. In the US/Chinese context, detente was an attempt to discover what is tolerable for both, and what is not, i.e., how much Chinese influence versus how much US presence in Asia.

It is noteworthy that none of the journalists consulted made much of the long standing US-Formosa relationship; no one brought up our continuing obligations under the 1954 Security Treaty. Gephardt thought there were few practical differences in our relations with Formosa. Patridge and Price favored gradual withdrawal of the umbrella, perhaps after Mao and Chiang Ching-Kuo are gone. De Yonge thought implementation of the Security Treaty was a hypothetical question. 'The Chinese needed detente too. Since they were worried about their northern frontier, it seemed doubtful, in the short run, that they would challenge the US and invade Formosa. He doubted that anything overt would happen before the Mao succession issue was settled.

D. Ideology:

Simply stated, this issue related to whether a detente relationship with the USSR should require the Soviet Union to have some regard for the criteria of civilization, or, more simply, how energetically should the US pursue its own ideological goals and what priority should it ascribe to them in the detente context. This rather fundamental question proved most difficult to pose in the abstract (except to Conine of the L. A. Times, who thought it was a central issue). Most writers responded in terms of CSCE outcomes, the Solzynitsyn case, or the Jackson amendment (no one was for it). White thought the best way to promote US ideological and moral objectives was to practice them as virtues at home and abroad. Although we obviously cannot confine our international relationships to democracies (there are too few of these), we have to accept realities and operate them to the extent that we can, rather than elect to posture for domestic audiences, as was the case with the Jackson amendment. De Yonge commented in a similar vein. He agreed philosophically with the idea that the US behave internationally in a manner consistent with its own moral philosophy.

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Nevertheless, there were limits imposed by practical considerations. If we have public difficulty tolerating Soviet restraint on emigration, the questions then are how to give this posture or policy practical effect, given a hierarchy of other goals which we also wish to pursue with the USSR. The operational choices are between public rhetoric, as exemplified by the Jackson amendment, or quiet diplomacy. Whether the public or particular pressure groups can be assured that moral issues in general or a particular issue stands high on the list of US priorities or goals (and will therefore be pursued vigorously), depends on how much public confidence the Government enjoys. Results are the acid test.

Conine, who has served as a Moscow correspondent, sees Soviet behavior colored and circumscribed by ideological considerations. He contends that the US has achieved nothing in this area of detente, despite arguments to the contrary, e.g., Solzhenitsyn was let loose on the West and not shot; Sakharov is persecuted but still at liberty; some Jews have been permitted to emigrate, and journalists move more freely in the USSR than heretofore. In other words, the above evidence of a change in climate, or rather evidence that Western public opinion is not an insignificant factor in Soviet calculations, is insufficient to demonstrate any real change that can be relied on. Conine believes that the US Government cannot and would not, of itself, pursue goals in this area, without external pressure, including public pressure.

As for the Solzhenitsyn case, Gephardt doubted that detente was so fragile as to collapse over a White House invitation. Woo thought that not inviting him was a lamentable act of political expediency, doubted the invitation would have damaged detente, and thought that the Administration had over-reacted. Unlike the Jackson amendment, in the Solzhenitsyn case the US was not attempting to "fuss with other peoples' internal policies." On the contrary, it seemed more as if the Soviets were fussing with ours. Having said that, Woo (and for that matter White, de Yonge and Patridge) doubted that many Americans who had read his books really agreed with many of Solzhenitsyn's ideas.

E. Grain:

Everyone agreed that trade was mutually beneficial. Nevertheless, all thought that the USSR had gotten the better of the US in the 1972⁵ grain sale, while conceding that the 1975⁶ grain arrangements were more equitable. Those who thought that detente was a one-way street mentioned the 1972 sales as evidence, although they were aware of the favorable overall balance of trade the US enjoys with the USSR. Of course all of the newspapers consulted are located in areas where grain growing or grain business are an important local concern. Given the apparent public perception that the 1972 grain sale arrangements were inequitable, one could conclude that some of the public suspicion about detente in the American West flows from this one keenly felt event. When pressed, few editors blamed the Soviets for making an "inequitable" deal. After all, business is business. Journalists attributed fault to the US Government, for not protecting US interests, concluding that if we did badly here, perhaps US negotiators had been or would be equally inept in other areas such as SALT.

F. European Security

There seems to be little detailed knowledge of detente-related European security issues (OSCE and MBFR) away from the East Coast. Editors and writers, and presumably the public, seem committed to a healthy US relationship with NATO partners, and remain concerned about the Soviet military threat to the continent and disturbed about the possibility that Italy and France may form governments which include the Italian and French Communist Parties. None favored troop withdrawals from Europe. All saw the security of Western Europe as an American interest.

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On CSCE, de Yonge said it was "probably true," as detente critics contend, that CSCE had certified the territorial status quo in Europe. The Soviets got what they had already. The West got a paper commitment to certain standards of behavior; if these standards are violated, we could presumably call the Soviets to public account. White thought CSCE was not a net loss but rather an outcome open to reasonable interpretation by reasonable people.

MBFR details were almost totally unfamiliar. Patridge and Price said there were in favor of the process, assuming a balanced outcome consistent with NATO security, and that this East/West dialogue was valuable in itself. De Yonge also thought MBFR was a "useful East/West type dialogue"--the more the better. Patridge, Price and Conine thought the process of negotiation was more important, for the moment, than an outcome.

More familiar were recent statements by Supreme Allied Command General Haig⁷ about the dangers posed by Soviet force improvements in Europe. Although there was some cynicism about the coincidence of General Haig's warnings with Congressional debate on the Defense budget, most journalists took the warnings seriously and wondered why there should be significant Soviet force improvements in Europe in an atmosphere of detente. One editor doubted General Haig's analysis because he doubted General Haig. None had any sophisticated sense of the relative force balance in Europe, or of concurrent Allied force improvement programs.

On political developments in Southern Europe, a few editors seemed to believe that although the USSR had apparently "lost" in Portugal, the prospect of Communist participation in the French and/or Italian Governments was a potential Soviet gain. They recognized that these parties were no longer under direct Moscow control, but feared that Italian or French Governments which included Communists would be less reliable NATO partners, and that Moscow would therefore achieve some advantage in security terms. Although it seemed clear to them that these communist parties might be acceptable Government participants to other French or Italian parties only to the extent that they were not subservient to Moscow, some journalists found it difficult to believe that some residual Soviet connection would not remain, and thus provide opportunity for Soviet trouble-making. Trouble in Europe would, in their view, be as destructive of a US/Soviet detente as anything else.

G. Defense Questions

No one questioned the principle that the United States needed strong defense, including conventional forces and a nuclear deterrent. All agreed that the US had interests abroad worth defending. None drew a parallel between the precise level of defense spending and the adequacy of the defense provided. All seemed aware and concerned about the costs of defense and the competing calls on the budget from the civilian sector. No one said that the US needed to match the USSR in all areas, force by force and system by system, although Gephardt was concerned that the USSR was devoting a larger share of GNP to defense purposes than the US. Although all recognized that there were conflicts over resources within the defense budget itself, none were willing to starve the conventional forces for the sake of maintaining and improving strategic systems, except (in extremis) Gephardt, who felt the strategic relationship was primary. None were willing to make choices through the defense budget process, which would inhibit action abroad in the American interest, e.g., whether the defense budget should eliminate intervention forces.

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Those differences that emerged from rather inchoate discussion related to how much defense, what kind, and why. At one end of the spectrum, de Yonge thought the detente process as primarily, but not exclusively, an arms control operation, which would, over time, reduce military expenditures thereby freeing resources for other purposes. He thought the US needed "minimum deterrence," and that the US probably could not meet every possible challenge everywhere. He had "no easy answer" to the question of how much the US might scale down. On the other hand, de Yonge recognized the need for forces capable of acting in situations where actual US interests were involved. Woo, too called "a genuine US interest" the criterion for military action. He said the defense budget should not be structured to avoid the possibility of intervention, and that the US should have the means to intervene anywhere in the world, if necessary. White also thought the US should be capable of "extending its arm," since the alternative statement, that "the US had no interests abroad except Europe and Japan," was short sighted. None of these saw Angola or southern Africa as a "test" of US interests as the others did, from which one could infer that they might apply stricter criteria to what a genuine US interest was.

On strategic forces, only Gephardt seemed committed to the present strategic triad (Land/Sea and Airborne delivery systems) and to the full and rapid development of follow-on systems to the limits of existing technology. Others (White, de Yonge) seemed content with maintaining a "credible" deterrent, and speculated about phasing out land-based delivery systems, extending the life of the B-52 with cruise missiles and extending the trident production cycle as various ways of saving money. None had fixed ideas in these areas. They were convinced that the management of the strategic relationship was at least one central detente requirement, and that therefore the US needed adequate (not otherwise defined) strategic forces.

One clear impression is that the broad guns-versus-butter arguments, how much bang for a buck questions, and the how much bigger and/or better are his (or mine) defense budget issues are not examined in extenso by most of the press beyond the Appalachians. Although everyone seems to recognize that these questions somehow impinge on their lives through taxation, federal employment, base construction and maintenance, industrial orders, and ultimately, war and peace, the issues seem so complex (in contrast to simplistic political formulations) that most editorials pages stay away from them. Therefore, Defense and Detente, and the relationships between them tend to be discussed in terms of specific issues, as they arise.

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Appendix - Persons Interviewed

1. Cincinnati Enquirer: Thomas Gephardt (Associate Editor,
Editorial Page)
2. Minneapolis Tribune: Robert J. White, (Editorial Writer)
3. St. Louis Post - Dispatch: William F. Woo (Editorial
Page Editor);
4. Denver Post: Robert F. Patridge (Editorial Page Editor);
Max Price, (Editorial Writer)
5. Seattle Post - Intelligencer: John de Yonge (Editorial
Page Editor)
6. Los Angeles Times: Louis Fleming (Editorial Writer);
Ernest Conine, (Columnist)

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Footnotes

1

SALT - Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. SALT I is shorthand for the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on certain measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Instruments of ratification were exchanged by the Signatories in October 1972. Most of the criticism of SALT I has been directed at the Interim Agreement, which expires in October 1977. That agreement froze, for a period of five years, ICBM and SLBM launchers on both sides in the numbers existing as of May 1972.

2

SALT II is shorthand for the ongoing round of strategic arms limitation negotiations. In October 1974, at Vladivostok, the US and USSR agreed to negotiate a new agreement in 1975, which would: (1) limit both sides to an aggregate of 2,400 strategic delivery systems (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers); (2) limit both sides to an aggregate of 1,320 ICBMs, and SLBMs equipped with multiple warheads.

3

Basic Principles of Relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed May 29, 1972. This document affirms: (1) the necessity of avoiding confrontation; (2) the imperative of mutual restraint; (3) the rejection of attempts to gain unilateral advantages; (4) the renunciation of attempts to gain special influence in the world, and (5) the willingness, on this new basis, to coexist peacefully, and build a firm, long-term relationship.

Secretary Kissinger explained this act as follows, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 19, 1974:

"These statements of principle are not an American concession; indeed we have been affirming them unilaterally for two decades. Nor are they a legal contract; rather, they are an aspiration and a yardstick by which we assess Soviet behavior. We have never intended to rely on Soviet compliance with every principle; we do seek to elaborate standards of conduct which the Soviet Union would violate only to its cost. And if, over the longer term, the more durable relationship takes hold, the basic principles will give it definition, structure and hope."

4

The acronym "MBFR" refers to "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions," a 19 nation multilateral negotiation between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries underway since October 1973, in Vienna. The avowed purpose of these negotiations is to reduce armed forces and armaments in Central Europe in such a way as to maintain the undiminished security of all participants.

5

According to USDA the US Government provided the Soviet Union with \$750 million of three-year credit from the Department of Agriculture Commodity Credit Corporation. No more than \$500 million of the credit could be outstanding at any one time. Repayment to CCC was guaranteed by commercial banks who handled the transaction. The Soviet Union used about \$550 million of this line of credit in the following three years. Repayments have been made on time.

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Criticism of the arrangement related to higher domestic US grain prices which followed it, alleged follow-on third country arrangements where the USSR was said to sell US grain (or its own) at higher prices, and alleged US failure to require that much or all be carried by US flag vessels.

6

1975 Grain Agreement - The Soviet Union has agreed to purchase 6 to 8 million tons of US wheat and corn in each of the 12-month periods from October 1, 1976, until September 30, 1981. This agreement was signed in Moscow on October 20, 1975, by US and Soviet officials.

The agreement calls for minimum purchases each 12 months of 6 million tons of US wheat and corn, in roughly equal amounts. The United States in turn agreed not to use any discretionary authority under US law to keep exports to the USSR below this minimum unless the total US grain supply falls below 225 million tons. The Soviets can purchase an additional 2 million tons of wheat and corn for a total of 8 million tons in any 12-month period, without consultation with the US Government, providing US grain supplies total at least 225 million tons. Purchases in excess of 8 million tons can be made after consultation with the US Government.

The grain agreement is designed to assure a steadier market for US grains in the Soviet Union. The agreement should also have a stabilizing influence on the world grain market. Purchases under the agreement are to be made by Soviet foreign trade organizations from private commercial sources at prevailing market prices. Shipment of grain will be according to provisions of the American-Soviet Maritime Agreement.

The agreement covers only wheat and corn. Thus, the Soviets can purchase additional quantities of US grain since such grains as barley, grain sorghum, oats, and rice are not included in the agreement. (Source: USDA - April 1976)

7

According to the February 9 edition of Newsweek, Haig declared at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies that "the explosion of Soviet military capabilities ... far exceeds the requirements of a purely defensive posture ... The enemy is moving." Haig noted that the Russians had increased their forces on the West European front by 100,000 men in recent years; he also said that the Soviet Navy has been transformed into "a global force," while its air force has become "offensive in character." The big buildup, Haig argued, was part of the Kremlin's strategy of "worldwide imperialism," and he warned: "We are getting to the fine edge of disaster."

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