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
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CANADA IN THE PACIFIC

Case Study by HARVEY G. MILLER

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Preface

Maintenance into the 1980s of a strong US military and political posture in the Western Pacific will require, in my view, a broadened base of public and congressional support. One way to help firm up this domestic ground is to induce the other industrial democracies in the Pacific -- Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada -- openly to make common cause with the US on key regional issues.

Until recently, any consensus of this sort seemed unattainable. Canada and (to a lesser extent) Japan had different perceptions than the others of the threat posed by the communist regime in Peking, and different evaluations of the political stakes in Indochina. But now, with both controversies out of the way, it is possible to contemplate formal coordination of policies toward the communist states of the region, and new forms of cooperation in dealing with problems of stability and development among the others.

Forecasting responses to any US initiative along these lines would be relatively easy with regard to Tokyo, Canberra, or Wellington; their attitudes on important regional issues are well known. Ottawa's views, however, seem undefined and poorly understood, and are the subject of this paper. 1/

1/ In preparing this study, I relied heavily on material in the Library of Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, and on the facilities of the Center of Canadian Studies at SAIS. Personal interviews were central to the investigation and included talks with two leading scholars at the Center, two officers of the Canadian Embassy in Washington, and ten Canadian Government officials in Ottawa.

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Canada in the Pacific

Background

Almost all Canadian (and American) authorities on the subject seem to feel that Canada is not a significant influence in Western Pacific Affairs. 2/ Canada's role, moreover, is seen as essentially economic and cultural--"economic for domestic reasons, cultural in order to develop and strengthen people-to-people relations." Canada's regional involvement, in the accepted view, is destined to remain "as apolitical...as the Government can make it."

I have come to question this point of view. I perceive development over the past decade or so of a very substantial Canadian economic stake in the Western Pacific and, over the past three or four years, a quiet willingness in Ottawa to foster accompanying political relations. On this basis, I see a clear trend toward involvement of Canada in the full range of regional problems, pursuing objectives far broader than those now acknowledged officially in Ottawa.

One may speculate that traditional Canadian modesty is at the root of official and non-official denials of any but the most limited interests and goals in the Pacific. It does seem almost a compulsion for Canadians to begin any foreign policy discussion with lengthy references to Ottawa's alleged inability to influence world events.

This often unwarranted humility is partly a result of Canada's acute awareness of the great weight of the US abroad. Inevitably, Ottawa compares its overseas capabilities with those of the "behemoth" to the south, and comes up with an unflattering self-image. In the Pacific, where capabilities for military action have been a dominant element in US policy since 1950, the Canadians are particularly shy of the comparison.

Another possible reason for Canadian modesty in assessing their Pacific interests is unwillingness openly to contradict Prime Minister Trudeau's established foreign policy line. 3/

2/ The "Western Pacific" includes Northeast Asia (Japan, Korea, China), Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines), and Australasia (Australia, New Zealand).

3/ Postwar Canadian governments:

<u>Prime Minister</u>	<u>Secretary of State for External Affairs</u>
W. L. MacKenzie King (Liberal) (1935-48)	W. L. MacKenzie King (1935-46) Louis St. Laurent (1946-48)
Louis St. Laurent (Liberal) (1948-57)	Lester B. Pearson (1948-57)
John G. Diefenbaker (Tory) (1957-63)	John G. Diefenbaker (1957) Sydney Smith (1957-59) Howard Green (1959-63)
Lester B. Pearson (Liberal) (1963-68)	Paul Martin (1963-68)
Pierre Elliott Trudeau (Liberal) (1968-)	Mitchell Sharp (1968-75) Allan J. MacEachen (1975-)

The Liberals have been the major political force in Canada since 1896. Since 1921, the Progressive Conservatives ("Tories") have held office only in 1926, 1930-35, and 1957-63.

Canadians like to joke about the local tendency (not unknown elsewhere in North America) to hail a "new era" in foreign policy at the anointment of every prime minister. It is nonetheless true that Pierre Trudeau took power in 1968 with a far different vision of Canada's role in the world than that held by Lester Pearson, who had set the tone of Canadian foreign policy in the two postwar decades.

Trudeau's well-publicized foreign policy review of 1968-70 had important political and bureaucratic motives. But it is also clear that he felt it was time to recognize a decrease in Canada's relative power in the world since the days when Western Europe was on its back and the "Third World" politically inconsequential. Where Pearson and his followers had seen a "middle power" or even a "minor great power," Trudeau perceived Canada in the mid-1960s as no more than a small power, and by no means at the top of that group. "We have discarded the view," he said, "that Canada should try to react to all international events and have a policy on everything that happened in the world." One of Trudeau's buzz-words was "realism"--"We shall do more good by doing well what we know to be within our resources to do, than to pretend either to ourselves or to others that we can do things clearly beyond our national capacity."

Such statements could be dismissed as official rhetoric. But the high-level rhetoric has been generally consistent since 1968, and codified in a series of well-publicized foreign policy booklets issued by the Prime Minister's Office in 1970. The booklets speak out in favor of an introverted national posture, designed first of all to serve purely domestic interests. Overseas goals are to be selected carefully: altruism and glory are out; pragmatism and modesty are in. The message--"think small!" Officials in closest touch with the Prime Minister's foreign policy thinking still go out of their way to deny any deviation from the 1970 foreign policy charter.

A final speculation on the roots of Canadian modesty with regard to the Western Pacific: It is only since 1972 or 1973, in my judgment, that Ottawa has dealt with the region on a truly conceptual basis. There are reasons.

One is Canada's historical disinterest in the Western Pacific. There was a presumption in Ottawa, even through World War II, that "Canada has no direct interest or stake in the Pacific." Canada's Asian markets were small and Asian goods were not vital to the nation's economy. Investment flows were inconsequential. Canadian missionary enterprise in Asia, though substantial, reflected no national sense of mission. Japanese and Chinese emigration to Canada exerted only a negative influence on Ottawa's perspectives. Even the growing military strength of Japan appeared somewhat remote beyond the expanse of the Pacific, and in any case, a matter for the US Navy.

Canada contributed relatively little to Allied military operations against the Japanese during World War II. 4/ Ottawa's focus was on Europe, of course, and by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Canadian forces available for overseas duty were almost totally committed to the struggle in that sector. When the European war ended, Canada did earmark a modest

4/ Canada's contributions in the Pacific included: the ill-timed dispatch of two infantry battalions to Hong Kong (at British request) in November, 1941; logistical assistance to US forces in Alaska, and combat support in the landings at Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians; participation in Allied air operations in the China/Burma/India theater; and, in the final year of the war, participation in US naval operations against Japan.

combined force for the projected Allied assault on Japan's home islands. Nonetheless, with the German surrender (and unlike the situation in the US), "Domestic preoccupations...resumed first place in Canadian minds."

Following the Japanese surrender, and despite occasional misgivings, Canada chose to accept the US lead on matters concerning Japan. In the late 1940s, Ottawa had no special stake in Japan worth an argument in Washington. World War II did stimulate Ottawa to establish diplomatic relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government. And Ottawa contributed relatively large amounts of military, economic, and humanitarian aid to China in the 1944-49 period. There was, however, no accompanying development of a clearly enunciated China policy; Canada seemed uninterested in close relations with Chiang. Indeed, Canada maintained an essentially detached official attitude toward the entire Western Pacific realm in the early postwar years. The foreign secretary's major policy statement of 1947, for example, made no reference at all to Asia.

The communist takeover in China in 1949 changed all this. Like the US, Canada became seriously concerned that Peking would become a danger to world peace and stability. Unlike Washington, Ottawa leaned toward recognition of Peking, in large part because Canadian leaders shared Nehru's desire to avoid antagonizing the Chinese colossus and permanently alienating it from international society.

Paradoxically, according to senior Canadian officials, the subsequent preoccupation in Ottawa with the China recognition issue--coupled with Canada's lengthy involvement in Indochinese "peacekeeping" after 1954--contributed heavily to the failure of Canadian leaders to get it together on Asian policy. In this view, the internal Canadian tug-of-war on recognition of China (resolved only in 1968) obscured for Ottawa the significance of such major Asian developments as the rise of Japan. 5/

Canada's seeming failure to "conceptualize" on Asia can also be linked to the world view that molded Canadian foreign policy during the St. Laurent-Pearson era. The UN was the cornerstone of Ottawa's external relations. It was perceived as an ideal stage on which a "middle power" could perform, an arena in which skill counted for more than muscle, and in which Canada might act as one of the "trustees of world order." Problems anywhere on the globe--the more remote from direct Canadian interests the better, or so it seemed--were viewed as susceptible of treatment, if at all, by collective action; and Canada became the most active participant in UN peacekeeping operations. Canadian military and political officers were posted for long periods to such trouble-spots as Kashmir, Indonesia, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, the Congo, West New Guinea, North Yemen, Cyprus, and the India/Pakistan border.

5/ Canadian leaders were ready to move toward recognition of Peking in early 1950, again in 1954-55, and in 1964. There were many reasons for their hesitancy, including substantial public opposition following the Korean War. A former Canadian official got to the heart of the matter in 1965 when he wrote, "In the absence of a strong national consensus for establishing relations with Peking, the caution of the Canadian government has been fortified by a feeling that it would be rash to anger the US Congress in order to pursue a matter of principle not directly involving Canadian national interests." The dilemma of the Canadian government, in short, was that "Canada's China policy is involved with Canada's general relations with the US."

Even the costly Canadian combat involvement in Korea was perceived, in the first instance, as an act of collective defense by the world community, as a UN action against aggression rather than an effort to contain communism or defend Canadian interests in Asia. 6/ Canada's nineteen years of supervisory responsibility in Indochina were not under UN auspices; and this accounts in some measure for the general distaste for the role some Canadian officials claim was thrust upon an unhappy Ottawa at Geneva in 1954.

The British Commonwealth was another pillar of Canadian foreign policy after World War II. Canada became the leader in the effort to transform the prewar Empire into a free association of sovereign states and--following the independence of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon--to develop its multiracial character. In Ottawa's view, the Commonwealth could provide a bridge between the developed and underdeveloped worlds and, more narrowly, another way in which Canada might influence international events.

The shaping of a multiracial Commonwealth in a Canadian image contributed to Ottawa's postwar preoccupation with problems essentially unrelated to Canada's direct and tangible interests. Whatever the longer range payoff--in racial understanding, for example--the constant slogging through the diplomatic muck of such issues as racial justice in Rhodesia, Biafran separatism, and Kashmiri autonomy overextended Canada's diplomatic resources. Its financial resources were overextended by active participation in the Colombo Plan for mutual economic aid of Commonwealth origin. Canada contributed over a billion dollars through the Colombo Plan during the 1950-69 period, more than two-thirds to India and over half the remainder to Pakistan and Ceylon.

As noted earlier, the strong Commonwealth linkage also affected Canadian perspectives on Asia, reinforcing Pearsonian tendencies to resist the hardline US view of the communist threat to Southeast Asia in favor of Nehru's bridge-building approach. The relationship was termed "the Indo-Canadian love affair" by frustrated US officials. 7/

The Commonwealth track in Canadian policy, as it happened, had little positive application to the Western Pacific. Australia and New Zealand, for their part, could not join Canada in the luxury of neutrality on such issues as China and Indochina. Both relied heavily on the US military shield for whatever security they might enjoy on the fringe of a volatile Asia. Both were charter members of SEATO.

Britain's former Southeast Asian possessions (Burma, Malaysia, Singapore) did benefit to some extent from Canadian economic and arms aid. But only in Malaysia, during the "confrontation" with Sukarno's Indonesia, was Ottawa impelled publicly to oppose aggression from the left. Even here--as British, Australian, and New Zealand forces engaged Indonesian

6/ In all, almost 29,000 Canadians participated in the Korean War, about 8,000 at any one time in a force that included an army brigade, two destroyers, and an air transport squadron. Canada suffered some 1,500 casualties, including over 300 dead. The total Canadian financial contribution was 260 million dollars. The last Canadian combat forces were withdrawn in 1957.

7/ During the truce negotiation on Korea, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson referred to the Canadian, British and Indian delegations at the UN as "the Krishna Menon cabal."

paramilitary units--Ottawa quibbled, perceiving an anti-colonialist tinge to Sukarno's antics. Earlier, in the mid-1950s, Canada had decided not to participate in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve which Britain, Australia, and New Zealand organized and posted to the Malayan peninsula to help cope with the communist insurrection there.

Ottawa's apparent neglect of Pacific interests in the postwar decades has other roots. A basic one is Canada's clear perception of itself--to this day--as an Atlantic nation. 8/ Canada emerged from World War II with historical ties in Western Europe tighter than before. Subsequently, Canada played a major role in the establishment of NATO, which it saw as the basis of a new Atlantic community as well as a military bulwark against the USSR. In Ottawa's view, the new military/political linkage with Europe would also reduce Canada's heavy dependence on the US. Of course, ties with the US, within NATO and in the context of North American air defense, have been Canada's main foreign policy preoccupation in the postwar decades.

Trudeau's New Look

Pierre Trudeau's far-ranging foreign policy review of 1968-70 turned out to be more important for the debris cleared away than for the policies initiated. Trudeau raised serious questions about the established bases of Canadian policy: the UN, the Commonwealth, NATO, and the continental partnership with the US. But the melange of cabinet committees, task forces, fact-finding missions, and public seminars on these and related issues succeeded in bringing forth only the series of six vaguely worded booklets mentioned earlier. 9/

"Foreign Policy for Canadians," issued in June 1970 by the Department of External Affairs, is keyed to the view that foreign and domestic policies are determined by and must be used to promote the same national aims. This emphasis on national interests in turn provided justification for Canada's new foreign policy priorities: policies designed to promote economic growth, social justice, and quality of life. The other policy themes--peace and security, sovereignty and independence, and a harmonious national environment--seemed to repose at a second level of importance. No longer, advised the government, would Canada's role be that of the world's "helpful fixer."

This somewhat materialistic and self-interested approach--tagged "a foreign policy for beavers" by one Canadian critic--was balanced to some extent by the broad interpretation accorded the concept of social justice--the goal of reducing disparities between rich and poor nations. Social justice was also evoked to justify a continuing active diplomatic role in reducing international tensions, promoting human rights, and avoiding the use of force in disputes between nations. But there is no effort in the conclusions of the policy review to spell out the implications of this objective for Canada's overseas relationships. One critic commented that Trudeau's "social justice" is essentially the "conscience money" that Canada is prepared to pay for pursuing its primary goal of affluence.

8/ Only in the past decade or so, according to Canadian historians, have even the people of British Columbia begun to feel the pull of Asia.

9/ There is a general booklet, setting out the conceptual framework of Trudeau's new policies, and five sector papers dealing with Canada's activities in Europe, Latin America, the Pacific, the UN, and in the field of international development.

The most remarkable omission in the series of 1970 papers is any clear notion of Canadian security and political interests abroad, beyond that of encouraging detente with the USSR. The theme of sovereignty and independence emerged as essentially an expression of deep concern over Canada's heavy dependence on the US and the consequent need for "diversification" of Ottawa's overseas links.

The reexamination of Canada's relations with the countries of the Pacific was the last stage of the government's foreign policy review. The resulting paper contained little more than a stated intention to expand Canada's relations with the countries of "the Pacific rim," particularly Japan and China. Development assistance to Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, was perceived as a contribution Canada ought to make to the stability and well-being of that region. At the time, Trudeau frankly admitted that even these modest Pacific objectives were essentially concessions to the commercial interests of Western Canada.

The real key to understanding Ottawa's policies in the Western Pacific since Trudeau took office is in a study of the shifts in Canadian perceptions of the two great regional powers--China and Japan. In 1968, Peking occupied center-stage in Ottawa's view of Asia; now, Tokyo is clearly the more important factor in Canada's Pacific calculus.

China

Recognition of Communist China was one of the few foreign policy issues on which Pierre Trudeau wrote consistently and at length before entering national politics. He had been in China in 1949 as a student, and in 1960 as a guest of the Chinese government. In Trudeau's view, non-recognition had been not only politically irrational for Canada, but had hampered development of a profitable trading relationship with (in his words) "the most formidable reservoir of consumption and production that has ever existed." 10/ In his campaign for leadership of the Liberal Party, Trudeau promised that his government would offer diplomatic recognition to Peking. In his first foreign policy statement as Prime Minister, he announced readiness to enter into bilateral negotiations to that end. By January 1969, negotiations were underway, in Stockholm. The talks were drawn out. Canada sought to avoid conceding possession of Taiwan to the communists, while Peking suspected a US-inspired attempt to put over some sort of "two-Chinas" deal. The Chinese were not prepared, as they had been with the French in 1964, to omit any reference to Taiwan in the memorandum of agreement.

The final formula, announced on 13 October 1970, provided Canadian recognition of Peking as "the sole legal government of China," while Peking "reaffirmed" that Taiwan was "an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC." Ottawa, in turn, "took note" of this position. The Canadian Embassy in Peking opened in January 1971. The Canadian Ambassador arrived in June. Henry Kissinger's surprise journey to Peking took place in July. Thus, Trudeau got the best of both worlds with his China move; he was able to demonstrate Canadian initiative and independence of US policy without jeopardizing friendly relations with Washington. (Moreover, Canada's profitable trade relations with Taiwan were maintained.)

10/ Actually, Canada had never ceased trading with Peking, though trade was only a trickle (via Hong Kong) until 1961. In that year, Peking made the largest purchase of grain in Canadian history. Further lucrative Canadian wheat sales followed.

Trudeau and his top advisors had hoped that Canada's demonstrated friendship toward Peking would bring early economic dividends. In June 1971, a high-level Canadian economic delegation visited China to assess prospects for Canada becoming something more than China's seventh largest trading partner. There was interest in selling the Chinese chemical fertilizers, iron and steel and other base metals, forest products, and specialized machinery and equipment. Ottawa was especially hopeful on the last count because of absence of American competition. Ottawa also hoped to retain its inside track (vis-a-vis Australia) on wheat sales to China.

Other factors were important in stimulating interest in what Ottawa, at least, perceived as a "special" relationship with Peking. Certain of Trudeau's key advisors saw the China opening as one of a series of foreign initiatives likely to enhance the Trudeau image at home and abroad. They also tended toward an inflated view of China's global importance; and felt compelled to sustain and purvey that view in Ottawa.

The Department of External Affairs contained a similar interest group which had relatively few problems with the Prime Minister's strategists on the China issue. These were the so-called "mish kids," sons of Protestant missionaries, teachers, and businessmen in China, who had long careers in the Canadian foreign service. They included many senior officials and tended to cluster around retired diplomat Chester Ronning. Ronning had worked for years to develop Canadian expertise on China--at the universities as well as in the Department--at unintended cost (as noted earlier) to Canadian interest in Japan.

Spurred by these forces, Canada actively wooed Peking. The cabinet-level economic mission of mid-1971 was followed by another in mid-1972 (in conjunction with the largest overseas trade fair ever held by Canada), and a third and fourth in March and September 1973. There was also a medical delegation in April and a scientific mission in September. An air transport agreement was signed in June along with a settlement of old Canadian financial claims. The exploratory phase of the bilateral relationship culminated in Prime Minister's Trudeau's triumphal visit to Peking in October 1973. Plans for the visit were put together by Ivan Head, Trudeau's special assistant and a key man in China policy. While satisfied with the bilateral exchange framework that had taken shape, Head sought in Trudeau's visit a breakthrough toward a less stereotyped, more productive relationship. He also wanted some tangible evidence of economic reward for Canada for having recognized Peking "prematurely."

Trudeau's 1973 visit resulted in several agreements on trade, medical and cultural exchange, and immigration of Chinese to Canada. In Peking, Trudeau had the coveted interview with Chairman Mao (90 minutes). On some of his tours outside Peking, he had the unexpected company of Premier Chou. Chou iced the cake by bestowing on Canada the title of "old friend." A Canadian newsman on the Trudeau tour noted that, "China recognition is the one move he made no one can take away from him. It was his baby. If he loses the next election, this visit will still look like the summation of Trudeau's foreign policy."

But Trudeau's flamboyant tour of China and subsequent events did little to change the narrow pattern of Sino-Canadian trade. China remained almost exclusively interested in import from Canada of primary products, mainly wheat. Canada's exports of manufactured products remained small, despite lip service to the issue on both sides. Ironically, on the day Trudeau's plane transited Tokyo en route to Peking, the Japanese announced a record sale of construction equipment to China.

At this point, Sino-Canadian trade totals about \$500 million annually (1974). It is characterized by a heavy balance in Canada's favor; the value of Canadian exports to China is more than seven times that of Canadian imports from China. Wheat sales have constituted about 90 percent of the total export over the past decade, though in recent years non-wheat sales (e.g., nickel and copper) have grown. The Chinese, though concerned, apparently have not insisted on balancing the trade, which can only be done by a high volume of manufactured exports to Canada, mainly in the area of textiles and other light manufactures. At present, there are very limited Chinese supplies of the goods of interest to Canadian importers. Needless to say, the grain trade with China remains a solid plus for the federal government in its relations with the prairie provinces. China has been a reliable buyer and shows every indication of remaining one. Canadians hope that Peking will continue to regard Ottawa as the "priority supplier" despite the entry of Australia and the US into the Chinese grain market.

Ottawa is concerned that the bilateral trade imbalance will not be tolerated indefinitely by China. The Canadians expect Peking to press Canada to accept more of its goods in return for Ottawa's prominent position in the Chinese grain and other markets. Canada is also aware of the difficulty of meeting Japanese, US, and Western European competition in China's limited import market for heavy equipment and whole industrial plants.

The increasingly intense sales competition highlights another blemish in Ottawa's initially rosy view of the outlook for Sino-Canadian relations. The Nixon-Kissinger initiatives toward China knocked the props from under Trudeau's dream of a starring role in the Western effort to prod China toward international respectability. Whatever friendship may now exist between Ottawa and Peking, the link to Washington has top priority for the Chinese. The Canadians understand this, of course, and have accepted it.

One of the persistent themes in my conversations with Canadian officials was this growing realism in appraising the benefits of the China tie. Certainly, no one regrets the Trudeau initiative; there is much pride that Canada was able to avoid Japan's embarrassing "shokku" when Dr. Kissinger turned up in Peking. But all agree that the glamour of the China opening--China was always more exotic than workaday Japan--has worn off. The economists have concluded that trade with China is unlikely to grow very rapidly or (aside from grain) become a substantial proportion of overall Canadian trade or investment overseas. In any case, it has become obvious to Canadians that trading opportunities with China are insignificant in comparison with Ottawa's prospects in Japan.

Disappointment with the progress of political contacts is also expressed. Aside from some mildly useful talks on the Law of the Sea, Ottawa has apparently found the Chinese unwilling to discuss major international issues with any degree of candor, even with an "old friend." Ottawa is particularly concerned over Peking's refusal to hash over North-South issues during their economic sessions. There is annoyance, too, over Peking's persistent pressure on Taiwan trade and related matters; the Canadians have had to step lively on occasion to avoid giving offence to Peking while they maintain trade and other commercial ties with Taiwan.

In sum, Ottawa has become increasingly realistic and relaxed in evaluating its ties with China. The Canadians perceive another profitable outlet for their grain, metals, and other primary products, and a modestly growing market for heavy equipment. But Ottawa no longer talks of China in the same breath as Japan as it contemplates broad issues of the national economy. And politically, Ottawa has scaled down its ambitions to little

more than a generalized desire to add the Canadian voice, however small, to those counselling Peking toward policies of restraint internationally. Finally, there is recognition in Canadian leadership circles of the primacy of Japan in all calculations of Western interest in the Orient.

Japan

The Canadians did not discover Japan yesterday. Ottawa established a diplomatic mission in Tokyo in 1929 when it had only two others, in Washington (1927) and Paris (1928). Bilateral contacts, however, remained limited and rather formal until relatively recently. In 1961, in recognition of growing bilateral trade and increased Japanese investment in Canada, a Canada-Japan Ministerial Consultative Committee was set up and directed to meet regularly on matters of common interest. (At the time, Canada's only other cabinet level arrangement of this sort was with Washington.)

I will not, in this paper, examine the growth and status of Canadian-Japanese trade and other economic links in detail. I wish here only to establish the fact of Japan's economic importance to Canada:

--Canada's trade with Japan has increased from about \$300 million in 1960 to about \$3.6 billion in 1974. This is about 5.7 percent of Canada's world trade and 61.5 percent of Canada's trade with all countries of the Western Pacific. (See tables.)

--Japan is Canada's second largest trading partner, having displaced the UK in 1973. ^{11/} Indeed, the only notable change in Canadian trade patterns since 1970 has been the growing importance of Japan and a corresponding decline in the role of the UK.

--Canadian exports to Japan in 1974 totalled over \$2.2 billion--7.0 percent of Ottawa's world exports and 64.8 percent of its exports to the Western Pacific. (China was a distant second in the region, taking about one-fifth the Japanese total.) Canadian exports to Japan expanded at an average annual rate of almost 20 percent between 1960 and 1974. This compares with annual increases of 15 percent in Canadian sales to the US, and 5 percent to the UK over the same period. (Expressed even more dramatically, Canadian exports to Japan have grown 13-fold since 1960, 7-fold to the US, 5-fold to the (original) EEC, and only 2-fold to the UK.) Canada in 1974 ranked third only to the US and Australia among non-OPEC suppliers to Japan, though Canada's share of the Japanese market has tended to remain between 4 1/2 and 5 1/2 percent since 1965.

--The growth of Canadian exports to Japan has been in large measure a function of Japan's need for mineral ores and concentrates to stoke its burgeoning industrial plant. The export profile also includes large quantities of agricultural products, and lumber and woodpulp. Only three percent of Canadian exports to Japan are in the category of "end products." In contrast, more than two-thirds of Japan's sales to Canada are in this category.

^{11/} The US continues to dominate the Canadian trade picture despite Trudeau's high-priority effort to lessen Canadian economic dependence on the US. Two-thirds of Canadian exports went to the US in 1974, up slightly from the 1970 proportion. And nearly 70 percent of Canada's 1974 purchases abroad came from the US, about the same as in 1970.

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TABLE 1
CANADA'S EXPORTS AND IMPORTS (%)

	<u>Exports</u>				<u>Imports</u>			
	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>
US	67.5	69.3	67.5	66.5	71.1	69.0	70.7	67.3
Japan	4.7	4.8	7.2	7.0	4.2	5.7	4.3	4.5
UK	7.8	6.9	6.3	5.9	5.3	5.1	4.3	3.6
EEC*	6.2	5.7	6.1	6.4	5.8	6.2	6.0	5.7
All Others	13.8	13.3	12.9	14.2	13.6	14.0	14.7	18.9
World	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Except UK, Denmark, and Ireland.

Source: Canada Commerce, April 1975

TABLE 2
CANADA'S TRADE WITH THE WESTERN PACIFIC - 1974

	<u>2-Way Trade</u> <u>(\$ million)</u>	<u>Exports</u>		<u>Imports</u>	
		<u>\$ million</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>\$ million</u>	<u>%</u>
Japan	3,647	2,224	64.8	1,423	56.9
Australia	635	307	8.9	329	13.1
PRC	496	434	12.7	61	2.4
Taiwan	236	43	1.2	194	7.8
South Korea	206	72	2.1	134	5.4
Hong Kong	177	41	1.2	135	5.4
New Zealand	141	65	1.9	77	3.1
Other	396	248	7.2	148	5.9
Total Region	5,934	3,433	100.0	2,501	100.0
Total World	63,473	31,946	---	31,527	---
Percentage to Region	9.4	10.8	---	7.9	---

Source: Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce

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--Canadian imports from Japan in 1974 were valued at over \$1.4 billion-- 4.5 percent of Canada's total imports and 56.9 percent of its Western Pacific imports. (Australia was a distant second in the region, shipping only about one-fourth the Japanese total.)

--The Canadian West (provinces west and northwest of Ontario) is particularly concerned about the Japanese markets. The western provinces account for an estimated 80 percent of total Canadian sales to Japan. ^{12/} (The control of resources has become a major source of conflict between the western provinces and federal authorities in Ottawa, particularly since 1973 in connection with the pricing, taxation, and export of oil, gas and coal.)

--In part because of the current economic slowdown in Japan and in part because of Canada's determination to limit foreign (i.e., US) control of its resources and industry, Japanese investment in Canada has slowed in recent years. Nonetheless, Japan has an estimated \$400-500 million invested in Canada, almost all of this committed since 1968. A high proportion is in the lumber and pulp industries, a modest amount in the mining sector, very little in manufacturing.

Clearly, its economic linkage with Japan is Canada's most rewarding relationship in the Western Pacific. So important and highly regarded that for the past three or four years, the Canadians have been pressing to give it more of a political configuration. In a published article in 1974, for example, Ivan Head went as far as to term "unhealthy" the essentially economic tone of the bilateral relationship. He advocated "broadening and deepening," advancing from economic linkage into other dimensions. Head highlighted what he perceived as a strong community of Japanese-Canadian interest: in active developmental strategies for the Third World; in commitment to the viability of such international economic institutions as GATT and OECD; in dependence on a functioning world trading system; in devotion to democracy at home and to the UN system; in foregoing national nuclear arms development; and much else. Head suggested that the Japanese begin to look upon Canada as something more than "a large open-pit mine." Repeatedly, he worked to make the case for cooperation in coping with the immensity of the US presence in the lives of both nations. Canada's "diversification" became Japan's "takaku gaiko."

I found in Ottawa in March 1976 that "broadening and deepening" had become the key phrase for policymakers on Japan. In fact, Mr. Head's 1974 remarks merely put the Trudeau stamp of approval on conclusions reached in the late 1960s by most Asian specialists in External Affairs--i.e., for Canada, Japan is the most of the show in the Orient and, with regard to implementation of Canada's "Third Option," Tokyo is demonstrably the only congenial new friend on the horizon. ^{13/}

There are many signs of Canada's more respectful view of the Japanese connection. Tokyo now boasts one of Canada's most experienced and able ambassadors and a large (25 officers at last count) and growing Canadian Embassy staff. Tokyo has become Canada's main listening post in Asia, a regional headquarters for the Canadian diplomatic establishment.

^{12/} The story is told that British Columbia's former premier responded to pressures from Ottawa to make all Canada bilingual (English and French) by having his calling cards printed in English and Japanese.

^{13/} The emphasis is on "new;" Canada is trying just as hard to negotiate a "contractual link" to its friends in the European Community.

Since 1972, bilateral ministerial talks have included a broad range of world issues, including such Asian security issues as Korea, Indochina, and the status of ASEAN--the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Canadian spokesmen now quietly assert the value of backing up Japanese moves that might enhance political stability or economic prospects in Southeast Asia. Finally, Prime Minister Tanaka in 1974 returned Prime Minister Trudeau's 1970 visit to Japan.

At this point, the Canadians are working hard to induce Japan to look upon Canada as a close partner in meeting the challenges of so-called post-industrial societies. Ottawa wants Tokyo to look upon Canadians as just as qualified as Americans to contribute to solution of some of Japan's problems. Foreign Secretary Allan MacEachen extended this cordial invitation a year ago. Is Japan short of industrial sites for polluting industries? Canada has the necessary space, water, and energy. Is Japan concerned about increased competition from low-wage economies? So is Canada. Why not coordinate financial, industrial, and technological strategies in key sectors to achieve mutually beneficial technical breakthroughs and economies of scale? In the meantime, urged MacEachen, let's increase contacts between officials, industrial planners, businessmen, financiers, and scientists. In the end, he seemed to say, Canada and Japan will develop, to their mutual benefit, the sort of intimate relationship that each now enjoys with the US.

Elsewhere in Northeast Asia: Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong

At this point, the Canadian view of South Korea does not seem much different than the US view. Despite obvious distaste for the Pak government, officials in Ottawa believe that survival of an anti-communist South Korea is extremely important if the physical and psychological security of Japan is to be maintained. There is a wish to see US forces remain in South Korea. Two Canadian officers remain on duty with the Military Armistice Commission. ROK officers are accepted for staff training in Canada. There is also a demonstrated willingness to continue in strong support of Seoul's international political position, at the UN and elsewhere.

Indeed, several in Ottawa expressed serious concern this spring over what was termed "Taiwanization" of South Korea--the erosion of its standing among Third World nations. They urged heroic diplomatic measures to get the Korean issue off the UN General Assembly's agenda, before the persistent North Koreans win a clear majority for a resolution condemning Seoul and the UN/US military presence in South Korea.

Canadian concern on the issue is related in part to the dilemma that might face the Trudeau government should the legality of the well-worn UN cloak over Korea be called into question by the world community. Officially, Canada still reads the Korean War as an act of collective security under UN auspices. In some circumstances, it would be hard for Ottawa to maintain that position--and Canada's diplomatic support for Seoul--against the many Canadian missionary and human rights groups seeking to destroy Ottawa's relationship with the Pak government.

A related consideration is Ottawa's lingering paper commitment to the preservation of peace in the peninsula. Canada signed the "Sixteen Nations Declaration of 27 July 1953." It states that "if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principle of the UN, we should again be united and prompt to resist." Ottawa has always been uncomfortable with this obligation. During the January 1968 Pueblo crisis, Ottawa took steps to limit it, declaring officially that, "should the situation in Korea develop adversely...it would be for the Canadian government and

parliament, in the absence of a new UN resolution, to decide whether the situation fell within the meaning of the 16-nation declaration." Thus, if the official UN role in Korea ended, Canada would be relieved of a disturbing international responsibility. On the other hand, Ottawa would find itself domestically handcuffed in any situation in which Canada's oldest allies--and the Japanese--faced increased threats to peace on the peninsula.

One purpose of Ottawa's 1973 move to raise its resident mission in Seoul to embassy status was to get a better handle on the Korean security situation. Another was to cope more effectively with a rising tide of South Korean emigration to Canada; South Koreans have ranked third to Hong Kong and the Philippines in recent years among Asians bound for Canada. 14/

Economic considerations constitute a third reason. Canada and the ROK signed their first trade agreement in 1966, though two-way trade totalled only \$5 million at the time. In 1974, the figure was \$206 million, with a balance of about 2:1 in South Korea's favor. There is also a growing Canadian investment in the prospering South Korean economy. The outstanding event of the past year in bilateral economic relations was a Canadian decision to sell a CANDU nuclear power reactor (600,000 KW installed capacity) to the Koreans on unusually favorable terms. The Koreans want to purchase another one soon.

Unlike the Australians, Canada has not opened diplomatic relations with North Korea nor even, it appears, seriously considered doing so. The Canadian Wheat Board tried to press the case for an overture to the North in 1971, and there was an \$11 million sale of Canadian flour to the North in 1973, but trade between the two countries remains negligible.

Since 1970, Ottawa has carefully avoided official contact with the government on Taiwan. But Canadian businessmen are active in the island's commerce and Taipei still sends economic delegations to Canada, all of this on a "private" basis. Two-way trade in 1974 totalled \$236 million, better than 4:1 in favor of the Taiwanese.

Ottawa is in good position to increase its lagging exports to Taiwan. Taipei has tried for years to purchase a CANDU reactor. But Ottawa has declined the touchy sale with the excuse that it would require an official bilateral agreement. For this reason and for his well-publicized friendships in Peking, Prime Minister Trudeau is highly unpopular in Taipei. For their part, the Canadians profess no great concern over the future of Taiwan; they assume that Peking will not try taking the island by force in the foreseeable future.

Canada's main economic interest in the British Colony of Hong Kong is as a trading partner and a source of high-quality immigration. Like South Korea and Taiwan, trade (totaling \$177 million in 1974) was over 3:1 in favor of the Asian producer of consumer goods. Hong Kong Chinese now account for perhaps five percent of Canada's total immigration--about 9,000 persons in 1975; the proportions of educated, skilled, and wealthy among the migrants are extraordinarily high. There is a less happy Canadian interest in the Colony: it is the main source of illegal narcotics entering Canada.

14/ There were in 1971 an estimated 285,000 ethnic Asians in Canada, about 1.3 percent of the population and almost triple the proportion in 1951. In 1971, 42 percent of the Asians were of Chinese descent and 13 percent were of Japanese descent.

The Commonwealth: Australia and New Zealand

In his 1970 policy statement, Prime Minister Trudeau downgraded the Commonwealth as an element in Canadian foreign policy calculations. He emerged nonetheless as the great conciliator of an extremely tense Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Singapore in 1971--the issue was British arms sales to South Africa. Gratified, perhaps, by his much-publicized leadership role, Trudeau by 1972 had elevated the Commonwealth to "one of the pillars of Canadian foreign policy."

Rhetoric aside, Canada's Commonwealth connection appears to mean relatively little in the Western Pacific context at this time. Relations with Canberra and Wellington are now based largely on mutual interests--in bilateral trade and investment, in Southeast Asian stability and development, in common problems of overseas marketing of foodstuffs and industrial raw materials, and in concern with the demands of the Japanese industrial machine. There is also a network of consultative arrangements in political, military and intelligence fields. These may not be very productive, however, in light of the extreme fluctuations in Australian foreign policy over the past five years. Trudeau, it is said, found the Labor Governments in Canberra and Wellington more to his taste than the conservatives who preceded them and who recently returned to power in both countries.

Canadian trade with Australia totalled a respectable \$635 million in 1974, but has been of declining importance to both countries for several years. Significantly, however, both Australia and New Zealand absorb a very large proportion of manufactures among their imports from Canada. Though Canada and Australia are natural competitors in the markets of East Asia, they have managed so far to avoid serious dispute on key economic issues. One reason may be that Canadian firms have invested substantially in Australian mining and manufacturing enterprises.

Malaysia and Singapore, the other Commonwealth members in the region (Burma left long ago) enjoy excellent relations with Canada and have tried to use the Commonwealth connection to secure special consideration in Ottawa for their needs. Increasingly, however, Canada has given priority in its Southeast Asian contacts to Indonesia, the regional leader.

At this point, Canada's Commonwealth sentiment is evidenced in Malaysia and Singapore mainly by modest military training assistance programs--a legacy of the 1964 conflict with Sukarno. Ottawa seems jumpy about even these small programs; a parliamentary report cites "political risks," presumably the possibility of involvement in Malaysia's endless (though small-scale) counter-guerrilla operations. Singapore enjoys Trudeau's personal favor. Apparently, he finds Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew a congenial fellow in Commonwealth dealings.

Southeast Asia

Canada's main interest in Southeast Asia, according to specialists in the Department of External Affairs, is Indonesia. Second ranked--far below--is Malaysia and Thailand. Thailand's importance to Canada is political; it is seen, at this point, as a democratic state worthy of some encouragement and assistance in its uphill effort to maintain national independence. Singapore follows in Canada's rank order. Then the Philippines, where economics and immigration are the overriding interests. Burma, the only country in Southeast Asia with no resident Canadian diplomatic personnel (they're in Bangkok), is literally off the charts in Ottawa.

The Indochinese communist states are special cases. Because of its long involvement in Indochinese peacekeeping, Canada developed rather unusual relationships with these states. Ottawa even felt uneasy through the sixties about its many involvements in the various Western economic aid groups operating in the non-communist zones. Only when its peacekeeping roles were terminated did Ottawa feel free to seek normal relationships with both sides to the struggle. Now, after the communist triumphs, Canada has diplomatic relations with the DRV (January 1975) and Laos, but no resident diplomatic personnel in either capital. Canada recognized the communist regime in Cambodia in late April 1975, but has not established diplomatic relations. As a matter of national policy, Ottawa wants increased contacts with all Francophone nations. Canada also sees modest sales opportunities in Vietnamese rehabilitation projects. There is also concern over Vietnamese encouragement of guerrilla war in Northeastern Thailand. For these and historical reasons, the Canadians may be among the more active Western nations in maintaining contact with Hanoi. 15/

Burma aside, the non-communist states of Southeast Asia are all members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a self-help effort, modest in content but dedicated to strengthening the region against domestic upheaval and foreign intimidation. Breaking one of their cherished foreign policy rules, over the past year or so Ottawa's leaders have publicly endorsed the objectives and programs of this unmistakably anti-communist five-nation bloc. In part, the endorsements are designed to flatter Indonesia, ASEAN's dominant influence. Strategically situated, populous, and rich in resources, Indonesia is the prime sales and investment target in Southeast Asia and the key to whatever potential stability the region may achieve in the post-Vietnam era.

The collective approach--exemplified by the recently concluded (Minister of Regional Economic Expansion) Jamieson Mission to the ASEAN states--is also a useful supplement to bilateral contacts in what is seen by the Canadians as a relatively homogeneous economic-growth region in which coordinated developmental, marketing, and investment strategies can really pay off. Their Djakarta embassy, largest in the region, has become the focus of this kind of activity for the Canadians. Total Canadian trade with the ASEAN countries in 1974 was about \$330 million.

In dealing with ASEAN, Canada seems to have patterned its approaches on those of the Australians. Both seek commercial advantage yet wish to contribute at least incrementally to local efforts to build regional stability and economic wellbeing. The ASEAN states are pleased with this sort of political and economic support, however modest, not least because Canada and Australia represent additional alternatives to ASEAN's economic overdependence on the Japanese.

I cannot offer detailed data on Canadian economic assistance to Southeast Asia. Since 1968, however, Ottawa has become one of the more generous aid donors among the OECD nations, ranking 13th in 1967, 10th in 1970, and 7th in 1971. Despite an unusually strong and continuing national consensus for overseas aid, Ottawa has not been able to reach Trudeau's announced goal of annual aid at a rate of .7 percent of GNP. Nonetheless, official Canadian development assistance increased from \$277 million in 1969-70 (.34 percent of GNP) to \$742 million in 1974-75 (.52 percent of GNP). Although India and Bangladesh receive the most Canadian assistance, aid to East Asia is increasingly rapidly, about 16 percent annually in recent years.

15/ For the record: Canada established diplomatic relations with Mongolia in 1974; the ambassador and his staff are accredited from Moscow.

In the 1960's, only Malaysia among regional states received significant Canadian aid. In 1971, Ottawa assumed a much more prominent role in the Asian Development Bank, tried (but failed) to win associate membership in ECAFE, and became an important member of the Indonesian aid consortium. Later, Canada joined the Philippine aid group. Canada is also now involved in a number of other developmental programs in the region, bilaterally and multilaterally. Bilateral programs are still the rule; but multilateral expenditures, once limited by law to one-fourth of Ottawa's total annual aid, are gaining popularity. The direction of Canadian aid programs for the 1975-80 period was set forth last September in a national policy document. Significantly, it made much of the aid instrument as a way of providing "the basis for a meaningful Canadian leadership in the international arena."

Canada in the Pacific: Postscript

Former Canadian diplomat and Director, Canadian Institute of International Affairs: "If Canada becomes more and more involved in exchanges across the Pacific, whether of trade or of people, the mutual stakes rise and it is bound to be more concerned with matters called 'security.' It will have an increasingly important stake in the survival of Japan as an economic partner and may increasingly develop special interests in its relations with Pacific countries...For the next generation... Asia, or at least parts of it, are certain to become as important to Canada as Europe. The 'gesture' toward the Pacific could turn into an essential commitment." (Spring 1971)

This relatively brief investigation of Canada's Pacific role suggests that Ottawa has come to recognize certain important interests in East Asia:

- (1) An orderly, prosperous, and pro-Western Japan;
- (2) Related to Japanese security, a non-communist South Korea;
- (3) A China disinclined toward regional military adventures;
- (4) A reasonably stable and non-communist Indonesia;
- (5) A regional environment in which trade and investment opportunities can flourish.

These conclusions can be expressed differently or the list expanded. The point is, as most of my Canadian contacts readily admitted, there are no longer any major policy differences between the US and Canada with regard to East Asia.

At this time, therefore, perhaps the only real obstacle to open Canadian-American cooperation in Pacific matters is Prime Minister Trudeau's doctrinal commitment against statements or actions that might provide even the appearance of Canadian subordination to US policy. The advent of a more pragmatic outlook in Ottawa or simply the evolution of "the new Canadian nationalism" toward a more self-confident phase could quickly dissolve this final barrier to cooperation in the Pacific.

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