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EXERCISE

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THE NAVY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Case Study by JOSEPH J. ORTEGA,
CAPTAIN, USN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE S/EPIC CDR Date: 1/17/91


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SIXTEENTH SESSION

SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



1973-74

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
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SIXTEENTH SESSION

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FOREWORD

My career in the U.S. Navy has exclusively involved duty in the Pacific theater. I have, therefore, chosen to use the occasion of conducting a case study while a member of the Sixteenth Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy to investigate and broaden my knowledge of the navy in the Atlantic. Early in my investigation it became obvious that the role of the U.S. Navy in the Atlantic is inexorably linked to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and therefore to the other navies of Western Europe and Canada. This study will discuss the current status of the North Atlantic Alliance, review the strategy of flexible response and some implications of current pressures on NATO's security posture. Then naval missions of the Alliance will be reviewed, followed by a discussion of rationalization issues involving naval forces.

The atmosphere in which this study was conducted was one of general world peace time but troubled over such issues as Western European guarded reaction to US-USSR negotiations toward detente such as SALT and MBFR talks, worldwide energy shortages which resulted in some nations resorting to bilateral agreements with oil producing countries rather than multilateral solutions and universal rising inflation which increasingly is causing nations to scrutinize and question expenditures for security purposes. Further, it is a time immediately following the October 1973 Yom Kippur war during which, although no naval confrontation occurred, the powerful navies of the US and USSR in the Mediterranean Ocean were alerted to the highest levels, which invites speculation as to what might have been the result if one or the other force had not been present.

I am grateful to the officers of military staffs and embassies that I visited while conducting this study. Their valuable time and efforts in arranging most suitable accommodations is warmly appreciated. These include the Current Plans Division, Atlantic, Europe, NATO and Mid-East of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, D. C., Operations Division at Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) Norfolk, Virginia; staff officers of Commander Naval Forces (COMUSNAVEUR) and the political military attachés, American Embassy, London, England; the Commander and officers at headquarters Commander in Chief Channel (CINCHAN) and Commander in Chief Eastern Atlantic (CINCEASTLANT) Northwood, England; staff officers of the U.S. Delegation to the Military committee and officers of US Mission to NATO, Brussels, Belgium; the Naval Attaché at American Embassy, Paris, France; the

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Commander and staff officers of Commander Sixth Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT),
Gaeta, Italy; the commander and staff officers of Deputy Commander
Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (DEPCOMSTRIKFORSSOUTH),
the political advisor on the staff of Commander in Chief Allied
Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), and Staff officers of Commander
Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH), Naples, Italy.

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Deterrence Strategy

For twenty-five years the North Atlantic Alliance has been a major factor in world politics. By its mere existence and power it has preserved the sovereign independence of its members without actual use of armed force. The success of the Alliance is founded in the premise of deterrence and not war.

In 1960 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, then a professor at Harvard University, offered this description of deterrence:

"Deterrence seeks to prevent a given choice by making it seem less attractive than all possible alternatives. It therefore ultimately depends on an intangible quality: the state of mind of the potential aggressor. From the point of view of deterrence a seeming weakness will have the same consequences as an actual one. A gesture intended as a bluff but taken seriously is more useful as a deterrent than a bona fide threat interpreted as a bluff. Deterrence requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor. Moreover, deterrence is a product of those factors and not a sum. If any one of them is zero, deterrence fails."¹

In view of Dr. Kissinger's cabinet position as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor to the President, it seems clear that the future courses that security alternatives offer for the United States, both as a global power and as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, will support Dr. Kissinger's concept of deterrence.

The keystone of American foreign policy which has persevered since the beginning of the Cold War is the NATO Alliance. It has been this collective security arrangement which has embodied the philosophy of containment of communist expansion, provided at least some unity and direction for the European segment of the free world, and served as a model for other U.S. multi-national defense agreements.

Flexible Response

Fundamental to the strategy of the NATO defensive policy has been that of flexible response. Codified in the NATO

1. Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, p. 12.

document MC 14/3, it entails a three stage response to Warsaw Pact aggression: conventional resistance, directed escalation, and finally all out nuclear war. The basis of this concept is that NATO should be able to deter, and (assuming deterrence fails) to counter, military aggression of any kind. This is to be attained through a wide range of forces equipped with a well balanced mixture of conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons. The purpose of this balance of forces, while retaining the principle of forward defense, is to permit a flexible range of responses combining two main capabilities: to meet any aggression at a level judged to be appropriate to defeat the attack, and to escalate the level, under full control, if the initial defense is not effective. An aggressor must be convinced of NATO's readiness to use nuclear weapons if necessary, but he must be uncertain regarding the timing or the circumstances in which they would be used. In this connection, however, selective and limited tactical use of nuclear weapons could not be deferred until NATO's conventional defenses were in a desperate position. First, in that case it would probably be neither feasible nor effective to use nuclear weapons. The enemy would already have advanced too far and there would be a danger of hitting friendly troops or the civilian population. And, secondly, NATO forces would be in no condition to exploit and drive home the advantage gained by use of the weapons. Under the strategic concept of flexible response with increased emphasis on the need to be prepared for attack of varying scales in any region of the NATO area, the aim is that NATO should have available a considerable sea, land and air conventional combat potential, supported by nuclear weapons for tactical use over and above strategic nuclear forces. All these forces must be well organized and prepared for immediate deployment.² Until recently this plan of graduated response seemed reasonable.

When the United States possessed a monopoly of nuclear weapons, there was little argument about the contribution to deterrence. That monopoly, however, has deteriorated to a dubious parity with the Soviet Union. This deterioration of nuclear superiority poses significant creditibility to the question: how reliable is a promise by the United States to use nuclear weapons in defense of Allies when a certain result would be the annihilation of the United States by Soviet nuclear weapons? The European members of NATO, except France, believe that such a promise is credible and even desirable because not only does this strategy commit the U.S. to the defense of Europe by all means but it assures that another long, conventional war is avoided. Furthermore, the necessity of maintaining large standing armies is reduced.

2. NATO Facts and Figures, p. 92, NATO Information Service, Brussels October 1971.

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The visible guarantee to Europe of the United States' commitment is the stationing of a sizable conventional force on the European continent. Their presence serves to insure U.S. sincerity regarding NATO strategy. In a sense, these U.S. forces are a tripwire--or human promissory notes--that make escalation to nuclear weapons believable.

Tactical nuclear weapons deployed on the European continent further confuse the issue. Originally introduced to offset Warsaw Pact advantage in manpower their presence is now explained as deterrent to similar weapons of potential enemies. On the one hand, these weapons appear appropriate to the NATO strategy of phased escalation. On the other hand, their physical presence seems to make any lengthy conventional response to aggression very unlikely. Release authority for use of these weapons may be only given by the United States, and in all likelihood would require unacceptable time delay. The NATO command might be quickly faced with the decision to use these weapons or lose them during a conventional warfare setback. Faced with the current nuclear parity situation it would seem prudent to move in some direction that would make recourse to tactical nuclear weapons less urgent, such as full or partial withdrawal or strengthening conventional forces to preclude pressures to resort to their use. In view of possession of tactical nuclear weapons by the United Kingdom and France, withdrawal by the United States is impractical. Only the strengthening of conventional forces provides a reasonable alternative to what may very well be automatic recourse to the use of nuclear weapons in the current atmosphere.

NATO Action Program

It is in recognition of this necessity to "raise the nuclear threshold" that the NATO Action Program has been undertaken. The United States has taken the position that NATO must be re-structured to offer a very increased conventional option. In his speech to the NATO Defense Planning Committee Ministerial Meeting on June 7, 1973, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger spoke of standing "at another crossroads." He warned that the U.S. and the Soviet Union "will be entering an era of strategic stalemate."

The Secretary assured NATO that the United States has not backed down from its firm resolve to support the Alliance with strategic weapons, but that the condition of parity would render this resolve less relevant. He said:

"These circumstances (nuclear parity) ensure that strategic forces will reliably deter a narrow range of contingencies. Their role will remain vital

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both for the deterrence of strategic attack and for the reinforcement that they give to the other components of the NATO triad. But a major portion of the burden of deterrence will fall increasingly on other forces. . . .we have to face the fact that our nuclear forces no longer carry a dominant weight in the balance."

and

"There is no inherent reason why the Pact should have conventional superiority over NATO. (Here he recited what he viewed as the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the two alliances and then concluded that. . .) Nothing precludes us from having an effective conventional deterrent and a high nuclear threshold; both are well within our means. Accordingly, the U.S. wishes very much to see the full non-nuclear option more wholeheartedly supported and the posture of the alliance tailored to suit it."³

The Secretary's pronouncement is however, clearly in opposition to the trend of spending for defense by Alliance members including the United States. A recent State Department paper noted that, "In the past ten years, there has been a decline in the percent of GNP which Allies have devoted to defense, from 5.0% to 4.2%. . . Furthermore, the decline in percent of GNP they devote to defense has been nowhere near as substantial as that of the U.S., which fell from 9.3% to 6.2% in the same period."

The paper continued, ". . . it is unrealistic to expect that our Allies will be able to increase the percent of GNP devoted to defense. There are three reasons for this. First, the problems of modern society which we have felt strongly for a number of years in the U.S. are only now being felt fully in Europe. Because of high population densities, rising living standards and expectations, and rising costs, solutions are not cheap. Second, the European tax burden is already quite severe, and among many of the Allies, is substantially greater than in the U.S. Reductions in defense expenditures thus seem particularly tempting to some European politicians. Finally, there is already a feeling

3. Principal remarks by Secretary of Defense-Designate James R. Schlesinger at NATO Defense Planning Committee Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, June 7, 1973.

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in Europe in some quarters that continued heavy expenditures for defense are unnecessary in an era of growing detente."⁴

[] concurs with the State Department's pessimistic views on the likelihood of more vigorous support for conventional forces.

] noted that although the European countries (European NATO members less France, Iceland and Portugal) had committed themselves to support a European Defense Improvement Program, and had boosted their defense budgets in each of the last two years, the increases were doing little more than keeping up with inflation.⁵

"Rising expenditures for pay, housing and other personnel associated costs are taking an ever increasing share of the military budgets, reducing the amount of money available for equipment purchases. In the FRG, for example, these and other operating expenses now absorb more than 70 percent of defense expenditures. The Germans project that, by the end of the decade, this trend will leave less than 10 percent of their annual defense budgets for new equipment. Similar trends are discernable throughout NATO. Meanwhile, equipment costs are rising so dramatically that major weapons are unlikely to be replaced on a one-for-one basis. . . . These trends indicate that the pace of European force moderation will continue to slow, and that these forces will probably be reduced."

A11
B1

Regarding manpower, []

"It will be increasingly difficult to assure adequate levels of trained manpower. Except for the U.K., all European NATO countries still require conscription to maintain the present size of their forces to insure proper training and adequate readiness, NATO military authorities state that 24 months of active service is the minimum time required for conscripts. However,

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- 4. Department of State Memorandum of July 24, 1973, subject: DPRC Security Related Efforts and Year of Europe.
 - 5. Appendix A is the 1972 Estimated Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries.

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the average term has been reduced over the last few years from 19 to 17.5 months. Three countries -- Belgium, Denmark, and Norway -- require only 12 months service, and Denmark is now in the process of reducing this nine months. There is pressure in a number of other countries to further reduce the length of service. Moreover, the time of actual military service is frequently even less than the established term, because of the widespread practice of giving conscripts an early release from duty or granting them an extended terminal furlough before final discharge. Thus, even if each country is able to maintain constant the number of men under arms, the effectiveness of these men will decline as the period of conscription is reduced.

It is probable then that the European members of NATO will not be able to respond to Secretary Schlesinger's call for greater expenditure and emphasis on conventional forces. If NATO is to continue as a viable deterrent a possible alternative might be for the United States to make up the difference between what exists and what is required. The likelihood of this occurring is scarcely credible and certainly not if increased military spending or increased manpower stationed in Europe would be required. Several factors support this:

- Domestic competition for available resources (predominately energy) has pushed aside demands for additional defense spending.
- Inflation is cutting deeply into defense buying power.
- The All Volunteer Force is only marginally competitive in a nearly full employment economy.
- The depreciation of the dollar abroad has changed overseas assignments for service families from a sought after tour to a hardship situation.
- The presence of U.S. forces in Europe contributes significantly to the balance-of-payments deficit.

These and other factors act to bar increased U.S. contributions to NATO's conventional defense.

8. Appendix B is a listing of manpower engaged in the NATO naval forces.

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Also, they provide increasing pressure for the withdrawal of at least some of the present U.S. contribution to NATO, and this further complicates the problem. For if the United States were to reduce its visible participation in NATO, it is unlikely that European members would step in to fill the gaps.

The argument for reducing U.S. conventional forces in NATO and elsewhere overseas has a persistent advocate in the U.S. Congress in the person of Senator Mike Mansfield. His latest proposal would recall fifty percent of the more than 500,000 U.S. servicemen stationed abroad. In his view, the recall of these military personnel "would reflect the judgment that they were not needed to fulfill existing international and domestic obligations and therefore appropriate for demobilization."⁹

A principal argument to Senator Mansfield's proposal has been that unilateral U.S. force withdrawals from Europe would offer the Soviet Union an advantage over the alliance and would make Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) irrelevant. More importantly, even a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe could be interpreted as a departure from NATO strategy of flexible response and a reliance upon early employment of nuclear weapons. This is directly contrary to the U.S. Government's position as announced by Secretary Schlesinger to work toward raising the nuclear threshold.

A balance does exist between NATO's conventional nuclear capabilities. In combination, these two military forces pose to a potential aggressor plausible expectations. One without the other simply does not provide reasonable deterrence. Reliance on conventional forces invites nuclear blackmail and reliance on nuclear weapons alone tempts an aggressor to limited confrontations that are not worth mutual devastation of nuclear war. The success of balanced deterrent capabilities is dependent upon the potential aggressors' perceptions. Any alteration of this balance must be made up for by some other means.

NATO's dilemma, then, is what to do. The U.S. Government has begun to investigate ways to continue to maintain strong conventional capability without the customary solution of adding more of everything. One proposal has concentrated on the pre-positioning of military equipment and supplies and reinforcing the battlelines by means of troop airlift. In this way NATO's initial warfighting capability could be sustained should troop withdrawals come about. Discussion then leads to the credible length of any war for which preparations should be made. Whether or not a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, once having begun,

9. Congressional Record - Senate, July 25, 1973, p. 814647.

~~would be likely to proceed for even a few days is a contested issue. It's vital to bear in mind that deterring a war is more important than fighting it. Once begun, the danger of wholesale employment of nuclear weapons increases dramatically.~~

Providing NATO with a credible initial warfighting capability is the first priority task. The U.S. Government has concluded that NATO should have the capability to fight a conventional war for at least ninety days. This would provide time to pause before electing either negotiation or nuclear warfare. Planning for a war of this duration requires the allocation of resources for both initial and sustaining capabilities.

Analysts who have studied NATO defense have remarked on an apparent imbalance between the Alliance's initial and sustaining capabilities as they presently exist.¹⁰ Euphemistically identified as "teeth" and "tail" respectively, these two segments of NATO's defense posture have been seen to be out of proportion-- the sustaining tail outweighing the initial fighting teeth in terms of allocated resources and planning emphasis. Without denying the mutual interdependence of teeth and tail in fighting a war of at least ninety day duration, they would underscore the argument for deterring the war altogether and would, therefore, redistribute both resources and emphasis in favor of the teeth.

NATO's Naval Missions

Since the formation of NATO, attention has concentrated on Warsaw Pact attack on the central land front of Western Europe. During this same period of time, the Soviet Navy has expanded from a force designed for coastal defense to one of global activity and appears to be continuing along this path. Writing in Morskoy Sbornik in February, 1972, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, S. G. Gorshkov commented on the relationship of naval power to national power.

"Navies have always played a great role in strengthening the independence of states whose territories are washed by seas and oceans, since they were an important political weapon. Naval might has been one of the factors which enabled certain states to advance into the ranks of the great powers. Moreover, history shows that states which do not have naval forces at their disposal have not been able

10. Komer, R. W., see Treating NATO's Self-Inflicted Wound, Foreign Policy, Winter 1973-74.

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no hold the status of a great power for a long time."¹¹

This expansion of the Soviet Navy was most vividly displayed during the October 1973 Arab-Israel War. By November 1, 1974, Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean reached a historical peak of 95. The previous record high number of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean -- 69 ships -- occurred in April-May, 1970, in connection with the worldwide Soviet Naval Exercise OKEAN. This expansion has greatly disturbed allied naval leaders and was recently expressed by the Commander of the Sixth Fleet Vice Admiral D. J. Murphy as he spoke to Spanish newsmen at Palma de Mallorca, on March 2, 1974 ". . . the growing Soviet naval threat both in the Mediterranean and throughout the world. It's quite evident to me that the threat has shifted to sea and that the Soviet Union is now making an effort for influence around the world by using its sea power. We can find Soviet ships in Cuba, or the Western coast of Africa, in the Indian Ocean, naturally in the Pacific, and concentrated mostly here in the Mediterranean."¹²

From a defensive point of view this new concern about the threat from the sea involves all the NATO nations, both as members of a collective agreement and also as individual national states interested in protection of their own shores. This study will deal only with the multinational aspect of NATO's navy rather than specific national interests of individual states, even though typically funding for new naval equipment is provided primarily on national interests.

The term maritime strategy here will refer to current use of naval forces and plans for acquiring future types of forces. In the short term, naval strategy can be greatly influenced by a potential enemy capability. This study will not attempt to assess enemy capabilities, but rather to look at roles that remain valid regardless of political fluctuations within states.

There are six possible missions for NATO maritime forces. These are: nuclear deterrence, counter-nuclear deterrence, general war at sea, geographically limited war at sea, protections of seabed installations, and political.¹³

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11. Source: Admiral S. G. Gorshov; Navies in War and in Peace, Morshoy Sbornik, February 1972.
 12. Vice Admiral D. J. Murphy, Interview - Spanish Newsmen, Palma de Mallorca, March 2, 1974.
 13. John Simpson, Technology and Political Choice in Future NATO Maritime Strategy, Orbis, Volume XVII, Spring 1973 No. 1 Foreign Policy Research Institute.

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DISCUSSION

Naval participation in the nuclear deterrence role is in the employment of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) which have a number of advantages over land based missiles. Primarily the advantage lies in the fact that they are mobile and difficult to destroy before launch. The most recent operationally deployed missile, the Poseidon, has a greater payload capacity and some are MIRV tipped. Under development is a new missile system named Trident that will greatly increase range capability. Nuclear states will certainly place increasing reliance on missile submarines as major deterrent systems.

Threats to the operation of SLBM are antiballistic missiles which are presently limited in development by SALT I agreement and antisubmarine warfare. Although some technological improvement in ASW is possible, real significant counter threat to SLBM submarines is doubtful and will in all likelihood be at least some what offset by developments to decrease noise produced by submarines. ASW is an area that requires considerable development and advances.

Although the United States provides the bulk of the NATO strategic nuclear force, the United Kingdom and France have also developed and operate SLBM systems. While these came about purely as national enterprises, they do pose an added uncertainty to a potential aggressor to Western Europe. The Soviet Union is at least in theory faced with three independent centers of nuclear decision making.

The application of the counter-deterrence naval role is the destruction of missile submarines before they have an opportunity to launch missiles. Required is an ability to localize areas in which nuclear missile submarines are operating, fix their positions accurately and a means to destroy them. The most promising approach to this problem is the use of fixed active and possible sonar systems. Theoretically, such a system can be developed so that individual friendly and potentially hostile vessels could be identified by comparison with sound memory tapes of their noise signatures. The development of such a system, along with existing NATO surface and air ocean surveillance forces, could not be effective on a purely national basis but would depend upon multinational cooperation. European states possess great geographical advantages in that their coastlines are ideally located for providing area coverage of the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Geography also affords NATO states the opportunity to monitor closely the European sea exits such as the North Cape, Baltic, Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

An alternative counter-deterrent system would rely on nuclear attack submarines to track missile submarines from their home ports or at known patrol stations. Then, when necessary, they could destroy them.

DISCUSSION

Components of an embryo maritime counter-deterrent system exist now. Its ineffectiveness stems from current operational limitations of most of its components. A further weakness is that it requires large scale cooperation in peacetime among NATO members and a consensus that such a system is politically and strategically desirable and economically feasible at a time of flux in NATO national relationships.

The concept of general war at sea involving NATO is usually discussed in two scenarios: a war at sea in support of a land war in Europe, and a purely war at sea. In the first scenario the contested issues referred to earlier regarding the length of a land war come to play. It is argued on the one hand that in a short war that quickly escalates to the nuclear stage, maritime forces would play no part at all. On the other hand, if the conflict were to endure for 90 days, as is planned for by the United States, naval forces would serve a vital function in all spectrums of warfare.

The pure war at sea presents a more credible and less contested situation. Several trends support a possible war of this type: the constantly increasing capability of the Soviet Navy, the inability of Western navies to keep pace with Soviet naval expansion, the increasing vulnerability of the West to sea lane interdiction and current upcoming struggle for increased national economic rights in international waters. Further, it is widely believed that the purpose of the Soviet Union's large submarine force is to wage an anti-shipping war against the NATO states.

A shipping protection system must be capable of dealing with three separate types of threat: undersea, surface and air-borne. The most difficult to counter is the undersea threat. Two differing antisubmarine strategies appear applicable to the shipping protection role. The first is to conduct a general ASW campaign in areas of the Atlantic that lend themselves to barriers such as the North Cape, the Baltic, Black Sea and Mediterranean exits, the Iceland/Faeroes and the Iceland/Greenland gaps. These barriers would in theory seal off Soviet submarines from the open ocean sea lanes. The second strategy would be to concentrate maritime forces on the defense of shipping to provide safe passage. This would require a greatly increased number of escort ships with advanced anti-air, surface, and subsurface capabilities, including defense against homing missiles.

The role of NATO naval forces in limited war is minimal. Decision by a nation to allocate funds for this purpose implies a policy choice between providing forces only for operations in the NATO area or adoption of a global perspective. There is, however, a possibility of localized attempts to disrupt shipping by the use of mines, or perhaps the use of fast patrol boats for localized purposes. Neither are likely, and probably do not justify significant investment.

Another series of roles for European maritime forces may be developing in connection with the protection of seabed installations and fishery. Further, measures to control pollution in confined waters will probably require attention in the future. This may bring about a new dimension in maritime strategy which traditionally has not been concerned with the occupation of ocean areas, or even defending it beyond coastal limits.

Summarizing NATO's naval missions then, it seems clear that seaborne nuclear deterrent forces will likely continue to provide military credibility. For counter-deterrent and general war at sea, greatly increased emphasis and expenditure should be directed to antisubmarine warfare forces and systems. To accept that a NATO could only last a few days before escalating to a strategic nuclear stage and therefore not prepare for the protection of shipping to support a longer war would only permit the Warsaw Pact increased political leverage and military advantage. To recall Dr. Kissinger's description of deterrence "(it) . . . requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor."

Rationalization

During travel and in the course of discussion in connection with this study it was most apparent that NATO's most demanding problem is being able to afford itself. Naval forces that require relatively larger expenditures come under particular question. Compounding decisions to allocate funds for naval forces is the issue of purpose--for NATO or national interest. In order to achieve more utilization and resources within an environment of constrained budgets and manpower availabilities the concept of "total force" is receiving a great deal of attention. The aim of the total force policy is for nations to specialize or reationalize in specific military areas and theoretically relieve other nations from making like expenditures. The conflict centers around a nation's willingness or unwillingness to trust others with some part of a needed defense.

In many of the NATO countries there is a history which has seen their politicians and bureaucrats reluctant to act to achieve the economies, or increased effectiveness which could be gained through restructuring of Alliance naval forces. Regarding their naval forces, there has not been universal acceptance of the total force concept.

Although the European navies are estimated to absorb an average of 15 percent of the annual defense budgets, the

effectiveness of this expenditure can be questioned.¹⁴ Navies require much more capital than ground and tactical air forces and have therefore been more affected by the rising costs of modern military equipment. A number of countries are unable or unwilling to support both operating expenses and modernization programs for navies of the size they currently have. The larger classes of ships, such as cruisers and ocean escorts, are decreasing in number while coastal types are being emphasized. European countries perceive a choice among a present sized but technically obsolescent navy, a smaller but more modern navy, or thirdly, improved ground and air forces and an even smaller navy.

Any suggestion for restructuring of navies of the Alliance must consider the possibility of necessary unilateral action by a country. It has been pointed out that through sea power, the Soviets can exert pressure on one nation without apparent threat to another Alliance nation. Some nations who foresee a need to provide defense for sources and supply routes of oil or other raw materials, or who have distant territorial obligations are understandably reluctant to divert themselves of independent naval capability. While there is agreement that specialization within the Alliance is appropriate regarding sea-based nuclear deterrent forces, since use of these forces would require concerted action, there is argument that overspecialization in conventional naval forces might preclude national reaction.

Faced with the same technical-economic squeeze, the United States Navy with global roles is moving toward restructuring with the objective of complementing Allied capabilities more effectively. Through the policy of total force, the U.S. hopes through the concept of comparative advantage to effect cost-effective specialization of U.S. and Allied forces.

Ideally rationalizing of NATO would restructure such that, under a single command, some countries would concentrate on naval forces, others on land forces, and still others on air forces. More practical are measures to consolidate forces and specialize according to region. For example, in a rational allocation of tasks, larger navies would provide for open ocean tasks while smaller navies would assume coastal defense functions such as short range ASW, mine warfare and strait closure.

A number of suggestions have been forwarded for specializing NATO's naval forces. They range from command reorganization to melting down submarines and rebuilding tanks. Most are

14. See Appendix A, 1972 Estimated Defense Expenditure of NATO countries.

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controversial, and invariably challenge the possible implications to national sovereignty.

One measure that holds merit for rationalization of naval forces is the centralization of supply management. The achievement of combined support and maintenance has been hampered by the lack of effective standardization of equipment. The NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) provides a ready forum for agreement on standardized designs of major equipments. Agreement on standardized designs could lead to further economics in research and development, production, evaluation and training. Further opportunities for regional pooling of naval supply, maintenance and other logistics operations are being explored.

SUMMARY

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is essentially and above all else a defensive Alliance. Secondly, it is an inter-governmental organization. Thirdly, in peacetime, national forces receive orders only from national authorities, although exercises are held.¹⁵ The military task of NATO is to draw up joint defense plans, to set necessary infrastructure and to arrange for joint training in order to provide for the best possible use of NATO forces in the event of war. Military preparedness is aimed at preventing war through deterrence.

The Alliance's policy has always been to maintain adequate forces necessary for preserving stability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In recent years the Soviet Union has achieved nuclear parity with the West, while in conventional arms Soviet naval forces are increasing markedly without a corresponding increase in NATO naval forces.

The overall strategy of flexible response is aimed at being able to counter aggression at any level.

NATO's current problem is to find ways to maintain a credible conventional option while being faced with serious and growing economic difficulties. Rationalization is one

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15. There are exceptions to this rule. One is the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANNAVFORLANT), a group of destroyers from several nations that are formed as a permanently operating task group. Efforts are also underway to form similar naval groups in the Channel Command and in the Mediterranean.

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approach to efficiency and economy. As applied to naval forces, this solution conflicts unacceptably for most Western European states.

To the brief observer, such as this writer, the solution to Western European naval force problems is obvious--unification. Europe must simply find ways to act and defend itself as a single autonomous unit, rather than twelve separate states. Real efficiency and economy will be achievable for all fifteen members when and if this can come about.

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Appendix A

1972 Estimated Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (in millions of US dollars)

Germany	\$ 9,058
U.K.	\$ 7,228
Italy	\$ 3,342
Netherlands	\$ 1,526
Belgium	\$ 1,016
Turkey	\$ 691
Portugal	\$ 613
Greece	\$ 557
Norway	\$ 499
Denmark	\$ 469
Total for Europe	\$24,999
Naval Forces (15% estimate)	\$ 3,750
Canada	\$ 2,155
Total including Canada	\$27,154
Naval Forces (15% estimate)	\$ 4,073
U.S. Defense Expenditures	\$79,528

It is difficult to allocate U.S. expenditures for NATO related naval forces, but it is obvious that it far exceeds the European contribution. The U.S. however, with global interests, is in a different category from other NATO members. For the same period the defense expenditures of France were \$7,173.16

16. ISS, The Military Balance, 1973-1974

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Appendix B

Manpower Engaged in the NATO Naval Forces

Belgium	4,600
Canada	14,000
Denmark	6,300
Germany	37,000 (6,000 Naval Air)
Greece	18,000
Italy	44,500
Netherlands	20,000 (2,000 Naval Air)
Norway	8,000 (1,600 Coast Artillery)
Portugal	15,000
Turkey	40,000
U.K.	81,000
Total European (less U.S. and France)	288,400
United States	602,000
France	69,000 (12,000 Naval Air) ¹⁷

17. ISS, The Military Balance, 1973-1974

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