NEGOTIATING CULTURE WITH PEKING

Case Study by GERALD STRYKER

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SIXTEENTH SESSION

SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1973 - 74
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DECLASSIFIED
NEGOTIATING CULTURE WITH PEKING

Some Findings on Canadian, British, French, Swedish, and American Experience

By
Gerald Stryker

Sixteenth Session
Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy
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THE SETTING

The day I left Canada, the editorial page of the Toronto Star was graced with a Macpherson cartoon showing a boiler-suited and be-capped Chinese gentleman discarding with his left hand a booklet titled "The Thoughts of Chairman Mao" while grinning broadly at a document in his right hand labelled "Canadian Visa".

It was a pithy symbol of the importance which the People's Republic of China has given to cultural exchange with countries like Canada and the United States in the last few years. China has come a long way since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution ended in 1970. And so has the United States.

With a minimum effort at nostalgic recollection of the notable events of our time, one can recall the electrifying announcement in July 1971 that Henry A. Kissinger had ridden his secret carpet to Peking and that President Nixon would travel there later with all the excitement of a first landing on the moon. Ping-pong diplomacy had already begun with the visit of a U.S. table tennis team to China in April 1971, but it was one paragraph in the Shanghai Communique of February 27, 1972 that set the stage for the wide range of cultural exchange to follow:

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

The United States, however, came late to the scene. For years before the Americans joined in, going back to 1951, the PRC had been carrying on a variety of cultural activities with countries all over the world. Thirty-seven countries had formal or informal agreements with China providing for cultural exchange. But many countries participated without any agreement at all. India, for example, enjoyed an extremely active exchange in the 1950s without an agreement. And the Soviet Union registered a higher level of activity before a cultural cooperation agreement was formalized in July 1956 than afterward.

Only one of the five countries looked at in this paper has a formal agreement with China. An agreement on cultural, educational, scientific, and technical exchange was arrived at during Canadian External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp's visit to Peking in August 1972. Visits by leading officials have a habit of bringing things to fruition and setting affairs in motion. In the field of cultural exchange, this little truism applied in the post-Cultural Revolution era not only in the visits of Nixon, Kissinger and Sharp but as well when British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home went to Peking in the fall of 1972 and the late French President Pompidou and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau a year later.
One normally expects any activity between a communist and a Western country to be governed by a detailed, chapter-and-verse binder. Why the absence of this with China? The answer seems quite simple. In the words of one source who tried without success, "the Chinese don't want to be tied down by written agreements". Another put it this way: "China likes the freedom of not having things written down." A number of my informants referred to conducting cultural exchange with China as an advanced exercise in "ad hoc-ery". The Chinese definitely prefer oral to written agreements and will reduce agreements to writing, said one source, "only if forced to".

And yet for every exchange activity there is something in writing. It may be only a written proposal by the Western side agreed to in part or in whole verbally by the Chinese. It may be an exchange of letters or notes. Or it may be a formal document signed by plenipotentiaries of the two sides, as in the case of the archaeological exhibition.

**THE RANGE OF ACTIVITY**

It would be appallingly tedious to list every cultural exchange between China and the five countries, but since the eye has trouble focusing on see-through skeletons, it is necessary to put a little flesh on the bones.

In the general perspective, all five countries have exchanged delegations of scientists, academicians, journalists, and all manner of athletes with China. All but the U.S. have a student exchange arrangement with China. Because this is one of the more interesting activities, a separate section of this paper is given to it. Also treated separately is the Chinese archaeological exhibition featuring the famed jade funeral suit and the bronze flying horse, already shown in Paris and London and due to open in Stockholm in May, Toronto in August, and Washington in 1975.

Sweden's cultural relations with China have the unique feature of comprising both government-to-government and "party-to-party" activity -- the latter meaning visits to China by delegations representing the Swedish Communist Party and two politicized friendship organizations. It is estimated that about ten such delegations have gone to China since the Cultural Revolution. At the government-to-government level, a joint committee convenes annually and alternately in Peking and Stockholm to set a general outline for exchange during the ensuing year, with the Ministry of Industry playing the leading role in this joint committee for the Swedish side. As this representation suggests, the committee's purview is primarily trade and commerce. Government-sponsored student exchange is handled by the Swedish Institute, a government-financed body similar to the British Council. And Stockholm's East Asiatic Museum specializes in exhibits: photographs of excavations and preservation of historical monuments in China (1964); post-liberation Chinese painting (1965); Chinese graphic art (1973); and slides, reproductions of wall newspapers, and actual posters from the Cultural Revolution, with a tape narration (started in 1970 and still touring Swedish cities).

France's cultural interchange with China has been on long standing and normally smooth. France prides itself on a special relationship with China. Chou En-lai, his lately rehabilitated colleague Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and many other Chinese leaders were students in France. Beyond this, I can offer nothing in the way of a general review as circumstances did not permit acquisition of data except for the archaeological exhibition, the cinematic satire "The Chinese in Paris", and a little on student exchange, which are discussed in separate sections of this paper.
Britain's cultural exchange with China was basically ad hoc up to 1972. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home's trip to Peking in the fall of that year resulted in an agreement in principle which became specific with a mission to Peking by a group of British negotiators in March 1973. In addition to concluding an arrangement for student exchange, it was agreed that the British Council would send six English-teaching experts to China for two months in the summer of 1974, that each country would receive 10 to 15 scholars for two months in the summer of 1974 to do research on Chinese and English teaching, that medical delegations would be exchanged, and that China would host visits by delegations of British scientists, Sinologists, and art experts.

Like Sweden, Canada has an annual Ministerial conference with China to set the pattern for cultural exchange for the following year. During Prime Minister Trudeau's visit in October 1973, something of a high point was reached when China accepted 12 of Canada's proposed 14 exchanges. One of the items agreed to was a visit by the Vancouver Symphony Orchestra in the fall of 1974. A major exhibition of Canadian paintings is to be held in China at some unspecified date. A Canadian English-teaching specialist will spend three to four months in China in the fall of 1974, and the Chinese will reciprocate with a visit by a professor of Chinese literature. A group of Canadian university presidents and chancellors is to visit China probably in July 1974. And in sports, Canada will send gymnasts, figure-skaters, and swimmers and divers in exchange for ping-pong, basketball, and volleyball teams from China.

United States cultural exchange with China blossomed after the February 1972 Shanghai communique. In 1972 and 1973 China received visits from Congressional leaders, scientists, computer specialists, journalists, economists, doctors, cardiologists, swimmers, basketball players, physicists, elementary and middle school teachers, White House Fellows, the Philadelphia Orchestra, archaeologists, art specialists, early childhood development researchers, an inner-city youth group from Chicago, and representatives of the two organizations which are the usual instruments for arranging cultural exchange: the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Inc., in New York and the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China in Washington. For its part, the People's Republic of China sent to the U.S. a table tennis team, a medical group, scientists, the Shenyang acrobatic troupe, journalists, gymasts, hydrotechnicians, high energy physicists, an insect hormone group, librarians, linguists, a computer group, and a group studying satellite communications. Cultural exchange may have peaked, for the moment at least, for the offerings in 1974 are less numerous. Still, the year should see delegations in acupuncture anaesthesia, herbal pharmacology, earthquake prediction, plant studies, linguistics, hydrology, and architecture from the U.S. to China, and from China to the U.S. specialists in seismology, cancer and cardio-vascular disease, and laser research, and a "martial arts" performing group.

And as a footnote, we might add that the PRC Liaison Office in Washington was itself exposed to a special kind of American culture. As the Office prepared to move to its new premises in the old Windsor Park Hotel, the manager of the Mayflower Hotel, where the Chinese diplomats had made their home for nine months, "organized a small, very private farewell reception with a western motif," according to a little item in the U.S. China Business Review. "Chinese officials were outfitted with cowboy hats and neckerchiefs and were treated to an evening of western music, pinball machines, horseshoe pitching, and old-fashioned barbecued ribs of beef. The Chinese loved it."
"We're on the raw end of the deal," one American told me. On the face of it, that's a rather strange statement when, according to one estimate, 15 Americans have gone to China for every Chinese who has gone to the U.S.

But the follow-on point was illuminating: "They send what they want to here -- and they pick and choose from what we want to send there." The reference was, of course, to the cultural exchange traffic, both official and private, not to the total number of people who have travelled each way. It is estimated that from mid-1971 to the end of 1973, about 7,000 Americans went to the People's Republic of China, but the vast majority went privately and many were Americans of Chinese ancestry visiting relatives.

The issue, then, is not numbers but the readiness of each side to receive what the other wants to send and the opportunity for each visiting group to do, within reason, what it wants to do in the other country. On this, Americans both inside and outside of government generally feel that there is a pronounced imbalance and lack of reciprocity.

When Chinese come to the U.S., one source commented, the Americans do everything possible to accommodate them, send them any place they want to go, make appointments with anyone they want to see. But when Americans go to China, the PRC decides what they may do, where they may go, whom they may see -- and does not generally respond to out-of-the-ordinary requests unless the American visitors are abnormally persistent. Appeals for deviation from the set schedule are more often than not met with the response that it is "not convenient", or "closed", or "the wrong time of year".

As for types of exchange, "China's proposals are almost 100 percent accepted, whereas ours are not," said one American. This may be due in part to the fact that, in the words of another informant, "we flooded them with suggestions". But the major contention is that China is cautious about visits from people in the humanities and social sciences. Some would maintain that China lets in only those whom it views with favor or who may be useful for image-building purposes. This is a position which would be difficult to defend. A glance at the partial listing of American scholarly visitors to China published in the Committee on Scholarly Communication's China Exchange Newsletter shows substantial numbers of professors and researchers in education, history, Chinese studies, economics, political science, law, sociology, and so on. But officially-sponsored exchanges have indeed been heavily weighted toward technology, the physical sciences, and sports.

That China should be able to pick and choose is natural enough, since all Americans seem to agree that, as one put it, "The U.S. is definitely the suitor. The U.S. has been the active one, the PRC passive. We are the 'yang' and they are the 'yin'". Another says with a smile: "We massage their Middle Kingdom complex very well."

But however pointed some of the comments may be, strict reciprocity is not the apple of the official American eye. One source said that unlike dealing with the Russians, where tit-for-tat reciprocity is a must, the U.S. purposely avoids this technique in dealing with China, believing that it would not be in the U.S. interest to do so.
The Canadian position is quite different. I was told that Canada has been "tougher on the issue of reciprocity", aiming at "rough numerical reciprocity". Canadians feel that they have striven for overall balance and have achieved it, not sector by sector or activity by activity, but in general. There is no suitor or pursued, as they see it. The Canadians take the initiative in some fields, the Chinese in others, and both sides have picked and chosen from suggestions put forth by the other. And yet the nature of the enterprise is such that, in the view of some Canadians, China enjoys the greater benefit. One source said: "They are getting much more out of it than we are. The return is 10 to 1 in their favor."

One reason why the Canadians have achieved a sort of balance may be their financial limitations. I was struck by the emphasis Canadians give to keeping the cost of exchange activities within bounds, in contrast, I might say, to the Americans for whom money for this endeavour almost seems to grow on trees. The Canadians also maintain that they have tailored their proposals to the reality of what is possible and have looked for ways in which the Chinese can reciprocate. An example of this is found in the experience of a high-level Canadian scientific delegation which went to China last year. As they travelled from city to city, visiting various installations on their way to Peking, the members took careful note of what China needed and what it might offer in return, so that when the leader of the delegation presented proposals in Peking, the result of the negotiation was a reasonably reciprocal exchange program.

In England, the situation is again different. "We don't even want overall reciprocity," the British told me. The U.K. has not been concerned about "head for head reciprocity", but it has sought a "comparable measure of interest", for "mutual interests have to be preserved". Referring to the large number of Chinese students in England -- over 200 are provided for under an exchange understanding, by far the largest number in any Western country -- I was told that "if the Chinese are prepared to pay, we are prepared to accept them -- at least in the initial stage."

The French view is that their cultural exchange with China is not really reciprocal. The Chinese, like the Soviets, they say, want to import more than they export. One Frenchman seemed to be echoing some American sentiment when he told me that "what we send them must be to their taste, and what they send us must also be to their taste." The French think that basically China has little to offer. Moreover, it is hard to find common ground for exchange with China. Social science is off-limits. In sports, the Chinese repertoire is limited and not up to international competition standards. Or take painting, they say -- the Chinese will hardly accept an exhibition of the work of modern French artists, so out of step with the socialist realism school. Only in the physical sciences, the French believe, is there some chance for reciprocity, for in this sphere there are some areas of mutual interest.

Sweden, I was informed, "has no policy on reciprocity". Sweden hasn't thought much about it. Cultural exchange activities have been handled pretty much on an ad hoc basis. For one thing, reciprocity does not apply in a situation where up to now, there has been a "very strong element of political groups going to China". The Swedish view is that reciprocity must be thought of in very broad terms because it is very hard to arrange exchanges in the same fields. But, one source said, Sweden may now be moving toward some exchanges in the same area -- reciprocal visits of geological study groups, for example.
CHINA'S GOALS

Before going any further, it may be well to pause and ask what China hopes to achieve through cultural exchange. On this question, which I posed to many of my informants, there is a remarkable unanimity of opinion, although emphasis varies with nationality. The major points can be set out simply by quoting from my record of conversations and from answers to questionnaires sent to academicians in the U.S. Although quotation marks are omitted, what follows is a consolidated set of direct quotes:

. (IMAGE) First, improved image of PRC, thru efforts of friends, new and old. It hopes to develop sympathy and understanding of its aims, progress, problems and aspirations. The PRC wants visits from Americans who will be impressed and influential enough to have an impact on U.S. opinion. China wants to encourage respect for China and make a favorable impression on visitors. China is trying to get a favorable image for itself. It wants to change its old image in the West and gain a new one. It wants to show that China treasures the past and has not destroyed it.

. (ACCESS) China wants to gain access to foreign science and technology. The Chinese want to see the organization of science and education and industry, see real live Western high technology, see what if anything they can borrow or adapt. One of two main objectives is to gain access to American science and technology. The PRC wants to gain access to U.S. technological and economic resources. China's goal is not to understand the West and its culture. The Chinese are interested basically in practical matters which can be applied to Chinese needs.

. (FOREIGN POLICY) Cultural exchange is carried on for the purpose of China's general foreign policy. Cultural exchange is tied indirectly to China's overall political-economic-military goals: to draw the U.S. into a triangular relationship to reduce the Soviet threat, to create an atmosphere for commercial interchange, and to create an atmosphere for favorable disposition of the Taiwan issue. Peking wants to pre-empt and erode Taiwan's international position. China's desire to develop sympathy and understanding is catalyzed in turn by a genuine concern with possible aggressive intentions of the USSR. The Chinese want friends in Congress and friends among the people so that a friendly Congress will eventually recognize Peking instead of Taipei, grant the PRC most favored nation status, and avoid taking any anti-Chinese stance with the Soviet Union. The PRC wants to build a positive atmosphere for more complete normalization of relations with the U.S. Cultural exchange is seen by the Chinese as both a vehicle and a symbol of the normalization process with the U.S.

CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD CULTURAL EXCHANGE

Respondents expressed a variety of opinions about China's attitude toward cultural exchange, and on most points there was substantial agreement.

China's spirit of self-reliance registered strongly. One informant noted that "self-sufficiency is a dominant theme in China today. They believe whatever they do will be done better, in the long run, if done indigenously. Moreover, this builds Chinese experience and expertise at every level." Another said that the Chinese would prefer to be self-reliant and go it alone, and yet another called attention to the continuation of a "don't depend on foreigners" attitude.

There was general agreement also that China has little to offer the West. One source felt that China is "embarrassed that it has so little to offer." "The Chinese are not very advanced in science and technology,"
another said. They "do not have much to contribute" and "are very much ill at ease" in this field. The Chinese are very proud of their insulin synthesis, this source went on, "but that was ten years ago -- and they are still talking about it."

I put to many informants an undeniably loaded question: does the PRC fear contamination? All of those who responded answered yes. One said that Peking fears information which conflicts with policies set by the government. Information sources in China are extremely limited and tightly controlled, and the PRC wants to keep it that way. Another respondent said that the Chinese "do fear contamination in the sense that so far (his italics) they have avoided sending graduate students or post docs for extended stays. I was told explicitly that they fear that U.S. orientation would not be right for them."

Quite apart from my survey but none the less relevant is an observation on "The Canton Fair: An Academic Perspective" in the October/December 1973 issue of The China Quarterly by Daniel Tretiak, a professor at York University in Toronto. "Traditional and modern Chinese governments, when strong, have tended towards a jaundiced view of excessive numbers of foreigners travelling widely throughout their country, particularly businessmen bringing new ideas and inventions that might upset the desired political and economic order."

To draw out opinions on China's attitude toward cultural exchange, I also asked if Peking retains a traditional Chinese sense of superiority. A minority maintained that China does indeed "convey a sense of superiority". One informant said that as for humility, "the Chinese say the words, but they are not thinking that". The Chinese, he felt, still consider themselves superior, the center of the world, regardless of time or political system. But the majority would agree with the view expressed by Doak Barnett in an article in the April 8, 1973 New York Times Magazine: "One of the highest-ranking Chinese leaders we met said to us: 'You have been to other Asian nations. You know we are saying the truth when we say that we are a developing nation. We have a very long way to go.' In years past I had tended to view such statements as examples of calculated modesty, designed to elicit compliments. I now view them as accurate statements, made by realistic men who, while proud of what China has accomplished since 1949, are under no illusions about all that must be done before China becomes a fully modernized society."

One of my respondents put it this way: "I detect no sense of superiority on the part of the PRC toward the West. This applies both to government officials and to the general public in the PRC. Parenthetically, let me remark that whatever Chinese sense of superiority there existed, that is something very much of the past. In fact, it is definitely a pre-twentieth century phenomenon. Does the PRC view cultural exchange as between equals? Certainly yes." Many others share this point of view. China does not approach cultural exchange with an attitude of superiority, said one. The Chinese are "really rather humble", "very modest about their accomplishments", and constantly state that they have much to learn. The PRC is proud of China's long cultural tradition but certainly does not claim it is superior -- far from it, for anything which glorifies the past diminishes the present. Others called attention to the new Chinese sense of self-assurance and self-confidence. There is no servile, snivelling attitude, no feeling of inferiority. "The Chinese are genuinely proud of the changes they have wrought," one told me, and are proud to show foreigners what they have done. Another commented that "it is good and important for an American visitor to appreciate the immense sense of pride and self-respect (neither superiority nor inferiority complex) among the Chinese people."
Finally, in this section, I would like to quote at some length from one particularly thoughtful respondent whose views pretty much coincide with my own:

"China wants friends, especially, it must be admitted, friends who will look up to her. The Chinese want to 'show off' their achievements through cultural exchange. They want to impress us, for they want us to respect them. They want admiring friends. Cultural exchange, therefore, is not, strictly speaking, the aim of their cultural exchange. They do not really want to exchange culture. They are not really interested in Western culture. They are certainly not looking for 'cultural enrichment'. Generally speaking, they have gone back to the pre-May 4th and pre-Liang Ch'i-ch'ao position of feeling that all the West has to offer is a certain amount of technology. I think that in the realm of cultural exchange, the PRC is unquestionably more interested in giving than in receiving. The Chinese want people to come to China to see not to show, while they themselves want to go abroad to show not to see. They are extremely proud of their own modern culture, and they want us to see it and be impressed. They want us to come, see, and be conquered. Conversely, they are not much impressed with our culture. Ideologically, I am sure that they think that most of Western culture is degenerate and potentially corrupting. But I suspect that there is often a sincere lack of interest, or, perhaps, even a visceral dislike, that runs deeper than ideology. They do not look on cultural exchange as an opportunity for cultural broadening."

THE QUALITY OF PRC NEGOTIATORS

Turning now to the business of negotiating cultural exchange, what do those who have dealt with the Chinese side think of their professional capacity and personal characteristics?

The Chinese generally get very high marks in all respects. Bright, well-informed, well-briefed, top quality, extremely affable -- these are the sorts of terms used again and again to describe them. Some informants noted variations, however. The Chinese are "generally extremely affable, except when sticky areas are being discussed", said one. "Jesus! They varied a great deal," said another, from very capable to very mediocre. One Chinese was described as "a pain in the neck" and another as being "quite noticeably arrogant" by two sources who stressed that these were exceptions in a system which brings the best to the top. Overall, Chinese negotiators were judged to be of very high quality, carefully chosen for their diplomatic skill.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE PRC

"In my experience, it appears dangerous to attempt to generalize on the negotiating characteristics of the Chinese or any other nation." These are wise words of caution from a Boston University law professor who was an adviser to Tanzania's Ministry of External Affairs when it concluded an Agreement on Cultural Cooperation with China in December 1962. (The quotation is from "Negotiating with China: A Minor Episode", by Gilbert P. Verbit, in China's Practice of International Law, edited by Jerome A. Cohen, published by the Harvard University Press in 1972.) Contrast that with this remark from one of my informants: "The Chinese mind is 2500 years old.
and will not change, call it Marxism or whatever they like. They behave like old Confucians... they keep imposing ideas on you, and finally at the end they come down like a sword".

Nevertheless, as unsatisfactory as it may be to try to do so, certain generalizations can be derived from the experience of those who have been involved in negotiating cultural exchange with the People's Republic of China. The first is that no matter whether the talks are held in a foreign country or in Peking itself, the Chinese negotiators decide nothing of importance on the spot. Everything must be referred to a higher level. Negotiating the visit of a group of Chinese journalists to the U.S., for example, was described as "tough". Final decisions were obviously made in Peking, not New York. "Negotiators were cordial, mostly receptive to our advice, but nothing was settled before Peking had several go's at it." One informant who had extensive experience in Peking said that issues are invariably referred to a higher level with the standard remark that "this matter will be referred to the department concerned" -- and "a great deal of it goes very high up".

A result of this is that negotiations involving any degree of difficulty take a lot of time. One source remarked that "negotiations on even relatively simple things tend to be terribly protracted". Foreigners who must wait and wait to hear from the Chinese side can find the delay terribly frustrating. A member of a negotiating group that went to Peking said that the major problem is that the Chinese are "very very slow -- it takes an immense time to get clarification." And yet, as proof of Professor Verbit's observation about the danger of generalizations, note what another informant who had some years' experience in Peking told me. The process is time-consuming, yes. Matters are always referred to higher authority. A series of meetings is always necessary. But, he said, the time required is a matter of China's priorities. When something is of high priority to the Chinese, they give answers and act "extremely quickly".

In some cases, the imposed waiting seems to have a pattern. The experience of the U.S. Committee on Scholarly Communication is illustrative. A Committee delegation went to Peking in May 1973 to negotiate scientific and technical exchanges. The Committee had sent written proposals ahead, in advance of the trip. On arrival a meeting was held in which nothing was accomplished -- and then nothing further happened. Days passed, and the delegation became increasingly anxious as its departure deadline approached. It did not want to leave China empty-handed and pressed for a negotiating session. Finally, shortly before its time in China was up, the delegation had its long-sought working meeting with its counterpart, the Chinese Scientific and Technical Association, and details were worked out swiftly and smoothly for 19 exchanges over the next one to two years. This pattern is typical of several other groups: arrive in Peking, make a presentation, wait, wait some more, and at the last minute work out a mutually satisfactory exchange.

Some of what would appear to be negotiating sessions are not really that. I was told by some participants that there is "very little negotiation -- you present your proposals, wait a while, and then they tell you what they are going to do. There is very little give and take." You can't really call it negotiation, said another; there is no arguing, no give and take -- just acceptance or rejection by the Chinese side. On the other hand, I was informed with equal certainty that, yes indeed, there are real negotiations, there is give and take. I have puzzled over an explanation for this contradictory testimony and cannot find a satisfactory one. It may be that the term "negotiation" is too all-embracing to begin with and that one should try to distinguish between conducting negotiations -- where there must be give and take -- and discussing unilateral Western
proposals -- where the Chinese have the option of answering simply yea or nay. Or it may be that in their eagerness to engage in cultural exchange with China, some from the West cast themselves in the role of petitioner and thus leave decisions up to the Chinese. Or the explanation may lie in the answers I got to the question of Chinese flexibility. In the words of one respondent: "The Chinese are usually quite inflexible, although this can be overcome by quiet determination on our part." Another put it in a more positive way, saying that the Chinese are "very flexible" in acceding to requests if the other side argues effectively and provided the request does not involve a highly sensitive political matter.

Western negotiators find the Chinese either unable or unwilling to recognize the gap that exists between the government and the private sector in the West. Once the Chinese have decided that they want a particular exchange, one source said, they assume it is very simple for the other side to accept and carry it out. "They don't realize that they are not dealing with just the state apparatus but with a combination of government and private." They can't understand, said another, "that the government is not in a position to tell people what to do." This problem has come up most often in having to get a facility for a major Chinese cultural presentation in the West on very short notice. One person told me, for instance, that the Chinese can't appreciate the fact that the Government of France cannot set up a major theatre on a few weeks' notice for a Chinese cultural attraction. Leading theatres are booked months and years in advance, and the Government does not control the private sector -- not even a National Theatre.

THE MECHANICS OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE: CHINESE IN THE WEST

After an exchange has been agreed on, how does it work out? What problems are encountered? What are the things to look out for? Let us first look at some experience with Chinese in the West, and in the next section at foreigners in China.

In general, things go very smoothly. Considering the numbers of persons involved on both sides, the complicated itineraries, the intricate schedule of appointments and visitations, the difference in cultures, and the always exhausting nature of travel in strange places far from home, it is remarkable that the record is as good -- a tribute as much to the hard work and tender loving care provided by the hundreds of hosts in the receiving countries as to the courtesy, politeness, and considerateness of the Chinese visitors.

The problems seem modest indeed in this general context, but there are some worth mentioning. One is insufficient advance notice of exactly when a Chinese group will arrive. Final detailed arrangements must sometimes wait until too late for comfort pending word from Peking on precise arrival time. Allied with this are last-minute changes in time of arrival and numbers of people in the Chinese exchange group. But this phenomenon, say those with experience in the field, is par for the course with visitors from all countries. One must learn to live with it and above all, be flexible.

Once the Chinese arrive in the host country, they adhere to the agreed schedule with only occasional lapses. U.S. hosts have had a few minor embarrassments. The Chinese acrobatic troupe cancelled out at the last minute on a rather elaborate reception prepared for them in a town near Washington because they were too tire. A hundred welfare mothers in Detroit were set to entertain the ping-pong team with soul food, only to have the affair canceled on very short notice. The day that a group of Chinese librarians was to visit Oral Roberts University in Tulsa, Oklahoma, they learned of the school's highly religious nature and called it off. A
linguist delegation became very reluctant to visit Seton Hall University, an institution strong in Chinese language instruction, when they discovered it has some Taiwan connections; after some discussion, a part of the delegation went to Seton Hall, keeping as low a profile as possible. The 22-member Chinese journalist group cancelled a luncheon to be hosted by the New York Times two days before the event and later caused the publisher of the Washington Post some unhappiness when only eight members appeared for a luncheon.

A few other miscellaneous observations may be of interest. Unlike the average Westerner seriously afflicted with the virus of consumerism, the Chinese visitors are not shoppers. They enjoy visiting stores when the opportunity is presented and they are curious about the goods available, but there is no buying to speak of. The Chinese visitors come well briefed about Western customs, and what they do not know they learn quickly. Necessary security measures are apparently readily understood and appreciated by the Chinese, much more so than by their hosts. Chinese visitors' sensitivity to meeting people from Taiwan or to seeing any symbols of that other government was remarked on by a number of informants. In such spare time as they have, the Chinese visitors do not seek out activity, preferring to rest for the next day's labors. "They are quite work-oriented," said one source in something of an understatement. When they do go out, it is almost invariably in pairs. One observer commented that "on the whole, the Chinese are not comfortable going around as individuals." Although in theory a classless society, the Chinese are very conscious of protocol in such things as seating arrangements. It is important that the head of a delegation be at the head of a table, for the Chinese are very discomfited if proper protocol is not adhered to.

And finally, press relations can be a problem. One informant said that Chinese visitors "equate a press conference with a firing squad." They will not tolerate open, unstructured sessions with the press and will not respond when "backed into a corner" with a camera or microphone when "jammed in their face", in the words of another source. But when they do submit to interviews or to a press conference with limits on the questions, the Chinese acquit themselves very well. And they are most definitely interested in good publicity, reading the papers and watching TV to check their coverage. One observer summed it up well by saying that "they want to have a good press, but they refuse to give the press what it wants."

THE MECHANICS OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE: WESTERNERS IN CHINA

Back in 1963, in his book China's Cultural Diplomacy, Herbert Passim wrote:

"...Most of the visitors come on whirlwind tours in delegations or organized groups...They are taken in hand for a carefully organized itinerary with guides and interpreters and, in the case of important delegations, by some high-ranking person or representative of the appropriate field. For the period of his stay, which may vary from a week to two months -- the average is probably three weeks -- the visitor is treated as an honored guest. He is shown every courtesy, surrounded by luxury, and given every attention. He attends receptions, meetings, important events, cultural activities, the theatre and other amusements, and excellent restaurants; he is shown the great sights of Peking and China's other big cities...In most cases, after a short stay in Peking, he will be taken on a grand tour of the country...In the course of these visits he will see people's communes, new factories, representatives of 'ordinary' workers, farmers, students...In other words, he will be given a very full, even rich and interesting experience, and he will see many things. But he will have been
guided, albeit with great skill, in accordance with his susceptibilities and dispositions, over a carefully-prepared stage..."

This description is still very accurate today. Leaders of scientific delegations from the West, escort-interpreters with athletic teams, managers of symphony orchestras, worldly-wise journalists -- all are very high in their praise of the extremely kind treatment they receive, the unbounded hospitality which can never seem to be reciprocated in the West, the friendliness of their Chinese hosts, the comforting sense of complete security for one's person and belongings, and the smoothness of arrangements for travel, lodging, and baggage. Some typical remarks: "We were met by the most friendly people imaginable." "It is a basic attribute of good Chinese manners to spare nothing to make guests very, very comfortable." "The Chinese were generous and accommodating and never put us in an embarrassing situation." "The way they handle cultural exchange, you'd think they were the best friends we ever had in the world."

Much has been written about restrictions on foreign travel in China. Certain cities and areas are completely closed, others are open to only a select few. For the nonce, this appears to be no particular problem. Travel to China is still such a novelty and so many people are still so anxious to go that the great cities and areas on the approved list satisfy all reasonable requirements. There is general acquiescence to the proposition that China feels the need to restrict travel for its own political and military reasons. In the places they do visit, during such time as is left over from normally packed schedules, Western visitors can wander freely, widely, and unaccompanied, provided they do not get into locally proscribed areas. Lack of enough guides, interpreters, and hotels is another generally accepted reason for limiting travel in China. One of my informants said that "I think that Chinese travel restrictions do not represent an attempt to show us only 'show places', but rather the sincere feeling that many cities in China simply do not as yet have 'proper accommodations' for (fussy) foreigners. They do not want to be embarrassed, and we should certainly not want to embarrass them. They are not afraid to show foreigners what they themselves call the 'backwardness' of China, but neither do they want a host of carping tourists." Another informant had a different point of view, however. He said that "Americans in China don't get to see the things the Chinese don't want them to see, and they often don't get to see what they do want to see." I myself rather like the tactful way another visitor phrased it: "One sees only regions and institutions on the approved list. Of course, this list differs for different people, but the general effect of having to get permission to travel anywhere is to dampen spontaneity and diminish the meaningfulness of exchange."

The fact that perserverance sometimes pays off has already been mentioned. Most visitors would agree with the observation from one traveller that the Chinese "are not geared to deal with individual requests". Another found the Chinese "sometimes flexible in changing prearranged plans". Many delegations can cite instances of objectives achieved through persistence. And this persistence can be carried to a somewhat humorous length. A group of 20 secondary and university students from Chicago, all active and in the top third of their class, a majority of them from very poor families and 13 of them black, visited China last August. Early on they were intrigued by the way their Chinese hosts sidestepped their many special requests, so they decided to take one -- a visit to an air-raid shelter -- and push it every step of the way. Finally, when they got to Peking, their request was granted.
To say that the Chinese calibrate visitors according to their importance to them is nothing unique. Every country has its VIP visitors who enjoy treatment somewhat above that of more ordinary mortals. Thus, the observation that some delegations are Class A and some Class D or that visiting big-name journalists get interviews with Chinese leaders while lesser lights have to make do with nameless spokesmen should surprise no one. Yet it will probably come as a surprise to learn that even the important groups visiting China often do not know what the day's activities will be until the morning of the day. A leading scientific delegation hosted by the prestigious Chinese Academy of Sciences didn't know where we would lecture and go before we arrived in China, and once in China, the schedule was given to them day by day. The London Philharmonic Orchestra, thanks to being in Hong Kong for two weeks to play at the Arts Festival there just before entering China in March 1973, worked out all of the details of its visit a week before the tour began. Everything, including its concert programs, was set before entry.

But the Philadelphia Orchestra enjoyed a different experience. Unable to get details in advance, even after arrival in China, which would permit issuance of a daily schedule to Orchestra members, the manager resorted to a blackboard in the hotel lobby with vital information such as "Bus leaves at 9:30 a.m." or "Concert at 7:30 tomorrow night". They were given practically no detailed information in advance, and the schedule was full of surprises.

The Philadelphia Orchestra's experience is also illuminating -- and no doubt beyond a certain point, unique -- in giving insight into the fruits of quiet insistence on the part of the Chinese and their penchant for leaving things to the last minute -- or put another way, not deciding things until the time comes when they must be decided. For months before its charter plane landed in Shanghai on September 12, 1973, Americans arranging the visit had been trying to get answers to all sorts of questions, but two weeks before departure only two things were firm: the date of the visit, and the Chinese desire to drop two program numbers (Don Juan and Afternoon of a Faun) proposed by the Orchestra for its concerts in China. On the morning the Orchestra took off, a cable arrived from Peking outlining a tentative itinerary and schedule of activities. This was discussed on the plane, a reply proposing some revisions was dispatched during a refueling stop in San Francisco, and this data was typed up and distributed to members of the Orchestra during a rest stop in Honolulu -- their first details on what they would be doing in China (which later developments rendered null and void).

The Orchestra arrived in Peking about nine o'clock at night, and its representatives were advised that a negotiating session had been set for 11 p.m. The meeting lasted four hours, an exhausting finish to an exhausting day, and was concerned primarily with the music to be played at the concerts, the first of which was to be held three days later. Programs already tentatively agreed to were torn apart and re-shaped. Everything went along fine until the Orchestra came up against the Chinese desire to have the Orchestra play Beethoven's Sixth Symphony. Orchestra representatives politely declined. They had not brought along the music and had not rehearsed the piece for a few years. The Chinese let the matter drop for the moment but returned to it later and were again given the same explanation. Once more the Chinese put it aside but later came back to it, saying that they could supply the musical scores. But we have 106 musicians, said the Orchestra representatives, and there may not be enough scores. No problem, said the Chinese, we have many symphony orchestras in China and can collect scores for them. The matter was let drop again, and when the Chinese raised it yet another time, the Orchestra representatives said that it was very kind of them to offer to collect scores, but Eugene Ormandy (the conductor) is very particular about bowing, which would not be marked the same on the Chinese scores -- and besides, there would not be enough time for rehearsal. The Chinese let the matter
rest for a bit, and when they took it up again, the Orchestra manager said: 'But I thought we had already decided that issue.' "Yes, we have decided it," said the Chinese, "but we are only trying to improve the program." It was now obvious that Beethoven's Sixth must be played, so it was agreed to consult with Ormandy in the morning. Over breakfast the situation was explained to him, and the answer to his question -- what do I do? -- was: play Beethoven's Sixth. And he did. It is now a matter of minor history that, as Ormandy later related, Chiang Ching was the one who asked for the piece. And for a time, a few months ago, there was much speculation in the media about whether some unkind words written about Western bourgeois music, including Beethoven's, represented a veiled attack on Chiang Ching -- or what.

One reason why the Chinese can leave things to the last minute is that they are such superb improvisers. The London Philharmonic Orchestra saw this skill displayed the day they were to leave Shanghai for Canton. The group arrived at the airport to find a lone aircraft and no other activity. There was "nobody there." Told that their flight would have to be delayed for two hours because of bad weather in Canton, the group discussed whether to stay at the airport or go back into the city. They decided to stay and wait. About noon, there was still no sign of anything happening, and the group was told that a further delay was required. The Orchestra manager asked if the group might get a bite to eat. One hour later, at what was a seemingly deserted airport, the group -- numbering 104 persons -- sat down to a seven-course dinner.

A great many Westerners -- Americans in particular -- have called attention to the difficulty of establishing more than a superficial relationship with their Chinese hosts. One American visitor who was particularly articulate on this point said that the trouble with exchanges as they are now constituted is that there is "a lot of formalism." "I was bored a good deal of the time," he went on, with formal banquet after formal banquet, canned briefings at visits to communes and factories and Revolutionary Committee headquarters. Visits to major academic and scientific institutions are "tremendously rushed", so that the "degree of contact is quite limited" and it is "difficult to have anything more than superficial conversations". Another obstacle, he said, is that "they don't invite you to their homes", and he understands the reasons for this. "Instead, they take you to restaurants, and it's damn hard to get to know people that way." His summary remark was this: "There's much more form than there is substance." Many others, Americans at least, would agree with this. To quote another American informant: "It's hard to get a meaningful dialogue going with these people" -- which makes beautifully appropriate a puckish sentence by Lord Mancroft in a recent Punch article: "How these Americans do relish a meaningful dialogue."

Are other nationalities concerned about the formalism and inability to probe below the surface? Not particularly, apparently. The Canadians told me, for example, that this is to be expected. All relations under these circumstances are bound to be superficial. One must restrain oneself, be realistic, know what is possible and what is not. As for the endless banquets, the Canadians look on them as part of the normal mode of social intercourse. It's good practice, one said, to get to know your opposite numbers over dinner and wine before sitting down at the negotiating table with them. And besides, the food is delicious.

STUDENT EXCHANGE

According to one probably reliable estimate, from 1949 up to the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, "as many as 15,000 Chinese may have studied in other countries, while not more than 2,000 foreign students attended Chinese institutions." Most of the Chinese students went abroad to study foreign languages and to take advanced training in
science and technology. Most of the students from what are called "advanced foreign countries" went to China to study its language, history, and culture, while those from the less-developed countries took up science and technology. In either case, all foreign students were required to spend at least one year on the Chinese language, even if they had already learned some Chinese.

By the end of 1966, the Cultural Revolution has closed all universities in China and had caused practically all foreign students in China to return home and Chinese students to be recalled from abroad. In recent years, student exchange has resumed in a modest way. I have no figures at all, not even a guess, on the total number of Chinese students now studying overseas. This section of the paper will give some details about the approximately 160 Chinese students in the U.K., 30 in France, 17 in Canada, and 10 in Sweden. As for foreign students in China, we know that the Peking Language Institute -- where all foreign students must, as before, spend their first year -- re-opened in the fall of 1973, and it is generally accepted that the Institute now has an enrollment of about 300, from as many as 40 countries, including France (about 30), Canada (20), the U.K. (15), and Sweden (3).

With that bit of general background out of the way, let me give such details as I have for each of the four countries individually. In order to spare the reader the tedium of attributions -- one source told me, according to another informant, a respondent commented, etc. -- I will present the information straight out, except where attribution is clearly necessary, using quotation marks to indicate precise wording, it being understood that everything is based on what I learned from a variety of sources and none of it is my own opinion, unless so stated.

Canada When Mitchell Sharp visited Peking in August 1972, student exchange was raised but the Chinese said it was "premature" by a couple of years. Late in 1972, however, the Chinese told the Canadian Embassy in Peking that they did want to discuss student exchange, and thus began "negotiations that went on for a solid six months."

The negotiations were "quite easy", according to one informant, but another said there was considerable pulling and hauling on freedom to travel and access to academic facilities for Canadian students who were to go to China. The Canadians tried, without success as it turned out, to get the Chinese to agree to let their students travel freely beyond the normal diplomatic limits around Peking and to give them access to libraries, archives, and other academic facilities. It seemed unfair that Chinese students would travel wherever they wished in Canada, whereas Canadian students in China would not be able to leave the Peking environs without special permission. The Canadian effort was to no avail, however, By August 1973 a student exchange agreement was wrapped up, and it was formalized in the course of Prime Minister Trudeau's visit in October.

The agreement is in the form of an exchange of notes. It provides for 20 students each way -- "the magic figure of 20 came from the Chinese side" -- with each side to pay the expenses of its students in the other's country. The Canadians consider this a bargain, since student costs in China are so low.

The Canadian students were to have left for China in late September 1973, but their departure was delayed at the request of the Chinese who were not yet ready for them. All 20 arrived in Peking in early November. Ten of them were chosen on a competitive basis by the Canadian Association of Universities and Colleges and are financed by a grant from the Federal Government's Department of External Affairs. The other ten were picked and are paid for by McGill University in Montreal, York University
near Toronto, and the University of Toronto. The students' academic interests are varied, including medicine, geography, psychology, art, media studies, language, science, and history. Politically, they cover all points in the spectrum from conservative to far left. The latter wanted to get involved in student political activities in China, but the Chinese said no to that.

All are in the Peking Language Institute for the first year. The class schedule is rigorous and the life spartan. The first bell rings at 6 a.m. and the gates close at 10 p.m. Classes are held six days a week with a total of 29 hours of class time. Physical education occupies an hour a day. Two hours a week are devoted to a course on the "facts of China", a general orientation course which is given in both English and Chinese with tedious interpretation. Teaching materials are in general judged very "tedious", and the course needs considerable improvement.

The students are given more freedom now than before. In days of yore, some Zambian students, frustrated by the restrictions, had gone on a drunken rampage, getting high on beer, assaulting police and stealing diplomatic cars. It was a bad scene. Some of the present students take a break from the routine in more acceptable ways. During the past winter vacation, for example, a Ph.D. candidate in Chinese history from York University went down to Hong Kong to enjoy the bright lights.

A nervous breakdown or two would have been expected by this time, but there has been none. None of the students has requested to return to Canada, and the only major medical problem was cleared up locally.

The agreement provides for the Canadian students to stay two years, but up to half of the 20 are expected to return to Canada after the first year. The reasons vary: some want to get back to spouse, actual or intended; some can't stand the isolation and spartan conditions; and some foresee the impossibility of pursuing their major field of study in China. It may be difficult to find money to replace all of those who leave, but there will be plenty of new applicants.

There is no assurance that the Canadian students now in Peking will be able to continue their studies in regular academic institutions in China. "We hope, we hope" that they will be able to work in their academic disciplines, one source said, but "one never knows in advance with the Chinese".

Just as the draft of this paper is to be consigned to final typing come clippings of two articles by John Burns, Peking correspondent of the Toronto Globe and Mail, about the 20 Canadian students in Peking. Burns writes that "the Canadians are in a somewhat frustrated and fractious mood" and that "many of the British and French are at least as disillusioned as the Canadians". Burns describes the limited intellectual fare in the Institute's curriculum and the students' "frustrations with the 'Mickey-Mouse' regulations binding their on-campus lives", even though "the Chinese can fairly be said to have gone out of their way to make the students comfortable". Burns also relates that "high hopes of getting close to the Chinese" have been severely dampened, with Canadian students grumbling that it is difficult to engage the Chinese students at the Institute in any but the most superficial conversations. The students have expressed dissatisfaction with the academic program in "numerous meetings with the Institute officials" and "drafted a petition to the principal demanding several policy changes, particularly in respect of their lack of contact with ordinary Chinese." Anyone who wants to read the articles in full will find them in the Globe and Mail of April 25 and 26.
Although the agreement provides for 20 Chinese students to go to Canada, only 10 came this academic year under the agreement. (An additional seven students are at Carleton University in Ottawa, not under the agreement, and are discussed separately below.) The other ten Chinese students are expected for the academic year beginning this fall, and it is anticipated that they will study science and technology. Of the ten current students, who began their studies in October 1973, five are studying primarily French at Laval University in Quebec city and at McGill, and five are studying primarily English at the University of Toronto and York University. The program for the students at McGill is not working out well; it's a "bad show". Beyond that, I have no information about the students at Laval and McGill.

The three Chinese students at the University of Toronto are all young men and all graduates of Peking University. The two at York are young ladies, like the other students in the early to mid-20s. One is a graduate of Futan University in Shanghai whose father is a mechanic, the other a Peking University graduate from a farm family. The Canadians do not know how these five students were selected, but it was apparently not through competition or examination. The choice was probably made on the basis of academic record and recommendation, and their coming to Canada must be viewed as a "political reward". The impression is that the Chinese students were picked in a hurry, like the Canadian students who went to China.

The students' proficiency in English was low on arrival and required remedial work. But the three men at the U of T (as it is known locally) started right off in regular courses. This caused some jealousy on the part of the two women at York until they discovered that the gradual approach laid out for them works much better. The students at York came not only with poor English but with almost no knowledge of foreign life and manners. So for the first week and a half they lived in a private home and were introduced to such Western eccentricities as the use of knife and fork, table manners, bathroom etiquette, and the operation of a vacuum cleaner. They too started regular courses at York but soon had to drop all but one because they could not keep up -- comprehension was perhaps 50%. The one course that they continue, with difficulty and with some special tutoring on the side to explain what they cannot follow, is a course in (of all things) Business Practices. To improve their English, a "tailor-made" program was set up at York and paid for by the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa under which the girls have four hours a day of foreign language instruction, together with another male tutor. The female contingent at York is judged to have a better command of English now than their male colleagues at the U of T.

All five students live on campus. The only place available for the men at the U of T to reside was the Anglican College, the most conservative of the colleges, and, as the name indicates, with a religious heritage. But the Chinese did not raise an eyebrow, possibly preferring a dormitory there because of the better moral tone. The women at York live in a small apartment (two bedrooms, study, and kitchen) on the top floor of the graduate student dormitory. Part of the attractiveness of this arrangement was the ability to cook their own Chinese food, but this practice came to an almost complete halt after the Chinese Ambassador in Ottawa, reinforcing less effectual advice from others, told them they must get use to eating Canadian food.

The Chinese Embassy takes a considerable direct interest in the students' progress and appears satisfied with the program set up for them. "If they weren't satisfied," I was told, "we'd know". The York students go to the Embassy in Ottawa for a long weekend about once a month for some home cooking and "hsueh hsi" (political study). There is "absolutely no
question of their loyalty", one source said when I mentioned that I had heard that the Embassy seemed to feel very secure about Chinese students in Canada. Politically, he said, they are very well trained, and he was quite certain that a few years in Canada would not erode their beliefs. The students do not openly criticize the Canadian scene, but privately they express very strong reservations and criticisms about "our way of life, values, and social structure".

The Chinese students are very poised and "self-confident", able to handle themselves well and get along in any situation. They are very honest and hardworking to the point of indulging in hardly any leisure pursuits: no sports, no TV, no shopping, no visits to the beauty parlor. The students are not degree candidates -- "a degree means nothing to them" -- and will not positively be in Canada for two years, although that is the clear expectation of the Canadians. The basic purpose of their study is to gain "fluency in English and an understanding of Canada", and their future will be as interpreters, translators, and on up the ladder in the foreign affairs field.

The Chinese initiative to enroll students at Carleton University also began in the fall of 1972, at about the same time that the Chinese expressed their interest in working out a formal student exchange agreement with the Swedish Embassy in Peking. But the Carleton arrangement proceeded on an independent course between the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa and Carleton University. In fact, the Canadian Embassy in Peking didn't even know about the Carleton agreement until it was well under way.

The particular part of Carleton where the Chinese students enrolled is St. Patrick's College, which is an interesting fact in itself. St. Patrick's was a wholly Catholic institution until it was absorbed by Carleton University (a Provincial university) in 1967, and it still "retains some of its Catholicity". This fact, as far as I could determine, did not put off the Chinese Embassy at all, the explanation being that the Embassy wanted to have these initial students in Ottawa, which meant a choice between Carleton and Ottawa University, also until just recently a Catholic School. In any event, when the then Dean of St. Patrick's College (the first dean without a Roman collar) heard that an institution was being sought to teach students from the People's Republic of China, he "jumped on it". St. Patrick's had the advantage of being a small college of only about 800 with its own residence facilities, smaller classes, and a generally good place for foreign students to start and get their bearings.

St. Patrick's set about preparing for the students' arrival on a crash basis, anticipating that the students would arrive almost immediately, beginning in the January 1973 winter semester. The College proposed and the Chinese Embassy accepted that St. Patrick's would provide a special remedial English course and orientation about Canada, to be paid for by the Chinese at a cost of several thousand dollars. But after that, "very little happened". The pause is attributed to some complications of an unspecified nature between the Embassy and the Canadian Department of External Affairs. The College consulted with the Embassy about the students' forthcoming academic program and whether the students would live at the Embassy or on campus. The Embassy made it very clear that the students should definitely live in a college dormitory.

Nine Chinese students arrived in the spring of 1973. Originally, there were to have been ten, but one fell by the wayside because of a health or visa problem. Two returned to China at the end of the year (one source surmised they were getting too bourgeois), making the present seven students at Carleton. The breakdown is 3-4 men-women, early twenties in age, from Shanghai, Nanking, Peking, Shansi Province, and the Northeast. All have worked in field or factory under the "hsia fang" (down to the countryside) movement and are happy to talk about their experiences, but any questions about the current scene in China are met with silence.
As the Canadians understand it, the Chinese purpose in placing students at Carleton is that it is to be "not just a language exercise" but is intended to give the students a full introduction to and appreciation of life in Canada -- and "the important point is to live and mix with Canadian students". The Chinese students live in a co-ed dormitory, paired off in double rooms. One source told me, incidentally, that the reason why the two Chinese students at York University were put off by themselves in graduate housing was that the students at St. Patrick's were "really shocked" by conduct in the coed dorm, but another source said this was simply not so, and that in fact the Chinese Embassy was unhappy about the York girls being so sequestered. I was told also that the Chinese students at Carleton get along well with the other students but that the Canadian students don't go out of their way to get to know the Chinese students, because of a certain reserve or lack of curiosity that distinguishes Canadian students from those in some other countries.

The special English-language and orientation program was successfully completed during the summer of 1973 at St. Patrick's, and in September the students started regular class work at Carleton. "They take any courses they want to." A male student is taking everything he can on English and Canadian literature. A female student is primarily studying English, to be an interpreter. Two students are enrolled in an introductory political science course.

There appears to be no concern at all on the part of the Chinese about defection or contamination. It is assumed that the students are "invulnerable". Like their colleagues at York and the U of T, the students at Carleton are not thought of as degree candidates. Their period of study was never spelled out, and it is not clear how long they will be there. If they go the route like Canadian students, it would be three years, since Canada's educational structure provides 13 years of schooling before reaching university level.

The United Kingdom If the reader has been told by this time more about penguins than he cared to know, he may be relieved by the assurance that I found out much less about China's student exchange program with the U.K., Sweden and France.

As mentioned on page 3, Britain's student exchange agreement with China was reached in Peking in March 1973. It provides for 200 Chinese students to go to England for an unspecified period. It's assumed the length of stay will be about 2 years, but like so much in the Chinese-British exchange, "there's a lot of ad-hoc-ery about this business" -- which doesn't seem to bother the British, with their relaxed manner and common law heritage, a bit. About 160 of this 200 are now in England (but if anyone cares about numbers, please note some additions below), having come in various-sized and -sized deployments beginning with a group of 40 students in May 1973. All are studying English, and all commence their study with a two-week orientation course provided and paid for by the British Council. All other costs are borne by the Chinese who are very cost-conscious.

After the British Council orientation, the students spend an average of two terms (each term is 12 weeks; a few with better English require only one term) at private language schools accredited by the Government, called ARELS(Association of Recognized English Language Schools). After testing, the students then proceed to "second tier" study at regular university-level institutions -- but even at universities, special tutoring is provided if needed. In early April of this year, 24 Chinese students were at the University of Bath, 12 at the University of Exeter, 8 at the London School of Economics, and 12 were about to enter the University of East
Anglia. The British consider their program flexible and geared to the students' needs and ability, a "mixture of approaches" -- purely ARELS, regular university-level study, or a combination of the two.

China's primary aim for the students is to produce proficiency in English. When that has come into conflict with learning about economics, government, or British life and institutions, preference has definitely been given to language study. The Chinese Embassy has sought advice from the British "meticulously" and has constantly checked on and evaluated the students' progress. The Chinese students themselves have also made clear their desire to advance as rapidly as possible. They work hard, taking their study seriously and showing a "constructive restlessness".

One informant described the English-language proficiency of the Chinese on arrival as "on the whole pretty high". He said the British have insisted that the Chinese send students with good English, otherwise the whole operation would be worthless. But the average half-year that each student spends initially on "topping up" his English indicates to me that average proficiency is pretty low. A cursory review of one Chinese student list showed that the time spent on English study before leaving China varied from six months to two years. The list did not indicate whether this was part-or full-time study and it rated the students with greatly varying levels of proficiency.

Very little is known of the students' background, but all are believed to have worked in factory or farm. The average age is about 25. The same future is foreseen for them as for other Chinese students - interpretation, translation, foreign affairs. All are living in student dormitories, hostels, or with families. The Chinese Embassy has encouraged their being "farmed out in families". The program is going very well, the atmosphere is very good, and there are no problems.

As for those other numbers, to make the picture a little more complete, 40 Chinese students went to the U.K. in three groups before the formal exchange agreement was made, the first group of 9 arriving in October 1971. And finally, in addition, the U.K. agreed to accept 60 Chinese students in science and technology, of whom about 35 had arrived "in dribs and drabs" by early April of this year.

Fifteen British students are at the Peking Language Institute. All went in October 1973, the first foreign students to arrive. The Chinese sought a delay, as they did with the Canadians, because the facilities were not yet ready, but the British "made a great stink about it" and the students were taken on schedule. Like the Canadians, the British have doubts about their students being able to engage in regular studies in China after the first year.

Sweden At the present time, about 10 Chinese students are in Sweden studying the language. Of these, three come under a formal student exchange agreement negotiated in Peking at Chinese initiative beginning in August 1973. The agreement, an exchange of notes, provides for three students each way each year, but if a student stays for more than one year, no additions. The financial arrangement is not the same as for the Canadians and the British. China pays transportation for its students to Sweden, and the Swedes pay for their upkeep in Sweden, tuition being free under the Swedish system. The reverse applies to Swedish students going to China.

The Chinese wanted to send students immediately, but the Swedish side needed a little time to prepare. So the three Chinese students started at Stockholm University in January 1974, under arrangements made by the Swedish Institute in close coordination with the Ministry for
External Affairs. Aged 20 to 22, inexperienced and unsophisticated, the students' knowledge of Swedish was "respectable", good enough for normal conversation but not good enough to take regular courses. Accordingly, the students were enrolled in the University's well-established Institute for the teaching of Swedish as a foreign language, where there are many other foreign students. Except for one private lesson a week, the Chinese students are in class with other foreign students.

The Swedes have no information on the students' background, none whatever. They live in a dormitory with Swedish and other foreign students -- and there are apparently more foreigners in the dorm than the Chinese would like. There is the strong "impression" -- it may be too early to judge after only three months' experience -- but nevertheless the strong impression that "Chinese students are reluctant to mix with Swedish students" at the University. This reluctance to mix is "obvious" and came as a surprise, since the opposite had been anticipated. Or it may be that the Chinese students themselves want to mix but are not permitted to do so by the Chinese Embassy. Time and again, for example, the students have been invited to join a student outing, and they have accepted. But then a day or so later, they beg off. The only conclusion to be drawn, said my sources, is that the declination resulted from Embassy advice. In any case, there is an undeniable "regularity in this pattern".

Sweden had students in China under an exchange program beginning in the mid-1960s, two in Peking for the first year of language study and then on to their discipline. There were also about five private Swedish students in China. The language study was good, but "in no case were the students able really to pursue their courses of study". Then came the Cultural Revolution and everything stopped.

Three Swedish students arrived in Peking in November 1973 under the new exchange agreement. Of the two men and one woman, two are interested in Chinese language and literature and plan to stay in China two years, and the other is an electrical engineering major who proposes to "stay a total of four years. All three had studied some Chinese and are described as experienced and sophisticated. Although the Swedes tried to get a commitment, the Chinese would not give an assurance that the students would be able to carry on their studies in China after the first year. According to word received from the Swedish Embassy in Peking, the students are "so far allowed to do more or less what they want to do".

France As always, I have the least information on France's cultural exchange activities. The number of French students in China is "about the same figure" as the number of Chinese students in France, which would be 30. Many French students want to go to China.

The 30 Chinese students in France are studying the French language and technology. It would be difficult to expand the number because of limited facilities in France and the lack of qualified students in China. The students now in France are of generally good quality and very hard-working. The students are lost in Western life and cannot fit very well into regular courses of study, hence courses must be tailor-made for them. My request for further details was politely declined.
THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXHIBITION

On May 12, 1974, the famed Chinese archaeological exhibition (hereafter called simply "exhibition" for the sake of brevity) will have opened in Stockholm. The proper title for it is "Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People's Republic of China", the importance of which will become clear in due course. The title was but one of the problems that complicated the display of this remarkable collection of close to 400 items dug out of ancient tombs throughout China since 1949, the items themselves covering the centuries from the Palaeolithic period going back before 7,000 B.C. through the Yuan Dynasty ending in A.D. 1368. There were also problems with maps and texts in catalogues and the text of an agreement governing the exhibition.

The Stockholm site for the exhibition is a plain yellow-brown stucco building of four stories on a little island close to the center of the city which is the Ostasiatiska Museet, or East Asiatic Museum (known formally in English as the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities). The edifice looks for all the world from the outside like a barracks or a warehouse -- which in fact it was until 1959. Originally built in 1700 as stables for King Charles XII's bodyguard, it served as a warehouse throughout the 18th and 19th centuries and held naval ordnance stores in the 20th. But inside it has been completely and beautifully rebuilt and houses one of the West's best collections of East Asian art, with a particularly fine group of Chinese bronzes. Much of the Museum's regular exhibit space will be emptied out to make way for the Chinese exhibition, and many new display cases are being built. The exhibition will be a major event in Stockholm, as in the other cities.

It was in February 1973 that a 14-member combined British-French delegation went to Peking to negotiate arrangements for the exhibit. The first showing was at the Petit Palais in Paris from May to September 1973. It then went to London for four months ending in January of this year and next to Vienna where it opened February 22. It will close in Stockholm on July 16, be on display in Toronto's Royal Ontario Musuem from August 7 to November 16, and sometime in early 1975 open at the National Gallery in Washington, the first of two U.S. showings before the objects are sent back to Peking. A truly impressive odyssey, considering its approximately $100 million valuation and the fragility of many of the items. Viewed by millions, it is without question a contribution to cultural exchange of major consequence.

With those prefatory remarks behind us, I will again present information gleaned from a variety of sources without giving any attribution unless clearly necessary, avoiding any expression of my personal views except when identified as such.

An introductory note in the British catalogue for the exhibit (by "catalogue"I mean the 160-page guidebook sold to exhibition viewers, handsomely printed on heavy paper with explanatory text and color or black-and-white photographs of every object in the exhibit) points out that the Chinese Committee for the Organization of Exhibitions of Archaeological Finds "selected the objects on display from amongst many thousand objects, 2,000 of which were sent from provincial museums to Peking for consideration. By the time the British and French delegations arrived in Peking in February of this year to discuss the details of the exhibition, the Chinese side had displayed the objects specially for us in the Museum of History. There was much useful supporting material and all had been excellently catalogued."
Everything was efficient and smooth up to that point, but "at this stage, efficiency and simplicity ended and problems began", according to an informant. Negotiations lasting several days were intense and sometimes heated, with some sessions lasting till 3 a.m. One problem was that the British and French wanted 10 key pieces included in the exhibition, but the Chinese proposed that reproductions be used instead. The British and French said absolutely no to this, insisting that the exhibition would fall flat without the real thing on display, so the Chinese finally agreed to inclusion of the originals of two -- the bronze flying horse and the jade funeral suit -- but none of the others. Another problem was which side would pay for transporting the exhibit from Peking to Paris. The British and French gave in on this and agreed to split the cost. Financing was a problem in other ways too, apparently, as I was told that "the Chinese wanted to do it without paying anything, and we tried not pay everything". The arrangements followed throughout the exhibition's journey, incidentally, are for the receiving country to pay for transportation from the previous stop. Two charter planes are used for each leg, as requested by the Chinese. The U.S. will pay for transport back to Peking. The receiving country provides either insurance or a guaranteed indemnity for the exhibit while in transit and while at the exhibition site. And the receiving country pays the living costs of the two Chinese curators and one interpreter who accompany the exhibit.

At the Peking negotiations, the Chinese wanted to check all the galley proofs of the first catalogue, which would be printed in Paris. The French would not agree to this for timing and other reasons, and the Chinese let it go. "Little things of little importance" took a great deal of time and discussion. The Chinese negotiators, given very little discretion, operated within very narrow margins. One source, speaking in general and not just about the exhibition, said that the three words which can be used to characterize the problems that arise in negotiating with China are "ignorance, suspicion, and difficulty". The Chinese can be very demanding, very suspicious, and ignorant of how things are normally done. Applying this to the exhibition negotiations, he said that the Chinese worried about breakage, pilferage, security, and fire, almost as if their opposite numbers had never dealt with matters like this before. They could not understand why the French Government had to go to private insurance companies for coverage of the exhibit rather than providing a Government indemnity guarantee. The Chinese insisted on two planes when one would have been adequate. They tried to get the British and French to accept reproductions rather than originals and put in the exhibit only two of the major items requested. And they showed real "lack of confidence" that their opposite numbers knew how to handle the exhibit competently. Also, according to another source, the Chinese had a "curious view of British-French relations" and made a "very definite attempt to divide the French from the British", without any success.

The exhibition was close to its opening date in Paris when a serious problem arose about the catalogue, which caused it to go through "three editions". The Chinese objected to the boundary line between China, India and Bhutan shown on three maps in different sections of the catalogue, and to the boundary line being delineated by dots rather than dashes (dots are standard for internal, dashes for international, boundaries). Copies of the catalogue had already been distributed to the press when this objection was raised, but the Chinese insisted, so all copies which had been printed up to that time -- about 10,000 copies, so one source told me -- were sent back to the printer to have the offending map pages overprinted in black. This did not look so good, however, so the next step was to razor out the pages. This was still rather unsightly and since the maps occupied only a half-page each, it meant that three 3/4-pages worth of text and photographs would be missing. So finally, the pages were restored by reprinting the pages with text and photographs re-arranged to cover the blank spaces created by elimination of the maps.
In London, the title of the exhibition was the big problem. The British resisted using the full Chinese-designated title, as they wanted something more eye-catching and less of a jawbreaker. When the British proposed as a title "The Genius of China", the Chinese objected on the grounds that the word "genius" can only refer to an individual, not a whole nation and culture. This was argued over at length, and the British had their way, using "The Genius of China" as the major title, with "An exhibition of archaeological finds of the People's Republic of China" as a sort of sub-title in their catalogue. It is to be noted -- and not just in passing, since this may have had something to do with China's strong objection to the British title, although this is only speculation on my part -- that one of the accusations levelled against Lin Piao is that he called himself a genius, as in this quotation from a People's Daily editorial of February 20, 1974: "Lin Piao's theoretical program for restoring the old order was the theory of innate genius. He bragged about being a genius...in order to create the theoretical grounds for his attempt to usurp the power of party and government.

But this was not the end of the title controversy. The term commonly used in Britain to refer to the forthcoming exhibition was "The Chinese Exhibition". The British, knowing that one cannot buck publicly-created and -accepted designations, used that title at the entry to the exhibit hall. When the Chinese advance party saw it, they protested vigorously. Subsequently, at a climatic meeting on the title issue, the Chinese Ambassador in London issued a sort of oral ultimatum, saying that the exhibition would not go on unless the British agreed to put up the full Chinese title. But the British refused to back down and carried the day, agreeing however to mount a small panel on the stairs with the full Chinese title.

The Chinese also objected to the "Genius of China" title page in the British catalogue after it was printed, but the British refused to make any changes. The British finessed the map problem by simply not showing the boundaries for Tibet and the Mongolian People's Republic at all. But some of the printed panels containing a description of the items in the display cases created a problem. The British thought that some of the captions were "irrelevant" or not historically accurate and that some of the language and graphic techniques were "old fashioned", not up to the standard required for such an important exhibition. When the Chinese advance party came on the scene three weeks before the exhibition was to open and saw what the British had done, they said, in effect: You can't use your own graphic material. The British replied that there was no way to accept this condition and went ahead with it, agreeing however to change about three panels, which was easy enough to do. The Chinese also demanded that the British not sell a Sunday-supplement type publication called "The Chinese Puzzle", done on newsprint with drawings in rather garish colors, which had already been printed in 40,000 copies for sale to children attending the exhibition. The British turned down the demand and proceeded according to their plan.

No deep analysis is required to see that what happened subsequently must have been due to Chinese unhappiness over their troubles with the British and French. The Chinese were described by one source as "infuriated". And there was another element: from the start, apparently, the Chinese wanted the exhibition to be presented and the catalogues to be organized according to their 34 archaeological finds. The French and British catalogues, however, were written according to 12 historical periods, from No. 1 - The Palaeolithic and Neolithic periods, to No. 12 - the Liao, Chin, and Yuan dynasties. Much erudite debate was devoted to this dispute, but the text written by Professor William Watson of the University of London and the School of Oriental and African Studies stood fast through the London exhibition.
When the exhibition moved to Vienna, however, a big change was made. The Austrians had to scrap their original catalogue based on the 12 historical periods and re-do it according to the 34 archaeological finds. According to one informant, the Austrians at one point asked if the British could keep the exhibition two months longer, an indication of the depth of their difficulties.

In November 1973 the Chinese told the Swedes that it would be all right for them to translate the text of the British catalogue, so the Swedes went to work on their catalogue accordingly. Suddenly, on March 6 of this year, shortly after a member of the Chinese Embassy in Stockholm returned from Vienna, the Embassy informed the Swedes in no uncertain terms that their catalogue would have to be drastically revised. The Austrians had done it right, organizing their catalogue by the 34 finds. For the Swedes it was "a terrible time", forcing them "to change the whole thing". The catalogue was already at first proof stage, but the entire catalogue had to be reorganized, new chapters written, the layout revised. This caused not only a setback in the printing schedule, to the extent that the Swedes are not positive the catalogue will be ready when the exhibition opens May 12, but it also added to their costs, so that the Swedes who originally hoped to show a profit will now consider themselves lucky to break even. Since March 6, every detail of the Swedish catalogue has been cleared with the Chinese Embassy. References to Western scholarship on archaeology in China, which the Chinese found offensive in the British catalogue, are to be avoided. And the full Chinese title will be used.

The "main thing for them was the grouping" into 34 finds rather than the 12 historical periods, a matter about which the Chinese were "very sensitive". "They want to have their own work presented in their own fashion." The Chinese were also very particular about details -- "every small detail they get upset about". Security of the objects in the exhibition is (understandably) very important to them; "the Chinese are very hard on that point", so in Stockholm special electronic devices are being installed and the Museum is contracting with an authorized private security firm to provide armed guards, as the Swedish police do not carry guns. And as a final note on sensitivity and fine detail, the Chinese asked that a seminar to be held in connection with the exhibit be cancelled. The seminar, organized by a professor of Chinese at Stockholm University, has commitments to attend from seven scholars in the U.K. and the U.S., plus local participants. It will consist of five lectures and five seminar sessions to be held at the nearby National Museum. The reason for the cancellation request, apparently, was that the Chinese were concerned that the seminar might get into criticism of the current China science. The request was refused, however, and plans are going ahead for the seminar.

Thus far, the only problem the Canadians have run into -- and that took three months to negotiate to conclusion -- is what is known as the "veto clause". To understand what this is all about, we must go back a bit. The China-U.K. agreement governing the exhibition states that "The British side will give the highest consideration to the view of the Chinese side as to the arrangement of the Exhibition." The China-France agreement used essentially the same wording.

What the China-Austria agreement specifies, I do not know, as I have not seen it and there is conflicting hearsay testimony on the point. The China-Sweden agreement states that "The specific arrangements concerning the holding of the exhibition shall be determined between the two bodies mentioned above" -- the two bodies being the Chinese Committee for the Organization of the Exhibition of Archaeological Finds and the Swedish Board of the Museum for Far Eastern Antiquities. Although one can probe for subtle nuances and find them, it seems to me that the British and Swedish formulations are not much different.
The Canadians, who started working with the Chinese on an exhibition agreement in September 1973 in Peking and really got down to brass tacks in mid-December, proposed to use the British wording, but the Chinese would have none of it. "Eventually we had to give in -- they wouldn't budge," and the Canadians signed on the dotted line on March 15. It reads: "The Canadian side shall not make any changes in the names of the exhibits, charts, captions and order of display prescribed by the Chinese side." That is indeed quite different from the earlier formulations.

What worries the Canadians is that this gives the Chinese a "veto on anything the Royal Ontario Museum wants to do". What happens, they ask, if the Chinese curators who will arrive in Toronto just ten days before the exhibition opens decide they don't like something which the ROM has done and order it changed or removed? What happens if the political climate in China shifts, causing the Chinese to insist on last-minute changes in the exhibition? However, "the ideology is no problem", nor is there any particular worry about propaganda. The ROM can live with the PRC historical chronology of slave-feudal/etc. The ROM is basically "worried about the unknown".

The reason for the Canadian reluctance to take everything as provided by the Chinese is that experts who saw the exhibition in Paris and London, I was told, found things in it that were "unappealing, not professional". The only changes the ROM wants to make are "artistic, aesthetic ones". The way it stands, apparently, is that the Canadians will use all the graphics provided by the Chinese but do in their own style. How this will work out remains to be seen.

ANTONIONI'S "CHINA" AND YANNÉ'S "LES CHINOIS A PARIS"

It may be stretching things a bit to devote a section of this paper to these two films. Although Antonioni's effort comes closer to it, neither can properly be classified as cultural exchange. Still, China's reaction to them as cultural media is so intriguing and, to me at least, so revealing of the standards by which China judges popular cultural enterprise that it would be a sin of omission to deny some discussion of them.

Michaelangelo Antonioni, an Italian film-maker, "came to China as our guest in the spring of 1972," stated a leading People's Daily article of January 30, 1974, which initiated condemnation of the film. And it continued:

"With his camera, he visited Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, Soochow, and Lin County. However, his purpose in making the visit was not to increase his understanding of China, still less to promote the friendship between the people of China and Italy. Hostile towards the Chinese people, he used the opportunity of his visit for ulterior purposes; by underhanded and utterly despicable means he hunted specifically for material that could be used to slander and attack China. His three and one-half hour long film does not at all reflect the new things, new spirit, and new face of our great motherland, but puts together many viciously distorted scenes and shots to attack Chinese leaders, smear socialist new China, slander China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and insult the Chinese people. Any Chinese with a modicum of national pride cannot but be greatly angered on seeing this film."
That set the stage, and anyone familiar with the way denunciation is orchestrated in the People's Republic of China could surmise what would follow: outraged criticism from all over the country, from film workers, refinery personnel, People's Liberation Army fighters, peasants, teachers, harbor administrators, and even a primary school pupil, to name but a few.

The crimes of "this anti-China buffoon", as Antonioni came to be commonly called, are too numerous and detailed to report in full, but the following condensed sampler from the PRC media should convey the flavor adequately. These are direct quotations pieced together from a dozen or so press articles and radio broadcasts:

"Antonioni had the audacity to defame Tian An Men in an unbridled way. Neither the panorama of the square nor the magnificence of the Tien An Men Gate is seen. It is obviously a bright sunny day in May, but the square is shown in dim and dreary colors. It is presented in a disorderly fashion and turned into a market place of noisy confusion. In Shanghai Antonioni showed little interest in the towering China-made cracking towers, the workers who were going about their jobs with a will, the advanced oil-refining technological processes, modern motors and instruments and computers. What was he interested in? Antonioni focused his camera on a patch on an operator's work clothes, on some weeds growing on the embankment enclosing the oil depot, and on some equipment in the coking section which had more soot than the others. He asked workers to take off their good work gloves and put on worn ones. Antonioni resorted to deceitful means to give a false picture of the Whangpo River. In his anti-China film the Whangpoa River is shrouded in smog, the big freighters are all foreign-made and only wooden junks are Chinese. In shooting the 10,000-ton oil-tanker 'Taching', he took a close-up of three rubber pipelines to avoid filming the tanker itself because it was made by China. Antonioni turned everything upside down and wantonly slandered the housing of the working people in Chinese cities as being 'very simple and poor'. He failed to depict the magnificent bridge which he set about taking shots, he turned his camera from very bad angles so that the magnificent bridge looked crooked and tottering. He took a shot of trousers hanging to dry below the bridge to mock the scene. He refused to follow the filming plan agreed upon by the two sides of China and Italy. Whenever Antonioni happened on a scene that he thought could be used to smear the Chinese people, he would stop at nothing to film it. He took shots against people's will. When this failed, he would take sneak shots and splice images. He stealthily and maliciously shot a peasant going to a latrine and then a pig urinating on the street. He disgustingly filmed a close-up of an old woman's bound feet and another of a child's backside. Filming a pig waggling its head, Antonioni, in a fit of hysteria, accompanied this shot with songs and music from the Peking opera 'Ode to Lungchian' whose script reads: 'Raise our
heads, thrust out our chests, march forward providently and confidently.' When Antonioni filmed the site of the First National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, all his shots were taken in dim light and gray colors, creating a chilly and gloomy atmosphere. The slow rhythm gives a dull, frightening, and melancholy feeling."

And so on and on. In Mandarin broadcasts to Taiwan, Radio Peking lashed out against "the Chiang Kai-shek clique" for treating the film "as a priceless treasure. It not only heaped lavish praises on this anti-China clown Antonioni but also paid a high price to purchase this anti-China film. It shortened the film to about 50 minutes by selecting the ugliest scenes and shows it openly in Taiwan." "U.S. imperialist elements" also came in for a glancing blow. Acting "as if they had found a treasure", a People's Daily article of February 6 said, these elements "bought the film for a big price and strove to be the first to show it," adding that "U.S. imperialism praised the film as 'one of the ten best documentaries' shown in the United States in 1973."

Criticism of Antonioni's film petered out after about a month or so, but some questions remain unanswered. Why the burst of denunciation well over a year after the film was made and shown in the West? Was it simply one more element in the upsurge of the anti-Lin anti-Confucius campaign? Another reminder not to "worship foreign things”? Was it a vehicle for attacking Chiang Ching, who according to some observers from afar is an avid amateur photographer and who may have invited Antonioni to come to China? Or was it, on the contrary, an attack on Chou En-lai and his policy of detente with the West? Or none of these? And how could so many critics in China be so intimately acquainted with the film that they could dissect particular scenes and techniques and quote verbatim portions of the film's narration? Was the film shown in China to these select critics, or were there somewhat wider showings (for Antonioni was thanked for "providing us with such an excellent negative teaching material")? And considering the numbers of people who now say that they saw Antonioni's "ugly features as an imperialist element" revealed at the time of filming, how is it that he was allowed to go back to Rome "with more than 30,000 meters of film carrying distorted images of the Chinese people"? As a Thai king is alleged to have once said, it's a puzzlement.

The brouhaha raised by the Chinese Embassy in Paris over the showing of Jean Yanne's new film, "The Chinese in Paris", provides a contemporaneous and rather humorous parallel.

Before the film was due to open in a number of theaters on February 27 this year, the Embassy lodged an official demarche with the French Government asking that it be banned. The French of course had to decline. Thinking in French circles was that this may have been an instance, not unknown in other countries, of a Foreign Office, not fully understanding the local situation, ordering an action which its diplomats on the scene knew to be fruitless and ill-advised.

Undaunted, the Embassy followed up with a press statement blasting the film. "We cannot understand how the French Government could have tolerated the release of such a film," the statement complained. Depicting the Chinese as occupying rulers of Paris "established an unacceptable parallel between socialist China and fascist Germany." Further, "the Chinese People's Liberation Army is ridiculed and abused. The modern Chinese theatre, whose works are the fruit of the Cultural Revolution, is also held up to scorn" -- the latter referring to the film's "Carmeng" segment, a hilarious take-off on Peking's current ballet-opera productions. Although the Embassy statement declared that "this is a very serious matter for relations between our two countries," French officials found the Embassy release quite ordinary, not particularly "nasty" (mechant).
Hearing the film in Paris, I can understand why Peking found the film so objectionable from its point of view. Even though Jean Yanne's aim may have been equally to ridicule his fellow countrymen's servile deportment during the Nazi occupation, his poking fun at the PLA and modern Chinese opera and casting Chinese in the role of imperialist conquerors could hardly strike Peking as laughable. A sardonic comment from La Nation was appropriate: "Jean Yanne has finally found someone to take him seriously."

THE OUTLOOK FOR CULTURAL EXCHANGE

Earlier this year, a rash of press reports would have led the average reader to believe that a new Cultural Revolution was underway in China and that, as one small result, cultural exchange was on the ropes. But most of the reporting appears to have been a little overblown. Despite all the journalistic analysis about what the anti-Lin Piao anti-Confucius campaign might mean to China's relations with the West, the criticism of Owen Lattimore, the denunciation of the Antonioni and Yanne Films, the attacks on Western bourgeois music, the labelling of Jonathan Livingston Seagull as an elitist bird, and the murky meaning of the widespread castigation of the Shansi provincial opera "Three Visits to Taofeng" -- only one scheduled activity (the visit to China of an educational delegation from New York State) was actually cancelled, as far as I have been able to determine.

In New York a spokesman for the National Committee on U.S.- China Relations told a Washington Post reporter (article by John Sharky, February 18) that "the number of American visitors given permission to go to China has dropped sharply in recent months, possibly by as much as 65 to 70 percent." Whether or not this was a carefully calibrated estimate is open to question, but it was presumably meant to apply primarily to the multitude of privately-arranged and often individual visits, not to major exchanges under the sort of bilateral understanding that exists.

But there was definitely something of a pause in operations in this latter category in U.S.-China exchange. Planned activities that would normally have been under process were not being actively discussed. Apparently concerned that the anti-Lin anti-Confucius campaign would be misinterpreted, the PRC Liaison Office in Washington put out the word that interested Americans should expect to find business back to normal in May or June. The Chinese were, in the opinion of one informant in a position to know, "trying to communicate to the U.S. that they don't want their internal troubles to disrupt the overall relationship with the U.S."

It was not necessary to wait till May or June for activities to pick up again, however. By mid-April the Chinese "wu shu" (martial arts -- mock sword play, tumbling, that sort of thing) group numbering about 40 which had been stalled was back on the tracks and scheduled to start its tour of U.S. cities in June. A group of about 20 American university presidents is now scheduled to go to China in October; this project had been treading water for a while. A delegation of hydrologists from Colorado State University and a group representing the American Institute of Architects suddenly got approval for their visits to China and were to leave in April. Other scientific exchanges mentioned on page 4 felt the pause only to the extent that some visits planned for the first half of 1974 were spread over the rest of the calendar year. And as I write comes the White House announcement that governors of six U.S. states (Iowa, Maryland, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia) have been invited to tour China for ten days in mid-May.

The Canadians told me that the anti-Lin/Confucius campaign has had no effect whatever on cultural exchange with China. Everything is going along as scheduled, no cancellations or postponements. "No problems -- we don't have any problems," one said. The Vancouver Symphony Orchestra's visit to
AN AFTERWORD

It's funny how things grow on you. When I picked the topic for this paper, I was mildly interested in the subject, but I had the feeling that I would be working over well-trodden ground and that nothing much new would come out of it. But when I started talking with Americans who had some experience in arranging cultural exchange with the People's Republic of China in January, in the time-off provided between the regular sessions of the Senior Seminar, my interest began to rise. And by the time I took off in late March to spend a few working days each in Ottawa, Toronto, London, Paris, and Stockholm, I found myself thoroughly intrigued by the subject and thought I might even turn out something worth reading. The reader can now judge whether the effort was worthwhile.

The reason why I chose to look at the experience of the five countries comes in two parts. First, my overseas research had to be confined within three weeks and fifteen hundred dollars. Second, within that generous limitation, I wanted to collect data that would have some degree of homogeneity and some relevance to U.S. interests and that would bring out parallels or contrasts with U.S. experience. Canada is our closest neighbor and like the U.S. has been experiencing a high level of cultural exchange with China. Britain and France have both enjoyed a much longer experience and had the benefit of long-standing diplomatic recognition. And Sweden, I thought, might provide a different perspective because of its avowedly neutral stance in foreign affairs, in particular its attitude toward one of China's close neighbors, North Vietnam. In addition, all four countries have student exchange agreements with China and either have hosted or will shortly receive the Chinese archaeological exhibition.

Originally, I had hoped to name my informants, but I soon discovered that most people were reluctant to talk freely about what they thought was a sensitive subject unless assured of anonymity. Accordingly, I told the roughly 40 persons who granted me interviews and the 10 who answered a mailed questionnaire that while I would use some direct quotes, I would do it in such a way that the source could not be identified. I hope I have succeeded in this and that none of these unfortunately nameless people who were so generous, helpful, and frank will feel that I have violated their confidence. It is because of this guarantee of anonymity that it is not possible even to list the names of those interviewed at the end of this paper. Also, all sources are referred to as "he", although many were women. Quotations are precise because at every interview I asked and was given permission to take detailed notes.

Finally, I apologize for the fact that this is in many respects a problem-oriented paper. The old journalistic adage that "good news is no news" applies, I suppose. I have tried to give a balanced picture of cultural exchange with China, but inevitably my attention has been drawn to the problems that have been encountered in the five countries' experience. But if this concentration on difficulties gives an impression to the contrary, I want to say that in my view cultural exchange with China has been an outstanding success. I personally am a very strong supporter of the enterprise and hope that it will flourish. Given the positive attitude on both the Chinese and Western sides, the prospects are very good.

April 28, 1974

Gerald Stryker