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# WARS WITHOUT FRONT THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH EXPERIENCES IN VIET-NAM

Case Study by THOMAS C. THAYER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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
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FIFTEENTH SESSION

**SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



1972-73



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
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FIFTEENTH SESSION

**SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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
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# SOUTH VIETNAM ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS



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SUMMARY

There are striking similarities in some of the basic patterns of the French and American experiences in Viet-Nam.

The intensity of the wars for the troops involved differs the most. About 5% of the forces died in combat each year during the French experience, versus 2.3% during the American experience. It was twice as dangerous to serve for a year with the French and their associated forces as it was to serve with the U. S. and South Vietnamese forces. (Moreover, the French tour of duty was 26 months, versus 12 months for the Americans.)

The annual cycles of combat in both wars were keyed to the weather, with heaviest fighting during the first half of the year, during the dry season.

Startling similarities emerge when the locations of major combat are examined in both wars, and they are supported by quotations from experienced observers and participants. The areas that caused the most problems for the French in South Viet-Nam were also the worst trouble spots during the American involvement twenty years later.

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WARS WITHOUT FRONT

The American and French Experiences in Vietnam

"While Mao Tse Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and even Che Guevara are avidly read and liberally quoted, the French, who were among the first of the western nations to gain practical experience of modern revolutionary war, are seldom heard from outside of their own country. Moreover, after the United States began the rapid expansion of its advisory effort in South Vietnam in 1962, the British experience in Malaya was often cited by Americans in Saigon as a model of how to handle an insurrection, but little if anything was ever said of the French experience in Indochina."

"What is of even greater significance is that today the United States is fighting essentially the same enemy that the French first engaged more than two decades ago, and is doing this over much the same terrain and under the same climatic conditions. Finally, and most important of all, is the fact that the present leadership of North Vietnam is the very same whose determination and tenacity helped it to prevail over the French. The lessons that the French learned in the course of their prolonged conflict should, therefore, offer something more than simple historical data."

Colonel V. J. Croizat, USMC (Ret), 1967<sup>1/</sup>

The American's "...first mistake was...their complete rejection of any lessons that may have emerged from the French experience up to 1954. By 1954, particularly at the Colonel and Major level, the French had realized what kind of war they were fighting and it was a great pity and a tragedy that the Americans didn't start from that point in their military development."

Michael Elliott-Bateman, 1969 <sup>2/</sup>

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HOW CAN YOU UNDERSTAND A WAR WITHOUT FRONT?

"In guerilla warfare there is no such thing as a decisive battle."

Mao Tse-Tung (Guerilla Warfare, 1937)

The French aptly called their war in Vietnam a "war without front." <sup>5/</sup> The question is how to analyze and grasp such a war. How does a military commander or analyst keep track of the situation, spot important changes, and judge how the war is going?

The writer's answer is that: "You must do a careful, systematic analysis of the available statistics. Without this you cannot fully understand what is happening in the war."

The wars in Vietnam were highly atomized wars and they simply cannot be grasped without analyzing the statistics reporting status and change. This section of the paper suggests the kind of statistics that are needed and how to analyze them.

While a war without front cannot be followed without analyzing the statistics, an analyst better not limit himself to them alone. Constant reading and, if possible, communication with those on the scene or recently on the scene, are also critical. Effective analysis requires both--the numbers alone can mislead the analyst just as often as narrative accounts by themselves.

Some of the paper following this section will be devoted to statistical analysis--expressed in terms a layman can understand--so it seems appropriate to begin by addressing the problem of whether statistics from the Vietnam wars are good enough to analyze. Let's start with a quotation from Sir Josiah Stamp (1880-1941):

"The government are very keen on amassing statistics. They collect them, raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful diagrams. But you must never forget that every one of these figures comes in the first instance from the village watchman, who just puts down what he damn pleases."

Perhaps, but the village watchman often pleases to tell the truth, and, in any case, he probably reports about the same way most of the time. So the writer has learned to look for a constant bias in reporting. The individual numbers may not be completely accurate, but the trends and changes in relationships among them may tell us quite a bit about what is going on in the village and how that village compares with other villages.

This is the way to deal with the Vietnam data, which have been subject to strong criticism and have the problems of any data reported by officials whose main job is to operate and manage, not to report. The writer has concluded, after years of careful study, that much of

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the data from Viet-Nam during the US involvement are good enough for systematic analysis, although their validity varies widely. For this paper he has simply assumed that the few French statistics available are no worse.

Why were the wars in Viet-Nam so difficult to grasp? Why did we and the French have such difficulty in judging real progress and spotting important changes? The answer lies in the character of the wars. They were different. They had no front lines, and, at first, commanders and analysts simply were unable to deal with their absence. The US was prepared to cope with a conventional war, but not a war without front. Historical accounts suggest the French had the same problem.

In a conventional war, such as in Europe or Korea, two items are needed to monitor progress, and that's about all:

- What is the state of the enemy forces and of friendly forces?
- Where is the front, and which way has it been moving?

If friendly forces are stronger than enemy forces and are pushing the enemy back, then friendly forces are winning, because the objective in a conventional war is to destroy the enemy's capability to fight.

But the Viet-Nam wars were highly atomized struggles for control of the population in hundreds of different districts, and there were no fronts as we know them. In Viet-Nam, then, only one of the two sets of data needed to keep track of a war was present, namely, order of battle data on enemy and friendly forces. Commanders and analysts needed a substitute for the front line if they were to understand the war and how it was going.

In the US experience, the substitute turned out to be systematic analysis of the hundreds, even thousands, of "countless" events occurring in many parts of Viet-Nam every day. Any given action was rarely important by itself, and at first glance, no patterns were seen. Systematic analysis, however, revealed the persistent patterns and cycles. From these, analysts were able to monitor the war with surprising precision. They simply analyzed:

- Changes in the situation of the rural population
- Levels of activity and forces
- Trends of activity and forces over time
- Locations where activity and forces were concentrated
- Changes in the types and mix of activities and forces.

This analysis allowed them to judge the importance of a given event or set of events to the overall progress of the war. For example, the enemy offensive in the Spring of 1970 was greeted in Washington as an enemy escalation of the war by those unfamiliar with the basic trends which had been underway for at least two years. By

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A final word of caution: The statistics used in this paper are the best available, but the reader should not assume that they are all precisely accurate. The writer certainly does not, and will not attempt fine-tuned calculations beyond the limits of their validity. It's better to be roughly right than precisely wrong!

THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE

"It is striking to compare some recent engagements with the history of certain battles which occurred during the conquest. The events were often the same and even happened at the same places. Some of the writings from Tonkinese Mandarins to our forces were written in the same vein as Viet Minh pamphlets."

Lessons of the War in Indochina, May 1955 6/

"How, with all that military machine still intact, did we ever end up as we have?"

Colonel Nemo (1956) 7/

Intensity of the Conflict

From 1951 on, there were two armies in Indochina fighting the Viet Minh. One was the French Expeditionary Corps. 8/ The other was the Armed Forces of the Associated States, which included Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.

The Expeditionary Corps included units made up of French, Algerian, Foreign Legion, Moroccan, and Sengalese troops. The French units, except for the airborne, included many Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians who had been locally recruited. The French also had operational control of several "sect forces" including the Cao Dai, the Binh Xuyen, the Hoa Hao, and the Christian Militias. 9/

Detailed statistics are not available for all of these forces, so the calculations of combat intensity will center on the total friendly forces, and their two basic components, the French Expeditionary Corps, and the Forces of the Associated States.

Various data suggest that the average number of full time friendly forces engaged in the eight year was about 240,000. 10/ Total friendly combat deaths were about 95,000. 11/

Taken together, these figures yield an average combat death rate of about 5% of the force each year. Stated another way, the chances of person in the force getting killed were 1 in 20 each year.

In the French Expeditionary Corps, the annual combat death rate was higher, averaging 6.7%. This raised the odds of death to about 1 in 15.

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The odds were lower in the Armed Forces of the Associated States which were organized slowly, late in the war. In this case, the combat death rate averaged about 3.0% per year; and the chances of dying in combat were about 1 in 28 each year. (This rate should not be taken as the combat death rate for all Indo-Chinese troops serving with the friendly forces, because about 45% of the combat deaths of the French Expeditionary Forces were indigenous troops recruited in Indo China.)

The French troops took heavy casualties. A total of 20,685 military personnel from Metropolitan France were killed. (Their number in the Forces never exceeded 63,636, <sup>12/</sup> and probably averaged closer to 50,000-55,000 for the eight year war.) This level of casualties for Metropolitan France by itself would translate into approximately 100,000 U. S. combat deaths in Viet-Nam. <sup>13/</sup>

The Annual Cycle of Combat.

The statistics for friendly combat deaths each month are not available for the French war, so this analysis is based on historical narratives. An annual cycle of combat appears in the accounts, but cannot be identified with much precision.

The cycle is tied to the weather, which consists of a dry season from October through April, and a wet season from May through September. A French commander alludes to the differences in the two seasons:

"During the dry season the enemy avoided the areas that drew our fire, but in the rainy season, 'in the middle of a mosaic of flooded rice paddies, interlaced by a network of canals and streams, the major terrain feature was the village and its surroundings...'" <sup>14/</sup>

In other words, almost everything but the village was under water during the rainy season.

In view of the difficulties of conducting major military operations during the rainy season, the dry season offered the best opportunity to go on the offensive, and both friendly and enemy forces often conducted offensives during this part of the year. One writer speaks of it as the campaigning season:

"During the 'campaigning' season of 1949-50 the French Military Command let things slide." <sup>15/</sup>

"When the rains ended in late September 1951, the campaigning season opened cautiously." <sup>16/</sup>

Without being too precise, we can probably assume that combat usually peaked from November through May, and slacked off somewhat during June through October.

But the evidence does not allow a firm conclusion for the French forces because, "During the rainy season, [July-August] Gen. Navarre carried out a number of operations designed to improve the French position, <sup>17/</sup> and, "...No large scale [French] operations were mounted

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when the rains did cease in October." <sup>18/</sup> Finally, "... By October 1952, the end of the rainy season, General Salan was not able to muster any appreciable extra numbers of French troops for offensive operations." <sup>19/</sup>

Thus, the French sometimes tried to go on the offensive during the rainy season. At other times, they didn't go on the offensive during the dry season. During most of one "campaigning season", neither side launched any major operations: "No really large scale operations, either French or Viet Minh, took place in the months from December 1952 until March 1953, although there were countless <sup>20/</sup> small actions everywhere, which caused a steady drain of casualties to both sides." <sup>21/</sup>

The communist "offensives" from September 1952 through July 1954 seem to fit the dry season-wet season cycle better. Table 1 collapses the two years into one 12-month cycle and shows how many offensives were underway during a given pair of months. The table indicates that enemy offensive activity peaked during the dry season; 21 of the 26 "offensive months" were dry season months. This suggests that the Viet Minh cycle of activity may have been well developed by the end of the war, even if the French cycle was not.

As a final point of interest, the battle at Dien Bien Phu took place from March 13 to May 7, 1954.

Table 1  
CYCLE OF COMMUNIST OFFENSIVES <sup>21a/</sup>  
(September 1952-July 1954)

		<u>Number of Offensives Underway</u>
<u>Dry Season</u>	November (1952-53)	2
	December (1952-53)	3
	January (1953-54)	2
	February (1953-54)	3
	March (1953-54)	4
	April (1953-54)	4
	May (1953-54) <u>Subtotal-21</u>	3
<u>Rainy Season</u>	June (1953-54)	1
	July (1953-54)	1
	August (1953)	0
	September (1952-53)	2
	October (1952-53) <u>Subtotal-5</u>	1
<u>Total - 26</u>		

Where Did Most of the Fighting Occur?

This section is drawn from narrative accounts in the open literature and from discussions with French officers in Paris.

All agree that the most intense fighting took place in North Viet-Nam, and that significant fighting took place in what is now

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Military Region 1 (MR 1) and Northern MR 2<sup>22/</sup> in South Viet-Nam. The most southern part of Viet-Nam saw less action, but there were definite pockets of enemy strength.

Perhaps the best portrayal of the situation, in the absence of statistics, is shown in the maps on the next two pages. The first map <sup>23/</sup> shows the territory held by the Viet Minh after Dien Bien Phu fell in 1954. Two points are of interest:


-- Except for the cities of the Hue, Tourane (now Danang), and Quang Tri, the entire area of what is now MR 1, plus Kontum and Binh Dinh Provinces, was under Viet Minh control, although they were not able to gain title to it at the Geneva Conference.

-- Further south, the Viet Minh held the northern part of Tay Ninh Province, the Plain of "Joncs" (Reeds), Camau (at the Southern tip of the country), and other pockets of people and territory.


The second map <sup>24/</sup> shows the estimated deployment of the Viet Minh battalions on September 30, 1953. The pattern is similar: a heavy concentration of regular battalions in the North, reaching down into South Viet-Nam's MR 2, with a lighter concentration of regional battalions shows further south.

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Territory held by the Viet Minh after Dien Bien Phu



Viet Minh deployment  
September 30, 1953

- Infantry battalion (regular)
- Regional battalion
- △ Artillery or antiaircraft or engineer battalion

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In discussing their worst trouble spots, the French noted that:

What we have observed in Indochina confirms a fact already known in our African possessions: "there exists a permanence or continuity in the centers of unrest. History and geography reveal that certain regions are traditional cradles of insurgent movements, and these later serve as preferred areas for the guerrillas."

"It is in the provinces where the population has always shown itself to be proud, bold and independent that the revolt has taken on the most acute and intense forms (the Plain of Reeds, the region of Vinh, the mountains surrounding Langson, etc.). It is striking to compare some recent engagements with the history of certain battles which occurred during the conquest. The events were often the same and even happened at the same places." 25/

It would be no surprise to find that the same areas continued to be troublesome to the South Vietnamese and Americans.

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-- October through January is normally a period of low combat intensity. October, on average, has the fewest friendly combat deaths, and is always a lull. Friendly combat deaths are below those in September during every year studied; in 5 of the 7 years, October deaths are also below those of November.

In summary, the basic pattern is heavy fighting from February through June, a lull in July, renewed combat in August-September, a lull in October, followed by relatively low activity until February, when the cycle starts all over again.

Table 2

THE CYCLE OF FRIENDLY COMBAT DEATHS  
IN SOUTH VIET-NAM 27/  
(Monthly Averages for 1966 through 1972)

BY MONTH

<u>January-December</u>		<u>War Cycle</u>	
Jan.	2177	Feb.	2864
Feb.	2864	Mar.	2871
Mar.	2871	Apr.	2919
Apr.	2919	May	3427
May	3427	Jun.	2752
Jun.	2752	Jul.	2097
Jul.	2097	Aug.	2361
Aug.	2361	Sep.	2300
Sep.	2300	Oct.	1880
Oct.	1880	Nov.	1936
Nov.	1936	Dec.	2011
Dec.	2011		

BY QUARTER

BY WAR CYCLE

Jan.-Mar.	2637	Feb.-Jun.	2967
Apr.-Jun.	3032	Jul.	2097
Jul.-Sep.	2253	Aug.-Sep.	2330
Oct.-Dec.	1942	Oct.-Jan.	2001

As in the French war, the basic drive behind the cycle is the weather. The rainy season in the southern part of South Viet-Nam and in the Laos panhandle (where the infiltration roads and trails are located) extends approximately from May through September. The rain closes down the enemy's infiltration routes in Laos, and makes it difficult for him to continue his annual offensive in the South. The terrain gets worse and worse, as he draws down men and supplies that can't be replaced until the infiltration corridors reopen in October.

Thus, the cycle can be explained as follows:

-- By October the enemy's personnel and supplies are low. The rain stops, and infiltration of men and supplies for the Spring offensive begins.

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-- At some point during February-April the enemy gets enough troops and supplies in position to begin his Spring offensive. The flow of infiltration continues, and gradually dwindles away as the rain starts again and the enemy goes into the final phase of his offensive, ending it sometime in June.

-- By July the offensive is over and infiltration through Laos has stopped. Much of the terrain in the southern part of South Viet-Nam is under water.

-- By mid-August the enemy has regrouped enough to launch a brief Summer offensive lasting into September. October brings a lull.

-- From the low point in October, the cycle starts all over again. In November, infiltrators and trucks are sighted coming down the trails in Laos and the enemy build-up for the Spring offensive is underway.

(To digress for a moment, why is the cycle important? Because it lends perspective to analysis of the tempo of combat. If you know that May is usually the toughest month of the year, you don't get quite as excited when activity rises above April's levels. By the same token, if you know that the infiltration cycle always starts up again in October-November, you don't get too upset when new enemy troops are suddenly reported heading down the trail for South Viet-Nam. Instead, you concentrate, in both cases, on the level of activity, and how it compares with similar periods of previous years.)

#### Where Did Most Of The Fighting Occur?

Table 3 and the map show the pattern of friendly combat deaths in South Viet-Nam for 1967 through 1972. By now, the pattern is a familiar one. The following points emerge:

-- Five provinces (11% of the total) accounted for about 33% of the friendly combat deaths.

-- This pattern is quite stable. All five provinces rank among the top ten provinces each year. Moreover, the range of percentages each year is narrow--from 30% to 37%, or 7 percentage points.

-- Stated another way, the war in these five provinces was almost four times as active as it was in the other 39 provinces.

-- If we include the top ten provinces (22% of the total), we see that they accounted for about half (51%) of the friendly combat deaths.




Table 4


PERCENTAGE OF FRIENDLY COMBAT DEATHS  
BY PROVINCE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM  
(For 1967 Through 1972)

<u>The 5 Provinces In Top 10 Every year:</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>Total Period</u>	
							<u>%</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Quang Tri (MR-1)	12%	10%	5%	6%	7%	12%	9	1
Quang Nam (MR-1)	8	10	8	6	6	6	8	2
Binh Dinh (MR-2)	6	4	5	8	9	6	6	3
Quang Ngai (MR-1)	7	4	6	5	4	5	5	5
Dinh Tuong (MR-4)	4	5	6	5	5	4	5	6
<u>% of Total</u>	<u>37%</u>	<u>33%</u>	<u>30%</u>	<u>30%</u>	<u>31%</u>	<u>33%</u>	<u>33%</u>	
<u>Five Additional Provinces With Very High Combat Death Rates:</u>								
Tay Ninh (MR-3)	3%	6%	10%	7%	4%	1%	5	4
Thua Thien (MR-1)	5	4	2	4	2	3	4	7
Kontum (MR-2)	4	2	4	3	3	5	3	8
Kien Hoa (MR-4)	2	2	3	4	5	4	3	9
Quang Tin (MR-1)	4	2	4	4	3	2	3	10
<u>% of Total</u>	<u>18%</u>	<u>16%</u>	<u>23%</u>	<u>22%</u>	<u>17%</u>	<u>15%</u>	<u>18%</u>	--
<u>Ten Provinces</u>								
<u>Total % of Country-Wide Friendly Combat Deaths</u>	<u>55%</u>	<u>49%</u>	<u>53%</u>	<u>52%</u>	<u>48%</u>	<u>48%</u>	<u>51%</u>	

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# PERCENTAGE OF FRIENDLY COMBAT DEATHS BY PROVINCE 1967-1972



All five provinces of MR 1 are among the top ten, as are Kontum and Binh Dinh in MR 2. This is precisely the area considered to be under Viet-Minh control in 1954, and where the French fought hardest in South Viet-Nam. In the words of Bernard Fall:

"For years communications along the central Annam coast had been plagued by Communist attacks against Road 1, the main north-south artery along the coast. The principal source of trouble was a string of heavily-fortified villages along a line of sand dunes and salt marshes stretching from Hue to Quang-Tri." 28/

And:

"In the plateau area of the PMS, the war also developed favorably to the Viet-Minh. Anchored on the three provinces of Quang-Ngai, Binh-Dinh, and Phu-Yen, which, as Interzone V, had been a Communist bastion since 1945, Viet-Minh control had slowly spread to the large Bahnar, Jarai, and Rhade mountain tribes and smaller groups. Thus, they literally "hollowed out" Franco-Vietnamese areas in Central Viet-Nam to the point where they merely covered a few narrow beachheads around Hue, Tourane (today known as Danang), and Nha-Trang." 29/

The other three provinces are further south and they also fit the French pattern. Tay Ninh was pointed out in the French section. Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa 30/ are next to the Plain of Reeds and are key provinces between Saigon and the Delta.

As to the French point that, "The events were often the same and even happened at the same places," the following quotations are offered:

"Standing in his map tent, the U. S. brigade commander was going through the details of the pull-out, for after all the blood and the firepower spent here, the Iron Triangle would not be held."

'We just haven't got the troops to stay here, and the Arvins simply won't.'

'In other words,' I said, 'the VC will move right back in again.'

'Sure,' said the general. 'But they'll find their dugouts smashed, huge open lanes in the forest, and at least we'll have helicopter LZ's (landing zones) all over the place. Next time's going to be easier to get back in.'

"As I walked out of the command post, a short, whitewashed obelisk caught my eye, standing at the entrance to Lai-Khe. It was a monument to the dead of the 2nd Moroccan Spahi Regiment, the 2nd Cambodian Mobile Battalion, the 3rd and 25th Algerian Rifle Battalions, and 3rd Battalion, 4th Tunisian Rifles; who had died for the Iron Triangle between 1946 and 1954." 31/

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CONCLUSION

There are striking similarities in some of the basic patterns of the French and American experiences in Viet-Nam.

The intensity of combat for the troops involved differs the most. About 5% of the forces died in combat each year during the French experience, versus 2.3% during the American experience. Thus, it was twice as dangerous to serve for a year with the French and their associated forces as it was to serve with the U. S. and South Vietnamese forces. (Moreover, the French tour of duty was 26 months, versus 12 months for the Americans.)

The annual cycle of combat in each war was keyed to the weather, with heaviest fighting during the first half of each year, during the dry season.

Startling similarities emerge when we look at where the major fighting occurred in both wars, and they are supported by quotations from experienced observers and participants. The areas that caused the most problems for the French in South Viet-Nam were also the worst trouble spots during the American involvement twenty years later.

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NOTES TO TEXT

- 1/ Croizat, V. J., Col., USMC (Ret), A Translation From the French: Lessons of the War In Indochina, Volume 2, The Rand Corporation, RM-5271-PR, May 1967, page iii.
- 2/ Cooper, C.; Legere L.; and others, The American Experience With Pacification In Vietnam, Volume II, History of Pacification, Institute for Defense Analyses R-185, March 1972, page 108, which quoted from remarks by Michael Elliott-Bateman, British lecturer on military studies, in Lessons from the Vietnam War, report of a seminar held at the Royal United Service Institution on February 12, 1969 (Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, 1969), page 4.
- 3/ As an official of the U. S. Department of Defense.
- 4/ Statistics were sought to allow the most precise statements of comparison wherever comparable figures are available.
- 5/ Croizat, Op. Cit., page 51.
- 6/ Croizat, Op. Cit., page 33.
- 7/ Cooper, Op. Cit., page 324 quoting from Colonel Nemo, "La Guerre dans le Milieu Social," Revue de Defense Nationale, vol. 22 (1956) pages 610-623.
- 8/ Bernard Fall calls it the French Union Forces.
- 9/ Croizat, Op. Cit., pages 54-55. Also, Fall, Bernard, Viet-Nam Witness 1953-66, Praeger, N. Y., 1966, page 309.
- 10/ Croizat, Op. Cit., page 204.
- 11/ Fall, Bernard, Street Without Joy, Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1964, 4th Edition., page 385.
- 12/ Croizat, Op. Cit., page 204.
- 13/ Cooper, Op. Cit., page 67.
- 14/ Croizat, Op. Cit., page 99.
- 15/ O'Ballance, Edgar. The Indo-China War 1945-1954, Faber and Faber London, 1964, page 110.
- 16/ Ibid., page 157.
- 17/ Ibid., page 200.
- 18/ Ibid., page 87.
- 19/ Ibid., page 175.

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- 20/ These "countless" small actions are the ones you have to count and analyze to understand a war without front. With computer assistance this can now be done. . . . .
- 21/ Ibid., page 186.
- 21a/ Calculated from data found in Bernard Fall's, The Two Vietnams, Praeger. N. Y., 1966, page 123.
- 22/ Primarily Kontum and Binh Dinh Provinces.
- 23/ O'Ballance, Op. Cit., page 248.
- 24/ Croizat, Op. Cit., page 107.
- 25/ Ibid., page 33.
- 26/ Fall, Bernard. Vietnam Witness 1953-66, Praeger, N.Y., 1966., page 340.
- 27/ Source: Averages calculated from statistics in Table 6, Statistics On Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 25, 1971 through January 17, 1973, pages 1-7.
- 28/ Fall, Street Without Joy, page 144.
- 29/ Fall, The Two Vietnams, page 120.
- 30/ The area that is now Kien Hoa was the prime French example of pacification success.
- 31/ Fall, Last Reflections On a War, 1967, page 259
- 32/ Fall, Street Without Joy, page 249

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