



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POLICE RIOT CONTROL UNITS

IN FOUR WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

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by

Albert W. Snell

Colonel, United States Marine Corps

THIRTEENTH SESSION

SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

Washington, D. C.

1970 - 1971

••••• This is an educational exercise and does not necessarily
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THE SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

THIRTEENTH SESSION
August 1970 - June 11, 1971

POLICE RIOT CONTROL UNITS
IN FOUR WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

A Case Study

by

Albert W. Snell
Colonel, United States Marine Corps

April, 1971

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SUMMARY

Civil disturbance and mob violence are increasing in urbanized, industrialized democratic societies and often threaten the internal security of the state. This paper provides a brief review of the organization, training, equipment and employment of police civil disturbance/riot control units of four major western European cities: Rome, Paris, Berlin and London. The three basically different police organizations created by the Italians and French, the Germans, and the British may provide some insight on those methods which appear useful and those which appear counter-productive in maintaining the difficult balance between citizens' freedoms and civil order.

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CHAPTER I

BASIC PROBLEMS OF CROWD CONTROL BY POLICE

The role of the police in a democratic nation presents certain basic dilemmas. As Gilbert and Sullivan noted in *The Pirates of Penzance*, "A policeman's lot is not a happy one." The great majority of citizens approve of the role of the police in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. There is considerably less acceptance and understanding of the role of the police in the maintenance of public order during civil disturbance. It is the purpose of this paper to examine briefly various aspects of the training, organization, equipment and employment of police civil disturbance, or riot control, units presently found in Rome, Paris, West Berlin, and London.

If we assume that concensus is the general precondition for any civilized government, and democracy rests on the consent of the governed, then the inherent conflicts in the police role become apparent, since police activity acts most directly on those who most oppose them. Police functions are essentially negative. They profit, and then only indirectly, only those citizens with whom they have little or no direct connection. The majority of citizens continue to regard any increase in police power as a threat, and the "police state" as the antithesis of democracy. (1) Few readers of this paper would deny some degree of prejudice against police. Under these circumstances, it is probably not surprising that to this outside non-professional observer, the police of those four major European cities appeared suspicious at best, often defensive, and occasionally (e.g., Paris) completely uncooperative.

While the scope of this paper does not permit any review of the psychology of crowds, there are several important factors to be kept in mind in any discussion of police crowd control. First the behavior of individuals in large crowds is highly dynamic and quite unpredictable. Most readers have had some personal experience in seeing a casual crowd, perhaps at a shopping center, develop into a cohesive crowd as their attention is focussed on an accident, then turn into an expressive crowd with a unified mood as they wait impatiently for the police and ambulance, and perhaps become an aggressive crowd as they react to some leadership and make verbal or even physical assaults on those causing the accident or on police handling the situation. (2) The speed and unpredictability of such a series of reactions from any large crowd thus create a second important factor: The planning and execution of successful crowd control measures by police is a complex problem requiring the most skillful use of crowd psychology, persuasion, minimum use of adequate force, individual and group discipline, and great technical skill in the proper use of communications and equipment. Such riot control operations are fully as difficult to plan and execute as an amphibious assault or an airborne landing, which are considered to be the most difficult military operations. A third factor is the extremely limited availability of police to handle such situations. In a paper prepared for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Kerner Commission) (3) Arnold and Louise Sagalyn noted that no city in the United States has enough police on hand to control a riot which erupts without warning and involves a large number of people. Three quarters of all U.S. cities over 100,000 have less than 500 police, and only 19 cities have 1,000 or more police. Providing 3 shifts, covering 24 hours per day and 365 days per year, plus necessary sick leave and vacation time drastically depletes on-duty police strength. Only about 10% of the police force are on street duty at any one time. A city of 500,000 will have less than 100 police on duty, and a city of 100,000 will generally have less than 25. Mobilizing off-duty police requires 1-2 hours, yet civil disorders tend to grow rapidly out of

control, and as the Sagalyns have noted (3) "During the first minutes of a disorder a hundred well-trained and commanded policemen can often prove more important and effective than one thousand men a few hours later."

The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (4) noted that police ability to respond effectively is based on: good prior intelligence, detailed pre-planning, accurate analysis of the nature of the incident and the amount of control required, prompt arrival of sufficient police manpower, and proper employment of an adequately trained and disciplined force under an experienced and decisive commander.

The national police and capital police forces of several democratic countries of Western Europe employ specially recruited, trained, organized and equipped riot control forces in order to meet the stringent demands of both citizen freedom and civil order. The public acceptance and overall success of those units varies widely. At least one major city (i.e., London) has no specially designated riot control police per se, but enjoys an excellent reputation for both civil liberty and public order.

It might be useful to examine four of these police civil disturbance forces to attempt to determine why some appear to be more effective than others and which techniques enhanced or detracted from their effectiveness.

CHAPTER II

ITALIAN POLICE AGENCIES: THE CORPS OF PUBLIC SECURITY AND THE CARABINIERI

Most of the material in this chapter was gained through personal observation and interviews and briefings from personnel in the ranks of colonel to policemen in the Corps of Public Security, the Chief of Operations of the Carabinieri and officials of the security office and defense attache office, U.S. Embassy, Rome.

One of the most surprising facts one discovers about the Italian police is that Italy has two separate and distinct national police forces whose mission, functions, and duties appear to duplicate and overlap each other throughout Italy.

The Corps of Public Security is responsible for public order in all larger (10,000+) Italian cities. It has approximately 76,000 police. Within the Corps of Public Security there are 12,000 police organized into mobile battalions and "celere" squads specifically for riot control purposes.

The Carabinieri are the second national police organization of Italy. This elite 80,000 man force is responsible for public order in smaller cities and villages. They also contain 10,000 specially equipped police organized in 13 para-military mobile battalions, located in each major city. In essence, these units are the reserve which is used to back up the Corps of Public Security riot control units.

It should be noted that Italy also has a 40,000 man Finance Guard responsible for internal revenue and customs, which is also available for internal security duties. To complete the picture, the major Italian cities also have relatively small municipal police forces which are responsible for traffic and similar local duties (5).

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Italian police are primarily recruited from the lower class, usually from southern Italy. Carabinieri recruits are generally better educated.

Corps of Public Security recruits receive approximately 3 months training, of which 3 weeks are spent in riot control subjects and drills. The Carabinieri recruits receive one year's recruit training which covers both police subjects (to include 120 hours self-defense training and 50 hours riot control) and general military training. The Carabinieri also take in some draftees to fill ranks of the mobile battalions. These draftees receive only 3 months training. Officers for the Corps of Public Security are either promoted from the lower ranks or are brought in via lateral entry from the Army. Carabinieri officers come from the Italian military academy and train for 2 years.

Administration of the Corps of Public Security differs considerably from that of the Carabinieri. The Corps of Public Security is responsible to the Minister of the Interior, while the Carabinieri report to the Minister of Justice for their police functions, and to the Minister of Defense for their functions as the military police for the Italian armed forces.

Corps of Public Security pay is relatively low, ranking with the unskilled or semi-skilled worker, while that of the Carabinieri is higher and generally equivalent to the pay of a semi-skilled or skilled worker. (6)

Another administrative factor that complicates Italian police work is the notably complex, multiplicitious nature of Italian civil and criminal law which is difficult to understand and more difficult to administer. The relatively uneducated police are always at a disadvantage in enforcing the law. As a result, it often appears to outside observers (7) that the police in crowd control situations tend to use force as instant punishment since legal punishment after arrest is slow and uncertain.

Communications equipment and technique are good in the Italian national police forces. The Corps of Public Security mobile battalions are well-equipped with vehicle radios and mobile command and communication vans with radio and teletype. The Carabinieri communications are completely owned and operated by the Carabinieri throughout Italy and Sardinia. It is a completely modern radio and teletype net, integrated for their air (helicopter) - land - sea (patrol boat) units. The command and control center of their operational headquarters which I was privileged to visit contained electronically displayed status boards indicating location and status of all their forces. The operators were able to communicate immediately by voice radio or teletype with each of the three units I selected at random. Their entire operational headquarters appeared thoroughly professional in all respects.

Both the Corps of Public Security and the Carabinieri riot control units are appreciably better equipped for such duties than the majority of American police or National Guard forces. All Corps of Public Security police are equipped with a small, automatic pistol, a truncheon, plastic helmet with transparent plastic face shield, a heavy left hand glove whose reinforced cuff extends to the elbow and acts as a small shield, and tear-gas goggles. Their mobile battalions have all of the above equipment, plus water cannon trucks, mobile command and communication vans, mobile generators for emergency power, truck mounted mobile field kitchens (1,000 man capacity), and assorted light engineer and fire and rescue equipment. The mobile battalion I visited in Rome had just returned from 3 weeks riot duty in Reggio Calabria. Their equipment was worn, and often dented, shipped and scorched from stones and Molotov cocktail fires but all was in good working order. The NCOs and men were clearly confident and fully competent in their demonstrations of the use of this equipment.

One item of particular interest was a tear gas grenade manufactured by Montini Chemical of Rome that could be used as either a rifle grenade or a hand-thrown grenade. It featured a soft plastic outer shell which blunted its impact and prevented injury if it struck anyone in flight but which subsequently melted on ignition and thus prevented the grenade being thrown or kicked back toward the police. The police claimed it was very effective and better than the U.S. or Italian grenades they had used previously. I was able to obtain one of these new grenades and deliver it to the Security Officer of the U.S. Embassy, Rome.

The Carabinieri has essentially all of the equipment used by the Corps of Public Security plus a wide variety of specialized equipment and purely military equipment. Their mobile battalions are equipped as mechanized light infantry to include light armored vehicles and automatic weapons. Their specialized units include 8 light helicopter units, 15 patrol boats, 12 police dog units, scuba diver units, drug control units, and the Presidential guard. (6)

Police employment in crowd control is characterized by a massive show of force, with masses of police and their full panoply of riot control equipment and weapons. The police make every effort to insure public order, even if it causes massive inconvenience (e.g., traffic jams) to other citizens. In one specific incident I witnessed there were over 30 uniformed police, including Public Security guards, Carabinieri, and Rome municipal (traffic) police detailed to watch a parade and presentation of a petition by less than 100 striking charwomen. The police had been standing or sitting in small trucks for several hours and were clearly irritable. The nearby precinct station had been stripped of all its men except for the officer in charge. When I asked him why there were over 30 police assigned to handle less than 100 mostly elderly women, he shrugged and said in effect "That is our policy."

The Italians observe three principles in riot control. First, observation, which includes good intelligence based on thorough penetration of student and right and left wing radical groups. They make extensive use of plain clothesmen in the crowd to spot and follow ringleaders and collect and transmit other intelligence data. Second, they insure protection of the target. This has included up to 2,000 police to defend the U.S. Embassy in 1968. In essence it appears that they use a fixed position defense. They also use a "sieve" technique to divert and confuse marchers coming to a large demonstration, and to remind the marchers that the police are watching them. Third, they use repression. After the magistrate literally "reads the riot act" three times when the crowd fails to disperse as ordered, the bugler actually sounds the charge, and police charge to break up the demonstration. This use of force is often relatively sudden and indiscriminating. However, firearms are rarely used except in self-defense.(5)

The general popular reputation of the police is good. The Public Security police are tolerated and considered to be as honest as the general citizenry. The Italian tradition of omerta (silence) leads to an overall lack of support for police. The Carabinieri reputation is better. They are respected, particularly in the countryside and in smaller cities and villages. However, the future prospects are not encouraging. The police seem to misuse their manpower, over-react to situations, and place too heavy reliance on force. The Carabinieri are truly an elite force and seem to be more professional in their overall approach. However, their elite nature, higher pay, and divided responsibility and overlapping functions constitute grounds for dissension between them and the Corps of Public Security. In view of the present economic unrest and political instability in Italy and the resultant increase in strikes and demonstrations, internal security may decline further under the present coalition government.

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CHAPTER III

FRENCH POLICE AGENCIES: THE SURETE NATIONALE, THE PARIS POLICE, THE
GENDARMERIE NATIONALE

During the research period (March '71) for this paper, the Paris police were considerably upset over "L'affaire Guyot" which culminated in Premier Pompidou's dismissal of Prefet de Police Grimaud, head of the Paris municipal police. As a result, the Paris police were unwilling or unable to discuss such relatively sensitive matters as riot control forces. The information contained in this chapter was obtained from the Security Officer of the U.S. Embassy, Paris, from a recently retired superintendent of the Paris police, and from officials of the International Police Academy, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.

The French have two national police forces, both of which have a strong riot control capability. The police of the City of Paris is a separate organization which also has a substantial riot control force.

The National Police, formerly called the Surete National, report to the Minister of the Interior, and are responsible for uniformed police in all big (10,000 +) cities and all detective and police intelligence work throughout France. It has over 60,000 employees, over 40,000 of whom are uniformed police. Its civil disturbance units are the well-known Compagnies Republicaine de Securite (CRS) which number approximately 17,000 police. The primary mission of the CRS is to reinforce local police forces when they are unable to cope with crowd control situations. There are 60 CRS companies of approximately 200 men each stationed throughout France, in seven groups, one per military district.

The Gendarmerie Nationale reports to the Minister of Defense and contains approximately 65,000 police. It is responsible for providing military police to the French armed forces and for police functions in rural France. Its 18,000 Mobile Gendarmerie corresponds to the CRS units of the National Police, and acts as a reserve in riot or emergency situations which the local Gendarmerie units are unable to handle. (8)

The third civil disturbance force within France is contained within the 24,000 man Prefecture de Police of Paris which is a separate entity within the National Police. Each of the seven police districts of Paris contains 2 100-man companies of riot control police.

Little detailed information was available on recruitment, training, communications or employment of these forces. Available information indicates that police in CRS, Mobile Gendarmerie and Paris police riot control units all receive one month's training in crowd and riot control.

The riot control companies of the Paris police are equipped with a long (85 cm) riot truncheon, plastic helmet with transparent face shield, rubber-mounted tear-gas goggles with plastic lenses (similar to their standard motorcycle goggle), and one "manchette" per man. The manchette is a heavy canvas mitten for the left hand with a long cuff or gauntlet which extends to the elbow and is reinforced with a special curved polyester plastic. It is used as a small shield to protect the police against rioters using clubs or poles. One of the four 25-man platoons of the riot control company carries a meter high specially designed dual aluminum shield for protection against thrown rocks or cobblestones.

The CRS units may carry submachine guns, carbines, or automatic rifles (rarely, if ever, used), tear gas grenades, and the well-known French army steel helmet. These units are well equipped with transport trucks, motorcycles and necessary vehicular radios. The Mobile Gendarmerie units are similarly equipped and have received light infantry training in addition to their police training to enable them to handle the infantry weapons and armored cars found in their mobile squadrons. (9)

The popular reputation of the Paris police and the CRS riot control units is not good. They have often been accused of police brutality and excessive force during the 1958 crisis that brought De Gaulle to power and the more recent student revolt in May, 1968. The police are actively disliked by the student population of the Left Bank, and most evidence indicates that the police, particularly the riot control units and the CRS, dislike the students with equal intensity. The bookstores of the Left Bank are currently full of displays and books celebrating the 100th anniversary of the 1871 Commune rebellion and the walls of the university district are covered with political graffiti directed against the police. On the weekend of 6-7 March, 1971, there was serious street fighting between left-wing and right-wing student factions in which many police were injured quelling the rioting. The police in a completely unprecedented plea for understanding, stopped cars and pedestrians all over Paris and passed out leaflets appealing for public support in police attempts to preserve order and keep the peace. (10)

These evidences of mounting mutual tensions, mistrust, and animosity between police and many citizens seem to indicate that further serious internal security problems confront the Pompidou government. The French national police organization, however large, well-trained and well-equipped, may be unable to handle the situation in Paris, as long as they remain as defensive, suspicious, and isolated from popular support as they now appear to be.

CHAPTER IV

WEST BERLIN'S BEREITSCHAFTSPOLIZEI ("FORCE B")

The contrast between the French police and the police of West Berlin was most noticeable in the willingness and enthusiasm with which the Berliners displayed their entire organization. The information in this chapter was obtained from interviews with the Public Safety Officer, U.S. Mission, Berlin, the commander of the West Berlin uniformed police, the commander of the Force "B" civil disturbance police, the commander of the 1st Battalion, Force "B", and the chief of West Berlin police communications, plus visits to their respective headquarters and discussions with their staff members.

West Berlin is a "land" or state of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Its police force operates under FRG laws and regulations, supplemented by certain orders of the Allied High Command in West Berlin. Each "land" or state of the FRG has a state police force responsible for all police functions other than the collection of political intelligence. Each state police force, including West Berlin, has a mobile Alert Police ("Force B" or Bereitschaftspolizei), organized in battalion-sized units, which serves as a reserve for quelling local disturbances, assisting local police in emergencies, and controlling insurgency. The combined strength of these Alert Police of all the Lander is approximately 14,000. West Berlin has a total of 14,000 police, 12,000 uniformed police and 2,000 plainclothesmen. The 3,100 man Force "B" Bereitschaftspolizei contains one training battalion and 3 line battalions, with one battalion attached to each of the Allied sectors. (11)

Recruitment into the West Berlin police has fallen off in recent years due primarily to the limited number of young men in West Berlin and also to the greater opportunities available to young Berliners who migrate to West Germany. Beginning in April, 1971, the West Berlin police are recruiting 16 year old middle school graduates to start their long police training program. Recruiting has already picked up markedly, since the new age limit allows a young man to begin paid technical training in a respected job immediately upon graduation from middle school.

Training for the West Berlin police takes 2-1/2 years. This amount of training appears excessive until one realizes that during this training the Berlin police receive basic military training, basic police training, and the equivalent of at least 1 year of an American junior college course in police science. (12)

All recruits receive their first year's training in the Training Battalion of the Force "B" Bereitschaftspolizei. Here they receive 300 hours of compensatory education (to complete high school level), 200 hours of political education (role of police in a democracy), 500 hours of civics and legal matters, 200 hours of weapons training (light infantry weapons), 6 hours per week of physical training, and instruction in a variety of related subjects (e.g., first aid, hygiene). During this first year, 20% of the recruits drop out or fail the final examinations. Those that graduate transfer to the training company of one of the three Force "B" battalions for another year's training. These trainees receive 1400 additional hours of instruction, to include 450 hours of training in local law, 320 hours of general education, 230 hours of weapons, 100 hours of political and civic instruction, 13 weeks of technical instruction on communications and vehicle operation, and 3 hours per week of physical conditioning. At the end of the second year of training, the recruit becomes a police corporal and is assigned to the Police Academy for six months instruction in police regulations and procedures, traffic, and legal reports. Considerable use is made of role-playing to increase understanding and involvement.

After this 2-1/2 year period of training, the new policeman spends two years in one of the line companies of the Force "B" battalions. Upon completion, he is transferred to the Einsatzkommando (the special tactical force) of one of West Berlin's 12 police districts. After two more years in this force, he is finally assigned for independent duty in a local police "rivere" or precinct station. A West Berlin policeman thus has 2-1/2 years of training and 4 years (2 in Force "B" battalion, 2 in district Einsatzkommando) of duty in a riot control alert force, before he is assigned to "normal" police duties. (13)

The pay of recruits entering the West Berlin police is equivalent to the pay of semi-skilled workers. Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of police administration is in their handling of political intelligence. The entire intelligence collection effort is done by a separate "Preservation of the Constitution" branch outside the police. Pertinent political intelligence is passed for action to Abteilung Eins (Legal Affairs Branch) under the direct personal supervision of the Police President. (11) As a result of these elaborate precautions, designed to prevent the rebirth of a Gestapo secret-police organization, the German police, in the words of the current police president, "can only react and can never suppress."

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Another administrative factor of note was the outstanding appearance and condition of the police barracks and equipment. The personal relationships between the officers, NCOs and policemen were relaxed, confident, and professional, and morale appeared to be high.

The communications organization of the West Berlin police appears to be modern and efficient in all respects. All police teletype and telephone circuits and switchboards are under police control. The police communications center which I visited was being operated in a manner consistent with the most advanced American practices. The large number of alternate and spare frequencies available for police emergency use, the availability of a scramble-encoder on the teletype to provide message security to and from the Force "B" battalion headquarters during emergencies, the availability and use of closed-circuit television transmission and recording, and the direct tie-in with a West German government operated computer to provide immediate reply to inquiries on automobile ownership all testified to their operational capability.

Further investigation revealed that headquarters of the Force "B" battalion in each Allied Sector has a mobile command and communications van with UHF and VHF radio, radio teletype with scrambler, switchboards to tie into local phone lines and a separate power-supply generator trailer.

The central police headquarters has a mobile TV transmitter van with a 28 meter telescoping antenna mast, remote controlled TV camera, a separate portable TV camera, a TV tape recorder, a standard police vehicular transceiver, and a separate mobile power supply. This closed-circuit TV equipment is linked to the TV monitors and recorders in police headquarters. (14)

The Force "B" battalions are essentially para-military units with a secondary mission to supplement the Allied garrison in event of attack. Their organization and equipment reflects this dual police-military role. The battalion is essentially a light infantry battalion and has a small headquarters, four line companies, and a technical company which contains 2 engineer/pioneer platoons with fire, rescue, bridging and light construction tools, 1 heavy weapons platoon with two water-cannon trucks and an armored (but unarmed) car, and 1 signal platoon. Their individual equipment includes a plastic helmet with transparent plastic face shield, a riot truncheon, a round duraluminum shield, a gas mask, and an automatic pistol (9 mm Walther) or rifle. (13) All of the equipment was in excellent working order and operated by men who knew their equipment and were eager to demonstrate their capabilities.

The Force "B" battalions and the Einsatzkommando companies use standard crowd control tactics with great emphasis on accurate and current intelligence, thorough planning and strict control and supervision based on good communications. In some respects, the erection of the Berlin wall has simplified the task of riot control in West Berlin since the "spontaneous workers demonstrations" no longer spill over the border as frequently happened during the 1950's. (11) The police leaders are quietly proud that they have been successful in reducing their use of force and in de-escalating their confrontations with various radical student groups. Although they are unable to comment publicly on this de-escalation for political and security reasons, they are actively working to reduce further the use of force while maintaining their readiness. (12, 13) In an interesting attempt to neutralize radical speakers, the Berlin police have organized and trained a psychological warfare team of young plainclothesmen who mingle with the crowds at demonstrations and respond to radical speakers and leaders with questions and comments designed to raise doubts and create divisions in their audience. They report some initial successes but have not yet reached any conclusions as to the long-term value of this technique. (12)

At the present time, the West Berlin police are widely respected for their honesty and efficiency. They are the major stabilizing force in West Berlin and appear to have the internal security situation well under control. Their only problem is that the Force "B" battalions are currently only at 70% of authorized strength due to lack of recruits in the past several years. If the recent increase in voluntary recruiting arising from lowering the recruit input age to 16 continues, these well-trained and well-equipped police units will be approaching authorized strengths during 1973. (11)

CHAPTER V


SCOTLAND YARD: THE METROPOLITAN POLICE OF LONDON

The Metropolitan Police of London are often referred to as Scotland Yard, which was the location of their original headquarters. Despite their international reputation, the Metropolitan Police do not seek publicity, and detailed information on their civil disturbance operations is not generally available. The information contained in this chapter was obtained from interviews with the Director of Training, the Deputy Commissioner for Operations, and the Head of Special Operations. This unit is directly responsible for crowd control and civil disturbance operations.

The Metropolitan Police are under the direct control of the Home Secretary. There are approximately 20,000 uniformed police in this force, which is responsible for an 800 square mile area containing 8 million people, and subdivided into 22 police districts.

The London police require approximately 1,500 recruits per year as replacements. Roughly half of their recruits come from the London area, with the remainder coming from elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Recruits must be 19 years of age, at least 5'8" tall, and be either a high school graduate or able to pass a general education test. The London police are more interested in evidences of personal stability and a calm disposition than in academic aptitude. Almost 300 recruits per year are brought in via the Metropolitan Police Cadet Corps which is in essence a technical boarding school which takes in young men between 16 and 18-1/2, provides them a mixture of general academic and technical police training, and then at age 18-1/2 graduates them to regular police recruit training. In general, the Metropolitan Police have been able to maintain good recruit input quality and are well satisfied with the motivation and performance of their recruits.

Recruit training requires two years to complete and is a mixture of formal school training, practical training on the job, formal on the job training, correspondence courses, formal refresher training, and a final examination. Initial recruit training is 17 weeks long and includes some very basic crowd control formation and physical training. Classes are small (under 20 recruits), conducted by specially trained police instructors, and make considerable use of role-playing to help the recruit better understand both his role and that of the citizen. In order to maintain interest and motivation, recruits are posted for two separate periods of one week each to the police district to which they will be assigned. Upon completion of initial training, recruit probationers are assigned to districts for fifteen months on the job training. Throughout this period, they complete assigned correspondence courses and spend two days per month in further instruction from instructors assigned to the police districts. Following successful completion of a final examination, they receive a final two weeks of refresher training and become full-fledged police constables.



Beginning in January, 1971, the recruit training has been revised to better integrate instruction with practical experience and to include instruction in social studies training to help recruits understand their role in society and in the environment of their district.

About 7% of the recruits fail the course or drop out voluntarily. Women recruits receive exactly the same training given the men. No recruit receives any firearms training of any type and only 3% of London police are ever trained to use firearms. (15)

The pay of a police constable is somewhat higher than that of a new elementary school teacher and is equal to that received by skilled unionized factory labor.

One of the most important features of police crowd control and civil disturbance operations in England is the very strong Public Order Act of 1936 which provides in part as follows:

"Section 1: Any person who in any public place or meeting wears a uniform signifying his association with any political organization or with the promotion of any political object shall be guilty of an offence.

Section 4: Any person who, while present at any public meeting or procession, has with him any offensive weapon, shall be guilty of an offence."

While persons can be charged under Section 1 only with the permission of the Attorney General, the definition of a uniform (Sec. 1) or an "offensive weapon" (Sec. 4) is undefined and judged in the context of the occasion. These very strong laws, which would presumably be found unconstitutional in the United States, do exist and are used as necessary to maintain public order. Senior police officials insist that the existence of these laws, enforced by trained police, and acted on promptly by independent magistrates, is essential to their successful use of non-violent methods in civil disturbances. (16,17)

The Metropolitan Police have a completely modern communications system. They make extensive use of closed-circuit TV for crowd control, and have 12 fixed transmission sites covering major crowd assembly areas, and 4 mobile TV transmission vans. Unlike the Italian, French or German police, they operate a separate operations center for civil disturbance and crowd control. This new facility has 12 voice radio telephone consoles, 6 closed-circuit TV monitors, and large illuminated map and status boards. This control center is fully manned every Saturday and Sunday (and on other days as necessary) and supervised in person by the Deputy Commissioner for Operations.

The London police have literally no riot control equipment. Their riot duty uniform is merely their regular duty uniform with one whistle, one helmet (non-functional) and one truncheon (carried concealed and rarely used). (16)

Their riot control procedures appear to be amazingly simple. They employ masses of police, without any weapons or equipment, standing with arms locked to form a line or a wedge. They have no special riot forces of any type. Police needed for crowd control duty are drawn in 23 man platoons (1 inspector - 2 sergeants - 20 police constables) from the various police districts. The police do have sufficient busses equipped with standard police radios to move 1000 police at one time. They also have 200 mounted police which have been used effectively to hold back crowds and restore police lines at major demonstrations. (16)

Many people erroneously believe that the British citizens are so calm and law-abiding that the London police can easily use non-violent tactics because they are seldom faced with violence from riotous crowds. In actuality, mob violence is on the increase in Britain as it is in almost all Western urbanized, industrialized societies. In 1962, the police arrested 1500 "Ban-the-Bombers" without injury to demonstrators or police. Since 1968 violence has increased to the point that there is almost one policeman injured for each arrest made. In 1969 there were 496 demonstrations in London, 30 of which required over 1000 police. In March 1968, police arrested 246 persons, had 146 police injured, and 42 demonstrators reported injured. In October 1968, London police used 9,000 police, including 150 mounted police, to protect the U.S. Embassy during an anti-Vietnam demonstration. (17)

Senior police officials continually emphasize the importance of accurate and current police intelligence. The size of Special Branch and the extent of its operations are never publicized and are not reported in the British press. Suffice it to say that this police intelligence unit uses both intercept and penetration operations to obtain necessary intelligence on radical organizations and leaders. These operations exist to a greater extent than has recently been practiced in the United States where they have caused considerable press and public consternation.

Although demonstration and parade permits are not required in London (except for Hyde Park and Trafalgar Square), police intelligence is sufficiently accurate as to time, place, and numbers of participants to permit accurate detailed planning under the supervision of the Head of Special Operations. Police action for each demonstration is covered in a separate operation order which covers the general situation, senior police officers on duty, the prescribed police uniform, transportation arrangements, police districts designated to furnish police platoons, parade and crowd control details, traffic plans, communications procedures, frequencies and call signs, messing arrangements, administrative details to include jails to be prepared to receive those arrested, and time and location of the intelligence and operations briefing before the demonstration. This detailed planning and its execution receives high level supervision both at the scene (Head of Special Operations), and at police headquarters (Deputy Commissioner for Operations). Finally, after-action reports are submitted and a follow-up critique is held to determine lessons learned. (18) With 4 to 6 demonstrations per week and a major demonstration (requiring over 1000 police) every 2 weeks, the intelligence, planning, execution and critique phases have clearly become completely professional in all respects. The London police were the only police organization I observed that made a continuing effort to apply lessons learned to improve training and performance.

During the actual demonstration, the police use plainclothesmen in the crowd to provide intelligence, particularly on radical groups and their leaders. Although they occasionally use stop and search techniques, the police make every effort to let the demonstrators express themselves through the usual panoply of banners, signs, shouts, songs, and gestures, and confine police activity to keeping the crowd moving along the designated line of march. To prevent "trashing" and other random vandalism after the demonstration breaks up, ten-man squads of police from the Special Operations Group follow those groups previously designated by police intelligence plainclothesmen in the crowd as planning further violence and destruction. If arrests are made, the arresting officer stays with the prisoner and takes him to a previously designated police station which has been warned and specially manned to handle the prisoner load. (19)

DISCONTINUED

The Metropolitan Police are admired by the great majority of British citizens, who apparently tacitly accept their stringent riot control laws and considerable police surveillance and intelligence activity as a reasonable price to pay for relatively full freedom to express their dissent while preserving public order overall. The morale of the police seemed excellent. All police officials commented on the firm but fair backing they received from the courts. The police are concerned about the increasing use of firearms (mainly shotguns) by criminals. However, no serious trouble is anticipated from radical groups. Some racial troubles are foreseen, but police officials are well aware of this problem and have an active community relations program underway in addition to the recent increased emphasis on social studies in recruit training. (19) All in all, the Metropolitan Police of London present a deceptively bland exterior of great courtesy, mild manner, and non-violence which tends to hide a very firm and tough interior marked by professional leadership, sound training, high standards, detailed intelligence, thorough planning, and disciplined execution. Their worldwide reputation for outstanding performance is well deserved.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Any analysis of a subject as complex and controversial as police control of civil disorder, based on limited observations made in foreign countries by an observer with limited experience in police matters should obviously be examined with suspicion. Any conclusions reached in this brief study should be carefully evaluated by the reader, not only for the above methodological reasons, but also because of the following complicating factors. First, the social, legal, and ethical environments in which the various police organizations operate vary considerably from country to country. Second, within any one country, wide variations occur within police organizations as a result of changes in police leadership, training and morale, and these changes interact dynamically with the society's acceptance and tolerance of the resulting police actions. Third, the limitations imposed by time, normal language barriers, and police reticence are so obvious as to require no further elaboration here.

However, it is still possible to draw some conclusions on the various alternatives posed by different approaches to police intelligence activities, specialized riot control equipment, and police employment tactics in civil disturbances.

Let us first examine police intelligence activity. Even if they assume that police intentions are benevolent and judicial systems independent of police and impartial to all, the great majority of citizens in western democracies presumably find police intelligence surveillance of the full spectrum of community activities either unnecessary, dangerous or unthinkable. Unfortunately, these same citizens find sizable police civil disturbance units as equally unnecessary, dangerous or unthinkable. And except for a few latter-day anarchists and nihilists, most citizens abhor the prospect of an increasing amount of civil disorder. Yet these appear to be the realistic alternatives facing most crowded, urbanized, politicized western democracies. If the society can tolerate increased police intelligence surveillance, such activity has often made a decisive contribution to civil peace and freedom of expression (e.g., London) by facilitating sound advance planning, aiding control and avoiding over-reaction by police during a disturbance. Good intelligence in a disciplined police force can materially reduce unnecessary police violence. (18) If the society cannot tolerate a high level of police intelligence activity,

then the need for a larger police civil disturbance unit, trained and equipped to handle the full range of civil disorder and violence, becomes more apparent. Under such circumstances, the increased chance of an over-reaction and excessive use of force by a uniformed police is readily apparent. The third alternative is to have minimal or non-existent police intelligence and no significant police civil disturbance capability. Under these circumstances one tacitly accepts the risks inherent in letting a small incident get out of control for the two hours during which off-duty police are called in or for the considerably longer time before the state National Guard or federal troops are mobilized and on hand. (19) Of these three unpalatable alternatives, I believe I would rather risk the increased police intelligence activity and rely on an independent judiciary and a free press to protect us from the obvious dangers.

The problem of determining what and how much specialized equipment is needed is fortunately considerably less difficult. The majority of the experienced European police officials continually stressed the need for excellent communication equipment including: closed-circuit television cameras, transmitters, recorders and monitors; police command and control communications vans; and (for major cities) a separate civil disturbance operations center. I found considerably less enthusiasm for such expensive and little used equipment as water-cannon trucks, armored personnel carriers and other heavy equipment. Needless to say, the European police are basically opposed to the use of police firearms. Even in riots involving thousands of police quelling a serious disturbance over several weeks (e.g., Paris, May '68 or Reggio Calabria, Italy, January '71) firearms were rarely used.

The problem of determining which crowd control tactics are most effective is subtle and complex, since so much depends on the nature of the crowd, the existing reputation of the police, and their present state of training, leadership and morale. However, the British experience clearly indicates (and the recent German experience tends to corroborate) that a "low posture" with a minimum (or no) display of force or weapons, maximum freedom of expression by the demonstrators as long as they keep moving, and denying demonstrators an opportunity to mass before a fixed target have all proven useful in reducing mob violence and police over-reaction. The alternative posture, which is frequently seen in Italy and France, involves large numbers of heavily armed police in the defense of a fixed position which the demonstrators often attempt to assault and which in turn triggers a frequently violent police counter-attack. Over the past twenty years, this pattern has been counter-productive in France and of no discernible value in Italy. If excessive force has been used by police in the past, disengagement will be an extremely slow and difficult process, but however difficult it may be, gradual adoption of a "low posture" with minimal use of force except in self-defense certainly seems more desirable than further escalation of violence. The European experience over the past decade seems to favor a policy of increased police intelligence activity, improved communications, less reliance on weapons and equipment, and more on disciplined non-violent (or at least non-aggressive) tactics. This may be a difficult and dangerous course for the cities and citizens of the United States to follow, but it seems to be less undesirable than the other alternatives. Based on what I have learned in the course of this case study, I recommend we try it. If it doesn't work, we as citizens can always request the governor to send in the National Guard.

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