



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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CASE STUDY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PACIFIC BASES IN THE 70'S
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William L. Roche
Colonel, United States Air Force

THIRTEENTH SESSION
SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY
Washington, D. C.
1970 - 1971

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THE SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

THIRTEENTH SESSION

August 17, 1970 - June 11, 1971

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PACIFIC BASES IN THE 70's

A Case Study

by

William L. Roche
Colonel, United States Air Force

April, 1971

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PACIFIC BASES IN THE 70s

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INTRODUCTION

The genesis of this case study dates to a proposed research project within State Department, originated by the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. The scope of the original research project was intended to be worldwide, with primary attention to Europe and the Far East, and entitled "Use of Overseas Bases in the 70s." This project was never funded and presumably has passed from the scene as an active project.

I have selected a small, but important segment of the above overall project for my Senior Seminar case study. I will examine only United States air bases and will limit my study to those air bases in the Pacific, and the military and political factors which, I think, will affect their use in the 1970s. It should also be pointed out that this study deals exclusively with operational flying bases and excludes other USAF facilities in the Pacific area.

Because of the limited scope of this study and the very short time frame involved in its preparation, some important aspects of basing, such as economic factors, will not be dealt with, except where it becomes obvious to the layman that budgetary considerations rule out certain possible courses of action.

From the beginning of this study it became increasingly evident that much official classified research had already been done, some fairly recently, on future air base structure in the Pacific and another short three week study would add very little to this official knowledge. Therefore, it was felt that a closer examination of the political ramifications involved would be more useful and could be objectively made, particularly by one unencumbered by bias or previous knowledge concerning the geographical area involved.

This study will not attempt to reveal what official planning documents provide for the 1970s, primarily because of the high classification of these documents, but also because of the large number of alternatives and uncertainties which make planning hazardous. Instead, this case study is a reflection of observations made by the author, based on conversations with both political and military officers at the various overseas bases and embassies visited during the period 1-20 March, 1971. It is also based on conversations with officers and civilians on the Air Staff and in State Department, as well as information gleaned from the press, here and abroad, and from periodicals and journals. Consequently, the content of this report will be highly impressionistic, and certainly does not reflect official USAF or State Department policy with regard to the possible future deployment of operational units. It is an attempt by the author to predict what may happen as a result of the Nixon Doctrine, the withdrawal from SEA and the foreign policy of the Pacific nations.

The countries involved in this case study are those with which the United States has bilateral treaties, namely Japan, Korea, Republic of China and the Philippines. The countries in Southeast Asia are not included in this study, although it is conceivable that some USAF

units may remain in this area for the remainder of the 1970s as part of the residual forces necessary to preserve peace in Southeast Asia. In this event, Thailand would certainly be the most logical location, because of the excellent facilities which have been built there, as well as the probability that all U.S. Forces will be withdrawn from Vietnam. The main focus will be on Okinawa, since this island will remain the keystone of our defense posture in the Pacific, and there is considerable anxiety concerning its future use following reversion to Japan.

Finally, it should be noted that in accordance with Senior Seminar tradition, and as previously mentioned, I have selected a topic and a geographical area with which I am totally unfamiliar. Therefore, I am the primary beneficiary of this case study and possibly the only one who will benefit from it.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN THE PACIFIC

The Nixon Doctrine appears to be implicit in its statement that "We will maintain our interests in Asia and the commitments that flow from them----the United States will keep all its treaty commitments." Thus briefly stated, our policy remains that of providing assistance to those countries with whom we have treaties in defense against aggression.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird declared in his annual defense report to the U.S. Congress on 11 March, that the United States will maintain adequate forces to meet its commitments in Asia.

Secretary Laird's defense report, which he submitted to the House Armed Services Committee, is based on the five-year defense program (FY 1972-1976) and the 1972 defense budget. The Defense Secretary stressed that it is "essential that our friends and allies understand that the U.S. will live up to its commitments and continue to support them. Thus, as we proceed to implement the Nixon Doctrine, both timing and balance are critical concerns. We must maintain our strength as a complement to the growing regional strength of our friends and allies in Asia, and use this strength if necessary to assist them in their efforts to provide for their own security, until such time as they reach self sufficiency."

This report will apparently set the pattern for the 1970s and there should be a gradual reduction in the U.S. military posture in the Pacific as Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines develop their own defense forces. Based upon this very abbreviated version of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia, let us move to a more detailed look at the area in question.

TAIWAN REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The most complicated of all problems related to air bases in the Pacific is that of Taiwan. The political future of the Republic of China is caught between the outcome of a future United Nations vote on the admission of the People's Republic of China, which includes the expulsion of Taiwan from the U.N., and the desire of both Japan and the United States to improve relations with the Communist Government on the mainland.

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It is considered possible this year that "Red" China may be admitted to the U.N. under a formula which would provide for a two-China policy. There is considerable doubt as to whether the Albanian Resolution, (which calls for the expulsion of Taiwan) could pass during the next session, but a proposal which would retain a seat in the General Assembly for Taiwan, while admitting Communist China and giving the Security Council seat to that government, is almost certain to pass. Neither Chinese Government would be happy with the two-China solution and the outcome is unpredictable. It could be a facesaving solution for both governments and considerable pressure will be brought to bear by both Japan and the United States to affect a compromise.

Whatever happens at the U.N. this fall, it will not affect U.S. air bases on Taiwan nearly as much as the Nixon Doctrine for Asia, and the desire of the United States to "normalize" relations with the Peking regime. Indeed, a number of significant actions have already been taken, including lifting restrictions on the use of passports to travel to Communist China, a more liberal trade policy and the journey of the U.S. ping pong team with accompanying journalists. Also, recently the United States has cautioned American oil companies against risking exploration of seabed resources in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea in the face of strong warnings by Communist China. U.S. firms holding oil exploration concessions from Nationalist China and South Korea were told they would be on their own if their ships were seized. U.S. Government officials made it clear that the United States is anxious to avoid getting caught in the middle of an international incident, even though current exploration is being conducted far off the coast of mainland China. Communist China claims that it alone has the right to develop "China's seabed," meaning China's continental shelf, expressly including the Senkaku Islands, 100 miles off Taiwan, which both Taiwan and Japan claim. The United States treats the islands as part of the Ryukyuan area currently under American jurisdiction and scheduled to revert to Japanese administration under the Okinawa agreement. The United States, in warning the oil companies against conducting operations in the disputed area, has made it clear that it wishes to avoid any incident which might place American lives and property in jeopardy or create tension in the area. This sensitivity on the part of the United States Government toward Communist China makes it appear highly unlikely that Taiwan will be used by United States Air Force combat units, following withdrawal from air bases in Southeast Asia.

Currently there are no permanently assigned combat aircraft on Taiwan, although a wing of C-130 transports has been stationed at Ching Chuan Kang Air Force Base on Taiwan's western coastal plain, about 100 miles south of Taipei, since 1966.

Air base facilities on Taiwan used by the USAF, in addition to CCK Air Base, include Tainan Air Base and Sung Shan Air Base in Taipei. There are ten other bases on Taiwan with significant military capability, including Hsinchu Air Base with a 12,000 foot runway. Therefore, adequate facilities exist which could accommodate additional USAF flying units, including fighter-bombers or heavy bombers.

Under Article II of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty the United States has the right to dispose military forces in Taiwan as determined by mutual agreement. Also, it is almost certain that the Nationalist government would agree to additional combat air units, if requested by the United States.

Therefore, the use of Taiwan as a part of the U.S. air base structure in the Pacific will depend on political factors which will develop in the 70s. If Communist China continues to exercise restraint and takes no action which would create public sentiment in the United States against her, it is likely that the policy of the United States Government will continue to be one of normalizing relations with the mainland. Doak Barnett, a Chinese expert representing the Brookings Institute at a two day conference on China policy, sponsored by the League of Women Voters and the National Committee on China Relations, has advocated that the United States remove its military presence from Taiwan, but continue to honor its defense commitments to the Republic of China through air and sea power. Mr. Barnett did not indicate where he felt the air power should be based. But to be effective it must be based within operational limitations of fighter aircraft. If Taiwan is eliminated as a possible base in the future, it becomes increasingly difficult to conduct air operations in the area, and the Philippines and Okinawa assume an even greater importance.

The Nationalist government on Taiwan adopting a realistic attitude and looking to the future, has been increasing its military expenditures as part of its continued effort to build a more self-reliant defense force and it is estimated that defense expenditures will remain at about 10% of the GNP. The largest amount planned is expected to be for maintenance and modernization of existing forces with increasing sums being allocated to research and development projects with potential military applications.

KOREA

The political situation of Korea, as it affects the positioning of USAF combat units in that country, is unique among the nations considered in this study.

The Korean War, the seizure of the Pueblo and imprisonment of its crew, the shooting down of the EC-121 and continued hostility and provocations by the North Koreans, have all combined to convince the majority of Americans that strong support of the South Korean Government is necessary now and throughout the 1970s.

In line with the Nixon Administration's new military policy toward Korea, there will be a minimum employment of U.S. ground forces in the case of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, while retaining the option to provide local ground combat forces with the required air, sea and logistic support. The number of tactical air wings initially deployed could be increased as forces from the United States were deployed to the theater. U.S. land combat forces could be increased substantially above peacetime deployment levels, assuming that adequate air and sea lift would be available and that we maintain our Europe deployed force.

This new defense strategy was disclosed by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird in his March 1971 defense report to Congress.

The withdrawal of 20,000 American troops from Korea will be compensated for by the enlargement of ROK defense forces, modernization of those forces and stationing of a USAF Tactical Fighter Wing in Korea. Secretary Laird also announced an additional \$150 million in military aid to be allocated to Korean armed forces modernization under a five year program. The goal of the modernization program is to provide South Korea better self-defense capabilities; and by the end of the 1970s enable the Republic of Korea to defend itself against any aggression from North Korea.

Although most observers believe that there is little likelihood of an attack on South Korea from either the USSR or Communist China, the North Korean regime is considered unpredictable and militarily capable of launching an attack on the ROK without external assistance. Any sustained military operations would require considerable material and probably military personnel assistance from North Korea's communist allies. It is extremely doubtful if North Korea would receive any encouragement from its allies for such an attack.

The North Korean Air Force has more than 550 tactical aircraft in its inventory, including Mig 21s and enjoys both a numerical and qualitative superiority over the ROK forces. To offset this superiority until the Korean Air Force has been modernized, the United States Air Force has deployed a tactical fighter wing, consisting of three F-4 Phantom squadrons to Korea. The wing, with 54 aircraft was formerly stationed at Misawa Air Base in Japan and U.S. authorities have publicly announced that this unit will be permanently stationed in Korea.

At the present time the United States Air Force operates air bases at Osan and Kunsan, South Korea and shares joint use with the ROK forces at several other bases, including Kimpo, Suwon, Kwangju and Taegu. It is expected that despite the deployment of the fighter-bombers mentioned above, these air bases in South Korea will continue to be used actively by U.S. military aircraft from Okinawa and elsewhere.

The future of U.S. air bases in South Korea is fairly well assured into the 1970s unless something unforeseen occurs. The government of Chung Hee Park will likely be reelected for a third consecutive four-year term when presidential elections are held on 27 April, 1971. The chief contestant to Mr. Park is Kim Dae Jung, considered a liberal member of the opposition New Democratic Party. Despite Mr. Kim's liberal views, which include withdrawal of South Korean forces from Vietnam, disbandment of the 2 million member militia, and a softened attitude toward North Korea, he has not advocated withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and would not be expected to do so, if elected.

Therefore, it appears that if the United States Air Force withdraws from South Korea during the 1970s, the decision will likely be initiated elsewhere, other than Seoul.

THE PHILIPPINES

Although the Philippines were not visited during the course of this study, it was believed appropriate to include a brief reference to the USAF facilities there and the possible role they will play in the 1970s. Clark Air Base, near Manila, is the major USAF base in the Philippines and Headquarters of the 13th Air Force and 6th Air Division. Clark AB is vital to USAF operations in Southeast Asia and provides maintenance and supply for over 800 aircraft of 31 types. It also provides many other support functions for the bases in its area of responsibility, which includes the Philippines, Taiwan and Southeast Asia (less Vietnam).

The 13th Air Force at Clark is also responsible for the U.S. air defense effort in the Philippines and air defense of the West Pacific. Air defense of the Philippines is a coordinated USAF and Philippine Air Force operation. It seems obvious that the United States would desire to retain Clark Air Base following the cessation of hostilities in Southeast Asia, both because of its strategic location and because of the large U.S.

investment in facilities there. Also, if the U.S. is restricted from using Taiwan as an air base, Clark Air Base assumes an even more important role.

Since much of the effort at Clark is devoted to supporting activities in Southeast Asia, there will undoubtedly be some rather sharp cutbacks in military and civilian personnel after the war. This could create further problems for the authorities at Clark, who have already been plagued with many community problems, including a period when the nearest city of Angeles was declared off-limits to all American nationals, following a series of serious anti-American incidents.

Nevertheless, it is apparent that some activities on the base will cease and that the Nixon Doctrine will apply here as elsewhere. This could call for reducing the USAF presence to the minimum necessary to maintain air defense of the Philippines and the Western Pacific.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos at a news conference on 14 March, 1971 said that U.S. presence in the area was vital for regional security. However, he also noted that either country could rescind on a year's notice, agreements on Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. President Marcos, who has been under political pressure to ease out American bases, added "As long as a great power like the United States is around the Pacific, there will be no danger from Japan. Whether we like it or not, Japan will have to assume a major role in this area, either to protect itself or to correct the balance of power."

It appears likely that President Marcos will be able to resist pressure to oust the Americans completely, but a lower U.S. military presence is probable following cessation of hostilities in SEA.

JAPAN

The key to stability in the Pacific and to the successful withdrawal of U.S. military power is Japan.

The Japanese military budget for 1970 was 570 billion yen or 1.6 billion dollars. This reportedly approximated 7/8 of 1% of the Japanese GNP. All estimates are that Japan will keep its military expenditures at roughly 1% of GNP for the next five years. This would mean a sizeable increase in defense spending, since estimates of the Japanese GNP by 1975 total over 400 billion dollars. The Director General of the Defense Agency, Yasuhiro Nakasone, told the Diet on 10 March, 1971, that the basic defense guidelines of 1957 should be revised before the start of the new five year defense buildup program (1972-1976) in order to make clear Japan's nonmilitaristic stand. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, supporting Nakasone's statement, said defense guidelines should be revised or complemented if necessary "to make it clear that Japan will not follow the path to militarism." Nakasone also said, that the situation in Japan regarding its security has changed as a result of the extension last year of the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty and the progress being made in the American troop withdrawals from Japan.

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It appears evident from these statements that a sizeable buildup in the Japanese Defense Forces is contemplated for the next five years. The withdrawal of the two remaining USAF tactical fighter wings in Japan currently being carried out places the air defense role of Japan squarely on the shoulders of the Japanese Air Force.

Consequently, it seems logical to assume that a considerable part of the buildup will go toward modernization of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, as well as some expansion. Japan already has contracted to build approximately 120 F4s and according to information available, Nike-Hercules and Hawk missiles are also manufactured in Japan. With these improvements in self-defense capability and the deployment of USAF fighter units to nearby Korea, the essential elements of the defense posture of Japan will not be significantly affected by the withdrawal of the two fighter wings from the Japanese homeland.

The USAF will continue to use Misawa and Yokota Air Bases, but with reduced flying activity and, of course, no tactical units for the time being. In addition, the Japanese air defense forces are expected to make greater use of Misawa. A key point made by Defense Director Nakasone in his speech to the Japanese Diet was that U.S. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird had pledged that the U.S. would use all kinds of weapons to defend Japan under the joint security treaty. He also added that nuclear weapons should naturally be included in the "all sorts of weapons." Also, in commenting on this statement, Prime Minister Sato said it was possible that the U.S. forces outside Japan would use nuclear weapons to defend Japan, adding that such action would not conflict with Japan's "nonnuclear principles" prohibiting Japan from producing, bringing in or possessing nuclear arms.

Despite the Japanese reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Prime Minister Sato and Director General Nakasone have made it clear that upon reversion of Okinawa to Japan, all nuclear weapons and nerve gas must have been removed.

This paper will not deal with the problems associated with nuclear weapons, because of the highly classified nature of that subject, other than to say that nuclear storage facilities for tactical weapons must be positioned where they can be used by forces designed for nuclear delivery or the nations involved suffer the loss of this deterrent.

There is some feeling in the official American community in Japan that the USAF withdrawal of its tactical fighters was too sudden and there is a danger that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces may lose some of the facilities being vacated because of strong civilian pressure for this real estate and the lack of military assets at this time. The argument being made is that the Japanese time table for the buildup of its military forces is in the 1972-1976 period and the vacuum created by the American withdrawal will be difficult to fill on such short notice. Whether this view will prove correct remains to be seen.

OKINAWA

The biggest question mark facing American planners, in my opinion, is the reliability of Okinawa as a U.S. military base, following its reversion to Japanese administrative control.

All of the evidence indicates that upon reversion, Okinawa will be afforded the same status as the Japanese mainland, under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Prior consultation with the Japanese will be required for launching combat operations from Okinawa and it is quite likely that the Security Treaty could be amended to preclude the full-time stationing of U.S. forces on Japan and Okinawa.

Probably the most critical factor which will delay the departure of U.S. military installations from Okinawa is the economic dependence of the island upon the U.S. military bases, which provide approximately 50% of the total income of the island.

The Japanese, who have made great economic inroads into Taiwan, Korea, China and the Philippines, have been reluctant so far to provide much capital for investment in Okinawa. This situation is expected to change somewhat when Okinawa becomes a prefecture of Japan, but the process of filling the economic gap, which would be created by withdrawal of U.S. forces, will be a slow one.

Why is Okinawa so important to the U.S. military posture in the Pacific? Okinawa is a key U.S. military base with over 50,000 military personnel and 30,000 dependents. The U.S. spends \$460 million annually on Okinawa and has \$750 million in fixed facilities. It has a highly skilled indigenous labor force of over 50,000 persons.

Strategically Okinawa is considered the keystone of the Pacific because of its geographical location. It is less than 1,000 miles from Taiwan, Korea, most of Japan, the Philippines and important areas of mainland China. It is used by the United States Air Force as a base for refueling, airlift support, reconnaissance and tactical forces. It also provides early warning radar and communications. It has excellent flying weather and fighter strikes are possible from Okinawa without refueling.

The USAF will maintain a wing of F-4 fighter aircraft at Kadena Air Base following the complete deployment of the 347th TFW from Yokota A.B. in Japan, expected to be completed by June, 1971. Kadena also is the home of KC-135 strato-tankers of the 376th Strategic Wing and other miscellaneous reconnaissance and transport aircraft.

The F-4 wing will assume the air defense mission of Okinawa in lieu of the F-102 squadron at Naha A.B. Okinawa which has been inactivated. It will also have a tactical reserve mission. Following reversion, when the Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces are capable of doing so, they will assume the full Air Defense of Okinawa.

Under the current reduction of forces in the Pacific, the USAF will consolidate all of its flying activity on Okinawa at Kadena, and Naha will be made available to the Japanese forces slated to move to Okinawa following reversion.

A major problem associated with this consolidation is the lack of housing at Kadena to accommodate the officers and men of the F-4 wing. The housing available at Naha is considered too distant from Kadena in terms of commuting time, because of the poor roads and traffic congestion. A possible solution would be for the Japanese Government to construct additional housing at Kadena, in exchange for the Naha housing which could be used by the Japanese forces.

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Post Southeast Asia, Kadena Air Base is expected to continue to play a critical role in the Pacific, barring any political decisions by either the U.S. or Japan. It is expected that additional transport aircraft will be stationed on the island to provide necessary airlift. Redeployment of heavy bombers to Okinawa would be dependent on the existence of a contingency situation requiring their use, and would be subject to the approval of the Japanese Government.

In addition to its value to the USAF, Okinawa also is important to the other military services. The Okinawa Army Logistical Base can provide sustained support to a deployed force of 500,000 men. The Marine Corps maintains the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa, a force of 19,000 marines. The U.S. Navy has facilities at Naha Port and Naha Air Base and provides fuel and provisions to ships of the 7th Fleet and antisubmarine warfare protection for these units. Finally, the Voice of America operates a major relay station on Okinawa, which provides coverage of North China, Soviet Far East and Korea.

Problems associated with the reversion of Okinawa to Japan are numerous. The removal of nuclear weapons and nerve gas demanded by the Japanese Government has already been mentioned. Some other problems which will be encountered are:

1. The Okinawa Bureau of the Stars & Stripes reported on 17 March, 1971, that the Government of the Ryukyus will ask the United States to remove SR 71 reconnaissance aircraft from Okinawa before the island's reversion, because the Japanese Government has repeatedly promised that the status of the military bases there will be scaled down to that of the bases in Japan. This request will perhaps be made through the Government of Japan. This statement alone should give an indication of things to come.
2. The purchase of U.S. assets by Japan upon reversion. This problem is too complicated to discuss in this paper, but involves reimbursement to the U.S. for welfare facilities, public corporations, roads, communications, Naha Airport facilities, etc. Discussion concerning this problem is continuing.
3. Protection of U.S. business interests on Okinawa. The Japanese Government has indicated that Japan is considering giving some provisional protection up to five years to small and medium firms, as well as doctors, lawyers, veterinarians and other licensed professionals. However, licenses and franchises granted by the U.S. Civil Administration to large American businesses in Okinawa will be nullified upon reversion, and these enterprises will have to come under foreign investment restrictions of the Japanese Government. The only assurance the Japanese Government intends to give small businesses is an official letter to the American Chamber of Commerce on Okinawa. It had no intention of including provisions about the guarantee in the planned reversion agreement with the U.S. However, it is almost certain now that some guarantee to U.S. businesses will be included in the treaty discussions.
4. The Voice of America may not be authorized to continue broadcast after the island's reversion, since operation of the VOA would be in violation of Japanese law.

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5. U.S. military forces on the island would not be permitted to train forces of other countries on Okinawa as is presently being done.
6. Land currently used by U.S. bases in Okinawa will be the subject of new contracts between Okinawan landowners and the Japanese Government. Approximately 15% of the proprietors are expected to reject the new contracts and special legislation may be required to enable the government to use the property necessary for the bases without the landowners approval. The Defense Facilities Administration Agency is considering limiting the term of the U.S. forces use of the land to about a year. This short term arrangement certainly does not indicate that Japan foresees a long period of U.S. military presence on Okinawa.

There are many other problems connected with the reversion of Okinawa, but the ones mentioned here are indication enough of the very difficult days ahead for U.S. negotiators. Now that the United States has formally notified Japan that the question of Okinawa reversion will necessitate approval by the U.S. Senate, most of the problems listed above will receive scrutiny before the treaty is signed.

Because of the many uncertainties posed by reversion and the tremendous importance of Okinawa to the U.S. effort in Southeast Asia, a delay in the return of the island until hostilities have ceased in SEA would be very advantageous to the United States, but could pose a serious problem for the Sato government.

CONCLUSIONS

The one inescapable conclusion which must be drawn from this brief examination of future prospects for USAF bases in the Pacific, is that no one is capable of predicting what will happen by the end of the 1970s and one estimate is as valid as another. The major uncertainties which exist regarding U.S. policies in Southeast Asia affect the rest of the Pacific area.

The current trend in the Pacific, as elsewhere, is to reduce forces, economize and encourage other nations to assume a greater share of the defense burden. This is being accomplished by withdrawal of some units and consolidation of other units, utilizing the same facilities. It also requires continued military assistance to certain Asian allies for a number of years.

In addition to the economic factor which has motivated and continues to motivate the posture of U.S. defense forces, the political factor looms very large in the Pacific.

The desire of both the United States and Japan to improve relations with Communist China, although possibly for different reasons, has the same limiting influence on where U.S. combat forces can be stationed. As relations with China continue to improve, as they certainly must, following the end of hostilities in Southeast Asia, the pressure at home and abroad for a greater reduction in overseas bases will mount. In the eyes of our Asian allies, the threat to the security of their countries, posed by a hostile isolated China, will diminish with China's admission to the U.N. and greater contact with the rest of the world. Without this threat, the United States is no longer the indispensable friend with the nuclear umbrella, but a strong competitor in the economic market, and in many cases, competing for the same market.

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All of these factors are likely to influence the decision making in the 1970s, and in my opinion, will result in a continued reduction of bases, including the withdrawal from both Taiwan and Okinawa by the end of the decade.

Alternatives to these two key locations are few. The Philippines have been mentioned as one possibility. Some thought has been given by planners to the possibility of utilizing islands in the Trust Territories, such as Saipan and Tinian. However, the limited scope of this paper has not permitted an examination of this possibility, although on the surface the proposal sounds feasible.

The only other alternative which is evident at this time would be even further reductions in the USAF combat operational forces in the Pacific area.

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