


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William H. Brubeck
Foreign Service Officer

ELEVENTH SESSION SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

Washington, D. C.

1968-1969

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THE SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

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JAPAN: THE FUTURE IS CITIES

A Case Study

by

William H. Brubeck
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May, 1969

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Postwar Japan is usually described as an economic miracle and it almost is. The economy grows at ten percent a year; it plows close to 20 percent of GNP back into new capital formation; productivity rises twice as fast as wages; despite a consumer boom, personal savings among wage earners are a high 8-10 percent and rising. All this in spite of five percent inflation and less than one percent unemployment.

Defying all the conventional wisdom of Western economics the boom goes on with a peculiarly Japanese logic of its own. Japan has become the third industrial power of the world, its second producer of steel and automobiles. The more exuberant prophets, like Herman Kahn, see Japan over the next twenty years surpassing the USSR and challenging the United States for economic primacy. It is a vision that deeply impresses the Japanese themselves.

Whatever the future may be it will depend on the great industrial cities, and there the miracle shows some signs of strain. Japan's population growth is low, barely one percent a year, but there is a heavy, continuing migration from the country to the city. The most densely populated of the world's major countries, Japan is half again as crowded as India, almost four times as crowded as China.* Only Britain and West Germany approach Japan's population density and even that comparison is misleading. More than four/fifths of Japan's land area is mountainous and sparsely populated; its people are crowded into its narrow valleys and its too few broad plains.

The bulk of Japanese live in Southern Honshu. Forty million of them, forty percent of the total, are jammed into the three great urban complexes of Tokyo-Yokohama, Osaka-Kobe, and Nagoya. Between 1955 and 1965 over half of Japan's prefectures (the least populous ones) lost some ten million people to the cities, with more than three million of the migrants pouring into the already overcrowded Tokyo area.

The great cities not only account for a growing share of Japan's population. They are an even more dominant factor in its economic growth.** In a nation single-mindedly focused on industrialization, modernization and economic growth, the big industrial cities have an irresistible magnetism. The result is an acute case of urban indigestion; its concomitant is declining rural prefectures and smaller cities struggling to survive.

* Population Density of Selected Countries (Per Sq. Km., 1965)

Japan	265	India	159	USSR	10
W. Germany	229	Mainland China	73		
UK	224	USA	21		

** Nearly 60 percent of Japan's manufacturing production comes from the three main urban areas.

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The phenomenon is familiar enough in all industrial countries; nowhere, perhaps, are the pace and intensity--and therefore the shock--of change so great as in Japan. To appreciate the impact, we must remember that, in contrast to its aggregate performance, Japan ranks only about 15th in the world in per capita income, along with countries like Argentina and Venezuela. It has built a superb, modern industrial plant, but has built it on an underdeveloped social base not far removed from the feudal past. Productive investment has come in considerable measure at the expense of social investment. As a result, Japan has been building up a heavy backlog of social needs; highways, housing, sewage and water facilities, health and recreational resources.*

The incongruities of Japan's development are painfully apparent in its traffic problem. In 1965, with somewhat more automobiles than Italy, Japan had one-fourth as much paved highway. By 1968, Japan's auto production had reached four million a year (as many as all the cars on the road in 1965 and almost as many per capita as the U.S.) yet road building increased only fractionally. Between 1960 and 1965, highway per auto dropped from 23 meters to 10 meters. Though current figures are not available, someone has calculated that Japan now has barely enough highway to park all its cars, which is about what happens during rush hours.**

The growing pains of modernization are most acute in the big cities, where economic and population growth are heaviest. In all its living color, Tokyo offers the most lurid but instructive picture. Tokyo is still trying to digest the mass of people that flooded into the central city in the early sixties. Since then, however, inflow to the central city has just about reached a balance with outflow to the suburbs, which now spread over a radius of fifty kilometers around the city. The four prefectures of the Tokyo-Yokohama area contain 24 million people. As a result, Tokyo has double trouble--an inner city still trying to accommodate the earlier migration, with a new and growing suburban problem piled on top.

Measuring Tokyo's predicament in simple terms is not easy. Its city planners figure that about 550,000 new housing units are needed, but the number obviously depends on the standard used. The proportion of private rental housing is increasing, and a large part of it is one or two story, wooden apartment tenements--"apato"--hardly more than rooming houses. Perhaps a fourth of Tokyo now lives in such housing--one or two room cold water flats, with communal toilets and public baths, so cramped that space per person in Tokyo is still below the prewar average.

Sewage facilities cover only a third of the city. On a population basis, Washington has fifty times, even New York 22 times as much park space as Tokyo. Sidewalks are almost as rare as rickshaws in modern Tokyo, and the consequences show up in

* Here, for example, is a profile of Japan's social development compared to Western Europe, on an index scale where the composite of the UK, France and West Germany = 100. (Data from the early and middle sixties.)

Rooms per household member	68	Paved roads per auto	13
Sewage Facilities	22	TV sets	167
Water Supply	20	Washing Machines	153

** I spent five hours one morning on a fifty-five mile trip out of Tokyo, including an hour on the only seven miles of "expressway" on the route.

pedestrian casualties

With 2 million cars, and the total going up a quarter of a million a year, Tokyo's traffic problem transcends both prose and statistics. The subway system is excellent but saturated. Suburban trains are crammed at rush hour to three times their nominal capacity and forty percent of Tokyo's workers spend at least three hours a day commuting.

Land shortage and soaring land prices drive builders ever farther out from the central city. Even for public housing, the Tokyo Government now goes outside its own administrative jurisdiction to find land it can afford. The local governments on whose territory it poaches are now, in their turn, beginning to resist because of the resulting demands on them for schools and services that Tokyo's housing developments are creating.

In the face of such problems, Tokyo's planners keep trying. Their primary goal is to relieve the congestion of the inner city, through development out along radials, following the lines of existing transport facilities and preserving some green space between the radials; development of suburban satellite cities; and decentralization within central Tokyo by creation of economic subcenters outside the downtown area. Tama, a suburban dormitory town initially planned for 300,000 is under development. Atsugi is a planned development of an existing town, not a dormitory but a city with its own planned industrial base, controlled land use and some social amenities. Within Tokyo proper, the area around Shinjuku Station has been redeveloped as a subcenter, with a 96 acre complex of new buildings and highways. Elsewhere, as around Shimbashi Station, the city government is engaged in large scale urban renewal; to relieve congestion around the central market, new wholesale markets are planned for outlying parts of the city.

Tokyo is engaged in large scale land reclamation from Tokyo Bay for industrial use. It has underway substantial public sewage and water programs, and a large project for new subway construction. What can be done, given resources and political support, was demonstrated in preparation for the 1964 Olympics, which provided Tokyo some permanent benefits in a hurry--an excellent expressway from the airport, a considerable improvement in tourist facilities, some fine new public buildings, such as Kenzo Tange's Olympic gymnasium and swimming pool.

Land, its availability and price, is the key element in Tokyo's development. It is not an insoluble problem and the city is turning to zoning and land use control to make more rational and economic use of its limited land resources. In spite of scarcity and high prices, Tokyo's real estate is not now well used. Buildings in the central city average less than a story and a half. Because of the earthquake threat, even the biggest postwar buildings have been limited to 10 or 12 stories. Now, however, a thirty-five story building has been erected (the tallest in Asia) and more like it will probably follow. For the future, high rise offers a very important and until now underexploited answer to rising land costs, one on which the planners are counting heavily.

Urban growth breeds trouble but, as this summary has suggested, there have gradually developed some recognition and effort to deal with it. At the national level (where the lion's share of money and power lie) as well as locally, there has been increasing concern with the cities, new legislation and even some new money, particularly for housing. Yet on balance, the effort is still too little and too late, for reasons that seem to run deep in Japanese politics and society. Tokyo's 1961 ten-year plan called for a green belt around the city. Almost before the plan was off the drawing boards, reality had wiped out the possibility of green belts and the planners are now trying only to salvage some green space between

conclusion

HOUSING

suburban centers. The housing goals of the same plan, modest enough in terms of need, were only a third fulfilled in the first six years of the plan. Tokyo's present plan calls for enough housing over the next three years, private and public, to keep up with new needs and even make a modest dent in the backlog of demand. It calls for a substantial increase in public housing. Yet Tokyo officials complain that with costs rising the National Government's subsidies are increasingly inadequate to the number of houses they are supposed to build and local government can't fill the gap from its very limited sources of additional revenue. While private sector construction may come closer to the targets, it will continue to include an unhealthy share of substandard wooden "apato", not a solution to housing needs.

Low cost private construction other than wooden tenements is almost ruled out by land costs. Even in the suburbs, 2 or 3 hours commuting round-trip from Tokyo, it is estimated that a house of 600 square feet on a 2000 square foot lot now costs about \$15,000. That is the equivalent, in income terms, of a \$60,000 U.S. house, of no help below the upper middle class. Both private and public construction, therefore, is concentrated in the huge, barracks-like concrete "danchi", apartment buildings that are growing in great, bleak tracts around Tokyo and other large cities. They are housing only in the most limited, cost-efficient sense, with few amenities and no aesthetic relief. Yet it is difficult to see where even limited improvement in Tokyo's housing shortage is to come from, other than the danchi wasteland.*

Although the power of eminent domain exists in law, its use in practice (in a country where peasant land hunger is deep-rooted) is severely limited by custom and social attitudes. More often, land is acquired for public purposes by open market negotiation. Thus highways, parks, housing--any program requiring land--operates under a handicap. In one provincial town, for example, a novel experiment in urban renewal is being attempted. A small community--housing, shops, offices, a community center and auditorium--is being built on a concrete platform one level above the street, with the ground level reserved for highway, parking, and other non-residential use. It is an important experiment in efficient land use and commands a good deal of interest among Japanese urban planners. Yet it is presently at a dead stop, one third complete, while public officials negotiate with owners of surrounding slum property for the remaining land needed.

Tokyo's problems are not unique. Osaka and Nagoya, for example, suffer only in lesser degree from inadequate housing. Where Tokyo has 51 applicants for each public housing vacancy, Osaka has eleven. Between 1960 and 1965, the number of automobiles in Osaka more than doubled; the highway net expanded by ten percent. Osaka, like Tokyo, is making an effort. It has nearly completed one large, well planned satellite town at Senri, and has another in progress. As did Tokyo with the Olympics, Osaka will benefit permanently from a large and accelerated program of highway and other improvements being undertaken for Expo 70.

* There were in 1965 (with no reason to believe matters have since improved) 51 applicants for every public housing vacancy in Tokyo. One project drew a record 7000 applicants per unit.

HOUSING

APPENDIX

It is generally agreed that, in the most narrowly quantitative terms, Japan is simply not putting enough resources into social infrastructure. In the big cities, where the pressures of population and industrial growth are heaviest, the disproportion is worst. There just aren't enough houses or highways being built to handle the number of people and automobiles in the cities. There isn't enough public transport. Sewage and water services, while improving, fall short of foreseeable needs.

What may be equally serious is the quality of life Japan is building into its cities. It is fast becoming a wealthy country; it has already an impressive increment of growth from which to finance its needs. Yet if, as seems clear, it is spending too little quantitatively on social infrastructure it is spending even less on the quality of life. Apatto housing has been described as "preslum"; certainly it is about as minimal a standard of housing as a prospering industrial country can endure. The huge concrete "danchi" which now ring Tokyo are better, but not much. They stretch in vast, ugly rows, with little or no green space, recreation areas, conveniences or amenities--just housing, apartments of two or three rooms with kitchen-dining area. Yet the wooden tenement and the concrete apartment block are becoming a permanent way of life for millions of urban Japanese.

Consider the typical case history of a young, urban Japanese worker today. He is likely to be a farm boy who left for Tokyo as soon as he finished school.* His goal, in a popular joke, is "an apartment, a television, and no grandfather". He has forsaken the life of his ancestors and, it is said, the ancestors themselves. He has left the extended family, which many believe has historically been the cement of Japanese society. He has moved into the danchi wasteland of Tokyo, spends a substantial part of his life commuting, and has enlisted as a vassal (in a very real sense and probably for life) of Mitsubishi. If he does well as a corporate liegeman he will in time acquire an auto in which to join the traffic jam; a comprehensive welfare scheme with health and pension benefits; and even company housing.** If he really makes it, he may join the true elite of Japanese economic life, the expense account executives.

All this is a far cry from traditional Japanese life, culture and loyalties. There is no garden in a danchi apartment; Tokyo offers little to feed the insistent Japanese love of "nature", a cult that may be highly artificial but seems to fill an important function. It offers, instead, the rootless anonymity of the city, the car, and the color television. Its social consequences are a matter for speculation.

This disturbs many thoughtful Japanese, troubled by the pace and intensity of change and sceptical as to what the new industrial cities are providing to replace the old culture they are uprooting. But the Japanese it disturbs are largely academic social scientists, socialist planners, architects and cultural philosophers. So far, the farm boy who comes to the city shows every sign of satisfaction

* In Shimane prefecture, a fishing and farming area with the heaviest population loss in Japan, four of every five high school graduates leave for the city.

** Company housing provides a significant fraction of Japan's total; while not appreciably better, it is a good deal cheaper to rent than private housing.

DEVELOPMENT

with his choice. His income is increasing steadily, and he can buy a range of consumer goods beyond anything earlier generations ever knew. So he keeps coming, crowding into the danchi, buying the color TVs and Western furniture, in relentless pursuit of modernization.*

The theorists and planners most troubled about the future of urban Japan are, characteristically, those with least power to shape that future. Around Kenzo Tange, the great figure of current Japanese architecture, are gathered a group called the Metabolists, who see society as an organism and are trying to think about Japan's future in terms of a "metabolic balance" in the body politic. The group includes some of the most interesting architects in Japan but by and large, outstanding contemporary architecture consists of single buildings or at most small groups of related buildings. Some of the best is public architecture--prefectural government buildings, cultural centers, museums. Working in precast concrete, the standard material of Japanese construction today, they have done some striking work which shows clearly the influence of traditional, wooden building techniques, as well as some totally new designs exploiting the engineering possibilities unique to concrete. Tange's Olympic buildings, hung on great cables like a suspension bridge, are conspicuous examples. Another group of philosophic architects, Maki Associates, have designed a total new university campus around some quite novel and abstruse theories of group relations.

Of the efforts to improve urban design and planning, however, most have been quite modest and conventional. Sanri new town, outside Osaka, is good by any standards, outstanding by present Japanese standards. Its buildings are attractive; they are varied in scale and type, built around neighborhood shopping and service centers; residential areas are planned for restricted traffic; there is generous provision for parks and open space. For all its quality, however, Senri is no more advanced than most town planning in Europe or the U.S., albeit considerably ahead of other Japanese developments.

Kagawa prefecture in Shikoku, and its capital Takematsu, show the benefits of strong and imaginative planning, led by an unusual Governor. It has a remarkable government office building by Tange; a beautiful cultural center combining traditional elements with a modern concrete structure; a number of other fine modern buildings including (fairly rare in Japan) some outstanding commercial buildings. An ancient and beautiful feudal estate has been converted to public gardens including, among other things, a center for exhibit and sale of local craft work, around which a flourishing craft industry exists. Its public housing and school buildings are of better than average quality (including an urban renewal project mentioned earlier which is an experiment in dual purpose land use). Kagawa has a vigorous program for agricultural diversification, one of Japan's largest shipyards, and a bold plan for a bridge across the Inland Sea, to link it to the economic heart land of Southern Honshu. Kagawa is of considerable interest, in the present Japanese context, as a place where tradition, culture, and modernity have been blended with considerable success, even within fairly stringent limitations of money and power.

* Dai Ichi, a large insurance company prepared to pioneer the new decentralization, built an entirely new head office complex in the green countryside fifty miles from Tokyo, complete with apartments, houses, and a sports club. After two years, they have been able to persuade only half their office staff to make the move, and those who did still yearn for Tokyo; many make the long commute in reverse for evenings and weekends in order to enjoy the delights of the big city.

DEVELOPMENT

DISCUSSION

One can feel considerable admiration for some of the achievements of contemporary architects and planners. Yet a limited sample of the best and most advanced social development in Japan today leaves one feeling that it is the exception, not the rule; that the best talents have relatively little influence on most development. Considering the richness of Japanese traditional culture, the remarkable Japanese aesthetic, the craftsmanship and originality of Japan, the over-all quality of social planning and development is disappointingly ordinary and drab. Tange several years ago conceived an ingenious scheme for building out over Tokyo Bay, with apartment buildings hung horizontally, like bridges, between service towers resting on islands in the Bay. But nothing has come of it and Tange, it is said, never hoped or expected that so novel a scheme would have any influence.

To a Westerner taking a brief look at Japan, and equipped with only a scant knowledge of Japanese society, politics, and culture, all this makes a puzzling picture. On the face of it, Japan looks like a country stoking up a formidable urban problem. The cities are the vital organs of the economic miracle, yet they are suffering from acute neglect. The economy owes some important part of its success to the traditional culture and social system, yet it is rapidly consuming them. The Japanese know this and it troubles them, yet even the sharpest Japanese critics of the system are not optimistic that it will change.

One suspects that the Japanese commitment to economic growth is simply too great for a drastic shift in policy and priorities. The business of Japan, to borrow from Coolidge, is business. Japan is preoccupied to a remarkable degree with its economic achievement and Herman Kahn, with his glowing vision of the future, is its favorite prophet. An island country poor in resources which must trade to live, Japan is understandably but intensely sensitive to its performance in international competition.

Yet one feels that the Japanese commitment to economic goals is not just the dynamic of the consumer society, as Westerners know it. More probably, Japanese history rather than Adam Smith holds the explanation of the Japanese system. An astute Western observer has referred to the "post-feudal elements" in Japanese society and compared "the Japanese employer to the feudal lord, and his employees, the salaried men, to vassals".

The feudal analogy, in fact, crops up repeatedly in speculative discussions about Japanese society, a reminder that feudalism has deep and ancient roots and that only in postwar Japan has the caste and clan structure of Japanese life, with its group loyalties and group ethic, really been challenged. Reciprocal rights and duties still compete with the acquisitive ethic as an economic and social creed. Japanese life still focuses around small group relations (which disappear in a social void in the anomic life of the big cities). It is often asserted that the disciplined work drive of the Japanese, while in part due to the normal individual incentives for reward, still owes a great deal to a nationalist motivation, a mystique about Japan's uniqueness and superiority, and a desire to see Japan excel among nations.

Similarly, the organization of Japanese economic and political life can still be described as a kind of shogunate. The Japanese Establishment (and it is a real group, not just a figure of speech) is a power triumvirate of the great business firms, the powerful ministries, and the governing Liberal Democratic Party. It is characterized by cooperation more than competition, by a common devotion to

DISCUSSION

national rather than narrowly corporate or party goals. This organic coalition sets national priorities, allocates resources, sets export goals, controls the shape and structure of the economy and even the conduct of individual businesses. When a balance of payments deficit was forecast for 1968, it is said, the shoguns of the Establishment got together in an exercise of "administrative guidance", determined the production and price schedules for key industrial firms, and turned the prospective deficit into a billion dollar surplus.*

It is the leaders of this interlocked Establishment, not the urban planners and social philosophers, who make policy and shape Japan's future, and they are dedicated to a national vision of economic growth, rather than to the social and cultural problems growth is causing. Their priorities are reflected in national policy. While achieving the highest capital formation rate of any industrial country, Japan's ratio of social capital to GNP dropped, during the decade 1955-1965 from a ratio of 1.02 to .85. While social needs expanded, their share of a booming economy declined. Like a growth economist's wildest dreams, the Japanese relentlessly plowed back the fruits of expanding industry into more industrial expansion.

Even in the allocation of resources to social infrastructure there is a heavy bias toward projects of direct economic utility--industrial land reclamation, port development, industrial water supply. Housing too often translates narrowly as the economic provision of shelter for workers. Highways are at least as much planned for road haulage as for passenger cars.

It is understandable that an Establishment with so economic an orientation would express such priorities. But there is also every indication that national policy commands public support. Socialist politicians and intellectuals concede that the Liberal Democrats command majority support; few believe it will be seriously challenged over the next few years. There persists in Japan a strong enough national pride and social discipline--call it mystique, vestigial feudalism, or something else--to sustain this remarkable performance. Furthermore, given the pattern of consensus by which the Establishment functions, its critics think any change in public policy will be slow and gradual, moving only as the Establishment consensus moves. The Establishment, they feel, will be late and reluctant in coming to any changes in policy and priorities which threaten the dominant national economic objectives.

Certainly, serious challenge to the existing balance of power and policy is unlikely to come from the older generation. Most of them are still firmly rooted in tradition; progress in postwar Japan has more than kept pace with their expectations; they never had it so good.

If change is to come, it will come from the younger generation. They are the unknown in the contemporary Japanese equation. With the postwar expansion of education, more than a million young Japanese are in the universities, which are suffering from the same unrest and rebellion as American campuses. Millions more have migrated to the cities, less tradition-bound and with higher expectations than their fathers. The effect on them of this new, violently different urban industrial world is yet to be seen.

* The "Japanese system" was succinctly described by Norishige Hasegawa, a leading Japanese businessman, in a recent statement to potential foreign investors. The system requires, he said, "a willingness to accept Government guidance, the honoring of long established labor management practices, and the respecting of agreements among industrial circles". N.Y. Times, May 10, 1969.

Japan

This is a new generation. The war and postwar are history to them. Prosperity, education, enlarged opportunity are the norm. They are the children of the economic boom, the great migration, the social and cultural transformation of Japan, modern, rational, and deracinee.* They are forsaking the kimono, drifting away from tatami domestic life. They are bigger, better fed, more attuned to Western consumer culture. They are the TV and auto generation, the real first fruits of Japan's love affair with modernization.

Few of their elders are confident in predicting performance of their children. The best of the university graduates, it is said, no longer go as a matter of course to the big corporations. They go instead to the professions, teaching, law, science, and the creative arts. Even among those who go to Mitsubishi, there is some doubt that they will be lifelong faithful vassals of the company and servitors of the consensus.

On the other hand, few consider the radical student militants as representative of their generation. Like their American counterparts most Japanese students, while restless and critical, are thought to close ranks with the militants only under attack from the older generation. The Japanese, it is frequently said, are pre-eminently role players. They have great ability to adapt and today's rebellious students are likely to become tomorrow's dark-suited, briefcase equipped businessmen.

Whatever the outcome, change is the order of the day. The most practical imperatives will sacrifice some of Japan's economic growth aspirations to its physical and social needs. Without more and better housing and services, the cities can't go on functioning. Without better highways, traffic will someday congeal into an immovable mass. There are limits to how many hours a day people can commute between home and work.

What is less certain, but worth pondering are the social and cultural consequences of the profound transformation Japan is experiencing. Some part of the miracle of Japan must draw on its unique tradition, its inherited social system. Yet urban industrialization is rapidly consuming not only the physical but the social base on which it is built.

Up to now, even with the heavy emphasis on growth, there has been a sufficiently steady improvement in personal well-being to support the burgeoning consumer ethic and even to compensate for the congestion, discomfort and rootlessness of urban life. For the average worker, wages have gone up with gratifying regularity. For the elite, the expense account (in Japan, the biggest element in middle and upper class income) has been a potent force in cementing loyalty. Even among the best of the restless younger generation, expense account perquisites are a powerful solvent of rebellion.

* As with most things in contemporary Japan, the evidence isn't all so clear. In 1966, an astrologically inauspicious year for births, the birthrate dropped sharply; and birthrates are made by young people. It should also be noted that the familiar ills of urban society--juvenile delinquency, crime, family instability--are not yet serious problems in Japan.

Yet it seems inevitable that a shift of resources from economic to social priorities must come, and when it does, that it will pose some threat to the present balance of accommodation. More spending for social purposes will mean some slowdown in economic growth (and the critically important international trade position that depends on it). With less growth, there will be greater stress and more difficult political issues over the division of benefits among social spending, productive investment, and private consumption.

Maybe the Soka Gakkai (Value Creating Society) and its political expression, the Komeito, are indicative of the kind of stresses in prospect for Japan. The Soka Gakkai, nominally a religious association, expresses a mixture of romantic reaction and petty bourgeois populism. It denounces corruption in business and government, calls for a return to traditional values, is authoritarian in character and vague in its prescriptions. But it has demonstrated a formidable appeal, largely among shopkeepers and artisans and, in the younger generation, among the less educated and less skilled workers who have migrated to the cities. The Komeito, originally discounted as a political force, has grown steadily stronger and could come to exercise a pivotal influence in Japanese politics. There are many who see Soka Gakkai and Komeito as a predictable response of frustrated elements in Japanese society to the disruption and change embodied in modern urban industrial society. They point out that Soka Gakkai offers a highly organized social life for its members, and that this has strong appeal in a traditionally group structured society that has lost much of its old organizational character.

There is plenty of material for speculation about present day Japan and the place to look for the future, I have argued, is in the cities. Japan's economic miracle must, it seems to me, begin to bog down in the familiar problems of urban industrial society. When that happens, when the magic of growth begins to falter, new forces will emerge that are now obscured by the remarkable performance of the economy. Still, a proper respect for the Japanese past makes one cautious about predicting serious trouble in the Japanese future. Adaptation and assimilation of change are not new to the Japanese. They have weathered the impact of two major foreign cultures in the past--the Chinese over a period of centuries and the modern West beginning in the 19th century. They have done more than weather them, they have borrowed, imitated and, in the end, absorbed them into something uniquely and triumphantly Japanese. Even though the evidence, today, is pretty thin, the Japanese may again vindicate their unquestionably remarkable talents in constructing their own version of an urban, industrial society.

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Government Officials in Tokyo, Takematsu, Kurashiki, Kyoto, Matsue.

Students at Kyoto University and Okayama University.

Professor Hidetoshi Kato, Kyoto University.

Hakaru Itami, Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Company.

Kiyoshi Murayama, Director Kagawa Prefectural Library.

Mr. Martin Cohen, writer on urban affairs, Tokyo.

Koichi Nagashima, architect, Maki and Associates.

Governor Kaneko, Kagawa Prefecture.

Governor Minobe, Tokyo Metropolitan Government.

U.S. Embassy: Richard Ericson, Political Counsellor

Walter Nichols, Cultural Attache

Peter Seip, Economic Counsellor

American Cultural Center, Kyoto: Sidney Hamolsky, Director

I. Kamagai

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