

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

716

70

R

THE SENIOR SEMINAR IN FOREIGN POLICY

ELEVENTH SESSION

1968 - 1969

UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS
(UNFICYP)

A Case Study

by

Charles R. Sniffin
Col. U.S. Army

April 1969

DECLASSIFIED

Exempted from Automatic Decontrol

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR

Date

18/22/92

☒ RELEASE ☐ DECLASSIFY

☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY

☐ DENY ☐ IN PART

☐ DELETE Non-Responsive info

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

MR Cases Only:

EO Citations

TS authority to.

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C OADR

☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C OADR

pp. 16 + 20 not available

03712201030

03712201030

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Summary	1
Introduction	2
Cyprus in Brief	3
Background Summary	7
Examination of UNFICYP	12
Future Role - UNFICYP	28
Conclusions	29
Enclosure	30
Footnotes	32
Bibliography	34

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

United Nations Peace-keeping
Force in Cyprus

SUMMARY

This study investigates the role of the United Nations in Cyprus. As matters of essential background, the study briefly examines the island of Cyprus and the historical highlights incident to the Cyprus dispute. It then examines in some detail the United Nations Force (UNFICYP), with attention to such important subjects, as: the mission, force composition, personnel considerations, operations, supply and logistics, medical support, economics role and the financial aspects. Finally, the study addresses the future role of UNFICYP, and reaches certain conclusions regarding the United Nations in Cyprus and possible peace-keeping operations which may be undertaken by the UN in the future.

DECLASSIFIED

Exempted from Automatic Decontrol

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

03712201030

03712201030

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INTRODUCTION

The idea of doing a study of the United Nations' Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) developed from a basic interest in the role of the United Nations (UN) in peace-keeping. Cyprus truly presents an excellent illustration of both peace-keeping and peacemaking. Since the latter part of 1963, the world has witnessed innumerable negotiations to prevent a Greco-Turkish confrontation from erupting over Cyprus as well as persistent diplomatic efforts which were undertaken with the objectives of keeping the peace and reaching a solution to the problem.

The energies dissipated over the Cyprus dispute have probably lessened, at least temporarily, the strength of the West in the troubled area but, of course, fall short of the dire consequences which would result from a Greco-Turkish conflict or from major and sustained violence on the island.

That UNFICYP has been reasonably successful in its complex task, is evidenced by the absence of armed conflict in Cyprus today. In perspective, this is not to say that the UN Force alone brought about this accomplishment, as many other important factors have been present in the peace-keeping formula. These include the role of the UN; the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus; the influence of the Governments of Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States; and the efforts of the Cypriots themselves.

In order to launch this study of the UN peace-keeping effort, this document includes certain minimum background information concerning the country itself and related to the causes and history of the Cyprus dilemma.

03712201030

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

The population of the republic is about 631,000 thousand of which 78% are Greek, 18% Turk and the remaining 4% is made up of various minorities. The principal cities of the island are: Nicosia, largest town and the capital, with a population of 107,000 thousand; Limassol 49,000; Famagusta 40,000; and Larnaca with a population of 21,000. Other important towns of lesser size are Paphos and Kyrenia. See Figure No. 2.

The economy of Cyprus is essentially agricultural. Two-thirds of the island's surface is covered with arable land and about 40% of the active population is engaged in agriculture. Citrus, potatoes, cereals, grapes and olives are cultivated and exported. Food exports in 1967 were valued at about thirty-four million dollars, an increase of more than double the 1960 figure. 4/

Cyprus has no heavy industry but rather a score of small industries, e.g., cement and plaster plants, distilleries, breweries, cigarette factories, a cotton and rayon cloth industry, plus numerous family enterprises of handicraft. 5/

Cyprus has some underground resources and exports copper concentrates, copper and iron pyrites, asbestos, chromium, amber and gypsum, for a total value in 1967 of approximately twenty-one million dollars. 6/

Finally, it is most unfortunate that this beautiful island country with such industrious people should be the scene of so much disorder and turmoil.

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CYPRUS IN BRIEF

This lovely island can be explained as timeless, yet timely; "timeless" as it is steeped in history and natural beauty, and "timely" due to its present role on the complex international scene.

Cyprus is the most easterly of the Mediterranean islands and after Sicily and Sardinia is the third largest in area. At the nearest coastal point, it is approximately 44 miles from Turkey, 64 miles from Syria, 250 miles from the Nile Delta and 500 miles from the Greek mainland.

Cyprus has an area of 3,572 square miles, the greatest length from east to west is 150 miles and from north to south, 60 miles. The coastal perimeter measures some 486 miles. 1/

The principal topographic features of Cyprus are two mountain ranges, one in the north and one in the southwest, and a broad fertile plain, known as Messaoria, which separates the mountainous areas. In the north the Kyrenia Range forms a narrow belt running practically the whole length of the coast. The northern range reaches a maximum height of over 3,000 feet. 2/ The mountains lose height as they extend eastward along the narrow peninsula known as the Karpus or Panhandle because of its shape. The mountains in the southwest, known as the Troodos Mountains, are larger in area and higher than the northern range; they occupy nearly half the total area of the island. The highest peak is Mount Olympus which reaches 6,403 feet above sea level. 3/ See Figure No. 1.

The coastline of Cyprus is varied and picturesque, and for the most part, dented and rocky, but interspersed by long beaches.


Cyprus enjoys what must be an almost perfect climate. The summer is hot but there is little humidity. The mean temperature is about 60 degrees (F) in winter and 90 degrees (F) in summer.

In winter you can enjoy warm days on the beaches yet only ten miles from the coast on the Troodos Mountains skiers enjoy their sport in several feet of snow. The rain falls chiefly between October and March.

0371220.030

0371220.030

CYPRUS



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Figure No. 1

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-4-

031712001030

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

BACKGROUND SUMMARY

The dispute over Cyprus has deep roots. It is linked to rivalry between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot factions and also between the two national governments having traditional interest in the affairs of the island - Greece and Turkey. Key issues have included enosis, i.e., the union of Cyprus with Greece, the local autonomy of the Turkish Cypriot community or minority and the Turkish desire to avoid a neutral or "nonaligned" Cyprus on its Southern flank which might fall under the influence of the Soviet Union.

Greek-Turkish rivalries are nothing new. In fact, Greece won its independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 1820's, and has since that time pursued the goal of enosis for areas adjacent or near to Greece where most of the population is Greek speaking. The Greek Cypriots have traditionally supported this goal. 7/ On the other hand, the Turks have seen their nation significantly reduced in size since the "high water mark" of the Ottoman Empire, and refuse to accept the concept of union of Cyprus with Greece.

Accordingly, when Great Britain acquired Cyprus from the Turks in 1878 the movement toward enosis was already well established. 8/ As already pointed out, the population of Cyprus today is primarily Greek Cypriot. Thus, ethnically and linguistically, there is significant basis of support for enosis. This issue was pressed by the Greek Cypriots with the Ottoman Turks and later with the British with no success. In fact, it has contributed to Turkish mistrust of Greek Cypriot motives and vice versa.

Events following the end of World War II prompted the desire for enosis and, subsequently, the Greek Cypriots under the leadership of General George Grivas, rebelled against the British. The EOKA movement (1955-59) furthered difficulties between the two major ethnic factions and also between the two "Mother Countries." 9/ Integrated living in Cyprus ended and the Turk and Greek Cypriots moved into segregated areas of their towns and villages; likewise, education became segregated and the influence of mainland nationalism increased. This rebellion was concluded in 1959.



The signing of the London-Zurich Agreements provided for an independent Republic of Cyprus, effective in August 1960. Signatories to these agreements included Greece, Turkey, Great Britain and the representatives of the two Cypriot communities. The documents, while providing for independence, did impose certain restrictions on the Cypriots, e.g., provision was made for two major British "Sovereign Bases", certain guarantees were imposed pertaining to the rights and privileges of the two Cypriot factions which, by their nature, dictated how many aspects of government that are usually considered to be "internal affairs" would be operated and staffed, and resulted in a basic structure for the government of the Republic that was inflexible. Thus, freedom of action by the Cypriot Government was, by design, restricted. 10/

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Figure No. 2

CYPRUS




LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

0317000030

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-9-



75161 12-68

Figure No. 3

0317000030

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

By the fall of 1963 this Constitution had proved basically unworkable, and by its nature caused the two communities to work against each other. 11/ This situation is considered by certain authorities as directly contributing to the strife which commenced in 1963. It has been said that independence made Cyprus a state but not a Nation. Mistrust and nationalism prevailed.

The problem was compounded by President Makarios in November 1963, when he submitted a thirteen-point proposal for amendments to the Constitution. This action was rejected by the Vice-President, Dr. Kuchuk, a Turkish Cypriot, and also by the Turkish Government as they viewed the proposed changes as another attempt to bring Cyprus under the rule of the majority, i.e., the Greek Cypriots. 12/

Disputes continued, and, in December 1963, fighting started. The government split into its two ethnic components, and many of the Turkish Cypriots moved into enclaves which still exist and which are defended today by Turkish Cypriot fighters. Thus, about 50 percent of the Turkish Cypriot population resides in a very small percentage of the island's area. See Figure No. 3.

With the outbreak of violence in December 1963, it became evident that efforts from external sources would be required if peace was to be returned to the island. This was compounded by threats by Turkey to intervene as authorized in the 1959 Agreements-implementing its role as a guarantor of Cypriot independence and constitutional integrity under the Treaty of Guarantee; thus insuring the rights and protection of the Turkish Cypriot community. 13/ The British fielded a peace-keeping force from their sovereign bases on the island. This force faced much difficulty in its efforts to stop the fighting and restore order. The 7,000 man British garrison was augmented by additional troops from England and Libya, totaling about 1100 reinforcements. The British, operating under the concept of a so-called "tripartite force" of Greek, Turkish and British soldiers, failed to restore peace and order. This was compounded by the memories of the British-Cypriot military conflict during the days of the EOKA movement and by claims of each of the Cypriot factions that the British were aiding or supporting the other ethnic element. 14/

The British position steadily eroded, resulting in their proposal that a multinational force consisting of units from NATO countries take on the peace-keeping task. The United States supported the British in this proposal, and the concept became known as the Anglo-American plan. The position of the Makarios Government, however, was that any such force would have to be provided through the "good offices" of the United Nations. As weeks passed the Makarios Government resisted the NATO-force concept, apparently feeling the interest of the Cypriots would become secondary to concern within NATO circles for preservation of unity of the alliance. 15/ The British, anxious to lessen the burden they had upon their shoulders, turned to the UN for a solution. In February, 1964, they requested that the Cyprus problem be considered by the Security Council. Subsequently, when the issue was addressed by the Security Council, the British were prompt to recommend immediate and priority attention to the restoration of peace in Cyprus. 16/ Following much political maneuvering, the UN did, in early March, 1964, authorize the creation of a force, responsive to the Secretary-General as the Security Council's executive agent. 17/ See the Enclosure hereto.

03712201030

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Though sizeable forces do remain in Cyprus, the situation has progressively improved. The following UN information concerning shooting incidents initiated by indigenous sources is indicative of this trend:

Summary of shooting incidents 18/

UNFICYP Zone or District	8 Jun 68 to 2 Dec 68	8 Mar 68 to 7 Jun 68	7 Dec 67 to 7 Mar 68	7 Jun 67 to 6 Dec 67	6 Dec 66 to 6 Jun 67
Nicosia West District	7	2	1	26	39
Nicosia East District	9	4	7	11	11
Famagusta Zone	1	3	5	25	31
Limassol Zone	4	1	6	41	8
Lefka District	11	8	23	100	88
Kyrenia District	33	21	25	81	169
TOTAL	65	39	67	284	346

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Before examining the UN Force, it would be desirable to consider briefly, and in general terms, the other forces which may be on the island today. A summary of these non-UN forces presents some impressive figures; they become even more so when the passions incident to the troubled situation are acknowledged. Rough estimates are:

Greek Cypriot/Greek National

National Guard	7,800	<u>1/</u>
Mainland Treaty Contingent	950	
CYPOL	<u>2,500</u>	
	11,250	<u>2/</u>

Turkish Cypriot/Turkish National

Fighter Force	8,900	<u>3/ 4/</u>
Mainland Treaty Contingent	650	
CYPOL	<u>600</u>	
	10,150	

Notes:

- 1/ Plus some illegal leaders (Officer and NCO) who are believed to be Greek National Army members.
- 2/ Plus NG trained reservists, possibly totaling as many as 30,000 personnel.
- 3/ Plus limited numbers of illegal leaders (mainly officers) who are believed to be Turkish National Army members.
- 4/ Started as an "underground force" after independence; all able bodied male Turk Cypriots between ages 16-60 are considered available as "Fighters". About one-half of the figure shown are estimated as possibly under arms, with the other half available as part-time participants.

While the above figures of active military participants appear to be reasonably close for the two factions, it should be remembered that Cyprus is only about forty miles off Turkey's Southern coast and within easy reaction time of Turkish forces. Further, the Turkish Air Force is only minutes away when its air strike capability is taken into consideration. Additionally, in gross numbers, the Turkish Armed Forces are significantly larger than the forces of "Mother Greece."

03:11:28.1030

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

The UN resolution was not wholeheartedly supported by all members of the Security Council. Of the permanent members, the Soviet Union was displeased with the dispatch of foreign troops, even those serving under the flag of the UN, to Cyprus. Though France and the USSR, both permanent members of the Council, abstained from the preliminary vote requested by the Secretary-General on paragraph 4 of the resolution, all members of the Security Council finally did vote in favor of the entire document. 21/ See Enclosure hereto.

The next big step was to identify those nations which would agree to furnish units and other support and which were acceptable to the several parties involved (the guarantor powers, plus Cyprus). Nations approached were not always immediately ready to agree to participate. For example, Sweden wanted not to be the only neutral nation involved and other nations sought certain clarifications, such as, those regarding financing, composition of the Force, and the duration of the undertaking. 22/ As finally resolved, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Canada, Great Britain, Austria and Ireland agreed to participate. Britain agreed to contribute the largest contingent while Austria made available the smallest military group.

The planned size of UNFICYP was about 7,000, however, for various reasons it never reached that goal. 23/ (See Figure No. 4 for illustrative composition and strengths). As recently as last summer the Force totaled about 4,500 men, however, the current strength, including the small UN Civil Police representation (UNCIVPOL) is about 3,700 personnel. The reduction from the 4500 figure resulted from a decision of the Secretary-General, with the knowledge of the Security Council, to effect a twenty-five percent reduction in strength largely as national contingents were replaced by new units of less strength. Current strengths are essentially the same as those which were reported by the Secretary-General, as of December 2, 1968, that is:

<u>Military</u>		<u>Total</u>
Austria	- HQ UNFICYP	1
	- Field Hospital	54
Canada	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	63
	- Battalion	466
	- Contingent HQ	66
Denmark	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	25
	- Battalion	446
Finland	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	18
	- Battalion	462
Ireland	- HQ UNFICYP and Military police	13
	- Battalion	405
Sweden	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	14
	- Battalion	410
United Kingdom	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	158
	- Battalion and Reconnaissance Squadron	728
	- UNFICYP logistic support units	164
	- Helicopter support	40
		<u>1,090</u>

Total Military Personnel 3,533

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

EXAMINATION OF UNFICYP

The Mission.

When examining the Force (UNFICYP) it is important initially to consider its basic mission in Cyprus. It is stated simply as:

TASK-UNFICYP 19/

- a. To prevent a recurrence of fighting.
- b. To contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order.
- c. To contribute to a return to normal conditions.

Thus, the military role is one of the peace-keeping, which in turn, is linked to the broader goal of peacemaking. If prolonged peace-making fails to reach a timely settlement and incidents do occur, it is not realistic to accuse the peace-keepers as this function cannot last indefinitely without difficulties arising; and there have been numerous examples in Cyprus of temporary failures to keep the peace. While there has been much impatience expressed along the path to ultimate settlement of the Cyprus problem, the unusual difficulties in 1964 and 1967 on that troubled island have demonstrated that without a UN presence there could have been much more serious consequences - including a regional confrontation between the two members of NATO, Greece and Turkey. Operationally as well as politically peace-keeping in Cyprus has been expensive, but probably has been worth it. More and more the Cypriots appear to realize that little or nothing can be accomplished by violence. Thus, while peacemaking efforts continue at the political level, special strain is placed on the UN Force to preclude incidents which could jeopardize or mar the present situation.

Composition - Past and Present.

The Security Council resolution which authorized the establishment of UNFICYP gave the Secretary-General responsibility incident to the composition and size of the Force, to be accomplished in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. He was also authorized to appoint the Force Commander. Participation in the Force was to be voluntary by UN member Governments electing to offer a military contingent or other support. Financial support of the operation was left up to the participating member nations and the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General was also authorized to accept voluntary contributions for this purpose. It was originally agreed that the Force would have a mandate of three months duration. 20/ It is history that the Force's existence repeatedly has been extended and is currently under a six month extension which expires mid-June, 1969.

031712201030

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Civilian Police

Total

Australia	50
Austria	45
Denmark	40
Sweden	<u>40</u>

Total Civilian Police 175

TOTAL UNFICYP 24/ 3,708

As previously indicated, the Force has been reduced in strength as the situation has improved. With the exception of the Austrian Field Hospital and the Force Reserve (British) the national contingents now consist of reduced size infantry battalions of slightly more than four hundred men each. These economies have been realized by various methods, including the elimination of certain units or sub-units and by reductions in the size of staffs. The UNFICYP contingents have managed these reductions in force largely as an internal matter, consistent with broad guidelines provided by the Force Commander.

Personnel Considerations.

The normal tour of service in UNFICYP is six months, however, this is a very general statement of policy as there are numerous exceptions found within the Force Headquarters as well as within the national contingents. Exceptions range from those affecting "key personnel" who often are expected to serve for a tour which more closely approximates a year to individual members of some contingents who may volunteer to stay for periods longer than the normal tour. As the Force Headquarters is reduced in size, some staff positions are declared "redundant" at which point the individual might be released ahead of the expiration of his commitment.

With the exceptions of certain individuals and the organizational equipment which would remain in Cyprus to be used by the replacement unit, contingents normally rotate as an entity. A typical annual rotation plan for UNFICYP is illustrated as follows:

UNITED NATIONS FORCE COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH - UNFICYP 1/

CONTINGENT:	30/4/64	8/6/64	12/12/64	10/6/65	1/12/65	7/6/66	5/12/66	7/6/67	7/12/67	7/6/68	4/12/68
<u>MILITARY:</u>											
AUSTRIA:	10	55	48	47	52	52	49	51	54	54	55
CANADA:	1,087	1,122	1,146	1,149	994	992	876	880	879	888	595
DENMARK:	NIL	676	996	1,008	1,016	659	673	645	657	638	471
FINLAND:	1,000	1,000	962	926	987	652	608	607	607	578	480
INDIA:	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	2	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
IRELAND:	636	639	1,060	1,061	524	522	520	523	525	524	418
SWEDEN:	889	954	844	964	953	757	618	616	614	618	424
UNITED KINGDOM:	2,719	1,792	1,049	1,016	1,063	1,053	1,092	1,127	1,227	1,154	1,090
TOTAL:	6,341	6,238	6,105	6,171	5,591	4,687	4,436	4,449	4,563	4,454	3,533
<u>POLICE:</u>											
AUSTRALIA:	NIL	40	40	42	40	40	40	39	49	50	50
AUSTRIA:	28	33	34	34	34	34	34	35	45	45	45
DENMARK:	NIL	40	40	40	41	40	40	39	40	40	40
NEW ZEALAND:	NIL	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	NIL	NIL	NIL
SWEDEN:	NIL	40	40	39	40	40	40	40	40	40	40
	28	173	174	175	175	174	174	173	174	175	175
GRAND TOTAL:	6,369	6,411	6,279	6,346	5,766	4,861	4,610	4,622	4,737	4,629	3,708

1/ United Nations, Security Council, Document Nos. S/5679, S/5764, S/6102, S/6426, S/7001, S/7350, S/7611, S/7969, S/8286 S/8622 and S/8914, respectively.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-14-

Figure No. 4

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

03115507030

0371201030

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

In all cases except the British, UNFICYP personnel receive various special allowances, bonus payments, or national tax benefits incident to their service in Cyprus. The British receive their normal overseas allowance only. The amounts paid are in the "sensitive" category of information as they are each based on arrangements for reimbursement which were accomplished between the UN and the national governments concerned. In general, the amounts paid are considerably above that which the officer or soldier would receive while serving in his home country, and are usually justified as necessary incentives to compete with wages offered by the civilian labor markets of these affluent nations. To date, this has been within the price tag the UN has agreed to pay in order to field and sustain the Force.

Operations.

The current organization and deployments of the United Nations Force in Cyprus are shown on Figures No. 5 and 6. In brief, the force is now deployed as follows: 26/

HQ UNFICYP, including HQ UNCIVPOL

Combined Staff

Nicosia West District

Danish Contingent
Danish Civilian Police
Austrian Civilian Police

Nicosia East District

Finnish Contingent
Austrian Civilian Police

Famagusta Zone

Swedish Contingent
Swedish Civilian Police

Limassol Zone

British Contingent
Australian Civilian Police

Lefka District

Irish Contingent
Australian Civilian Police
Austrian Civilian Police


Kyrenia District

Canadian Contingent
Danish Civilian Police

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Figure No. 5



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

031712041030

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-19-





Figure No. 6

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Figure No. 7



* FD Hospital is Austrian.
Other Supporting Units are British.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

037125001000

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

The Secretary-General in an aide-memoire prepared early in the existence of the Force, clarified the command relationships with the organization, i.e., the chain of command was to be from the Secretary-General (acting for the Security Council) to the Force Commander. National contingents, as integral elements of the Force, would take their orders from its commander. While this command arrangement has not been put to the "acid test", i.e., under conditions of major and sustained combat, it does appear to function smoothly and no major command and control problems have been identified during the process of this study. As to their manner of performance, personnel were instructed to act with full impartiality and avoid public expressions concerning the political problems within Cyprus. UNFICYP was permitted to use armed force only in self-defense and as otherwise provided in the aide-memoire when peaceful persuasion failed to accomplish its peace-keeping objectives. 28/

In particular, this latter point from the aide-memoire limits the use of military measures by UNFICYP and is, in part, a basis for criticism concerning the real need for such an organized military formation vs a UN military observer mission of lesser size. There is little doubt that if either party to a confrontation deliberately provoked a conflict the UN Force could do little to prevent it. However, the psychological impact of the presence of armed UN personnel or units positioned between the two forces does play an important role in discouraging or lessening the degree of confrontation, and if possible, in preventing the strife from actually breaking out. The actions by UN leaders at the scene, to observe, report and to arbitrate or negotiate have made a significant contribution to the termination of situations of varying scope.

Supply and Logistics.

Supply and logistic support for the Force is fairly simple to accomplish when compared with other UN operations, e.g., the Congo, in which the UN had to establish a support structure in addition to the peace-keeping operational requirements. Due to the presence of the British Sovereign Bases and the stores of supplies the British had placed there, the UK was able and did agree to become the UN's "quartermaster" for UNFICYP. As a result, the UN looks to the British to handle the majority of the supply effort, especially for such high tonnage consumable supply items as food, POL and other items which are in constant demand. The British, in turn, bill the UN on a monthly basis for support furnished, less that provided to the British Contingent. UNFICYP requirements handled annually under this procedure amount to about three million US dollar equivalents, at the present strength of the force. 29/ Additionally, some supplies are furnished from out-of-country sources by the respective national governments. In the main, these items are brought to Cyprus by either national air flights to Nicosia International Airport or by ship to the port at Famagusta. The Irish and Finnish units are said to rely the least upon such support from national sources. As might be expected, the UN Headquarters in New York is pleased with the ease with which this otherwise potentially troublesome aspect of the operation has functioned. The following information illustrates the general sources of supply for certain selected items:

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Sources of
UNFICYP LOGISTIC SUPPORT 30/

Item	National Contingent	British	UN
Weapons	X		
Vehicles	X	X	X
Rations		X	
Radios & Communications Equipment	X	X	X
Tentage	X	X	
POL		X	
Clothing	X		X
Furniture		X	X
Refrigerator	X	X	X
Defense Stores		X	
Civil Labor		X	X

The miscellaneous separate logistic support units of UNFICYP are, with one exception, British and accordingly are included within the total strength of that nation's contingent. The exception is the Austrian Field Hospital.

Some UN furnished supplies are provided from the UN regional depot in Pisa, Italy. The UN furnishes the Force membership with distinctive UN caps and berets, flags and insignia through its supply system. Likewise, all local expenditures in Cyprus incident to support of the Force are controlled by the UNFICYP Chief Administrative Officer under a "Field Allotment" procedure. He must justify these expenditures to the fiscal authorities at UN Headquarters in accordance with established procedures. At present, this in-country UN "field allotment" is just under one million dollars annually.

Medical Support.

In addition to limited medical support organic to the national contingents, the small Austrian Contingent operates a centrally located, brigade-level field hospital. This establishment provides out-patient, in-patient, dental, surgical and laboratory care for the civilian and military members of UNFICYP. Though situated in buildings, its essential equipment is air transportable, including the X-ray apparatus. Accordingly, a surgical team can become operational anywhere on the island within a maximum of two hours. Through local arrangements, supplemental medical

03:45:00

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

support can be provided UNFICYP at the medical installations located on the British Sovereign Bases; this supplement has produced excellent results when called upon. During the course of its existence, this small UN hospital has assisted in local Cypriot emergencies resulting from such events as automobile accidents and, in at least one case, from a major commercial air disaster.

Economics Role.

Before the troubles of 1963, the Turk Cypriots were scattered throughout the island, mixed among the Greek Cypriots in integrated communities. Both factions were making a significant contribution to the national economy. When the troubles started, the Turk Cypriots progressively left their jobs, families abandoned their homes and properties and took refuge in predominantly Turk Cypriot villages or in the enclaves situated in the Kyrenia District and elsewhere. In some cases, they took over Greek Cypriot owned lands and properties. These events brought the economy almost to a standstill. The Cypriot Government countered by blocking the enclaves and forbidding the entry of materials which might have a strategic value. Soon after however, these restrictions were extended to other commodities; even essential services such as water and electricity were cut-off and the delivery of mail was interrupted.

To bring a remedy to this situation, UNFICYP organized an economics section in the headquarters and appointed an economics officer in each district. Initially, the economics section concentrated its efforts on relief operations and organized the supply of food, water, fuel and medical products. Prevention of disease, including animal diseases, and the treatment of the sick were also undertaken. Gradually, the Cypriot Government lifted its restrictions and, today, relief operations are no longer necessary. The efforts of this area of activity are now utilized to assist as much as possible, to bring the economic life on the island back to normal. The role of the economics officer is to create a climate of confidence whereupon enterprises will resume their activities. ^{31/} The economics effort by UNFICYP has scored some success and, in part, with this assistance the economy in Cyprus is improving constantly. It is doubtful, however, that the Turkish Cypriots are yet playing their proportionate role in the development of the country, and, accordingly there is much room for their reintegration into the national economy as conditions return to normal.

Law and Order - UNCIVPOL.

The UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) function and personnel strengths have already been addressed in this report. This small group provides UNFICYP valuable assistance by performing duties that are more in line with normal police work than with military functions. In this connection, members of UNCIVPOL are professional civil policemen on voluntary UN service from their respective national police establishments. As indicated earlier, four Member States now provide UNCIVPOL personnel. Additionally, New Zealand participated in 1964-67 but was forced to withdraw its unit due to requirements in that country.

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNCIVPOL maintains liaison with the Cyprus Police and the Turkish Cypriot police elements throughout the island and assists in the investigation of any incident, offense or crime of an inter-communal nature. Recently, there has been a marked increase in the number of requests for assistance, both from the Cyprus Police and the Turkish Cypriot police elements, and it is reported that UNCIVPOL's efforts in this regard have been largely successful. UNCIVPOL's duties also include the carrying out of some joint patrols with the Cyprus Police, the maintenance of UNCIVPOL posts in sensitive areas, regular patrols to certain villages, observation at Nicosia Airport when Turkish Cypriots travel to or from Turkey, the daily marshalling and escort of the Kyrenia Road convoys, observation on the Kyrenia Road and traffic control in certain Turkish Cypriot villages incident to convoy movements, and investigations concerning the whereabouts of missing persons. Additionally, UNCIVPOL has helped to combat the illegal excavation of antiquities, which has become quite extensive in Turkish Cypriot areas outside of the Government's control. 32/

It is logical to conclude that UNCIVPOL will play a role in Cyprus as long as there is a UN presence on the island.

Financial Aspects.

The costs borne by the United Nations for the operation of UNFICYP for the fifty-seven-month period from its inception on 27 March 1964 to 15 December 1968 were estimated in a recent report of the Secretary-General (as of 2 December 1968) at \$95,835,000. This total did not include an estimate of \$590,000 which would be required for the final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs.

As of 2 December 1968, payments and pledges of voluntary contributions received from forty-seven Member States and four non-member Governments to cover these costs totalled the equivalent of \$87,259,026. To the above amount may be added \$486,000 which had been received as of 30 October 1968 from interest earned on investment of temporarily surplus funds, public contributions, gains on exchange and other miscellaneous income. 33/

Accordingly, unless additional pledges were received, it was estimated that the deficit on 15 December 1968 would be in the amount of approximately \$8,090,000.

It was estimated in the same report that the six month extension of the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1968, including the already mentioned amount of \$590,000 as the costs incident to deactivation, assuming continuance of reimbursement commitments, would cost the Organization as follows:

0371291030

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNFICYP cost estimates by major categories of expense 34/
(in thousands of US dollars)

I. Operating costs incurred by the United Nations

Movement of contingents	655
Operational expenses	776
Rental of premises	88
Rations	415
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	658
Miscellaneous and contingencies	<u>108</u>
Total Part I -	2,700

II. Reimbursement of extra costs to Governments providing contingencies

Pay and allowances	4,850
Contingent-owned equipment	500
Death and disability awards	<u>100</u>
Total Part II -	5,450
Grand Total: Parts I and II -	<u>8,150</u>

These estimates did not reflect the full cost of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States since they excluded certain other costs which Members providing contingents or police units to the Force agreed to absorb at their own expense rather than to seek reimbursement from the United Nations. Based on reports received from certain of the Governments providing contingents or civil police units to the Force, the estimated amounts of such extra costs which they would initially agree to absorb at their own expense in the event the mandate of UNFICYP were extended (until mid-June, 1969) and the Governments concerned agreed to continue the present financial arrangements were as follows:

Australia	\$186,150
Austria	110,337
Canada <u>1/</u>	638,770
Denmark	260,000
Ireland	382,000

The United Kingdom agreed to absorb at its own expense the sum of \$300,000 for a three-month period. Finland and Sweden are also absorbing certain UNFICYP costs at their own expense incident to the continuation of their contingents in Cyprus. 35/

1/ Exclusive of the cost of normal pay and allowances.

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for a period of six months after 15 December 1968 and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to 15 December 1968, the report provided that it will be necessary for the Secretary-General to receive pledges totalling \$16,240,000. 36/

Accordingly the UN Secretariat has, due to shortages of funds, paid reimbursements to Governments providing contingents to UNFICYP for their extra-costs in respect to pay and allowances, depreciation of contingent-owned equipment and supplies or death and disability awards through 31 December 1967, only. This remains a delicate issue with certain participating nations as they have relatively limited national resources to devote to this undertaking and, therefore, aspire to prompt reimbursement when their claims are submitted to the UN in accordance with agreed procedures. 37/

Of the total cost to the United Nations, the US is pledged to meet forty percent. The US Government makes its payments as other Governments also meet their commitments, thus preserving a running 40/60 ratio of monetary support for the operation. As of March, 1969, the US had contributed about \$33.1 million of the approximately \$78.4 million which had been received by the Organization from supporting nations. 38/ There are two deficits, i.e., "paper" and "real", with the "real" one being larger as it also must include the difference between pledges and actual amounts paid.

Thus, over the roughly five years of its existence UNFICYP has, on an average, cost the UN about \$20 million a year, of which the United States provides forty percent. To this must be added the lesser costs borne by the several nations without reimbursement.

The voluntary financing of the operation is considered as essentially wrong. Some type of an assessment or levy of UN Member States is needed. Nevertheless, proponents of UNFICYP are quick to point out that the Governments involved should not be swayed by the financial aspects as such payments are viewed to be "premiums on the insurance" (of peace).

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

0371201030

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FUTURE ROLE-UNFICYP

The presence of this UN Force in its impartial and non-political capacity has played a significant role in maintaining the peace and restoring conditions which may be described as closer to normal. The situation has cooled down to the point that high level political talks are currently being conducted by the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. These talks may lead to at least a partial or solution in principle type settlement. All interested parties appear to aspire to an early solution to this complex situation. The key issue remains that of an acceptable formula of local autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots. Once this problem area is resolved, lesser issues may reach early resolution.

Little support now exists for a further reduction in the size of UNFICYP. Once the major political issues are settled, at least "in principle", and progress is made toward normalizing the situation on the island, pressures will again increase for a major reduction in the UN presence. This could be accomplished by: eliminating a national contingent, through further reductions in all contingents now present, or by a combination of these methods. A reduction in the strength of existing units by another fifteen to twenty-five percent would result in something less than "demi-battalions", with a related impact upon operational responsiveness and efficiency.

A more drastic measure, situation permitting, would be the elimination of UNFICYP as an operational military organization combined with the activation of a much smaller UN international observer and civilian police structure. This decision could be the next or a subsequent action of the Secretary-General, based on appropriate recommendations from the Force Commander and with the approval of the Security Council.

Any of these actions would reduce the UN presence and would lessen the financial burdens of the Organization and the participating Member-States. It remains to be seen how the authorities involved will decide upon these important matters. It suffices to add that any such decisions must be timely and with the goal of leaving Cyprus when the situation realistically permits, not before.

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CONCLUSIONS

1. The UN Force in Cyprus has played an important role as a peace-keeper. It is an expensive undertaking, but one for which there was no other logical and acceptable alternative.
2. While UNFICYP must remain for the present, the UN should reduce its force structure in Cyprus to a Military Observer/UNCIVPOL formation as soon as feasible, and withdraw completely when the situation realistically permits.
3. In the interim, UNFICYP can be profitably utilized in pacification, and particularly by efforts at the local and Force levels to bring about increased deconfrontation in sensitive areas within the island.
4. Due to its unique role in World affairs, the United States should avoid the actual commitment of forces in such operations. Proportionate financial and material support of UN peace-keeping operations by the US is appropriate.
5. Many lessons have been learned from UNFICYP. While these may not be the "blue print" for possible UN peace-keeping operations in the future, they will certainly strongly influence related decisions.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

03:17:23:10:30

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Enclosure

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

AT ITS 1102nd MEETING OF 4 MARCH 1964

(Doc. No. S/5575)

The Security Council,

Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution,

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960,

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations",

1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace;

2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;

4. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The commander of the force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation;

5. Recommends that the function of the force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;

6. Recommends that the stationing of the force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose;

7. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a mediator, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

03:41:29.1030

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FOOTNOTES

- 1/ Republic of Cyprus, Public Information Office, Cyprus in Brief, March 1968, Pg. 3
- 2/ Ibid, Pg. 3.
- 3/ Ibid, pg. 4
- 4/ Ibid, pg. 9
- 5/ Ibid, pg. 8
- 6/ Ibid, pg. 9
- 7/ James A. Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus, Ohio State University Press, 1968, p. 17.
- 8/ Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, Inc., The Cyprus Dilemma - Options for Peace, 1967, p. 8.
- 9/ Stegenga, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
- 10/ Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, Inc., Op. Cit., pp 7-14.
- 11/ Stegenga, op. cit., pp. 24-26.
- 12/ Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, Inc., op. cit., p. 42.
- 13/ Ibid., p. 43.
- 14/ Stegenga, op. cit., pp. 35-40.
- 15/ Ibid., pp. 41-43.
- 16/ Ibid., pp. 48-50.
- 17/ United Nations, Security Council, Document S/5575, March 4, 1964, pp. 1-2.
- 18/ United Nations, Security Council, Document S/8914, December 4, 1968, p. 12.
- 19/ United Nations, Security Council, Document S/5575, March 4, 1964, para 5.
- 20/ Ibid., pp 1-2.
- 21/ Stegenga, op. cit., p. 70.
- 22/ Ibid., pp. 72-80.
- 23/ Ibid., p. 81.
- 24/ United Nations, Security Council, Document No. S/8914, December 4, 1968, p. 4.
- 25/ UNFICYP, Personnel Staff Briefing, Nicosia, March 1969.
- 26/ United Nations, Document No. S/8914, op. cit., p. 6.
- 27/ Ibid., p. 6-7.

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FOOTNOTES (continued)

- 28/ United Nations, Security Council, Document S/5653, April 11, 1964, pp. 1-5.
- 29/ UNFICYP, Logistics Staff Briefing, Nicosia, March, 1969.
- 30/ Ibid.
- 31/ UNFICYP, Economics Staff Briefing, Nicosia, March, 1969.
- 32/ United Nations, Security Council, Document S/8914, December 4, 1968, pp. 13-14.
- 33/ Ibid., p. 29.
- 34/ Ibid., pp. 29-30.
- 35/ Ibid., p. 30.
- 36/ Ibid., p. 30.
- 37/ United Nations, Comptroller, Letter, dated January 22, 1969, p. 1-2.
- 38/ Ibid., p. 1.

031712291030

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bloomfield, Lincoln P., The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy. Little, Brown and Co., 1960.
- Gordon, J. King, "The U. N. in Cyprus." International Journal. Vol. XIX, 1964, pp. 326-347.
- Gross, Ernest A., The United Nations Structure for Peace. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962.
- Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, Inc., The Cyprus Dilemma - Options for Peace. New York, 1967.
- Newman, Philip, A Short History of Cyprus. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1953.
- Republic of Cyprus. Ministry of Finance. Statistical Summary For the Month of August, 1968. Report No. 218. Nicosia Cyprus: Jan. 31, 1969.
- Republic of Cyprus. Public Information Office. Cyprus in Brief. Nicosia, Cyprus: March 1968.
- Rosner, Gabriella, The United Nations Emergency Force. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.
- Salih, Halil Ibrahim, Ph.D., Cyprus-An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord. Brooklyn, N.Y.: Theo. Gaus Sons, Inc., 1968.
- Stegenga, James A., The United Nations Force in Cyprus. Ohio State University Press, 1968.
- Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration, Public Information Office, Map, Turkish Cypriot Enclaves. Nicosia, Cyprus, March, 1969.
- United Nations. Office of the Comptroller, Letter, Jan. 22, 1969.
- UNFICYP, Economics Staff Briefing. Nicosia, Cyprus, March 6, 1969.
- UNFICYP, Funding Staff Briefing, Nicosia, Cyprus, March 11, 1969.
- UNFICYP, Information Staff Briefing. Nicosia, Cyprus, March 6, 1969.
- UNFICYP, Logistics Staff Briefing. Nicosia, Cyprus, March 11, 1969.
- UNFICYP, Operations Staff Briefing. Nicosia, Cyprus, March 6, 1969.
- UNFICYP, Personnel Staff Briefing. Nicosia, Cyprus, March 11, 1969.
- United Nations. General Assembly, Official Records: Twenty-third Session. Supplement No. 1A (A/7201/ Add. 1), Sept., 1968.
- United Nations. General Assembly, Official Records: Twenty-third Session. Supplement No. 6 (A/7206), 1968.
- United Nations. Security Council, Document S/5575, March 4, 1964.

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- United Nations, Security Council, Document S/5653, April 11, 1964.
- United Nations, Security Council, Document S/5679, May 2, 1964.
- United Nations, Security Council, Document S/5764, June 15, 1964.
- United Nations, Security Council, Document S/6102, Dec. 12, 1964.
- United Nations, Security Council, Document S/6426, June 10, 1965.
- United Nations, Security Council, Document S/7001, Dec., 10, 1965.
- United Nations, Security Council, Document S/7350, June 10, 1966.
- United Nations, Security Council, Document S/7611, Dec. 8, 1966.
- United Nations, Security Council, Document S/7969, June 13, 1967.
- United Nations, Security Council, Document S/8286, Dec. 8, 1967.
- United Nations, Security Council, Document S/8914, Dec. 4, 1968.
- U.S. Dept. of the Army. Pamphlet No. 550-22: U.S. Army Area Handbook for Cyprus, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 5, 1964.
- U.S. Department of State, Publication 8399, Report By the President to the Congress for Year 1967, U.S. Participation in the UN, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, Oct., 1968.
- Urquhart, Brian, "Evolution of the Peace-keeping Function of the United Nations." The Evolution of the United Nations, New York: Pergamon Press, 1964. pp. 48-58.

03171238.1930

03171238.1930

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

A 10x10 grid of dots forming the number 5. The dots are arranged in a pattern that is 5 units wide and 10 units high. The top row has 5 dots, the second row has 4 dots, the third row has 3 dots, the fourth row has 2 dots, and the fifth row has 1 dot. The remaining five rows (6-10) are empty.